Continuing the series of posts about Tatar-Mongol invasion and the struggle of Rus' against the invaders.

Reporting about the Mongol invasion, the chronicler emphasized that countless numbers of Tatars came, “like pruzs, eating grass”1. The question of the number of Batu’s troops has occupied historians for about 200 years and still remains unresolved. WITH light hand N.M. Karamzin, most pre-revolutionary researchers (I.N. Berezin, S.M. Solovyov, M.I. Ivanin, D.I. Ilovaisky, D.I. Troitsky, etc.) arbitrarily determined the size of the horde at 300 thousand people or, uncritically perceiving the data of the chroniclers, they wrote about an army of 400, 500 and even 600 thousand. Until the mid-60s, Soviet historians (K.V. Bazilevich, V.T. Pashuto, E.A. Razin, A.A. Strokov, etc.) either agreed with these figures or simply noted that the Mongol army was very numerous. After research by V.V. Kargalov established the figure of 120-140 thousand people, although some defend the previous point of view, and I.B. Grekov and F.F. Shakhmagonov went to the other extreme, reducing Batu’s army to 30-40 thousand people2.
However, Kargalov's calculations are incomplete. The state of the sources does not allow us to know the exact number of the Mongol hordes. But generalizing the accumulated knowledge makes it possible to at least evaluate it. To do this, it is necessary to critically use the information of chroniclers, draw on archaeological and demographic data, and connect the number of troops with their organization, recruitment system, the state of food resources in the theater of war and the nature of military operations.
The news of the chroniclers about the number of troops of the Mongols is as unreliable as the reports of Herodotus about the number of troops of the ancient Persians. Russian and Armenian chroniclers indicated that “countless multitudes” of invaders came, “in heavy strength.” Chinese, Arab and Persian historians spoke of several hundred thousand Mongol warriors. Western European travelers, in the 13th century. those who visited the horde are prone to obvious exaggeration: Julian wrote about Batu’s army of 375 thousand people, Plano Carpini - 600 thousand, Marco Polo - from 100 to 400 thousand people3.
Most of the sources that have come down to us were written decades after the Mongol invasions. Their authors, accustomed to a more limited scale of military conflicts, were greatly impressed by the enormous scope of the Mongol conquests and the monstrous devastation with which they were accompanied. The source of their information about the army of the steppe inhabitants, as a rule, were rumors and stories of frightened refugees and warriors, to whom the enemies seemed countless. In addition, it is possible that the fantastic figures in the stories about the Mongols were perceived by contemporaries precisely as hyperbole, a poetic cliche.
The most reliable news about the forces of the Mongols is the message of a Persian historian of the early 14th century. Rashid ad-Din, vizier of the Iranian Hulaguid khans, who used Mongol documents that have not reached us. He refers to the “Altan-daftar” (“Golden Book”), kept in the treasury of the khans of Iran. According to Rashid ad-Din, Genghis Khan had 129 thousand warriors at the time of his death (1227)4. This figure is indirectly confirmed by the data of the Mongol epic of 1240 that in 1206 Genghis Khan had 95 thousand fighters5. The truth of these messages is beyond doubt - in both cases, formations up to thousands (and in the Chinggis Guard - even hundreds) are listed in detail with the names of their commanders.
This army was inherited by the sons and grandsons of Genghis Khan, and most of it (101 thousand people) went to his youngest son Tuluy. The Western Campaign, which began in 1236, involved 13 Chinggisid khans, including the heirs of all four uluses of the Mongol Empire. According to Kargalov’s calculations, based on indirect data from Rashid ad-Din, these khans accounted for 40-45 thousand people6, and at least 20-25 thousand were the troops of the heirs of Tuluy7.
In addition, there is a message from the Chinese history of Yuan-shi that the commander Subudai, having returned from a campaign against Rus' in 1224, proposed “to form a special corps ... from the Merkits, Naimans, Keraits, Khangins and Kipchaks, to which Genghis agreed” 8. Subudai was the de facto commander-in-chief Western campaign 1236-1242, and it is more than likely that this corps (tumen, i.e. 10 thousand people) took part in it.
Finally, the Persian historian-panegyrist Wassaf, a contemporary and colleague of Rashid ad-Din, says that Juchiev’s four personal thousand (his share in Chinggis’s inheritance) by 1235 amounted to more than one tumen, i.e. more than 10 thousand people9. It is possible that Chinese history and Wassaf are telling the same story.
Thus, sources confirm the presence of only 50-60 thousand soldiers in Batu’s army in 1236. Kargalov’s opinion that these were actually Mongol troops, and in addition to them there were auxiliary corps from conquered peoples, is refuted by the above quote from Yuan-shi, to which he refers: the Merkits, Keraits and Naimans recruited into the Subudai corps were indigenous Mongols. The conquered peoples, after their pacification, were included in the army of the conquerors; prisoners captured in battle, as well as civilians, were herded by the steppe inhabitants into an assault crowd, which was driven into battle in front of the Mongol units. Units of allies and vassals were also used. Eastern and Western sources are full of reports of similar tactics, telling about battles in China and Rus', in Germany and Asia Minor.
There is information that detachments of Bashkirs and Mordovians joined Batu10. Neither of them were ever numerous. In the 10th century, according to the Arab historian Abu-Zeid al-Balkhi, the Bashkirs were divided into two tribes, one of which numbered 2 thousand people (probably men)11. The second was unlikely to be much larger. In the 17th century (!), according to Russian yasak books, there were 25-30 thousand male Bashkirs12. From the Mordovians, only one of the two princes joined the Mongols; the second fought against the invaders13. Probably, the number of Bashkir and Mordovian detachments can be determined at 5 thousand people.
Kargalov’s opinion that, in addition to the Mordovians and Bashkirs, Batu’s hordes “joined a large number of Alans, Kipchaks and Bulgars”14 seems extremely doubtful. The Alans offered stubborn resistance to the Mongols for many years; the war in the North Caucasus was reported by Plano Carpini in 1245 and Rubruk in 1253!15. The Polovtsians (Kipchaks) continued their fierce struggle with Batu until 1242. The Volga Bulgars, conquered in 1236 after 12 years of war, rebelled in 1237 and 124116. It is unlikely that in such a situation, representatives of these peoples were used by the Mongols other than in the assault crowd17.
Its numbers can only be determined on the basis of an analysis of the forage capabilities of North-Eastern Rus'. Researchers have proven that even at the turn of the XV-XVI centuries. The peasants mowed a little hay, obviously no more than was needed to feed the livestock. Winter Russian forests, covered with deep snow, practically devoid of grass even in summer, did not give the Mongols the opportunity to keep their horses grazing. Consequently, the horde could only rely on the meager Russian food supplies. Each Mongol warrior had at least 2 horses; sources speak of several or 3-4 horses for each warrior18. In the state of Jin, many of whose features were copied by Genghis Khan, a warrior was entitled to 2 horses, a centurion - 5, a thousand - 619. A horde of 140 thousand would have had at least 300 thousand horses.
In the Russian army at the beginning of the 20th century. the horse's daily allowance consisted of 4 kg of oats, 4 kg of hay and 1.6 kg of straw. Since the Mongol horses did not eat oats (the nomads simply did not have it), one should count according to the so-called grass ration - 15 pounds (6 kg) of hay per day per horse20 or 1800 tons of hay for the whole Mongol army. If we take 2 heads of cattle per peasant household21, then this is an annual supply of 611 households, or almost 200 villages22! And if we take into account that in January, when the Mongols moved across Vladimir Rus', half of the fodder supply had already been eaten by their own livestock, take into account the partisan war (reflected in the legends of Evpatiy Kolovrat and Mercury of Smolensk) and the Mongol robberies that spoiled most of the fodder, it would not be an exaggeration to consider the one-day foraging area of ​​a horde to be 1,500 households.
According to archaeologists, in the 13th century. 1 yard cultivated 8 hectares of land per year23, i.e. 1500 yards - 120 sq. km of arable land; the cultivated land could not account for more than 10% of the entire surface, therefore, the Mongol horde had to advance 40 km every day, sending foraging detachments 15 km on both sides of the route. But the speed of the horde’s movement across Russian lands is known - even M.I. Ivanin calculated it at 15 km per day24. Thus, Kargalov’s figure - a horde of 140 thousand with 300 thousand horses - is unrealistic. It is not difficult to calculate that an army with about 110 thousand horses could move across Rus' at a speed of 15 km per day.
Batu's army (according to our estimates, 55-65 thousand people) had at least 110 thousand horses. This means that there was no assault crowd or it was on foot, and can be neglected as a fighting force.
So, Batu in the fall of 1237 gathered 50-60 thousand Mongol troops and about 5 thousand allies, and a total of 55-65 thousand people, at the Russian borders. This was only part of the forces: numerous troops were with Kagan Ogedei in Karakorum, fought in China and Korea, and from 1236 began a major offensive in Transcaucasia and Asia Minor. This figure is in good agreement with the nature of military operations in 1237-1238: having suffered heavy losses in battles with the Ryazan and Vladimir people, the Mongols at the end of the campaign barely took the small cities of Torzhok and Kozelsk and had to abandon the campaign against the crowded (about 30 thousand) people. person25) Novgorod. Finally, only with a clear organization and iron discipline that reigned in the troops of Genghis Khan, it was possible to control such huge masses of people in battle in the absence of modern means of communication.
The Russian principalities could oppose the horde with very small forces. Russian and Soviet historians since the time of S.M. Solovyov for some reason believe the chronicler’s report that Vladimir Rus' with Novgorod and Ryazan could field 50 thousand people and the same number in Southern Russia26. These figures paradoxically coexisted with the recognition of the small number of princely squads (on average 300-400 people), on the one hand27 , and Western European armies (7-10 thousand people in the largest battles - on the other28. The analogy of the development of military affairs in Rus' and Western Europe was rejected, exaggerating the role of the Russian infantry, which was declared “the main and decisive branch of the military”29, and even tried to prove , that “the provisions of F. Engels (who rated the medieval infantry very low. - D.Ch.) are not applicable when analyzing major Russian battles of the 13th century.” However, we have no facts refuting Engels, who believed that “in the Middle Ages the decisive force The troops were cavalry"30.
With the exception of Novgorod with its special political and military organization31, nowhere in Rus' did infantry play any noticeable role in battle. IN biggest battle near Yaroslavl (1245), numerous “footmen” were useful only in order to keep the garrison of the besieged city from attacking with their appearance32. And in the battles of Novgorod (Battle of the Ice 1242, Battle of Rakovor 1268) the infantry played a passive role, holding back the onslaught of the German knights while the cavalry delivered the decisive blow from the flanks. The Russian principalities had typically feudal armed forces, in which the main role was played by cavalry - the militia of the feudal lords. Increase in the share of infantry (city regiments) in the 13th century. It is connected both with a change in the methods of siege and storming of cities, and with the alliance of citizens with the grand ducal power that was emerging in some lands. Peasants (smerds) have not participated in wars since the 11th century, “being involved only in extreme cases and in small numbers”33: poorly armed and trained, they were useless in battle.
Rus' did not have an advantage over Western Europe either in population34, or in the level of socio-economic development, or in the method of recruiting troops; therefore, the forces of the Russian principalities did not exceed the average number of European armies, i.e. several thousand people.
According to demographic data, in the middle of the century the population density in Rus' was 4-5 people per 1 sq. km 35. Consequently, the largest, with an area of ​​​​about 225 thousand square meters. km, and the most powerful of the Russian principalities of the early 13th century. - Vladimir-Suzdal - had a population of 0.9-1.2 million people. It is estimated that in Rus' the urban population was 6%36. Based on data from M.N. Tikhomirov37, we obtain the population of the principality in the middle of the 13th century. about 1.2 million people. Only townspeople and feudal lords were involved in the organized fight against the Mongols - 7-8% (85-100 thousand people). Of this number, half are women, 25% are children, old people and those unable to fight; “fit for military service” amounted to only 20-25 thousand people. It was, of course, impossible to collect them all. Yuri II of Vladimir did not send all his forces against the Mongols. Some of the city regiments remained in the cities and then defended them; some squads gathered under the banner of the Grand Duke only on the river. Sit. Near Kolomna in January 1238, Batu was met by 10-15 thousand people. The same calculations for the Ryazan principality give an army of 3-7 thousand people. These figures are confirmed by the assessment of the Novgorod army at 5-7, rarely 10 thousand people made by M.G. Rabinovich38, and data from chronicles39.
In Southern Rus' the military forces were probably even larger, but when the Mongols approached, most of the princes fled abroad, abandoning their lands to the mercy of fate, and the horde had to deal only with scattered detachments. The most fierce battles took place for Kyiv. One of the largest cities in Europe, Kyiv had 50 thousand inhabitants40 and could field up to 8 thousand soldiers41. Batu in 1240 had fewer forces than in 1237-1238: the losses suffered in North-Eastern Rus' and the migration to Mongolia of the troops of Mengu Khan, the son of Tului, and Guyuk Khan, the son of Kagan Ogedei, had an impact on reported by Russian, Chinese and Persian sources42.
To calculate the size of the horde near Kiev, several factors should be taken into account. Firstly, the troops of the departed khans in 1237 made up ⅓ of the entire Mongol army. Secondly, after the capture of Kyiv in 1241, Batu’s army was divided into two parts. One, which, according to the calculations of the Polish historian G. Labuda, consisted of 8-10 thousand people43, passed through Poland and defeated the Silesian-German troops near Liegnitz, and the other, led by Batu himself, invaded Hungary and defeated it on the river. Shayo army of King Bela IV.
The Hungarian researcher E. Lederer believes that the Mongols were opposed by “a relatively small army of the king, who no longer had the personal squads of feudal nobles, nor the old military organization of the court, nor the help of royal servants”44. The Persian historian of the 13th century. Juvaini, in his story about the Battle of Shayo, named the size of the Mongol vanguard at 2 thousand people45, which, given the usual battle formation of the Mongols, corresponds to an army of 18-20 thousand people46.
Consequently, approximately 30 thousand Mongols invaded Western Europe, which, taking into account Batu’s heavy losses during the storming of Kyiv, gives about 40 thousand soldiers at the start of the campaign in Southern Rus'. “Only” a 5-fold superiority of the Mongols makes it possible to explain the phenomenally long defense of Kyiv (from September 5 to December 6, 1240), recorded in Pskov I and other chronicles47. The retreat of the Mongols from Europe after victories over the Hungarians and Germans also becomes more understandable.
The relatively low number of medieval armies corresponded to the then level of development of the productive forces of society. The special military organization of the Mongols provided them with a decisive advantage over their feudally fragmented neighbors, which became one of the main reasons for the success of the conquests of Genghis Khan and his successors.

The question of the size of the Mongol army during the campaign against Eastern Europe is one of the least clear questions in the history of the invasion. The lack of direct indications from trustworthy sources led to an arbitrary determination of the size of Batu’s army by various historians.

The only thing the researchers agreed on was the recognition of the huge number of Batu’s hordes.

The majority of Russian pre-revolutionary historians estimated the size of the horde that Batu led to conquer Rus' at 300 thousand people, and together with the detachments of peoples conquered during the movement of the Mongols to the Volga - even half a million 134. Soviet historians did not specifically address the issue of the size of Batu’s army. They either relied on the traditional figure in Russian historiography of 300 thousand people, or limited themselves to simply stating the fact that the Mongol army was very numerous 135.

Sources speak sparingly and vaguely about the size of the Mongol-Tatar army. Russian chroniclers limit themselves to pointing out that the Mongols advanced “in heavy strength”, “countless in number, like a prune that eats grass.” Armenian sources say approximately the same about Batu’s army. The notes of Europeans who were contemporaries of the invasion give absolutely fantastic figures. Plano Carpini, for example, determines the size of Batu’s army, which besieged Kyiv, at 600 thousand people; the Hungarian chronicler Simon claims that “500 thousand armed” invaded Hungary with Batu 136.

Eastern authors also greatly exaggerate the size of the Mongol army. However, it is still possible to approximately determine the size of Batu’s army before the invasion of Eastern Europe by drawing on the evidence of the Persian historian Rashid ad-Din, who was close to the Mongol headquarters and apparently had access to documents of the Mongolian imperial chancellery, as well as various indirect data.

The first volume of Rashid ad-Din’s “Collection of Chronicles” provides a detailed list of the actual Mongol troops that remained after the death of Genghis Khan and were divided by him among his heirs. In total, Genghis Khan distributed among his “sons, brothers and nephews” the Mongol army of “one hundred and twenty-nine thousand people” 137. A detailed list of the Mongol troops, dividing them into thousands and even hundreds, indicating the names and pedigrees of military leaders, a list of heirs and the degree of their relationship with the Great Khan - all this testifies to the documentary nature of Rashid ad-Din’s information. The testimony of Rashid ad-Din is to a certain extent confirmed by another credible source - the Mongolian feudal chronicle of the 13th century. Thus, when determining the size of Batu’s army, one can apparently proceed from these data.

According to the testimony of Rashid ad-Din and Juveini, the following Chingizid princes took part in Batu’s campaign against Rus': Batu, Buri, Horde, Shiban, Tangut, Kadan, Kulkan, Monke, Byudzhik, Baydar, Mengu, Buchek and Guyuk.

According to the will of Genghis Khan, the “princes” who participated in the campaign were allocated approximately 40-45 thousand of the Mongol army itself. But the size of Batu’s army was not limited, of course, to this figure. During campaigns, the Mongols constantly included detachments of conquered peoples in their army, replenishing the Mongol “hundreds” with them and even creating special corps from them 138. The proportion of the Mongol units themselves in this multi-tribal horde is difficult to determine. Plano Carpini wrote that in the 40s of the 13th century. in Batu's army there were approximately 74 Mongols (160 thousand Mongols and up to 450 thousand warriors from conquered peoples). It can be assumed that on the eve of the invasion of Eastern Europe there were slightly more Mongols, up to Uz, since subsequently a large number of Alans, Kipchaks and Bulgars joined Batu’s hordes. Based on this ratio, the total number of Batu’s troops on the eve of the invasion can be very approximately estimated at 120-140 thousand soldiers.

These figures are confirmed by a number of indirect data. Usually the “Genghisid” khans commanded a “tumen” on a campaign, that is, a detachment of 10 thousand horsemen. This was the case, for example, during the campaign of the Mongol Khan Hulagu to Baghdad: an Armenian source lists “7 khan’s sons, each with a tumen of troops” 139. In Batu’s campaign to Eastern Europe, 12-14 “Genghisid” khans took part, who could lead Behind them are 12-14 tumens of troops, i.e. again 120-140 thousand soldiers. Finally, the forces of the Jochi ulus, even with the Central Mongolian troops attached to the campaign, could hardly exceed the combined army of Genghis Khan before the invasion of Central Asia, the number of which various historians determine to range from 120 to 200 thousand people.

So, it seems to us impossible to assume that there were 300 thousand people in the Mongol army before its invasion of Eastern Europe (not to mention half a million). The 120-140 thousand people that sources say is a huge army for that time. In the conditions of the 13th century, when an army of several thousand people represented a significant force, more than which individual feudal principalities and cities could not field*, an army of more than one hundred thousand Mongols, united by a single command, possessing good fighting qualities and experience in military operations with large cavalry masses, provided Batu with overwhelming superiority over the feudal militias and the few squads of Russian princes.

The tactics and armament of the Mongols are discussed in a number of special works by military historians and the corresponding sections of general historical works. Without repeating them, we will limit ourselves only to the main points necessary to explain the military actions of the Mongols during Batu’s invasion of Rus'.

F. Engels classifies the Mongol troops as the “mobile, light cavalry of the East” and writes about their superiority over the heavy knightly cavalry 140. From the essence of the Mongol army as “light, mobile cavalry,” the peculiarities of its tactics and methods of combat flowed.

The Mongol tactics were clearly offensive in nature. The Mongols sought to launch surprise attacks on an enemy taken by surprise, to disorganize and create disunity in its ranks, resorting to both purely military and diplomatic means. Whenever possible, the Mongols avoided large frontal battles, breaking up the enemy piecemeal, wearing them down with continuous skirmishes and surprise attacks.

The invasion was usually preceded by careful reconnaissance and diplomatic preparation aimed at isolating the enemy and fanning internal strife. Then there was a hidden concentration of Mongol troops near the border. An invasion of an enemy country usually began from different sides, by separate detachments, heading, as a rule, to one point noted in advance. Striving first of all to destroy the enemy's manpower and deprive him of the opportunity to replenish his army, the Mongols penetrated deep into the country, devastating everything in their path, exterminating the inhabitants and stealing herds. Observation detachments were deployed against fortresses and fortified cities, devastating the surrounding area and preparing for the siege.

As the enemy army approached, individual detachments of the Mongols quickly gathered and tried to strike with all their might, unexpectedly and, if possible, until the enemy forces were completely concentrated. For battle, the Mongols lined up in several lines, having heavy Mongol cavalry in reserve, and formations from conquered peoples and light troops in the front ranks. The battle began by throwing arrows, with which the Mongols sought to cause confusion in the ranks of the enemy. IN hand-to-hand combat light cavalry was at a disadvantage, and the Mongols resorted to it in rare cases. First of all, they sought to break through the enemy’s front with sudden attacks, to divide it into parts, making extensive use of enveloping the flanks, flank and rear attacks.

The strength of the Mongol army was its continuous leadership of the battle. Khans, temniks and commanders of thousands did not fight together with ordinary soldiers, but were behind the line, on elevated places, directing the movement of troops with flags, light and smoke signals, and corresponding signals from trumpets and drums.

The Mongol tactics were matched by their weapons. The Mongol warrior is a horseman, agile and fast, capable of large transitions and sudden attacks. According to contemporaries, even a mass of Mongol troops, if necessary, could make daily marches of up to 80 versts*. The main weapon of the Mongols was the bow and arrows, which every warrior had. In addition, the warrior’s weapons included an ax and a rope for dragging siege engines. Very common weapons were a spear, often with a hook for pulling the enemy off a horse, and shields. Only part of the army had sabers and heavy defensive weapons, primarily the commanding staff and the heavy cavalry, which consisted of the Mongols themselves. The blow of the heavy Mongol cavalry usually decided the outcome of the battle.

The Mongols could make long journeys without replenishing their supplies of water and food. Dried meat, “krut” (sun-dried cheese), which all soldiers had in a certain quantity, as well as herds that were gradually driven after the army, provided the Mongols with food even during prolonged movement through desert or war-torn terrain.

IN historical literature The tactics of the Mongols were sometimes defined as “tactics of nomads” and contrasted with the more advanced military art of “sedentary peoples” (M. Ivanin, N. Golitsin). This is not entirely correct if we talk about the tactics of the Mongol-Tatars recent years the life of Genghis Khan or the time of Batu’s invasion of Eastern Europe. Of course, the tactical techniques of the Mongol cavalry bore features typical of nomadic peoples, but the military art of the Mongol-Tatars was not limited to this. The Mongols adopted many methods of warfare from the Chinese, primarily methods of siege of cities, which went beyond the scope of “nomadic tactics.” The Mongols were characterized by the use of all modern means of siege technology (rams, throwing machines, “Greek fire”, etc.).

D.), and on a very wide scale. Numerous Chinese and Persian engineers, constantly present in the Mongol army, provided the conquerors with a sufficient number of siege engines. As D'Hosson reported, during the siege of the city of Nishabur in Central Asia, the Mongols used 3000 ballistas, 300 catapults, 700 machines for throwing pots of oil, 400 ladders, 2500 carts of stones 141. The Chinese (Yuan-shi) repeatedly report the massive use of siege engines by the Mongols ), Persian (Rashid ad-Din, Juvaini) and Armenian (“History of Kirakos”) sources, as well as evidence from European contemporaries (Plano Carpini, Marco Polo).

It is necessary to note one more aspect of the military art of the Mongols - careful reconnaissance of the future theater of military operations. Before starting a war, the Mongols conducted deep strategic reconnaissance, found out the internal situation and military forces of the country, established secret connections, tried to win over the dissatisfied and separate the enemy forces. The Mongol army had special officials, “yurtji,” who were engaged in military reconnaissance and studying the theater of military operations. Their responsibilities included: setting up winter and summer nomadic camps, designating camp sites during campaigns, knowing the routes of the army, the condition of the roads, food and water supplies.

Reconnaissance of the future theater of military operations was carried out using a variety of methods and often long before the start of the war. Reconnaissance trips were a very effective method of reconnaissance. 14 years before Batu’s invasion, the army of Subedei and Jebe penetrated far to the west, which, in essence, followed the future road of conquest and collected information about the countries of Eastern Europe. Embassies were a very important source of information about neighboring countries. We know about the Tatar embassy that passed through Rus' just before the invasion: a Hungarian missionary of the 13th century. Julian reports that Tatar ambassadors tried to pass through Rus' to the Hungarian king Bela IV, but were detained by Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich in Suzdal. From the message taken from the Tatar ambassadors and translated by Julian, it is known that this was not the first Tatar embassy to the west: “For the thirtieth time I am sending ambassadors to you,” 142 Batu wrote to King Bela.

Another source of military information were merchants who visited countries of interest to the Mongols with trade caravans. It is known that in Central Asia and the countries of Transcaucasia, the Mongols sought to win over the merchants associated with transit trade. Caravans from Central Asia constantly traveled to Volga Bulgaria and further to the Russian principalities, delivering valuable information to the Mongols. Among the Mongols there were people who knew languages ​​well and who repeatedly traveled on errands to neighboring countries. Julian reports, for example, that during a trip to Eastern Europe he personally met “the ambassador of the Tatar leader, who knew Hungarian, Russian, Teutonic, Cuman, Seracin and Tatar languages”

After many years of reconnaissance, the Mongol-Tatars knew well the situation in the Russian principalities and the features of the theater of military operations in North-Eastern Rus'. This is precisely what can explain the choice of winter as the most suitable time for an attack on North-Eastern Rus'. The Hungarian monk Julian, who passed near the southern borders of the Russian principalities in the fall of 1237, specifically noted that the Tatars “are waiting for the earth, rivers and swamps to freeze with the onset of winter, after which it will be easy for the entire multitude of Tatars to defeat all of Rus', the country of the Russians.” 143.

Batu also knew well about the states of Central Europe, for example

about Hungary. Threatening the Hungarian king Bela IV, he wrote: “You, living in houses, have castles and cities, how can you escape my hand?”

The direction of the Mongol-Tatars’ campaigns during the invasion of Rus' along convenient routes of communication, well-planned detours and flank attacks, grandiose “raids” that captured thousands of kilometers of space and converged at one point - all this can only be explained by the conquerors’ good familiarity with the theater of military operations.

What forces could feudal Rus' oppose to the one and a half hundred thousand Mongol army?

Russian chronicles do not contain figures for the total number of Russian troops on the eve of Batu's invasion. S. M. Solovyov believes that Northern Rus' with the regions of Novgorod, Rostov with Beloozero, Murom and Ryazan could field 50 thousand soldiers in case of military danger; “Southern Rus' could have fielded about the same number” 144, i.e. only about 100 thousand soldiers. Soviet military historian A. A. Strokov notes that “in case of exceptional danger, Rus' could deploy more than 100 thousand people” 145.

But it was not only the insufficient number of Russian troops that predetermined defeat in the war with the Mongol-Tatar conquerors. The main factor that determined the military weakness of Rus' was feudal fragmentation and the associated feudal nature of the Russian armed forces. The squads of princes and cities were scattered over a vast territory, in fact not connected with each other, and the concentration of any significant forces encountered great difficulties. The feudal fragmentation of Rus' allowed the numerous Mongol army, united by a single command, to smash the scattered Russian armies piece by piece.

In historical literature, an idea has developed of the armed forces of the Russian principalities as an army superior to the Mongol convoy in weapons, tactics and combat formation. One cannot but agree with this when it comes to princely squads. Indeed, the Russian princely squads were an excellent army at that time. The armament of Russian warriors, both offensive and defensive, was famous far beyond the borders of Rus'. The use of heavy armor - chain mail and “armor” was widespread. Even such a far from first-rate prince as Yuri Vladimirovich Belozersky could field, according to the chronicler, “a thousand armored squads of the Belozersky squad” *. The chronicles are full of stories about complex tactical plans, skillful campaigns and ambushes of Russian princely squads.

But when assessing the armed forces of Rus' in the middle of the 13th century, we should limit ourselves to merely stating the fact of the high military art and armament of the Russian princely squads means viewing the phenomenon one-sidedly. For all their excellent fighting qualities, the princely squads usually did not exceed several hundred people. If such a number was enough for internecine wars, then for the organized defense of the entire country from strong enemy this was not enough. In addition, even such excellent fighting material as princely squads, due to the feudal nature of the Russian troops, was little suitable for action in large masses, under a single command, according to a single plan. The feudal nature of the princely squads, even in the case of the concentration of significant forces, reduced the combat value of the army. This was the case, for example, in the battle of the Kalka River, when the Russian princely squads were unable to achieve success, despite their numerical superiority.

If the princely squads can be considered an army superior in armament to the Mongol cavalry, then this cannot be said about the main, most numerous part of the Russian armed forces - urban and rural militias, which were recruited at the moment of greatest danger. First of all, the militia was inferior to the nomads in weapons.

A. V. Artsikhovsky showed, using materials from excavations of mounds in the Leningrad region, that in the burials of the rural population - the main contingent from which the militia was recruited - “a sword, the weapon of a professional warrior, is very rarely found”; the same applied to heavy defensive weapons. The usual weapons of Smerds and townspeople were axes (“plebeian weapons”), spears, and less often spears146. While inferior to the Tatars in the quality of weapons, the feudal militia, hastily recruited from peasants and townspeople, was certainly inferior to the Mongol cavalry in the ability to wield weapons.

Historians differ in their assessment of Genghis Khan's military talents. Some consider him one of the four greatest commanders in human history, while others attribute victories to the talents of his military leaders. One thing is certain: the army created by Genghis Khan was invincible, regardless of whether he himself was at its head great khan or one of his associates. His strategy and tactics stunned the enemy with their surprise. Its main principles include the following:

• - a war, even punctuated by truces, is waged until the complete destruction or surrender of the enemy:
• - unlike the usual raids of nomads undertaken for the purpose of robbery, Genghis Khan’s ultimate goal was always the complete conquest of enemy territory;
• - those who submitted on the terms of recognition of vassal dependence of the state are placed under strict Mongol control. Widespread in the Middle Ages, nominal vassalage was occasionally allowed only at first.

Back to basics military strategy Genghis Khan should also include the principle of maintaining strategic initiative, maximum mobility and maneuverability of formations. In almost all wars, the Mongols acted against a numerically superior enemy, but at the point of delivering the main blow they always achieved a significant numerical superiority. The blows were always delivered in several directions at once. Thanks to these techniques, the enemy got the impression that he was attacked by countless hordes.

Such efficiency was achieved by combining iron discipline with encouraging initiative, developing skills of interaction and mutual assistance. Driven hunts were widely used in troop training, when squads of hunters, moving from different directions, gradually tightened the ring. The same method was used in war.

It is worth noting the widespread involvement of foreigners in the army, any formations ready to fight on the side of the Mongols. For example, on the Kalka River, wanderers who lived in the Eastern European steppes found themselves in the ranks of the Mongols.

It is also impossible not to take into account the constant study of combat experience and the introduction of innovations. The most striking example is the use of the achievements of Chinese engineering, the widespread use of siege and various throwing weapons. The ability of the Mongols to take cities, including well-fortified ones, had fatal consequences for their opponents: the usual tactics used against nomads - to bring troops into fortresses and sit out - both in Central Asia and in Rus' turned out to be fatal.

The Mongol cavalry was capable of leading fighting in almost any natural environment, including northern latitudes(only the climate of the Indian deserts turned out to be unbearable for her).

Conquerors make extensive use of local resources for war through merciless, organized plunder. They also found craftsmen and specialists among the local population.

The Mongols widely used strategic and tactical intelligence, methods of psychological warfare, national conflicts, and diplomacy to deceive and disorient the enemy.

Medieval wars were generally distinguished by cruelty, and horror was caused not so much by the Mongols’ resort to the method of terror, but by the systematic use of it. The mass extermination of the population in the occupied territory was supposed to undermine the resources of the resistance and paralyze the survivors with horror.

All fortresses in the subordinate territory were destroyed, and regular taxation was introduced. Management was entrusted to local feudal lords, who were placed under the strict control of Mongol “commissars” - darugachi. The latter, like other representatives of the Mongol administration, for the most part were also not ethnic Mongols. Thus, the conquered countries became the basis for further conquests.

Many great empires have collapsed during the lifetime or shortly after the death of their founder. The merciless system created by Genghis Khan, having proven its effectiveness, outlived him for several decades.

The Mongol army of the era of Genghis Khan and his successors is a completely exceptional phenomenon in world history. Strictly speaking, this applies not only to the army itself: in general, the entire organization of military affairs in the Mongolian state is truly unique. Emerging from the depths of clan society and ordered by the genius of Genghis Khan, this army in its fighting qualities far surpassed the troops of countries with a thousand-year history. And many elements of organization, strategy, and military discipline were centuries ahead of their time and only in the 19th-20th centuries entered the practice of the art of war. So what was the aria of the Mongol Empire like in the 13th century?

Let's move on to issues related to the structure, management, discipline and other elements of the military organization of the Mongols. And here it seems important to say once again that all the foundations of military affairs in the Mongol Empire were laid and developed by Genghis Khan, who cannot at all be called a great commander (on the battlefield), but we can confidently speak of him as a true military genius.

Already starting from the great kurultai of 1206, at which Temujin was proclaimed Genghis Khan of the Mongol Empire he created, a strict decimal system was used as the basis for the organization of the army. In the very principle of dividing an army into tens, hundreds and thousands, there was nothing new for the nomads.

However, Genghis Khan made this principle truly comprehensive, deploying not only the army, but also the entire Mongolian society into similar structural units.

Following the system was extremely strict: not a single warrior had the right under any circumstances to leave his ten, and not a single foreman could accept anyone into the ten. The only exception to this rule could be an order from the khan himself.

This scheme made a dozen or a hundred a truly cohesive fighting unit: soldiers acted as a unit for years and even decades, knowing full well the abilities, pros and cons of their comrades. In addition, this principle made it extremely difficult for enemy spies and just random people to penetrate into the Mongol army itself.

Genghis Khan also abandoned the generic principle of army building.

And in the army the principle of tribal subordination was completely abolished: the instructions of the tribal leaders had no force for the soldiers; the orders of the military commander - foreman, centurion, thousander - had to be carried out unquestioningly, under the threat of immediate execution for non-compliance.

Initially, the main military unit of the Mongol army was a thousand. In 1206, Genghis Khan appointed ninety-five thousand officers from among the most trusted and loyal people.

Soon after the great kurultai, based on military expediency, Genghis Khan made his best thousand commanders temniks, and two old comrades - Boorchu and Mukhali - headed, respectively, the right and left wings of the Mongol army.

The structure of the Mongol army, which included troops of the right and left hands, as well as the center, was approved in the same year 1206.

However, later in the 1220s, strategic necessity caused by the increase in the number of theaters of war forced Genghis Khan to effectively abandon this principle.

After the Central Asian campaign and the emergence of several fronts, this structure was changed. Genghis Khan was forced to abandon the principle of a single army. Formally, the tumen remained the largest military unit, but to carry out the most important strategic tasks, large army groups were created, as a rule, of two or three, less often of four tumens, and operating as autonomous combat units. The overall command of such a group was given to the most prepared temnik, who in this situation became, as it were, the deputy of the khan himself.

The demand from the military commander for completing combat missions was great. Even his favorite Shigi-Khutukha, after he suffered an unexpected defeat from Jalal ad-Din at Perwan, Genghis Khan permanently removed from the highest military command.

Giving unconditional preference to his trusted comrades, Genghis Khan, however, made it clear that a career was open for any of his warriors, right up to the highest positions. He speaks unambiguously about this in his instructions (bilik), which actually made such a practice the law of the state: “Whoever can lead his house faithfully can lead his possession; Anyone who can arrange ten people according to the condition, it is decent to give him a thousand, and tumen, and he can arrange it well.” And vice versa, any commander who failed to cope with his duties faced demotion or even the death penalty; a person from the same military unit who was most suitable for this command position was appointed as the new chief. Genghis Khan brought out another one important principle command is a principle that is fundamental in the modern army, but was fully included in the charters of European armies only by the 19th century. Namely, in the event of the absence of a commander for any reason, even the most insignificant, a temporary commander was immediately appointed in his place. This rule applied even if the boss was absent for several hours. Such a system was very effective in unpredictable military conditions. Completely unique for the Middle Ages, with its unbridled praise of the individual fighting qualities of a warrior, is another principle of selection of command personnel. This rule is so surprising and so clearly proves the military-organizational talent of Genghis Khan that it is worth citing here in full. Genghis Khan said: “There is no bahadur like Yesunbay, and there is no person similar to him in talents. But since he does not suffer from the hardships of the campaign and does not experience hunger and thirst, he considers all other people, nukers and warriors like himself, to bear the hardships, but they are not able to bear them. For this reason, he is not fit to be a boss. The person who deserves to be such is the one who himself knows what hunger and thirst are, and therefore judges the condition of others, the one who goes on the road with calculation and does not allow the army to go hungry and thirsty, or the cattle to become emaciated.”

Thus, the responsibility imposed on troop commanders was very high. Among other things, each junior and mid-level commander was responsible for the functional readiness of his soldiers: before the campaign, he checked all the equipment of each soldier - from a set of weapons to a needle and thread. One of the articles of the Great Yasa states that for the misconduct of his soldiers - slackness, poor readiness, especially military crime - the commander was punished with the same measure as them: that is, if the soldier was subject to the death penalty, then the commander could also be executed. The demand from the commander was great, but no less great was the power that he enjoyed in his unit. The order of any boss had to be carried out without question. In the Mongolian army, the system of control and transmission of orders to higher commanders was raised to the proper height.

Operational control in combat conditions was carried out in different ways: by verbal order from the commander or on his behalf through a messenger, signaling with horsetails and the ever-memorable whistling arrows, a clearly developed system of sound signals transmitted by pipes and war drums - “nakars”. And yet, it was not only (and not even so much) order and discipline that made the Mongol army of Genghis Khan a unique phenomenon in world history. This was a serious difference between the Mongol army and the army of both the past and the future: it did not need either communications or convoys; in fact, during a military campaign it did not require supplies from outside at all. And with good reason, any Mongol warrior could express this in the words of the famous Latin proverb: “I carry everything I have with me.”

On a campaign, the Mongol army could move for months, and even years, without carrying food and fodder supplies. The Mongolian horse was completely grazing: it did not need either a stable or a bag of oats for the night. Even from under the snow he could get food for himself, and the Mongols never knew the principle to which almost all armies of the Middle Ages obeyed: “they don’t fight in winter.” Special detachments of the Mongols were sent forward, but their task was not only tactical reconnaissance; but also economic reconnaissance - the best pastures were selected and places for watering were determined.

The endurance and unpretentiousness of the Mongol warrior was amazing. During the campaign, he was content with what he managed to obtain by hunting or robbery; if necessary, he could eat for weeks on his stone-hard khurut, stored in his saddle bags. When she had absolutely nothing to eat, the Mongol warrior could feed on... the blood of his own horses. Up to half a liter of blood could be taken from a Mongolian horse without much harm to its health. Finally, fallen or injured horses could also be eaten. Well, at the first opportunity, the horse herds were replenished again at the expense of captured cattle.

It was precisely these features that made the Mongol army the most resilient, the most mobile, the most independent of external conditions of all the armies that existed in the history of mankind. And we can say without mincing words: such an army was truly capable of conquering the whole world: its combat capabilities fully allowed this. The bulk of the Mongol army were lightly armed horse archers. But there was another important and significant group - heavy cavalry, armed with swords and pikes. They played the role of “Taran”, attacking in deep formation with the aim of breaking through the enemy’s battle formations. Both riders and horses were protected by armor - first leather, made from specially boiled buffalo leather, which was often varnished for greater strength.

The varnish on the armor also served another function: if there was an indirect hit, the arrow or blade would slide off the varnished surface - therefore, for example, horse armor was almost always varnished; people often sewed metal plaques onto their armor. Unique was the interaction of these two branches of troops, brought to automaticity, and the battle was always started by horse archers. They attacked the enemy with several open parallel waves, continuously firing at him from bows; at the same time, the riders of the first ranks, who were out of action or who had used up their supply of arrows, were instantly replaced by warriors from the rear ranks. The density of fire was incredible: according to sources, Mongol arrows in battle “blown out the sun.” If the enemy could not withstand this massive shelling and turned his rear, then the light cavalry, armed with bows and sabers, completed the rout. If the enemy counterattacked, the Mongols did not accept close combat. A favorite tactic was to retreat in order to lure the enemy into a surprise attack due to a siege. This blow was delivered by heavy cavalry and almost always led to success. The reconnaissance function of the archer was also important: by delivering seemingly unsystematic strikes here and there, they thereby checked the readiness of the enemy’s defense.

And the direction of the main attack depended on this. The armament of the light cavalry was very simple: a bow, a quiver of arrows and sabers. Neither the warriors nor the horses had armor, but this, oddly enough, did not make them too vulnerable. The reason for this was the uniqueness of the Mongolian combat bow - probably the most powerful military weapons warrior before the invention of gunpowder. The Mongolian bow was relatively small in size, but extremely powerful and long-range. The Mongol bow was very powerful, and the Mongol archers had significant physical strength. This is not surprising if we remember that a Mongolian boy first received his bow at the age of three, and shooting exercises were a favorite pastime of the Mongols. In battle, the Mongol warrior was able to fire 6-8 arrows per minute without much damage to shooting accuracy. Such exceptional firing density required very significant amount arrow Each Mongol warrior, before setting off on a military campaign, had to present to his superior “three large quivers full of arrows.” The quiver's capacity was 60 arrows.

The Mongol went into battle with one, and, if necessary, two full quivers - thus, in major battle The warrior's ammunition was 120 arrows. Mongolian arrows themselves are something special. There were special armor-piercing tips, also different - for chain mail, for plate and for leather armor. There were arrows with very wide and sharp tips (the so-called “cut”), capable of cutting off a hand or even a head. The commanders always had several whistling signal arrows. There were other types that were used depending on the nature of the battle. During excavations in the Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin in 2001-2002, archaeologists found more than 15 various types arrowheads. Almost all of them were of Mongolian (Tatar) origin and dated back to the 13th and 14th centuries. Another important weapon of the light-horse warrior was the saber. Saber blades were very light, slightly curved and cut on one side. The saber, almost without exception, was a weapon in combat against a retreating enemy, that is, a fleeing enemy was cut from behind, not expecting to encounter serious resistance.

Each Mongol horseman had a lasso with him, and often even several. This terrible Mongol weapon terrified the enemy - probably no less than his arrows. Although the main force of the Mongol army were horse archers, there is a lot of information about the use of a wide variety of weapons. Small throwing spears and darts were especially widely used, in the handling of which the Mongols were real specialists. The owners of armor actively used heavy hand weapons, which gave an advantage in contact combat: battle axes and clubs, spears with a long and wide blade. It is impossible not to say about probably the main weapon of any Mongol warrior. This is the famous Mongolian horse. The Mongolian horse is surprisingly small in size. Her height at the withers usually did not exceed one meter and thirty-five centimeters, and her weight ranged from two hundred to three hundred kilograms. A light Mongolian horse, of course, could not compare in the power of a ramming blow with the same knight's horse. But the Mongols were greatly helped by one important quality inherent in their steppe horses: significantly inferior in speed to the enemy’s horses, they had almost exceptional endurance. The Mongolian horse withstood both hours-long battles and extremely long hikes with unprecedented ease. The highest level of training of Mongolian horses was also important. The Mongol warrior and his horse acted as one creature in battle. The horse obeyed the slightest instruction from its owner. She was capable of the most unexpected feints and maneuvers. This allowed the Mongols, even during retreat, to maintain both order and fighting qualities: quickly retreating, the Mongol army could instantly stop and immediately launch a counterattack or release a shower of arrows at the enemy. An amazing fact: Mongolian horses were never tied or hobbled. Mongolian horses never left their generally quite harsh owners.

Starting with the Chinese campaign, infantry units appeared in the army, which were used during sieges. This group is the "siege crowd" or, in Mongolian, "khashar", widely known in history. This is simply the large civilian population of the conquered country gathered in one place. Such masses of people were used mainly during the Mongol sieges of fortresses and cities. The siege technology of the Mongols was very diverse. Let us note here various throwing devices: vortex stone throwers, catapults, arrow throwers, powerful stone throwing machines. There were also other siege devices of various kinds available: assault ladders and assault towers, battering rams and “assault domes” (apparently special shelters for warriors using a ram), as well as “Greek fire” (most likely a Chinese mixture of various flammable oils ) and even powder charges. Another important structural unit of the Mongol army were fairly large groups of light-horse soldiers called “reconnaissance detachments.” Their tasks also included mass “cleansing” of the population along the army’s route, so that no one could warn the enemy about the Mongol campaign. They also explored possible ways advance, determined camp sites for the army, and found suitable pastures and watering places for horses. A story about the principles of strategy and military training among the Mongols would be incomplete without mentioning a very peculiar phenomenon that actually played the role of full-scale military exercises. We are talking about the famous round-up hunts. At the behest of Genghis Khan, such hunts were carried out once or twice a year, by the entire army. Obligatory round-up hunting was used during a military campaign and performed two tasks: replenishing the army's food supplies and improving the combat and tactical training of Mongol warriors. To conclude the topic of Mongolian military art, it is necessary to say about such a specific subject as the equipment (not combat) of the Mongolian warrior. In many ways, it was this ammunition that made the Mongol army what it was - “invincible and legendary.” Let's start with the "uniform". The clothing of the Mongol warrior was simple and purely functional. In summer - sheep wool pants and the famous Mongolian robe. Shoes all year round boots were used, the bottom of which was leather, and the top was made of felt. These boots are a little reminiscent of Russian felt boots, but they are much more comfortable, as they are not afraid of dampness. Winter boots could be made of thicker felt and could withstand any frost. In addition, in winter, a fur hat with earmuffs and a long, below the knees, fur coat made of fur folded in half - with wool both inside and outside - were added to the Mongol outfit. It is curious that after the conquest of China, many Mongol warriors began to wear silk underwear. But not at all in order to impress his ladies. The fact is that silk has the property of not being penetrated by the arrow, but being drawn into the wound along with the tip. Of course, it is much easier to remove such an arrow from a wound: you just need to pull the edges of this silk underwear. This is such an original surgery. The mandatory items of equipment included a full set of harness, a special file or sharpener for sharpening arrows, an awl, a flint, a clay pot for cooking food, and a two-liter leather bag with kumis (during the campaign it was also used as a container for water). An emergency supply was kept in two saddlebags food products: in one there are strips of meat dried in the sun, in the other there is khurut. In addition, the set of equipment also included a large wineskin, usually made of cowhide. Its use was multifunctional: on a hike it could serve both as an ordinary blanket and as a kind of mattress; when crossing deserts, it was used as a container for large supplies of water.

And finally, when inflated with air, it became an excellent means of crossing rivers; According to sources, even such serious water obstacles as the Volga were overcome by the Mongols with the help of this simple device. And such instant Mongol crossings often also came as a shock to the defending side. Such well-thought-out equipment made the Mongol warrior ready for any vicissitudes of military fate. He could act completely autonomously and in the most difficult conditions - for example, in severe frost or in the complete absence of food in the deserted steppe. And coupled with the high discipline, mobility and endurance of a nomad, it made the Mongol army the most advanced military instrument of its time, capable of solving military problems of any degree of complexity.

Fatal 1223 At the very end of the spring of 1223, 500 km from the southern borders of Rus', Russian-Polovtsian and Mongolian troops clashed in mortal combat. The tragic events for Rus' had their own prehistory, and therefore it is worth dwelling on the “deeds of the Mongols”, to understand the historical inevitability of the path that led the regiments of Genghis Khan, the Russians and the Polovtsians to Kalka that very spring.

How do we know about the Tatar-Mongols and their conquests? About ourselves, the history of our people in the 13th century. The Mongols told a little in the epic work "The Secret Legend", which included historical songs, "genealogical legends", "oral messages", sayings, and proverbs. In addition, Genghis Khan adopted the “Great Yasa,” a set of laws that allows one to understand the principles of the structure of the state, troops, and contains moral and judicial regulations. Those whom they conquered also wrote about the Mongols: Chinese and Muslim chroniclers, later Russians and Europeans. At the end of the 13th century. In China, conquered by the Mongols, the Italian Marco Polo lived for almost 20 years, then described in detail in his “Book” about what he saw and heard. But, as usual for the history of the Middle Ages, information from the 13th century. contradictory, insufficient, sometimes unclear or unreliable.

Mongols: what is hidden behind the name. At the end of the 12th century. Mongol-speaking and Turkic tribes lived in the territory of north-eastern Mongolia and Transbaikalia. The name "Mongols" has received a double interpretation in historical literature. According to one version, the ancient Men-gu tribe lived in the upper reaches of the Amur, but one of the Tatar clans in Eastern Transbaikalia had the same name (Genghis Khan also belonged to this clan). According to another hypothesis, Men-gu is a very ancient tribe, rarely mentioned in sources, but the ancients never confused them with the Dada tribe (Tatars).

The Tatars stubbornly fought with the Mongols. The name of the successful and warlike Tatars gradually became a collective name for a whole group of tribes living in Southern Siberia. The long and fierce confrontation between the Tatars and Mongols ended by the middle of the 12th century. victory of the latter. The Tatars were included among the peoples conquered by the Mongols, and for Europeans the names “Mongols” and “Tatars” became synonymous.

Monglols: heavily armed
12th century horseman, horse archer
XII-XIII centuries and a commoner

Traditional activities of the Mongols and their "kureni". The main occupations of the Mongols were hunting and cattle breeding. The tribes of Mongol herders, who later played such a significant role in world history, lived south of Lake Baikal and up to the Altai Mountains. Main value The steppe nomads had thousands of herds of horses.

The very way of life and habitat instilled in the Mongols endurance, perseverance, and the ability to easily endure long hikes. Mongol boys were taught to ride horses and wield weapons in early childhood. Already teenagers were excellent riders and hunters. It is not surprising that as they grew up, they became magnificent warriors. Harsh natural conditions and frequent attacks by unfriendly neighbors or enemies formed the characteristics characteristic of those “living in felt tents”: courage, contempt for death, the ability to organize for defense or attack.

In the period before unification and conquest, the Mongols were in the last stage of the tribal system. They wandered in "kurens", i.e. clan or tribal associations numbering from several hundred to several thousand people. With the gradual collapse of the clan system, separate families, “ails,” were separated from the “kurens.”

Stone statue
in the Mongolian steppes

The rise of the military nobility and squad. The main role in the social organization of the Mongolian tribes was played by people's assemblies and the council of tribal elders (kurultai), but gradually power was concentrated in the hands of noyons (military leaders) and their warriors (nukers). The successful and mining noyons (who eventually turned into khans) with their faithful nukers, towered over the bulk of the Mongols - ordinary cattle breeders (Oirats).

Genghis Khan and his "people-army". The unification of disparate and warring tribes was difficult, and it was Temujin who finally had to overcome the resistance of the obstinate khans with “iron and blood.” A descendant of a noble family, according to Mongolian standards, Temujin experienced a lot in his youth: the loss of his father, poisoned by the Tatars, humiliation and persecution, captivity with a wooden block around his neck, but he endured everything and stood at the head of a great empire.

In 1206, the kurultai proclaimed Temujin Genghis Khan. The conquests of the Mongols, which amazed the world, were based on the principles of iron discipline and military order introduced by him. The Mongol tribes were welded by their leader into a horde, a single “people-army”. The entire social organization of the steppe inhabitants was built on the basis of the “Great Yasa” introduced by Genghis Khan - the above-mentioned set of laws. The squad of nukers was transformed into the personal guard (kishkitenov) of the khan, numbering 10 thousand people; the rest of the army was divided into tens of thousands (“darkness” or “tumens”), thousands, hundreds and tens of fighters. Each unit was headed by an experienced and skilled military leader. Unlike many European medieval armies, the army of Genghis Khan professed the principle of appointing military leaders in accordance with personal merit. For the flight of one warrior out of a dozen from the battlefield, the entire ten were executed, for the flight of a dozen a hundred were executed, and since dozens consisted, as a rule, of close relatives, it is clear that a moment of cowardice could result in the death of a father or brother and happened extremely rarely. Death penalty The slightest failure to comply with the orders of military leaders was also punishable. The laws established by Genghis Khan also affected civil life.

The principle “war feeds itself.” When recruiting for the army, each ten tents was obliged to field from one to three warriors and provide them with food. None of Genghis Khan's soldiers received a salary, but each of them had the right to a share of the spoils in the conquered lands and cities.

Naturally, the main branch of the army among the steppe nomads was cavalry. There were no convoys with her. The warriors took with them two leather skins with milk for drinking and a clay pot for cooking meat. This made it possible to travel very long distances in a short time. All needs were provided from the conquered territories.

The Mongols' weapons were simple but effective: a powerful, varnished bow and several quivers of arrows, a spear, a curved saber, and leather armor with metal plates.

The Mongol battle formations consisted of three main parts: the right wing, the left wing and the center. During the battle, Genghis Khan's army maneuvered easily and very skillfully, using ambushes, diversionary maneuvers, false retreats with sudden counterattacks. It is characteristic that Mongol military leaders almost never led troops, but directed the course of the battle, either from a commanding height or through their messengers. This is how the command cadres were preserved. During the conquest of Rus' by the hordes of Batu, the Mongol-Tatars lost only one Genghisid - Khan Kulkan, while the Russians lost every third of the Rurikovichs.

Before the start of the battle, meticulous reconnaissance was carried out. Long before the start of the campaign, Mongol envoys, masquerading as ordinary traders, found out the size and location of the enemy garrison, food supplies, and possible routes of approach or retreat from the fortress. All routes of military campaigns were calculated by the Mongol commanders in advance and very carefully. For ease of communication, special roads were built with stations (pits), where there were always replacement horses. Such a “horse relay race” transmitted all urgent orders and instructions at a speed of up to 600 km per day. Two days before any march, detachments of 200 people were sent forward, backward, and on both sides of the intended route.

Each new battle brought new military experience. The conquest of China gave especially a lot.

Read also other topics Part IX "Rus between East and West: battles of the 13th and 15th centuries." section "Rus and Slavic countries in the Middle Ages":

• 39. “Who is the essence and the split-off”: Tatar-Mongols by the beginning of the 13th century.
• 41. Genghis Khan and the “Muslim front”: campaigns, sieges, conquests
• 42. Rus' and the Polovtsians on the eve of Kalka
  • Polovtsy. Military-political organization and social structure of the Polovtsian hordes
  • Prince Mstislav Udaloy. Princely Congress in Kyiv - the decision to help the Polovtsians
• 44. Crusaders in the Eastern Baltic

Tactics and strategy of the Mongol army during the reign of Genghis Khan

Marco Polo, who lived for many years in Mongolia and China under Kublai Khan, gives the following assessment of the Mongol army: “The armament of the Mongols is excellent: bows and arrows, shields and swords; they are the best archers of all nations.” Riders who grew up riding horses from an early age. They are amazingly disciplined and persistent warriors in battle, and in contrast to the discipline created by fear, which in some eras dominated European standing armies, for them it is based on a religious understanding of the subordination of power and on tribal life. The endurance of the Mongol and his horse is amazing. During the campaign, their troops could move for months without transporting food supplies and fodder. For the horse - pasture; he doesn’t know oats or stables. Vanguard with a force of two or three hundred, preceding the army at a distance of two marches, and the same side detachments performed the tasks of not only guarding the enemy’s march and reconnaissance, but also economic reconnaissance - they let them know where the best food and watering places were.

Nomadic pastoralists are generally distinguished by their deep knowledge of nature: where and at what time the herbs reach greater richness and greater nutritional value, where the best water pools are, at which stages it is necessary to stock up on provisions and for how long, etc.

The collection of this practical information was the responsibility of special intelligence, and without it it was considered unthinkable to begin an operation. In addition, special detachments were deployed whose task was to protect feeding areas from nomads not taking part in the war.

The troops, unless strategic considerations prevented this, lingered in places where there was plenty of food and water, and forced a forced march through areas where these conditions were not available. Each mounted warrior led from one to four clockwork horses, so he could change horses during a campaign, which significantly increased the length of the transitions and reduced the need for halts and days. Under this condition, marching movements lasting 10-13 days without days were considered normal, and the speed of movement of the Mongol troops was amazing. During the Hungarian campaign of 1241, Subutai once walked 435 miles with his army in less than three days.

The role of artillery in the Mongol army was played by the then extremely imperfect throwing weapons. Before the Chinese campaign (1211-1215), the number of such vehicles in the army was insignificant and they were of the most primitive design, which, by the way, put it in a rather helpless position in relation to the fortified cities encountered during the offensive. The experience of the mentioned campaign brought major improvements to this matter, and in the Central Asian campaign we already see in the Mongolian army an auxiliary Jin division serving a variety of heavy combat vehicles, used mainly during sieges, including flamethrowers. The latter threw various flammable substances into the besieged cities, such as burning oil, the so-called “Greek fire”, etc. There are some hints that during the Central Asian campaign the Mongols used gunpowder. The latter, as is known, was invented in China much more before the appearance it was used in Europe, but it was used by the Chinese mainly for pyrotechnic purposes. The Mongols could have borrowed gunpowder from the Chinese and also brought it to Europe, but if this was the case, then it apparently did not have to play a special role as a weapon of war, since in fact firearms neither the Chinese nor the Mongols had it. As a source of energy, gunpowder was used mainly in rockets, which were used during sieges. The cannon was undoubtedly an independent European invention. As for gunpowder itself, the assumption expressed by G. Lam that it might not have been “invented” in Europe, but brought there by the Mongols, does not seem incredible.”

During sieges, the Mongols used not only the artillery of that time, but also resorted to fortification and the art of mines in its primitive form. They knew how to produce floods, made tunnels, underground passages, etc.

The war was usually conducted by the Mongols according to the following system:

1. A kurultai was convened, at which the issue of the upcoming war and its plan was discussed. There they decided everything that was necessary to form an army, how many soldiers to take from each ten tents, etc., and also determined the place and time for the collection of troops.

2. Spies were sent to the enemy country and “tongues” were obtained.

3. Military operations began as usual in early spring(depending on the condition of the pasture, and sometimes depending on climatic conditions) and in the fall, when horses and camels are in good body. Before the opening of hostilities, Genghis Khan gathered all the senior commanders to listen to his instructions.

The supreme command was exercised by the emperor himself. The invasion of the enemy's country was carried out by several armies in different directions. From the commanders receiving such a separate command, Genghis Khan demanded to present a plan of action, which he discussed and usually approved, only in rare cases introducing his own amendments to it. After this, the performer is given complete freedom of action within the limits of the task given to him in close connection with the headquarters of the supreme leader. The emperor was personally present only during the first operations. As soon as he was convinced that the matter was well established, he provided the young leaders with all the glory of brilliant triumphs on the battlefields and within the walls of conquered fortresses and capitals.

4. When approaching significant fortified cities, private armies left an observation corps to monitor them. Supplies were collected in the surrounding area and, if necessary, a temporary base was set up. Usually the main forces continued the offensive, and the observation corps, equipped with machines, began to invest and siege.

5. When a meeting in the field with an enemy army was foreseen, the Mongols usually adhered to one of the following two methods: either they tried to attack the enemy by surprise, quickly concentrating the forces of several armies to the battlefield, or, if the enemy turned out to be vigilant and surprise could not be counted on, they directed their forces in such a way as to achieve a bypass of one of the enemy flanks. This maneuver was called "tulugma". But, alien to the template, the Mongol leaders, in addition to the two indicated methods, also used various other operational techniques. For example, a feigned flight was carried out, and the army with great skill covered its tracks, disappearing from the eyes of the enemy until he fragmented his forces and weakened security measures. Then the Mongols mounted fresh clockwork horses and made a quick raid, appearing as if from underground before the stunned enemy. In this way, the Russian princes were defeated in 1223 on the Kalka River. It happened that during such a demonstrative flight, the Mongol troops dispersed so as to envelop the enemy from different sides. If it turned out that the enemy was staying focused and prepared to fight back, they released him from the encirclement in order to later attack him on the march. In this way, in 1220, one of the armies of Khorezmshah Muhammad, which the Mongols deliberately released from Bukhara, was destroyed.

Prof. V.L. Kotvich, in his lecture on the history of Mongolia, notes the following military “tradition” of the Mongols: to pursue a defeated enemy until complete destruction. This rule, which formed a tradition among the Mongols, is one of the indisputable principles of modern military art; but in those distant times this principle did not enjoy universal recognition in Europe. For example, the knights of the Middle Ages considered it beneath their dignity to chase after an enemy who had cleared the battlefield, and many centuries later, in the era of Louis XVI and the five-step system, the winner was ready to build a “golden bridge” for the vanquished to retreat. From everything that has been said above about the tactical and operational art of the Mongols, it is clear that among the most important advantages of the Mongol army, which ensured its victory over others, its amazing maneuverability should be noted.

In its manifestation on the battlefield, this ability was the result of the excellent individual training of the Mongol horsemen and the preparation of entire units of troops for rapid movements and evolutions with skillful application to the terrain, as well as the corresponding dressage and equestrian strength; in the theater of war, the same ability was an expression, first of all, of the energy and activity of the Mongol command, and then of such organization and training of the army, which achieved unprecedented speed in carrying out marches and maneuvers and almost complete independence from the rear and supply. It can be said without exaggeration about the Mongol army that during campaigns it had a “base with it.” She went to war with a small and unwieldy, mostly pack, train of camels, and sometimes drove herds of cattle with her. Further provisions were based solely on local funds; If funds for food could not be collected from the population, they were obtained through round-ups. Mongolia of that time, economically poor and sparsely populated, would never have been able to withstand the stress of continuous great wars of Genghis Khan and his heirs if the country had fed and supplied its army. The Mongol, who cultivated his belligerence on animal hunting, also looks at war partly as hunting. A hunter who returns without prey, and a warrior who demands food and supplies from home during a war, would be considered “women” in the Mongols’ minds.

To be able to rely on local resources, it was often necessary to conduct an offensive on a broad front; This requirement was one of the reasons (regardless of strategic considerations) why the private armies of the Mongols usually invaded an enemy country not in a concentrated mass, but separately. The danger of being defeated piecemeal in this technique was compensated by the speed of maneuvering of individual groups, the ability of the Mongols to evade battle when it was not part of their calculations, as well as the excellent organization of reconnaissance and communications, which constituted one of the characteristic features Mongol army. Under this condition, she could, without great risk, be guided by the strategic principle, which was later formulated by Moltke in the aphorism: “To move apart, to fight together.”

In the same way, i.e. With the help of local means, the advancing army could meet its needs for clothing and means of transportation. The weapons of that time were also easily repaired through local resources. The heavy “artillery” was carried by the army, partly in disassembled form; there were probably spare parts for it, but if there were a shortage of such, of course, there was no difficulty in making them from local materials by our own carpenters and blacksmiths. Artillery “shells,” the production and delivery of which is one of the most difficult tasks of supplying modern armies, were available locally at that time in the form of ready-made millstone stones, etc. or could have been extracted from associated quarries; in the absence of both, stone shells were replaced with wooden logs from plant tree trunks; to increase their weight they were soaked in water. During the Central Asian campaign, the bombardment of the city of Khorezm was carried out in this primitive way.

Of course, one of the important features that ensured the ability of the Mongol army to do without communications was the extreme endurance of men and horses, their habit of the most severe hardships, as well as the iron discipline that reigned in the army. Under these conditions, large detachments passed through waterless deserts and crossed the highest mountain ranges, which were considered impassable by other peoples. With great skill, the Mongols also overcame serious water obstacles; crossings of large and deep rivers were made by swimming: property was stored on reed rafts tied to the tails of horses, people used waterskins (sheep's stomachs inflated with air) to cross. This ability to not be embarrassed by natural adaptations gave Mongol warriors the reputation of some kind of supernatural, devilish creatures to whom the standards applied to other people are inapplicable.

The papal envoy to the Mongol court, Plano Carpini, apparently not devoid of observation and military knowledge, notes that the victories of the Mongols cannot be attributed to their physical development, in respect of which they are inferior to the Europeans, and the large number of the Mongolian people, who, on the contrary, are quite small in number. Their victories depend solely on their superior tactics, which are recommended to the Europeans as a model, exemplary. “Our armies,” he writes, “should be governed on the model of the Tatars (Mongols) on the basis of the same such harsh military laws.

The army should in no way be fought in one mass, but in separate detachments. Scouts must be sent in all directions. Our generals must keep their troops day and night in combat readiness, since the Tatars are always vigilant like devils." Next, Carpini will teach various tips of a special nature, recommending Mongolian methods and skills. All the military principles of Genghis Khan, says one of the modern researchers, were new not only in the steppe, but also in the rest of Asia, where, according to Juvaini, completely different military orders prevailed, where autocracy and abuses of military leaders became customary and where the mobilization of troops required several months of time, since the command staff never maintained readiness of the required number of soldiers.

It is difficult to reconcile with our ideas about a nomadic army as a gathering of irregular gangs with the strict order and even the external gloss that dominated Genghis’s army. From the above articles by Yasa, we have already seen how strict her requirements were for constant combat readiness, punctuality in the execution of orders, etc. Setting out on a campaign found the army in a state of impeccable readiness: nothing was missed, every little thing was in order and in its place; the metal parts of weapons and harness are thoroughly cleaned, the storage containers are filled, and an emergency supply of food is included. All this was subject to strict inspection by superiors; omissions were severely punished. Since the Central Asian campaign, the armies had Chinese surgeons. When the Mongols went to war, they wore silk underwear (Chinese chesucha) - this custom has survived to this day due to its property of not being penetrated by an arrow, but being drawn into the wound along with the tip, delaying its penetration. This occurs when injured not only by an arrow, but also by a bullet from a firearm. Thanks to this property of silk, an arrow or bullet without a shell was easily removed from the body along with the silk fabric. So simply and easily the Mongols performed the operation of removing bullets and arrows from a wound.

Once the army or its main mass was concentrated before the campaign, it was inspected by the supreme leader himself. At the same time, he knew how, with his characteristic oratorical talent, to admonish the troops on the campaign with short but energetic words. Here is one of these parting words, which he pronounced before the formation of a punitive detachment, once sent under the command of Subutai: “You are my commanders, each of you is like me at the head of the army! You are like precious ornaments of the head. You are a collection of glory, you are indestructible, like a stone! And you, my army, surrounding me like a wall and leveled like the furrows of a field! Listen to my words: during peaceful fun, live with one thought, like the fingers of one hand; during an attack, be like a falcon that rushes at a robber; in During peaceful play and entertainment, swarm like mosquitoes, but during battle, be like an eagle on prey!

One should also pay attention to the widespread use that secret reconnaissance received from the Mongols in the field of military affairs, through which, long before the opening of hostile actions, the terrain and means of the future theater of war, weapons, organization, tactics, the mood of the enemy army, etc., are studied to the smallest detail. d. This preliminary reconnaissance of potential enemies, which in Europe began to be systematically used only in recent historical times, in connection with the establishment of a special corps of the general staff in the armies, was raised by Genghis Khan to an extraordinary height, reminiscent of the one at which things stand in Japan at the present time . As a result of this deployment of intelligence services, for example in the war against the Jin state, Mongol leaders often showed better knowledge of local geographical conditions than their opponents operating in their own country. Such awareness was a great chance for success for the Mongols. Likewise, during the Central European campaign of Batu, the Mongols amazed the Poles, Germans and Hungarians with their familiarity with European conditions, while the European troops had almost no idea about the Mongols.

For the purposes of reconnaissance and, incidentally, to disintegrate the enemy, “all means were considered suitable: the emissaries united the dissatisfied, persuaded them to betray with bribery, instilled mutual distrust among the allies, created internal complications in the state. Spiritual (threats) and physical terror was used against individuals.”

In carrying out reconnaissance, the nomads were extremely helped by their ability to firmly retain local signs in their memory. Secret reconnaissance, begun in advance, continued continuously throughout the war, for which numerous spies were involved. The role of the latter was often played by traders, who, when the army entered an enemy country, left the Mongol headquarters with a supply of goods in order to establish relations with the local population.

Mentioned above were the raid hunts that were organized by the Mongol troops for food purposes. But the significance of these hunts was far from being limited to this one task. They also served as an important means for the combat training of the army, as established by one of the articles of Yasa, which reads (Article 9): “In order to maintain the combat training of the army, a big hunt should be organized every winter. For this reason, it is forbidden to kill anyone from March to October deer, goats, roe deer, hares, wild donkeys and some species of birds."

This example of the widespread use of animal hunting among the Mongols as military educational and teaching aid is so interesting and instructive that we consider it not superfluous to give a more detailed description of the conduct of such a hunt by the Mongol army, borrowed from the work of Harold Lamb.

“The Mongolian raid hunt was the same regular campaign, but not against people, but against animals. The entire army took part in it, and its rules were established by the khan himself, who recognized them as inviolable. Warriors (beaters) were forbidden to use weapons against animals, and letting an animal slip through the chain of beaters was considered a disgrace. It was especially hard at night. A month after the start of the hunt, a huge number of animals found themselves herded inside a semicircle of beaters, grouping around their chain. They had to perform real guard duty: light fires, post sentries. Even the usual " pass." It was not easy to maintain the integrity of the line of outposts at night in the presence of the front excited mass of representatives of the four-legged kingdom, the burning eyes of predators, to the accompaniment of the howling of wolves and the growls of leopards. The farther, the more difficult. Another month later, when the mass of animals was already beginning to feel that she was being pursued by enemies, it was necessary to increase vigilance even more. If a fox climbed into any hole, she had to be driven out of there at all costs; the bear, hiding in a crevice between the rocks, had to be driven out by one of the beaters without harming it. It is clear how favorable such a situation was for young warriors to display their youth and prowess, for example when a lone boar armed with terrible fangs, and even more so when a whole herd of such enraged animals rushed in a frenzy at the chain of beaters.”

Sometimes it was necessary to make difficult crossings across rivers without breaking the continuity of the chain. Often the old khan himself appeared in the chain, observing the behavior of people. For the time being, he remained silent, but not a single detail escaped his attention and, at the end of the hunt, evoked praise or censure. At the end of the drive, only the khan had the right to be the first to open the hunt. Having personally killed several animals, he left the circle and, sitting under a canopy, watched the further progress of the hunt, in which the princes and governors labored after him. It was something like the gladiatorial competitions of Ancient Rome.

After the nobility and senior ranks, the fight against animals passed to junior commanders and ordinary warriors. This sometimes continued for a whole day, until finally, according to custom, the khan’s grandchildren and young princes came to him to ask for mercy for the surviving animals. After this, the ring opened and the carcasses began to be collected.

At the end of his essay, G. Lamb expresses the opinion that such a hunt was an excellent school for warriors, and the gradual narrowing and closing of the ring of riders, practiced during its course, could be used in a war against an encircled enemy.

Indeed, there is reason to think that the Mongols owe a significant part of their belligerence and prowess to animal hunting, which instilled in them these traits from an early age in everyday life.

Taking together everything that is known regarding the military structure of the empire of Genghis Khan and the principles on which his army was organized, one cannot help but come to the conclusion - even completely independent of the assessment of the talent of his supreme leader as a commander and organizer - about the extreme fallacy of a fairly widespread view , as if the campaigns of the Mongols were not campaigns of an organized armed system, but chaotic migrations of nomadic masses, who, when meeting with the troops of cultural opponents, crushed them with their overwhelming numbers. We have already seen that during the military campaigns of the Mongols, the “popular masses” remained calmly in their places and that victories were won not by these masses, but by the regular army, which was usually inferior to its enemy in numbers. It is safe to say that, for example, in the Chinese (Jin) and Central Asian campaigns, which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, Genghis Khan had no less than double enemy forces against him. In general, the Mongols were extremely few in relation to the population of the countries they conquered - according to modern data, the first 5 million out of about 600 million of all their former subjects in Asia. In the army that set out on a campaign in Europe, there were about 1/3 of the total composition of pure Mongols as the main core. Military art in its highest achievements in the 13th century was on the side of the Mongols, which is why in their victorious march through Asia and Europe not a single people was able to stop them, to oppose them with something higher than they had.

“If we compare the great penetration into the depths of the enemy disposition of the armies of Napoleon and the armies of the no less great commander Subedei,” writes Mr. Anisimov, “then we must recognize in the latter significantly greater insight and greater leadership genius. Both of them, leading their armies, were faced with the task of correctly resolving the issue of rear, communications and supply of their hordes. But only Napoleon was unable to cope with this task in the snows of Russia, and Subutai resolved it in all cases of isolation thousands of miles from the core of the rear. In the past, covered by centuries , as in much later times, when large and distant wars were started, the question of food for the armies was raised first. This issue in the mounted armies of the Mongols (over 150 thousand horses) was complicated to the extreme. The light Mongol cavalry could not drag bulky convoys, always constraining movement, and inevitably had to find a way out of this situation. Even Julius Caesar, when conquering Gaul, said that “war should feed war” and that “the capture of a rich region not only does not burden the conqueror’s budget, but also creates for him material base for subsequent wars."

Quite independently, Genghis Khan and his commanders came to the same view of the war: they looked at the war as a profitable business, expanding the base and accumulating forces - this was the basis of their strategy. A Chinese medieval writer points out how main feature, which determines a good commander, the ability to maintain an army at the expense of the enemy. The Mongol strategy saw the duration of the offensive and the capture of large areas as an element of strength, a source of replenishment of troops and supplies. The more the attacker advanced into Asia, the more herds and other movable wealth he captured. In addition, the vanquished joined the ranks of the victors, where they quickly assimilated, increasing the strength of the winner.

The Mongol offensive represented an avalanche, growing with every step of movement. About two-thirds of Batu's army were Turkic tribes roaming east of the Volga; When storming fortresses and fortified cities, the Mongols drove prisoners and mobilized enemies in front of them like “cannon fodder.” The Mongol strategy, given the enormous scale of distances and the dominance of predominantly pack transport on “ships of the desert” - indispensable for quick transitions behind cavalry through roadless steppes, deserts, rivers without bridges and mountains - was unable to organize proper transportation from the rear. The idea of ​​​​transferring the base to the areas that lay ahead was the main one for Genghis Khan. The Mongol cavalry always had a base with them. The need to be content primarily with local resources left a certain imprint on the Mongol strategy. Quite often, the speed, impetuosity and disappearance of their army were explained by the direct need to quickly reach favorable pastures, where the horses, weakened after passing through hungry areas, could fatten their bodies. Of course, prolongation of battles and operations in places where there were no food supplies was avoided.

At the end of the essay on the military structure of the Mongol Empire, it remains to say a few words about its founder as a commander. That he possessed a truly creative genius is clearly evident from the fact that he was able to create an invincible army out of nothing, basing it on the creation of ideas that were recognized by civilized humanity only many centuries later. A continuous series of celebrations on the battlefields, the conquest of cultural states that had more numerous and well-organized armed forces compared to the Mongol army, undoubtedly required more than organizational talent; This required the genius of a commander. Such a genius is now unanimously recognized by representatives of military science as Genghis Khan. This opinion is shared, by the way, by the competent Russian military historian General M.I. Ivanin, whose work “On the art of war and the conquests of the Mongol-Tatars and Central Asian peoples under Genghis Khan and Tamerlane,” published in St. Petersburg in 1875. , was adopted as one of the manuals on the history of military art in our Imperial Military Academy.

The Mongol Conqueror did not have so many biographers and, in general, such enthusiastic literature as Napoleon had. Only three or four works were written about Genghis Khan, and then mainly by his enemies - Chinese and Persian scientists and contemporaries. In European literature, his due as a commander began to be given only in recent decades, dispelling the fog that covered him in previous centuries. Here is what a military specialist, French Lieutenant Colonel Renck, says about this:

“We should finally discard the current opinion according to which he (Genghis Khan) is presented as the leader of a nomadic horde, blindly crushing oncoming peoples in his path. Not a single national leader was more clearly aware of what he wants, what he can. Enormous practical common sense and correct judgment constituted the best part of his genius... If they (the Mongols) always turned out to be invincible, then they owed this to the courage of their strategic plans and the infallible clarity of their tactical actions.Certainly, in the person of Genghis Khan and the galaxy of his commanders, military art reached one of its highest peaks."

Of course, it is very difficult to make a comparative assessment of the talents of great commanders, and even more so given that they worked in different eras, under different states of military art and technology and under a wide variety of conditions. The fruits of the achievements of individual geniuses are, it would seem, the only impartial criterion for evaluation. In the Introduction, a comparison was made from this point of view of the genius of Genghis Khan with two generally recognized greatest commanders- Napoleon and Alexander the Great, - and this comparison is quite rightly decided not in favor of the latter two. The empire created by Genghis Khan not only surpassed the empire of Napoleon and Alexander many times over in space and survived for a long time under his successors, reaching under his grandson, Kublai, an extraordinary size, unprecedented in world history, 4/5 of the Old World, and if it fell , then not under the blows of external enemies, but due to internal decay.

It is impossible not to point out one more feature of the genius of Genghis Khan, in which he surpasses other great conquerors: he created a school of commanders, from which came a galaxy of talented leaders - his associates during life and the successors of his work after death. Tamerlane can also be considered a commander of his school. As is known, Napoleon failed to create such a school; the school of Frederick the Great produced only blind imitators, without a spark of original creativity. As one of the techniques used by Genghis Khan to develop an independent leadership gift in his employees, we can point out that he provided them with a significant amount of freedom in choosing methods for carrying out the combat and operational tasks given to them.

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