How Vlasov died. The story of the betrayal of General Vlasov

Life in this world is a struggle.

N. Berdyaev

Writer N. Konyaev in his book about Vlasov writes: “Meretskov failed to organize an assault group of such strength that was capable of breaking through the German defenses.”

Well, let this remain on the conscience of the author, who accuses only one K.A. of all mortal sins. Meretskova. But according to the plan for the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army from the encirclement, a simultaneous strike of both groups towards each other was envisaged. In other words, not only the strike of the relief troops, but also the exit of the surrounded forces. It is known that the encircled troops broke through without a fight, in groups and unorganized. This was one of the reasons for the unsuccessful exit. And Commander A.A. himself is largely to blame for this. Vlasov and his staff, who lost control at the last moment and were confused. As a result, the flanks were not covered, and there was no reliable information about the actions of friendly troops. Cooperation to ensure an exit corridor (breakthrough) was not organized either.

But I don’t understand why N. Konyaev forgot to accuse, for example, A.M. Vasilevsky in the inability to break through the German defenses to save the 2nd Shock Army, since it was he, as a representative of the headquarters, who was next to Meretskov, but at the same time had significantly more powers.

In his memoirs he wrote:

“From June 10 to June 19, 1942, fierce battles took place continuously, in which large forces of troops, artillery, tanks of the 4th, 59th and 52nd armies took part... The progress of these battles was continuously monitored by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. As a result, our troops managed to break through a narrow gap in the German trap and save a significant part of the encircled 2nd Shock Army.”

Many eyewitness accounts and documents have been preserved about how General Vlasov and the remnants of his army emerged from encirclement. Let's get to know some of them.

Personal driver of General Vlasov N.V. Konkov:

“On June 22, 1942, the army command issued an order - with all available forces to storm the German defense in the Myasnoy Bor area.

This assault was planned for the evening of the same day. Everyone took part in the assault: the rank and file, the drivers, the army commander, the head of the special department of the army, and employees of the army headquarters.

At the time of preparation for the assault, the head of the special department of the army, State Security Major Shashkov, behaved especially actively and boldly. He talked with the soldiers and encouraged them, calling on them to show courage and courage at the time of the assault. During the assault, Shashkov walked with the soldiers. The army commander and staff also remained steadfast and calm and walked with the soldiers at the time of the assault. The assault began at 9-10 pm, but was not successful, since our units were met with strong mortar fire, as a result of which the assault was repulsed and units of the 2nd Shock Army were scattered.

Therefore, subsequently, organized military operations were no longer carried out, and the remaining groups of fighters and commanders left the encirclement on their own. 150–200 staff members took part in the assault. After the assault was repulsed, no more than a hundred people remained in the group of headquarters workers.”

“On June 22, it was announced in hospitals and units that those who wish could go to Myasnoy Bor. Groups of 100–200 soldiers and lightly wounded commanders moved to M. Bor without landmarks, without signs and without group leaders, ending up on the front line of the enemy’s defense and captured by the Germans. Before my eyes, a group of 50 people wandered into the Germans and were captured. Another group of 150 people walked towards the German front line of defense, and only the intervention of a group of the special department of the 92nd Infantry Division prevented the transition to the enemy’s side”...

Driver N.V. Konkov:

“On the morning of June 23, our group was joined by soldiers and commanders from units of the 2nd Shock Army, including Major General Antyufeev and the commander of one of the brigades, Colonel Cherny.

Lieutenant General Vlasov gave the order for everyone remaining to go in one group to the north, deep into the German rear, in the direction of Finev Lug, in order to escape the encirclement through the forests. As I heard from the commanders, on the evening of June 23, moving through the forest to Finev Meadow, we passed the German defenses and reached the German rear.”

Chief of Communications of the 2nd Shock Army, Major General Afanasyev:

“The strike group advanced beyond the river. Glushitsa came very close, and in some places crossed the river by 100 m. Polist. There was no further progress. Second echelons were prepared to develop a breakthrough near the river. Polist. The enemy from the west crossed the river. Kerest and decisively launched an offensive between Bulanov and Antyufeyev on Krechno, thereby threatening our command post. But thanks to the correct organization of defense at the command post, the enemy penetrated deeper only by bypassing our command post. As a result, by order of the commander, the entire command post had to concentrate in the area of ​​​​the headquarters of the 57th Infantry Brigade, that is, between the Glushitsa and Polist rivers, where they stayed from June 13 to 24.

The enemy activated aviation here too, but not without losses. The bulk of the headquarters staff with the command at their head remained intact. The Army Military Council decided that with the advance of the second echelons, the entire army headquarters would “break up” into brigade and division headquarters and make their way together to the east. All departments went to their places, and the command, the military council, the special department, Vlasov, Zuev, the head of the special department, Vinogradov, Belishev, Afanasyev and others in the amount of 120 people followed the 46th Rifle Division (division commander Colonel Cherny).”

Driver N.V. Konkov:

“On the evening of June 24, in the forest, Lieutenant General Vlasov gathered all the soldiers and commanders and announced that there was a long and difficult journey ahead, they would have to walk at least 100 km through forests and swamps, there was no food available and they would have to eat grass and what they could recapture. from the Germans. Vlasov immediately announced that those who feel weak can remain in place and take measures as they wish.

That same evening, reconnaissance reported that there was a large road ahead, along which there was a river. After the return of reconnaissance, Lieutenant General Vlasov held a meeting with headquarters employees, as a result of which it was decided to advance in small groups of 20–30 people. About ten such groups were organized, each with a leader appointed. I ended up in a group commanded by some battalion commissar, whose last name I don’t know. There were twenty people in the group, including the driver Abramov, the adjutant of the commissar of the army headquarters Petrov, the messenger of the army commander Borodavchenko and a number of others. When organizing the groups, Lieutenant General Vlasov took with him only employees of the army headquarters and the Military Council, a military doctor of the 2nd rank and waitress Maria Ignatievna and, leaving all the adjutants, messengers and drivers, went forward, after which he was not seen again.

With him went: Chief of Army Staff Colonel Vinogradov, Commissar of Army Staff Regimental Commissar Sviridov, Major General Antyufeev, Colonel Cherny, waitress Maria Ignatyevna, Major General of Artillery and a military doctor of the 2nd rank, whose names I do not know. In addition to these individuals, staff members of the headquarters also left with Vlasov, but I don’t know who exactly. I also don’t know where this group went.”

Detective officer of the 1st branch of the Special Department of the NKV D Front, State Security Lieutenant Isaev:

“At 20 o’clock on June 24, by order of the division’s logistics chief, Major Begun, the entire division’s personnel, about 300 people, set off along the clearing of the central communication line to M. Bor. Along the way, I observed the movement of similar columns from other brigades and divisions, numbering up to 3,000 people.

The column, having traveled up to three kilometers from the Drovyanoe Pole clearing, was met by a strong barrage of machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire from the enemy. Having reached the wire fence, the enemy met the column with hurricane fire, after which the command was given to retreat back to a distance of 50 m. When retreating back, mass panic resulted and the groups fled through the forest. We split into small groups and scattered through the forest, not knowing what to do next. Each person or small group solved their further task independently. There was no single leadership for the entire column. Group 92 page div. 100 people decided to go the other way, along the narrow-gauge railway. As a result, we passed through a barrage of fire to Myasnoy Bor with some losses.”

Detective officer of the 25th Infantry Brigade, political instructor Shcherbakov:

“June 24 this year. From early morning, a barrier detachment was organized, which detained all passing military personnel capable of carrying weapons, who, together with the remnants of units and subunits of the brigade, were divided into three companies. An operator was attached to each company for service. employee of the NKVD organization. When reaching the starting line, the command did not take into account the fact that the first and second companies had not yet moved to the starting line. Having pushed the third company forward, we placed it under heavy enemy mortar fire.

The company command was confused and could not provide leadership to the company. The company, having reached the flooring under enemy mortar fire, scattered in different directions. The group moved to the right side of the flooring, where there were detective officer Korolkov, platoon commander ml. Lieutenant K Uzovlev, several soldiers of the OO platoon and other units of the brigade, came across enemy bunkers and lay down under enemy mortar fire. The group consisted of only 18 - 20 people.

The group could not attack the enemy in such numbers, so platoon commander Kuzovlev suggested returning to the starting line, joining other units and leaving on the left side of the narrow-gauge railway, where enemy fire was much weaker.

Concentrating on the edge of the forest, the head of the OO comrade. Plakhatnik found Major Kononov from the 59th Infantry Brigade, joined his group with his people, with whom they moved to the narrow-gauge railway, and left together with the 59th Rifle Brigade.”

Operative officer of the 6th Guards. mortar division lieutenant of state security Lukashevich:

“The entire brigade personnel, both privates and commanders, were informed that the exit would begin by assault at exactly 23.00 on June 24, 1942 from the starting line of the river. Polist. The third battalion moved in the first echelon, and the second battalion moved in the second echelon. From the brigade command, service chiefs, and battalion commands, no one came out of the encirclement due to the delay at the command post. Having broken away from the main body of the brigade and, obviously, starting to move in a small group, they, presumably, died along the way.”

Reserve operative of the NKV D Front, Captain Gornostaev:

“Through our workers, commanders and fighters who came out, it is established that all units and formations were given a specific task about the order and interaction of entering the formation in battle. However, during this operation, a disaster occurred, small units were confused, and instead of a fist, there were small groups and even individuals. The commanders, for the same reasons, could not control the battle. This happened as a result of heavy enemy fire. There is no way to establish the actual position of all the parts, because no one knows. They say that there is no food, many groups are rushing from place to place, and no one will bother to organize all these groups and fight to join forces.”

Major General Afanasiev:

“Everyone went out at night from June 24 to June 25 at the 46th Infantry Division checkpoint, and at the moment of transition at 2 a.m. the entire group came under artillery and mortar barrage fire. Groups get lost in the smoke. One group, led by Zuev and the head of the special department with a detachment of machine gunners of 70 people, disappeared in the area of ​​the Polist River in the direction of a height of 40.5 (according to Comrade Vinogradov), that is, they left us to the right, and we and Vlasov’s group , Vinogradov, Belishev, Afanasyev and others left through the smoke of artillery and mortar explosions to the left; They organized a search for Zuev and Shashkov, but were unsuccessful. They couldn't go forward. And we decided to go back to the 46th Infantry CP, where the 46th Infantry headquarters also returned. We were waiting for a moment of calm, but, alas, during this period the enemy broke through the front from the west and was moving towards us along the clearing in platoon columns and shouting: “Rus, surrender!” I was ordered to organize the defense of the command post and meet the Fritz with organized fire, throwing them back into the forest area. I gathered 50 fighters, together with the commissar of the headquarters, Comrade. Sviridov met the Fritzes with rifle and machine gun fire, scattered them, but the enemy continued to press, increased his forces, and the fire on the command post intensified.”

“It should be noted that Comrade. Vlasov, despite the shelling, continued to stand in place, not paying attention to the terrain; one felt some kind of confusion or forgetfulness. When I began to warn, “we need to take cover,” he still remained in place. The shock of feelings was noticeable. A decision was immediately made, and Vinogradov set about organizing a retreat to the enemy’s rear with access through the front again to his own. We must frankly admit that everything was done in secret.”

Attention should be paid to the fact that Vlasov was already indifferent to everything. Perhaps to your life too. He was seized by a paralyzing shock, and in fact, he handed over all the “reins of power” to his chief of staff.

It is characteristic that General Afanasyev notices: confusion, forgetfulness, shock of feelings. Such a small psychological touch to the portrait of his commander, who is no longer able to control not only the troops, but also the group of people next to him. Note, a small group!

“But despite these conditions, willingly or unwillingly, the group voluntarily joined a single group of up to 45 people. It was clear that this did not suit him (Vinogradov). But it was too late to stop the flow. Plus, a group of 40 people from Colonel Cherny was added to this. It turned out to be quite a large group.”

And again Afanasyev mentions Vlasov in one phrase: “Comrade. Vlasov was indifferent, he was appointed general commander, and Vinogradov offered his services. Comrade me Vlasov proposed as a commissioner. A squad list was compiled. They divided it into sections: security, reconnaissance and fighters. We went further north, where in the forest along the road near Bolshoi Aprelevsky Mokh we met three groups of Larichev, Cherny and the command of the 259th Infantry Division separated from us and were moving north.”

Head of the political department of the 46th Infantry Division, Major Zubov:

“...at 12 noon on June 25, the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army and the headquarters of the 46th Infantry Division were in the same place in the forest.

Commander of the 46th Infantry Division Comrade. Cherny told me that we would now go to break through the enemy, but Commander Vlasov warned that there would be no extra people... Thus, there were 28 of us from the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army and no less from the headquarters of the 46th Infantry Division. Having no food, we went to Zamoshskoe, walking on days 25 and 26. In the evening we found a dead elk, ate, and on the morning of the 27th, the chief of staff of the 2nd shock army, after consulting with Vlasov, decided to split into two groups, since there was so much to go impossible".

So, on the night of June 24-25, a column of the Military Council and army headquarters left the headquarters of the 57th Infantry Brigade (between the Glushitsa and Polist rivers) to the area of ​​the 46th Infantry Brigade, and from there into the exit corridor to the east. Ahead is the head guard under the command of the deputy. the head of the special department of the 2nd shock army, senior lieutenant of state security Gorbov, then the Military Council of the army and rear security.

At the moment of transition when approaching the river. At 2 o'clock in the morning the column comes under mortar and artillery fire. Along the way, it turned out that no one really knew the route. They moved at random. Heading the forward combat guard, Gorbov, in accordance with the order of the battle command, did not deviate to the right and continued to move forward towards the exit, while members of the Army Military Council and a group of commanders lay down in the crater and remained in place on the western bank of the Polist River. Everyone was lost in the smoke. And when the shooting died down, one group (Zuev and Lebedev, the head of the political department, brigade commissar Garus, the deputy head of the special department of the army Sokolov, the head of the special department Shashkov, plus 70 machine gunners) went to the right, and later joined the remnants of the soldiers of the 382nd rifle division, which he commanded regiment commander Colonel Bolotov.

Another group (Vlasov, Vinogradov, Belishev, Afanasyev) went to the left. But since the forward passage was (allegedly) closed, they returned to the CP of the 46th Infantry Division, where they met with its headquarters, led by the division commander, Colonel Cherny. Everyone was waiting for calm, but the enemy broke through the front from the west and they had to organize the defense of the command post.

On the same day, the head of the army intelligence department, Colonel A.S. Rogov moved out a little later than the column of the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army. He also came across enemy barrage fire and was forced to stop. After some time, the fire began to weaken and move towards the narrow-gauge railway. Assuming that a breakthrough had formed there, Colonel Rogov moved there and escaped the encirclement.

On June 27, Zuev, Lebedev, Garus and Sokolov with a detachment of fighters numbering up to 600 people moved forward to escape the encirclement, but Bolotov was seriously wounded on the way in battle, and the detachment lost control. The soldiers, having come under enemy artillery fire, became confused in the forest. Some surrendered. Together Zuev, Lebedev, Sokolov and the beginning went into the forest. Novgorod regional department of the NKV D Grishin. The last two tried to establish the location of the army commander Vlasov, for which they went on reconnaissance, but when they returned, they did not find Zuev and Lebedev and on July 5 they left the encirclement on their own. In his report addressed to the head of the special department of the NKV D of the Volkhov Front, deputy. beginning OO NKVD 2nd Shock Army, Captain GB Sokolov indicated: “We found a hut where Vlasov was, but in this hut there was only one military trade employee named Zina, who replied that Vlasov was here, but went to the commander of the 382nd division, and then allegedly had the intention of moving to the CP of the 46th division.”

According to the assistant. beginning Directorate of the NKV DUSSR OO, Senior State Security Major Moskalenko (07/1/42): “From 06/22/42 to 06/25/42 no one left the 2nd UA. During this period, the corridor remained on the western bank of the river. Polist. The enemy fired strong mortar and artillery fire. fire. In the corridor itself there was also infiltration of machine gunners. Thus, the exit of units of the 2nd Shock Army was possible with battle.”

Let me remind you that on June 24 at 19.45 Vlasov asked for assistance from the east with manpower, tanks and to cover the troops with aviation from 3.00 on June 25. And they helped him, although they couldn’t cover him with aviation. She was not enough for such a task.

On the same night, a detachment under the command of Colonel Korkin was sent to reinforce units of the 59th Army and secure the corridor. It was formed from fighters and commanders of the 2nd Shock Army who emerged from encirclement on June 22. When enemy resistance in the corridor and on the western bank of the river. The force was broken; from about 2 o'clock, units of the 2nd Shock Army moved in a common stream, which was stopped at 8.00 due to continuous enemy air raids. On this day, about 6,000 people came out, of which 1,600 were sent to hospitals. N. Konyaev in his book, referring to the General Staff report compiled on the basis of the report of K.A. Meretskova (“On June 25, at 3:15 a.m., with a coordinated strike from the 2nd and 59th armies, the enemy’s defenses in the corridor were broken and from 1:00 a.m. units of the 2nd Army began to leave”), as always, ironically: “A man cannot It may seem strange to someone experienced in the style of staff documents that the exit of the encircled army began more than two hours before it was possible to break the enemy’s defenses. However, there is no contradiction here. After all, Kirill Afanasyevich called this insane attack of soldiers and commanders staggering from hunger “a way out of encirclement.” Well, paper will endure anything, but why write lies.

All documents and eyewitness accounts indicate that the organization of the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement suffered from serious shortcomings. The Volkhov Front headquarters is partly to blame for this, as it was unable to organize interaction between the 59th Army and the 2nd Shock Army. But there is no doubt that much of the blame lies with the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army, and specifically with its commander, who became confused and lost control not only of the troops, but also of his headquarters.

Thus, the corridor was open from approximately 2 o’clock to 8.00... and responding to the irony of the respected author, I can say: the fact is that groups of fighters and commanders of units and formations began to leave at 1.00, and the enemy’s defense was broken by 3 o’clock 15 minutes, there is nothing criminal on the part of K.A. Meretskov as front commander. Let us remember that Vlasov asked for assistance precisely from 3 o’clock, and the fact that the exit began much earlier is a question more for Vlasov, his headquarters and the commanders of formations and units of the 2nd Shock Army. According to data received from the General Staff on June 29, a group of fighters and commanders of units of the 2nd Shock Army entered the 59th Army sector through enemy rear lines to the Mikhalevo area without losses. Those who came out argued that in this area the enemy forces were few in number, while the passage corridor, tightened by a strong enemy group and targeted with mortars, artillery and intensified air strikes, was already practically inaccessible for a breakthrough of the 2nd Shock Army from both the west and 59- th army from the east.

Senior State Security Major Moskalenko noted in his report on July 1, 1942: “It is characteristic that the areas through which 40 military personnel who left the 2nd Shock Army passed were precisely indicated by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the exit of units of the 2nd Shock Army.” army, but neither the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army nor the Military Council of the Volkhov Front ensured the implementation of the Headquarters directive.”

Thus, the whole course of events of breaking out of encirclement looks truly tragic, but we must not forget that the main blame lies primarily with the commander of the 2nd Shock Army and his headquarters. Only partially does it fall on the headquarters of the Volkhov Front and its commander. Although, as you know, K.A. Meretskov arrived again in Malaya Vishera only on June 9, replacing Khozin. And we must not forget about this. Can he bear personal responsibility for the open flanks when the 2nd shock army leaves? And for the fact that during the operation in this army “a disaster occurred in which small units were lost, and instead of a fist there were small groups and individuals who were unable to fight to form a unit.” Is it his fault that no one was able to organize all these groups, that heavy enemy fire sowed panic in their ranks, and there was no single leadership? Almost everyone, even the slightly wounded, moved without landmarks, without signs, without group leaders.

One of the factors that significantly influenced the difficulty of the army’s escape from encirclement can clearly be called facts of treason and betrayal.

So on June 2, the assistant chief of the 8th department of the headquarters of the 2nd shock army, technical quartermaster of the 2nd rank Malyuk Semyon Ivanovich, went over to the side of the enemy with encryption documents and revealed the location of the units of the 2nd shock army and the location of its command post. On June 10, two German intelligence agents, arrested by the special department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front, testified that during the interrogation of captured soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army in the Abwehr, the commander of the 25th Infantry Brigade, the assistant chief of the army's operational department, the 1st rank quartermaster, and deputy were present in the Abwehr. the commander of the 2nd Shock Army and a number of others who betrayed the command and political staff to the Germans.

In the encircled army, there were also cases of group betrayal. Thus, the deputy head of the special department of the 2nd shock army, Gorbov, in the presence of the head of the special department of the 59th army, Nikitin, said that 240 people from Chernigov betrayed their Motherland. Specialists did not rule out the possibility of using the moment of the 2nd Shock Army's exit from the encirclement by German intelligence to send in converted soldiers and commanders who had previously been captured. For example, on June 27, a Red Army soldier emerged from encirclement and immediately came under suspicion. He stated that he spent a day in the crater and is now returning. When he was offered something to eat, he refused, saying he was full. The route to the exit was described by a route that was unusual for everyone. Now let’s return to the exit from General Vlasov’s encirclement.

Major General Afanasiev:

“Everyone went in different directions again. We pass the Protnino swamp, again we meet Cherny with a detachment, who ran into a minefield and turned his detachment to the northeast. Our detachments again, by Vinogradov’s decision, went down to the south, to the barns, which are south of mark 31, 8. Here we organized a reconnaissance of four people, no one returned, we waited until the morning, we decided to go north, under the Olkhovskie farmstead, where we crossed the Kerest River . The Germans took into account that units of the Red Army were moving deep into the rear, and, fearing this, they quickly organized along the river. There were pickets and guards who prevented our troops from entering the forests - deep behind enemy lines.

Having passed near the Olkhovsky (farms), we organized reconnaissance, found a suspended rope crossing made of tents, we used it, there was no picket here, and we freely crossed to the western bank of the Kerest River. Then we strictly went in the direction of Vditsko to the west. Everyone was tired, exhausted, cold, ate only grass, no salt, cooked themselves only unleavened soups and mushrooms. It was decided that the fighter squad would raid a vehicle loaded with food, pick up the food and deliver it to our forest. 15 people set out, as a result the entire group came under fire from a bunker, a battle ensued, the commissar of the headquarters, Comrade. Sviridov was wounded in the chest by a bullet right through and one soldier was killed. Their losses were 12 people. We were again left without food. We decide to go to Shchelkovka to the old place of our former checkpoint. After spending the night there, we sent in search of food to Shchelkovka and here we lost one person, two traitors were killed. We returned again with nothing. We decided to go west through the Poddubye railway... guards were discovered, but we passed through it unnoticed. We came out onto a wooden narrow-gauge railway at an intersection, 2 km east of Poddubye. A long stop was made here. Comrade Vinogradov agreed with Comrade. Vlasov, that the group should be divided into small groups, which should choose their own route and plan of action, they made lists and suggested that we move. I personally objected to this event, told my plan, that is, everyone should move to the Oredezh River. We will go fishing locally on Lake Chernoe and, if possible, on the river, and the rest of the group, with me at the head, will go to look for the partisans, where we will find a radio station, and we will be connected with our units in the east, and we will be given help. My offer was not accepted. I then asked who else wanted to go with me, one political instructor wanted to go, who was on the lists along with Vlasov, then Comrade me. Vinogradov accused me of allegedly luring him over, and that was the end of the matter. I told them my decision. The time has come for my speech. I, consisting of four people, went along my own route.

Before leaving, I started asking the group who would go where, no one had made a decision yet, I started asking Vlasov and Vinogradov, they told me that they had not made a decision yet and that they would go after everyone else. We said goodbye to them well, and I and my people set off on the road...”

The search for Vlasov began on June 25, from the very day when he did not leave the encirclement. K.A. Meretskov wrote this in his memoirs:

“But where is the army leadership? What is his fate? We took all measures to find the Military Council and the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army.

When on the morning of June 25, the officers who emerged from the encirclement reported that they had seen General Vlasov and other senior officers in the area of ​​the narrow-gauge road, I immediately sent there a tank company with an infantry landing and my adjutant, Captain M.G. Beard. The choice fell on Captain Beard not by chance. I was sure that this man would break through all the obstacles... And so, at the head of a detachment of five tanks, Beard now moved to the German rear. Four tanks were blown up by mines or were hit by the enemy. But, moving from tank to tank, Beard still reached the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army on the fifth of them. However, there was no one there anymore. Having returned, a handful of brave men reported this to me in the presence of Headquarters representative A.M. Vasilevsky. Knowing that the army headquarters had a radio with it, we periodically radioed the order to leave. By the evening of the same day, several reconnaissance groups were sent with the task of finding the Army Military Council and withdrawing it. These groups also managed to complete part of the task and reach the indicated areas, but to no avail, since they did not find Vlasov.”

N. Konyaev, in his book about Vlasov, claims that the commander of the 2nd Shock Army was last seen by the senior political instructor of a separate chemical defense company of the 25th Infantry Division, Viktor Iosifovich Klonlyev (around June 29), who testified: “Moving north with his group in the forest area, three kilometers southwest of Priyutino, I met the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, with a group of commanders and soldiers of 16 people. Among them was Major General Alferyev, several colonels and two women. He questioned me and checked my documents. He gave advice on how to get out of the encirclement. Here we spent the night together, and the next morning at three o’clock I left with my group to the north, and I was embarrassed to join and ask permission...”

N. Konyaev writes:

“This is the last news about Andrei Andreevich Vlasov. Somewhere after two o’clock in the afternoon on June 27, 1942, Vlasov’s trace was lost until July 12…”

However, this is not quite true. Having parted with Vlasov’s group, on the second day General Afanasyev’s group met with Dmitriev’s Luga partisan detachment. Dmitriev then helped contact the commander of the partisan detachment of the Oredezh region, Sazonov, who had a radio station.

On July 5, 1942, Afanasyev arrived to Sazonov, and on July 6, the following telegram was sent to the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement:

“We have Major General of Communications of the 2nd Shock Army Afanasiev. Vlasov and Vinogradov are alive. Sazonov."

And on July 8, Sazonov reported to Leningrad: “Afanasyev left Vlasov with a group of command personnel and a woman in the Yazvinka area. Sazonov."

Here it is worth paying attention to the following fact: senior political instructor V.I. Klonlyev found Vlasov with a group of 16 people. Among them he saw General Alferyev and two women. Afanasyev reported only about one woman and about Vinogradov and Vlasov (from the command staff). Consequently, General Afanasyev saw Vlasov last, and this could have been July 1 or even July 2. At the same time, the group was divided into smaller groups.

The search for Vlasov continued.

From the report of the Volkhov Front headquarters “On the operation to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement”: “To search for the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army, reconnaissance. The front department sent radio groups: 06/28/42 two groups to the Glushitsa region, both were scattered by enemy fire, and contact with them was lost. In the period from July 2 to July 13, 1942, 6 groups of three to four people each were dropped from the plane. Of these groups, one was scattered during the drop and partly returned back, two groups, successfully dropped, established communication, but did not provide the necessary data, and three groups give regular reports about the movements of small groups of commanders and fighters of the 2nd unit. armies behind enemy lines. All attempts to find traces of the Military Council have so far been unsuccessful.”

The partisans were also looking for the commander. Here is the text of radio conversations with the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement: “July 13. Zhdanov. Afanasiev arrived to us on July 5th. The Vlasovs dispersed Yazvinki. Nothing is known about him after that. I sent 22 people on the wanted list, two groups of 19 people, 5 regional activists. I continue the search. Sazanov." And one more thing: “July 14th. The commanders of the partisan brigades operating in the partisan region have been summoned to the city of Valdai, where they will receive the task of organizing combat operations on a number of enemy communications in the event of the possible transportation of prisoners from among the command staff of the 2nd Shock Army.”

In his memoirs A.M. Vasilevsky expressed a very interesting idea: “However, despite all the measures taken with the involvement of partisans, special detachments, parachute groups and other measures, we were unable to remove Vlasov’s encirclement from the ring. And it was not possible to do it, first of all, because Vlasov himself did not want it.”

All documents and eyewitness accounts indirectly speak of this. But the facts stubbornly convince us that A.A. Vlasov was in no hurry to leave the encirclement and was biding his time. Apparently he had reasons for this. So, we have established that General Afanasyev was the last to see Vlasov. What's next?

N. Konyaev believes: “Somewhere after two o’clock in the afternoon on June 27, 1942, the trace of Vlasov is lost until July 12.” Actually this is not true. Konstantin Antonovich Tokarev, a reserve major, was a special correspondent for Frontovaya Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda during the war. In the late 1980s he testified:

“And Vlasov took refuge in the guardhouse of Prokhor, the Volkhov watchman, a former coachman who knew and remembered Vlasov’s father from the Nizhny Novgorod fair, where he got drunk and confessed to the shrine with the lamp. Prokhor, who later fought in a partisan detachment, told me that Vlasov demanded his “old clothes” and changed his clothes. “Eneral,” as Prokhor called him, whispered something, as if he was calling one of those ghosts that lurked behind the dark faces of the icons, slightly illuminated by the lamp. That same night, having waited at the guardhouse for his “doctor’s wife” and a bodyguard with horses in the absence of Prokhor, Vlasov and his fellow travelers rode out on horseback onto a remote forest path, and were no longer seen on this side... The partisans came out to the fugitives and invited the tramps to follow to the forest base ( The same Prokhor told me about this). They answered that they had fallen ill from hunger and dampness and were unable to go further. The partisans made a stretcher out of poles. But Vlasov and his Dunya turned out to be so heavy that they were forced to leave them in the barn under the supervision of a guard, promising to return with help and horses. When the partisans returned a day later, neither Vlasov nor the “doctor’s wife” were in the barn, and the guard lay dead at the door...”

We can learn about what happened next from the interrogation protocol of September 21, 1945 of Maria Ignatievna Voronova, who arrived from Berlin and settled in the city. Baranovichi. This is the same doctor “Dunya” from the story by K.A. Tokarev (Prokhor). Field wife (PPW) A.A. Vlasov from the 20th Army. She entered the service as a civilian and served in the military trade system as a chef. Then she was transferred to work in the canteen of the Military Council of the Army, where she met Vlasov and replaced his former PPZh. It is characteristic that Vlasov loved comfort very much and even in the field he always kept women nearby. He is probably the only general of the Red Army who emerged from encirclement with a woman and was captured with her. Our history has not known such examples until then and still does not know them.

So, Maria Voronova said:

“Around June 1942, near Novgorod, the Germans discovered us in the forest and forced a battle, after which Vlasov, I, the soldier Kotov and the driver Pogibko escaped into the swamp, crossed it and reached the villages. Killed with the wounded soldier Kotov went to one village, and Vlasov and I went to another. When we entered a village, I don’t know its name, we went into one house, where we were mistaken for partisans, the local “self-defense” surrounded the house, and we were arrested. We were put in a collective farm barn, and the next day the Germans arrived, showed Vlasov a portrait of him in a general’s uniform cut out from a newspaper, and Vlasov was forced to admit that he was really Lieutenant General Vlasov. Previously, he had been recommended by a refugee teacher. The Germans, making sure that they had caught Lieutenant General Vlasov, put us in a car and brought us to the Siverskaya station, to the German headquarters. Here I was put in a prisoner of war camp, located in the town of Malaya Vyra, and Vlasov was taken to Germany two days later.”

K.A. told a slightly different story about the captivity of Vlasov. Tokarev:

“Vlasov was accidentally “found” by the headman of the Russian Old Believer village. He detained a tall man in glasses and a tunic without insignia, in worn-out boots, and his companion - they were exchanging watches for food in the village. The headman locked them in the barn and reported this to the Germans. Vlasov and his companion on the same day - it was July 12 - were sent to the commander of the 18th German Army, General Lindemann. The headman, for his vigilance, received a reward from the German authorities - a cow, 10 packs of tobacco, two bottles of “cumin vodka and a certificate of honor.”

And here is what the former communications chief of the 4th German Air Division, Captain Ulrich Gard, said:

“Vlasov, wearing clothes without insignia, was hiding in a bathhouse near the village of Mostki, south of Chudov. He was discovered by the village chief and reported to a German officer passing through the village. When they opened the door and commanded “hands up!”, Vlasov shouted: “Don’t shoot, I am General Vlasov, the commander of the second shock army.”

There is no reason to doubt the reliability of all these sources. They differ only in minor details, but their essence is the same.

On July 21, 1942, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria informed Comrade Stalin about the results of the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement. At the end of the memo, in particular, it was stated: “On July 14, German radio broadcasting in a report from the high command reported: “During the cleaning of the recent Volkhov cauldron, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was found in his shelter and captured.”

Commenting on this, N. Konyaev writes:

“Let’s pay attention to the words about “our refuge.” It seems that Vinogradov and Vlasov knew of some spare, unused command post of the 2nd Shock Army, where there was a supply of food... This command post became “his refuge” for General Vlasov.”

It is known that Vlasov was captured in the village. The Germans were looking for him. And if he had been hiding in some spare “shelter” that was not used by the checkpoint, he would have been found first of all by his own people or, in extreme cases, by the Germans. Both of them knew all the CPs and ZCPs of the 2nd Shock Army. In addition, the entire territory was continuously combed by the enemy. All the facts confirm again and again that the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov was not going to surrender to the Germans, but he was in no hurry or did not want to go out to his own people. Moreover, every day his chances of reaching his own people decreased. And the fact that they couldn’t find him was because Vlasov himself didn’t want it. Why?

No one knows and will never say what was going on in the head and soul of this person, because traitors are not born, they are made. And yet this question can be partially answered. And I'll try.

In Bor, near the village of Shchelkovka, in the general’s hut, correspondent K.A. Tokarev found his work “The Terrible and Kurbsky” “read” by Vlasov (before the war, K.A. Tokarev studied history and was a graduate student at Leningrad University) with many comments from Vlasov, from which Tokarev realized that he hated the first for the oprichnina, and bowed to the second .

Exactly the same notes appeared in the old edition of Prince Kurbsky’s “Tales” with a foreword by the publisher, the historian Ustryalov from Kazan University. Judging by the comments in the margins, Vlasov was looking for analogies in the ancient past with modernity and with his destiny...

General Vlasov knew very well the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army dated August 16, 1941 No. 270, marked “Without publication,” but to be read “in all companies, squadrons, squadrons, commands and headquarters.”

This order stated:

“But we cannot hide the fact that recently there have been several shameful facts of surrender to the enemy. Some generals set a bad example for our troops. The commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General Kachalov, being surrounded by the headquarters of a group of troops, showed cowardice and surrendered to the German fascists. The headquarters of Kachalov’s group emerged from encirclement, parts of Kachalov’s group fought their way out of encirclement, and Lieutenant General Kachalov chose to surrender, chose to desert to the enemy.

Lieutenant General Ponedelin, who commanded the 12th Army, having found himself surrounded by the enemy, had every opportunity to break through to his own, as did the vast majority of units of his army. But Ponedelin did not show the necessary persistence and will to win, succumbed to panic, became cowardly and surrendered to the enemy, deserted to the enemy, thus committing a crime against the Motherland, as a violator of the military oath.

The commander of the 13th Rifle Corps, Major General Kirillov, who found himself surrounded by Nazi troops, instead of fulfilling his duty to the Motherland, organizing the units entrusted to him to staunchly repel the enemy and escape from the encirclement, deserted from the battlefield and surrendered to the enemy . As a result of this, units of the 13th Rifle Corps were defeated, and some of them surrendered without serious resistance.

It should be noted that with all the above facts of surrender to the enemy, members of the military councils of the armies, commanders, political workers, special detachment officers who were surrounded, showed unacceptable confusion, shameful cowardice and did not even try to prevent the frightened Kachalov, Ponedelin, Kirillov and others from surrendering. to the enemy.

These shameful facts of surrender to our sworn enemy indicate that in the ranks of the Red Army, which steadfastly and selflessly defends its Soviet Motherland from vile invaders, there are unstable, cowardly, cowardly elements. And these cowardly elements exist not only among the Red Army soldiers, but also among the commanding personnel. As you know, some commanders and political workers, by their behavior at the front, not only do not show the Red Army soldiers an example of courage, perseverance and love for the Motherland, but, on the contrary, hide in the cracks, fiddle around in offices, do not see or observe the battlefield, and at the first serious difficulties in battle they give in to the enemy, tear off their insignia, and desert from the battlefield.

Is it possible to tolerate in the ranks of the Red Army cowards who desert to the enemy and surrender to him, or such cowardly commanders who, at the first hitch at the front, tear off their insignia and desert to the rear? No you can not! If these cowards and deserters are given free rein, they will quickly disintegrate our army and ruin our Motherland. Cowards and deserters must be destroyed..."

“I order:

1. Commanders and political workers who, during battle, tear off their insignia and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy, are considered malicious deserters, whose families are subject to arrest as the families of deserters who violated the oath and betrayed their homeland.

Oblige all higher commanders and commissars to shoot on the spot such deserters from the command staff.

2. Those units and subunits who are surrounded by the enemy, selflessly fight to the last possible opportunity, take care of their material as the apple of their eye, fight their way to their own behind the rear of the enemy troops, defeating the fascist dogs. Oblige every serviceman, regardless of his official position, demand from a superior commander, if part of him is surrounded, to fight to the last opportunity in order to break through to his own, and if such a commander or part of the Red Army soldiers, instead of organizing resistance to the enemy, prefer to surrender to him, destroy them all means, both ground and air, and the families of the Red Army soldiers who surrendered were deprived of state benefits and assistance..."

The order was signed by the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. Stalin, his deputy Molotov, Marshals of the Soviet Union S. Budyonny, K. Voroshilov, S. Timoshenko, B. Shaposhnikov and Army General Zhukov.

Now let’s talk about the victims of the 270th order, or rather about what Vlasov and many others did not know about.

Kachalov Vladimir Yakovlevich. 51 years old In the First World War - staff captain. In the Red Army since 1918. During the Civil War he was wounded five times. After its completion, he commanded a cavalry brigade, division, and corps. Graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. He commanded the troops of the districts, then the 28th Army. Awarded two Orders of the Red Banner.

Ponedelin Pavel Grigorievich. 48 years old. In the First World War - commander of a platoon, company, battalion. From 1918 in the Red Army, and after the end of the Civil War he commanded rifle brigades and a regiment. Graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze, taught there. In July 1940 he was chief of staff of the Leningrad Military District, and from March 1941 he commanded the 12th Army. Awarded the Order of Lenin and two Orders of the Red Banner.

Kirillov Nikolay Kuzmich. 43 years. In the First World War, commander of a company or battalion. In the Red Army since 1920 - company and platoon commander. After the Civil War he commanded rifle regiments, a division, and a corps. Awarded the Order of the Red Star.

On September 29, 1941, a thirty-minute court hearing took place to consider Kachalov’s case. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR found Kachalov guilty of the fact that during the combat operations of units of the 28th Army on the Western Front on August 4, 1941 in the area of ​​​​the city of Roslavl near the village of Starinka, leaving his troops and using a tank at his disposal, he crossed to the side of the enemy.

The military board sentenced Kachalov to death. In addition, on the basis of a resolution of a special meeting at the NKV D dated December 27, 1941, Kachalov’s wife, Elena Nikolaevna Khanchina-Kachalova, and her mother, Elena Ivanovna Khanchina, were imprisoned for 8 years. October 13, 1941 by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in a closed court hearing on the basis of Art. The 58th “b” Criminal Code of the RSFSR sentenced the former commander of the 12th Army, Lieutenant General Pavel Grigorievich Ponedelin, and the former commander of the 13th Rifle Corps, Major General Nikolai Kuzmich Kirillov, to execution in absentia.

They were found guilty of the fact that in August 1941, finding themselves surrounded by German troops in the area of ​​the city of Uman, they surrendered to the enemy without resistance. Based on the resolution of a special meeting at the NKV D of the USSR on October 12, 1941, that is, before the court decision took place, Ponedelin’s wife, N.M. Ponedelina. and his father - Ponedelin G.V. were imprisoned in a forced labor camp for a period of 5 years each. Kirillov’s wife – Kirillova N.M. as a member of the family of a traitor to the Motherland, she was sentenced on October 19, 1941 by the military tribunal of the Volga Military District to exile in the Krasnoyarsk Territory for a period of 5 years.

The most amazing thing is that General Kachalov died in battle on August 4, 1941. Then Soviet tanks failed to break out of the encirclement. This became known only in 1952, when an eyewitness to this battle was found, who was driving the tank of General Kachalov. Then this tank was hit and caught fire.

But only on December 23, 1953, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced V.Ya. Kachalov. due to newly discovered circumstances, it was canceled and the case was terminated due to the lack of corpus delicti in his actions. Elena Nikolaevna Khanchina-Kachalova died in 1957 from a severe heart disease at the age of 45. Her mother died back in 1944 in a camp.

General Vlasov knew nothing about this. Vlasov could have escaped the encirclement alive and could have died upon leaving on June 25. He could have been taken out in a tank by Meretskov's adjutant, Boroda, or taken out by our scouts or partisans. He could. In principle, he had nothing to fear, since the 270th order of Headquarters mainly concerned only those who surrendered. Generals Ponedelin and Kirillov, although they did not voluntarily surrender, nevertheless fell into the hands of the Germans.

Vlasov had time to think, and he thought from June 25 to July 12, 1942. There is an opinion in Russian literature: General Vlasov was afraid of responsibility, became cowardly and therefore began to collaborate with the Germans. But he was captured because he could not get out of the encirclement. But all this is not entirely true. While working on the book, I came up with an interesting version. I assumed that General Vlasov might have wanted to stay in the temporarily occupied territory by the Germans, change his name and get lost there.

There were such examples. Major General Stepan Arsentievich Moshenin, chief of artillery of the 24th Army of the Western Front, holder of three orders, in October 1941, together with his headquarters, found himself surrounded by German troops. He changed into civilian clothes, destroyed personal documents and remained behind enemy lines. He was detained by them and worked for 8 months on repairs and re-stitching of railway tracks in the front line. At the end of June 1942 he escaped and got a job in an agricultural community. Moshenin was arrested for treason on August 28, 1943. However, A. A. Vlasov simply would not have been able to hide and get lost. His height, and perhaps his horn-rimmed glasses, were too noticeable differences. Moreover, the general’s portrait was published in all newspapers in the occupied territory. They searched for him every day. Accordingly, this version simply disappears.

Thus, there is only one version left. Examining documents, evidence and facts, I came to the conclusion that Vlasov still had a fear of responsibility, or, more precisely, could have had it. We must not forget that in those days there were slightly different concepts of crime and punishment.

And the fate of the general who emerged from encirclement depended entirely on the decision the leader would make. And the leader could accept him only after the corresponding reports from the commander of the Volkhov Front, the representative of the Headquarters on the Volkhov Front and reports from the special department of the NKV D of the Volkhov Front. Apparently, Andrei Andreevich was still afraid of responsibility for failure to comply with the directives of Headquarters, for the loss of control of the army, for his confusion and for much, much more. He had reasons to be afraid of something. For example, reports by K.A. Meretskov, with whom he had a very difficult relationship, and reports by A.M. Vasilevsky. In the end, Vlasov could “invent his own” punishment and be afraid of it. In the psychological state in which he had apparently been since April (the moment of his unwanted appointment as part-time army commander), then from June 2 (the day of complete encirclement) and finally from June 24 to 25 - the day of leaving the encirclement. I think he understood perfectly well that his career could end there. It was a kind of chess game when it was necessary to decide: what to do in the current situation? He was afraid to return to his people, afraid to meet with K.A. Meretskov, was afraid of meeting Stalin.

“Commanding the troops of the 2nd Shock Army and ending up in the mountains. Lyuban surrounded by German troops, I betrayed my Motherland. This was a consequence of the fact that, starting from 1937, I was hostile to the policies of the Soviet government, believing that the gains of the Russian people during the Civil War by the Bolsheviks were nullified. I perceived the failures of the Red Army during the war with Germany as the result of inept leadership of the country and was convinced of the defeat of the Soviet Union. I was sure that the interests of the Russian people were brought by Stalin and the Soviet government to please the Anglo-American capitalists. While surrounded by the enemy, my anti-Soviet sentiments worsened even more and, not wanting to fight for interests alien to me, on July 13, 1942, taking advantage of the arrival of the Germans in the village where I was, I voluntarily surrendered to them as a prisoner.”

Of those who went out with Vlasov, Major General M.A. was captured. Beleshev, commander of the Air Force of the 2nd Shock Army, and commander of the 46th Infantry Division, Colonel F.E. Black.

Head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 2nd Shock Army A.G. Shashkov was wounded on the night of June 24-25 and shot himself. Divisional Commissioner I.V. Zuev will die in a few days, running into a German patrol. Chief of Staff of the 2nd Shock Army P.S. Vinogradov died, deputy. Commander P.F. Alferyev went missing and apparently also died.

In total, 13,018 people emerged from the encirclement, despite the fact that on June 1, the 2nd Shock Army had, according to the lists of units and formations, 40,157 personnel (6 rifle brigades and 8 rifle divisions). Of the 27,139 people who were surrounded, most died in battle with the enemies, and some surrendered.

“Hitler’s scribblers cite an astronomical figure of 30,000 allegedly captured prisoners, and also that the number of those killed exceeds the number of prisoners many times over. Of course, this latest Hitler fake does not correspond to the facts... According to incomplete data, in these battles the Germans lost at least 30,000 people killed... Units of the 2nd Shock Army retreated to a pre-prepared line. Our losses in these battles are up to 10,000 people killed, about 10,000 people missing..."

YES. Volkogonov, in his book “Stalin,” commenting on this message, wrote: “It is very difficult to believe that both the Germans and our losses are always so “round”! Only today we are gradually learning that in the early spring, a poorly prepared operation of the Volkhov Front swallowed up thousands and thousands of Soviet people in the swamps, who to this day are bitterly listed as “missing in action”!

If we talk about the losses of only the 2nd Shock Army, then the Sovinformburo did not make a big mistake.

According to him, 20,000 people died or went missing, and according to archival documents, which are beyond doubt, this figure is slightly higher - 27,139.

But D.A. Volkogonov was somewhat mistaken. After all, if we consider the figures of losses in the Lyuban offensive operation (7.1 - 30.4.42, Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front) and the figures of losses in the operation to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front (13.5 - 10.7.42), where they took the participation of three armies: the 2nd shock army, the 52nd and 59th armies of the Volkhov Front, then they are truly astronomical. Judge for yourself:

I don’t remember which of the authors or publishers called the Lyuban operation an “optimistic tragedy.” And indeed, despite the enormous losses, the significance of this heroic epic is extremely great. The Volkhov Front, having absorbed about 15 enemy divisions, created favorable conditions for the offensive of other fronts and, above all, the right wing of the North-Western Front near Demyansk.

Even the changes in the combat strength of the 18th Army of Army Group North, against which the Volkhov Front fought, speak volumes.

If on June 27, 1941, the German 18th Army consisted of: 1st Army Corps (1st, 11th, 21st Infantry Divisions); 26th Army Corps (61, 217 infantry divisions); 38th Army Corps (58, 291st infantry divisions). Total: three army corps (7 infantry divisions). Then already on August 12, 1942, the size of this army seems fantastic: 38th Army Corps (212 infantry divisions, 250 infantry divisions (Spanish); 1st Army Corps (1, 61, 254 and 291 infantry. division); 28th Army Corps (11, 21, 96, 217 and 269 Infantry Divisions, 5th Mountain Division); 26th Army Corps (223 and 227 Infantry Divisions, units of the 207th ( 374 infantry regiment), 285 (322 infantry regiment) security divisions); 50th Army Corps (58, 121, 215 infantry divisions, SS police division, 2 SS brigade, SS legion Norway, 1 regiment 93- 1st infantry division, 2 regiments of the 225th infantry division, group “Jekeln”); 170th infantry division (in transfer); 2 regiments of the 93rd infantry division, most of the 12th tank division.

Consequently, by the summer of 1942, the number of divisions of the 18th Army of Army Group North had more than doubled. From 7 to 18, and this is not counting 6 more regiments, a brigade, a legion, a group and part of a tank division. Something to think about! But now we can talk about poor management of front-line operations, about huge losses “for nothing.” But those who think so simply weren’t there then, in those conditions. We weren’t in the “skin” of Stalin, we weren’t in Malaya Vishera at the front command post next to K.A. Meretskov. How do they know what a war, an operation, or combat operations are like after the defeat of 1941!

Paul Carell in his book "The Road to Nowhere: The Wehrmacht and the Eastern Front in 1942" wrote: “The first interrogations of the captured headquarters officers showed that the Soviet offensive on the Volkhov Front was prepared in all respects very carefully and professionally. For example, maps for this operation were specially prepared by a special department created for this offensive operation. But where did the cards go? A thorough search was undertaken at all battle sites - but in vain. The cards disappeared without a trace.

In the end, they found one junior lieutenant who was related to the cartographic department. He told everything. Having brought German specialists to the bank of some nondescript river, even a trickle, he advised them to divert the water and dig deep into the mud at the bottom - that’s where the cache of the Soviet cartographic department was located. Just as the Visigoths once buried their king Alaric, so the head of the cartographic department hid three truckloads of military maps at the bottom of the stream. This was the most valuable find of cartographic material that the Germans acquired during the entire Second World War. Maps from the western borders of Russia to the Urals. The trophy was immediately sent to Berlin, and since then troops on all fronts have had the opportunity to work using the most reliable maps.”

Well, in this case, it was not without the betrayal of a junior officer. But the fact remains: the maps found did not help the Wehrmacht.

It was about how Andrey Vlasov was considered a talented and promising general of the Red Army. After commanding (often successfully) a number of units, on April 20, 1942, Vlasov was appointed commander of the 2nd Shock Army. This army, intended to break the blockade of Leningrad, found itself in a difficult situation by the end of spring. In June, the Germans closed the “corridor” connecting army units with the main front line. About 20 thousand people remained surrounded, along with the commander, General Vlasov.

Rescue of General Afanasyev

Both the Germans and ours, knowing that the command of the 2nd Shock Army remained surrounded, tried at all costs to find him.

Vlasov's headquarters, meanwhile, tried to get out. The few surviving witnesses claimed that after the failed breakthrough, a breakdown occurred in the general. He looked indifferent and did not hide from the shelling. Took command of the detachment Chief of Staff of the 2nd Shock Army Colonel Vinogradov.

The group, wandering around the rear, tried to reach their own. It entered into skirmishes with the Germans, suffered losses, and gradually dwindled.

The key moment occurred on the night of July 11. Chief of Staff Vinogradov suggested dividing into groups of several people and going out to their own people on their own. He objected Chief of Army Communications Major General Afanasyev. He suggested that everyone should go together to the Oredezh River and Lake Chernoe, where they could feed themselves by fishing, and where the partisan detachments should be located. Afanasyev’s plan was rejected, but no one stopped him from moving on his route. 4 people left with Afanasyev.

Literally a day later, Afanasyev’s group met with the partisans, who contacted the “Big Land”. A plane arrived for the general and took him to the rear.

Alexey Vasilyevich Afanasyev turned out to be the only representative of the senior command staff of the 2nd Shock Army who managed to escape from the encirclement. After the hospital, he returned to duty and continued his service, finishing his career as the chief of communications for the artillery of the Soviet Army.

“Don’t shoot, I’m General Vlasov!”

Vlasov's group was reduced to four people. He broke up with Vinogradov, who was ill, which is why the general gave him his overcoat.

On July 12, Vlasov's group split up to go to two villages in search of food. Stayed with the general cook of the canteen of the military council of the army Maria Voronova.

They entered the village of Tuchovezy, introducing themselves as refugees. Vlasov, who identified himself as a school teacher, asked for food. They were fed, after which they suddenly pointed weapons and locked them in a barn. The “hospitable host” turned out to be the local elder, who called local residents from among the auxiliary police for help.

It is known that Vlasov had a pistol with him, but he did not resist.

The headman did not identify the general, but considered those who came to be partisans.

The next morning, a German special group arrived in the village and was asked by the headman to pick up the prisoners. The Germans waved it off because they were coming for... General Vlasov.

The day before, the German command received information that General Vlasov had been killed in a skirmish with a German patrol. The corpse in the general's overcoat, which was examined by members of the group upon arriving at the scene, was identified as the body of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army. In fact, Colonel Vinogradov was killed.

On the way back, having already passed Tuchowiezy, the Germans remembered their promise and returned for the unknown.

When the barn door opened, a phrase in German sounded from the darkness:

- Don’t shoot, I’m General Vlasov!

Two destinies: Andrey Vlasov vs. Ivan Antyufeev

At the very first interrogations, the general began to give detailed testimony, reporting on the state of the Soviet troops and giving characteristics to Soviet military leaders. And just a few weeks later, while in a special camp in Vinnitsa, Andrei Vlasov himself would offer the Germans his services in the fight against the Red Army and Stalin’s regime.

What made him do this? Vlasov’s biography shows that not only did he not suffer from the Soviet system and from Stalin, but he received everything he had. The story about the abandoned 2nd Shock Army, as shown above, is also a myth.

For comparison, we can cite the fate of another general who survived the Myasny Bor disaster.

Ivan Mikhailovich Antyufeev, commander of the 327th Infantry Division, took part in the Battle of Moscow, and then with his unit was transferred to break the siege of Leningrad. The 327th Division achieved the greatest success in the Lyuban operation. Just as the 316th Rifle Division was unofficially called "Panfilovskaya", the 327th Rifle Division received the name "Antyufeevskaya".

Antyufeyev received the rank of major general at the height of the battles near Lyuban, and did not even have time to change his shoulder straps from a colonel to a general, which played a role in his future fate. The division commander also remained in the “cauldron” and was wounded on July 5 while trying to escape.

The Nazis, having captured the officer, tried to persuade him to cooperate, but were refused. At first he was kept in a camp in the Baltic states, but then someone reported that Antyufeyev was actually a general. He was immediately transferred to a special camp.

When it became known that he was the commander of the best division of Vlasov’s army, the Germans began to rub their hands. It seemed to them self-evident that Antyufeyev would follow the path of his boss. But even having met Vlasov face to face, the general refused the offer to cooperate with the Germans.

Antyufeyev was presented with a fabricated interview in which he declared his readiness to work for Germany. They explained to him that now for the Soviet leadership he is an undoubted traitor. But here, too, the general answered “no.”

General Antyufeyev stayed in the concentration camp until April 1945, when he was liberated by American troops. He returned to his homeland and was reinstated in the Soviet Army. In 1946, General Antyufeyev was awarded the Order of Lenin. He retired from the army in 1955 due to illness.

But it’s a strange thing - the name of General Antyufeyev, who remained faithful to the oath, is known only to fans of military history, while everyone knows about General Vlasov.

“He had no convictions - he had ambition”

So why did Vlasov make the choice that he did? Maybe because what he loved most in life was fame and career growth. Suffering in captivity did not promise lifetime glory, not to mention comfort. And Vlasov stood, as he thought, on the side of the strong.

Let us turn to the opinion of a person who knew Andrei Vlasov. Writer and journalist Ilya Erenburg met with the general at the peak of his career, in the midst of his successful battle near Moscow. Here is what Ehrenburg wrote about Vlasov years later: “Of course, someone else’s soul is dark; nevertheless, I dare to state my guesses. Vlasov is not Brutus or Prince Kurbsky, it seems to me that everything was much simpler. Vlasov wanted to complete the task assigned to him; he knew that Stalin would congratulate him again, he would receive another order, rise to prominence, and amaze everyone with his art of interrupting quotes from Marx with Suvorov jokes. It turned out differently: the Germans were stronger, the army was again surrounded. Vlasov, wanting to save himself, changed his clothes. When he saw the Germans, he was afraid: a simple soldier could be killed on the spot. Once captured, he began to think about what to do. He knew political literacy well, admired Stalin, but he had no convictions - he had ambition. He understood that his military career was over. If the Soviet Union wins, at best he will be demoted. So, there is only one thing left: accept the Germans’ offer and do everything so that Germany wins. Then he will be the commander-in-chief or minister of war of a ripped-off Russia under the auspices of the victorious Hitler. Of course, Vlasov never said that to anyone, he declared on the radio that he had long hated the Soviet system, that he longed to “liberate Russia from the Bolsheviks,” but he himself gave me a proverb: “Every Fedorka has his own excuses.”... Bad people exists everywhere, it does not depend either on the political system or on upbringing.”

General Vlasov was mistaken - betrayal did not bring him back to the top. On August 1, 1946, in the courtyard of Butyrka prison, Andrei Vlasov, stripped of his title and awards, was hanged for treason.

From the editor:

Every year on May 9, our country celebrates Victory Day and pays tribute to the valiant defenders of the Fatherland - living and dead. But it turns out that not everyone who should be remembered with a kind word is remembered and known by us. The lies of totalitarian ideology have given rise to myths for many years. Myths that became truth for several generations of Soviet people. But sooner or later the truth becomes known. People, as a rule, are in no hurry to part with myths. It’s more convenient and familiar this way... Here is one of the stories about how a national hero, a favorite of the authorities, “became a traitor.” This story happened with the combat lieutenant general of the Red Army Andrei Vlasov.

Who are you, General Vlasov?

So, autumn 1941. The Germans attack Kyiv. However, they cannot take the city. The defense has been greatly strengthened. And it is headed by a forty-year-old Major General of the Red Army, commander of the 37th Army, Andrei Vlasov. A legendary figure in the army. Came all the way - from private to general. He went through the civil war, graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod theological seminary, and studied at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. Friend of Mikhail Blucher. Just before the war, Andrei Vlasov, then still a colonel, was sent to China as military advisers to Chiang Kai-shek. He received the Order of the Golden Dragon and a gold watch as a reward, which aroused the envy of the entire Red Army generals. However, Vlasov was not happy for long. Upon returning home, at Almaty customs the order itself, as well as other generous gifts from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, were confiscated by the NKVD...

Returning home, Vlasov quickly received general's stars and an appointment to the 99th Infantry Division, famous for its backwardness. A year later, in 1941, the division was recognized as the best in the Red Army and was the first among the units to be awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle. Immediately after this, Vlasov, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, took command of one of the four created mechanized corps. Headed by a general, he was stationed in Lvov and was practically one of the very first units of the Red Army to enter hostilities. Even Soviet historians were forced to admit that the Germans “got punched in the face for the first time,” precisely from the mechanized corps of General Vlasov.

However, the forces were unequal, and the Red Army retreated to Kyiv. It was here that Joseph Stalin, shocked by Vlasov’s courage and ability to fight, ordered the general to gather the retreating units in Kyiv, form the 37th Army and defend Kyiv.

So, Kyiv, September-August 1941. Fierce fighting is taking place near Kyiv. German troops are suffering colossal losses. In Kyiv itself... there are trams.

Nevertheless, the well-known Georgy Zhukov insists on the surrender of Kyiv to the attacking Germans. After a small intra-army “showdown,” Joseph Stalin gives the order: “Leave Kyiv.” It is unknown why Vlasov’s headquarters was the last to receive this order. History is silent about this. However, according to some as yet unconfirmed reports, this was revenge on the obstinate general. The revenge of none other than Army General Georgy Zhukov. After all, just recently, a few weeks ago, Zhukov, while inspecting the positions of the 37th Army, came to Vlasov and wanted to stay the night. Vlasov, knowing Zhukov’s character, decided to joke and offered Zhukov the best dugout, warning him about night shelling. According to eyewitnesses, the army general changed his face after these words and hastened to retreat from his position. It’s clear, said the officers present, who wants to expose their heads... On the night of September 19, practically undestroyed Kyiv was abandoned by Soviet troops.

Later, we all learned that 600,000 military personnel ended up in the “Kiev cauldron” through Zhukov’s efforts. The only one who withdrew his army from encirclement with minimal losses was “Andrei Vlasov, who did not receive the order to withdraw.”

Having been out of the Kyiv encirclement for almost a month, Vlasov caught a cold and was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of inflammation of the middle ear. However, after a telephone conversation with Stalin, the general immediately left for Moscow. The role of General Vlasov in the defense of the capital is discussed in the article “The failure of the German plan to encircle and capture Moscow” in the newspapers “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, “Izvestia” and “Pravda” dated December 13, 1941. Moreover, among the troops the general is called nothing less than “the savior of Moscow.” And in the “Certificate for Army Commander Comrade. Vlasov A.A.,” dated 24.2.1942 and signed by deputy. head HR Department of the NPO Personnel Directorate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Zhukov and head. The Sector of the Personnel Administration of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) reads: “By working as a regiment commander from 1937 to 1938 and by working as a rifle division commander from 1939 to 1941, Vlasov is certified as comprehensively developed, well prepared in operational and tactical terms commander."

(Military Historical Journal, 1993, N. 3, pp. 9-10.). This has never happened in the history of the Red Army: possessing only 15 tanks, General Vlasov stopped Walter Model’s tank army in the Moscow suburb of Solnechegorsk and pushed back the Germans, who were already preparing for a parade on Moscow’s Red Square, 100 kilometers away, liberating three cities... It was from which he received the nickname “the savior of Moscow.” After the battle of Moscow, the general was appointed deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

What remains behind the Sovinformburo reports?

And everything would be just great if, after the completely mediocre operational policy of the Headquarters and the General Staff, Leningrad found itself in a ring akin to Stalingrad. And the Second Shock Army, sent to the rescue of Leningrad, was hopelessly blocked in Myasny Bor. This is where the fun begins. Stalin demanded punishment for those responsible for the current situation. And the highest military officials sitting on the General Staff really did not want to hand over their drinking buddies, the commanders of the Second Shock, to Stalin. One of them wanted to have absolute command of the front, without having any organizational abilities for this. The second, no less “skillful”, wanted to take this power away from him.

The third of these “friends,” who drove the Red Army soldiers of the Second Shock Army in front under German fire, later became the Marshal of the USSR and the Minister of Defense of the USSR. The fourth, who did not give a single clear command to the troops, imitated a nervous attack and left... to serve in the General Staff. Stalin was informed that “the group’s command needs to strengthen its leadership.” Here Stalin was reminded of General Vlasov, who was appointed commander of the Second Shock Army. Andrei Vlasov understood that he was flying to his death. As a person who went through the crucible of this war near Kiev and Moscow, he knew that the army was doomed, and no miracle would save it. Even if he himself is a miracle - General Andrei Vlasov, savior of Moscow.

One can only imagine that the military general changed his mind « Douglas », flinching from the explosions of German anti-aircraft guns, and who knows, if the German anti-aircraft gunners had been luckier, they would have shot down this « Douglas » .

Whatever grimace history would make... And now we would not have the heroically deceased Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov. According to existing, I emphasize, information that has not yet been confirmed, there was a proposal against Vlasov on Stalin’s table. And the Supreme Commander-in-Chief even signed it...

Official propaganda presents further events as follows: traitor general A. Vlasov voluntarily surrendered. With all the ensuing consequences...

But few people to this day know that when the fate of the Second Shock became obvious, Stalin sent a plane for Vlasov. Of course, the general was his favorite! But Andrei Andreevich has already made his choice. And he refused to evacuate, sending the wounded on the plane. Eyewitnesses of this incident say that the general threw through his teeth « What kind of commander abandons his army to destruction? »

There are eyewitness accounts that Vlasov refused to abandon the fighters of the 2nd Shock Army who were actually dying of hunger due to the criminal mistakes of the Supreme Command and fly away to save his life. And not the Germans, but the Russians, who went through the horrors of the German and then Stalinist camps and, despite this, did not accuse Vlasov of treason. General Vlasov with a handful of fighters decided to break through to his...

Captivity

On the night of July 12, 1942, Vlasov and a handful of soldiers accompanying him went to the Old Believer village of Tukhovezhi and took refuge in a barn. And at night, the barn where the encirclement found shelter was broken into... no, not the Germans. To this day it is unknown who these people really were. According to one version, these were amateur partisans. According to another - armed local residents, led by the church warden, decided to buy the favor of the Germans at the price of the general's stars. That same night, General Andrei Vlasov and the soldiers accompanying him were handed over to regular German troops. They say that before this the general was severely beaten. Please note, your...

One of the Red Army soldiers who accompanied Vlasov then testified to SMERSHA investigators: “When we were handed over to the Germans, the technical officers, without talking, shot everyone. The general came forward and said: “Don’t shoot!” I am General Vlasov. My people are unarmed!’” That’s the whole story of the “voluntary departure into captivity.” By the way, between June and December 1941, 3.8 million Soviet troops were captured by the Germans, and in 1942, more than a million, for a total of about 5.2 million people.

Then there was a concentration camp near Vinnitsa, where senior officers of interest to the Germans - prominent commissars and generals - were kept. Much was written in the Soviet press that Vlasov, they say, chickened out, lost control of himself, and saved his life. The documents say otherwise.

Here are excerpts from official German and personal documents that ended up in SMERSH after the war. They characterize Vlasov from the point of view of another side. These are documentary evidence of Nazi leaders, whom you certainly would not suspect of sympathizing with the Soviet general, through whose efforts thousands of German soldiers were destroyed near Kiev and Moscow.

Thus, the adviser to the German embassy in Moscow, Hilger, in the protocol of the interrogation of the captured General Vlasov dated August 8, 1942. briefly described him: “He gives the impression of a strong and straightforward personality. His judgments are calm and balanced” (Archive of the Institute of Military History of the Moscow Region, no. 43, l. 57.).

Here is the opinion of General Goebbels. Having met with Vlasov on March 1, 1945, he wrote in his diary: “General Vlasov is a highly intelligent and energetic Russian military leader; he made a very deep impression on me” (Goebbels J. Latest entries. Smolensk, 1993, p. 57).

Vlasov’s attitude seems clear. Maybe the people who surrounded him in the ROA were the last scum and slackers who were just waiting for the start of the war to go over to the side of the Germans. Annette, here the documents give no reason to doubt.

...and the officers who joined him

General Vlasov's closest associates were highly professional military leaders who at various times received high awards from the Soviet government for their professional activities. Thus, Major General V.F. Malyshkin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the medal “XX Years of the Red Army”; Major General F.I. Trukhin - the Order of the Red Banner and the medal “XX Years of the Red Army”; Zhilenkov G.N., Secretary of the Rostokinsky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Moscow. - Order of the Red Banner of Labor ( Military-historical magazine, 1993, N. 2, p. 9, 12.). Colonel Maltsev M. A. (ROA Major General) - commander Air Force by KONR forces, was at one time pilot-instructor the legendary Valery Chkalov (“Voice of Crimea”, 1944, N. 27. Editorial afterword).

The Chief of Staff of the VSKONR, Colonel A.G. Aldan (Neryanin), received high praise upon graduation from the General Staff Academy in 1939. The then Chief of the General Staff, Army General Shaposhnikov, called him one of the brilliant officers of the course, the only one who graduated from the Academy with excellent marks. It is difficult to imagine that they were all cowards who went to serve the Germans in order to save their own lives. Generals F. I. Trukhin, G. N. Zhilenkov, A. A. Vlasov, V. F. Malyshkin and D. E. Purchase during the signing ceremony of the KONR manifesto. Prague, November 14, 1944.

If Vlasov is innocent, then who?

By the way, if we are talking about documents, then we can remember one more. When General Vlasov ended up with the Germans, the NKVD and SMERSH, on behalf of Stalin, conducted a thorough investigation of the situation with the Second Shock Army. The results were put on the table to Stalin, who came to the conclusion: to admit the inconsistency of the accusations brought against General Vlasov for the death of the 2nd Shock Army and for his military unpreparedness. And what kind of unpreparedness could there be if the artillery did not have enough ammunition for even one salvo... The investigation from SMERSH was headed by a certain Viktor Abakumov (remember this name). Only in 1993, decades later, Soviet propaganda reported this through clenched teeth. (Military Historical Journal, 1993, N. 5, pp. 31-34.).

General Vlasov - Hitler is kaput?!

Let's return to Andrey Vlasov. So did the military general calm down in German captivity? The facts speak differently. It was possible, of course, to provoke a guard into firing a burst of automatic fire, it was possible to start an uprising in the camp, kill a couple of dozen guards, flee to your own people and... end up in other camps - this time Stalin’s. It was possible to show unshakable convictions and... turn into a block of ice. But Vlasov did not experience any particular fear of the Germans. One day, the concentration camp guards who “took their breasts” decided to organize a “parade” of captured Red Army soldiers and decided to put Vlasov at the head of the column. The general refused this honor, and several “organizers” of the parade were knocked out by the general. Well, then our camp commandant arrived in time.

The general, who has always been distinguished by his originality and unconventional decisions, decided to act differently. For a whole year (!) he convinced the Germans of his loyalty. Then, in March and April 1943, Vlasov made two trips to the Smolensk and Pskov regions, and criticized ... German politics in front of large audiences, making sure that the liberation movement resonated with the people.

Noza's "shameless" speeches frightened the Nazis send him under house arrest. The first attempt ended in complete failure. The general was eager to fight, sometimes committing reckless acts.

All-seeing eye of the NKVD?

Then something happened. Soviet intelligence came out to the general. In his circle appeared a certain Melenty Zykov, who held the position of divisional commissar in the Red Army. The personality is bright and... mysterious. General, he edited two newspapers...

To this day it is not known for certain whether this man was who he said he was. Only a year ago, circumstances “surfaced” that could turn all ideas about the “case of General Vlasov” upside down. Zykov was born in Dnepropetrovsk, a journalist, worked in Central Asia, then at Izvestia with Bukharin. He married the daughter of Lenin's comrade-in-arms, People's Commissar of Education Andrei Bubnov, and was subsequently arrested in 1937. Shortly before the war he was released (!) and the army was called up to serve as a battalion commissar (!).

He was captured near Bataysk in the summer of 1942, being the commissar of an infantry division, whose numbers he never named. They met Svlasov in the Vinnitsa camp, where they kept Soviet officers of particular interest to the Wehrmacht. From there Zykov was brought to Berlin by order of Goebbels himself.

The stars and commissar insignia of Zykov, delivered to the military propaganda department, remained unbroken on his tunic. Melenty Zykov became the general's closest adviser, although he received only the rank of captain in the ROA.

There is reason to believe that Zykov was a Soviet intelligence officer. And the reasons are very compelling. Melenty Zykov was very actively in contact with senior German officers who, as it turned out, were preparing an assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler. For this they paid. It remains a mystery what happened on a June day in 1944 when he was called to the telephone in the village of Rasndorf. ROA captain Zykov left home, got into his car and... disappeared.

According to one version, Zykov was kidnapped by the Gestapo, who uncovered the assassination attempt on Hitler, and then shot in Sachsenhausen. A strange circumstance, Vlasov himself was not very concerned about Zykov’s disappearance, which suggests the existence of a plan for Zykov’s transition to an illegal position, that is, to return home. In addition, in 1945-46, after the arrest of Vlasov, SMERSH was very actively looking for traces of Zykov.

Yes, so actively that it seemed like they were deliberately covering their tracks. When in the mid-nineties they tried to find the criminal case of Melenty Zykov from 1937 in the FSB archives, the attempt was unsuccessful. Strange, isn't it? After all, at the same time, all of Zykov’s other documents, including the reader’s form in the library, and the registration card in the military archive, were in place.

General's family

There is one more significant circumstance that indirectly confirms Vlasov’s cooperation with Soviet intelligence. Usually, relatives of “traitors to the Motherland,” especially those occupying a social position at the level of General Vlasov, were subjected to severe repression. As a rule, they were destroyed in the Gulag.

In this situation, everything was exactly the opposite. Over the past decades, neither Soviet nor Western journalists have been able to obtain information that would shed light on the fate of the general’s family. Only recently it became clear that Vlasov’s first wife Anna Mikhailovna, arrested in 1942, after serving 5 years in a Nizhny Novgorod prison, was living and thriving in the city of Balakhna several years ago. The second wife, Agnessa Pavlovna, whom the general married in 1941, lived and worked as a doctor in the Brest regional dermatovenerological dispensary, died two years ago, and her son, who achieved a lot in this life, lives and works in Samara.

The second son, illegitimate, lives and works in St. Petersburg. At the same time, he denies any relationship with the general. He has a son growing up, very similar to his wife... His illegitimate daughter, grandchildren and great-grandchildren also live there. One of his grandchildren, a promising officer in the Russian Navy, has no idea who his grandfather was. So decide after this whether General Vlasov was a “traitor to the Motherland.”

Open action against Stalin

Six months after Zykov’s disappearance, on November 14, 1944, Vlasov proclaimed the manifesto of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia in Prague. Its main provisions: the overthrow of the Stalinist regime and the return to the people of the rights they won in the 1917 revolution, the conclusion of an honorable peace with Germany, the creation of a new free statehood in Russia, “approval national labor building”, “full development of international cooperation”, “elimination of forced labor”, “liquidation of collective farms”, “granting the intelligentsia the right to create freely”. The very familiar demands proclaimed by political leaders of the last two decades are not true.

Why is there treason here? KONR receives hundreds of thousands of applications from Soviet citizens in Germany to join its armed forces.

Star...

On January 28, 1945, General Vlasov took command of the Armed Forces of the KONR, which the Germans authorized at the level of three divisions, one reserve brigade, two squadrons of aviation and an officer school, a total of about 50 thousand people. At that time, these military formations were not yet sufficiently armed.

Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov and representatives of the German command inspect one of the Russian battalions as part of Army Group North, May 1943. In the foreground is a Russian non-commissioned officer (deputy platoon commander) with shoulder straps and buttonholes of the Eastern troops, introduced in August 1942.

The war was ending. The Germans were already under-generalized by Vlasova; they were saving their own skins. February 9 and April 14, 1945 were the only occasions when the Vlasovites took part in battles on the Eastern Front, forced by the Germans. In the first battle, several hundred Red Army soldiers went over to Vlasov’s side. The second one radically changes some ideas about the end of the war.

On May 6, 1945, an anti-Hitler uprising broke out in Prague... Upon the call of the rebel Czechs, Prague entered... The first division of the army of General Vlasov. She enters the battle with units of the SSivermacht armed with teeth, captures the airport, where fresh German units arrive and liberates the city. The Czechs are rejoicing. Very eminent commanders of the Soviet army are beside themselves with fury of wickedness. Of course, again it’s the upstart Vlasov!

Then strange and terrible events began. Those who yesterday begged for help come to KVlasov and ask the general... to leave Prague, since his Russian friends are unhappy. IVlasov gives the command to withdraw. However, this did not save the walkers; they were shot... by the Czechs themselves. By the way, it was not a group of impostors who asked for Vlasov’s help, but people who carried out the decision of the highest body of the Czechoslovak Republic.

...And the death of General Vlasov

But this did not save the general, Colonel General Viktor Abakumov, the head of SMERSH, gave the command to detain Vlasov. The SMERSHists took the show. On May 12, 1945, the troops of General Vlasov were squeezed between the American and Soviet troops of the southwestern Czech Republic. The “Vlasovites,” who fell into the hands of the Red Army, are shot on the spot... According to the official version, the general himself was captured and arrested by a special reconnaissance group that stopped the convoy of the first division of the ROA and SMERSH. However, there are at least four versions of how Vlasov ended up behind the Soviet troops. We already know the first one, but here is another one, compiled on the basis of eyewitness accounts. Indeed, General Vlasov was in that very ROA column.

Only he wasn’t hiding on the carpet on the floor of the Willis, as stated by Captain Yakushov, who allegedly took part in that operation. The general sat calmly in the car. And the car was not a Willys at all. Moreover, this same car was of such a size that the two-meter tall general simply could not fit inside, wrapped in a carpet... And there was no lightning attack by the scouts on the convoy. They (the scouts), dressed in full uniform, calmly waited on the side of the road for Vlasov’s car to catch up with them. When the car slowed down, the leader of the group saluted the general and invited him to get out of the car. Is this how they greet traitors?

And then the fun began. There is evidence from the military prosecutor of the tank division to which Andrei Vlasov was taken. This man was the first to meet the general after his arrival at the location of the Soviet troops. He claims that the general was dressed in... a general's uniform of the Red Army (old style), with insignia and orders. The stunned lawyer could not find anything better than to ask the general to produce documents. This is what he did, showing the prosecutor the pay book of the commanding staff of the Red Army, the identity card of the Red Army general No. 431 dated 02.13.41. and party card of a member of the CPSU (b) No. 2123998 - everything is in the name of Andrey Andreevich Vlasov...

Moreover, the prosecutor claims that the day before Vlasov’s arrival, an unimaginable number of army commanders came to the division, who did not even think of showing any hostility or hostility towards the general. Moreover, a joint lunch was organized.

On the same day, the general was transported to Moscow by transport plane. I wonder if this is how traitors are greeted?

Very little is known further. Vlasov is located in Lefortovo. “Prisoner No. 32” was the name of the general in prison. This prison belongs to SMERSH, and no one, not even Beria and Stalin, has the right to enter there. They didn’t come in - Viktor Abakumov knew his business well. Why then I paid, but that was later. The investigation lasted more than a year. Stalin, or maybe not Stalin at all, thought about what to do as a sleepy general. Elevate the rank of a national hero? It’s impossible: the military general did not sit quietly, he spoke a lot. Retired NKVD officers claim that they bargained with Andrei Vlasov for a long time: repent, they say, before the people and the leader. Admit mistakes. And they will forgive. May be…

They say that it was then that Vlasov met with Melenty Zykov again...

But the general was consistent in his actions, as when he did not leave the soldiers of the Second Shock to die, as when he did not abandon his ROA in the Czech Republic. Lieutenant General The Red Army, holder of the Order of Lenin and the Red Banner of Battle, made his last choice...

August 2, 1946 official TASS message published in all central newspapers: August 1, 1946 lieutenant general The Red Army A. A. Vlasov and his 11 comrades were hanged. Stalin was cruel to the end. After all, there is no death more shameful for officers than the gallows. Here are their names: Major General of the Red Army Malyshkin V. F., Zhilenkov G. N., Major General of the Red Army Trukhin F. I, Major General of the Red Army Zakutny D. E, Major General of the Red Army Blagoveshchensky I. A, Colonel of the Red Army Meandrov M. A, Colonel of the USSR Air Force Maltsev M. A, Colonel of the Red Army Bunyachenko S. K, Colonel of the Red Army Zverev G. A, Major General of the Red Army Korbukov V. D. and Lieutenant Colonel of the Red Army Shatov N. S. It is unknown where the bodies of the officers were buried. SMERSH knew how to keep its secrets.

Forgive us, Andrey Andreevich!

Was Andrei Vlasov a Soviet intelligence officer? There is no direct evidence of this. Moreover, there are no documents indicating this. But there are facts that are very difficult to argue with.

The main one among them is this. It is no longer a big secret that in 1942 Joseph Stalin, despite all the successes of the Red Army near Moscow, wanted to conclude a separate peace with Germany and stop the war. Having given up Ukraine, Moldova, Crimea...

There is even evidence that Lavrenty Beria “ventilated the situation” on this issue.

IVlasov was an excellent candidate to conduct these negotiations. Why? To do this, you need to look at the pre-war career of Andrei Vlasov. You can come to some startling conclusions. Back in 1937, Colonel Vlasov was appointed head of the Second Department of the Leningrad Military District headquarters. Translated into civilian language, this means that the brave Colonel Vlasov was responsible for all the security work of the district. And then repressions broke out. Colonel Vlasov, who received the first pseudonym “Volkov”, was... safely sent as an adviser to the already mentioned Chiang Kai-shek... Further, if you read between the lines of the memoirs of the participants in those events, you come to the conclusion that someone else worked in China as... Colonel Volkov, a Soviet intelligence officer.

It was he, and someone else, who made friends with German diplomats, took them to restaurants, gave them vodka until they fainted, and talked for a long, long time. It is unknown, but how can an ordinary Russian colonel behave this way, knowing what is happening in his country, that people were arrested only because they were explaining to foreigners on the street how to get to the Alexander Garden. Where does Sorge go with his efforts at undercover work in Japan? All of Sorge’s female agents could not supply information comparable to that of Chiang Kai-shek’s wife, with whom the Russian colonel had a very close relationship... The seriousness of Colonel Vlasov’s work is evidenced by his personal translator in China, who claims that Volkov ordered him to shoot him at the slightest danger.

Another argument. I saw the document marked “Top Secret.” Ex. No. 1" dated 1942, in which Vsevolod Merkulov reports to Joseph Stalin on the destruction work traitor general A. Vlasova. So, Vlasov was hunted by more than 42 reconnaissance and sabotage groups with a total number of 1,600 people. Believe that in 1942 such a powerful organization as SMERSH could not “get” one general, even if he was well guarded. I don't believe. The conclusion is more than simple: Stalin, knowing full well the strength of the German intelligence services, tried in every possible way to convince the Germans of the general’s betrayal.

But the Germans turned out to be so simple. Hitler did not accept Vlasov that way. Andrei Vlasov fell in line with the anti-Hitler opposition. It is now unknown what prevented Stalin from completing the job - either the situation at the front, or the too late or unsuccessful attempt by the Naführer. IStalin had to choose between destroying Vlasov or kidnapping him. Apparently, we stopped last. But... This is the most Russian “but”. The whole point is that at the time of the general’s “transition” to the Germans in the USSR, there were already three intelligence agencies operating: the NKGB, SMERSH and the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army. These organizations competed fiercely with each other (remember this). IVlasov, apparently, worked for the GRU. How else can one explain the fact that the general was brought to the Second Shock by Lavrentiy Beria and Kliment Voroshilov. Interesting, isn't it?

Further, the trial against Vlasov was carried out by SMERSH and did not allow anyone to be involved in this case. Even the trial took place behind closed doors, although logically, the trial of a traitor should be public and open. You need to see photographs of Vlasov in court - eyes expecting something, as if asking: “How long will it take, stop the clownery.” But Vlasov did not know about the secret services. He was executed... People present at the scene claim that the general behaved with dignity.

The scandal began the day after the execution, when Joseph Stalin saw the latest newspapers.

It turns out that SMERSH had to ask for written permission to punish from the Military Prosecutor's Office and the GRU. They asked, and they answered: “The execution will be postponed until further notice.” This letter remains in the archives to this day.

But Abakumov did not see the answer. Why did I pay? In 1946: the year Stalin personally ordered Viktor Abakumov to be arrested. They say that Stalin visited him in prison and reminded him of General Vlasov. However, these are just rumors...

By the way, in the indictment against Andrei Vlasov there is no article incriminating treason against the Motherland. Only terrorism and counter-revolutionary activities.

In the summer of 1942, Lieutenant General of the Red Army Andrei Vlasov was captured by the Nazis. He was not the first Soviet general to fall into German hands. But Vlasov, unlike others, actively cooperated, agreeing to take Hitler’s side.

From the beginning of the war, the Nazis were looking for collaborators among the captured Soviet military leaders. First of all, the bet was made on those who were older, in the hope of playing on nostalgic feelings for Imperial Russia. This calculation, however, did not come true.
Vlasov became a real surprise for the Germans. A man who owed his entire career to the Soviet system, a general who was considered Stalin’s favorite, agreed to cooperate with them.
How did General Vlasov end up in captivity, and why did he take the path of betrayal?

“Always stood firmly on the general line of the party”

The thirteenth child in a peasant family, Andrei Vlasov was preparing for a career as a priest. The revolution changed priorities - in 1919, an 18-year-old boy was drafted into the army, with which he connected his life. Having performed well in the final part of the Civil War, Vlasov continued his military career.


The young commander of the Red Army Vlasov with his wife Anna, 1926.
In 1929 he graduated from the Higher Army Command Course "Vystrel". In 1930 he joined the CPSU (b). In 1935 he became a student at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy.
The repressions of 1937-1938 not only did not affect Vlasov, but also helped his career growth. In 1938, he became assistant commander of the 72nd Infantry Division. In the fall of 1938, Vlasov was sent to China as a military adviser, and in 1939 he became the acting chief military adviser of the USSR under the government of Chiang Kai-shek.
After returning to the USSR in January 1940, Vlasov was appointed commander of the 99th Infantry Division. Soon the division becomes the best in the Kiev Military District, and one of the best in the Red Army.

Hero of the first months of the war

In January 1941, Vlasov was appointed commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Kyiv Special Military District, and a month later he was awarded the Order of Lenin.
War can be a difficult test for those officers who make a career not thanks to knowledge and skills, but through intrigue and groveling before their superiors.
However, this does not apply to Vlasov. His corps fought with dignity in the first weeks near Lvov, holding back the onslaught of the Germans. Major General Vlasov earned high praise for his actions and was appointed commander of the 37th Army.
During the defense of Kyiv, Vlasov’s army found itself surrounded, from which hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and officers did not emerge. Vlasov was among the lucky ones who managed to escape from the “cauldron”.
In November 1941, Andrei Vlasov received a new appointment. He is ordered to form and lead the 20th Army, which will take part in the counteroffensive near Moscow.
The 20th Army took part in the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation, the troops defeated the main forces of the enemy’s 3rd and 4th tank groups, drove them back to the Lama River - Ruza River line and liberated several settlements, including Volokolamsk.


Rewarding General Vlasov in 1942.
Andrei Vlasov was included in official Soviet propaganda among the heroes of the Battle of Moscow. On January 4, 1942, for these battles, Vlasov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and promoted to lieutenant general.

Assignment to the Volkhov Front

Leading Soviet and foreign correspondents are interviewing Vlasov, and a book about him is planned to be published. Everything indicates that Vlasov was considered by the highest Soviet leadership as one of the most promising military leaders. That is why, at the beginning of March 1942, he received an appointment to one of the most important sectors of the Soviet-German front - Vlasov became deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.
Since January 1942, front troops, in cooperation with units of the Leningrad Front, have been conducting an offensive operation, the purpose of which is to break the blockade of Leningrad. At the forefront of the Soviet offensive is the 2nd Shock Army, which managed to break through the enemy’s defenses and move forward significantly.
However, the troops had to advance through forested and swampy areas, which seriously hampered their actions. Moreover, the breakthrough was never expanded. At the most successful moment, the width of its neck did not exceed 12 kilometers, which created the danger of a German counterattack and encirclement of Soviet units.
In February 1942, the pace of the offensive slowed sharply. The task set by Moscow to take the village of Lyuban by March 1 was not fulfilled. On July 12, 1942, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, General Vlasov, was captured by the Germans. He pointed out the reason: heavy losses of the 2nd Shock Army, lack of reserves, supply problems.
Andrei Vlasov was sent to strengthen the command staff of the front.

Break the blockade at any cost

Things were getting worse. On March 15, 1942, the German counteroffensive began, and a direct threat of encirclement loomed over the 2nd Shock Army. They did not stop the offensive and withdraw the divisions. This is usually interpreted as the whim and stupidity of the Soviet leadership.
But we must not forget that the offensive was carried out for the sake of the blockade of Leningrad. The famine in the besieged city continued to methodically kill people. Failure to advance meant a death sentence for hundreds of thousands of people. There were fierce battles for the supply corridor of the 2nd Shock Army. It either closed completely, then broke through again, but with a much smaller width.


On March 20, a commission headed by Lieutenant General Vlasov was sent to the 2nd Shock Army to conduct an inspection. The commission returned without him - he was left to control and assist Army Commander Nikolai Klykov.
In early April, Klykov fell seriously ill. On April 20, Vlasov was confirmed as army commander while retaining the position of deputy front commander. Vlasov was not delighted with the appointment - he received not fresh, but very battered troops that were in a difficult situation. Meanwhile, the Volkhov Front was united with the Leningrad Front under the overall command of Colonel General Mikhail Khozin. He received orders to release the army.
General Khozin thought about the plans promised to Headquarters for three weeks, and then suddenly reported that the 2nd Shock Army needed to be withdrawn to the neck of the breakthrough, expand it, then gain a foothold at this line, and move the offensive to another area.
In fact, Khozin repeated what Meretskov had previously insisted on, but three weeks were wasted. All this time, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army, eating crackers and horse meat and suffering heavy losses, continued to hold their positions.
On May 14, Headquarters issues a directive on the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army from the Lyuban salient. General Khozin himself received a similar order orally two days earlier.
And what about Vlasov himself? He carried out his duties, but did not show any large-scale initiative. The fate of his army was determined by others. Despite everything, the first stage of the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army was successful. But the Nazis, realizing that their prey was slipping away, increased their pressure.
The disaster began on May 30. Taking advantage of the overwhelming advantage in aviation, the enemy launched a decisive offensive. On May 31, the corridor through which the 2nd Shock Army exited slammed shut, and this time the Germans were able to strengthen their positions in this area.
More than 40 thousand Soviet soldiers found themselves in the “cauldron”. Exhausted by hunger, people under continuous attacks from German aviation and artillery continued to fight, breaking out of encirclement.

The path to salvation through the “Valley of Death”

Later, Vlasov and his supporters would say that the Soviet command “abandoned the 2nd Shock Army to the mercy of fate.” This is not true, attempts to relieve the blockade did not stop, units tried to break through a new corridor to the encircled.
On June 8, 1942, General Khozin was removed from his post, the Volkhov Front again became a separate unit, and General Meretskov was sent to save the situation. Stalin personally set him the task of withdrawing the 2nd Shock Army from the “cauldron,” even without heavy weapons.


Meretskov gathered all the reserves of the front into his fist to break through to Vlasov’s army. But on the other hand, the Nazis transferred more and more forces.
On June 16, a radiogram was received from Vlasov: “The personnel of the troops are exhausted to the limit, the number of deaths is increasing, and the incidence of illness from exhaustion is increasing every day. Due to the cross-fire of the army area, the troops suffer heavy losses from artillery mortar fire and enemy aircraft...
The combat strength of the formations decreased sharply. It is no longer possible to replenish it from the rear and special units. Everything that was taken was taken. On June 16, there were an average of several dozen people left in battalions, brigades and rifle regiments.”
On June 19, 1942, a corridor was broken through which several thousand Soviet soldiers were able to exit. But the next day, under air strikes, the escape route from the encirclement was again blocked.
On June 21, a corridor with a width of 250 to 400 meters was opened. He was shot right through, people died in the hundreds, but still several thousand more people were able to reach their own.
On the same day, a new radiogram arrived from Vlasov: “Army troops have been receiving fifty grams of crackers for three weeks. The last few days there was absolutely no food. We are finishing off the last horses. People are extremely exhausted. There is group mortality from starvation. There is no ammunition..."
The corridor for the fighters to exit, at the cost of heavy losses, was held until June 23. The agony of the 2nd Shock Army was approaching. The territory she controlled was now shot right through by the enemy.
On the evening of June 23, the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army made a new breakthrough. It was possible to open a corridor about 800 meters wide. The space, which was constantly narrowing, was called the “Valley of Death.” Those who went through it said that it was real hell. Only the luckiest managed to break through.

Last hours of the 2nd strike

On the same day, the Germans attacked Vlasov’s command post. The soldiers of the special department company managed to repulse the attack, allowing the staff workers to retreat, but the leadership of the troops was lost.
In one of the last radiograms, Meretskov warned Vlasov that on June 24, the troops outside the “cauldron” would make a last decisive attempt to save the 2nd Shock Army. Vlasov scheduled a withdrawal from the encirclement of headquarters and rear services for that day. On the evening of June 24, the corridor was opened again, but now its width did not exceed 250 meters.


The headquarters column, however, lost its way and ran into German bunkers. Enemy fire fell on her, and Vlasov himself was slightly wounded in the leg. Of those who were close to Vlasov, only the head of the army’s intelligence department, Rogov, managed to break through to his own people at night, who single-handedly found the saving corridor.
Around 9:30 a.m. on June 25, 1942, the ring around the 2nd Shock Army closed completely. More than 20 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers remained surrounded. In the following weeks, several hundred more people managed to escape, individually and in small groups.
But what is important is that German sources record that there were no facts of mass surrender. The Nazis noted that the Russians in Myasnoy Bor preferred to die with weapons in their hands. The 2nd Shock Army died heroically, not knowing what black shadow would fall on it because of its commander...

Rescue of General Afanasyev

Both the Germans and ours, knowing that the command of the 2nd Shock Army remained surrounded, tried at all costs to find him. Vlasov’s headquarters, meanwhile, tried to get out. The few surviving witnesses claimed that after the failed breakthrough, a breakdown occurred in the general. He looked indifferent and did not hide from the shelling.
The command of the detachment was taken over by the chief of staff of the 2nd Shock Army, Colonel Vinogradov. The group, wandering around the rear, tried to reach their own. It entered into skirmishes with the Germans, suffered losses, and gradually dwindled.
The key moment occurred on the night of July 11. Chief of Staff Vinogradov suggested dividing into groups of several people and going out to their own people on their own. The chief of army communications, Major General Afanasyev, objected to him. He suggested that everyone should go together to the Oredezh River and Lake Chernoe, where they could feed themselves by fishing, and where the partisan detachments should be located.
Afanasyev’s plan was rejected, but no one stopped him from moving on his route. 4 people left with Afanasyev.
Literally a day later, Afanasyev’s group met with the partisans, who contacted the “Big Land”. A plane arrived for the general and took him to the rear.
Alexey Vasilyevich Afanasyev turned out to be the only representative of the senior command staff of the 2nd Shock Army who managed to escape from the encirclement. After the hospital, he returned to duty and continued his service, finishing his career as the chief of communications for the artillery of the Soviet Army.

“Don’t shoot, I’m General Vlasov!”

Vlasov's group was reduced to four people. He broke up with Vinogradov, who was ill, which is why the general gave him his overcoat.
On July 12, Vlasov's group split up to go to two villages in search of food. The cook from the canteen of the military council of the army, Maria Voronova, stayed with the general.

General Vasov in a prisoner of war camp.
They entered the village of Tuchovezy, introducing themselves as refugees. Vlasov, who identified himself as a school teacher, asked for food. They were fed, after which they suddenly pointed weapons and locked them in a barn. The “hospitable host” turned out to be the local elder, who called local residents from among the auxiliary police for help.
It is known that Vlasov had a pistol with him, but he did not resist. The headman did not identify the general, but considered those who came to be partisans.
The next morning, a German special group arrived in the village and was asked by the headman to pick up the prisoners. The Germans waved it off because they were coming for... General Vlasov.
The day before, the German command received information that General Vlasov had been killed in a skirmish with a German patrol. The corpse in the general's overcoat, which was examined by members of the group upon arriving at the scene, was identified as the body of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army. In fact, Colonel Vinogradov was killed.
On the way back, having already passed Tuchowiezy, the Germans remembered their promise and returned for the unknown. When the barn door opened, a phrase in German sounded from the darkness:
- Don’t shoot, I’m General Vlasov!

Two destinies: Andrey Vlasov vs. Ivan Antyufeev

At the very first interrogations, the general began to give detailed testimony, reporting on the state of the Soviet troops and giving characteristics to Soviet military leaders. And just a few weeks later, while in a special camp in Vinnitsa, Andrei Vlasov himself would offer the Germans his services in the fight against the Red Army and Stalin’s regime.
What made him do this? Vlasov’s biography shows that not only did he not suffer from the Soviet system and from Stalin, but he received everything he had. The story about the abandoned 2nd Shock Army, as shown above, is also a myth.
For comparison, we can cite the fate of another general who survived the Myasny Bor disaster.
Ivan Mikhailovich Antyufeev, commander of the 327th Infantry Division, took part in the Battle of Moscow, and then with his unit was transferred to break the siege of Leningrad. The 327th Division achieved the greatest success in the Lyuban operation. Just as the 316th Rifle Division was unofficially called "Panfilovskaya", the 327th Rifle Division received the name "Antyufeevskaya".
Antyufeyev received the rank of major general at the height of the battles near Lyuban, and did not even have time to change his shoulder straps from a colonel to a general, which played a role in his future fate. The division commander also remained in the “cauldron” and was wounded on July 5 while trying to escape.

Ivan Mikhailovich Antyufeev
The Nazis, having captured the officer, tried to persuade him to cooperate, but were refused. At first he was kept in a camp in the Baltic states, but then someone reported that Antyufeyev was actually a general. He was immediately transferred to a special camp.
When it became known that he was the commander of the best division of Vlasov’s army, the Germans began to rub their hands. It seemed to them self-evident that Antyufeyev would follow the path of his boss. But even having met Vlasov face to face, the general refused the offer to cooperate with the Germans.
Antyufeyev was presented with a fabricated interview in which he declared his readiness to work for Germany. They explained to him that now for the Soviet leadership he is an undoubted traitor. But here, too, the general answered “no.”
General Antyufeyev stayed in the concentration camp until April 1945, when he was liberated by American troops. He returned to his homeland and was reinstated in the Soviet Army. In 1946, General Antyufeyev was awarded the Order of Lenin. He retired from the army in 1955 due to illness.
But it’s a strange thing - the name of General Antyufeyev, who remained faithful to the oath, is known only to fans of military history, while everyone knows about General Vlasov.

“He had no convictions - he had ambition”

So why did Vlasov make the choice that he did? Maybe because what he loved most in life was fame and career growth. Suffering in captivity did not promise lifetime glory, not to mention comfort. And Vlasov stood, as he thought, on the side of the strong.
Let us turn to the opinion of a person who knew Andrei Vlasov. Writer and journalist Ilya Ehrenburg met with the general at the peak of his career, in the midst of his successful battle near Moscow. Here is what Ehrenburg wrote about Vlasov years later:
“Of course, someone else’s soul is dark; nevertheless, I dare to state my guesses. Vlasov is not Brutus or Prince Kurbsky, it seems to me that everything was much simpler. Vlasov wanted to complete the task assigned to him; he knew that Stalin would congratulate him again, he would receive another order, rise to prominence, and amaze everyone with his art of interrupting quotes from Marx with Suvorov jokes.
It turned out differently: the Germans were stronger, the army was again surrounded. Vlasov, wanting to save himself, changed his clothes. When he saw the Germans, he was afraid: a simple soldier could be killed on the spot. Once captured, he began to think about what to do. He knew political literacy well, admired Stalin, but he had no convictions - he had ambition.


He understood that his military career was over. If the Soviet Union wins, at best he will be demoted. So, there is only one thing left: accept the Germans’ offer and do everything so that Germany wins. Then he will be the commander-in-chief or minister of war of a ripped-off Russia under the auspices of the victorious Hitler.
Of course, Vlasov never said that to anyone, he declared on the radio that he had long hated the Soviet system, that he longed to “liberate Russia from the Bolsheviks,” but he himself gave me a proverb: “Every Fedorka has his own excuses.”... There are bad people everywhere “, this does not depend either on the political system or on upbringing.”
General Vlasov was wrong - betrayal did not bring him back to the top. On August 1, 1946, in the courtyard of Butyrka prison, Andrei Vlasov, stripped of his title and awards, was hanged for treason.

He and eight other generals became heroes of the battle of Moscow. How does the story of General Vlasov’s betrayal begin? His personality is as legendary as it is mysterious. Until now, many facts related to his fate remain controversial.

A case from the archives, or a dispute of decades

The criminal case of Andrei Andreevich Vlasov consists of thirty-two volumes. For sixty years there was no access to the history of General Vlasov’s betrayal. It was in the KGB archives. But now she was born without the stamp of secrecy. So who was Andrei Andreevich? A hero, a fighter against the Stalinist regime or a traitor?

Andrei was born in 1901 into a peasant family. The main occupation of his parents was farming. First, the future general studied at a rural school, then at a seminary. Went through the Civil War. Then he studied at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. If you trace his entire service, you can note that he was a man who was incredibly lucky. The story of the betrayal of General Vlasov in this case, of course, is not meant.

Highlights in a military career

In 1937, Andrei Andreevich was appointed commander of the 215th Infantry Regiment, which he commanded for less than a year, since already in April 1937 he was immediately appointed assistant division commander. And from there he went to China. And this is another success of Andrei Vlasov. He served there from 1938 to 1939. Three groups of military specialists operated in China at that time. The first are illegal immigrants, the second are those working undercover, the third are military specialists in the troops.

They worked simultaneously for both Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek's troops. This part of the giant Asian continent, for which all the intelligence services in the world were fighting at that time, was so important for the USSR that intelligence worked in both opposing camps. Andrei Andreevich was appointed to the position of department adviser in Chiang Kai-shek's troops. Then General Vlasov, whose story of betrayal today causes a huge amount of controversy, again falls into a streak of luck.

Lucky General's Awards

In November 1939, Vlasov was appointed commander of the 99th division in the Kiev Military District. In September 1940, district inspection exercises were held here. They were conducted by the new People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko. The division was declared the best in the Kiev district.

And Andrei Andreevich became the best division commander, a master of training and education. And it was presented in the fall at the end of the academic year. What happens next defies any explanation. Because, contrary to all orders and rules, he is awarded

Two patrons and a political career

All these events could be explained by another lucky coincidence. But it is not so. Andrei Andreevich made great efforts to create his positive image in the eyes of management. Andrei Vlasov’s political career was launched by two people. This is the commander of the Kyiv Military District Timoshenko and a member of the military council, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Nikita Khrushchev. It was they who proposed him for the post of commander of the 37th Army.

At the end of November 1940, Andrei Vlasov was awaiting another certification. His next promotion to a higher position was being prepared. How did the story of General Vlasov’s betrayal begin? Why did a person with such a fate become a dark spot in the history of the USSR?

The beginning of hostilities, or leadership errors

The war has begun. Despite stubborn resistance, the Red Army suffers serious defeats in major battles. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers are captured by the Germans. Some of them volunteer for the German army, either out of political conviction or to avoid starvation and death like the millions of prisoners in Nazi camps.

In the Kiev cauldron, the Germans destroyed more than six hundred thousand Soviet soldiers. Many front commanders and army chiefs of staff were shot then. But Vlasov and Sandalov will remain alive, and fate will bring them together in the battle of Moscow. The archival documents of those years record that on August 23, due to a mistake made by the command of the southwestern front and the commander of the 37th Army, General Vlasov, the Germans managed to cross the Dnieper in its sector.

The death of the army, or the possibility of being captured

Here Andrei Andreevich finds himself surrounded for the first time, abandons his positions and hastily tries to get out of it. Which, in essence, destroys his army. Which is amazing. Despite the difficulties of escaping from encirclement, the general confidently walked behind enemy lines. He could easily have been captured. But, apparently, he did not take advantage of even the slightest opportunity for this. The story of General Vlasov's betrayal is yet to come.

In the winter of 1941, German troops came close to Moscow. Stalin announces that he appoints Andrei Andreevich as Commander. It was Khrushchev and Timoshenko who proposed Vlasov for this position. In the winter battle near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the German army disappears. The troops of four Soviet fronts managed to inflict the first crushing blow on the Germans; more than one hundred thousand Wehrmacht soldiers were killed or captured. The 20th Army under the leadership of General Vlasov also contributed to this victory.

New assignment and captivity

Stalin promotes Andrei Andreevich to the rank of lieutenant general. This is how he becomes famous among the troops. After the battle of Moscow, he reaps the fruits of glory. He gets lucky all the time. His finest hour is coming, but all luck comes to an end. Now the reader will face General Vlasov, whose story of betrayal has crossed out all previous achievements.

Andrei Andreevich becomes deputy commander of the 2nd Shock Army, and then heads it. During heavy bloody battles, a significant part of it dies in the forests. But those who sought to escape the encirclement could break through the front line in small groups. However, Vlasov deliberately remained in the village. The next day, when a German patrol began to find out his identity, he suddenly unexpectedly introduced himself: Lieutenant General Vlasov, commander of the 2nd Shock Army.

The subsequent fate and history of Andrei Vlasov. Anatomy of Betrayal

After being captured, Andrei Andreevich ends up in a special camp of the propaganda department in Vinnitsa, where German specialists work with him. He surprisingly quickly accepted the Nazis' offer to lead the non-existent Russian army of the ROA. In mid-1943, Wehrmacht propaganda spread information that a Russian liberation army and a new Russian government had been created. This is the so-called “Smolensk Appeal”, in which Vlasov promises the Russian people democratic rights and freedom in a Russia liberated from Stalin and Bolshevism.

Andrei Andreevich spent the spring of 1944 under house arrest at his villa in Dahlem. He was sent there by Hitler for a memorable trip through the occupied territories, where he showed too much independence. But November 14, 1944 became the day of triumph of Andrei Vlasov as commander of the ROA. The entire political elite of the Wehrmacht arrived at the official ceremony on the occasion of the formation of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. The culmination of the event is the proclamation of the political program of this committee.

Last years of the war

What was General Vlasov thinking about at that time? Didn't the history of betrayal, Russia and the people who would never forgive him for this act frighten him? Did he really believe so much in Germany's victory? The turn of 1944 and 1945 is marked by numerous events in Berlin. On them he selects Soviet prisoners of war and osterbeiters for his political purposes. At the beginning of 1945, Goebbels and Himmler met with him.

Then on January 18, he signs a loan agreement between the German government and Russia. As if the final German victory was only a matter of time. In the spring of 1945, things were going very badly for Germany. In the west the Allies are advancing, in the east the Red Army leaves no chance for the Wehrmacht to win, occupying one German city after another. So how could the story of betrayal end for a person like General Vlasov? Its epilogue awaits the reader.

First division or endless defeats

Andrei Andreevich does not seem to notice the events taking place. For him, it seems, everything is going well again. On February 10, he solemnly received his first division, which was sent to the Eastern Front for inspection. The clashes here were short. The Red Army cannot be stopped. ROA soldiers are running and abandoning their positions. The Vlasovites made their last attempt to somehow rehabilitate themselves in the war in Prague. But they were defeated there too.

Fearing capture by Soviet troops, the Vlasovites, together with the Germans, hastily leave Prague. Some groups surrender to the Americans. Two days earlier, General Vlasov himself did this. The tank corps of the Fomins and Kryukov was tasked with breaking through to the base where Andrei Andreevich and his closest associates were being held, capturing them and delivering them to Moscow.

Then the investigation will continue at Lubyanka for a year. Eleven officers and Vlasov himself, whose history of betrayal was carefully studied by Lubyanka specialists, were sentenced to death by hanging on July 30, 1946, on charges of high treason.

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