Crisis of power structures of the Russian Empire (late 1916 - early 1917)

On November 1, 1916, the next session of the State Duma began. And what happened that day in the meeting room was called by contemporaries “a storm signal of the revolution.”

On the eve of its speech in the Duma, the opposition developed a scenario for upcoming actions with the participation of a wide range of people of various political orientations. At the end of October, a series of meetings of the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc were held in Petrograd, at which the draft Duma declaration drawn up by P. N. Milyukov and V. V. Shulgin was actively discussed. The Cadets insisted on including in the declaration a provision on the special merits of the Allies and, above all, England in the war. The rightists believed that more attention should be paid not to the external, but to the internal political aspect, and that “the system, not Sturmer,” should be criticized. As a result, a compromise was worked out; the left's demand for a responsible ministry was removed from the project, but its tone was defiant.

On October 25, 1916, in Moscow, at a congress of chairmen of provincial zemstvo councils, a resolution was adopted with an unprecedented demand for the tsar to replace the “reactionary ministry.” Similar decisions were made these days at the party forums of Cadets and Progressives held in Petrograd. Before the opening of the session, the Chairman of the State Duma received an appeal from the head of the Zemstvo Union, Prince G. E. Lvov, in which he reported “ominous rumors, about betrayal and treason, about secret forces working in favor of Germany.” The chairman of the Union of Cities, M.V. Chelnokov, sent a similar letter to the Duma. Direct interference in the internal affairs of Russia was the speech of the British Ambassador J. Buchanan at the ceremonial meeting in Petrograd of the English Flag Society (created with the participation of M. M. Kovalevsky in 1915). In his speech, the ambassador of the allied power called on the opposition to bring the war “to a victorious end,” not only on the European battlefields, but also in Russia itself.

Thus, the upcoming demarche of the opposition was agreed upon both with the deputies and with circles outside the Duma, including allies. Under such conditions, the Duma began work on November 1, 1916, and the opposition immediately launched an open attack on the Stürmer government. Speaking on behalf of the Progressive Bloc, Octobrist S. A. Shidlovsky said that the country needed a government of people's trust, and that the bloc would seek its creation “by all means available to it.” The representative of the left factions, A.F. Kerensky, sharply criticized the tsarist ministers, calling them traitors to the interests of the country. However, the main speech of the opposition was the famous speech of P. N. Milyukov “Stupidity or Treason?”

“We have lost faith that this government can lead us to victory,” said the leader of the cadets, supported by “true” votes from the seats. Without rejecting rumors of betrayal and betrayal of the “court party led by Stürmer and Rasputin,” Miliukov stated that it was “grouped around the young queen.” Operating mainly with quotes from foreign and Russian newspapers, accompanying them with his own comments, Miliukov rhetorically repeated: “What is this: stupidity or treason? Choose any. The consequences are the same."

Miliukov's speech was distributed in thousands of copies throughout the country. Numerous copyists, inserting entire paragraphs on their own behalf, replicated and amplified the most incredible rumors. Meanwhile, the reliability of the facts cited by Miliukov has not been proven. Moreover, later, already in exile, many prominent cadets admitted that Miliukov’s speech was of a purely political nature and did not reflect real events.

Nevertheless, the opposition achieved its goal. Enormous pressure began on the tsar, including from his closest relatives - the grand dukes. On November 10 (23), Stürmer was dismissed. The new chairman of the Council of Ministers was 52-year-old A.F. Trepov, who previously held the post of Minister of Railways and shared much of the program of the Progressive Bloc.

Trepov became the third leader of the government during the war years (after I. Goremykin and B. Sturmer), but headed it for just over a month - on the eve of 1917 he was replaced by N. D. Golitsyn. This premiership (December 27, 1916 - February 27, 1917) turned out to be the last in the Russian Empire and was as short-lived as it was unsuccessful. He enjoyed serious influence on the tsar in the last two government compositions.

A. D. Protopopov, former oppositionist, comrade of the Chairman of the State Duma and member of the Progressive Bloc, appointed in September

1916 to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs, becoming one of the emperor's most trusted persons.

So-called "ministerial leapfrog" was one of the signs of a crisis in power structures. During the war, there were 4 prime ministers, 6 interior ministers, 4 military ministers and 4 justice ministers. The lack of stability as a result of court intrigues and behind-the-scenes struggles had a negative impact on the governance of the country during a period that required the greatest stress and responsibility. The tsar often did not have a real opportunity to directly influence state affairs. Of his 19 months as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, 9 months he was at Headquarters, 6 in the capital, 4 traveling between Mogilev, Tsarskoye Selo and Petrograd.

What were the signs of a crisis of power in 1916?

Nicholas II spent the last months of his reign in severe loneliness. The murder of Rasputin, in which the king’s relatives participated, and the reaction of high society to the death of the “elder” plunged the emperor into deep depression. Together with his family, he lived mainly in Tsarskoye Selo, only occasionally communicating with Protopopov. The estrangement between the Romanovs and their subjects became increasingly insurmountable. Even provincial noble assemblies, which in the past were the stronghold of monarchical foundations, now adopted resolutions in support of the Duma. On January 6, the tsar signed a rescript to the government (the first document of this kind after October 17, 1905). It spoke of the complete unity of Russia with its allies, and rejected any idea “of concluding peace before the final victory.” The cabinet of ministers was given two tasks: to supply the army and rear with food, and to organize transport transportation. The hope was also expressed that the legislative bodies, zemstvos and the public would help the government.

Meanwhile, during the two and a half years of Russia's war, society's attitude towards events at the front has changed significantly. For many political forces, the issue of war has become a subject of speculation. Thus, the opposition spread rumors about the tsar’s readiness to conclude a separate peace with Germany, which naturally caused excitement among the allied ambassadors. In addition, the people expressed fatigue from wartime and related problems, such as food difficulties, high prices, interruptions in fuel and transport, etc. The patriotic enthusiasm of the first months gave way to apathy. The fighting took place hundreds of miles from the center of Russia, and the ordinary population of Russian cities, towns and villages suffered from it. The authorities failed to unite the people in the fight against the aggressor: disagreements between classes regarding the war only intensified.

Since the beginning of the war, over 15 million people were mobilized into the army, losses at the front reached 9 million, including 1.7 million killed. The national economy experienced a shortage of workers. Over 650 industrial enterprises suspended operations. By the end of 1916, the country's economy entered a period of serious testing.

A massive rise in the strike movement began in industrial centers, in particular in Petrograd. In the fall of 1916 alone, 273 strikes occurred in the country, in which about 300 thousand people took part. It is significant that almost all the actions took place under political slogans. The first months of 1917 were especially characteristic in this regard.

Thus, in January 1917, the factory inspectorate recorded 371 strikes, including 228 with political demands, the number of strikers was 250 thousand people. In February 1917 there were already 959 strikes, of which 912 were political. 450 thousand workers went on strike - the highest number of strike participants during the war years. Despite all efforts, the authorities failed to break the close connection between the labor movement and the socialist parties. Social Democrats, especially the Mensheviks, enjoyed great influence among the workers, who managed to retain their cadres not only in the Duma, but also in legal proletarian organizations - insurance companies, health insurance funds, consumer cooperatives. Working groups under military-industrial committees also played a significant role. They were created in 36 cities and ensured stable contacts between representatives of left-wing socialist parties and radical opposition figures. The Working Group at the Central Military-Industrial Committee (TsVPK) in Petrograd was most active. She began to issue proclamations with a pronounced anti-government orientation. One of them, dated January 26, began with a call for the decisive elimination of the autocratic regime and the complete democratization of the country and ended with an appeal to the workers of the capital to be ready for a general strike in support of the Duma.

The tsarist government tried to seize the initiative and took a number of decisive actions. On the night of January 28, by order of A.D. Protopopov, arrests were made of members of the Working Group of the Central Military Commission, who were imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. At the direction of Nicholas II, a draft Manifesto was drawn up on the dissolution of the Duma; elections for its new composition were expected at the end of the year.

These events excited the opposition and forced it to once again turn to plans for a coup. The highest military officials were involved in the conspiracy. Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief M.V. Alekseev, Commander-in-Chief of the Northwestern Front N.V. Ruzsky, General A.M. Krymov and a number of other military men, involved, according to some sources, in the Masonic community, were privy to the plans of the conspiracy. One of these plans involved intercepting the king's train and demanding that he abdicate in favor of his son. However, the exact timing of the action was not established, since the sovereign was in Tsarskoe Selo, and it was unknown when he was going to return to Headquarters. The capital was uneasy. The workers' protests, which began on January 9, not only did not stop, but, on the contrary, grew in intensity. Under these conditions, an attempt to seize power could turn into a popular explosion. The conspirators spent weeks waiting for the “right hour” for the coup, and meanwhile events occurred that were the prologue to the revolution.

Speech by I. N. Milyukov, delivered at a meeting of the State Duma on November 1, 1916 // Russian liberals: Cadets and Octobrists (documents, memoirs, journalism) / comp. D. B. Pavlov, V. V. Shslokhasv. M.: ROSSPEN, 1996. P. 177.
Right there. P. 185.

The main event of the 1916 campaign was the Battle of Verdun. It is considered the longest battle of the First World War (lasted from February 21 to December 18, 1916) and was very bloody. Therefore, it received another name: “Verdun meat grinder.”

At Verdun, the German strategic plan collapsed. What was this plan?

In the 1915 campaign, Germany did not achieve significant success on the Eastern Front, so the German command decided in 1916 to withdraw France from the war, delivering the main blow in the west. It was planned to cut off the Verdun ledge with powerful flank attacks, encircle the entire enemy Verdun group, create a gap in the Allied defenses, and through it strike the flank and rear of the central French armies and defeat the entire Allied front.

But after the Verdun operation, as well as after the Battle of the Somme, it became clear that Germany’s military potential began to deplete, and the forces of the Entente began to strengthen.

Battle of Verdun

From the history of the Verdun fortress

After Germany annexed Alsace and part of Lorraine in 1871, Verdun turned into a border military fortress. During the First World War, the Germans failed to capture Verdun, but the city was almost completely destroyed by artillery fire. In the vicinity of the city, where the main battles took place, Germany used a powerful artillery strike using flamethrowers and poisonous gases, as a result of which 9 French villages were wiped off the face of the earth. The battles of Verdun and its environs made the city a household name for senseless slaughter.

Back in the 17th century. The Verdun underground citadel of Suterren was planned. Its construction was completed in 1838. One kilometer of its underground galleries was turned in 1916 into an invulnerable command center housing 10 thousand French soldiers. Now in part of the galleries there is a museum exhibition that, using light and sound, reproduces the Verdun massacre of 1916. Infrared glasses are required to view part of the exhibition. There are exhibits related to the history of these places during the First World War.

The front section was small, only 15 km. But Germany concentrated 6.5 divisions on it against 2 French divisions. There was also a struggle for advantage in the airspace: at first only German bombers and fire spotters operated in it, but by May France was able to deploy a squadron of Nieuport fighters.

Before the First World War, this company produced racing aircraft, but during and after the war it began to produce fighter aircraft. Many Entente pilots flew on the company's fighters, including the French ace Georges Guynemer.

Progress of the battle

After a massive 8-hour artillery preparation, German troops went on the offensive on the right bank of the Meuse River. The German infantry from the strike force was formed in one echelon. The divisions consisted of two regiments in the first line and one regiment in the second. The battalions were formed in echelons deep. Each battalion created three chains, advancing at a distance of 80-100 m. Ahead of the first chain moved scouts and assault groups, consisting of two or three infantry squads, reinforced with grenade launchers, machine guns and flamethrowers.

Despite the powerful performance, German troops met stubborn resistance. During the first day of the offensive, German troops advanced 2 km, occupying the first French position. Then Germany conducted an offensive according to the same pattern: first, during the day, artillery destroyed the next position, and by the evening the infantry occupied it. By February 25, the French had lost almost all of their forts, and the important fort of Douamont was taken. But the French desperately resisted: along the only highway connecting Verdun with the rear, they transported troops from other sectors of the front in 6,000 vehicles, delivering about 190 thousand soldiers and 25 thousand tons of military cargo by March 6. Thus, the French superiority in manpower was formed here by almost one and a half times. France was greatly helped by the actions of Russian troops on the Eastern Front: the Naroch operation eased the position of the French troops.

Naroch operation

After the start of the German offensive near Verdun, the commander-in-chief of the French army, Joffre, turned to the Russian command with a request to deliver a diversionary blow to the Germans. The general offensive of the Entente was planned for May 1916, but the Russian headquarters complied with the ally's request and decided to conduct an offensive operation on the northern wing of the Western Front in March. On February 24, a meeting at Headquarters decided to deliver a strong blow to the German armies, gathering the largest possible forces for this. The commander-in-chief of the armies of the Western Front at that time was the Russian adjutant general Alexei Ermolaevich Evert.

After artillery preparation, which lasted two days, Russian troops went on the offensive. The 2nd Army south of Lake Naroch wedged itself into the defenses of the 10th German Army at 2-9 km.

The enemy had difficulty holding back the fierce attacks of the Russian troops. But the Germans pulled up significant forces to the offensive area and repulsed the Russian offensive.

During the Naroch operation, 17-year-old Evgenia Vorontsova, a volunteer of the 3rd Siberian Rifle Regiment, accomplished her feat. She inspired the entire regiment with her example and led it, infecting it with her enthusiasm, into the attack. She died during this attack. The Russian and German armies suffered heavy losses.

The German command decided that the Russians had launched a general offensive and were ready to break through the German defenses, and stopped attacks on Verdun for two weeks. In essence, this operation was a diversionary operation; in the summer, the German command expected the main blow on its front, and the Russian carried out the Brusilov breakthrough on the Austrian front, which brought colossal success and brought Austria-Hungary to the brink of military defeat.

But first there was the Baranovichi operation, which was also led by A.E. Evert.

The 1915 military campaign on the Western Front did not produce any major operational results. Positional battles only delayed the war. The Entente moved to an economic blockade of Germany, to which the latter responded with a merciless submarine war. In May 1915, a German submarine torpedoed the British ocean-going steamer Lusitania, on which over a thousand passengers died.

Without undertaking active offensive military operations, England and France, thanks to the shift in the center of gravity of military operations to the Russian front, received a respite, and focused all their attention on the development of the military industry. They accumulated strength for further war. By the beginning of 1916, England and France had an advantage over Germany by 70-80 divisions and were superior to it in the latest weapons (tanks appeared).

The severe consequences of active offensive military operations in 1914-1915 prompted the leaders of the Entente to convene a meeting of representatives of the general staffs of the allied armies in December 1915 in Chantilly, near Paris, where they came to the conclusion that the war could be ended victoriously only with coordinated active offensive operations on the main fronts .

However, even after this decision, the offensive in 1916 was scheduled primarily on the Eastern Front - June 15, and on the Western Front - July 1.

Having learned about the planned timing of the Entente offensive, the German command decided to take the initiative into their own hands and launch an offensive on the Western Front much earlier. At the same time, the main attack was planned on the area of the Verdun fortifications: for the protection of which, in the firm conviction of the German command, “the French command will be forced to sacrifice the last man,” since in the event of a breakthrough of the front at Verdun, a direct path to Paris will open. However, the attack on Verdun, launched on February 21, 1916, was not crowned with success, especially since in March, due to the advance of Russian troops in the area of the city of Dvinsky Lake Naroch, the German command was forced to weaken its onslaught near Verdun. However, bloody mutual attacks and counterattacks near Verdun continued for almost 10 months, until December 18, but did not produce significant results. The Verdun operation literally turned into a “meat grinder”, into the destruction of manpower. Both sides suffered colossal losses: the French - 350 thousand people, the Germans - 600 thousand people.

The German offensive on the Verdun fortifications did not change the Entente command's plan to launch the main offensive on July 1, 1916 on the Somme River.

The Somme battles intensified every day. In September, after a continuous barrage of Anglo-French artillery fire, British tanks soon appeared on the battlefield. However, technically still imperfect and used in small numbers, although they brought local success to the attacking Anglo-French troops, they could not provide a general strategic operational breakthrough of the front. By the end of November 1916, the Somme fighting began to subside. As a result of the entire Somme operation, the Entente captured an area of 200 square meters. km., 105 thousand German prisoners, 1,500 machine guns and 350 guns. In the battles on the Somme, both sides lost over 1 million 300 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners.

Carrying out the decisions agreed upon at a meeting of representatives of the general staffs in December 1915 in Chantilly, the high command of the Russian army scheduled for June 15 the main offensive on the Western Front in the direction of Baranovichi with a simultaneous auxiliary attack by the armies of the Southwestern Front under the command of General Brusilov in the Galician-Bukovinian direction. However, the German offensive on Verdun, which began in February, again forced the French government to ask the Russian tsarist government for help through an offensive on the Eastern Front. At the beginning of March, Russian troops launched an offensive in the area of Dvinsk and Lake Navoch. The attacks of Russian troops continued until March 15, but led only to tactical successes. As a result of this operation, Russian troops suffered heavy losses, but they pulled over a significant number of German reserves and thereby eased the position of the French at Verdun.

French troops were given the opportunity to regroup and strengthen their defenses.

The Dvina-Naroch operation made it difficult to prepare for the general offensive on the Russian-German front, scheduled for June 15. However, after the help to the French, there was a new persistent request from the command of the Entente troops to help the Italians. In May 1916, the 400,000-strong Austro-Hungarian army went on the offensive in Trentino and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Italian army. Saving the Italian army, as well as the Anglo-French in the west, from complete defeat, the Russian command began an offensive of troops in the southwestern direction on June 4, earlier than planned. Russian troops under the command of General Brusilov, having broken through the enemy’s defenses on an almost 300-kilometer front, began to advance into Eastern Galicia and Bukovina (Brusilovsky breakthrough). But in the midst of the offensive, despite General Brusilov’s requests to reinforce the advancing troops with reserves and ammunition, the high command of the Russian army refused to send reserves to the southwestern direction and began, as previously planned, an offensive in the western direction. However, after a weak blow in the direction of Baranovichi, the commander of the northwestern direction, General Evert, postponed the general offensive to the beginning of July.

Meanwhile, the troops of General Brusilov continued to develop the offensive they had begun and by the end of June had advanced far into Galicia and Bukovina.

On July 3, General Evert resumed the attack on Baranovichi, but attacks by Russian troops on this section of the front were not successful. Only after the complete failure of the offensive of General Evert’s troops did the high command of the Russian troops recognize the offensive of General Brusilov’s troops on the Southwestern Front as the main one - but it was already too late, time was lost, the Austrian command managed to regroup its troops and pull up reserves. Six divisions were transferred from the Austro-Italian front, and the German command, at the height of the Verdun and Somme battles, transferred eleven divisions to the Eastern Front. Further advance of Russian troops was suspended.

As a result of the offensive on the Southwestern Front, Russian troops advanced deep into Bukovina and Eastern Galicia, occupying about 25 thousand square meters. km., territory. 9 thousand officers and over 400 thousand soldiers were captured. However, this success of the Russian army in the summer of 1916 did not bring a decisive strategic result due to the inertia and mediocrity of the high command, backwardness of transport, and lack of weapons and ammunition. Still, the offensive of Russian troops in 1916 played a major role. It eased the position of the Allies and, together with the offensive of the Anglo-French troops on the Somme, negated the initiative of the German troops and forced them in the future to strategic defense, and the Austro-Hungarian army after the Brusilov attack in 1916 was no longer capable of serious offensive operations.

When Russian troops under the command of Brusilov inflicted a major defeat on the Austro-Hungarian troops on the Southwestern Front, the Romanian ruling circles considered that the opportune moment had come to enter the war on the side of the winners, especially since, contrary to the opinion of Russia, England and France insisted on the entry of Romania into the war.

On August 17, Romania independently began the war in Transylvania and initially achieved some success there, but when the Somme fighting died down, Austro-German troops easily defeated the Romanian army and occupied almost all of Romania, obtaining a fairly important source of food and oil. As the Russian command foresaw, 35 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions had to be transferred to Romania in order to strengthen the front along the Lower Danube - Braila - Focsani - Dorna - Vatra line.

On the Caucasian front, developing an offensive, Russian troops captured Erzurum on February 16, 1916, and occupied Trabzond (Trebizond) on April 18. Battles developed successfully for the Russian troops in the Urmia direction, where Ruvandiz was occupied, and near Lake Van, where Russian troops entered Mush and Bitlis in the summer.

1916 can generally be characterized as a year of a noticeable decline in the military power of the Central Powers compared to the Entente, which already predetermined the fate of the war in favor of the latter. The forces of the Central Powers were depleted in an incomparably greater proportion compared to the forces of the Entente. The former had no sources of replenishment, while the latter still had plenty.

The Germans began and ended this year with two offensive operations - near Verdun and in Romania. The operations did not produce positive results, they only depleted manpower and resources, and in Romania they ended in a spectacular throw forward, completely scattering German forces and making them weak at the main point of the struggle, namely the Somme. In all other operations - on the Russian Front, on the Isonzo, on the Somme - the Central Powers managed to keep the Entente armies from developing broad operations, but everywhere their front received noticeable cracks and no longer had the strength to respond to the maneuver with a counter-maneuver, but had to limit itself only to defense .

The operations of this year, conceived with a broad strategic plan, resulted, with the exception of the Romanian one, primarily in a struggle of a tactical nature, in a struggle of attrition. Of all the broad plans of the Germans at Verdun, the French at the Somme, the Russians at Lutsk, the Austrians at Trentino and the Italians at the Isonzo, nothing came of it, and the battles, which cost millions of victims, resulted exclusively in actions of a tactical nature, maintaining the same external strategic situation as it was was also at the beginning of the year.

But if from the outside, in the territorial sense, this was so, then in a hidden form, in the broad sense of strategy as the combat power of the warring parties, the powers of the Central Union were so exhausted that they could no longer count on undertaking an offensive operation in any from the fronts. To do this, they had to look for new ways, and they were found in connection with the Russian revolution, which was included in the calculations of the German General Staff as a certain operational data. The Central Powers expected salvation only with the withdrawal of Russia, but this exit could no longer be achieved on the battlefields. Verdun, Somme and Lutsk finally exhausted the strength of the Austro-Germans.

On the Entente side, 1916 provided more examples than previous years of combined actions by the armies of various powers, but this combination was not enough, and in relation to Romania, the Entente provided a high example of military-political discord. The unified administration in the form of the Chantilly conferences did not pass the test, as one might expect.

The Central Powers fared better. Hindenburg almost managed to seize full operational power, but the death at the end of the year of the old Austrian emperor and the accession to the throne of the young Charles again led to excessive independence of the Austrian ally.

1916 brought a new data into the arena, which was relatively little taken into account in the preceding years of the war. This is the moral exhaustion of those nations that suffered most from the war or saw its purposelessness, and, as a consequence of this, the exacerbation of the class struggle in them.

The wealth in artillery, technology and all economic prerequisites is gradually passing over to the side of the Anglo-French and making the fight against them unsuccessful in the future for Germany. The latter's only hope of establishing balance was the unrestricted conduct of submarine warfare, which Germany, for political reasons, did not risk resorting to until 1917.

The battles at Verdun, on the Somme and partly on the Russian Front showed the difficulty of entering the maneuverable space during a positional war. This is preceded by a long and systematic struggle to exhaust all the forces and means of the opposing side. On the Somme, this struggle lasted until November, when the Germans, due to the Romanian operation, exhausted all means of fighting there. The exit for the Anglo-French to maneuver was almost open, but they also did not have timely concentrated forces for the final onslaught. The Somme and Romania are two opposite poles of modern military art.

The operations of 1916 revealed the importance of: 1) air supremacy by aircraft, 2) the use of chemical shells, 3) tanks as a powerful means of attack, 4) road transport on a large scale.

At the same time, the organization of a defensive operation begins to take on clear forms: 1) the basis of defense is considered to be a fortified zone 15-20 km deep with 2-3 strips of fortifications, 2) the first zone is poorly occupied and 3) defense is considered as a maneuver by operational reserves.

In general, 1916 was a turning point year, which fundamentally undermined the military power of the Central Powers and, on the contrary, brought the forces of the Entente to their culminating development. This was the year that determined the future victory of the Entente. The year that finally revealed that war is waged by peoples, not armies. The question of propaganda, of influencing the entire mass of the people in the cause of war, is part of the work of Ludendorff's operational headquarters, where at the end of 1916 a special propaganda department was organized.

The general situation of the past year clearly showed the Central Powers that they had lost the war, and therefore in December they made an attempt to begin peace negotiations, but set conditions that were completely inconsistent with the balance of forces of both sides, and therefore this attempt did not find a response from the Entente powers.

Defense fortifications of the First World War. Baranovichi operation

At Verdun, the German strategic plan collapsed. What was this plan?

But after the Verdun operation, as well as after the Battle of the Somme, it became clear that Germany’s military potential began to deplete, and the forces of the Entente began to strengthen.

Battle of Verdun

Map of the Battle of Verdun

From the history of the Verdun fortress

Verdun underground citadel

German observation post at Verdun

"Nieuport 17 °C.1" - a fighter aircraft from the First World War

Georges Guynemer

Progress of the battle

German flamethrower

Naroch operation

Alexey Ermolaevich Evert

After artillery preparation, which lasted two days, Russian troops went on the offensive. The 2nd Army south of Lake Naroch wedged itself into the defenses of the 10th German Army at 2-9 km.

The enemy had difficulty holding back the fierce attacks of the Russian troops. But the Germans pulled up significant forces to the offensive area and repulsed the Russian offensive.

But first there was the Baranovichi operation, which was also led by A.E. Evert.

Baranovichi operation

This offensive operation of the troops of the Russian Western Front took place from June 20 to July 12, 1916.

The area of the city of Baranovichi was occupied by German troops in mid-September 1915. It was considered one of the most important sectors of the German Eastern Front in the Warsaw-Moscow direction. The Russian command assessed this section of the front as a springboard for a breakthrough to Vilna and further to Warsaw. Therefore, the Russian command strengthened units of the Western Front, which outnumbered the troops of the Southwestern Front. The Western Front was entrusted with delivering the main blow.

The operation plan of the Russian command was to break through the fortified zone with the main attack by two corps (9th and 35th) in an 8-km sector. But the Russians were unable to break through the fortified German positional front; they captured only the first fortified line in certain sectors of the offensive. With a powerful short counterattack, the German units were able to partially restore the original position.

The losses of the Russian army amounted to 80,000 people against 13,000 enemy losses, of which 4,000 were prisoners.

Defense fortifications. Baranovichi operation

The main reasons for the defeat: poor artillery preparation, weak concentration of artillery in the breakthrough area. Poor reconnaissance of the fortified line: the overwhelming majority of the fortifications of the first line of defense were not identified, and the second and third lines of defense generally remained unknown to the Russian command before the start of the battle. The command staff was not prepared to organize a breakthrough of the fortified lines. Numerical superiority was not used.

None of the objectives of the operation were completed. Russian troops were unable to improve their position, did not create conditions for a future offensive, and did not distract the attention of the enemy command from the actions of the Southwestern Front. This defeat had a negative impact on the morale of the Russian troops, in which anti-war sentiment began to intensify. And in 1917, fertile ground was created for revolutionary propaganda among the troops, which made parts of the Western Front most susceptible to the influence of the Bolsheviks.

After the failure of the Baranovichi strike, the armies of the Western Front no longer undertook large-scale operations.

Brusilovsky breakthrough

The Brusilov breakthrough was at that time a new type of front-line offensive operation of the Southwestern Front of the Russian Army under the command of General A. A. Brusilov.

General Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov

This operation was carried out from June 3 to August 22, 1916, and during it a heavy defeat was inflicted on the armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany, Bukovina and Eastern Galicia were occupied.

Brusilovsky breakthrough

On the southern flank of the Eastern Front, the Austro-German allies created a powerful, deeply echeloned defense against Brusilov’s armies. The strongest was the first of 2-3 lines of trenches with a total length of 1.5-2 km. Its basis was support units, in the gaps there were continuous trenches, the approaches to which were shot from the flanks, and pillboxes at all heights. The trenches had canopies, dugouts, shelters dug deep into the ground, with reinforced concrete vaults or ceilings made of logs and earth up to 2 m thick, capable of withstanding any shells. Concrete caps were installed for machine gunners. There were wire barriers in front of the trenches; in some areas, electricity was passed through them, bombs were hung, and mines were laid. Between the stripes and lines of trenches, artificial obstacles were installed: abatis, wolf pits, slingshots.

The Austro-German command believed that the Russian armies could not break through such a defense without significant reinforcement, and therefore Brusilov’s offensive was a complete surprise to them.

Russian infantry

As a result of the Brusilov breakthrough, the Southwestern Front defeated the Austro-Hungarian army, the fronts advanced from 80 to 120 km deep into enemy territory.

Austria-Hungary and Germany lost more than 1.5 million killed, wounded and missing. The Russians captured 581 guns, 1,795 machine guns, 448 bomb launchers and mortars. Huge losses undermined the combat effectiveness of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The troops of the Southwestern Front lost about 500,000 soldiers and officers killed, wounded and missing.

To repel the Russian offensive, the Central Powers transferred 31 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions (more than 400 thousand bayonets and sabers) from the Western, Italian and Thessaloniki fronts, which eased the position of the Allies in the Battle of the Somme and saved the defeated Italian army from defeat. Under the influence of the Russian victory, Romania decided to enter the war on the side of the Entente.

The result of the Brusilov breakthrough and the operation on the Somme: the final transition of the strategic initiative from the Central Powers to the Entente. The Allies managed to achieve such cooperation that for two months (July-August) Germany had to send its limited strategic reserves to both the Western and Eastern Fronts simultaneously.

From the point of view of military art, this was a new form of breaking through the front simultaneously in several sectors, which was developed in the last years of the First World War, especially in the 1918 campaign in the Western European Theater of Operations

Results of the Verdun operation

By December 1916, the front line had moved to the lines occupied by both armies on February 25, 1916. But at Verdun, the German strategic plan for the 1916 campaign, which was to take France out of the war with one strong and short blow, collapsed. After the Verdun operation, the military potential of the German Empire began to decline.

The "wounds" of the Battle of Verdun are still visible

But both sides lost about a million people. At Verdun, light machine guns, rifle grenade launchers, flamethrowers and chemical shells began to be used for the first time. The importance of aviation has increased. For the first time, troop regroupings were carried out using road transport.

Other battles of the 1916 military campaign

In June 1916, the Battle of the Somme began and lasted until November. During this battle, tanks were used for the first time.

Battle of the Somme

It was an offensive operation of the Anglo-French armies in the French theater of the First World War. The results of the battle have not been definitively determined to this day: formally, the Allies achieved victory over the Germans with limited results, but the German side believed that it was they who won.

The operation was one of the elements of the agreed Entente plan for 1916. According to the decision of the inter-allied conference in Chantilly, the Russian and Italian armies were to go on the offensive on June 15, and the French and British armies on July 1, 1916.

The operation was to be carried out by three French and two British armies with the aim of defeating the German armies in northern France. But dozens of French divisions were killed in the “Verdun meat grinder,” which led to a significant correction of the plan in May. The breakthrough front was reduced from 70 to 40 km, the main role was assigned to the English 4th Army of General Rawlinson, the French 6th Army of General Fayol carried out an auxiliary attack, and the English 3rd Army of General Allenby allocated one corps (2 divisions) for the offensive. The overall leadership of the operation was entrusted to the French General Foch.

General Ferdinand Foch

The operation was planned as a difficult and lengthy battle, in which artillery was supposed to reach 3,500 guns, aviation - over 300 aircraft. All divisions underwent tactical training, practicing attacks on the ground under the protection of a barrage of fire.

The scope of preparations for the operation was enormous, which did not allow it to be carried out secretly, but the Germans believed that the British were not capable of conducting a large-scale offensive, and the French were too bled dry at Verdun.

Artillery preparation began on June 24 and lasted 7 days. It assumed the nature of the methodical destruction of the German defense. The first defensive position was destroyed to a large extent. On July 1, the British and French went on the offensive and occupied the first position of the German defense, but four other corps suffered huge losses from machine-gun fire and were repulsed. On the first day, the British lost 21 thousand soldiers killed and missing and more than 35 thousand wounded. The French 6th Army captured two German defense positions. But such a rapid movement was not included in the offensive schedule, and by the decision of General Fayol they were withdrawn. The French resumed their offensive on July 5, but the Germans had already strengthened their defenses. The French were never able to take Barleu.

By the end of July, the British brought 4 new divisions into battle, and the French - 5. But Germany also transferred many troops to the Somme, including from near Verdun. But in connection with the Brusilov breakthrough, the German army could no longer conduct two major operations simultaneously, and on September 2 the offensive near Verdun was stopped.

German soldiers in September 1916

After almost two months of attrition, the Allies launched a new large-scale offensive on September 3. After a powerful artillery bombardment in 1900 with only heavy guns, two British and two French armies went on the offensive against the three German armies commanded by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.

Over 10 days of fierce fighting, the Anglo-French troops only penetrated 2-4 km into the German defense. On September 15, the British used tanks in an attack for the first time. And although there were only 18 tanks, their psychological impact on the German infantry was enormous. As a result, the British were able to advance 5 km in 5 hours of attack.

During the attacks on September 25-27, Anglo-French troops took the ridge of the dominant heights between the Somme and Ancre rivers. But by mid-November, the fighting on the Somme stopped due to the extreme exhaustion of the sides.

The Somme demonstrated the complete military and economic superiority of the Entente. After the Somme, Verdun and the Brusilov breakthrough, the Central Powers ceded the strategic initiative to the Entente.

At the same time, the Somme operation clearly demonstrated the shortcomings of the approach to breaking through fortified defenses that prevailed in the general staffs of France, Great Britain and Russia.

The tactical preparation of the French units at the beginning of the operation turned out to be more appropriate to the conditions of the offensive than that of the British. French soldiers followed the artillery fire light, and the British soldiers, each carrying a load of 29.94 kg, moved slowly, and their chains were successively mowed down by machine-gun fire.

British soldiers

Battle of Erzurum

In January-February 1916, the Battle of Erzurum took place on the Caucasian front, in which Russian troops completely defeated the Turkish army and captured the city of Erzurum. The Russian army was commanded by General N.N. Yudenich.

Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich

It was impossible to capture the fortifications of Erzurum on the move, so Yudenich suspended the offensive and began preparations for the assault on Erzurum. He personally supervised the work of his air squad. The soldiers were trained for upcoming actions on the heights in their rear. Clear interaction between different types of troops was thought out and worked out. To do this, the commander applied an innovation, creating assault detachments - in the most important directions, infantry regiments were given guns, additional machine guns and sapper units to destroy the enemy's long-term fortifications.

Yudenich's plan: to break through the front on the northern right flank and, bypassing the most powerful defensive positions of the Turks, strike at Erzurum from the western, inner side of the Deve-Boynu ridge to the flank and rear of the 3rd Turkish Army. To prevent the enemy from strengthening some areas at the expense of others, he had to be attacked simultaneously along the entire line of fortifications, in ten columns, without respite, around the clock. Yudenich distributed his forces unevenly, and the advancing columns were unequal. The blows were delivered as if with a “stepwise” build-up and mutual reinforcement towards the right wing.

As a result, the Caucasian army of General Yudenich advanced 150 km. The Turkish 3rd Army was completely defeated. It lost more than half of its members. 13 thousand were captured. 9 banners and 323 guns were taken. The Russian army lost 2339 killed and 6 thousand wounded. The capture of Erzurum opened the way for the Russians to Trebizond (Trabzon), which was taken in April.

Trebizond operation

The operation took place from February 5 to April 15, 1916. Russian troops and the Black Sea Fleet acted jointly against the Turkish army. The Russian naval landing landed in Rize. The operation ended with the victory of Russian troops and the capture of the Turkish Black Sea port of Trebizond.

The operation was commanded by N.N. Yudenich.

In July, Erzincan was taken, then Mush. The Russian army advanced deeply into the territory of Turkish Armenia.

Battle of Jutland

The Battle of Jutland was the largest naval battle of the First World War between the German and British navies. It occurred in the North Sea near the Danish Jutland Peninsula in the Skagerrak Strait.

Explosion on the battlecruiser HMS Queen Mary

At the beginning of the war, the British fleet blocked the exit from the North Sea, which interrupted sea deliveries of raw materials and food to Germany. The German fleet attempted to break the blockade, but the English fleet prevented such a breakthrough. Before the Battle of Jutland there were the Battle of Heligoland Bight (1914) and the Battle of Dogger Bank (1915). The British prevailed in both battles.

The losses on both sides in this battle were significant, but both sides declared victory. Germany believed that the English fleet had suffered significant losses and should therefore be considered defeated. Great Britain considered Germany the losing side, because The German fleet was never able to break the British blockade.

In fact, British losses were almost 2 times higher than German losses. The British lost 6,784 people killed and captured, the Germans lost 3,039 people killed.

Of the 25 ships lost in the Battle of Jutland, 17 were sunk by artillery and 8 by torpedoes.

But the British fleet retained dominance at sea, and the German battle fleet ceased to take active action. This had a significant impact on the course of the war as a whole: the German fleet remained at bases until the end of the war, and, under the terms of the Versailles Peace, was interned in Great Britain.

Germany switched to unrestricted submarine warfare, which led to the United States entering the war on the side of the Entente.

The continuation of the naval blockade of Germany led to the undermining of German industrial potential and an acute shortage of food in the cities, which forced the German government to conclude peace.

The death of the cruiser "Indefetigable"

Results of the 1916 campaign

All the events of the First World War of 1916 showed the superiority of the Entente. By the end of 1916, both sides lost 6 million people killed, about 10 million were wounded. In November-December 1916, Germany and its allies offered peace, but the Entente rejected the offer. The main argument was formulated as follows: peace is impossible “until the restoration of violated rights and freedoms, recognition of the principle of nationalities and the free existence of small states is ensured.”

February revolution. February Revolution Important nuances of the reason for war

Crisis of power structures of the Russian Empire (late 1916 - early 1917)

Battle of Verdun

From the history of the Verdun fortress

Progress of the battle

Naroch operation

Baranovichi operation

Brusilovsky breakthrough

Results of the Verdun operation

Other battles of the 1916 military campaign

Battle of the Somme

Battle of Erzurum

Trebizond operation

Battle of Jutland

Results of the 1916 campaign