While Napoleonic troops are relaxing with drunkenness and looting in Moscow, and the regular Russian army is retreating, making clever maneuvers that will then allow it to rest, gather strength, significantly replenish its strength and win victories over the enemy, let's talk about club of people's war, as we like to call the partisan movement of 1812 with the light hand of Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy.
Partisans of the Denisov detachment
Illustration for Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace
Andrey NIKOLAEV
Firstly, I would like to say that this club has a very distant relationship with guerrilla warfare in the form in which it existed. Namely, army partisan detachments consisting of military personnel of regular units and Cossacks, created in the Russian army to operate in the rear and on enemy communications. Secondly, reading even in Lately various materials, not to mention Soviet sources, you often come across the idea that their ideological inspirer and organizer was solely Denis Davydov, famous poet and the partisans of that time, who were the first to propose the creation of detachments, like the Spanish guerrilla, through Prince Bagration to Field Marshal Kutuzov before the Battle of Borodino. It must be said that the dashing hussar himself put a lot of effort into this legend. Happens...
Portrait of Denis Davydov
Yuri IVANOV
In fact, the first partisan detachment in this war was created near Smolensk by order of the same Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly, even before Kutuzov’s appointment as commander-in-chief. By the time Davydov turned to Bagration with a request to allow the creation of an army partisan detachment, Major General Ferdinand Fedorovich Wintzingerode (commander of the first partisan detachment) was already in full swing and successfully smashing the rear of the French. The detachment occupied the cities of Surazh, Velezh, Usvyat, and constantly threatened the outskirts of Vitebsk, which was the reason that Napoleon was forced to send the Italian division of General Pino to help the Vitebsk garrison. As usual, we have forgotten the deeds of these “Germans”...
Portrait of General Baron Ferdinand Fedorovich Wintzingerode
Unknown artist
After Borodino, in addition to Davydov’s (by the way, the smallest detachment), several more were created that began active fighting after leaving Moscow. Some detachments consisted of several regiments and could independently solve large combat missions, for example, the detachment of Major General Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov, which included a dragoon, hussar and 3 cavalry regiments. Large detachments were commanded by colonels Vadbolsky, Efremov, Kudashev, captains Seslavin, Figner and others. Many glorious officers fought in the partisan detachments, including future satraps(as they were previously introduced to us) Alexander Khristoforovich Benkendorf, Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev.
Portraits of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov and Ivan Efremovich Efremov
George DOW Unknown artist
At the beginning of October 1812, it was decided to surround Napoleonic army with a ring of army partisan detachments, with a clear plan of action and a specific area of deployment for each of them. Thus, Davydov’s detachment was ordered to operate between Smolensk and Gzhatsk, Major General Dorokhov – between Gzhatsk and Mozhaisk, Staff Captain Figner – between Mozhaisk and Moscow. In the Mozhaisk area there were also detachments of Colonel Vadbolsky and Colonel Chernozubov.
Portraits of Nikolai Danilovich Kudashev and Ivan Mikhailovich Vadbolsky
George DOW
Between Borovsk and Moscow, attacks on enemy communications were carried out by detachments of Captain Seslavin and Lieutenant Fonvizin. North of Moscow, a group of detachments under the overall command of General Wintzingerode waged an armed struggle. Colonel Efremov’s detachment operated on the Ryazan road, Colonel Kudashev’s on Serpukhovskaya, and Major Lesovsky’s on Kashirskaya. The main advantage of partisan detachments was their mobility, surprise and swiftness. They never stood in one place, they constantly moved, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. If necessary, several detachments were temporarily united to conduct large operations.
Portraits of Alexander Samoilovich Figner and Alexander Nikitich Seslavin
Yuri IVANOV
Without in any way detracting from the exploits of Denis Davydov’s detachment and himself, it must be said that many commanders were offended by the memoirist after the publication of his military notes, in which he often exaggerated his own merits and forgot to mention his comrades. To which Davydov replied innocently: Fortunately, I have something to say about myself, why not say it? And it’s true, the organizers, generals Barclay de Tolly and Wintzingerode, passed away one after another in 1818, so what to remember about them... And written in a fascinating, rich language, the works of Denis Vasilyevich were very popular in Russia. True, Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky wrote to Xenophon Polevoy in 1832: Let it be said between us, he wrote out more than he knocked out his reputation as a brave man.
A memoirist, and even more so a poet, and even a hussar, well, how can one do without fantasies :) So let’s forgive him these little pranks?..
Denis Davydov at the head of the partisans in the vicinity of Lyakhovo
A. TELENIK
Portrait of Denis Davydov
Alexander ORLOVSKY
In addition to partisan detachments, there was also a so-called people's war, which was waged by spontaneously created self-defense units of villagers and the importance of which, in my opinion, is greatly exaggerated. And it’s already teeming with myths... Now, they say, a film has been made about the elder Vasilisa Kozhina, whose very existence is still disputed, and we can’t even say anything about her exploits.
But strangely enough, the same “German” Barclay de Tolly had a hand in this movement, who back in July, without waiting for instructions from above, addressed through the Smolensk governor Baron Kazimir Asch to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga regions with appeal:
The inhabitants of Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga! Hear the voice calling you to your own peace, to your own safety. Our irreconcilable enemy, having undertaken a greedy intention against us, has hitherto nourished himself with the hope that his impudence alone will be enough to frighten us, to triumph over us. But our two brave armies, stopping the daring flight of his violence, confronted him with their breasts on our ancient borders... Avoiding a decisive battle, ... his bandits of bandits, attacking unarmed villagers, tyrannized over them with all the cruelty of barbarian times: they rob and burn their houses; they desecrate the temples of God... But many of the inhabitants of the Smolensk province have already awakened from their fear. They, armed in their homes, with courage worthy of the Russian name, punish the villains without any mercy. Imitate them, all who love themselves, the fatherland and the sovereign!
Of course, ordinary people and peasants behaved differently in the territories abandoned by the Russians. When the French army approached, they moved away from home or into the forests. But often, some first of all destroyed the estates of their tyrant landowners (we must not forget that the peasants were serfs), robbed, set fire, ran away in the hope that the French would come now and liberate them (the earth was full of rumors about Napoleon’s intentions to rid the peasants of serfdom ).
The destruction of the landowner's estate. Patriotic War of 1812
Looting of a landowner's estate by peasants after the retreat of Russian troops before Napoleon's army
V.N. KURDIUMOV
During the retreat of our troops and the entry of the French into Russia, landowner peasants often rose up against their masters, divided the master's estate, even tore up and burned houses, killed landowners and managers- in a word, they destroyed the estates. The passing troops joined the peasants and, in turn, carried out plunder. Our picture depicts an episode of such a joint robbery of civilians with the military. The action takes place in one of the rich landowners' estates. The owner himself was no longer there, and the remaining clerk was captured so that he would not interfere. The furniture was taken out into the garden and broken. The statues that decorated the garden were broken; the flowers are wrinkled. There is a wine barrel lying around with its bottom knocked out. The wine spilled. Everyone takes whatever they can for themselves. And unnecessary things are thrown away and destroyed. A cavalryman on a horse stands and calmly looks at this picture of destruction.(original caption for illustration)
Partisans of 1812.
Boris ZVORYKIN
Where the landowners behaved humanely, the peasants and courtyard people armed themselves with whatever they could, sometimes under the leadership of the owners themselves, attacked the French troops, convoys and repulsed them. Some detachments were led by Russian soldiers who lagged behind their units due to illness, injury, captivity and subsequent escape from it. So the audience was varied.
Defenders of the homeland
Alexander APSIT
Scouts Plastun
Alexander APSIT
It is also impossible to say that these detachments operated on a permanent basis. They were organized for as long as the enemy was on their territory, and then disbanded, all for the same reason that the peasants were serfs. After all, even from the militias created at the behest of the emperor, fugitive peasants were escorted home and put on trial. So Kurin’s detachment, whose exploits were sung by Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, lasted 10 days - from October 5 to 14, until the French were in Bogorodsky district, and then was disbanded. And not the entire Russian people participated in the people's war, but only residents of several provinces where the fighting took place, or adjacent to them.
French guards under the escort of grandmother Spiridonovna
Alexey VENETSIANOV, 1813
I started this whole conversation in order, firstly, to understand that our club of people's war could not stand any comparison with the Spanish-Portuguese guerrillas (you can read a little about this), which we supposedly looked up to, and, secondly, to show once again that the Patriotic War was won primarily thanks to the actions of our commanders, generals, officers , soldier. And the emperor. And not by the forces of the Gerasimov Kurins, the mythical lieutenants Rzhevskys, Vasilis Kozhins and other entertaining characters... Although it could not have happened without them... And we will talk more specifically about partisan warfare in the future...
And finally, a picture from today:
Archpriest of the Cavalry Regiment Gratinsky, serving a prayer service in the parish church of St. Euplaus, in Moscow, in the presence of the French on September 27, 1812.
Engraving from a drawing by an unknown artist
...Wanting to create a more favorable attitude towards himself among the population, Napoleon ordered not to interfere with the performance of divine services in churches; but this was possible only in a few temples that were not touched by the enemy. From September 15, services were properly performed in the Church of Archdeacon Euplaus (on Myasnitskaya); Divine services were held daily in the Charitonia Church in Ogorodniki. The first gospel message in the Church of Peter and Paul on Yakimanka made a particularly deep impression in Zamoskorechye...(w-l Excursionist's companion No. 3, published for the centenary of the War of 1812)
“For us Russians, guerrilla warfare will always be extremely necessary and useful,” wrote Denis Davydov. The most famous hussar in Russia tried to convince his contemporaries that it was he who developed the methods of guerrilla warfare, was the first to apply them comprehensively and became the best partisan in the Patriotic War of 1812. Can you believe this? What was the military path of the famous poet and his role in the Russian partisan movement of 1812?
“Born for royal service”
Denis Davydov was destined to become a military man. His father was an associate of Suvorov, Nikolai Raevsky and Alexei Ermolov were his relatives, and he spent his childhood on the Borodino estate, next to which the main battle of the Patriotic War would take place in 1812. Born in 1784, Denis Davydov absorbed the military spirit from childhood and prepared to become an officer.
However, there were many obstacles on the way of young Davydov, the main ones being his poverty and freethinking. In 1801, he joined the ranks of the prestigious Cavalry Regiment, but found it difficult to maintain the lavish lifestyle of a capital officer. In addition, the authorities disliked the young cornet for his satirical poems, in which the young man ridiculed influential people. For these two reasons, Davydov did not stay in St. Petersburg and was transferred out of sight to the Belarusian Hussar Regiment, stationed in Zvenigorodka, Kyiv province. From then on, his reputation as a freethinker followed him until the end of his life.
Denis Davydov. Artist – J. Doe
Source – dic.academic.ru
The vicissitudes of the transfer to a new duty station prevented the young officer from taking part in the Austerlitz campaign of 1805, in which his former fellow cavalry guards distinguished themselves. Only in 1807 did he have the opportunity to smell gunpowder. Thanks to the support of influential persons at court, Davydov managed to obtain the position of adjutant under Lieutenant General Pyotr Bagration. During the fighting against the French, the impetuous adjutant initiated several skirmishes with the enemy - more curious than successful. The Swedish campaign of 1808 became a real partisan school for Davydov, during which he ended up in the detachment of Colonel Yakov Kulnev, a famous hussar, whom Napoleon himself called the best Russian cavalry commander. With Kulnev, Davydov took an “outpost service course”: he was engaged in reconnaissance, pickets, patrols, and vanguard contacts. In wooded Finland, both the Swedes and the Russians had to act in small units and fight like a guerrilla. Mastering the wisdom of guerrilla warfare in practice, Davydov turned into an experienced cavalry commander.
"The War I Was the Creator"
Denis Davydov tried to convince everyone that it was he who developed the methods of guerrilla warfare, proposed its use, and was the best partisan in the Russian army. However, all of these statements are most likely false. A short excursion into the history of partisan warfare will help to better understand Davydov’s place in the theory and practice of partisan actions.
In the 18th–19th centuries, the word “partisans” meant professional soldiers who participated in the so-called “small war” - skirmishes, raids on convoys, reconnaissance, and so on. The Austrians and Russians were the first to use “small war” methods. Among the subjects of the Habsburgs and Romanovs there were many people who were accustomed to waging war “in a non-European way.” In the first case, we were talking about Hungarians, Romanians, Serbs and Croats, and in the second, about Cossacks. During the First Silesian War of 1740–1742, the Prussian king Frederick the Great was given a lot of trouble by the elusive Hungarian hussars and Croatian pandurs who ruled in his rear. The Great Powers hastened to copy this Austrian discovery. In the atmosphere of the emerging philosophy of the Enlightenment with its sympathies for the image noble savage(noble savage) to be a hussar became a very attractive fate, and the sons of the best European families began to grow mustaches and dress up as “barbarians.” It is no coincidence that we see jackets of the Hungarian style, luxuriously embroidered with cords, on the Russian hussars of 1812 - including on Denis Davydov.
General Nadasty's Hungarian hussars attack the Prussian camp during the Battle of Soor. Artist – D. Morier
Source – britishbattles.com
In 1756, a treatise by Philippe Augustin Thomas de Grandmaison was published La petite guerre ou traité du service des troupes légères en campagne(“The Little War, or a Treatise on the Field Service of Light Troops”). Unfortunately, we do not know whether Davydov read this work, but it became reference book for many subsequent generations of partisans, formalizing theoretically the partisan experience of the era of Frederick the Great.
But it is known for sure that Grandmaison’s treatise was translated into Spanish in 1780 and was very useful to the inhabitants of the Pyrenees, who in 1808 faced the invasion of Napoleonic troops. A popular war against the invaders broke out in Spain, during which the stars of several guerrilla commanders rose, the most famous of whom was Juan Martin Diaz, or El Empesinado ("The Undaunted"). Russian society, dissatisfied with the forced alliance with Napoleon, followed the events in Spain with sympathy and hope.
Juan Martin Diaz is Davydov’s Spanish “colleague”. Artist – F. Goya
Source – ruralduero.com
By the beginning of 1812, the inevitability of a new conflict with Napoleon became obvious, and Alexander I was bombarded with various notes with plans for war against the “Corsican monster.” Historian V. M. Bezotosny especially notes the note of Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Chuykevich, an employee of the Special Chancellery of the War Ministry, in which he proposes that in a future war against Napoleon “to undertake and do something completely opposite to what the enemy wants”. Chuykevich lists the necessary measures:
“Evasion of general battles, guerrilla warfare by flying detachments, especially in the rear of the enemy’s operational line, avoidance of foraging and determination to continue the war”
Chuikevich did not rule out that the people would have to be used in the war, « which should be stolenlive and set up, as in Gishpania, with the help of the Clergy.”
“I was born for the fateful year of 1812”
In June 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia. Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov began the war in the 2nd Army, which was led by his patron, Prince Bagration. According to the poet’s memoirs, he himself volunteered to organize a partisan detachment. On August 22, 1812, on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, a fateful explanation took place with Bagration, in which Denis Davydov argued in favor of his proposal:
“The enemy is going one way. This path has gone beyond measure in its length; transports of the enemy's vital and combat food cover the space from Gzhat to Smolensk and beyond. Meanwhile, the vastness of the part of Russia lying in the south of the Moscow route contributes to the twists and turns of not only parties, but also the entire army. What are crowds of Cossacks doing at the vanguard? Having left a sufficient number of them to maintain the outposts, it is necessary to divide the rest into parties and send them into the middle of the caravan following Napoleon."
Bagration approved this plan and reported it to Kutuzov. The commander-in-chief was skeptical about the hussar's idea, but gave him a small detachment for testing. Modern historians agree that Denis Davydov distorted the history of the creation of partisan detachments. In particular, P. P. Grunberg noticed indirect evidence in Davydov’s memoirs that he had some oral instructions from Prince Bagration. It seems that, rather, Bagration explained the problem to Davydov, and not Davydov to Bagration. Between August 19 and 22, several parties were created, and not just Davydov’s party. A.I. Popov, who studied the actions of partisan detachments in 1812, dates their first appearance back to July. Finally, the detachments of Seslavin and Figner, two other famous partisan commanders, were created not on their own initiative, but by the decision of the command. Most likely, Davydov took credit for the initiative to create partisan detachments, which actually came from the main headquarters.
Partisans of Denis Davydov. Artist – A. Nikolaev
The bright figure of the partisan poet Denis Davydov obscured other partisan commanders of that time from us. In the days when Davydov was just receiving a detachment under command, Baron Ferdinand von Winzengerode made a daring raid on Vitebsk. Captain Alexander Seslavin and his squad were the first to discover Napoleon's movement from Moscow to Maloyaroslavets, thanks to which Kutuzov revealed the enemy's plan at the decisive moment of the 1812 campaign. Alexander Benckendorff liberated the Netherlands with a flying detachment in 1813, sparking an anti-French uprising. The British historian D. Lieven writes that strategically, the most important partisan raid was the invasion of Alexander Chernyshev’s detachment into Prussian territory at the beginning of 1813, which prompted the Prussian king to switch to the side of Russia.
So, Denis Davydov was neither the father of guerrilla warfare, nor the first partisan, nor, most likely, the most successful partisan of the Napoleonic era. However, this man did something more for the guerrilla wars of the future - he gave them a beautiful legend and a theory tested in practice. Let's turn to the last one.
Poet, hussar and partisan Denis Davydov among his fellow soldiers. Artist – E. Demakov
Source – golos-epokhi.ru
"A field full of poetry"
« Partisan- This fish, the population is the sea in which he swims", wrote Mao Zedong. Denis Davydov could not have known this aphorism, but he perfectly understood the importance of popular support. In his memoirs, Davydov colorfully describes his first meeting with the peasants after his detachment left the location at the end of August 1812 active army. The peasants mistook the Russian hussars for the French and almost killed them. “Then I learned from experience that in a people’s war one must not only speak the language of the mob, but adapt to it, to its customs and clothing,”– recalled the famous partisan.
According to Davydov’s recollections, he put on peasant clothes, grew a beard, hung the image of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker on his chest and was accepted by the peasants as one of their own. Did he really have to resort to such a masquerade? P. P. Grunberg, who is skeptical of Davydov, believes that the ardent poet-partisan came up with this episode, and points out that none of the Russian partisans needed icons and army jackets. One way or another, Davydov immediately tried to enlist the support of the population, distributing weapons taken from the French to the peasants and ordering them to kill "enemies of Christ's Church". With the help of the energetic district leader of the nobility Semyon Yakovlevich Khrapovitsky, Davydov gathered a militia, which was joined by 22 landowners with their peasants.
Denis Davydov considered the enemy’s supply system to be the main target of the partisan detachments. Consequently, the main actions of the parties should have been attacks on foragers, carts and warehouses. Knowing full well that a small detachment would not be able to attack large enemy forces or a well-fortified supply base, Davydov hoped to interrupt the connection between this base and the enemy army. The more extensive Napoleon's communications were, the easier this task became. By September 1812, food, ammunition and reinforcements were reaching Napoleon along a long line from Vilna through Smolensk to Moscow. When Kutuzov’s army carried out the Tarutino maneuver and hung over this line from the south, an almost ideal situation developed for Davydov’s detachment.
Davydov was not one of the armchair strategists who at that time enthusiastically assessed the pros and cons mutual arrangements opposing armies. He was a practitioner and well understood the importance of the moral side of military affairs. For Davydov, partisanship is a formidable psychological weapon:
“What consequences will we not witness when the successes of the parties will turn to their side the entire population of the regions located in the rear of the enemy army, and the horror sown on its routes of communication will be revealed in its ranks?”
At first, Kutuzov gave Davydov only 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks - with such forces it was not easy to “spread terror” in the enemy’s rear. However, the party gradually grew due to reinforcements, captured prisoners and the aforementioned militia - at the peak of its activity, Davydov could put about 2,000 people under arms. He could, but he didn't want to. His detachment had to be as mobile as possible, so more than half a thousand people rarely took part in partisan operations. The rest (primarily peasants) continued to live a peaceful life and helped the partisans, giving them shelter, guarding prisoners and serving as guides.
The partisans' way of life was extraordinary. The day usually began at midnight, in the light of the moon the partisans had a hearty breakfast, saddled their horses and set out on a campaign around three o’clock in the morning. The party always marched together, having a small vanguard, a rearguard and guards marching from the side of the road to minimum distance from the main forces. They walked until dusk and then settled down for the night. The camp was organized in such a way as to eliminate the likelihood of a surprise attack - pickets were set up around it, long- and short-range patrols were arranged, and in the camp itself there was always a detachment of twenty people in full combat readiness. Davydov borrowed this system from his teachers Bagration and Kulnev. Bagration said: “The enemy can beat me, but he won’t find me sleepy.”. Kulnev explained to his people: "I don't sleep so you can sleep".
Denis Davydov at the head of the partisans in the vicinity of Lyakhov. Artist – A. Telenik
Source – pro100-mica.livejournal.com
Davydov's detachment most often attacked from an ambush. A collection point was designated four or five miles from the ambush site, where the horsemen were to retreat in case of failure (if possible, scattered and in roundabout ways). Thus, the party was difficult to destroy even if the operation failed. Only part of the detachment attacked the convoy - Davydov was convinced that even if the guards outnumbered the attackers, it could always be defeated by choosing the right moment and using the factor of surprise. If this was successful, then the spoils went to only those who participated in the attack. Sometimes the attackers had to be reinforced, in which case the spoils went to the reserve, and the first wave received nothing.
Denis Davydov's ashtray, made from a horse's hoof. From the collection of the State Historical Museum
Source – vm1.culture.ru
In 1812, Russian partisans caused a lot of trouble for the French. On October 28, the combined forces of Vasily Orlov-Denisov, Denis Davydov, Alexander Seslavin and Alexander Figner forced the entire division of Jean-Pierre Augereau to lay down their arms - this happened after the battle at Lyakhov, near Smolensk. When the following year, 1813, the Russian army entered the territory of the German states, a real “competition” began between the partisans to liberate kingdoms, principalities and their capitals. In this quite serious struggle for laurels and ranks, Denis Davydov received the keys to Dresden as a prize. The partisan poet ended the war in Paris with the rank of major general.
“And the lyre grows numb, and the saber does not cut...”
In 1815, the Russian military began a new life and a completely different service. Like many other military officers, Davydov could not adapt to peacetime for a long time. “A boring time has come for our soldier brother!”, he writes to Pavel Kiselev. The wayward partisan had difficult relations with both Alexander I and many influential people from the royal circle. This predetermined Davydov’s resignation in 1823. Having retired from business, he “set up a bivouac” on the Verkhnyaya Maza estate near Syzran and plunged into a quiet family life. Only at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I, Denis Davydov briefly returned to duty, fought in the Caucasus and participated in the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830–1831 - however, without gaining new fame.
Denis Davydov. Portrait fragment. Artist – V. Langer
Source – museumpushkin-lib.ru
The partisan experience of 1812 remained almost unclaimed after the Napoleonic Wars. This is not surprising, since partisanship was a desperate means - distributing weapons to the civilian population and inciting hatred in them was considered not only impermissible from the point of view of the unwritten rules of European war, but also dangerous for social foundations. No one could guarantee that the peasant would direct his weapon against the enemy, and not against his landowner. Figuratively speaking, there was a very visible danger of not being able to hold the “club of the people’s war” in one’s hands. In the papers of Denis Davydov there are orders to shoot peasants who killed nobles and robbed churches. And the partisans themselves did not always comply with the laws of war, since they could not burden themselves with prisoners.
There were other difficulties as well. If on the territory of “indigenous” Russia Davydov met with complete sympathy from the population, then after his detachment crossed the Dnieper near the village of Kopys (now in the Vitebsk region of Belarus), he was forced to request reinforcements:
“While I was robbing the middle of Russia, I was content with first 130, and then 500 people; but now with 760 people in enemy land, where everything is hostile to us, I am too weak and therefore I ask your Excellency to ask His Grace for an order to attach the 11th Jaeger Regiment with two guns to my detachment and leave it with me until further order, than do me a favor"
Fighting near Moscow and Smolensk, the partisans enjoyed the support of the peasants and easily found a common language with them. In the German lands, the population also welcomed the Russians cordially, but the language barrier was already felt. It is no coincidence that during this period partisans of German origin came to the fore - Benckendorff, Winzengerode and others. In France, the Russian partisans did not meet with either cordiality or a common language, and therefore were unable to check in significant matters. Following the results of the Napoleonic Wars, the prevailing belief among the Russian military was that guerrilla warfare was a means only for internal use. In his writings, Davydov argued the opposite, but did not explain how he intended to wage an offensive guerrilla war on foreign territory. As Colonel Sergei Gershelman wrote about Davydov at the end of the 19th century, “He elevated the norms derived from observation during the Patriotic War into a general norm.”
The problem was that guerrilla warfare required completely different cavalry training. The horse party must be on the move all the time, so emphasis is needed on the endurance of the horse composition, and not on its strength. The partisans could rarely count on the help of infantry and artillery, which means they had to be able to conduct firefights themselves - both in the saddle and on foot. All this did not correspond to the cavalry traditions of the early 19th century.
The fighting of the Russians in the Caucasus and the French in Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s forced the military to think hard about protecting communications from raids. In the Caucasus, reinforced columns were formed that accompanied valuable cargo (the so-called “occasions”), and the highlanders did not risk attacking them. A similar system was introduced in Algeria by the French Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, who emphasized the superiority of columns over individual posts that did not protect anything except the ground on which they stood. It seemed that a recipe for reliable protection of communications had been found, and that soon only memories and poetic lines would remain about the partisans. Although attempts to create partisan detachments were made in Tsarist Russia, it took the exceptional circumstances of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars for Russian partisanship to truly revive.
Bibliography:
- D. Davydov. Partisan diary of 1812 // Terrible weapon: Small war, partisanship and other types of asymmetric warfare in the light of the heritage of Russian military thinkers. M., 2007
- D. Davydov. Experience in the theory of partisan action // Formidable weapons: Small war, partisanship and other types of asymmetric warfare in the light of the heritage of Russian military thinkers. M., 2007
- F. Gershelman. Guerrilla warfare// Formidable weapons: Small war, partisanship and other types of asymmetric warfare in the light of the heritage of Russian military thinkers. M., 2007
- Patriotic War of 1812. Encyclopedia. M., 2004
- Bezotosny V. M. Russia in the Napoleonic Wars: 1805–1815. M., 2014
- Lieven D. Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814. (2014)
- Kravchinsky Yu. Behind enemy lines and ahead of the troops: partisans, but not those // http://ria.ru/1812_parallels/20121002/764467735.html
- Grunberg P. P. Some features of the memoirs of D. V. Davydov “Diary of partisan actions of 1812” // The era of the Napoleonic wars: people, events, ideas. M., 2008
- Popular Resistance in the French Wars: Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates. Ed. by Charles J. Esdaile. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
- D. Davydov. About guerrilla warfare // Formidable weapons: Small war, partisanship and other types of asymmetric warfare in the light of the heritage of Russian military thinkers. M., 2007
The partisan war (partisan movement) of 1812 is an armed conflict between Napoleon's troops and Russian partisans during the Patriotic War of 1812.
The partisan troops consisted of detachments of the Russian army located in the rear, escaped Russian prisoners of war and numerous volunteers from civilian population. Partisan units were one of the main forces participating in the war and resisting the attackers.
Prerequisites for the creation of partisan detachments
Napoleon's troops that attacked Russia moved quite quickly into the interior of the country, pursuing the retreating Russian army. This led to the fact that the French army was quite stretched across the territory of the state, from the borders to the capital itself - thanks to the extended communication lines, the French received food and weapons. Seeing this, the leadership of the Russian army decided to create mobile units that would operate in the rear and try to cut off the channels through which the French received food. This is how partisan detachments appeared, the first of which was formed by order of Lieutenant Colonel D. Davydov.
Partisan detachments of Cossacks and regular army
Davydov compiled a very effective plan conducting partisan warfare, thanks to which he received from Kutuzov a detachment of 50 hussars and 50 Cossacks. Together with his detachment, Davydov went to the rear of the French army and began subversive activities there.
In September, this detachment attacked a French detachment transporting food and additional manpower (soldiers). The French were captured or killed, and all goods were destroyed. There were several such attacks - the partisans acted carefully and always unexpectedly for the French soldiers, thanks to which they almost always managed to destroy carts with food and other belongings.
Soon peasants and Russian soldiers released from captivity began to join Davydov’s detachment. Despite the fact that the partisans’ relations with the local peasants were strained at first, quite soon the local residents themselves began to take part in Davydov’s raids and actively help in the partisan movement.
Davydov, together with his soldiers, regularly disrupted food supplies, freed prisoners and sometimes took weapons from the French.
When Kutuzov was forced to leave Moscow, he gave the order to start an active guerrilla war in all directions. By that time, partisan detachments began to grow and appeared throughout the country; they consisted mainly of Cossacks. Partisan detachments usually numbered several hundred people, but there were also larger formations (up to 1,500 people) that could easily cope with small detachments of the regular French army.
Several factors contributed to the partisans' success. Firstly, they always acted suddenly, which gave them an advantage, and secondly, local residents quickly established contact with partisan detachments rather than with the regular army.
By the middle of the war, the partisan detachments had grown so large that they began to pose a significant danger to the French, and a real guerrilla war began.
Peasant partisan units
The success of the partisan war of 1812 would not have been so stunning if not for the active participation of peasants in the life of the partisans. They always actively supported the units working in their area, brought them food and provided assistance in every possible way.
The peasants also offered all possible resistance to the French army. First of all, they refused to conduct any trade with the French - this often went so far as the peasants burning own houses and food supplies if they knew that the French would come to them.
After the fall of Moscow and discord in Napoleon's army, the Russian peasantry moved to more active action. Peasant partisan detachments began to be created, which also offered armed resistance to the French and carried out raids.
Results and role of the partisan war of 1812
Largely thanks to the active and skillful actions of Russian partisan detachments, which over time turned into a huge force, Napoleon’s army fell and was expelled from Russia. The partisans actively undermined the ties between the French and their own, cut off the supply routes for weapons and food, and simply defeated small detachments in dense forests - all this greatly weakened Napoleon’s army and led to its internal disintegration and weakening.
The war was won, and the heroes of the partisan war were awarded.
The unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the entire people. In the overwhelming majority of areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived the “Great Army” not as his liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. The next invasion of “foreigners” was perceived by the overwhelming majority of the population as an invasion aimed at eradicating the Orthodox faith and establishing atheism.
Speaking about the partisan movement in the War of 1812, it should be clarified that the partisans themselves were temporary detachments of military personnel of regular units and Cossacks, purposefully and organizedly created by the Russian command for actions in the rear and on enemy communications. And to describe the actions of spontaneously created self-defense units of villagers, the term “people's war” was introduced. Therefore, the popular movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is integral part more general theme “The People in the War of the Twelfth Year.”
Some authors associate the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 with the manifesto of July 6, 1812, which supposedly allowed the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality, things were somewhat different.
Even before the start of the war, the lieutenant colonel drew up a note on the conduct of an active guerrilla war. In 1811, the work of the Prussian Colonel Valentini, “The Little War,” was published in Russian. However, the Russian army looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement “a disastrous system of fragmentation of the army.”
People's War
With the invasion of Napoleonic hordes, local residents initially simply left the villages and went to forests and areas remote from military operations. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army called on his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was apparently drawn up on the basis of the work of the Prussian Colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to conduct guerrilla warfare.
It arose spontaneously and represented the actions of small scattered detachments of local residents and soldiers lagging behind their units against the predatory actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to memoirs, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms.”
French foragers sent to villages for food faced more than just passive resistance. In the area of Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev, detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy convoys, destroyed their foragers, and captured French soldiers.
Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became domestic for the Russian people. It was here that popular resistance acquired the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would later be brought to justice. However, this process subsequently intensified.
Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812
Unknown artist. 1st quarter of the 19th century
In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasant detachments attacked French parties making their way towards them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychev detachments, police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Emelyanov, armed their villagers with guns taken from the French and established proper order and discipline. Sychevsky partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they killed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.
Residents of the Roslavl district created several horse and foot peasant detachments, arming the villagers with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders making their way into the neighboring Elny district. Many peasant detachments operated in Yukhnovsky district. Having organized defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the enemy’s path in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment D.V. Davydova.
Another detachment, created from peasants, was also active in the Gzhatsk district, headed by a private of the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment. Chetvertakov’s detachment began not only to protect villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. As a result, throughout the entire space of 35 versts from the Gzhatsk pier, the lands were not devastated, despite the fact that all the surrounding villages lay in ruins. For this feat, the residents of those places “with sensitive gratitude” called Chetvertakov “the savior of that side.”
Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner. In Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.
The actions of peasant detachments became especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.
The battle between Mozhaisk peasants and French soldiers during and after the Battle of Borodino. Colorized engraving by an unknown author. 1830s
In Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost mayor Ivan Andreev and the centenarian Pavel Ivanov. In Volokolamsk district, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost mayor Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitsy district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratyev, Vladimir Afanasyev.
Don't hesitate! Let me come! Artist V.V. Vereshchagin. 1887-1895
The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications in 1813 about the formation of this detachment, it was written that “the head of the economic volosts of Vokhnovskaya, the head of the centenary Ivan Chushkin and the peasant, the Amerevskaya head Emelyan Vasiliev, gathered the peasants subordinate to them, and also invited the neighboring ones.”
The detachment consisted of about 6 thousand people in its ranks, the leader of this detachment was the peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodskaya district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into armed struggle with enemy troops.
It should be noted that even women took part in forays against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes became overgrown with legends and in some cases did not even remotely resemble real events. A typical example is s, to whom popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed no less than the leadership of a peasant detachment, which in reality was not the case.
French guards under the escort of grandmother Spiridonovna. A.G. Venetsianov. 1813
A gift for children in memory of the events of 1812. Cartoon from the series I.I. Terebeneva
Peasant and partisan detachments constrained the actions of Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on enemy personnel, and destroyed military property. The Smolensk road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subject to their raids. They intercepted French correspondence, delivering especially valuable ones to the headquarters of the Russian army.
The actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “The peasants,” he wrote, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy... They kill the enemy in large numbers, and take those taken prisoner to the army.”
Partisans in 1812. Artist B. Zvorykin. 1911
According to various estimates, over 15 thousand people were captured by peasant formations, the same number were exterminated, and significant supplies of fodder and weapons were destroyed.
In 1812. French prisoners. Hood. THEM. Pryanishnikov. 1873
During the war, many active participants in peasant groups were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to reward the people subordinate to the count: 23 people “in charge” - with insignia of the Military Order (St. George Crosses), and the other 27 people - with a special silver medal “For Love of the Fatherland” on the Vladimir Ribbon.
Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militia warriors, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone under his control and create additional bases to supply the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to obtain additional communications that would have connected the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kyiv.
Army partisan units
Army partisan detachments also played a major role in the Patriotic War of 1812. The idea of their creation arose even before the Battle of Borodino, and was the result of an analysis of the actions of individual cavalry units, which, by force of circumstances, ended up in the enemy’s rear communications.
The first to begin partisan actions was a cavalry general who formed a “flying corps.” Later, on August 2, already M.B. Barclay de Tolly ordered the creation of a detachment under the command of a general. He led the united Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of Dukhovshchina on the flanks and behind enemy lines. Its strength was 1,300 people.
Later, the main task of partisan detachments was formulated by M.I. Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is approaching, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, then I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, for the separated forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him, and for this, being Now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I am giving up important units in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk.”
Army partisan detachments were created mainly from the most mobile Cossack units and were unequal in size: from 50 to 500 people or more. They were tasked with sudden actions behind enemy lines to disrupt communications, destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons and suitable reserves, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to obtain food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the main headquarters of the Russian army. Interaction was organized between the commanders of the partisan detachments whenever possible.
The main advantage of partisan units was their mobility. They never stood in one place, constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The partisans' actions were sudden and swift.
The partisan detachments of D.V. became widely known. Davydova, etc.
The personification of the entire partisan movement was the detachment of the commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov.
The tactics of his partisan detachment combined rapid maneuver and striking an enemy unprepared for battle. To ensure secrecy, the partisan detachment had to be almost constantly on the march.
The first successful actions encouraged the partisans, and Davydov decided to attack some enemy convoy walking along the main Smolensk road. On September 3 (15), 1812, a battle took place near Tsarev-Zaimishcha on the great Smolensk road, during which the partisans captured 119 soldiers and two officers. The partisans had 10 supply wagons and a wagon with ammunition at their disposal.
M.I. Kutuzov closely followed Davydov’s brave actions and attached great importance to great importance expansion of partisan warfare.
In addition to Davydov’s detachment, there were many other well-known and successfully operating partisan detachments. In the fall of 1812, they surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring. The flying detachments included 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and a light horse artillery team, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns. Thus, Kutuzov gave partisan warfare a wider scope.
Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy transports and convoys, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. Every day, the commander-in-chief received reports on the direction of movement and actions of enemy detachments, captured mail, protocols of interrogation of prisoners and other information about the enemy, which was reflected in the log of military operations.
A partisan detachment of captain A.S. operated on the Mozhaisk road. Figner. Young, educated, fluent in French, German and Italian languages, he found himself in the fight against a foreign enemy, without fear of dying.
From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of General F.F. Wintzingerode, who, by sending small detachments to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access for Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.
When the main forces of the Russian army were withdrawn, Kutuzov advanced from the Krasnaya Pakhra area to the Mozhaisk road to the area of the village. Perkhushkovo, located 27 versts from Moscow, a detachment of Major General I.S. Dorokhov, consisting of three Cossack, hussar and dragoon regiments and half a company of artillery with the goal of “making an attack, trying to destroy enemy parks.” Dorokhov was instructed not only to observe this road, but also to strike the enemy.
The actions of Dorokhov’s detachment received approval in the main headquarters of the Russian army. On the first day alone, he managed to destroy 2 cavalry squadrons, 86 charging wagons, capture 11 officers and 450 privates, intercept 3 couriers, and recapture 6 pounds of church silver.
Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutino position, Kutuzov formed several more army partisan detachments, in particular detachments, and. The actions of these detachments were important.
Colonel N.D. Kudashev with two Cossack regiments was sent to the Serpukhov and Kolomenskaya roads. His detachment, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolskoye, suddenly attacked the enemy, destroyed more than 100 people and captured 200.
Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of captain A.N. Seslavina. He and a detachment of 500 people (250 Don Cossacks and a squadron of the Sumy Hussar Regiment) were instructed to operate in the area of the road from Borovsk to Moscow, coordinating their actions with the detachment A.S. Figner.
A detachment of Colonel I.M. operated in the Mozhaisk area and to the south. Vadbolsky as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. He advanced to the village of Kubinsky to attack enemy convoys and drive his parties away, taking possession of the road to Ruza.
In addition, a detachment of a lieutenant colonel of 300 people was also sent to the Mozhaisk area. To the north, in the area of Volokolamsk, a detachment of a colonel operated, near Ruza - a major, behind Klin towards the Yaroslavl highway - Cossack detachments of a military foreman, and near Voskresensk - major Figlev.
Thus, the army was surrounded by a continuous ring of partisan detachments, which prevented it from foraging in the vicinity of Moscow, as a result of which the enemy troops experienced a massive loss of horses and increased demoralization. This was one of the reasons for Napoleon leaving Moscow.
About the start of the advance French troops from the mother throne, again, the partisans A.N. were the first to know. Seslavina. At the same time, he, being in the forest near the village. Fomichev, personally saw Napoleon himself, which he immediately reported. Napoleon’s advance to the new Kaluga road and the covering detachments (a corps with the remnants of the vanguard) were immediately reported to M.I.’s main apartment. Kutuzov.
An important discovery of the partisan Seslavin. Unknown artist. 1820s.
Kutuzov sent Dokhturov to Borovsk. However, already on the way, Dokhturov learned about the occupation of Borovsk by the French. Then he went to Maloyaroslavets to prevent the enemy from advancing to Kaluga. The main forces of the Russian army also began to arrive there.
After a 12-hour march, D.S. By the evening of October 11 (23), Dokhturov approached Spassky and united with the Cossacks. And already in the morning he entered into battle on the streets of Maloyaroslavets, after which the French had only one escape route left - Old Smolenskaya. And then A.N.’s report will be late. Seslavin, the French would have bypassed the Russian army at Maloyaroslavets, and what the further course of the war would have been then is unknown...
By this time, the partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them under the command of Major General I.S. Dorokhova, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, launched an assault on the city of Vereya on September 28 (October 10), 1812. The enemy took up arms only when the Russian partisans had already broken into the city. Vereya was liberated, and about 400 people of the Westphalian regiment with the banner were taken prisoner.
Monument to I.S. Dorokhov in Vereya. Sculptor S.S. Aleshin. 1957
Continuous exposure to the enemy was of great importance. From September 2 (14) to October 1 (13), according to various estimates, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, 6.5 thousand French were captured. Their losses increased every day due to the active actions of peasant and partisan detachments.
To ensure the transportation of ammunition, food and fodder, as well as road safety, the French command had to allocate significant forces. Taken together, all this significantly affected the moral and psychological state of the French army, which worsened every day.
The battle near the village is rightfully considered a great success for the partisans. Lyakhovo west of Yelnya, which occurred on October 28 (November 9). In it, partisans D.V. Davydova, A.N. Seslavin and A.S. Figner, reinforced by regiments, a total of 3,280 people, attacked Augereau's brigade. After a stubborn battle, the entire brigade (2 thousand soldiers, 60 officers and Augereau himself) surrendered. This was the first time an entire enemy military unit surrendered.
The remaining partisan forces also continuously appeared on both sides of the road and harassed the French vanguard with their shots. Davydov's detachment, like the detachments of other commanders, always followed on the heels of the enemy army. The colonel, following on the right flank of the Napoleonic army, was ordered to go forward, warning the enemy and to raid individual detachments when they stopped. A large partisan detachment was sent to Smolensk in order to destroy enemy stores, convoys and individual detachments. The Cossacks M.I. pursued the French from the rear. Platova.
No less energetically, partisan detachments were used to complete the campaign to expel Napoleonic army from Russia. Detachment A.P. Ozharovsky was supposed to capture the city of Mogilev, where large rear enemy warehouses were located. On November 12 (24), his cavalry broke into the city. And two days later the partisans D.V. Davydov interrupted communication between Orsha and Mogilev. Detachment A.N. Seslavin, together with the regular army, liberated the city of Borisov and, pursuing the enemy, approached the Berezina.
At the end of December, the entire detachment of Davydov, by order of Kutuzov, joined the vanguard of the main forces of the army as its forward detachment.
The guerrilla war that unfolded near Moscow made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon's army and expelling the enemy from Russia.
Material prepared by the Research Institute (military history)
Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces
Protracted military conflict. Detachments in which people were united by the idea of the liberation struggle fought on a par with the regular army, and in the case of a well-organized leadership, their actions were highly effective and largely decided the outcome of the battles.
Partisans of 1812
When Napoleon attacked Russia, the idea of strategic guerrilla warfare arose. Then for the first time in world history Russian troops a universal method of conducting military operations on enemy territory was used. This method was based on the organization and coordination of rebel actions by the regular army itself. For this purpose, trained professionals - “army partisans” - were thrown behind the front line. At this time, the detachments of Figner and Ilovaisky, as well as the detachment of Denis Davydov, who was lieutenant colonel Akhtyrsky, became famous for their military exploits
This detachment was separated from the main forces longer than others (for six weeks). The tactics of Davydov’s partisan detachment consisted in the fact that they avoided open attacks, attacked by surprise, changed directions of attacks, and probed for the enemy’s weak points. The local population helped: the peasants were guides, spies, and participated in the extermination of the French.
In the Patriotic War, the partisan movement had special meaning. The basis for the formation of detachments and units was the local population, who were familiar with the area. In addition, it was hostile to the occupiers.
The main goal of the movement
The main task of guerrilla warfare was to isolate enemy troops from its communications. The main blow of the people's avengers was aimed at the supply lines of the enemy army. Their detachments disrupted communications, prevented the approach of reinforcements and the supply of ammunition. When the French began to retreat, their actions were aimed at destroying ferries and bridges over numerous rivers. Thanks to the active actions of army partisans, Napoleon lost almost half of his artillery during his retreat.
The experience of waging partisan warfare in 1812 was used in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). During this period, this movement was large-scale and well organized.
Period of the Great Patriotic War
The need to organize a partisan movement arose due to the fact that most of the territory of the Soviet state was captured by German troops, who sought to make slaves and liquidate the population of the occupied areas. The main idea of partisan warfare in the Great Patriotic War is the disorganization of the activities of the Nazi troops, causing them human and material losses. For this purpose, fighter and sabotage groups were created, the network expanded underground organizations to direct all actions in the occupied territory.
The partisan movement of the Great Patriotic War was two-sided. On the one hand, the detachments were created spontaneously, from people who remained in enemy-occupied territories, and sought to protect themselves from mass fascist terror. On the other hand, this process took place in an organized manner, under leadership from above. Sabotage groups were thrown behind enemy lines or pre-organized in the territory that they were supposed to leave in the near future. To provide such detachments with ammunition and food, they first made caches with supplies, and also worked out issues of their further replenishment. In addition, issues of secrecy were worked out, the locations of detachments based in the forest were determined after the front retreated further to the east, and the provision of money and valuables was organized.
Movement leadership
In order to lead the guerrilla war and sabotage struggle, workers from among the local residents who were well acquainted with these areas were sent to the territory captured by the enemy. Very often, among the organizers and leaders, including the underground, were the leaders of Soviet and party bodies who remained in the territory occupied by the enemy.
Guerrilla warfare played a decisive role in the victory Soviet Union over Nazi Germany.