Kolesnikov Vladislav
The work contains a comparison of the Mongol and Russian troops in the 12th-13th centuries. The author is trying to answer the question: “Why was the Russian army defeated by the Mongol-Tatars, but at the same time the Russian army itself defeated the crusaders from Europe?”
When writing the work, we used both textbook materials (A.A. Danilov, L.G. Kosulina. History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the 16th century. M.: Prosveshchenie, 2011), and the historical magazine "Rodina", Internet resources. As a conclusion, the statement of Doctor of Historical Sciences V.P. Darkevich: “The advantage of the Mongols was not a high and multifaceted culture, but an excellent military organization, the basis of which was light cavalry, the presence of complex siege equipment, combat tactics, iron discipline, mass repressions designed to intimidate the enemy when all living things were destroyed.” .
Download:
Preview:
I. Introduction………………………………………………………………..….... 3 pages.
II. Mongol-Tatar army: …………………………………………..…..4-8 pp.
- Discipline
- Troop composition
- Armament
- Battle tactics
III. Russian army: ………………..……………………………………...8-12 pp.
- Discipline
- Troop composition
- Armament
- Battle tactics
IV. Conclusion……………………………………………………………...13 -14 pp.
V. Literature…………………………………………………………….………………….….15 pp.
Appendix No. 1………………………………………………………………………………..16-19 pages.
Appendix No. 2……………………………………………………………………………………….….20-23 pp.
Introduction
It is still interesting why the Mongol tribes, who did not have cities and led a nomadic lifestyle, were able to capture such a huge and powerful state as Rus' in the 13th century?
And this interest is also enhanced by the fact that the Russian army defeated the crusaders from Europe in the middle of the 13th century.
Therefore, the purpose of the work is to compareMongol and Russian troops in the XII - XIII centuries.
To achieve this goal, you need to solve the following tasks:
1. study the literature on the research topic;
2. describe the Mongol-Tatar and Russian troops;
3. create a comparison table based on characteristics
Mongol-Tatar and Russian troops.
Hypothesis:
If we assume that the Russian army lost to the Mongol-Tatar army
in anything, then the answer to the question becomes obvious: “Why did the Mongol tribes defeat the Russians?”
Object of study:
Armies of the Mongols and Russians.
Subject of study:
The state of the armies of the Mongols and Russians.
Research: analysis, comparison, generalization.
They are determined by the goals and objectives of the work.
The practical significance of the work lies in the fact that the conclusions drawn from the generalization compiled comparison table, can be used in history lessons.
The structure of the work consists of an introduction, two chapters, a conclusion, and a list of references.
Mongol-Tatar army
“An unheard of army has come, godless Moabites, and their name is Tatars, but no one knows who they are and where they came from, and what their language is, and what tribe they are, and what their faith is...” 1
1. Discipline
The Mongol conquests that amazed the world were based on the principles of iron discipline and military order introduced by Genghis Khan. The Mongol tribes were welded by their leader into a horde, a single “people-army”. The entire social organization of the steppe inhabitants was built on a set of laws. For the flight of one warrior out of a dozen from the battlefield, the entire ten were executed, for the flight of a dozen a hundred were executed, and since dozens consisted, as a rule, of close relatives, it is clear that a moment of cowardice could result in the death of a father or brother and happened extremely rarely. The slightest failure to comply with the orders of military leaders was also punishable by death. The laws established by Genghis Khan also affected civil life. 2
2. Composition of the army
The Mongol army consisted mainly of cavalry and some infantry. Mongols are riders who grew up riding horses from an early age. Wonderfully disciplined and persistent warriors in battle. The endurance of the Mongol and his horse is amazing. During the campaign, their troops could move for months without food supplies. For the horse - pasture; he doesn’t know oats or stables. Vanguard with a force of two or three hundred, preceding the army at a distance of two marches, and the same side detachments performed the tasks of not only guarding the enemy’s march and reconnaissance, but also economic reconnaissance - they let them know where the best food and watering places were. In addition, special detachments were deployed whose task was to protect feeding areas from nomads not taking part in the war.
Each mounted warrior led from one to four clockwork horses, so he could change horses during a campaign, which significantly increased the length of the transitions and reduced the need for halts and days. The speed of movement of the Mongol troops was amazing.
Setting out on a campaign found the Mongol army in a state of impeccable readiness: nothing was missed, every little thing was in order and in its place; the metal parts of weapons and harness are thoroughly cleaned, the storage containers are filled, and an emergency supply of food is included. All this was subject to strict inspection by superiors; omissions were severely punished. 3
The leading role in the army was occupied by the guard (keshik) of Genghis Khan, consisting of ten thousand soldiers. They were called “bagatur” - heroes. They were the main striking force of the Mongol army, so particularly distinguished warriors were recruited into the guard. Private guardsman special cases had the right to command any detachment of other troops. On the battlefield, the guard was in the center, near Genghis Khan.The rest of the army was divided into tens of thousands (“darkness” or “tumens”), thousands, hundreds and tens of fighters. Each unit was headed by an experienced and skilled military leader. The army of Genghis Khan professed the principle of appointing military leaders in accordance with personal merit. 4
____________________
1 “Chronicle of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russian soil”
2 Internet resources:http://www.licey.net/war/book1/kto
4 Internet resources:
The Mongol army included a Chinese division serving heavy combat vehicles, including flamethrowers. The latter threw various flammable substances into the besieged cities: burning oil, the so-called “Greek fire” and others.
During sieges, the Mongols also resorted to the art of mines in its primitive form. They knew how to produce floods, made tunnels, underground passages and the like.
The Mongols overcame water obstacles with great skill; property was piled on reed rafts tied to the tails of horses; people used wineskins for crossing. This ability to adapt gave Mongol warriors a reputation as some kind of supernatural, diabolical creatures. 1
3. Armament
“The armament of the Mongols is excellent: bows and arrows, shields and swords; they are the best archers of all nations,” Marco Polo wrote in his “Book.” 2
The weapon of an ordinary warrior consisted of a short compound bow made of flexible wood plates attached to a central whip for shooting from a horse, and a second bow of the same design, only longer than the first, for shooting while standing. The firing range from such a bow reached one hundred and eighty meters. 3
____________________
1 Internet resources: Erenzhen Khara-Davan "Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy"
3 Internet resources:Denisov Yu.N. Who ordered the Tatar-Mongol invasion? M.: Flinta, 2008
Arrows were mainly divided into light ones for long-range shooting and heavy ones with a wide tip for close combat. Some were intended for piercing armor, others - for hitting enemy horses... In addition to these arrows, there were also signal arrows with holes in the tip, which emitted a loud whistle in flight. Such arrows were also used to indicate the direction of fire. Each warrior had two quivers of thirty arrows. 1
The warriors were also armed with swords and light sabers. The latter are strongly curved, sharply sharpened on one side. The crosshairs on Horde sabers have upward curved and flattened ends. Under the crosshair, a clip with a tongue covering part of the blade was often welded - a characteristic feature of the work of Horde gunsmiths.
The warrior's head was protected by a conical steel helmet with leather pads covering the neck. The warrior’s body was protected by a leather camisole, and in later times chain mail was worn over the camisole or metal strips were attached. Riders with swords and sabers had a shield made of leather or willow, and horsemen with bows did without a shield. 2
The infantry was armed with various forms of polearms: maces, six-fingers, hammers, pincers and flails. The warriors were protected by plate armor andhelmets . 3
____________________
1 Historical magazine “Rodina”. - M.: 1997. – page 75 of 129.
2 Internet resources:Denisov Yu.N. Who ordered the Tatar-Mongol invasion? M.: Flinta, 2008
3 Internet resources:http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_of the Mongol_Empire
“They don’t know how to fight with knives and don’t carry them naked. Shields are not used, and very few use spears. And when they use them, they strike from the side. And at the end of the spear they tie a cord and hold it in their hand. And yet, some have hooks on the tip of their spears...”- reports Medieval by Vincent of Beauvais.
The Mongols wore Chinese silk underwear, which was not pierced by the arrow, but was pulled into the wound along with the tip, delaying its penetration. The Mongol army had surgeons from China.
4. Battle tactics
The war was usually conducted by the Mongols according to the following system:
1. A kurultai was convened, at which the issue of the upcoming war and its plan was discussed. There they decided everything that was necessary to form an army, and also determined the place and time for the collection of troops.
2. Spies were sent to the enemy country and “tongues” were obtained.
3. Military operations began as usual in early spring and in autumn, when horses and camels are in good health. Before the opening of hostilities, Genghis Khan gathered all the senior commanders to listen to his instructions. The supreme command was exercised by the emperor himself. The invasion of the enemy's country was carried out by several armies in different directions.
4. When approaching significant fortified cities, private armies left a special corps to monitor them. Supplies were collected in the surrounding area and, if necessary, a temporary base was set up. Usually the main forces continued the offensive, and the observation corps, equipped with machines, began to invest and siege.
5. When a meeting in the field with an enemy army was foreseen, the Mongols usually followed one of the following two methods:
Either they tried to attack the enemy by surprise, quickly concentrating the forces of several armies to the battlefield;
Or, if the enemy turned out to be vigilant and surprise could not be counted on, they directed their forces in such a way as to achieve a bypass of one of the enemy flanks. This maneuver was called "tulugma".
In addition to the two indicated methods, the Mongol leaders also used various other operational techniques. For example, a feigned flight was carried out, and the army with great skill covered its tracks, disappearing from the eyes of the enemy until he fragmented his forces and weakened security measures. Then the Mongols mounted fresh clockwork horses and made a quick raid, appearing as if from underground before the stunned enemy. In this way they were divided in 1223 intoKalka River Russian princes.
Mongolia had another military “tradition”: to pursue a defeated enemy until complete destruction.
Among the most important advantages of the Mongolian army is its amazing maneuverability. On the battlefield, this was expressed in the form of excellent training of the Mongol horsemen and the preparation of entire units of troops for rapid movements on the ground. 1
________________________
The Mongol offensive represented an avalanche, growing with every step of movement. About two-thirds of Batu's army were Turkic tribes roaming east of the Volga; When storming fortresses and fortified cities, the Mongols drove prisoners in front of them like “cannon fodder.” 1 This is what a Hungarian Franciscan writes to the Bishop of Perugia: “They armed warriors and villagers fit for battle and send them against their will into battle ahead of them...” 2
The energy and activity of the Mongolian command, the organization and training of the army, which achieved unprecedented speed of marches and maneuvers and almost complete independence from the rear and supply - this is the main advantage of the Mongolian army. 1 “Move apart - fight together,” says the aphorism about Mongol warriors.
Among the Mongols, the military commander observed the progress of the battle and coordinated the actions of his units from the outside, which gave an undeniable advantage. 2
Here is what a military specialist, French Lieutenant Colonel Renck says: “... If they (the Mongols) always turned out to be invincible, then they owed this to the courage of their strategic plans and the infallible clarity of their tactical actions. Of course, in the personGenghis Khan and the galaxy of his generals, the art of war reached one of its highest peaks".
Thus, we can point out the following advantages of the Mongolian army over the Russians: collective discipline over individual heroism, skilled archers over heavy cavalry and infantry. These tactical differences became the key to Mongol success on Kalka, and subsequently to the lightning-fast conquest of Eastern and Central Europe.
Russian army
1. Discipline
By the beginning of the 13th century, the Russian army did not exist as a single military association. Each appanage prince had his own horse squad. In some cases, princely squads united for joint actions against one or another enemy, but since the time of Vladimir Monomakh, such an association did not have a supreme military leader; each prince considered himself equal to the other princes. This already lay the key to the collapse of military discipline.
2. Composition of the army
The princely squads were few in number and consisted of professional warriors. One squad consisted of several hundred warriors. Each warrior was skilled in any form of hand-to-hand combat. The warriors were trained to act in formation, sacredly preserved the traditions of mutual assistance, but with other squads they acted ineptly together. 3
The squad was divided into senior and junior. Sometimes foreigners were hired to serve. Most often these wereNormans , Pechenegs , Then Cumans , Hungarians , berendei , Torques , Poles , Balts , occasionally even Bulgarians , Serbs And Germans . The system of official position is also known - after the prince came the governors, then the thousanders, centurions, and tens. The number of squads was small. One prince has no more than 2000 people. 4
____________________
1 Internet resources: Erenzhen Khara-Davan "Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy"
2 Historical magazine “Rodina”. - M.: 1997. – page 55 of 129.; Page 88 of 129
3 Internet resources: http://moikraitulski.ru/russkoe-vojsko/
4 Internet resources:http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Druzhina
The cavalry army consisted of heavily armed horsemen - spearmen and light cavalry - archers. 1
...In front of the cavalry came the infantry, which began the battle. Infantrymen - "footmen" - were used to protect city walls and gates, cover the rear of the cavalry, and carry out the necessary transport and engineering work, for reconnaissance and punitive attacks. ... The infantry detachments were for the most part formed from common people - smerds, artisans, and not from professional warriors. 2 In terms of numbers, the infantry made up the majority of the Russiantroops .
3. Armament
The equipment of Russian soldiers in the middle of the 13th century changed little - helmets, shields, spears, sabers and swords still formed its basis.
2 Internet resources:http://www.ois.org.ua/club/public/public1016.htm
http://moikraitulski.ru/russkoe-vojsko/
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Russian_Army
Appendix No. 1
GIOVANNI DEL PLANO CARPINI. “HISTORY OF MONGALS”
CHAPTER SIX
About war and the division of troops, about weapons and tricks in a clash, about the siege of fortifications and their treachery against those who surrender to them, and about cruelty against prisoners
Having spoken about power, we must talk about war as follows: first, about the division of troops, secondly, about weapons, thirdly, about tricks in a collision, fourthly, about the siege of fortresses and cities, fifthly, about treachery, which they show to those who surrender to them, and the cruelty with which they treat captives.
§ I. On the division of troops
Let's say about the division of troops in this way: Chinggis Kan ordered that one person be placed at the head of ten men (and in our language he is called a foreman), and at the head of ten foremen was placed one, who is called a centurion, and at the head of ten centurions was put one, who is called a thousand-man, and at the head of ten thousand-mans one was placed, and this number is called darkness among them. At the head of the entire army, two leaders or three are placed, but in such a way that they are subordinate to one. When the troops are at war, then if out of ten people one, or two, or three, or even more, flee, then they are all killed, and if all ten flee, and the other hundred do not flee, then all are killed; and, to put it briefly, if they do not retreat together, then all those fleeing are killed; in the same way, if one or two or more boldly enter into battle, and ten others do not follow, then they are also killed, and if one or more out of ten are captured, but the other comrades do not free them, then they are also killed.
§ II. About weapons
I. Everyone should have at least the following weapons: two or three bows, or at least one good one, and three large quivers full of arrows, one ax and ropes to pull the weapons. The rich have swords that are sharp at the end, cut only on one side and are somewhat crooked; they also have an armed horse, shin guards, helmets and armor. Some have armor, as well as coverings for horses made of leather, made as follows: they take straps from a bull or other animal the width of an arm, fill them with resin together in threes or fours and tie them with straps or ropes; on the upper belt they place the ropes at the end, and on the lower one in the middle, and so on until the end; hence, when the lower straps tilt, the upper ones rise up, and thus double or triple on the body. They divide the horse's covering into five parts: on one side of the horse one, and on the other side the other, which extend from the tail to the head and are tied at the saddle, and behind the saddle on the back and also on the neck; They also place the other side on the sacrum, where the connections of the two sides join; in this piece they make a hole through which they expose the tail, and they also place one side on the chest. All parts extend to the knees or to the ligaments of the shins; and in front of the forehead they place an iron strip, which on both sides of the neck is connected with the above-mentioned sides. The armor also has four parts; one part extends from the hip to the neck, but it is made according to the position of the human body, since it is compressed in front of the chest, and from the arms and below it fits roundly around the body; behind the sacrum they place another piece, which extends from the neck to the piece that fits around the body; on the shoulders, these two pieces, namely the front and back, are attached with buckles to two iron strips, which are on both shoulders; and on both arms they have a piece on top that extends from the shoulders to the hands, which are also open below, and on each knee they have a piece; all these pieces are connected by buckles. The helmet is made of iron or copper on top, and what covers the neck and throat around is made of leather. And all these pieces of leather are composed in the above manner.
II. For some, everything that we named above is composed of iron in the following way: they make one thin strip the width of a finger and the length of a palm, and in this way they prepare many strips; in each strip they make eight small holes and insert three thick and strong belts inside, lay the strips one on top of the other, as if climbing along ledges, and tie the above-mentioned strips to the belts with thin straps, which are passed through the holes noted above; in the upper part they sew one strap, which doubles on both sides and is sewn with another strap so that the above-mentioned strips come together well and tightly, and form from the strips, as it were, one belt, and then they tie everything together in pieces as described above . And they do this both to arm horses and people. And they make it shine so much that a person can see his own face in them.
III. Some of them have spears, and on the neck of the iron of the spear they have a hook, with which, if they can, they pull a person from the saddle. The length of their arrows is two feet, one palm and two fingers, and since the feet are different, we give here the measure of a geometric foot: twelve grains of barley make up the diameter of a finger, and sixteen crosses of fingers make up a geometric foot. The iron arrowheads are very sharp and cut on both sides like a double-edged sword; and they always carry files with their quivers to sharpen their arrows. The above-mentioned iron tips have a sharp tail, one finger long, which is inserted into the wood. Their shield is made of willow or other twigs, but we do not think that they wore it except in the camp and to protect the emperor and princes, and even then only at night. They also have other arrows for shooting birds, animals and unarmed people, three fingers wide. They also have a variety of other arrows for shooting birds and animals.
§ III. About tricks in case of a collision
I. When they wish to go to war, they send forward skirmishers (praecursores), who have with them nothing but felts, horses and weapons. They do not rob anything, do not burn houses, do not kill animals, and only wound and kill people, and if they cannot do otherwise, they put them to flight; yet they are much more willing to kill than to put to flight. They are followed by an army, which, on the contrary, takes everything it finds; also people, if they can be found, are taken prisoner or killed. However, after this, the troops at the head send heralds who must find people and fortifications, and they are very skillful in searches.
II. When they get to the rivers, they cross them, even if they are large, in the following way: the more noble ones have round and smooth skin, on the surface of which they make small handles all around, into which they insert a rope and tie it so that they form a general a kind of round bag, which is filled with dresses and other property, and tied very tightly; after this, saddles and other more rigid objects are placed in the middle; people also sit in the middle. And this ship, thus prepared, they tie to the tail of the horse and force the person who would control the horse to sail forward, along with the horse. Or sometimes they take two oars, row them through the water and thus cross the river, the horses are driven into the water, and one person swims next to the horse that he controls, but other horses follow that one and thus cross the waters and large rivers. Other poorer people have a leather wallet, tightly sewn; everyone must have it. In this purse, or in this sack, they put the dress and all their property, tie this bag very tightly at the top, hang it on the horse’s tail and cross, as stated above.
III. You need to know that whenever they see enemies, they go at them, and each throws three or four arrows at their opponents; and if they see that they cannot defeat them, then they retreat back to their own; and they do this for the sake of deception, so that their enemies will pursue them to those places; where they set up an ambush; and if their enemies pursue them to the aforesaid ambush, they surround them and thus wound and kill them. In the same way, if they see that there is a large army against them, they sometimes withdraw from it one or two days' journey and secretly attack another part of the land and plunder it; at the same time they kill people and destroy and devastate the earth. And if they see that they cannot do even this, then they retreat back ten or twelve days' journey. Sometimes they also remain in a safe place until the army of their enemies is divided, and then they come stealthily and devastate the whole land. For in wars they are very cunning, since they have been fighting with other nations for forty years and even more.
IV. When they wish to begin battle, they arrange all their troops as they should fight. The leaders or commanders of the army do not enter into battle, but stand at a distance against the enemy army and have youths on horses next to them, as well as women and horses. Sometimes they make images of people and place them on horses; They do this in order to make people think about more combatants. In the face of their enemies they send a detachment of captives and other nations that are between them; maybe some Tatars are going with them. They send other detachments of braver people far to the right and left, so that they are not seen by their opponents, and thus surround the opponents and close them in the middle; and thus they begin to fight on all sides. And, although they are sometimes few, their opponents, who are surrounded, imagine that they are many. And this especially happens when they see those who are with the leader or commander of the army, youths, women, horses and images of people, as mentioned above, whom they consider to be warriors, and as a result they become afraid and confused. And if by chance the opponents fight successfully, then the Tatars make a way for them to escape, and as soon as they begin to flee and separate from each other, they pursue them and then, during the flight, they kill more than they could kill in war.
However, one must know that if it can be done otherwise, they are reluctant to engage in battle, but they wound and kill people and horses with arrows, and when people and horses are weakened by arrows, then they engage in battle with them.
§ IV. About the siege of fortifications
They conquer fortifications in the following way. If such a fortress is encountered, they surround it; Moreover, sometimes they fence it off so that no one can enter or exit; At the same time, they fight very bravely with guns and arrows and do not stop fighting for a single day or night, so that those on the fortifications have no rest; The Tatars themselves rest, since they divide the troops, and one replaces the other in battle, so that they do not get very tired. And if they cannot take possession of the fortification in this way, then they throw Greek fire at it; Moreover, they usually sometimes take the fat of the people they kill and pour it melted on the houses; and wherever fire falls on this fat, it burns, so to speak, unquenchable; yet it can be extinguished, as they say, by pouring wine or beer; if it falls on the body, it can be extinguished by rubbing the palm of the hand. And if they do not prevail in this way, and this city or fortress has a river, then they block it or make another channel and, if possible, drown this fortification. If this cannot be done, then they dig under the fortification and enter it armed underground. And when they have already entered, one part throws fire to burn it, and the other part fights with the people of that fortification. If they cannot defeat him anyway, then they set up their camp or fortification opposite him, so as not to see the burden from the enemy’s spears, and stand against him for a long time, unless the army that is fighting them accidentally receives help and removes them by force.
§ V. About the treachery of the Tatars and about cruelty against prisoners
But when they are already standing against the fortification, they speak kindly to its inhabitants and promise them a lot with the goal that they will surrender into their hands; and if they surrender to them, they say: “Come out to be counted according to our custom.” And when they come out to them, the Tatars ask which of them are artisans, and they leave them, and kill the others, excluding those whom they want to have as slaves, with an ax; and if, as has been said, they spare someone else, then they never spare noble and respectable people, and if by chance, due to some circumstance, they spare some noble persons, then they can no longer get out of captivity prayers, not for ransom. During wars, they kill everyone they take prisoner, unless they want to save someone to have them as slaves.
They divide those appointed for killing among the centurions, so that they kill them with a double-edged axe; after this, they divide the captives and give each slave ten people to kill, or more or less, as the rulers wish.
Appendix No. 2
Marco Polo. “A book about the diversity of the world”
Translation by I. P. Minaev
CHAPTER LXV
How Chingiz [Genghis Khan] became the first Khan of the Tatars
It happened that in 1187 the Tatars chose a king for themselves, and he was called Genghis Khan in their own way; he was a brave, intelligent and daring man; when, I tell you, they chose him as king, Tatars from all over the world, who were scattered in foreign countries, came to him and recognized him as their sovereign. This Genghis Khan ruled the country well. What else can I tell you? It’s even surprising how many Tatars there are here.
Genghis Khan saw that he had a lot of people, armed them with bows and other weapons and went to fight foreign countries. They conquered eight regions; They did not do evil to the people, did not take anything away from them, but only took them away with them to conquer other people. And so, as you have heard, they conquered many people. And the people see that the government is good, the king is merciful, and they followed him willingly. Genghis Khan gathered so many people that they were wandering all over the world, and decided to conquer more land.
So he sent his ambassadors to priest Ivan, and that was in 1200 A.D.; He told him that he wanted to marry his daughter. Priest Ivan heard that Genghis Khan was wooing his daughter and became angry. “What is the shamelessness of Genghis Khan!” he began to say. “He’s wooing my daughter! Or maybe he doesn’t know that he’s my servant and slave! Go back to him and tell him, I’ll burn my daughter, but I won’t marry him; tell him from me.” that he should be executed by death as a traitor and traitor to his sovereign!” He then told the ambassadors to leave and never return.
The ambassadors listened to this and immediately left. They came to their sovereign and told him in order everything that priest Ivan had punished.
CHAPTER LXVI
How Genghis Khan equips his people for a campaign against priest Ivan
Genghis Khan heard the shameful abuse that Priest Ivan was punishing him, he pouted
his heart almost burst in his stomach; I tell you, he was a powerful man. Finally he spoke, so loudly that everyone around him heard; he said that he would not want to reign if priest Ivan did not pay dearly for his abuse, which he was punishing, more dearly than anyone had ever paid for abuse, he said that it was necessary to quickly show whether he was priest Ivan’s slave. He called his people together and began to make preparations the likes of which had never been seen or heard of. He let priest Ivan know so that he could defend himself as best he could; Genghis Khan was coming at him with all his might; and priest Ivan heard that Genghis Khan was coming towards him, chuckled and did not pay attention. They are not military people, he said, but in his mind he decided to do everything so that when Genghis Khan comes, he will be captured and executed. He summoned his own from everywhere and from foreign countries and armed them; Yes, he tried so hard that such a large army was never talked about.
This is how you heard that both of them equipped themselves. And without further ado, know the truth, Genghis Khan with all his people came to the large, glorious plain of priest Ivan, Tanduk, here he became a camp; and there were many of them there, no one, I tell you, even knew the number of them. The news came that priest Ivan was coming here; Genghis Khan rejoiced; the plain was large, there was a place to fight, he was waiting for him here, he wanted to fight him. But enough about Genghis Khan and his people, let’s return to priest Ivan and his people.
CHAPTER LXVII
How priest Ivan and his people went to meet Genghis Khan
It is said in the legends that priest Ivan learned that Genghis Khan with all his people was coming against him, and he and his people came out against him; and he kept walking until he reached that same Tanduk plain, and here, twenty miles from Genghis Khan, he camped; Both sides rested here so that by the day of the fight they would be fresher and more energetic. So, as you heard, two greatest armies met on that plain of Tanduk [Tenduk].
Just once Genghis Khan called his astrologers, Christians and Saracens, and ordered them to guess who would win the battle - he or priest Ivan. The astrologers knew their magic. The Saracens failed to tell him the truth, but the Christians explained everything clearly; they took a stick and broke it in half; one half was placed in one direction, and the other in the other, and no one touched them; They then tied Genghis Khan’s name onto one half of the stick, and Ivan’s priest onto the other. “Tsar,” they later said to Genghis Khan, “look at these sticks; on one is your name, and on the other is Ivan’s priest; now we have finished the magic, and whose stick goes to the other will win.”
Genghis Khan wanted to look at it, and he ordered the astrologers to show it to him as quickly as possible. The Christian astrologers took the psalter, read some psalms and began to cast spells, and that same stick that had the name of Genghis Khan, untouched by anyone, went to the stick of priest Ivan and climbed onto it; and it happened in front of everyone who was there. Genghis Khan saw this and was very happy; and since the Christians told him the truth, he always respected them and considered them to be undeceitful and truthful people.
CHAPTER LXVIII
This describes the great battle between priest Ivan and Genghis Khan
Two days later both sides armed themselves and fought fiercely; a fiercer battle than that had never been seen; There were many troubles for both sides, but in the end Genghis Khan won. And then priest Ivan was killed.
From that day on, Genghis Khan went to conquer the world. He reigned, I tell you, for another six years from that battle and conquered many fortresses and countries; and at the end of six years he went to the Kangi fortress, and an arrow hit him in the knee; He died from that wound. It's a pity, he was a daring and smart man. death of Genghis Khan (14th century miniature)
I described to you how Genghis Khan was the first sovereign of the Tatars, I also told you how at first they defeated priest Ivan, now I will tell you about their morals and customs.
CHAPTER LXX
The Tatar god and the Tatar faith are described here
And their faith is this: they have a god, they call him Nachigai and say that he is an earthly god; He protects their sons and their cattle and bread. They honor him and pray to him a lot; Everyone has one in their house. They make it from felt and cloth and keep it in their homes; They also make the wife of that god and sons. The wife is placed on his left side, and the sons in front of him; and they are also prayed to. During the meal, they will take and anoint the mouth of God, his wife and sons with a fatty piece, and then pour the juice over house door and they say, having done this, that God ate with his own, and they themselves begin to eat and drink. They drink, you know, mare’s milk; They drink it, I tell you, as if it were white wine, and it is very tasty, it is called shemius.
Their clothes are like this: the rich dress in gold and silk fabrics, trimming them with feathers, furs - sable, ermine, silver fox, fox. Their harness is beautiful and expensive.
They are armed with a bow, a sword and a club; Most of all, they use the bow, because they are dexterous arrows; and on their back they have a shell made of buffalo or some other skin, boiled and very strong. They fight well and very bravely.
They wander more than others, and here’s why: if the need arises, the Tatar will often go to whole month, without any food; he feeds on mare's milk and the game that he catches, and the horse grazes on whatever grass he can find, and he does not need to take with him either barley or straw. They are very obedient to their sovereign; if the need arises, they will stand armed on horseback all night; and the horse always grazes on the grass. They are more resilient in labor and hardship than anyone else, they have little to spend, and they are the most capable people to conquer the earth and kingdoms.
This is what their order is: when the Tatar king goes to war, he takes with him one hundred thousand horsemen and arranges the following order: he puts an elder over ten people, another over a hundred, another over a thousand, and another over ten thousand; he communicates only with ten people, and the foreman over ten thousand also communicates with ten people; whoever is placed over a thousand, also with ten, and whoever is over a hundred, also with ten. This is how, as you have heard, everyone answers his superior.
When the sovereign of a hundred thousand wants to send someone somewhere, he orders the foreman over ten thousand to give him a thousand, and he orders the thousand's captain to give his share, the thousand's captain to the centurion, the centurion orders the foreman to give his share to the one who is above ten thousand; everyone gives as much as he should be given. Orders are obeyed better than anywhere else in the world. One hundred thousand, you know, they are called here, ten thousand toman, thousand..., hundred..., ten...
When an army goes for some business across the plains or mountains, two days before, two hundred scouts are sent forward, the same number back and the same number on both sides, that is, on all four sides, and this is done so that by chance who did not attack. When they go on a long journey, to war, they don’t take harnesses with them, but they take two leather skins with milk for drinking. clay pot cook meat. They also bring a small tent for shelter in case of rain. If the need arises, they gallop, I tell you, for ten days without food, without lighting a fire, and feed on the blood of their horses; pierces the horse's sinew and drinks the blood. They also have powdered milk, thick like dough; carry it with them; put it in water and stir until it dissolves, then drink it.
In battles with the enemy, this is how they gain the upper hand: they are not ashamed to run away from the enemy; while running away, they turn and shoot. They trained their horses, like dogs, to turn in all directions. When they are driven, they fight gloriously while running, and fight just as hard as if they were standing face to face with the enemy; runs and turns back, shoots accurately, hits both enemy horses and people; and the enemy thinks that they are upset and defeated, and he himself loses, because his horses have been shot, and a fair number of people have been killed. The Tatars, when they see that they have killed both the enemy’s horses and many people, turn back and fight gloriously, bravely, ruin and defeat the enemy. This is how they won many battles and conquered many nations.
Such is the life and such customs, as I told you, among real Tatars; Now, I tell you, they have deteriorated greatly; in Cathay they live like idolaters, according to their customs, and have abandoned their law, while the Levantine Tatars adhere to Saracen customs.
The judgment is done this way: whoever steals, even if it’s a little, will receive seven strokes of the cane, or seventeen, or twenty-seven, or thirty-seven, or forty-seven, and so on up to three hundred and seven, increasing by ten, depending on the what was stolen. Many people die from these blows. Whoever steals a horse or anything else will die for it; they cut it with a sword; but whoever can give a ransom, pay ten times what was stolen, is not killed.
Every elder or who has a lot of livestock marks stallions and mares, camels, bulls and cows and all large livestock with his sign; with a mark he lets them graze without any guards in the plains and mountains; if the cattle are mixed, they give it to the one whose mark; Sheep, rams, goats are grazed by people. Their cattle are large, fat, and nice.
They have a wonderful custom, I forgot to write about it. If two people die, one has a son about four years old or so, and the other a daughter, they marry them; they give a dead girl as a wife to a dead guy, then they write an agreement and burn it, and when the smoke rises into the air, they say that the agreement has been carried to the next world, to their children, so that they would regard each other as husband and wife. They hold a wedding, scatter food here and there and say that this is for the children in the next world. They do something else: they draw on paper people who look like themselves, horses, fabrics, bizants, harnesses, and then they burn it all and say - everything that they drew and burned will be with their children in the next world. And when all this is over, they consider themselves relatives and cherish their relationship in the same way as if their children were alive.
He told you, clearly described Tatar customs and rights, but said nothing about the great deeds of the Great Khan, the great sovereign of all the Tatars, and about his great imperial court. This will be discussed in this book in its own time and place. There are a lot of strange things to write down...
Historians differ in their assessment of Genghis Khan's military talents. Some consider him one of the four greatest commanders in human history, while others attribute victories to the talents of his military leaders. One thing is certain: the army created by Genghis Khan was invincible, regardless of whether it was led by the Great Khan himself or one of his associates. His strategy and tactics stunned the enemy with their surprise. Its main principles include the following:
- - a war, even punctuated by truces, is waged until the complete destruction or surrender of the enemy:
- - unlike the usual raids of nomads undertaken for the purpose of robbery, Genghis Khan’s ultimate goal was always the complete conquest of enemy territory;
- - those who submitted on the terms of recognition of vassal dependence of the state are placed under strict Mongol control. Widespread in the Middle Ages, nominal vassalage was occasionally allowed only at first.
The fundamentals of Genghis Khan’s military strategy should also include the principle of maintaining the strategic initiative, maximum mobility and maneuverability of formations. In almost all wars, the Mongols acted against a numerically superior enemy, but at the point of delivering the main blow they always achieved a significant numerical superiority. The blows were always delivered in several directions at once. Thanks to these techniques, the enemy got the impression that he was attacked by countless hordes.
Such efficiency was achieved by combining iron discipline with encouraging initiative, developing skills of interaction and mutual assistance. Driven hunts were widely used in troop training, when squads of hunters, moving from different directions, gradually tightened the ring. The same method was used in war.
It is worth noting the widespread involvement of foreigners in the army, any formations ready to fight on the side of the Mongols. For example, on the Kalka River, wanderers who lived in the Eastern European steppes found themselves in the ranks of the Mongols.
It is also impossible not to take into account the constant study of combat experience and the introduction of innovations. The most striking example is the use of the achievements of Chinese engineering, the widespread use of siege and various throwing weapons. The ability of the Mongols to take cities, including well-fortified ones, had fatal consequences for their opponents: the usual tactics used against nomads - to bring troops into fortresses and sit out - both in Central Asia and in Rus' turned out to be fatal.
The Mongol cavalry was capable of fighting in almost any natural environment, including northern latitudes(only the climate of the Indian deserts turned out to be unbearable for her).
Conquerors make extensive use of local resources for war through merciless, organized plunder. They also found craftsmen and specialists among the local population.
The Mongols widely used strategic and tactical intelligence, methods of psychological warfare, national conflicts, and diplomacy to deceive and disorient the enemy.
Medieval wars were generally distinguished by cruelty, and horror was caused not so much by the Mongols’ resort to the method of terror, but by the systematic use of it. The mass extermination of the population in the occupied territory was supposed to undermine the resources of the resistance and paralyze the survivors with horror.
All fortresses in the subordinate territory were destroyed, and regular taxation was introduced. Management was entrusted to local feudal lords, who were placed under the strict control of Mongol “commissars” - darugachi. The latter, like other representatives of the Mongol administration, for the most part were also not ethnic Mongols. Thus, the conquered countries became the basis for further conquests.
Many great empires have collapsed during the lifetime or shortly after the death of their founder. The merciless system created by Genghis Khan, having proven its effectiveness, outlived him for several decades.
The Mongol army of the era of Genghis Khan and his successors is a completely exceptional phenomenon in world history. Strictly speaking, this applies not only to the army itself: in general, the entire organization of military affairs in the Mongolian state is truly unique. Emerging from the depths of clan society and ordered by the genius of Genghis Khan, this army in its fighting qualities far surpassed the troops of countries with a thousand-year history. And many elements of organization, strategy, and military discipline were centuries ahead of their time and only in the 19th-20th centuries entered the practice of the art of war. So what was the aria of the Mongol Empire like in the 13th century?
Let's move on to issues related to the structure, management, discipline and other elements of the military organization of the Mongols. And here it seems important to say once again that all the foundations of military affairs in the Mongol Empire were laid and developed by Genghis Khan, who cannot at all be called a great commander (on the battlefield), but we can confidently speak of him as a true military genius.
Already starting from the great kurultai of 1206, at which Temujin was proclaimed Genghis Khan of the Mongol Empire he created, a strict decimal system was used as the basis for the organization of the army. In the very principle of dividing an army into tens, hundreds and thousands, there was nothing new for the nomads.
However, Genghis Khan made this principle truly comprehensive, deploying not only the army, but also the entire Mongolian society into similar structural units.
Following the system was extremely strict: not a single warrior had the right under any circumstances to leave his ten, and not a single foreman could accept anyone into the ten. The only exception to this rule could be an order from the khan himself.
This scheme made a dozen or a hundred a truly cohesive fighting unit: soldiers acted as a unit for years and even decades, knowing full well the abilities, pros and cons of their comrades. In addition, this principle made it extremely difficult for enemy spies and just random people to penetrate into the Mongol army itself.
Genghis Khan also abandoned the generic principle of army building.
And in the army the principle of tribal subordination was completely abolished: the instructions of the tribal leaders had no force for the soldiers; the orders of the military commander - foreman, centurion, thousander - had to be carried out unquestioningly, under the threat of immediate execution for non-compliance.
Initially, the main military unit of the Mongol army was a thousand. In 1206, Genghis Khan appointed ninety-five thousand officers from among the most trusted and loyal people.
Soon after the great kurultai, based on military expediency, Genghis Khan made his best thousand commanders temniks, and two old comrades - Boorchu and Mukhali - headed, respectively, the right and left wings of the Mongol army.
The structure of the Mongol army, which included troops of the right and left hands, as well as the center, was approved in the same year 1206.
However, later in the 1220s, strategic necessity caused by the increase in the number of theaters of war forced Genghis Khan to effectively abandon this principle.
After the Central Asian campaign and the emergence of several fronts, this structure was changed. Genghis Khan was forced to abandon the principle of a single army. Formally, the tumen remained the largest military unit, but to carry out the most important strategic tasks, large army groups were created, as a rule, of two or three, less often of four tumens, and operating as autonomous combat units. The overall command of such a group was given to the most prepared temnik, who in this situation became, as it were, the deputy of the khan himself.
The demand from the military commander for completing combat missions was great. Even his favorite Shigi-Khutukha, after he suffered an unexpected defeat from Jalal ad-Din at Perwan, Genghis Khan permanently removed from the highest military command.
Giving unconditional preference to his trusted comrades, Genghis Khan, however, made it clear that a career was open for any of his warriors, right up to the highest positions. He speaks unambiguously about this in his instructions (bilik), which actually made such a practice the law of the state: “Whoever can lead his house faithfully can lead his possession; Anyone who can arrange ten people according to the condition, it is decent to give him a thousand, and tumen, and he can arrange it well.” And vice versa, any commander who failed to cope with his duties faced demotion or even the death penalty; a person from the same military unit who was most suitable for this command position was appointed as the new chief. Genghis Khan also brought out another important principle of command - a principle that is fundamental in the modern army, but which was fully included in the regulations of European armies only by the 19th century. Namely, in the event of the absence of a commander for any reason, even the most insignificant, a temporary commander was immediately appointed in his place. This rule applied even if the boss was absent for several hours. Such a system was very effective in unpredictable military conditions. Completely unique for the Middle Ages, with its unbridled praise of the individual fighting qualities of a warrior, is another principle of selection of command personnel. This rule is so surprising and so clearly proves the military-organizational talent of Genghis Khan that it is worth citing here in full. Genghis Khan said: “There is no bahadur like Yesunbay, and there is no person similar to him in talents. But since he does not suffer from the hardships of the campaign and does not experience hunger and thirst, he considers all other people, nukers and warriors like himself, to bear the hardships, but they are not able to bear them. For this reason, he is not fit to be a boss. The person who deserves to be such is the one who himself knows what hunger and thirst are, and therefore judges the condition of others, the one who goes on the road with calculation and does not allow the army to go hungry and thirsty, or the livestock to become emaciated.”
Thus, the responsibility imposed on troop commanders was very high. Among other things, each junior and mid-level commander was responsible for the functional readiness of his soldiers: before the campaign, he checked all the equipment of each soldier - from a set of weapons to a needle and thread. One of the articles of the Great Yasa states that for the misconduct of his soldiers - slackness, poor readiness, especially military crime - the commander was punished with the same measure as them: that is, if the soldier was subject to the death penalty, then the commander could also be executed. The demand from the commander was great, but no less great was the power that he enjoyed in his unit. The order of any boss had to be carried out without question. In the Mongolian army, the system of control and transmission of orders to higher commanders was raised to the proper height.
Operational control in combat conditions was carried out in different ways: by verbal order from the commander or on his behalf through a messenger, signaling with horsetails and the ever-memorable whistling arrows, a clearly developed system of sound signals transmitted by pipes and war drums - “nakars”. And yet, it was not only (and not even so much) order and discipline that made the Mongol army of Genghis Khan a unique phenomenon in world history. This was a serious difference between the Mongol army and the army of both the past and the future: it did not need either communications or convoys; in fact, during a military campaign it did not require supplies from outside at all. And with good reason, any Mongol warrior could express this in the words of the famous Latin proverb: “I carry everything I have with me.”
On a campaign, the Mongol army could move for months, and even years, without carrying food and fodder supplies. The Mongolian horse was completely grazing: it did not need either a stable or a bag of oats for the night. Even from under the snow he could get food for himself, and the Mongols never knew the principle to which almost all armies of the Middle Ages obeyed: “they don’t fight in winter.” Special detachments of the Mongols were sent forward, but their task was not only tactical reconnaissance; but also economic reconnaissance - the best pastures were selected and places for watering were determined.
The endurance and unpretentiousness of the Mongol warrior was amazing. During the campaign, he was content with what he managed to obtain by hunting or robbery; if necessary, he could eat for weeks on his stone-hard khurut, stored in his saddle bags. When she had absolutely nothing to eat, the Mongol warrior could feed on... the blood of his own horses. Up to half a liter of blood could be taken from a Mongolian horse without much harm to its health. Finally, fallen or injured horses could also be eaten. Well, at the first opportunity, the horse herds were replenished again at the expense of captured cattle.
It was precisely these features that made the Mongol army the most resilient, the most mobile, the most independent of external conditions of all the armies that existed in the history of mankind. And we can say without mincing words: such an army was truly capable of conquering the whole world: its combat capabilities fully allowed this. The bulk of the Mongol army were lightly armed horse archers. But there was another important and significant group - heavy cavalry, armed with swords and pikes. They played the role of “Taran”, attacking in deep formation with the aim of breaking through the enemy’s battle formations. Both riders and horses were protected by armor - first leather, made from specially boiled buffalo leather, which was often varnished for greater strength.
The varnish on the armor also served another function: in case of an indirect hit, the arrow or blade would slide off varnished surface- therefore, for example, horse armor was almost always varnished; people often sewed metal plaques onto their armor. Unique was the interaction of these two branches of troops, brought to automaticity, and the battle was always started by horse archers. They attacked the enemy with several open parallel waves, continuously firing at him from bows; at the same time, the riders of the first ranks, who were out of action or who had used up their supply of arrows, were instantly replaced by warriors from the rear ranks. The density of fire was incredible: according to sources, Mongol arrows in battle “blown out the sun.” If the enemy could not withstand this massive shelling and turned his rear, then the light cavalry, armed with bows and sabers, completed the rout. If the enemy counterattacked, the Mongols did not accept close combat. A favorite tactic was to retreat in order to lure the enemy into a surprise attack due to a siege. This blow was delivered by heavy cavalry and almost always led to success. The reconnaissance function of the archer was also important: by delivering seemingly unsystematic strikes here and there, they thereby checked the readiness of the enemy’s defense.
And the direction of the main attack depended on this. The armament of the light cavalry was very simple: a bow, a quiver of arrows and sabers. Neither the warriors nor the horses had armor, but this, oddly enough, did not make them too vulnerable. The reason for this was the uniqueness of the Mongolian combat bow - probably the most powerful military weapon of a warrior before the invention of gunpowder. The Mongolian bow was relatively small in size, but extremely powerful and long-range. The Mongol bow was very powerful, and Mongol archers had considerable physical strength. This is not surprising if we remember that a Mongolian boy first received his bow at the age of three, and shooting exercises were a favorite pastime of the Mongols. In battle, the Mongol warrior was able to fire 6-8 arrows per minute without much damage to shooting accuracy. Such exceptional shooting density required a very significant number of arrows. Each Mongol warrior, before setting off on a military campaign, had to present to his superior “three large quivers full of arrows.” The quiver's capacity was 60 arrows.
The Mongol went into battle with one, and, if necessary, two full quivers - thus, in a major battle, the warrior’s ammunition was 120 arrows. Mongolian arrows themselves are something special. There were special armor-piercing tips, also different - for chain mail, for plate and for leather armor. There were arrows with very wide and sharp tips (the so-called “cut”), capable of cutting off a hand or even a head. The commanders always had several whistling signal arrows. There were other types that were used depending on the nature of the battle. During excavations in the Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin in 2001-2002, archaeologists found more than 15 different types of arrowheads. Almost all of them were of Mongolian (Tatar) origin and dated back to the 13th and 14th centuries. Another important weapon of the light-horse warrior was the saber. Saber blades were very light, slightly curved and cut on one side. The saber, almost without exception, was a weapon in combat against a retreating enemy, that is, a fleeing enemy was cut from behind, not expecting to encounter serious resistance.
Each Mongol horseman had a lasso with him, and often even several. This terrible Mongol weapon terrified the enemy - probably no less than his arrows. Although the main force of the Mongol army were horse archers, there is a lot of information about the use of a wide variety of weapons. Small throwing spears and darts were especially widely used, in the handling of which the Mongols were real specialists. The owners of armor actively used heavy hand weapons, which gave an advantage in contact combat: battle axes and clubs, spears with a long and wide blade. It is impossible not to say about probably the main weapon of any Mongol warrior. This is the famous Mongolian horse. The Mongolian horse is surprisingly small in size. Her height at the withers usually did not exceed one meter and thirty-five centimeters, and her weight ranged from two hundred to three hundred kilograms. A light Mongolian horse, of course, could not compare in the power of a ramming blow with the same knight's horse. But the Mongols were greatly helped by one important quality inherent in their steppe horses: significantly inferior in speed to the enemy’s horses, they had almost exceptional endurance. The Mongolian horse withstood both hours-long battles and extremely long hikes with unprecedented ease. The highest level of training of Mongolian horses was also important. The Mongol warrior and his horse acted as one creature in battle. The horse obeyed the slightest instruction from its owner. She was capable of the most unexpected feints and maneuvers. This allowed the Mongols, even during retreat, to maintain both order and fighting qualities: quickly retreating, the Mongol army could instantly stop and immediately launch a counterattack or release a shower of arrows at the enemy. An amazing fact: Mongolian horses were never tied or hobbled. Mongolian horses never left their generally quite harsh owners.
Starting with the Chinese campaign, infantry units appeared in the army, which were used during sieges. This group is the "siege crowd" or, in Mongolian, "khashar", widely known in history. This is simply the large civilian population of the conquered country gathered in one place. Such masses of people were used mainly during the Mongol sieges of fortresses and cities. The siege technology of the Mongols was very diverse. Let us note here various throwing devices: vortex stone throwers, catapults, arrow throwers, powerful stone throwing machines. There were also other siege devices of various kinds available: assault ladders and assault towers, battering rams and “assault domes” (apparently special shelters for warriors using a ram), as well as “Greek fire” (most likely a Chinese mixture of various flammable oils ) and even powder charges. Another important structural unit of the Mongol army was quite large groups light-horse warriors by “reconnaissance detachments”. Their tasks also included mass “cleansing” of the population along the army’s route, so that no one could warn the enemy about the Mongol campaign. They also explored possible routes of advance, determined camp sites for the army, and found suitable pastures and watering holes for horses. A story about the principles of strategy and military training among the Mongols would be incomplete without mentioning a very peculiar phenomenon that actually played the role of full-scale military exercises. We are talking about the famous round-up hunts. At the behest of Genghis Khan, such hunts were carried out once or twice a year, by the entire army. Obligatory round-up hunting was used during a military campaign and performed two tasks: replenishing the army's food supplies and improving the combat and tactical training of Mongol warriors. To conclude the topic of Mongolian military art, it is necessary to say about such a specific subject as the equipment (not combat) of the Mongolian warrior. In many ways, it was this ammunition that made the Mongol army what it was - “invincible and legendary.” Let's start with the "uniform". The clothing of the Mongol warrior was simple and purely functional. In summer - sheep wool pants and the famous Mongolian robe. Shoes all year round were boots, the bottom of which was leather and the top was made of felt. These boots are a little reminiscent of Russian felt boots, but they are much more comfortable, as they are not afraid of dampness. Winter boots could be made of thicker felt and could withstand any frost. In addition, in winter, a fur hat with earmuffs and a long, below the knees, fur coat made of fur folded in half - with wool both inside and outside - were added to the Mongol outfit. It is curious that after the conquest of China, many Mongol warriors began to wear silk underwear. But not at all in order to impress his ladies. The fact is that silk has the property of not being penetrated by the arrow, but being drawn into the wound along with the tip. Of course, it is much easier to remove such an arrow from a wound: you just need to pull the edges of this silk underwear. This is such an original surgery. The mandatory items of equipment included a full set of harness, a special file or sharpener for sharpening arrows, an awl, a flint, a clay pot for cooking food, and a two-liter leather bag with kumis (during the campaign it was also used as a container for water). An emergency supply of food was stored in two saddle bags: in one - strips of meat dried in the sun, in the other - khurut. In addition, the set of equipment also included a large wineskin, usually made of cowhide. Its use was multifunctional: on a hike it could serve both as an ordinary blanket and as a kind of mattress; when crossing deserts, it was used as a container for large supplies of water.
And finally, when inflated with air, it became an excellent means of crossing rivers; According to sources, even such serious water obstacles as the Volga were overcome by the Mongols with the help of this simple device. And such instant Mongol crossings often also came as a shock to the defending side. Such well-thought-out equipment made the Mongol warrior ready for any vicissitudes of military fate. He could act completely autonomously and in the most difficult conditions - for example, in severe frost or in the complete absence of food in the deserted steppe. And coupled with the high discipline, mobility and endurance of a nomad, it made the Mongol army the most advanced military instrument of its time, capable of solving military problems of any degree of complexity.
Mongols in a miniature from the early 14th century, Mongolian Iran. Illustrations for “Jami at-tawarikh” by Rashid ad-Din.
Since the late 90s. with the light mind of the science fiction writer A. Bushkov, an attack on Russian history began under the name " Mongol invasion there wasn’t.” Then the initiative was taken up by two mathematicians who imagined themselves as historians and writers, Fomenko and Nosovsky, and, after them, various smaller adherents of “alternative history” (more precisely, an alternative fantasy on a historical theme). If you look at the arguments of the alternative public, then their only three: 1) “I don’t believe in the tales of the “official historians”, 2) “This could not have happened”, 3) “They could not have done this.” As evidence, the alternative public invents delusional versions, takes them to the point of absurdity and attributes their nonsense to historians, after which they begin to refute their own fantasies with mockery and buffoonery towards historical science. This is an alternative method: he himself came up with nonsense, and he himself refuted it.
One of the favorite arguments of the alternative public is the size of the Mongol army, which allegedly could not reach Rus'. This is what Bushkova sounds like:
“Russian pre-revolutionary sources mention a “half-million-strong Mongol army.”
Sorry for the harshness, but both the first and second numbers are bullshit. Since they were invented by townspeople, armchair figures who saw the horse only from afar and had absolutely no idea what kind of care is required to maintain a fighting, as well as a pack and marching horse in working condition...
A primitive calculation shows: for an army of half a million or four hundred thousand soldiers, about one and a half million horses are needed, in extreme cases - a million. Such a herd will be able to advance at most fifty kilometers, but will not be able to go further - the front ones will instantly destroy the grass over a huge area, so that the rear ones will die from lack of food very quickly. Store as much oats for them in toroks (and how much can you store?) ...
It turns out to be an enchanted cool: a huge army of “Mongol-Tatars”, for purely physical reasons, would not be able to maintain combat effectiveness, move quickly, or deliver those same notorious “indestructible blows.” A small army could never have established control over most of the territory of Rus'."
A. Bushkov “Russia that never existed”, M., 1997
Here, in fact, is the entire “alternative version” in all its glory: “Historians are lying to us, I don’t believe them, the Mongols couldn’t.” For this version, each alternative adherent composes his own details of why he does not believe and why the Mongols could not. Although Bushkov’s version is already striking in its wretchedness. Well, if there were not half a million, but let’s say there were 100 thousand Mongols, wouldn’t that be enough to conquer Rus'? And why did Bushkov send the Mongols on a campaign in one column, what is called single file, and not on a wide front of tens of kilometers?? Or does the alternative public think that there was only one road from Mongolia to Rus'? And why did Bushkov imagine that horses, like locusts, eat grass as they run? The reference to the writer V. Yan looks rather strange - if only he started referring to cartoons. And which historian wrote about Batu’s half-million-strong army? But these are typical complaints about historians among the alternative public.
Let's first look at the opinions of historians:
N. M. Karamzin “History of the Russian State” (1818): “. ..the new Khan gave 300,000 soldiers to Batu, his nephew, and ordered him to conquer the northern shores of the Caspian Sea with further countries".
S. M. Solovyov "History of Russia..." (1853): " In 1236, 300,000 Tatars under the command of Batu entered the Bulgarian land...".
D. I. Ilovaisky "History of Russia", vol. II (1880): " From the upper reaches of the Irtysh, the horde moved westward, along the nomadic camps of various Turkish hordes, gradually annexing significant parts of them; so it crossed the Yaik River in the amount of at least half a million warriors".
E. Khara-Davan "Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy" (1929): " It would be more accurate to assume that the Batu army that set out to conquer Russia in 1236 included from 122 to 150 thousand combat elements, which should have already provided him with sufficient superiority in the fight against the scattered forces of the Russian princes".
G.V. Vernadsky "Mongols and Rus'" (1953): " The Mongol core of Batu's armies probably amounted to fifty thousand warriors. With the newly raised Turkic formations and various auxiliaries the total might have been 120,000 or even more, but owing to the vast territories to be controlled and garrisoned during the invasion, the strength of Batu's field army in his main campaign was hardly more than fifty thousand in each phase operations".
E. A. Razin "History of Military Art" (1957): " Over the course of two decades, the Mongols enslaved 720 different peoples. The Mongol army had up to 120 thousand people".
L. N. Gumilev "From Rus' to Russia" (1992): " However, the total number of troops that went to the west hardly exceeded 30-40 thousand people".
V.V. Kargalov "Rus and nomads" (2004): " The number of the Mongol-Tatar army that marched under the banner of Batu reached 150 thousand people (usually each of the Genghisid princes commanded a tumen, that is, a 10 thousand-strong detachment of troops, on a campaign)".
R. P. Khrapachevsky “The Military Power of Genghis Khan” (2005): "... and that kaan Ogedei had free and available forces planned by the kurultai of 1235 for campaigns of about 230-250 thousand people only in the regular army, not counting the reserve in the form of his eldest sons." ... then it was quite possible to allocate 120-140 thousand people for the Great western campaign of this total military force of the Mongol Empire".
Of the pre-revolutionary historians, only D.I. Ilovaisky wrote about Batu’s half-million-strong army. It remains only to find out why the alternative public mentions Ilovaisky in the plural?
Where did historians get these numbers? The alternative public assures us that they allegedly took it and made it up (they judge by themselves). Why did you make it up? In order to receive salaries and for some reason hide the “truth” about the Russian Khan Batu from the Russian-Aryan Trans-Volga Horde. One can understand alternative writers: they need to somehow force gullible and narcissistic readers to buy their books. If people read real scientific works of real historians, then the alternative crooks will be left without caviar sandwiches.
In fact, historians make such conclusions based on written sources. Alas, the Mongols did not leave us exact numbers because they did not consider it important. For them, the army formation and the mobilization resource for these formations in the form of the number of families (or wagons) were considered an important combat unit, that is, a certain number of families were assigned to regiments (thousands) and divisions (tumens) and, upon conscription, they were obliged to field a certain number of soldiers in these formations. So the figures given by historians of 230-250 thousand people are not the size of the army. This is the mobilization resource of the Mongol Empire, including the Mongols themselves and the militias of the subordinate peoples. Yes, the Mongol khans could put 250 thousand people under the banners, but this does not mean that they did it. The Mongols did not have a regular army. Only the Great Khan's guard and garrison troops can be called a regular army among the Mongols. The rest of the army was sent home in peacetime and convened as needed. Maintaining an army has always been expensive, and for the medieval economy it was simply unaffordable. The Mongols won victories because each nomad was also a warrior, which gave them a numerical superiority over their sedentary neighbors with their professional feudal armies, after whose defeat the fall of the state was a matter of time, because crowds of armed peasants or townspeople usually did not represent a serious force (for with the exception of cities that had a permanent militia). Only the internecine wars of the nomads among themselves prevented them from pursuing a successful policy of conquest. But when a strong ruler united the nomads under the supreme power, they became a force that few could resist.
Although we do not know the exact size of the Mongol army, we do have a fairly detailed schedule of the formations of the Mongol army left by Rashid ad-Din (d. 1318) in the “Collection of Chronicles”. Historians compare and clarify this schedule with data from other sources, obtaining the approximate size of the Mongol army. So historians do not allow any fantasies. Anyone who wants to get acquainted with the calculations of historians of the size of the Mongol army based on historical sources, I recommend the book by R. P. Khrapachevsky “The Military Power of Genghis Khan”, where everyone can familiarize themselves with the work of the historian in order to understand that these calculations did not appear out of nowhere. In the 19th century Rashid ad-Din's work was not known until the release of Cartmer's French translation of part of Rashid ad-Din's work entitled "The History of Hulagu Khan" in 1836 and in 1858-1888. translation by N.I. Berezin, so historians only had to guess the size of the Mongol army based on the rather fantastic data of European contemporaries like Plano Carpini and Master Rogerius, who wrote about an army of half a million people. After the works of Rashid ad-Din and other eastern historians became available, the figures for the size of the Mongol army became more objective, because they began to be based on factual data. Therefore, the size of the Mongolian army is almost the same among different historians - 120-150 thousand people. L. N. Gumilyov stands out separately, who had rather unique views on history.
The alternative audience especially laughs at the size of the Mongolian army of 130 thousand people. They are confident and assure others that Mongolia in the 13th century. could not field such a number of warriors. For some reason they believe that Mongolia is a barren steppe and the Gobi Desert. It is useless to explain to the alternative public that the natural landscapes of Mongolia are rich and varied, from taiga to desert, just as it is useless to tell them that mountainous areas are a familiar habitat for the Mongols. The alternative public does not believe in the geography of Mongolia - and that’s all.
But let's see how things stood in the 19th century. We open the "Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron" (1890-1907), article " ":
“The Manchus did not violate the clan principles of governance and hereditary rights to own princely destinies that had developed among the Mongols, but, leaving the existing fragmentation of M. into destinies inviolable, they attached the military system they practiced to it. The former “aimags”, representing groups of destinies, now received meaning “military corps.” Individual principalities or fiefs also turned into a military unit called “khoshun.” Khoshuns were divided into squadrons called “sumuns” (150 families in each), and in those khoshuns that contained over 6 sumuns, more regiments were established - “tsalans”, in 6 sumuns...
The Mongols must maintain a total of 1325 squadrons, i.e., field about 198,750 horsemen, armed in 1/3 of their part with firearms, 1/3 with spears and pikes, 1/3 with bows and arrows. In reality they do not have even 1/10 of this number. The last time widespread procurement of weapons was carried out was in 1857, and it was ordered that weapons be stored and checked annually; but over time, the formality was forgotten, and at the present time M. seems, one might say, completely unarmed: more than half of the bows and pikes were lost, and of those that survived, a lot of them were broken and unusable.”
Have you noticed the size of the Mongol militia at 198,750 soldiers? This is no longer the “fiction” of historians, but the harsh truth of the Chinese bureaucracy. True, this number most likely dates back to the middle of the 19th century, because another reference book, “Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences” (1885-1893), in the article “Mongolia,” gives slightly different data - 117,823 Mongolian horsemen:
“The entire male population, excluding lamas, constitutes the military class and is obliged to field cavalry units at the request of the emperor. The organization of the Mongolian militia is closely connected with the division of the people into khoshuns... Each of the latter is obliged to provide the number of militiamen necessary to form the scheduled number hundreds or sumuns. In khoshuns, which field a significant number of hundreds, the last 6 each are united into regiments or tsalans. Each aimak forms a separate corps or chugulgun. Hundreds, regimentals and corps are appointed by the Chinese government from the khoshun princes of those clans from which the corresponding part is fielded ...Staff strength of the Mongolian militia and banner chahars:
In peacetime, only a very small number of hundreds are invited to serve to protect the borders, post roads and stations, and therefore, in the event of war, expect that the required number of hundreds will be placed in the field."
"Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences", vol. IV, p. 204.
As we see, the Manchus did not change anything in the mobilization of the Mongols since the time of Genghis Khan, maintaining the traditional nomadic division of the population into groups. One sumun squadron of 150 horsemen should be fielded by 150 families. That is, one warrior from one family. The same "Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences" gives the number of Mongols in the 90s. XIX century: " With such a grouping, the total number of the Mongol tribe is reduced to 4-5 million people, including 3 million in Mongolia, 1 million Kalmyks, 250 thousand Buryats and approximately the same number of Hezareans"(ibid., p. 204). The difference in the number of Mongolians can be assumed that the Manchus wrote off a third of the Mongolian militia as unnecessary by the end of the 19th century, probably archers, as an obsolete type of troops, or reduced the number of families liable for military service due to military unsuitability.
R.P. Khrapachevsky calculates the number of Mongols in the 13th century. one million people. We can agree with this assessment. The number of Mongols in Mongolia (Northern - Khalkha, the modern Mongolian People's Republic, and Southern - the modern Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China Inner Mongolia) was higher than that of the Kalmyks due to their conquest by the Manchus and the end of internecine wars. As we see at the end of the 19th century. 3 million Mongols fielded from 198 thousand to 112 thousand horsemen, while fielding only one person from one family. That is, based on the data of the 19th century, 1 million Mongols would be able to field from 70 thousand to 40 thousand soldiers without much effort, simply by selecting one person from each family. In the 13th century All members of the clan capable of holding weapons were mobilized for combat operations, so the figure of 120-140 thousand Mongol soldiers in Genghis Khan’s army should not come as a surprise. 120-140 thousand soldiers is the limit of the mobilization capabilities of the Mongols of the 13th century. with a population of 1 million people.
A legitimate question arises here: “If 130 thousand adult Mongolian men went to war, then who remained in the shop, that is, herded the cattle?” Let us remember that in Mongolia in the 13th century. approximately 870 thousand people remained (if we subtract 130 thousand warriors), and the war did not occupy the nomad’s entire time. And most importantly, pasture farming does not require many workers. " Each herd is looked after by one shepherd, who owns two or three horses. This rule is mandatory. One of the modern farmers, Zunda Akayev, has a herd of 23 horses, 500 sheep and 70 cows in the south of Kalmykia. This is a medium-sized farm. Let's compare the average household of a modern Mongolian nomad: one family - a shepherd, his wife and son graze a flock of 1,800 sheep"(Andrianov B.V. "Non-sedentary population of the world", M. 1985, p. 177, cit.)
Let's see how things stand in modern Mongolia (3 million people as of 2015):
“According to statistical data, arat herders were the largest social group in 2004 - 389.8 thousand people. A slight decrease in their number was recorded in 2009 - 360.3 thousand people. In general, the share of the rural population to the total number remained within 40%. According to the results of the annual livestock census of 2012, a further decrease in the number of pastoralists is observed in Mongolia. In total, there were 207.8 thousand families with livestock. Of these, 70.3%, or 146.1 thousand families, are engaged in cattle breeding all four seasons of the year, i.e. it is the main occupation...
In 2012, there were 3,630 cattle-breeding families that owned 1,000 animals or more. livestock On average, there were 244 animals per cattle-breeding family in 2012. livestock, of which horses – 14 heads, cattle (including yaks) – 14 heads, camels – 2 heads, sheep – 109 heads, goats – 105 heads.
By gender and age, the pastoral population is distributed as follows: 40.7% are people aged 16–34 years; 49.7% are pastoralists aged 35-60 years; 9.6% are persons over 60 years old."
B. Ekhntuvshin, L. V. Kuras, B. D. Tsybenov "Traditional cattle breeding of Mongolian nomads in the context of globalization", "Vestni Buryatsky scientific center Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013, No. 4 (12), pp. 210-211.
As of December 2012, the total livestock population in Mongolia was 40.9 million.
Ibid., p. 216
So, in 2012 in Mongolia, 390-360 thousand adult Mongols, or 208.9 thousand families (in the Middle Ages they would say “kibitok”) are engaged in breeding 40.9 million heads of livestock, and 146.1 thousand families are engaged in nomadic cattle breeding. As we can see, little has changed among the Mongols since the time of Genghis Khan. That is, if the Mongols decided to mobilize the army the old fashioned way, then by allocating one person from 146 thousand families, they would get 146 thousand soldiers. If we take the number of adult men (from 16 to 60 years old) to be a quarter of the Mongols’ population, then in the 13th century. under the rule of Genghis Khan there were approximately 250 thousand adult men liable for military service. And if Genghis Khan deployed 120-140 thousand soldiers, then 130-110 thousand adult Mongolian men remained at home in the steppes.
As you can see, the data from the 19th century. and XXI century only confirmed by historical sources of the 13th-14th centuries. and the conclusions of historians made on the basis of these sources are reliable. The army of the first Genghisids of 120-140 thousand Mongol warriors is not an invention or fantasy. This is the real military combined strength of all Mongolian tribes, united by Genghis Khan under the rule of one khan. This was the maximum number that the Mongols could field without disrupting the nomadic economy. All objections to this size of the Mongol army are based on complete ignorance of the realities of life of nomads and Mongols, as well as the ignorant fantasies of alternative historians. The Mongols, united into a single state, could field an army of 120-140 thousand people. They fielded such an army and created a grandiose empire.
The huge Mongol Empire created by the great Genghis Khan was many times larger than the empires of Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander the Great. And it fell not under the blows of external enemies, but only as a result of internal decay...
Having united the disparate Mongol tribes in the 13th century, Genghis Khan managed to create an army that had no equal in Europe, Rus', or the Central Asian countries. No ground force of that time could compare with the mobility of his troops. And its main principle has always been attack, even if the main strategic objective was defense.
The Pope's envoy to the Mongol court, Plano Carpini, wrote that the victories of the Mongols depended in many ways not so much on their physical strength or numbers, how much from superior tactics. Carpini even recommended that European military leaders follow the example of the Mongols. “Our armies should be managed on the model of the Tatars (Mongols - author's note) on the basis of the same harsh military laws... The army should in no way be conducted in one mass, but in separate detachments. Scouts should be sent out in all directions. And our generals must keep their troops day and night in combat readiness, since the Tatars are always vigilant, like devils.” So where did the invincibility of the Mongol army lie, where did its commanders and rank and file originate from those techniques of mastering the martial art?
Strategy
Before starting any military operations, the Mongol rulers at the kurultai (military council - author's note) developed and discussed in the most detailed manner the plan for the upcoming campaign, and also determined the place and time for the collection of troops. Spies necessarily obtained “tongues” or found traitors in the enemy’s camp, thereby supplying military leaders detailed information about the enemy.
During Genghis Khan's lifetime, he was the supreme commander. He usually carried out an invasion of the captured country with the help of several armies and in different directions. He demanded a plan of action from the commanders, sometimes making amendments to it. After which the performer was given complete freedom in solving the task. Genghis Khan was personally present only during the first operations, and after making sure that everything was going according to plan, he provided the young leaders with all the glory of military triumphs.
Approaching fortified cities, the Mongols collected all kinds of supplies in the surrounding area, and, if necessary, set up a temporary base near the city. The main forces usually continued the offensive, and the reserve corps began preparing and conducting the siege.
When a meeting with an enemy army was inevitable, the Mongols either tried to attack the enemy suddenly, or, when they could not count on surprise, they directed their forces around one of the enemy flanks. This maneuver was called “tulugma”. However, the Mongol commanders never acted according to a template, trying to extract maximum benefit from specific conditions. Often the Mongols rushed into feigned flight, covering their tracks with consummate skill, literally disappearing from the eyes of the enemy. But only until he let his guard down. Then the Mongols mounted fresh spare horses and, as if appearing from underground in front of the stunned enemy, made a swift raid. It was in this way that the Russian princes were defeated on the Kalka River in 1223.
It happened that in a feigned flight, the Mongol army scattered so that it enveloped the enemy from different sides. But if the enemy was ready to fight back, they could release him from the encirclement and then finish him off on the march. In 1220, one of the armies of Khorezmshah Muhammad, which the Mongols deliberately released from Bukhara and then defeated, was destroyed in a similar way.
Most often, the Mongols attacked under the cover of light cavalry in several parallel columns stretched along a wide front. The enemy column that encountered the main forces either held its position or retreated, while the rest continued to move forward, advancing on the flanks and rear of the enemy. Then the columns approached each other, the result of which, as a rule, was the complete encirclement and destruction of the enemy.
The amazing mobility of the Mongol army, allowing it to seize the initiative, gave the Mongol commanders, and not their opponents, the right to choose both the place and time of the decisive battle.
To maximally streamline the advancement of combat units and quickly convey to them orders for further maneuvers, the Mongols used signal flags of black and white flowers. And with the onset of darkness, signals were given by burning arrows. Another tactical development of the Mongols was the use of a smoke screen. Small detachments set the steppe or dwellings on fire, which concealed the movements of the main troops and gave the Mongols the much-needed advantage of surprise.
One of the main strategic rules of the Mongols was the pursuit of a defeated enemy until complete destruction. This was new in the military practice of medieval times. The knights of that time, for example, considered it humiliating for themselves to chase an enemy, and such ideas persisted for many centuries, right up to the era Louis XVI. But the Mongols needed to make sure not so much that the enemy was defeated, but that he would no longer be able to gather new forces, regroup and attack again. Therefore, it was simply destroyed.
The Mongols kept track of enemy losses in a rather unique way. After each battle, special detachments cut off the right ear of each corpse lying on the battlefield, and then collected it in bags and accurately counted the number of killed enemies.
As you know, the Mongols preferred to fight in winter. A favorite way to test whether the ice on the river could withstand the weight of their horses was to lure the local population there. At the end of 1241 in Hungary, in full view of starving refugees, the Mongols left their cattle unattended on the eastern bank of the Danube. And when they were able to cross the river and take away the cattle, the Mongols realized that the offensive could begin.
Warriors
Every Mongol from the very early childhood was preparing to become a warrior. Boys learned to ride a horse almost earlier than to walk, and a little later they mastered the bow, spear and sword to the subtleties. The commander of each unit was chosen based on his initiative and courage shown in battle. In the detachment subordinate to him, he enjoyed exceptional power - his orders were carried out immediately and unquestioningly. No medieval army knew such cruel discipline.
Mongol warriors did not know the slightest excess - neither in food nor in housing. Having acquired unprecedented endurance and stamina over the years of preparation for military nomadic life, they practically did not need medical care, although since the time of the Chinese campaign (XIII-XIV centuries), the Mongol army always had a whole staff of Chinese surgeons. Before the start of the battle, each warrior put on a shirt made of durable wet silk. As a rule, the arrows pierced this tissue, and it was drawn into the wound along with the tip, significantly complicating its penetration, which allowed surgeons to easily remove the arrows along with the tissue from the body.
Consisting almost entirely of cavalry, the Mongol army was based on the decimal system. The largest unit was the tumen, which included 10 thousand warriors. The tumen included 10 regiments, each with 1,000 people. The regiments consisted of 10 squadrons, each of which represented 10 detachments of 10 people. Three tumens made up an army or army corps.
An immutable law was in force in the army: if in battle one of the ten fled from the enemy, the entire ten were executed; if a dozen escaped in a hundred, the entire hundred were executed; if a hundred escaped, the entire thousand were executed.
The light cavalry fighters, who made up more than half of the entire army, had no armor except for a helmet, and were armed with an Asian bow, spear, curved saber, light long pike and lasso. The power of curved Mongolian bows was in many ways inferior to large English ones, but each Mongolian horseman carried at least two quivers of arrows. The archers had no armor, with the exception of a helmet, and it was not necessary for them. The tasks of the light cavalry included: reconnaissance, camouflage, supporting the heavy cavalry with shooting and, finally, pursuing the fleeing enemy. In other words, they had to hit the enemy from a distance.
Units of heavy and medium cavalry were used for close combat. They were called nukers. Although initially nukers were trained in all types of combat: they could attack scattered, using bows, or in close formation, using spears or swords...
The main striking force of the Mongol army was heavy cavalry, its number was no more than 40 percent. Heavy cavalry had at their disposal a whole set of armor made of leather or chain mail, usually taken from defeated enemies. The horses of the heavy cavalrymen were also protected by leather armor. These warriors were armed for long-range combat - with bows and arrows, for close combat - with spears or swords, broadswords or sabers, battle axes or maces.
The attack of the heavily armed cavalry was decisive and could change the entire course of the battle. Each Mongol horseman had from one to several spare horses. The herds were always located directly behind the formation and the horse could be quickly changed on the march or even during the battle. On these short, hardy horses, the Mongol cavalry could travel up to 80 kilometers, and with convoys, battering and throwing weapons - up to 10 kilometers per day.
Siege
Even during the life of Genghis Khan, in the wars with the Jin Empire, the Mongols largely borrowed from the Chinese both some elements of strategy and tactics, and military equipment. Although at the beginning of their conquests Genghis Khan’s army often found itself powerless against the strong walls of Chinese cities, after several years the Mongols developed such fundamental system a siege that was almost impossible to resist. Its main component was a large but mobile detachment, equipped with throwing machines and other equipment, which was transported on special covered wagons. For the siege caravan, the Mongols recruited the best Chinese engineers and created on their basis a powerful engineering corps, which turned out to be extremely effective.
As a result, not a single fortress was any longer an insurmountable obstacle to the advance of the Mongol army. While the rest of the army moved on, the siege detachment surrounded the most important fortresses and began the assault.
The Mongols also adopted from the Chinese the ability to surround a fortress with a palisade during a siege, isolating it from the outside world and thereby depriving the besieged of the opportunity to make forays. The Mongols then launched an assault using various siege weapons and stone-throwing machines. To create panic in the enemy ranks, the Mongols rained down thousands of burning arrows on the besieged cities. They were fired by light cavalry directly from under the fortress walls or from a catapult from afar.
During a siege, the Mongols often resorted to cruel, but very effective methods for them: they drove a large number of defenseless captives in front of them, forcing the besieged to kill their own compatriots in order to get to the attackers.
If the defenders offered fierce resistance, then after the decisive assault the entire city, its garrison and residents were subjected to destruction and total plunder.
“If they always turned out to be invincible, this was due to the boldness of their strategic plans and the clarity of their tactical actions. In the person of Genghis Khan and his commanders, the art of war reached one of its highest peaks,” as the French military leader Rank wrote about the Mongols. And apparently he was right.
Intelligence service
Reconnaissance activities were used by the Mongols everywhere. Long before the start of campaigns, scouts studied the terrain, weapons, organization, tactics and mood of the enemy army to the smallest detail. All this intelligence gave the Mongols an undeniable advantage over the enemy, who sometimes knew much less about himself than he should have. The Mongol intelligence network spread literally all over the world. Spies usually acted under the guise of merchants and merchants.
The question of the size of the Mongol army during the campaign against Eastern Europe is one of the least clear questions in the history of the invasion. The lack of direct indications from trustworthy sources led to an arbitrary determination of the size of Batu’s army by various historians.
The only thing the researchers agreed on was the recognition of the huge number of Batu’s hordes.
The majority of Russian pre-revolutionary historians estimated the size of the horde that Batu led to conquer Rus' at 300 thousand people, and together with the detachments of peoples conquered during the movement of the Mongols to the Volga - even half a million 134. Soviet historians did not specifically address the issue of the size of Batu’s army. They either relied on the traditional figure in Russian historiography of 300 thousand people, or limited themselves to simply stating the fact that the Mongol army was very numerous 135.
Sources speak sparingly and vaguely about the size of the Mongol-Tatar army. Russian chroniclers limit themselves to pointing out that the Mongols advanced “in heavy strength”, “countless in number, like a prune that eats grass.” Armenian sources say approximately the same about Batu’s army. The notes of Europeans who were contemporaries of the invasion give absolutely fantastic figures. Plano Carpini, for example, determines the size of Batu’s army, which besieged Kyiv, at 600 thousand people; the Hungarian chronicler Simon claims that “500 thousand armed” invaded Hungary with Batu 136.
Eastern authors also greatly exaggerate the size of the Mongol army. However, it is still possible to approximately determine the size of Batu’s army before the invasion of Eastern Europe by drawing on the evidence of the Persian historian Rashid ad-Din, who was close to the Mongol headquarters and apparently had access to documents of the Mongolian imperial chancellery, as well as various indirect data.
The first volume of Rashid ad-Din’s “Collection of Chronicles” provides a detailed list of the actual Mongol troops that remained after the death of Genghis Khan and were divided by him among his heirs. In total, Genghis Khan distributed among his “sons, brothers and nephews” the Mongol army of “one hundred and twenty-nine thousand people” 137. A detailed list of the Mongol troops, dividing them into thousands and even hundreds, indicating the names and pedigrees of military leaders, a list of heirs and the degree of their relationship with the Great Khan - all this testifies to the documentary nature of Rashid ad-Din’s information. The testimony of Rashid ad-Din is to a certain extent confirmed by another credible source - the Mongolian feudal chronicle of the 13th century. Thus, when determining the size of Batu’s army, one can apparently proceed from these data.
According to the testimony of Rashid ad-Din and Juveini, the following Chingizid princes took part in Batu’s campaign against Rus': Batu, Buri, Horde, Shiban, Tangut, Kadan, Kulkan, Monke, Byudzhik, Baydar, Mengu, Buchek and Guyuk.
According to the will of Genghis Khan, the “princes” who participated in the campaign were allocated approximately 40-45 thousand of the Mongol army itself. But the size of Batu’s army was not limited, of course, to this figure. During the campaigns, the Mongols constantly included detachments of conquered peoples in their army, replenishing the Mongol “hundreds” with them and even creating special corps from them 138. Specific gravity It is difficult to determine the actual Mongol troops in this multi-tribal horde. Plano Carpini wrote that in the 40s of the 13th century. in Batu's army there were approximately 74 Mongols (160 thousand Mongols and up to 450 thousand warriors from conquered peoples). It can be assumed that on the eve of the invasion of Eastern Europe there were slightly more Mongols, up to Uz, since subsequently Batu’s hordes were joined by a large number of Alans, Kipchaks and Bulgars. Based on this ratio, the total number of Batu’s troops on the eve of the invasion can be very approximately estimated at 120-140 thousand soldiers.
These figures are confirmed by a number of indirect data. Usually the “Genghisid” khans commanded a “tumen” on a campaign, that is, a detachment of 10 thousand horsemen. This was the case, for example, during the campaign of the Mongol Khan Hulagu to Baghdad: an Armenian source lists “7 khan’s sons, each with a tumen of troops” 139. In Batu’s campaign to Eastern Europe, 12-14 “Genghisid” khans took part, who could lead Behind them are 12-14 tumens of troops, i.e. again 120-140 thousand soldiers. Finally, the forces of the Jochi ulus, even with the Central Mongolian troops attached to the campaign, could hardly exceed the combined army of Genghis Khan before the invasion of Central Asia, the number of which various historians determine to range from 120 to 200 thousand people.
So, it seems to us impossible to assume that there were 300 thousand people in the Mongol army before its invasion of Eastern Europe (not to mention half a million). The 120-140 thousand people that sources say is a huge army for that time. In the conditions of the 13th century, when an army of several thousand people represented a significant force, more than which individual feudal principalities and cities could not field*, an army of more than one hundred thousand Mongols, united by a single command, possessing good fighting qualities and experience in military operations with large cavalry masses, provided Batu with overwhelming superiority over the feudal militias and the few squads of Russian princes.
The tactics and armament of the Mongols are discussed in a number of special works by military historians and the corresponding sections of general historical works. Without repeating them, we will limit ourselves only to the main points necessary to explain the military actions of the Mongols during Batu’s invasion of Rus'.
F. Engels classifies the Mongol troops as the “mobile, light cavalry of the East” and writes about their superiority over the heavy knightly cavalry 140. From the essence of the Mongol army as “light, mobile cavalry,” the peculiarities of its tactics and methods of combat flowed.
The Mongol tactics were clearly offensive in nature. The Mongols sought to launch surprise attacks on an enemy taken by surprise, to disorganize and create disunity in its ranks, resorting to both purely military and diplomatic means. Whenever possible, the Mongols avoided large frontal battles, breaking up the enemy piecemeal, wearing them down with continuous skirmishes and surprise attacks.
The invasion was usually preceded by careful reconnaissance and diplomatic preparation aimed at isolating the enemy and fanning internal strife. Then there was a hidden concentration of Mongol troops near the border. An invasion of an enemy country usually began from different sides, by separate detachments, heading, as a rule, to one point noted in advance. Striving first of all to destroy the enemy's manpower and deprive him of the opportunity to replenish his army, the Mongols penetrated deep into the country, devastating everything in their path, exterminating the inhabitants and stealing herds. Observation detachments were deployed against fortresses and fortified cities, devastating the surrounding area and preparing for the siege.
As the enemy army approached, individual detachments of the Mongols quickly gathered and tried to strike with all their might, unexpectedly and, if possible, until the enemy forces were completely concentrated. For battle, the Mongols lined up in several lines, having heavy Mongol cavalry in reserve, and formations from conquered peoples and light troops in the front ranks. The battle began by throwing arrows, with which the Mongols sought to cause confusion in the ranks of the enemy. In hand-to-hand combat, light cavalry was at a disadvantage, and the Mongols resorted to it in rare cases. First of all, they sought to break through the enemy’s front with sudden attacks, to divide it into parts, making extensive use of enveloping the flanks, flank and rear attacks.
The strength of the Mongol army was its continuous leadership of the battle. Khans, temniks and commanders of thousands did not fight together with ordinary soldiers, but were behind the line, on elevated places, directing the movement of troops with flags, light and smoke signals, and corresponding signals from trumpets and drums.
The Mongol tactics were matched by their weapons. The Mongol warrior is a horseman, agile and fast, capable of large transitions and sudden attacks. According to contemporaries, even a mass of Mongol troops, if necessary, could make daily marches of up to 80 versts*. The main weapon of the Mongols was the bow and arrows, which every warrior had. In addition, the warrior’s weapons included an ax and a rope for dragging siege engines. Very common weapons were a spear, often with a hook for pulling the enemy off a horse, and shields. Only part of the army had sabers and heavy defensive weapons, primarily the commanding staff and the heavy cavalry, which consisted of the Mongols themselves. The blow of the heavy Mongol cavalry usually decided the outcome of the battle.
The Mongols could make long journeys without replenishing their supplies of water and food. Dried meat, “krut” (sun-dried cheese), which all soldiers had in a certain quantity, as well as herds that were gradually driven after the army, provided the Mongols with food even during prolonged movement through desert or war-torn terrain.
In historical literature, the tactics of the Mongols were sometimes defined as “tactics of nomads” and contrasted with the more advanced military art of “sedentary peoples” (M. Ivanin, N. Golitsin). This is not entirely correct if we talk about the tactics of the Mongol-Tatars recent years the life of Genghis Khan or the time of Batu’s invasion of Eastern Europe. Of course, the tactical techniques of the Mongol cavalry bore features typical of nomadic peoples, but the military art of the Mongol-Tatars was not limited to this. The Mongols adopted many methods of warfare from the Chinese, primarily methods of siege of cities, which went beyond the scope of “nomadic tactics.” The Mongols were characterized by the use of all modern means of siege technology (rams, throwing machines, “Greek fire”, etc.).
D.), and on a very wide scale. Numerous Chinese and Persian engineers, constantly present in the Mongol army, provided the conquerors with a sufficient number of siege engines. As D'Hosson reported, during the siege of the city of Nishabur in Central Asia, the Mongols used 3000 ballistas, 300 catapults, 700 machines for throwing pots of oil, 400 ladders, 2500 carts of stones 141. The Chinese (Yuan-shi) repeatedly report the massive use of siege engines by the Mongols ), Persian (Rashid ad-Din, Juvaini) and Armenian (“History of Kirakos”) sources, as well as evidence from European contemporaries (Plano Carpini, Marco Polo).
It is necessary to note one more aspect of the military art of the Mongols - careful reconnaissance of the future theater of military operations. Before starting a war, the Mongols conducted deep strategic reconnaissance, found out the internal situation and military forces of the country, established secret connections, tried to win over the dissatisfied and separate the enemy forces. The Mongol army had special officials, “yurtji,” who were engaged in military reconnaissance and studying the theater of military operations. Their responsibilities included: setting up winter and summer nomadic camps, designating camp sites during campaigns, knowing the routes of the army, the condition of the roads, food and water supplies.
Reconnaissance of the future theater of military operations was carried out by the most various methods and often long before the start of the war. Reconnaissance trips were a very effective method of reconnaissance. 14 years before Batu’s invasion, the army of Subedei and Jebe penetrated far to the west, which, in essence, followed the future road of conquest and collected information about the countries of Eastern Europe. Embassies were a very important source of information about neighboring countries. We know about the Tatar embassy that passed through Rus' just before the invasion: a Hungarian missionary of the 13th century. Julian reports that Tatar ambassadors tried to pass through Rus' to the Hungarian king Bela IV, but were detained by Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich in Suzdal. From the message taken from the Tatar ambassadors and translated by Julian, it is known that this was not the first Tatar embassy to the west: “For the thirtieth time I am sending ambassadors to you,” 142 Batu wrote to King Bela.
Another source of military information were merchants who visited countries of interest to the Mongols with trade caravans. It is known that in Central Asia and the countries of Transcaucasia, the Mongols sought to win over the merchants associated with transit trade. Caravans from Central Asia constantly traveled to Volga Bulgaria and further to the Russian principalities, delivering valuable information to the Mongols. Among the Mongols there were people who knew languages well and who repeatedly traveled on errands to neighboring countries. Julian reports, for example, that during a trip to Eastern Europe he personally met “the ambassador of a Tatar leader who knew Hungarian, Russian, Teutonic, Cuman, Seracin and Tatar languages.”
After many years of reconnaissance, the Mongol-Tatars knew well the situation in the Russian principalities and the features of the theater of military operations in North-Eastern Rus'. This is precisely what can explain the choice of winter as the most suitable time for an attack on North-Eastern Rus'. The Hungarian monk Julian, who passed near the southern borders of the Russian principalities in the fall of 1237, specifically noted that the Tatars “are waiting for the earth, rivers and swamps to freeze with the onset of winter, after which it will be easy for the entire multitude of Tatars to defeat all of Rus', the country of the Russians.” 143.
Batu also knew well about the states of Central Europe, for example
about Hungary. Threatening the Hungarian king Bela IV, he wrote: “You, living in houses, have castles and cities, how can you escape my hand?”
The direction of the Mongol-Tatars’ campaigns during the invasion of Rus' along convenient routes of communication, well-planned detours and flank attacks, grandiose “raids” that captured thousands of kilometers of space and converged at one point - all this can only be explained by the conquerors’ good familiarity with the theater of military operations.
What forces could feudal Rus' oppose to the one and a half hundred thousand Mongol army?
Russian chronicles do not contain figures for the total number of Russian troops on the eve of Batu's invasion. S. M. Solovyov believes that Northern Rus' with the regions of Novgorod, Rostov with Beloozero, Murom and Ryazan could field 50 thousand soldiers in case of military danger; “Southern Rus' could have fielded about the same number” 144, i.e. only about 100 thousand soldiers. Soviet military historian A. A. Strokov notes that “in case of exceptional danger, Rus' could deploy more than 100 thousand people” 145.
But it was not only the insufficient number of Russian troops that predetermined defeat in the war with the Mongol-Tatar conquerors. The main factor that determined the military weakness of Rus' was feudal fragmentation and the associated feudal nature of the Russian armed forces. The squads of princes and cities were scattered over a vast territory, in fact not connected with each other, and the concentration of any significant forces encountered great difficulties. The feudal fragmentation of Rus' allowed the numerous Mongol army, united by a single command, to smash the scattered Russian armies piece by piece.
In historical literature, an idea has developed of the armed forces of the Russian principalities as an army superior to the Mongol convoy in weapons, tactics and combat formation. One cannot but agree with this when it comes to princely squads. Indeed, the Russian princely squads were an excellent army at that time. The armament of Russian warriors, both offensive and defensive, was famous far beyond the borders of Rus'. The use of heavy armor - chain mail and “armor” was widespread. Even such a far from first-rate prince as Yuri Vladimirovich Belozersky could field, according to the chronicler, “a thousand armored squads of the Belozersky squad” *. The chronicles are full of stories about complex tactical plans, skillful campaigns and ambushes of Russian princely squads.
But when assessing the armed forces of Rus' in the middle of the 13th century, we should limit ourselves to merely stating the fact of the high military art and armament of the Russian princely squads means viewing the phenomenon one-sidedly. For all their excellent fighting qualities, the princely squads usually did not exceed several hundred people. If such a number was enough for internecine wars, then for the organized defense of the entire country from strong enemy this was not enough. In addition, even such excellent fighting material as princely squads, due to the feudal nature of the Russian troops, was little suitable for action in large masses, under a single command, according to a single plan. The feudal nature of the princely squads, even in the case of the concentration of significant forces, reduced the combat value of the army. This was the case, for example, in the battle of the Kalka River, when the Russian princely squads were unable to achieve success, despite their numerical superiority.
If the princely squads can be considered an army superior in armament to the Mongol cavalry, then this cannot be said about the main, most numerous part of the Russian armed forces - urban and rural militias, which were recruited at the moment of greatest danger. First of all, the militia was inferior to the nomads in weapons.
A. V. Artsikhovsky showed, using materials from excavations of mounds in the Leningrad region, that in the burials of the rural population - the main contingent from which the militia was recruited - “a sword, the weapon of a professional warrior, is very rarely found”; the same applied to heavy defensive weapons. The usual weapons of Smerds and townspeople were axes (“plebeian weapons”), spears, and less often spears146. While inferior to the Tatars in the quality of weapons, the feudal militia, hastily recruited from peasants and townspeople, was certainly inferior to the Mongol cavalry in the ability to wield weapons.