From what heights and planes do paratroopers jump with a parachute. Russian Airborne Forces: history, structure, weapons

German parachute troops were used in the Second World War to solve independent operational tasks and tactical tasks within the framework of the operations of larger ground army formations. Operation Freudenthal. which was planned to be carried out during the Sudetenland crisis, was that German paratroopers were to “open” the Czechoslovak fortification line from the rear. It was conceived as a completely independent operation. It was followed by other independent operations of rifle paratroopers: the only partially successful capture of the “Fortress Holland” in May 1940, the capture of the island of Crete in May 1941 - the largest and truly independently carried out airborne operation, as well as a number of smaller operations carried out in eastern Mediterranean in the fall of 1943, after Italy broke its alliance with Germany. The landing of German paratroopers in Northern Ireland planned as a major diversionary maneuver in the late autumn of 1940, as well as the unrealized plan to capture the island of Malta in the summer of 1942, were supposed to be independent operations of parachute troops. Units of the army, navy and aviation assigned to interact with parachute landings were supposed to carry out tactical tasks as part of the operations of the parachute troops.

All of the largest of these airborne operations were based on almost the same idea: first attack in several places from the air and create several strong points in order to break into the enemy’s defense system from the inside, preventing him from concentrating his forces on any one area and cut off communications necessary for defense; then select one of the created strongholds, concentrate all existing and newly arriving forces on it, so that they then spread out, like an inkblot, until the main stronghold merges with the others and absorbs them. This tactic - I would call it the "inkblot tactic" - was preferred by the Germans in all airborne operations, as opposed to the "carpet" tactics used by the Allies, which consisted in the fact that paratroopers were scattered evenly on the terrain to be captured from the very beginning. The “ink spot” tactic paid off both in Holland and in Crete.

Along with the use of German parachute troops to solve operational problems, the German high command during the war increasingly began to assign tactical tasks to paratroopers as part of the combat operations of large front-line formations. At the same time, parachute troops were used for the most part as forward detachments or as rearguards, that is, to some extent they were likened to modernized cavalry. The actions of parachute troops in Norway - in the Dombos area and at Oslo airfield in April 1940 - and the attack by an engineer platoon of parachute troops on Fort Eben-Emael, the capture and provision of crossings across the Albert Canal and the capture of crossings across the Lower Rhine on May 10, 1940 can be considered as actions parachute troops in the role of advanced detachments. When attacking Alexandria, Rommel also initially planned to use four battle groups of Ramke's brigade as a vanguard to surprise and destroy the British anti-tank barriers. The planned use of one of the parachute force formations to suddenly capture the oil region northwest of Baku before the retreating enemy destroyed it also placed the parachute troops in the role of an advance detachment. Finally, Kampfgruppe von Heydte, dropped during the last major German paratroop action in December 1944 in the Eifel mountain region to secure the northern flank of the attackers and to capture mountain passes and roads, was also the vanguard.

It goes without saying that in a major airborne operation, a small number of parachute riflemen, dropped by parachute or landing on gliders, perform the tasks of the vanguard. For example, during the fighting in Crete, companies of the assault regiment landed in the area of ​​Malemes and eastern Kania on cargo gliders before the paratroopers; when planning the operation to capture the island of Malta, the above-mentioned battalion was supposed to, using diving cargo gliders, disable the anti-aircraft artillery of the island. Much less often it was planned to use parachute and parachute-glider landings as a rearguard. Thus, in August 1943, units of the 2nd Parachute Division landed in Sicily on the western and southern slopes of Etna with the task of establishing a cut-off position between the retreating and partially defeated Italian troops and the enemy units pursuing them and ensuring the creation of a powerful bridgehead near the Strait of Messina even before , when the troops were evacuated from Sicily, were a kind of rearguard. The use of paratroopers in the role of a rearguard is to some extent approached by another type of their combat use. In soldier's jargon it is called "firefighting." It consists of throwing parachutist riflemen into the gap that has arisen in order to restore a continuous front line. No matter how great the number of cases when paratroopers replaced infantry units, I do not know of a single example when such “firefighting” was carried out from the air by parachute and parachute-glider landings. True, once the high command planned a similar enterprise (to establish contact with the encircled German group in the Kholm area in the spring of 1942), but it was not carried out.

If one follows the progress of the major German airborne operations and the few cases of tactical use of parachute troops, one inevitably gets the impression that the German High Command did not know how to use parachute troops in accordance with their characteristics. It hesitantly and reluctantly accepted proposals that came from representatives of the parachute troops themselves, and in particular from General Student. All this led to the fact that such a valuable unit for the army, which consisted entirely of selected volunteer soldiers and had excellent equipment, weapons and expensive equipment, turned into an ordinary infantry unit.

The actions of the German parachute and parachute-glider landings indicate that the command's fear of large landing losses was completely unfounded. True, the losses of parachute troops in such operations were undoubtedly heavy, since the actions of any large landing force represented a fierce, difficult struggle. However, the use of a parachute landing always gives the command the opportunity to achieve an operational or tactical goal with the expenditure of much less force than in a ground operation of ground forces, where much larger forces must be used to achieve a similar goal. Even if we assume that the goals set for the parachute landings in Holland (1940) and Crete (1941) could have been achieved without the use of airborne assaults, only through the actions of ground forces, then this would have taken much more time and much more forces, while the absolute numbers of losses would, of course, be no less. In any case, the use of paratrooper shooters always justifies itself, but for this, parachute troops must be brought into battle in the direction of the main attack. They should not be used dispersedly and perform various secondary tactical tasks. It is very doubtful whether the command of the 6th Panzer Army “SO” observed this principle during the last landing of German parachute troops in December 1944.

When performing tactical missions, a separate group of paratroopers must be given greater freedom of action. Nowhere is a stamp and stencil more harmful than when attacking from the air, be it a jump or actions from a glider. Despite this, we must admit that during the Second World War, German paratroopers and glider landings used three main types of air attack: drop or landing directly on an object, drop or landing near an object, and drop or landing away from an object.

Direct release onto an object is possible only if the object is small in size. In this case, this form of attack is even necessary. A typical example of this is the landing on Fort Eben-Emael on May 10, 1940. The fort was captured only by landing directly on the site. In the same way, when planning the operation to capture the island of Malta, it was envisaged to land troops from diving gliders directly at the anti-aircraft artillery positions. Rommel also thought about landing troops on anti-tank barriers when he wanted to carry out an attack on Alexandria. The first English parachute landing, dropped in February 1942 north of Le Havre, was also a drop on the site. His task was to eliminate the German Wurzburg radar installation and remove from it the parts necessary for the British. The bridgehead can be captured from the air only if the landing is carried out directly on the bridge, as was done, for example, by German paratroopers in 1940 on the Lower Rhine and in 1941 on the Isthmus of Corinth. The British ignoring this basic rule of parachute tactics at Arnhem in September 1944 cost them the loss of one of their best parachute divisions. Capturing a bridge requires unloading or landing on both bridgeheads, and this is an indisputable rule.

A typical case of a drop or landing near an object may be the capture of an airfield. Landing directly on an object using gliders or parachutes would cause completely unnecessary losses here, in open terrain.

Dropping or landing away from an objective lacks the advantage of a surprise air attack directly on or near an objective. If a drop or landing directly on or near an object can be compared to an attack on the move, then a landing away from an object is essentially occupying the starting position for the attack. In this case, after occupying the starting position, the landing force begins an attack, guided by the general principles of infantry operations. An example of such a landing away from the objective is the actions of the 3rd Parachute Rifle Regiment in Crete. This regiment had the task of capturing the capital of the island - the city of Cania. To complete the task, the regiment parachuted onto the Kania - Alikianu road, approximately 3 km southwest of the outskirts of Kania. Then, from the landing area cleared of the enemy, the regiment began to systematically develop an offensive in the northeast direction, towards the main city of the island.

The commander of a separate parachute unit will decide to drop troops far from the target only if the target has a large extent (area) and the enemy’s situation is completely unclear. As part of a major landing operation, the command of the parachute troops will use separate part under certain circumstances, far from the object also because, if necessary, she can change the task by ordering her to participate in ground combat in other areas. In the example above, the 3rd Parachute Regiment had all of the above prerequisites.

It would be a mistake to assume that at the moment when paratroopers find themselves on the ground - be it when landing directly on an object, next to it or far from it - the actions of the paratrooper-gunner lose their specific characteristics, and everything that happens afterwards , takes on the character of an ordinary infantry battle, conducted according to old, proven rules. Even after unloading or disembarking, the combat of paratroopers retains its special features. Combat under landing conditions, in contrast to combat in normal infantry units, is characterized mainly by three points: the need to defend from all sides, that is, to conduct an all-round defense; the lack of close-in reconnaissance and reconnaissance in force prior to the battle and, not least, the lack of artillery. The old truth that the essence of an offensive lies in the harmonious interaction of fire and movement loses its meaning in the conditions of an airborne assault. In this case, the fire recedes into the background, making way for movement. Its overwhelming and paralyzing effect is not as effective as the stunning surprise, deliberate order and overturning force of movement that characterize the airborne attack. After landing, the commander of the parachute regiment is no longer the conductor of a large “fire orchestra”, but to a certain extent an “ammunition conservation commissioner” who seeks to compensate for insufficient firepower with skillful and unexpected fire maneuvers of his heavy weapons. Where this art of fire maneuver was replaced by bombing and strafing from aircraft, for example on the island of Crete and in South Holland (September 1944), instead of a clear, complementary and successful interaction of fire and movement, only clumsy and rather useless “assistance” was obtained. "

During the last landing of German paratroopers in the Eifel mountain region in December 1944, the battle group included forward observers - long-range artillery divisions (batteries) and an artillery communications team, who controlled fire from deep behind enemy lines. The results of their actions showed that such use of observers is fully justified.

Airborne troops
(Airborne Forces)

From the history of creation

The history of the Russian Airborne Forces is inextricably linked with the history of the creation and development of the Red Army. A great contribution to the theory of the combat use of airborne assault forces was made by Marshal of the Soviet Union M.N. Tukhachevsky. Back in the second half of the 20s, he was the first among Soviet military leaders to deeply study the role of airborne assaults in a future war and substantiate the prospects of the Airborne Forces.

In the work “New Issues of War” M.N. Tukhachevsky wrote: “If a country is prepared for the widespread production of airborne troops capable of seizing and stopping the activities of the enemy’s railways in decisive directions, paralyzing the deployment and mobilization of his troops, etc., then such a country will be able to overturn the previous methods of operational actions and make the outcome of the war much more more decisive character."

A significant place in this work is given to the role of airborne assaults in border battles. The author believed that airborne assaults during this period of battle would be more advantageous to use to disrupt mobilization, isolate and pin down border garrisons, defeat local enemy troops, capture airfields, landing sites, and solve other important tasks.

Much attention was paid to the development of the theory of the use of Airborne Forces by Ya.I. Alksnis, A.I. Egorov, A.I. Cork, I.P. Uborevich, I.E. Yakir and many other military leaders. They believed that the most trained soldiers should serve in the Airborne Forces, ready to carry out any task, while showing determination and perseverance. Airborne assaults must deliver surprise attacks on the enemy where no one is waiting for them.

Theoretical studies led to the conclusion that the combat activities of the Airborne Forces should be offensive in nature, bold to the point of insolence and extremely maneuverable in carrying out quick, concentrated strikes. Airborne landings, making maximum use of the surprise of their appearance, must rapidly strike at the most sensitive points, achieving success hourly, thereby increasing panic in the enemy’s ranks.

Simultaneously with the development of the theory of the combat use of airborne forces in the Red Army, bold experiments were carried out on airborne landings, an extensive program was carried out to create experienced airborne units, issues of their organization were studied, and a system of combat training was developed.

The first time airborne assault was used to carry out a combat mission was in 1929. On April 13, 1929, the Fuzaili gang made another raid from Afghanistan into the territory of Tajikistan. The Basmachi's plans included capturing the Garm district and subsequently ensuring the invasion of the Alai and Fergana valleys by larger Basmachi gangs. Cavalry detachments were sent to the Basmachi invasion area with the task of destroying the gang before it captured the Garm district. However, information received from the city indicated that they would not have time to block the path of the gang, which had already defeated a detachment of Garm volunteers in a counter battle and was threatening the city. In this critical situation, the commander of the Central Asian Military District P.E. Dybenko made a bold decision: to transport a detachment of fighters by air and destroy the enemy on the outskirts of the city with a sudden blow. The detachment consisted of 45 people armed with rifles and four machine guns. On the morning of April 23, two platoon commanders flew to the combat area on the first plane, followed by the commander of the cavalry brigade T.T. on the second plane. Shapkin, brigade commissar A.T. Fedin. Platoon commanders had to capture the landing site and ensure the landing of the main forces of the detachment. The brigade commander's task was to study the situation on the spot and then, returning back to Dushanbe, report the results to the commander. Commissioner Fedin was supposed to take command of the landing force and lead the actions to destroy the gang. An hour and a half after the first plane took off, the main landing force took off. However, the detachment’s previously planned plan of action was canceled immediately after the plane with the commander and commissar landed. Half of the city was already occupied by the Basmachi, so there was no time to hesitate. Having sent a plane with a report, the brigade commander decided to immediately attack the enemy with available forces, without waiting for the landing party to arrive. Having obtained horses from the nearest villages and splitting into two groups, the detachment moved to Garm. Having burst into the city, the detachment brought down powerful machine-gun and rifle fire on the Basmachi. The bandits were confused. They knew about the size of the city's garrison, but they were armed with rifles, and where did the machine guns come from? The bandits decided that a Red Army division had broken into the city, and, unable to withstand the onslaught, retreated from the city, losing about 80 people. The approaching cavalry units completed the defeat of the Fuzaili gang. District Commander P.E. During the analysis, Dybenko highly appreciated the actions of the detachment.

The second experiment took place on July 26, 1930. On this day, under the leadership of military pilot L. Minov, the first training jumps were made in Voronezh. Leonid Grigoryevich Minov himself later told how the events took place: “I didn’t think that one jump could change a lot in life. I loved flying with all my heart. Like all my comrades, I was distrustful of parachutes at that time. Well, simply about them and didn’t think so. In 1928, I happened to be at a meeting of the leadership of the Air Force, where I made my report on the results of work on “blind” flights at the Borisoglebsk school of military pilots." After the meeting, Pyotr Ionovich Baranov, the head of the Air Force, called me over and asked: “In your report, you said that you must fly blindly with a parachute. Leonid Grigorievich, in your opinion, are parachutes needed in military aviation?” What could I say then! Of course, parachutes are needed. The best proof of this was the forced parachute jump of test pilot M. Gromov. Remembering this incident, I answered Pyotr Ionovich in the affirmative. Then he invited me to go to the USA and get to know how things are going with their aviation rescue service. To be honest, I agreed reluctantly. I returned from the United States of America “light”: with a “diploma” in my pocket and three jumps. Pyotr Ionovich Baranov put my memo in a skinny folder. When he closed it, on the cover I saw the inscription: “Parachute business.” I left Baranov’s office two hours later. was coming big job on the introduction of parachutes in aviation, on the organization of various studies and experiments aimed at improving flight safety. It was decided to hold classes in Voronezh to familiarize the flight crew with parachutes and the organization of jumps. Baranov suggested thinking about the possibility of training 10-15 parachutists at the Voronezh training camp to perform a group jump. July 26, 1930 training camp participants Air Force The Moscow Military District gathered at the airfield near Voronezh. I had to perform a demonstration jump. Of course, everyone who was on the airfield considered me an ace in this matter. After all, I was the only person here who had already received air parachute baptism and jumped not once, not twice, but had as many as three jumps! And the prize-winning place I won at the competition of the strongest US parachutists, apparently, seemed to those present to be something unattainable. The pilot Moshkovsky, who was appointed my assistant at the training camp, was preparing for the jump with me. There were no more applicants yet. My jump was really a success. I landed easily, not far from the spectators, and even stayed on my feet. We were greeted with applause. A girl who appeared from somewhere handed me a bouquet of field daisies. - “And how is Moshkovsky?”... The plane is on course. His figure is clearly visible in the doorway. It's time to jump. It's time! But he still stands in the doorway, apparently not daring to rush down. Another second, two more. Finally! A white plume shot up above the falling man and immediately turned into a tight parachute canopy. - “Hurray!..” - was heard around. Many pilots, seeing Moshkovsky and me alive and unharmed, expressed a desire to jump too. On that day, squadron commander A. Stoilov, his assistant K. Zatonsky, pilots I. Povalyaev and I. Mukhin made jumps. And three days later there were 30 people in the ranks of paratroopers. After listening to my report on the progress of the classes over the phone, Baranov asked: “Tell me, is it possible to prepare, say, ten or fifteen people for a group jump in two or three days?” Having received a positive response, Pyotr Ionovich explained his thought: “It would be very good if, during the Voronezh exercise, it were possible to demonstrate the drop of a group of armed paratroopers for sabotage actions on the territory of the “enemy.”

Needless to say, we accepted this original and interesting task with great enthusiasm. It was decided to carry out the landing from the Farman-Goliath aircraft. In those days it was the only aircraft we mastered for jumping. Its advantage over the TB-1 bombers available in the air brigade was that a person did not need to climb out onto the wing - the paratroopers jumped directly into the open door. Moreover, all the trainees were in the cockpit. The feeling of a comrade's elbow calmed everyone. In addition, the releaser could watch him and encourage him before the jump. Ten volunteers who had already completed training jumps were selected to participate in the landing. In addition to the landing of fighters, the landing operation plan included dropping weapons and ammunition (light machine guns, grenades, cartridges) from aircraft using special cargo parachutes. For this purpose, two soft mail bags and four semi-heavy boxes designed by K. Blagin were used. The landing group was divided into two detachments, since no more than seven parachutists could fit in the cockpit. After the first paratroopers landed, the plane returned to the airfield for the second group. During the break between jumps, it was planned to drop six cargo parachutes with weapons and ammunition from three R-1 aircraft. As a result of this experiment, I wanted to get an answer to a number of questions: to establish the degree of dispersion of a group of six people and the time of separation of all fighters from the plane; record the time it takes to lower the paratroopers to the ground, receive the dropped weapons and bring the landing force into full readiness for combat operations. In order to expand the experience, the first detachment was planned to drop from a height of 350 meters, the second - from 500 meters, and drop the load - from 150 meters. Preparations for the landing operation were completed on July 31. Each fighter knew his place on the plane and his task on the ground. The paratroopers' equipment, consisting of the main and reserve parachutes, was packed and carefully adjusted to the soldier's figure; weapons and ammunition were packed in hanging bags and cargo parachute boxes.

On August 2, 1930, at exactly 9 o’clock, a plane took off from the home airfield. On board is the first parachute landing detachment. The leader of the second group, J. Moszkowski, is also with us. He decided to see where our group was separating, so that he could then accurately parachute his guys. Following us, three R-1 aircraft took off, under the wings of which cargo parachutes were suspended from bomb racks.

Having made a circle, our plane turned to the landing site, located approximately two kilometers from the airfield. The landing site is a field free of crops measuring 600 by 800 meters. It was adjacent to a small farm. One of the buildings, located on the outskirts of the village, was designated as a landmark for the collection of paratroopers after landing and the starting point for the start of landing operations behind “enemy” lines. - "Get ready!" - I ordered, trying to shout over the roar of the engines. The guys immediately got up and stood one after another, clutching the pull ring in their right hands. Their faces are tense and concentrated. As soon as we crossed the platform, I gave the command: “Let’s go!”... - the fighters literally poured out of the plane, I dived last and immediately pulled the ring. I counted - all the domes opened normally. We landed almost in the center of the site, not far from each other. The soldiers quickly collected parachutes and ran up to me. Meanwhile, a flight of P-1s passed overhead and dropped six parachutes with weapons on the edge of the farm. We rushed there, unpacked the bags, took out machine guns and cartridges. And now our Farman appeared in the sky again with the second group. As planned, Moshkovsky’s group left the plane at an altitude of 500 meters. They landed next to us. It only took a few minutes, and 12 paratroopers, armed with two light machine guns, rifles, revolvers and grenades, were fully ready for combat..."

This is how the world's first parachute landing was dropped.

In the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated October 24, 1930, People's Commissar K. Voroshilov noted: “As achievements, it is necessary to note successful experiments in organizing airborne assaults. Airborne operations must be comprehensively studied from the technical and tactical side by the Red Army Headquarters and given appropriate instructions on the spot.”

It is this order that is the legal evidence of the birth of the “winged infantry” in the Land of the Soviets.

Organizational structure of the airborne troops

• Command of the Airborne Forces
• Airborne and air assault formations:
  • 98th Guards Airborne Svir Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Division;
  • 106th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Airborne Division;
  • 7th Guards Air Assault (Mountain) Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Division;
  • 76th Guards Air Assault Chernigov Red Banner Division;
  • 31st Separate Guards Air Assault Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Brigade;
• Special purpose military unit:
  • 45th Separate Guards Order of Kutuzov Order of Alexander Nevsky Special Purpose Regiment;
• Military support units:
  • 38th separate communications regiment of the Airborne Forces;

Airborne troops- a branch of troops intended for combat operations behind enemy lines.

Designed for airborne landings behind enemy lines or for rapid deployment in geographically remote areas, they are often used as quick reaction forces.

The main method of delivering airborne forces is parachute landing; they can also be delivered by helicopter; During the Second World War, delivery by gliders was practiced.

Airborne Forces consist of:
• paratroopers
• tank
• artillery
• self-propelled artillery
• other units and divisions
• from units and units of special troops and rear services.

Airborne personnel are parachuted together with personal weapons.

Tanks, rocket launchers, artillery guns, self-propelled guns, ammunition and other materiel are dropped from aircraft using airborne equipment (parachutes, parachute and parachute-jet systems, cargo containers, platforms for installing and dropping weapons and equipment) or delivered by air behind enemy lines to captured airfields.

The main combat properties of the Airborne Forces:
• ability to quickly reach remote areas
• strike suddenly
• successfully conduct a combined arms battle.

The Airborne Forces are armed with the ASU-85 airborne self-propelled guns; Sprut-SD self-propelled artillery guns; 122 mm howitzers D-30; combat vehicles landing BMD-1/2/3/4; armored personnel carriers BTR-D.

Part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may be part of the joint armed forces (for example, the CIS Allied Forces) or be under a unified command in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation (for example, as part of the UN peacekeeping forces or collective CIS peacekeeping forces in zones of local military conflicts ).

Airborne troops are required to undergo jump training even at the training stage. Then the skills of parachute jumping are used during combat operations or demonstration performances. Jumping has special rules: requirements for parachutes, aircraft used, and training of soldiers. The landing party needs to know all these requirements for a safe flight and landing.

A paratrooper cannot jump without training. Training is a mandatory stage before the start of real airborne jumps; during it, theoretical training and jumping practice take place. All the information that is told to future paratroopers during training is given below.

Aircraft for transportation and landing

What planes do paratroopers jump from? The Russian army currently uses several aircraft to airdrop troops. The main one is IL-76, but other flying machines are also used:

• AN-12;
• MI6;
• MI-8.

The IL-76 remains preferred because it is most conveniently equipped for landing, has a spacious luggage compartment and maintains pressure well even at high altitudes if the landing force needs to jump there. Its body is sealed, but in case of emergency, the compartment for paratroopers is equipped with individual oxygen masks. This way, every skydiver will not experience a lack of oxygen during the flight.

The plane reaches speeds of approximately 300 km per hour, and this is the optimal indicator for landing in military conditions.

Jump height

From what height do paratroopers usually jump with a parachute? The height of the jump depends on the type of parachute and the aircraft used for landing. The recommended optimal landing altitude is 800-1000 meters above the ground. This indicator is convenient in combat conditions, since at this altitude the aircraft is less exposed to fire. At the same time, the air is not too thin for the paratrooper to land.

From what height do paratroopers usually jump in non-training situations? The deployment of the D-5 or D-6 parachute when landing from an IL-76 occurs at an altitude of 600 meters. The usual distance required for full deployment is 200 meters. That is, if the landing begins at a height of 1200, then the deployment will occur at around 1000. The maximum permissible during landing is 2000 meters.

More advanced models of parachutes allow you to start landing from a level of several thousand meters. Thus, the modern D-10 model allows landing at a maximum altitude of no more than 4000 m above the ground. In this case, the minimum permissible level for deployment is 200. It is recommended to start deployment earlier to reduce the likelihood of injury and a hard landing.

Types of parachutes

Since the 1990s, Russia has used two main types of landing parachutes: D-5 and D-6. The first is the simplest and does not allow you to adjust the landing location. How many lines does a paratrooper's parachute have? Depends on the model. The sling in D-5 is 28, the ends are fixed, which is why it is impossible to adjust the direction of flight. The length of the slings is 9 meters. The weight of one set is about 15 kg.

A more advanced model of the D-5 is the D-6 paratrooper's parachute. In it, the ends of the lines can be released and the threads can be pulled, adjusting the direction of flight. To turn left, you need to pull the lines on the left, to maneuver to the right side, pull the thread on the right. The area of ​​the parachute dome is the same as that of the D-5 (83 square meters). The weight of the kit is reduced - only 11 kilograms, it is most convenient for paratroopers still in training, but already trained. During training, about 5 jumps are made (with express courses), D-6 is recommended to be issued after the first or second. There are 30 rafters in the set, four of which allow you to control the parachute.

D-10 kits have been developed for complete beginners; this is an updated version, which only recently became available to the army. There are more rafters here: 26 main and 24 additional. Of the 26 stops, 4 allow you to control the system, their length is 7 meters, and the remaining 22 are 4 meters. It turns out that there are only 22 external additional lines and 24 internal additional ones. Such a number of cords (all of them are made of nylon) allow maximum flight control and course correction during disembarkation. The dome area of ​​D-10 is as much as 100 square meters. At the same time, the dome is made in the shape of a squash, a convenient green color without a pattern, so that after the landing of the paratrooper it would be more difficult to detect.

Rules for deplaning

Paratroopers disembark from the cabin into in a certain order. In IL-76 this happens in several threads. For disembarkation there are two side doors and a ramp. At educational activities prefer to use side doors exclusively. Disembarkation can be carried out:

• in one stream of two doors (with a minimum of personnel);
• in two streams from two doors (with an average number of paratroopers);
• three or four streams of two doors (for large-scale training activities);
• in two streams both from the ramp and from the doors (during combat operations).

The distribution into streams is done so that the jumpers do not collide with each other when landing and cannot get caught. There is a small delay between threads, usually several tens of seconds.

Mechanism of flight and parachute deployment

After landing, the paratrooper must calculate 5 seconds. It cannot be considered a standard method: “1, 2, 3...”. It will turn out too quickly, the real 5 seconds will not pass yet. It’s better to count like this: “121, 122...”. Nowadays the most commonly used counting is starting from 500: “501, 502, 503...”.

Immediately after the jump, the stabilizing parachute automatically opens (the stages of its deployment can be seen in the video). This is a small dome that prevents the paratrooper from spinning while falling. Stabilization prevents flips in the air, in which a person begins to fly upside down (this position does not allow the parachute to open).

After five seconds, stabilization is completely removed, and the main dome must be activated. This is done either using a ring or automatically. A good paratrooper must be able to adjust the opening of the parachute himself, which is why trained students are given kits with a ring. After activating the ring, the main dome opens completely within 200 meters of fall. The duties of a trained paratrooper paratrooper include camouflage after landing.

Safety rules: how to protect troops from injury

Parachutes require special treatment and care to ensure that jumps using them are as safe as possible. Immediately after use, the parachute must be folded correctly, otherwise its service life will be sharply reduced. An incorrectly folded parachute may not function during landing, resulting in death.

• Before landing, check the stabilization parachute;
• check other equipment;
• remember all the disembarkation rules, calm down by using an oxygen mask;
• don’t forget about the five second rule;
• ensure uniform landing of troops in several streams to reduce the risk of collisions.

It is imperative to take into account the weight of the jumper. All parachute models can withstand no more than 150 kg. Moreover, when jumping with a weight of up to 140, they can be used 80 times, but if the load is 150, then only 10, after which the parachute goes to waste. The weight must be calculated from the sum of the paratrooper itself and the weight of the kit. The new D-10 weighs 15 kg, like the D-5, but the D-6 weighs 11 kg.

• “Of the five thousand residents of Rostov celebrating Airborne Forces Day, only one and a half thousand actually served in the airborne forces”
  

Today is Airborne Forces Day!

Airborne Forces Day!

Day of the Paratroopers or “Landing Forces”!

Of course, every year, the “Landing Forces” are becoming quieter. Grandiose fights and showdowns with the “Watermelon” mafia in the markets are slowly becoming a thing of the past. Still, our country is becoming more and more tough on all kinds of lawlessness, on the one hand, on the other hand, we are fighting in some places around the world. And it has long been noticed that if the country’s Army leads real fighting, fewer people bathe in fountains and go to protest rallies.

Therefore, the question is always relevant: how to distinguish a real paratrooper from one who simply puts on a vest and takes it, or maybe even wears a “Throwaway” tattoo, drinks in the fountain and tells army stories.

By the way, this is what distinguishes Muscovites. Anyone who served in the Airborne Forces knows that rotten soldiers are more often found among those drafted from Moscow...

Of course not all, there are many excellent fighters among the guys from Moscow. I myself had a “friend” from the Capital in the army.

But honestly, everyone knows that among the residents of Moscow there are “not very good comrades”, more than from the outskirts of the country...

In our company there was a “Muscovite”, the only communist among the soldiers. By the way, he was sent to the army after “shar” (shar or sharatsya is another slang expression in the army and airborne forces) in civilian life. He was the released secretary of the Komsomol, I don’t remember where. There was a delay, but he got pregnant and was sent to serve in the elite troops. I'm sure he bathes in the fountain and drinks in a beret and vest.

But for every real paratrooper there are several fake ones. So let's start learning to identify the deceiver. I will give below a few questions and some detailed answers to these questions.

Knowing the answers to these questions, you can identify a fake “Landing”!

1. Where did you serve?

The answer to the Airborne Forces or DShB does not work, just like the DMB (this is demobilization!). As well as the place of service, such as Pskov, Ryazan, and so on. Maybe he's heard enough army tales from his older brother or neighbor. By the way, addition, in the military camp of the airborne unit there may even be construction battalions. For example in Pskov. If anyone remembers, soldiers from the construction battalion went to the photographer and took photos in a “demobilization parade with axels” and a blue beret. They sent us home and boldly told us that they were serving in the Airborne Forces. Of course they did it secretly. The construction battalions were not very fond of landings. In Pskov, there was a garrison lip (gaubwatch), this is a place where soldiers and officers are detained for minor and major violations of military discipline. The lip was guarded by the guard of the Pskov division

2. Part number?

Each military unit has a number. The unit number is hammered into the soldier's head. As well as the number of the machine gun and military ID. I served almost 30 years ago and still remember.

3. What is the VUS?

VUS, this military registration specialty is written on the Military ID. If such a Landing is shown to you by his military officer, then looking at his VUS, you will understand who he really is. “Military specialty (MRS) is an indication of the military specialty of an active or reserve service member of the Russian Armed Forces and other troops and formations. Information about the military service is entered into the military ID. All VUS are divided into groups; the VUS designation itself is a multi-digit number (for example, VUS-250400).

Possible list of military specialties

Apparently, there are no open sources containing decryption of the codes of all currently operating VUS: the VUS catalog is a document of the Russian Ministry of Defense with the secrecy level “Secret”.

The first three digits of the VUS for warrant officers, sergeants, foremen and soldiers indicate specialization (VUS code), for example:

100 - rifle
101 - snipers
102 - grenade launchers
106 - military reconnaissance
107 - units and units of the Special Forces
122 - BMD
461 - HF radio stations
998 - without military training, fit for military service
999 - the same thing, only LIMITEDLY fit for military service, etc.

The following three digits indicate the position (position code):

97 - ZKV
182 - KO
259 - MV
001 - battery operator, etc.

The letter at the end indicates “special characteristics of the service”:

A - having none
B - missile weapons specialists
D - Airborne Forces
K - crew of surface ships
M - MP
P - V.v.
R - PV (FPS)
S - Ministry of Emergency Situations (?)
T - construction parts and divisions
F - SpN, etc.
E - Flight personnel for warrant officers, sergeants, soldiers

4. How many times did you jump? Usually you will hear mind-boggling numbers of 30-40-50, or maybe 100 jumps. “The annual norm for a conscript soldier is 12 jumps, 6 in each training period. In general, parachute training is required condition services in the Airborne Forces. Everyone is parachuted - from the general to the private" - interview with Shamanov. For those who don’t know, Vladimir Shamanov is the Airborne Forces Commander and Colonel General. Even in the USSR, jumping more than 20 times during military service was problematic. Because the soldier went on guard duty (this is when a man with a gun buries “Guba”, warehouses and parks with equipment), went on duty in the park (where the equipment is located), and finally on duty in the dining room (where he peeled potatoes, set the table and washed the dishes), stood “on the bedside table” (company duty), and so on... In the army there was self-service, the soldier did everything himself and no one freed him to make the jump. Of course, there were sports companies in the army. These are free units where soldiers mainly train and perform for the unit. For example, where I served, there was a “squadron”. Conscripts were skydiver athletes who did nothing but jump and compete. But this is a separate caste, they even wore a unique uniform, officer’s greatcoats and shoulder straps of conscripts. The beginnings of a contract army. I'm not talking about contract sergeants and warrant officers. They were already professional soldiers then. But an ordinary paratrooper did not jump very much. Just like now. Only “for demobilization” could they buy “nausea” ( Chest sign skydiver in the form of a canopy with a pendant in the form of numbers according to the number of jumps) with a large number of jumps.

5. Did you jump in combat? Many fake paratroopers do not know that the Airborne Forces and special forces in every possible way can jump in several options.

I will give the simplest ones:

Without weapons and RD (Paratrooper's Backpack)

With taxiway and weapon in transport position. An assault rifle, SVD and even an RPG, in a special transport case, are “screwed” behind the back of the dashing landing force.

With taxiway and main body (Cargo Container)

With a combat weapon, on the chest under the chest strap of the harness. Allows you to fire while descending by parachute, straight from the sky.

Then there are night ones, in the forest, on the water, at high altitudes, and so on. Only no one jumps inside the equipment, although this option was developed for war. The son of the legendary founder of the Airborne Forces Vasily Margelov, Alexander Margelov, made a parachute jump inside a BMD-1 back in 1973. For this feat, he was awarded the title of Hero of Russia, 20 years later... Since then, more than 110 people have jumped inside the equipment, but these are testers. An ordinary paratrooper who tells you about this is simply pi....!

6. Have you jumped with the ISS? For reference, the ISS is a Multidome system for landing equipment, for example the ISS-5-760. A person simply cannot jump with this crap. But I met Landing Forces who claimed that they jumped with it... In the Airborne Forces they jump mainly with parachutes: D-1-8 is the oldest parachute, created back in 1959. This parachute has the main advantage, the canopy cover clings through an extension halyard to an airplane or helicopter. The paratrooper doesn't even have a ring. They took me to the hatch and gave me a kick in the ass. Then everything works automatically without any devices. This is the perfect parachute for your first jump. 300% guarantee, the main thing is not to twist the slings during installation. D-1-5U is the oldest controlled parachute. D-6 and all its modifications. You have seen this dome in most films about the Airborne Forces. The paratroopers fly for some time on a stabilizing small canopy. The same canopy extends the main canopy of the parachute if you pull the ring or when a belay device like PPK-U is triggered. PPK-U - Semi-automatic Parachute Combined Unified (device) - designed to deploy the parachute pack (after a certain period of time at a certain altitude). Now they are planning to supply the D-10 to the troops. PSN - Parachute Special Purpose. I jumped with PSN-71, it is more controllable. It has rolls for better handling (which we were forbidden to unlock) and locks on suspension system. When landing, you can immediately unfasten the canopy. For example, in the wind, when jumping into water or in battle. Created for the GRU Spetsnaz and Airborne reconnaissance companies. Software - Planning Shell. These are the same rectangular “wings” or “mattresses” on which all athletes now jump. From PO-9, from the times of the USSR, to modern PO-16, PO-17 and the famous “Crossbows”. A conscript has never jumped with such canopies!

7. And finally, what is “Razor - Smile”? Or did they shave you with a smile? This is a flexible pin from the same PPK-U device. In the Airborne Forces and among civilian paratroopers, the most fashionable keychain and souvenir. On the neck, on the keys and so on. When straightened, the hairpin specifically catches the hairs, no worse than an epilator. In the army it is used to punish careless soldiers, and just for fun. Airborne humor, I shaved with a smile. Did they shave you with a smile? Only understandable to paratroopers.

In principle, there is still a lot of information that only those who served in the Airborne Forces can know. But I think that what I wrote will be enough to identify the fake paratroopers who disgrace the glorious name of Uncle Vasya’s Troops. Vasily Margelov is the founder of the Airborne Forces and the father of all paratroopers!

Happy Airborne Forces Day to all real paratroopers!
Nobody except us!

I work as a fitness instructor. I have professional education and 25 years of coaching experience. I help people lose weight or gain muscle while staying healthy. I conduct training via the Internet or at the Mamba fitness club in Rostov-on-Don.

Parachute and airborne troops

As a result of the experience of the Second World War, views on the offensive value of large airborne operations began to be characterized by greater realism. Some optimism in this regard that existed before the war was a natural result of the novelty of the matter, enthusiasm and lack of experience. “The parachute is no longer a life-saving device, it has become an offensive weapon of the future,” wrote one of the Soviet military commentators in 1930, when the first units of parachute troops were formed in the USSR. For five years, only in the Soviet Union was experimental work carried out on the training and formation of paratroopers. In 1935, the first major maneuvers of airborne troops took place in Kyiv, where military representatives of foreign states were present, before whom an airborne assault of over 1,000 people with weapons was demonstrated. In the same year, one Soviet division with all its weapons and light tanks was airlifted from Moscow to Vladivostok, a distance of more than 6,400 km. Soon after this spectacular demonstration, the end of the Soviet monopoly came when Goering created the first paratrooper units in Germany from selected soldiers of the Hermann Goering regiment. Other countries were in no hurry to organize airborne troops. The USA, Japan and Italy lagged far behind in this regard. In England, too, this matter moved extremely slowly. Only in June 1940 did Winston Churchill move forward on the issue of airborne troops. "We must have an airborne force of at least 5,000 men...please send me a War Department memorandum on this subject." So he wrote to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, and after about a month the issue was resolved.

By this time, the airborne troops had already had some successes, although they had to deal with a weak and small enemy. Even before the outbreak of World War II, airborne troops were used to capture bridgeheads, important bridges and road junctions. This was in 1939, when Germany occupied part of Czechoslovakia and when the USSR annexed Bessarabia that same year. These operations were only slightly more serious than maneuvers and did not test the combat qualities of the airborne troops. When did the second one start? World War, the airborne troops had their first important tactical success in the Norwegian campaign. The Germans dropped parachute troops near the airfields of Stavanger and Oslo. The purpose of these landings was to capture airfields necessary for the landing of airborne troops and the operations of German Air Force units. This goal was achieved, and within about 24 hours, fuel, air bombs, airfield equipment, and anti-aircraft guns were airlifted to these airfields. German aviation began its operations from both airfields. However, many paratroopers landed outside the drop zones and were injured. During this operation there were great difficulties with the collection of troops on the ground and with the organization of communications; The Germans were simply lucky that the Norwegians in the area offered almost no resistance.

Airborne operations in Norway did not answer basic questions. What is the actual striking force of airborne troops? What quantity is best to use? How long are they able to resist strong and weak opponents? How decisive can their actions be in attack or offensive? A study of the major airborne operations conducted during World War II does not provide a clear answer to all of these questions; but it helps to clarify some of the advantages and disadvantages of airborne troops that may become apparent when they are used en masse.

When the Germans planned a major airborne landing on the Dutch Walhaven airfield near Rotterdam as a prelude to the attack on Belgium, France and Holland on May 10, 1940, they did not imagine that the Dutch would give up resistance within less than a week, and that the Belgians would follow. For the German Air Force at that time, it was important to capture forward air bases as quickly as possible to ensure the invasion of France, since their close air support aircraft - Messerschmitt 109 fighters and Junkers 87 dive bombers - had a range of only 175 km. This meant that air units had to quickly move forward, following the advance of their tank divisions. What did the above-mentioned paratroopers and airborne troops who landed near Rotterdam achieve in order to capture the Walhaven airfield, which was assigned an important role in the German plan? The 2,000 paratroopers who took part in the operation learned how vulnerable they were to attack by ground forces. At one point, the Dutch infantry managed to recapture this airfield from the Germans. The Germans suffered heavy casualties and, although the Allied forces were in retreat at the time, over 100 German prisoners were captured and taken to England for interrogation. Considering this airborne operation as a whole, it is difficult to justify its conduct. If the Allies had resisted to the fullest extent of their strength, the airborne troops would not have been able to keep the airfield in their hands. But Allied ground resistance was so weak that the Germans would have captured the airfield within two or three days anyway.

It is important to note that during the subsequent rapid German advances into France in 1940, Russia in 1941, or Africa in 1942, airborne troops were never used to capture airfields located a short distance ahead of the advancing troops. It was quite natural that when the parachute troops were still an experimental branch of the army, such an authoritative figure as General Student, commander of the German paratroopers, wanted to quickly introduce his troops into the German army.

It is difficult to imagine how airborne troops would cope in the future with such a task as the capture of Walhaven in May 1940.

Italian airborne troops also launched an unsuccessful attack on an airfield in Libya in 1942, but this was based more on the desire to show off their airborne forces than on the desire to use them as an auxiliary force in the general military plan. The use of airborne troops to capture any island on which there is or may be established an important air base, of course, presents a completely different problem. It may become the main combat mission of airborne troops in the future.

Yet the first major operation of its kind, carried out during the Second World War, raised great doubts when its results were analyzed from a military point of view. The German airborne landing on Crete can be seen as a strategic mistake. The German military campaign in the Balkans in the spring of 1941 was lightning fast. If there are air bases on the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, in Italy and Greece on the island. Rhodes and, of course, North Africa Germany's air and naval forces could establish dominance in the Mediterranean without capturing Crete. They lacked the air power, not the air bases, to capture Malta and support Rommel's corps in Africa. Before landing an airborne assault on Crete, the Germans used large forces of glider landing troops for the first time on April 26, 1941 to capture the Isthmus of Corinth and the city of Corinth. Landing troops on gliders were also used for experimental purposes in the summer of 1940 to capture the Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael. But during the capture of Corinth, as well as later during the capture of Crete, there were many accidents among the landing troops transported by gliders. It is quite clear that after the summer of 1941 the Germans used gliders only for transporting goods.

The airborne landing on Crete did not give the Germans any great advantages strategically. When the Axis countries sent their convoys to support the Cretan operation, the latter were virtually destroyed by the British fleet. Therefore, an airborne landing was necessary to capture the island. But if the Germans had left Crete in the hands of the Allies, wouldn't the British navy and air force have had to carry out additional defense and supply tasks, which would have led to increased losses for England and the British Commonwealth of Nations in the Mediterranean theater of operations? The British Navy would have to fight a difficult battle with large air forces based in the Athens area, as was shown by the large losses of the fleet during the operation to capture the island. Crete.

Perhaps even more important The Cretan operation was intended to implement the “Barbarossa plan” - a German attack on the USSR. The landing operation on Crete tied down about 500 German transport aircraft for several months, which were essential for transporting troops during the attack on the USSR. Moreover, some transport aviation units suffered heavy losses during the capture of Crete, so that in June 1941 they were understaffed and insufficiently ready for action. This took place precisely at a time when the German Air Force needed maximum mobility. Moreover, the Germans were forced to use about one third of the fighter and bomber aircraft units intended for use against Russia during the capture of Crete. Instead of resting them and preparing them for an attack on Russia, they had to be transferred to air bases in Poland and East Prussia. This happened several weeks before the attack began. Many of the crews involved in the intensive operations to capture Crete were fatigued, and the squadrons had low combat readiness. The operation to capture Crete not only delayed the German attack on the USSR, but significantly reduced the striking power of the German Air Force, which was the vanguard of its armed forces.

If the strategic significance of the airborne operation to capture Crete was questionable, then from an operational point of view, despite the German victory, the operation turned out to be disastrous. Theoretically, the conditions for an airborne operation were almost ideal.

Aviation opposition was suppressed, air defense turned out to be weak, and the defenders had only a few light tanks. They had poor communications and few means of transportation. The Germans dropped two or three thousand paratroopers in the areas of three airfields - Maleme, Retimo and Heraklion. In two drop zones, paratroopers were destroyed after landing. Even at Maleme airfield they were nearly defeated by two battalions of New Zealand troops; but they managed to hold out in the area, and since nothing prevented the Germans from delivering reinforcements by air, the victory of the airborne troops was assured. But the victory was not easy for the Germans: they suffered heavy losses in manpower and aircraft. Germany never again carried out major airborne operations, although there were many moments when the Germans were well placed to carry them out. The Germans did not carry out an airborne landing operation on Malta, nor did they use airborne troops against the USSR. There is no doubt that in 1940 and 1941 the Germans realized how inappropriate it was to use large forces of airborne troops, since they were very vulnerable and suffered heavy losses, especially in transport aircraft. Not surprisingly, Hitler wanted to expand production of transport aircraft, even at the expense of reducing fighter production. Since the main goal of German strategy in the spring of 1941 was the defeat of Russia, it is difficult to judge what impact the airborne landing on Crete had on the German successes. The island of Crete was not a decisive stronghold for Axis operations in the Mediterranean, since the British naval forces in this area could be increased to their maximum size.

The strategic background of the Allied airborne landings at Arnhem in September 1944 was, of course, completely different. This time, airborne troops played an important role in the Anglo-American military plans, which included ending the war as soon as possible. In August 1944, the German army was retreating to Flanders and through France to the Siegfried Line at a pace that it had not advanced to the west in the summer of 1940.

The task of the Anglo-Americans was to ensure rapid advance to the Meuse and the Rhine, but due to difficulties in delivering fuel, food, ammunition and other supplies to the advancing troops from the Normandy landing beachheads, the number of advanced units was reduced, and they turned into small tank patrols. Important role in these conditions, a quick crossing of the Rhine could have played a role. General Montgomery's plan was to seize the crossings of the lower Rhine with the help of airborne troops and, with the help of his northern army group, to develop an offensive through the North German Plain to Berlin. To accomplish this task, it was necessary to place at his disposal most of the available vehicles and equipment, and this meant dooming the American troops west of the Rhine to inaction. However, Eisenhower refused to consider this plan. The Allied plan of action for this decisive stage of the war was adopted in Brussels on 10 September. The airborne troops were to capture bridgehead positions on the Meuse, Waal and Rhine rivers, and then, instead of advancing into Germany, Montgomery was to liberate Antwerp by capturing Fr. Walcheren and the destruction of German troops on the banks of the Scheldt.

But even this plan turned out to be too pretentious. The detailed plan developed by the First Allied Airborne Army at Airborne Forces Headquarters was also not very successful. General Brereton's officers hurriedly assembled at headquarters near Ascot Racecourse in southern England. During the first two or three weeks of its existence, the headquarters drew up a plan to drop parachute and landing units on the other side of the Seine and Somme rivers, but this plan was disrupted by the rapid advance of troops. General Eisenhower made a belated decision to support Montgomery's plan to cross the lower Rhine, Meuse and Waal using bridgeheads captured by airborne troops. There was little time left for intensive reconnaissance of the release zones, nor was there enough time for detailed planning, which is a necessary condition conducting a major airborne operation. The Germans planned the landing operation on Crete many months in advance. Allied Airborne Headquarters postponed drawing up detailed plans for the last week before the start of the operation. In mid-September, three airborne divisions, two American and one British, supported by a Polish brigade, were to be dropped along a line running through Dutch territory from Eindhoven to Arnhem.

On September 17, about 750 transport aircraft and gliders took off, and from the very beginning the landing was a success. The gunners completed their mission almost 100 percent. Anti-aircraft artillery and enemy fighters shot down less than 2 percent of aircraft and gliders. In the Eindhoven area, close to the advancing British troops, an American airborne division dropped out, which a few hours later linked up with the ground forces. It is highly doubtful whether it was necessary to drop an entire airborne division into this area. Perhaps one battalion would be enough. It would be more expedient to use the rest of the division to carry out diversionary actions near the German borders in Nijmegen or Arnhem. The Second American Airborne Division occupied a strong bridgehead in Nijmegen, but an important bridge over the river. Baal remained in German hands for two decisive days, which delayed the connection of the landing force with the troops in Arnhem. The plan was not carried out for reasons that are common to all major airborne operations. The reconnaissance was poorly done. Both British and American intelligence underestimated the Germans' ability to reorganize their badly battered tank units in a timely manner. The Allied airborne forces suddenly found themselves facing the main forces of two tank divisions, which had more tanks than expected. Couldn't this mistake be repeated during major airborne operations? Thus, a small group of enemy tanks can easily destroy the forward echelon of an airborne assault force. It is true that modern transport aircraft can drop heavier tanks and guns than during the Second World War, but the difficulty of supplying ammunition and fuel, as well as organizing radio communications in the first twenty-four hours after a drop, will almost always allow defending tanks to maintain a local tactical advantage. In modern mobile warfare, it will be almost impossible to accurately determine in advance the number of enemy tanks in the areas of drop zones.

Bad weather hampered the delivery of supplies and also delayed the arrival of the Polish brigade in Arnhem for reinforcements. In other areas and at other times of the year, you might be able to pick three or four days of good weather. But good weather favors the actions of enemy artillery and aircraft, exposing them to targets in the landing zones. During the landing at Arnhem the weather was bad; In northwestern Europe in September it is rare to expect good flying weather for three days in a row. A more important issue is the organization of communication. During the decisive period of hostilities, the headquarters of the Allied airborne army, located in southern England, had no contact with the British airborne division dropped near Arnhem. Communication is almost always weak point during large airborne operations. How can communications units be expected to operate successfully in initial period landing after the first losses, when there is general confusion, when fighters and equipment are scattered in the drop zones? The Germans encountered this difficulty during the airborne landings on Crete. The Russians, too, as a result of small battalion-sized landings in the Don basin and Crimea in 1943 and 1944, found this problem virtually insoluble.

General Guingan, one of the main participants in drawing up the plan to capture Arnhem, pointed out in his book Operation Victory that due to a lack of aircraft it was impossible to completely airlift the 1st Airborne Division in less than two days. Therefore, on the first day, the Germans were able to locate the Allies and attack them at a time when only half of the landing force had been dropped. It can be doubted that at any time in the future it will be possible to assemble a sufficient number of transport aircraft for a major airborne operation. In the age of the atomic and hydrogen bomb, even more transport aircraft and helicopters will be needed than before for anti-submarine warfare, civil defense, army support, and as a reserve vehicle for urgent military transcontinental transport. One sometimes reads about the huge number of airborne troops in the USSR and its allies, amounting to many hundreds of thousands of fighters, but the Communists, having vast areas, many of which have an underdeveloped railway network, would apparently never be able to provide 1000 or even 500 aircraft for a major airborne operation. Most likely they will limit themselves to landing small airborne assault forces of up to a battalion. The Russians will also dump partisans and saboteurs who successfully acted against the Germans on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. The partisans' actions against airfields in the occupied territory were so successful that the German command was forced to strengthen their security. This was at a time when the German army was already short of soldiers. In the event of war, the Communists would be able to carry out similar operations against airfields and possibly against major bomb depots.

In light of the already known vulnerability of the landing force at that time and the uncertainty in the outcome of large airborne operations, the Arnhem operation seems too pretentious. According to the plan, the advance detachment of paratroopers was supposed to hold Arnhem for about three days, until the British second army, advancing from Antwerp through Eindhoven, Grave, Nijmegen, came into contact with the paratroopers. Three airborne divisions were to capture and hold three important bridges. The troops held out in Arnhem for more than a week, although the failure of the operation was obvious by the end of the third day. Due to a communications breakdown, only 10 percent of the supplies dropped from the planes ended up in the hands of friendly troops. Such failures are possible in the future, but not with such a catastrophic outcome.

The reasons for the failure of the airborne operation in Arnhem will be mentioned again and again in military annals. They consist of poor intelligence, poor communications, a lack of transport facilities and the general vulnerability of the airborne forces. It would be unfair to the Red Devils, who were part of the British airborne forces, to treat the assessment of their exceptional heroism and courage with purely military dogmatism. For nine terrible days after September 17, 1944, they had to endure enemy fire, thirst, hunger and uncertainty. The troops were accompanied by doctors who shared with them all the hardships of front-line life: wounds, death and captivity. The Dutch population did everything possible to feed the paratroopers and provide shelter for the dying. The paratroopers were people capable of carrying out the most daring plan, but too much was demanded of them.

It should be noted that the next major Allied airborne operation in Europe was more modest in scale and carried out more carefully. In the spring of 1945, two airborne divisions were used to cross the Rhine at Wesel. It was on the morning of March 24, 1945. This time, using the British 6th and American 17th Airborne Divisions, Montgomery employed new but more conservative tactics. In Normandy and Arnhem, airborne troops were dropped, as usual, before the advance of troops. During this operation they did the opposite. The night before, the advancing troops crossed the Rhine on special ships, and tanks were transported with them in the first echelons. At 10 a.m. the next day, paratroopers were dropped in an area just outside the firing range of their artillery. Thus, the main forces were able to provide immediate support to the airborne troops before the Germans could bring up their forces. For twenty-four hours, the strip separating the airborne troops from the main forces was impregnable, and all the main objects in the drop zone were captured and held. The operation at Wesel, although significant in scale, turned out to be very modest in tactical terms. The enemy was able to offer only minor resistance in the air, and the airborne troops could quickly link up with the main forces.

A similar general tactical situation developed in almost all airborne operations in the Pacific theater of military operations. In the war between America and Japan there were no airborne operations similar to those in Crete or the Arnhem area. The geographical location of the Pacific theater of operations and the conditions of logistics there were, of course, completely different, not comparable to the European theater. For example, during the New Guinea campaign in 1943, American airborne forces were successful, but they were used on a limited scale and in the face of very little opposition from Japanese aircraft and ground forces. In September 1943, an American airborne regiment, along with a small detachment of Australian paratroopers, was dropped at Nazdab. They were closely supported by a battalion of Australian ground forces, which had already crossed the Markham River and was within gunshot of the ejected parachute detachment. The latter, with a strength of about 1,700 people, was essentially a reconnaissance landing, since it did not capture any important objects or bridgeheads and was mainly engaged in reconnaissance. On another occasion during the same campaign, some 1,400 American paratroopers participated in part of the plan to capture Salamoa and Lae. The airborne assault had to be dropped on the airfield. This was successful, although many paratroopers were injured; The enemy resistance here was so weak that one battalion of airborne troops, which was planned to be dropped by parachute, landed at the airfield after the plane landed. In both of these 1943 operations in New Guinea, airborne troops were used as local reinforcements rather than as the vanguard of an attack. In the future, such actions may be one of the most important tasks of airborne troops.

There is no doubt that the airborne troops played a decisive role in the victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad. In the summer of 1942, the General Staff of the Soviet Army completely incorrectly determined the direction of the main German attack. The Russians believed that the main attack would be directed against Moscow, but instead an attack was launched on Voronezh and Stalingrad. At that time, Soviet airborne divisions were concentrated east of Moscow. At the beginning of 1942, they took part in the battles near Leningrad and Smolensk, as well as in the Donetsk basin. In August 1942, Stalin was forced to radically revise his plan and carry out organizational changes, since the Germans threatened Stalingrad, the city that bore his name. He reorganized the airborne troops into infantry, artillery and armored guard divisions and rushed them south to stop the advancing German army. Large forces of long-range bomber aircraft and as many transport air units as possible participated in the transfer of former airborne troops who still wore their former insignia. They were mercilessly thrown into the battle of Stalingrad, and it brought success; they played a decisive role in the glorious victory, which went down in world history.

Of course, long before the Battle of Stalingrad, the German high command used the airborne troops of General Student (7th Aviation Corps) to eliminate the crisis on the Soviet-German front. During the Battle of Stalingrad, General Ramcke's parachute units were busy fighting in North Africa, covering Rommel's withdrawal from El Alamein at the end of 1942. Later, General Ramke's airborne units continued to successfully participate in ground forces in Sicily, Italy and France in 1943 and 1944. It is necessary to note the tenacity of these units during the defense of the Brest fortress in 1944.

After the Battle of Stalingrad, large numbers of former Soviet airborne troops acted as infantry as part of the ground forces fighting in the north at Demyansk and Staraya Russa, in the center - near Kursk and Orel and in the south - in major battles of the Soviet Army, during which Donbass and most of Ukraine were returned. By the end of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front for the use of airborne troops to support the advance of the Soviet Army was ideal. It was clear to the Soviet high command that the enemy could no longer launch a serious and major counteroffensive. Ahead were rivers and German lines of communication, beckoning Soviet paratroopers. Along the banks of the Volkhov, Lovat and Dnieper, and later the Oder, Prut, Bug, Dniester, Berezina, Vistula and other rivers, German troops held very fragile positions. They were withdrawing more and more fighters and anti-aircraft artillery units from their Eastern Front for the defense of Germany, which could counter the low-speed transport-landing aircraft and gliders. But almost all of the former airborne troops of the Soviet Army continued to operate as part of the ground forces. In fact, if one were able to look into the complete statistics of the Second World War (which, of course, never will be), one would find that at least 3/4 of all battles were carried out by German airborne units , Russia, Japan, Italy, England and America, were routine ground battles and that in most cases airborne troops were not transported to combat areas by air.

However, the Soviet command in the combined landing operation in Crimea in April 1944 used parachute troops in moderate numbers. The use of airborne troops as a forward echelon, with the goal of capturing or maintaining a bridgehead on the enemy’s coast, will remain in the future the main type of combat operations of airborne troops. Sometimes meteorological conditions make airborne operations very difficult; Thus, gliders and airplanes when flying through water can encounter great difficulties due to strong winds. A similar incident occurred in February 1945, during the American airborne landing on the island. Corregidor. About 2,000 American paratroopers were dropped in a small coastal area to support the amphibious landing at San Jose in the Philippines. This operation was extremely risky, as strong winds blew and there were dangerous rocks in the drop zone. However, the losses were only 10 percent, that is, half of the expected losses. Airborne troops bypassed Japanese fortifications at the most crucial moment of the campaign. General MacArthur, pleased with the success of the airborne troops, said: “The operation to capture Corregidor Island is clear proof that the days of permanent fortresses are over.” This bold statement may have been made partly under the influence of the initial successes of American airborne forces in the same Philippine campaign, which had great importance personally for General MacArthur. During the American offensive in the southern part of the island. Luzon, a month before the landing on the coast of Corregidor, troops of the US 11th Airborne Division captured an important crossroads. However, this landing was small - up to a regiment in strength. The commander, aware of the difficulties of the operation, did not want his regiment to be thrown more than a day's march from the main forces. His predictions of difficulties came true. The alarm system that ensured the drop was broken, and more than half of the paratroopers landed outside the intended zone. But important objects were nevertheless captured, and this operation contributed to the rapid advance of troops to the capital of the Philippines, Manila.

The airborne landings in Sicily in July 1943 to support the Anglo-American invasion demonstrated that strong high-altitude winds and other unforeseen bad weather conditions could disrupt a major airborne operation involving paratroopers and gliders. The inexperience of tow plane pilots and glider pilots also had an impact bad influence to perform this operation. A strong southeast wind, sometimes turning into a storm, knocked most of the planes and gliders off course. Several gliders unhooked from the towing aircraft ahead of time, and more than 50 gliders sank into the sea five to six kilometers from the coast. Some gliders and paratroopers landed 60 km from the intended drop zone. American and British paratroopers were scattered in small groups between Licata and Noto and were forced to fight almost independently. But despite this, important local success was achieved. A group of paratroopers, delivered on gliders, captured one of the important objects - the Ponte Grande bridge, which was the key to the advance of troops to the port of Syracuse.

Airborne troops on the island. Sicily encountered the usual difficulties characteristic of this type of operation: difficulties in landing, collecting after landing and finding dropped equipment. They suffered not only from the wind and other weather conditions, but also from the fire of their anti-aircraft artillery. Anti-aircraft fire caused casualties in personnel and disabled many aircraft and gliders, which lost their course in the darkness. Shortly before the Allied landings, the Germans also dropped paratroopers in some areas to strengthen their garrisons. This further complicated the situation. In the darkness, unexpected curious collisions occurred between paratroopers of both sides.

The failures of the airborne troops over the dusty olive orchards of Sicily in July 1943, and over the fields of Algeria and Tunisia in November 1942, were not to be repeated on the day of the Normandy invasion in the summer of 1944, when the airborne troops led Operation Overlord. . The lessons of previous failures were taken into account. The troops were transported by plane exactly to the designated areas, losses were insignificant, and all the main tasks assigned to the airborne troops were completed. The glider landing force was especially successful, with the task of capturing bridges across the river. Orne and the Caen Canal. The bridges were captured quickly and without damage and were held for several hours until the landing and arrival of the amphibious forces.

Both British and American airborne forces had great success in helping the troops establish a beachhead in Normandy in the early days of the invasion. They fought against snipers, artillery, tanks and repelled local counterattacks. American airborne troops suffered heavy losses while closing the gap between the two sections of the American beachhead, although losses during the drop itself were very minor. The results achieved on the day of the invasion fully confirmed the feasibility of the massive use of airborne troops in the general plan of the amphibious landing operation. These actions would serve as a model for future airborne assaults. But despite the great success of these operations, after reading the official data on the fighting, it is difficult to escape the feeling that even in this case the chances of success or failure were about the same. Some confusion after an airborne landing seems inevitable, and the strength of enemy resistance in the landing areas cannot be determined in advance.

One of the most original plans for the use of airborne troops was the plan of General Wingate during the military operations in Burma in the spring of 1944. The so-called “long-range penetration groups” had previously operated behind the front line with the aim of disrupting Japanese communications in Burma. But in the spring of 1944, a special air group was formed, which was supposed to carry out the tasks of dropping, supplying and evacuating General Wingate’s paratroopers. This group had over 200 gliders, several helicopters, fighters, medium bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and about 25 transport aircraft. Despite the fact that in the end about 10 thousand selected fighters were airlifted to areas west and north of Mandalay with the task of harassing the Japanese division fighting Chinese and American troops, there was a lot of turmoil and confusion during the operation itself. confusion. Troops, pack mules, artillery pieces, bulldozers, vehicles and other equipment were successfully delivered to the airstrips, imaginatively named "Broadway", "Blackpool" and "Aberdeen". During the landing at one of the sites, a serious incident could have occurred if, at the last minute, aerial photography had not been able to determine that the site was blocked by trees. The point was that, in order to ensure the secrecy of the preparation of the operation, General Wingate prohibited aerial reconnaissance over the landing areas and was ready to begin the operation without knowing the condition of the airfields planned for landing. Airborne operations without intensive preliminary reconnaissance are fraught with serious consequences.

As the gliders took off for flight to the Broadway landing pad, the tow ropes of several gliders snapped and they made emergency landings, some of them in enemy territory. The gliders that landed in the landing area first damaged their landing gear, as there were ditches and holes filled with water on the landing site. Damaged gliders could not be removed, and gliders that landed later crashed when they collided with them. Almost all the gliders that managed to fly to the Broadway site were crashed or damaged. However, more than 500 soldiers and 300 tons of important cargo were delivered here unharmed; Within 24 hours, one airstrip was cleared up, and for the next five days it was used by transport planes bringing in troops, animals, and supplies. The remaining sites were ready at the end of March. In one month, transport aircraft and gliders carried out over a thousand sorties, which ensured the transfer of about 10 thousand soldiers to carry out harassing operations against the Japanese division from deep in the rear. But this task force did not completely fulfill its assigned task, namely, it did not completely isolate the 18th Japanese Division. The disruption of the Japanese supply through actions on their communications was compensated by the British warehouses captured by the Japanese during an attack near Imphal, just at the time of the airborne landing of Wingate's group. General Wingate's special forces were evacuated by air in August; Some of the group's personnel participated in the fighting for almost six months. This operation in Burma demonstrated new way the use of airborne troops, suitable for many areas of Asia and Africa, where communications are stretched and defending troops and aircraft are highly dispersed. In such conditions, airborne troops can carry out harassing operations behind enemy lines on a large scale, as well as interact with partisans. In the future, they will even be able to destroy and capture enemy units. The actions of the airborne troops in Burma, planned and carried out in accordance with local conditions and in unusual ways, determined a new direction in the use of airborne troops in the future.

The German use of paratroopers during the Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944 was perhaps the most remarkable use of airborne troops during the Second World War. In addition to performing the usual tasks of capturing bridges and road junctions, units of German paratroopers were tasked with disorganizing the rear of American troops. The tank brigade, prepared for special tasks, was subordinate to Skorzeny, who led the group of German paratroopers that rescued Mussolini in September 1943. Operating in the Ardennes, these saboteurs and terrorists were dressed in uniforms captured from the Americans; they spoke English with a good American accent, and were well acquainted with the organization, regulations and insignia of the American army. However, few of these paratroopers saw action. Of the 106 German aircraft that were allocated to transport these paratroopers, only 35 reached the intended drop area. Strong winds contributed significantly to the disruption of the aircraft, which was already unstable due to poor navigation. Many paratroopers have been injured during landing as the terrain in the Ardennes is covered pine forests. This group of saboteurs traveled in American Jeeps and carried out sabotage missions aimed at disrupting traffic, spreading false rumors about the advance of the Germans and causing disorganization in the rear of the Allied troops. The Americans reacted quickly. They began asking each other questions about things known only to their fellow countrymen - about the composition of baseball and football teams, about the geographical features of certain areas of the United States. The Germans in American uniform could not withstand such a test and were soon captured or killed. Despite the fact that sabotage actions were in conflict with the international laws of war, they introduced a new element into the issue of the use of paratroopers, who were not aimed at capturing certain objects, but at creating panic among enemy troops and undermining them morale. It was a kind of guerrilla warfare in the rear, aimed at breaking enemy resistance in the area. It is very likely that such tactics will be used more frequently in the future. If the Anglo-American ground forces in eastern France had been supported by such actions in the summer of 1944, victory in the West might have been achieved more quickly.

The experience of using airborne troops during the Second World War makes it possible to predetermine the trends in the development of their operations in the future. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the continuously emerging new types of weapons: supersonic fighters, guided missiles, atomic bombs and atomic artillery shells. Will airborne forces be more vulnerable due to the development of these new weapons and other equipment? In general, yes. During the Second World War, the difference in flight speed between transport aircraft and towed gliders, on the one hand, and fighter aircraft, on the other, was about 320–400 km/h. Currently, this difference has become even greater and is likely to remain so in the future. The task of escorting transport aircraft flying at low speeds with high-speed fighters is the most difficult and does not look like it will become easier in the future. Guided projectiles will be more effective means against transport aircraft than radar-controlled anti-aircraft artillery fire, and a general increase in the caliber of guns on aircraft will make gliders more vulnerable to fighter fire. An atomic projectile or radio-controlled aircraft with an atomic charge can be detonated in the landing zone, and therefore it will be impossible to carry out landing operations from gliders. Improvements in radio jamming equipment mean that navigational aids and radio communications will be more susceptible to interference than before.

In what conditions can airborne troops be most successfully used? First and foremost in campaigns like those that took place in Indochina or Malaya, where the latest atomic weapons, guided missiles, supersonic fighters and radio interference were not used. But even in such conditions, airborne troops will prove to be very vulnerable if there is strong opposition at the landing sites. It is likely that airborne troops will be used in emergencies. Such a case took place in Last year wars in Indochina. In the spring of 1954, the Dien Bien Phu fortress occupied by French troops was subjected to continuous attacks by the Vietnamese and was isolated from the main forces of the French troops. Due to the lack of opposition in the air, transport aircraft were free to fly over the fortress and drop reinforcements by parachute. But due to poor meteorological conditions, the presence of minefields and barbed wire in the drop zones located in narrow valleys, as well as heavy artillery and machine gun fire, reinforcements were dropped into required quantities turned out to be impossible. There will always be a temptation to send airborne troops to the aid of a besieged garrison; but if such a garrison has no hope of connecting with the main forces of the troops, then the landing troops will be senselessly sacrificed. It should be added that transport planes evacuated the wounded from Dien Bien Phu and dropped necessary supplies for the besieged garrison, which allowed the troops to continue the fight and save their lives.

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