The dispute between Russia and Japan over the islands is unlikely to be resolved. History of the Kuril Islands

But developing islands is not profitable

Japan refused Dmitry MEDVEDEV's proposal to create a free trade zone with Russia in the Southern Kuril Islands. At the same time, Deputy Foreign Minister of Japan Takeaki MATSUMOTO emphasized that Japan considers the four islands of the Kuril chain to be its territory and the proposal Russian President does not correspond to the Japanese position.
Our political consultant Anatoly VASSERMAN explained why these islands are so important to the Japanese and why we need them.

Japan claims four islands in the southern part of the Kuril chain - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai, citing a bilateral treaty on trade and borders in 1855. We stand on the fact that the Southern Kuril Islands became part of the USSR, of which Russia became the legal successor, following the results of the Second World War. And Russian sovereignty over them cannot be doubted. But because of Khrushchev’s stupidity, we will have to chew this Japanese gum for a long time. Let me explain.
The Japanese need the Kuril Islands for two reasons.
Firstly, on the South Kuril Islands and in the ocean around them there are a lot of natural values: rare expensive metals, a damn lot of all kinds of fish and aquatic life, which our fishermen catch and immediately resell to the Japanese, without even entering the ports. For us, this living creature is of no significant value, but for the Japanese it is like daily lard for the Ukrainians. Not to mention natural resources, of which Japan basically has too few.
The second reason is prestige. Japan is very upset about losing its territories. Although America did not formally take anything away from Japan as a result of World War II, Okinawa, the largest island of the Japanese Ryukyu archipelago, turned out to be an American base for several decades and remained under US jurisdiction. We actually took away from them not only the southern part of Sakhalin, which they took from us after the Russo-Japanese War, but also the Kuril Islands - Russia left them for Japan in 1867.
In 1956, he was the first to do something stupid Nikita Khrushchev, promising to give up the island of Shikotan and a group of small Habomai islands as a carrot in front of the nose after the conclusion of a peace treaty. He repeated his promise to give up the islands subject to the signing of a peace agreement Gorbachev And Yeltsin. The Japanese clung to the unclear wording and changed the procedure: first give up the islands, and then we will sign agreements. Moreover, two more were added to the islands promised by Khrushchev - Kunashir and Iturup.
In this case, we will be deprived of the most convenient approaches to the Pacific Ocean in terms of navigation in the southern part of the Kuril ridge, which will greatly complicate the entire Pacific navigation for us. In addition, for Russia, giving up these islands is a completely catastrophic loss of prestige. Because still Suvorov developed a formula: what is taken in battle is sacred. For us, these islands are a military trophy, and the military has this sign: to give up the trophy means to be defeated in the next war.
For the Japanese, the Kuril Islands are revenge for defeat in World War II, and for us, it is confirmation that we are still a great power. Therefore, a solution to the issue is not expected in the near future.
It is also impractical to develop these islands: they are too small and are isolated from the world by storms for most of the year. It would be possible to build shift camps there for seasonal work. For example, fish processing bases, mines for the extraction of rare metals, laboratories, and create transhipment bases for goods there. But workers need infrastructure, and maintaining it is too expensive.
However, militarily, the Kuril Islands provide us with access to the Pacific Ocean and at the same time block the approach of the military forces of a potential enemy. Radar complexes are now located there, providing surveillance of the Pacific Ocean. It is extremely dangerous for us to lose them.

True fact
Until 1855, the Three Sisters (Kunashir), Citronny (Iturup), Figured (Shikotan) and Green (Habomai) were part of Russian Empire, and then, according to the Japanese-Russian treaty on trade and borders (“Shimoda Treaty”), were given to Japan. After Japan's defeat in World War II, the islands returned to the jurisdiction of the USSR.

Recently, Shinzo Abe announced that he would annex the disputed islands of the South Kuril chain to Japan. “I will solve the problem of the northern territories and conclude a peace treaty. As a politician, as a prime minister, I want to achieve this at all costs,” he promised his compatriots.

According to Japanese tradition, Shinzo Abe will have to commit hara-kiri to himself if he does not keep his word. It is quite possible that Vladimir Putin will help the Japanese prime minister live to a ripe old age and die a natural death. Photo by Alexander Vilf (Getty Images).

In my opinion, everything is heading towards the fact that the long-standing conflict will be resolved. The time for establishing decent relations with Japan has been chosen very well - for the empty, hard-to-reach lands, which their former owners now and then look nostalgically at, you can get a lot of material benefits from one of the most powerful economies in the world. And the lifting of sanctions as a condition for the transfer of the islands is far from the only and not the main concession, which, I am sure, our Foreign Ministry is now seeking.

So the quite expected surge of quasi-patriotism of our liberals, directed at the Russian president, should be prevented.

I have already had to analyze in detail the history of the islands of Tarabarov and Bolshoy Ussuriysky on the Amur, the loss of which Moscow snobs cannot come to terms with. The post also discussed a dispute with Norway over maritime territories, which was also resolved.

I also touched on the secret negotiations between human rights activist Lev Ponomarev and a Japanese diplomat about the “northern territories,” filmed and posted online. Generally speaking, this one video it is enough for our concerned citizens to bashfully swallow the return of the islands to Japan if it takes place. But since concerned citizens will definitely not remain silent, we must understand the essence of the problem.

Background

February 7, 1855— Shimoda treatise on trade and borders. The now disputed islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands were ceded to Japan (therefore, February 7 is annually celebrated in Japan as Northern Territories Day). The issue of the status of Sakhalin remained unresolved.

May 7, 1875— Petersburg Treaty. Japan was given the rights to all 18 Kuril Islands in exchange for all of Sakhalin.

August 23, 1905- Treaty of Portsmouth resultsRussian-Japanese War.Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin.

February 11, 1945 — Yalta conference. THE USSR, USA and UK reached a written agreement on the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan, subject to the return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to it after the end of the war.

February 2, 1946 based on the Yalta agreements in the USSR The Yuzhno-Sakhalin region was created - on the territory of the southern part of the island Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. On January 2, 1947 she was merged with the Sakhalin region Khabarovsk Territory, which expanded to the borders of the modern Sakhalin region.

Japan enters the Cold War

September 8, 1951 The Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan was signed in San Francisco. Regarding the currently disputed territories, it says the following: “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.”

The USSR sent a delegation to San Francisco headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko. But not in order to sign a document, but to voice my position. We formulated the mentioned clause of the agreement as follows:"Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the southern part of Sakhalin Island with all the adjacent islands and to the Kuril Islands and waives all rights, title and claims to these territories.”

Of course, in our version the agreement is specific and more in line with the spirit and letter of the Yalta agreements. However, the Anglo-American version was accepted. The USSR did not sign it, Japan did.

Today, some historians believe that The USSR had to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the form in which it was proposed by the Americans— this would strengthen our negotiating position. “We should have signed the agreement. I don’t know why we didn’t do this - perhaps because of vanity or pride, but above all, because Stalin overestimated his capabilities and the degree of his influence on the United States,” N.S. wrote in his memoirs .Khrushchev. But soon, as we will see further, he himself made a mistake.

From today's perspective, the absence of a signature on the notorious treaty is sometimes considered almost a diplomatic failure. However, the international situation at that time was much more complex and was not limited to the Far East. Perhaps what seems like a loss to someone, in those conditions became a necessary measure.

Japan and sanctions

It is sometimes mistakenly believed that since we do not have a peace treaty with Japan, then we are in a state of war. However, this is not at all true.

December 12, 1956 An exchange ceremony took place in Tokyo to mark the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. According to the document, the USSR agreed to “the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and the island of Shikotan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.”

The parties came to this formulation after several rounds of long negotiations. Japan's initial proposal was simple: a return to Potsdam - that is, the transfer of all the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin to it. Of course, such a proposal from the side that lost the war looked somewhat frivolous.

The USSR was not going to give up an inch, but unexpectedly for the Japanese, they suddenly offered Habomai and Shikotan. This was a fallback position, approved by the Politburo, but declared prematurely - the head of the Soviet delegation, Ya. A. Malik, was acutely worried about N. S. Khrushchev’s dissatisfaction with him due to the protracted negotiations. On August 9, 1956, during a conversation with his counterpart in the garden of the Japanese Embassy in London, the fallback position was announced. It was this that was included in the text of the Joint Declaration.

It is necessary to clarify that the influence of the United States on Japan at that time was enormous (as it is now). They carefully monitored all its contacts with the USSR and, undoubtedly, were a third party to the negotiations, albeit invisible.

At the end of August 1956, Washington threatened Tokyo that if, under a peace treaty with the USSR, Japan renounces its claims to Kunashir and Iturup, the United States would forever retain the occupied island of Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu archipelago. The note contained wording that clearly played on the national feelings of the Japanese: “The US government has come to the conclusion that the islands of Iturup and Kunashir (along with the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which are part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan and should rightly be considered as belonging to Japan " That is, the Yalta agreements were publicly disavowed.

The ownership of the “northern territories” of Hokkaido, of course, is a lie - on all military and pre-war Japanese maps, the islands were always part of the Kuril ridge and were never designated separately. However, I liked the idea. It was on this geographical absurdity that entire generations of politicians in the Land of the Rising Sun made their careers.

The peace treaty has not yet been signed; in our relations we are guided by the Joint Declaration of 1956.

Price issue

I think that even in the first term of his presidency, Vladimir Putin decided to resolve all controversial territorial issues with his neighbors. Including with Japan. In any case, back in 2004, Sergei Lavrov formulated the position of the Russian leadership: “We have always fulfilled and will fulfill our obligations, especially ratified documents, but, of course, to the extent that our partners are ready to fulfill the same agreements . So far, as we know, we have not been able to come to an understanding of these volumes as we see it and as we saw in 1956.”

“Until Japan’s ownership of all four islands is clearly determined, a peace treaty will not be concluded,” responded then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. The negotiation process has again reached a dead end.

However, this year we again remembered the peace treaty with Japan.

In May, at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin said that Russia is ready to negotiate with Japan on the disputed islands, and the solution should be a compromise. That is, neither party should feel like a loser. “Are you ready to negotiate? Yes, we are ready. But we were surprised to hear recently that Japan has joined some kind of sanctions - what does Japan have to do with this, I don’t really understand - and is suspending the negotiation process on this topic. So, are we ready, is Japan ready, I still haven’t figured it out for myself,” said the Russian President.

It looks like the pain point has been found correctly. And the negotiation process (hopefully, this time in offices tightly closed from American ears) is underway full swing at least six months. Otherwise, Shinzo Abe would not have made such promises.

If we fulfill the terms of the 1956 Joint Declaration and return the two islands to Japan, 2,100 people will have to be resettled. They all live on Shikotan; only the border post is located on Habomai. Most likely, the problem of our armed forces being on the islands is being discussed. However, for complete control over the region, the troops stationed on Sakhalin, Kunashir and Iturup are quite sufficient.

Another question is what kind of reciprocal concessions we expect from Japan. It is clear that sanctions must be lifted - this is not even discussed. Perhaps access to credit and technology, increased participation in joint projects? It's possible.

Be that as it may, Shinzo Abe faces a difficult choice. The conclusion of a long-awaited peace treaty with Russia, flavored with the “northern territories,” would certainly make him the politician of the century in his homeland. It will inevitably lead to tension in Japan's relations with the United States. I wonder what the Prime Minister will prefer.

But we will somehow survive the internal Russian tension that our liberals will fan.

The Habomai Island group is labeled "Other Islands" on this map. These are a few white spots between Shikotan and Hokkaido.
____________________

The history of the end of the Second World War is interesting.

As you know, on August 6, 1945, the American Air Force dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, and then on August 9, 1945, on Nagasaki. The plan was to drop several more bombs, the third of which would be ready by August 17-18 and would have been dropped if such an order had been given by Truman. Tom did not have to resolve the dilemma, since on August 14-15 the Japanese government announced surrender.

Soviet and Russian citizens, of course, know that by dropping nuclear bombs, the Americans committed a war crime, purely in order to scare Stalin, and the Americans and Japanese - that they forced Japan to surrender in World War II, thereby saving at least a million human lives, mostly military ones and Japanese civilians, and, of course, Allied soldiers, mainly Americans.

Let's imagine for a moment whether the Americans scared Stalin nuclear bomb, even if they suddenly set such a goal? The answer is obvious - no. The USSR entered the war with Japan only on August 8, 1945, i.e. 2 days after the bombing of Hiroshima. The date May 8 is not accidental. At the Yalta Conference on February 4-11, 1945, Stalin promised that the USSR would enter the war with Japan 2-3 months after the end of the war with Germany, with which [Japan] there was a neutrality pact concluded on April 13, 1941 (see. the main events of World War II according to the author of this LJ). Thus, Stalin fulfilled his promise on the last day of the promised 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, but immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima. Whether he would have fulfilled this promise or not without her is an interesting question, perhaps historians have an answer to it, but I don’t know.

So, Japan announced surrender on August 14-15, but this did not lead to the end of hostilities against the USSR. The Soviet army continued to advance in Manchuria. Again, it is obvious to Soviet and Russian citizens that hostilities continued because the Japanese army refused to surrender due to the fact that some did not receive the order to surrender, and some ignored it. The question is, of course, what would have happened if the Soviet army had stopped offensive operations after August 14-15. Would this have led to the surrender of the Japanese and saved about 10 thousand lives of Soviet soldiers?

As is known, there is still no peace treaty between Japan and the USSR, and subsequently Russia. The problem of the peace treaty is linked to the so-called “northern territories” or the disputed islands of the Lesser Kuril chain.

Let's begin. Below the cut is a Google Earth image of the territory of Hokkaido (Japan) and now the Russian territories to the north - Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and Kamchatka. The Kuril Islands are divided into the Large Ridge, which includes large and small islands from Shumshu in the north to Kunashir in the south, and the Small Ridge, which includes from Shikotan in the north to the islands of the Habomai group in the south (limited on the diagram by white lines).

From the blog

To understand the problem of disputed territories, let’s plunge into the deep history of the development of the Far East by the Japanese and Russians. Before both of them, local Ainu and other nationalities lived there, whose opinion, according to the good old tradition, does not bother anyone due to their almost complete disappearance (Ainu) and/or Russification (Kamchadals). The Japanese were the first to come to these territories. First they came to Hokkaido, and by 1637 they had drawn up maps of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

From the blog

Later, the Russians came to these places, drew up maps and dates, and in 1786 Catherine II declared the Kuril Islands her possessions. At the same time, Sakhalin remained a draw.

From the blog

In 1855, namely on February 7, an agreement was signed between Japan and Russia, according to which Urup and the islands of the Greater Kuril ridge to the north went to Russia, and Iturup and the islands to the south, including all the islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge, went to Japan. Sakhalin, speaking modern language, was a disputed possession. True, due to the small number of Japanese and Russian populations, the issue was not so serious at the state level, except that problems arose among traders.

From the blog

In 1875, in St. Petersburg, the Sakhalin issue was resolved. Sakhalin passed completely to Russia, in return Japan received all the Kuril Islands.

From the blog

In 1904, the Russo-Japanese War began in the Far East, in which Russia was defeated and as a result, in 1905 the southern part of Sakhalin passed to Japan. In 1925, the USSR recognized this state of affairs. Afterwards there were all sorts of minor skirmishes, but the status quo lasted until the end of the Second World War.

From the blog

Finally, at the Yalta Conference on February 4-11, 1945, Stalin discussed the issue of the Far East with the allies. I repeat, he promised that the USSR would enter the war with Japan after the victory over Germany, which was just around the corner, but in return the USSR would return Sakhalin, as illegally conquered by Japan during the 1905 war, and would receive the Kuril Islands, albeit in an indefinite amount.

And here the most interesting thing begins in the context of the Kuril Islands.

On August 16-23, the Soviet Army battles and defeats the Japanese group in the Northern Kuril Islands (Shumshu). On August 27-28, without a fight, since the Japanese capitulated, the Soviet Army took Urup. On September 1, landings take place on Kunashir and Shikotan; the Japanese offer no resistance.

From the blog

September 2, 1945 Japan signs surrender - World War II officially ends. And then our Crimean operation takes place to capture the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge, located south of Shikotan, known as the Habomai Islands.

The war is over, and the Soviet land continues to grow with the original Japanese islands. Moreover, I never found out when Tanfilyev Island (a completely deserted and flat piece of land off the very coast of Hokkaido) became ours. But what is certain is that in 1946 a border post was established there, which became famous for the bloody massacre carried out by two Russian border guards in 1994.

From the blog

As a result, Japan does not recognize the seizure of its “northern territories” by the USSR and does not recognize that these territories passed to Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR. February 7 (according to the date of the treaty with Russia in 1855) celebrates the day of the Northern Territories, which, according to the treaty of 1855, includes all the islands south of Urup.

An attempt (unsuccessful) to solve this problem was made in 1951 in San Francisco. Japan, under this treaty, must renounce any claims to Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, with the exception of Shikotan and the Habomai group. The USSR did not sign the treaty. The United States signed the treaty with the clause: “ It is provided that the terms of the Treaty will not mean recognition for the USSR of any rights or claims in the territories that belonged to Japan on December 7, 1941, which would harm Japan's rights and title to these territories, nor will any whatever the provisions in favor of the USSR in relation to Japan contained in the Yalta Agreement.»

Comments from the USSR regarding the treaty:

Comment by Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR) regarding the treaty: The Soviet delegation has already drawn the attention of the conference to the inadmissibility of such a situation when the draft peace treaty with Japan does not say anything about the fact that Japan must recognize the sovereignty of the Soviet Union over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The project is in gross contradiction with the obligations regarding these territories assumed by the United States and England under the Yalta Agreement. http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/195_dok/19510908gromy.php

In 1956, the USSR promised Japan to return Shikotan and the Habomai group if Japan did not lay claim to Kunashir and Iturup. Whether the Japanese agreed with this or not, opinions differ. We say that yes - Shikotan and Habomai are yours, and Kunashir and Iturup are ours. The Japanese say that everything south of Urup is theirs.

UPD Text of the declaration: At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and the island of Shikotan with the fact that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion.

The Japanese then retreated back (perhaps under pressure from the Americans), linking together all the islands south of Urup.

I don’t want to predict how history will unfold next, but most likely Japan will use the ancient Chinese wisdom and wait until all the disputed islands sail to them. The only question is whether they will stop at the 1855 treaty or go further to the 1875 treaty.

____________________________

Shinzo Abe announced that he would annex the disputed islands of the South Kuril chain to Japan. “I will solve the problem of the northern territories and conclude a peace treaty. As a politician, as a prime minister, I want to achieve this at any cost,” he promised his compatriots.

According to Japanese tradition, Shinzo Abe will have to commit hara-kiri to himself if he does not keep his word. It is quite possible that Vladimir Putin will help the Japanese prime minister live to a ripe old age and die a natural death.

In my opinion, everything is heading towards the fact that the long-standing conflict will be resolved. The time for establishing decent relations with Japan has been chosen very well - for the empty, hard-to-reach lands, which their former owners now and then look nostalgically at, you can get a lot of material benefits from one of the most powerful economies in the world. And the lifting of sanctions as a condition for the transfer of the islands is far from the only and not the main concession that, I am sure, our Foreign Ministry is now seeking.

So the quite expected surge of quasi-patriotism of our liberals, directed at the Russian president, should be prevented.

Background

February 7, 1855 - Shimoda Treaty on Trade and Borders. The now disputed islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands were ceded to Japan (therefore, February 7 is annually celebrated in Japan as Northern Territories Day). The issue of the status of Sakhalin remained unresolved.

May 7, 1875 - Treaty of St. Petersburg. Japan was given the rights to all 18 Kuril Islands in exchange for all of Sakhalin.

August 23, 1905 - Treaty of Portsmouth following the results of the Russo-Japanese War. Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin.

February 11, 1945 - Yalta Conference. The USSR, USA and Great Britain reached a written agreement on the Soviet Union's entry into the war with Japan, subject to the return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to it after the end of the war.

On February 2, 1946, on the basis of the Yalta Agreements, the South Sakhalin Region was created in the USSR - on the territory of the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. On January 2, 1947, it was merged with the Sakhalin region of the Khabarovsk Territory, which expanded to the borders of the modern Sakhalin region.

Japan enters the Cold War

On September 8, 1951, the Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan was signed in San Francisco. Regarding the currently disputed territories, it says the following: “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.”

The USSR sent a delegation to San Francisco headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko. But not in order to sign a document, but to voice my position. We formulated the mentioned clause of the agreement as follows: “Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the southern part of Sakhalin Island with all the adjacent islands and the Kuril Islands and renounces all rights, title and claims to these territories.”

Today, some historians believe that the USSR should have signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the form in which it was proposed by the Americans - this would have strengthened our negotiating position. “We should have signed the agreement. I don’t know why we didn’t do this - perhaps because of vanity or pride, but above all, because Stalin overestimated his capabilities and the degree of his influence on the United States,” N.S. wrote in his memoirs .Khrushchev. But soon, as we will see further, he himself made a mistake.

Japan and sanctions

It is sometimes mistakenly believed that since we do not have a peace treaty with Japan, then we are in a state of war. However, this is not at all true.

On December 12, 1956, a ceremony for the exchange of documents took place in Tokyo, marking the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. According to the document, the USSR agreed to “the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and the island of Shikotan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.”

The peace treaty has not yet been signed - in our relations we are guided by the Joint Declaration of 1956.

Price issue

“Until Japan’s ownership of all four islands is clearly determined, a peace treaty will not be concluded,” reacted then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. The negotiation process has again reached a dead end.

However, this year we again remembered the peace treaty with Japan.

It looks like the pain point has been found correctly. And the negotiation process (hopefully, this time in offices tightly closed from American ears) has been in full swing for at least six months. Otherwise, Shinzo Abe would not have made such promises.

But we will somehow survive the internal Russian tension that our liberals will fan.

From the blog

The Habomai Island group is labeled "Other Islands" on this map. These are a few white spots between Shikotan and Hokkaido.

(The post was written more than two years ago, but the situation as of today has not changed, but conversations about the Kuril Islands have intensified again in recent days, - editor's note)

The Kuril Islands are a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula (Russia) and the island of Hokkaido (Japan). The area is about 15.6 thousand km2.

The Kuril Islands consist of two ridges - the Greater Kuril and the Lesser Kuril (Habomai). A large ridge separates the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean.

The Great Kuril Ridge is 1,200 km long and stretches from the Kamchatka Peninsula (in the north) to the Japanese island of Hokkaido (in the south). It includes more than 30 islands, of which the largest are: Paramushir, Simushir, Urup, Iturup and Kunashir. The southern islands have forests, while the northern ones are covered with tundra vegetation.

The Lesser Kuril Ridge is only 120 km long and extends from the island of Hokkaido (in the south) to the northeast. Consists of six small islands.

The Kuril Islands are part of the Sakhalin region (Russian Federation). They are divided into three regions: North Kuril, Kuril and South Kuril. The centers of these areas have corresponding names: Severo-Kurilsk, Kurilsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk. There is also the village of Malo-Kurilsk (the center of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The relief of the islands is predominantly mountainous and volcanic (there are 160 volcanoes, of which about 39 are active). The prevailing heights are 500-1000m. An exception is the island of Shikotan, which is characterized by low-mountain terrain formed as a result of the destruction of ancient volcanoes. The most high peak Kuril Islands - Alaid volcano - 2339 meters, and the depth of the Kuril-Kamchatka depression reaches 10339 meters. High seismicity causes constant threats of earthquakes and tsunamis.

Population -76.6% Russians, 12.8% Ukrainians, 2.6% Belarusians, 8% other nationalities. The permanent population of the islands lives mainly on the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the northern ones - Paramushir, Shumshu. The basis of the economy is the fishing industry, because The main natural wealth is marine bioresources. Agriculture due to unfavorable natural conditions, there was no significant development.

On the Kuril Islands, deposits of titanium-magnetites, sands, ore occurrences of copper, lead, zinc and the rare elements contained in them, indium, helium, thallium, have been discovered, there are signs of platinum, mercury and other metals. Large reserves of sulfur ores with a fairly high sulfur content have been discovered.

Transport connections are carried out by sea and air. In winter, regular shipping ceases. Due to difficult weather conditions, flights are not regular (especially in winter).

Discovery of the Kuril Islands

During the Middle Ages, Japan had little contact with other countries of the world. As V. Shishchenko notes: “In 1639, a “policy of self-isolation” was announced. On pain of death, the Japanese were forbidden to leave the islands. The construction of large ships was prohibited. Foreign ships were almost not allowed into the ports.” Therefore, the organized development of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands by the Japanese began only at the end of the 18th century.

V. Shishchenko further writes: “For Russia, Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin is deservedly considered the discoverer of the Far East. In 1638-1639, led by Moskvitin, a detachment of twenty Tomsk and eleven Irkutsk Cossacks left Yakutsk and made a difficult transition along the Aldan, Maya and Yudoma rivers, through the Dzhugdzhur ridge and further along the Ulya River, to the Sea of Okhotsk. The first Russian villages (including Okhotsk) were founded here.”

The next significant step in the development of the Far East was made by the even more famous Russian pioneer Vasily Danilovich Poyarkov, who, at the head of a detachment of 132 Cossacks, was the first to travel along the Amur - to its very mouth. Poyarkov, left Yakutsk in June 1643; at the end of the summer of 1644, Poyarkov’s detachment reached the Lower Amur and ended up in the lands of the Amur Nivkhs. At the beginning of September, the Cossacks saw the Amur estuary for the first time. From here the Russian people could also see the northwestern coast of Sakhalin, which they received the idea of as a large island. Therefore, many historians consider Poyarkov to be the “discoverer of Sakhalin,” despite the fact that the expedition members did not even visit its shores.

Since then Cupid has acquired great importance, not only as a “river of grain”, but also as a natural communication. After all, until the 20th century, the Amur was the main road from Siberia to Sakhalin. In the fall of 1655, a detachment of 600 Cossacks arrived in the Lower Amur, which at that time was considered a large military force.

The development of events steadily led to the fact that already in the second half of the 17th century the Russian people could fully gain a foothold on Sakhalin. This was prevented by a new twist in history. In 1652, a Manchu-Chinese army arrived at the mouth of the Amur.

Being at war with Poland, the Russian state could not allocate the required number of people and funds to successfully counteract Qing China. Attempts to extract any benefits for Russia through diplomacy did not bring success. In 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was concluded between the two powers. For more than a century and a half, the Cossacks had to leave the Amur, which practically made Sakhalin inaccessible to them.

For China, the fact of the “first discovery” of Sakhalin does not exist, most likely for the simple reason that the Chinese knew about the island for a very long time, so long ago that they do not remember when they first learned about it.

Here, of course, the question arises: why didn’t the Chinese take advantage of such a favorable situation and colonize Primorye, Amur Region, Sakhalin and other territories? V. Shishchenkov answers this question: “The fact is that until 1878, Chinese women were prohibited from crossing the Great Chinese wall! And in the absence of “their fair half,” the Chinese could not firmly establish themselves in these lands. They appeared in the Amur region only to collect yasak from the local peoples.”

With the conclusion of the Nerchinsk Peace, the sea route remained the most convenient road to Sakhalin for the Russian people. After Semyon Ivanovich Dezhnev made his famous voyage from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific in 1648, the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean became regular.

In 1711-1713 D.N. Antsiferov and I.P. Kozyrevsky made expeditions to the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, during which they obtained detailed information about most of the Kuril Islands and the island of Hokkaido. In 1721, surveyors I.M. Evreinov and F.F. Luzhin carried out, by order of Peter I, a survey of the northern part of the Great Kuril Ridge to the island of Simushir and compiled detailed map Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands.

In the 18th century there was a rapid development of the Kuril Islands by Russian people.

“Thus,” notes V. Shishchenko, “by the middle of the 18th century an amazing situation arose. Sailors different countries literally plowed the ocean length and breadth. A Great Wall, the Japanese “policy of self-isolation” and the inhospitable Sea of Okhotsk formed a truly fantastic circle around Sakhalin, which left the island beyond the reach of both European and Asian explorers.”

At this time, the first clashes between the Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in the Kuril Islands took place. In the first half of the 18th century, Russian people actively developed the Kuril Islands. Back in 1738-1739, during the Spanberg expedition, the Middle and Southern Kuriles were discovered and described, and even a landing was made on Hokkaido. At that time, the Russian state was not yet able to take control of the islands, which were so far from the capital, which contributed to the abuses of the Cossacks against the aborigines, which sometimes amounted to robbery and cruelty.

In 1779, by her highest command, Catherine II freed the “shaggy Kurilians” from all fees and forbade encroaching on their territory. The Cossacks were unable to maintain their power without force, and they abandoned the islands south of Urup. In 1792, by order of Catherine II, the first official mission took place with the aim of establishing trade relations with Japan. This concession was used by the Japanese to stall for time and strengthen their position in the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin.

In 1798, a large Japanese expedition to the island of Iturup took place, led by Mogami Tokunai and Kondo Juzo. The expedition had not only research goals, but also political ones - Russian crosses were demolished and pillars were installed with the inscription: “Dainihon Erotofu” (Iturup - possession of Japan). The following year, Takadaya Kahee opens the sea route to Iturup, and Kondo Juzo visits Kunashir.

In 1801, the Japanese reached Urup, where they set up their pillars and ordered the Russians to leave their settlements.

Thus, by the end of the 18th century, Europeans’ ideas about Sakhalin remained very unclear, and the situation around the island created the most favorable conditions in favor of Japan.

Kuril Islands in the 19th century

In the 18th - early 19th centuries, the Kuril Islands were studied by Russian researchers D. Ya. Antsiferov, I. P. Kozyrevsky, I. F. Kruzenshtern.

Japan's attempts to seize the Kuril Islands by force provoked protests from the Russian government. N.P., who arrived in Japan in 1805 to establish trade relations. Rezanov, told the Japanese that “...to the north of Matsmaya (Hokkaido) all lands and waters belong to the Russian emperor and that the Japanese should not expand their possessions further.”

However, the aggressive actions of the Japanese continued. At the same time, in addition to the Kuril Islands, they began to lay claim to Sakhalin, making attempts to destroy signs on the southern part of the island indicating that this territory belongs to Russia.

In 1853, the representative of the Russian government, Adjutant General E.V. Putyatin negotiated a trade agreement.

Along with the task of establishing diplomatic and trade relations, Putyatin’s mission was supposed to formalize the border between Russia and Japan with an agreement.

Professor S.G. Pushkarev writes: “During the reign of Alexander II, Russia acquired significant expanses of land in the Far East. In exchange for the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin Island was acquired from Japan.”

After the Crimean War in 1855, Putyatin signed the Treaty of Shimoda, which established that “the borders between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup and Urup,” and Sakhalin was declared “undivided” between Russia and Japan. As a result, the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup went to Japan. This concession was stipulated by Japan's consent to trade with Russia, which, however, developed sluggishly even after that.

N.I. Tsimbaev characterizes the state of affairs in the Far East at the end of the 19th century: “Bilateral agreements signed with China and Japan during the reign of Alexander II for a long time determined Russia’s policy in the Far East, which was cautious and balanced.”

In 1875, the tsarist government of Alexander II made another concession to Japan - the so-called St. Petersburg Treaty was signed, according to which all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka, in exchange for recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan. (See Appendix 1)

The fact of Japan's attack on Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. was a gross violation of the Shimoda Treaty, which proclaimed “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan.”

Results of the Russo-Japanese War

As already mentioned, Russia had extensive possessions in the Far East. These territories were extremely remote from the center of the country and were poorly involved in national economic turnover. “The changing situation, as noted by A.N. Bokhanov, was associated with the construction of the Siberian Railway, the construction of which began in 1891. It was planned to run through the southern regions of Siberia with access to the Pacific Ocean in Vladivostok. Its total length from Chelyabinsk in the Urals to the final destination was about 8 thousand kilometers. It was the longest railway line in the world."

By the beginning of the 20th century. The main hub of international contradictions for Russia was the Far East and the most important direction was relations with Japan. The Russian government was aware of the possibility of a military clash, but did not strive for it. In 1902 and 1903 Intensive negotiations took place between St. Petersburg, Tokyo, London, Berlin and Paris, which led to nothing.

On the night of January 27, 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur and disabled 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. The next day, 6 Japanese cruisers and 8 destroyers attacked the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets in the Korean port of Chemulpo. Only on January 28 did Japan declare war on Russia. Japan's treachery caused a storm of indignation in Russia.

A war was forced on Russia that it did not want. The war lasted a year and a half and turned out to be inglorious for the country. The reasons for general failures and specific military defeats were caused by various factors, but the main ones included:

incomplete military-strategic training of the armed forces;
the significant distance of the theater of military operations from the main centers of the army and control;
extremely limited communication network.

The futility of the war was clearly evident by the end of 1904, and after the fall of the Port Arthur fortress on December 20, 1904, few people in Russia believed in a favorable outcome of the campaign. The initial patriotic uplift gave way to despondency and irritation.

A.N. Bokhanov writes: “The authorities were in a state of stupor; no one could have imagined that the war, which according to all preliminary assumptions should have been short, dragged on for so long and turned out to be so unsuccessful. Emperor Nicholas II for a long time did not agree to admit the Far Eastern failure, believing that these were only temporary setbacks and that Russia should mobilize its efforts to strike Japan and restore the prestige of the army and the country. He undoubtedly wanted peace, but an honorable peace, one that could only be ensured by a strong geopolitical position, and this was seriously shaken by military failures.”

By the end of the spring of 1905, it became obvious that a change in the military situation was possible only in the distant future, and in the near future it was necessary to immediately begin a peaceful resolution of the conflict that had arisen. This was forced not only by military-strategic considerations, but, to an even greater extent, by the complications of the internal situation in Russia.

N.I. Tsimbaev states: “Japan’s military victories turned it into a leading Far Eastern power, supported by the governments of England and the United States.”

The situation for the Russian side was complicated not only by military-strategic defeats in the Far East, but also by the lack of previously worked out conditions for a possible agreement with Japan.

Having received the appropriate instructions from the sovereign, S.Yu. On July 6, 1905, Witte, together with a group of experts on Far Eastern affairs, went to the United States, to the city of Portsmouth, where negotiations were planned. The head of the delegation only received instructions not to agree under any circumstances to any form of payment of indemnity, which Russia had never paid in its history, and not to cede “not an inch of Russian land,” although by that time Japan had already occupied the southern part of Sakhalin Island.

Japan initially took a tough position in Portsmouth, demanding in the form of an ultimatum that Russia completely withdraw from Korea and Manchuria, transfer the Russian Far Eastern fleet, pay indemnity and consent to the annexation of Sakhalin.

The negotiations were on the verge of breakdown several times, and only thanks to the efforts of the head of the Russian delegation it was possible to achieve a positive result: on August 23, 1905. the parties entered into an agreement.

In accordance with it, Russia ceded lease rights to Japan in the territories in Southern Manchuria, parts of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, and recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests. A.N. Bokhanov speaks about the negotiations as follows: “The Portsmouth agreements became an undoubted success for Russia and its diplomacy. They looked in many ways like an agreement between equal partners, rather than a treaty concluded after an unsuccessful war.”

Thus, after the defeat of Russia, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded in 1905. The Japanese side demanded Sakhalin Island from Russia as an indemnity. The Treaty of Portsmouth terminated the 1875 exchange agreement and also stated that all Japanese trade agreements with Russia would be nullified as a result of the war.

This treaty annulled the Shimoda Treaty of 1855.

However, treaties between Japan and the newly created USSR existed back in the 20s. Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “In April 1920, the Far Eastern Republic (FER) was created - a temporary revolutionary democratic state, a “buffer” between the RSFSR and Japan. People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Far Eastern Republic under the command of V.K. Blucher, then I.P. Uborevich in October 1922 liberated the region from Japanese and White Guard troops. On October 25, NRA units entered Vladivostok. In November 1922, the “buffer” republic was abolished, its territory (with the exception of Northern Sakhalin, from where the Japanese left in May 1925) became part of the RSFSR.”

By the time of the conclusion of the convention on the basic principles of relations between Russia and Japan on January 20, 1925, there was in fact no existing bilateral agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands.

In January 1925, the USSR established diplomatic and consular relations with Japan (Beijing Convention). The Japanese government evacuated its troops from Northern Sakhalin, captured during the Russo-Japanese War. The Soviet government granted Japan concessions in the north of the island, in particular for the exploitation of 50% of the area of oil fields.

War with Japan in 1945 and the Yalta Conference

Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “...a special period of the Great Patriotic War was the war of the USSR with militaristic Japan (August 9 - September 2, 1945). On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On August 9, fulfilling its allied obligations assumed at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan...During the 24-day military campaign there was The million-strong Kwantung Army, which was located in Manchuria, was defeated. The defeat of this army became the determining factor in the defeat of Japan.

It led to the defeat of the Japanese armed forces and to their heaviest losses. They amounted to 677 thousand soldiers and officers, incl. 84 thousand killed and wounded, more than 590 thousand prisoners. Japan lost its largest military-industrial base on the Asian mainland and its most powerful army. Soviet troops expelled the Japanese from Manchuria and Korea, from Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japan lost all the military bases and bridgeheads that it was preparing against the USSR. She was unable to conduct an armed struggle.”

At the Yalta Conference, the “Declaration of a Liberated Europe” was adopted, which, among other points, indicated the transfer to the Soviet Union of the South Kuril Islands, which were part of the Japanese “northern territories” (the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, Habomai).

In the first years after the end of World War II, Japan did not make territorial claims to the Soviet Union. Putting forward such demands was excluded then, if only because the Soviet Union, along with the United States and other Allied Powers, took part in the occupation of Japan, and Japan, as a country that agreed to unconditional surrender, was obliged to implement all decisions made by the Allied Powers, including decisions concerning its borders. It was during that period that new borders between Japan and the USSR were formed.

The transformation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into an integral part of the Soviet Union was secured by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 2, 1946. In 1947, according to changes made to the Constitution of the USSR, the Kuril Islands were included in the South Sakhalin region of the RSFSR. The most important international legal document recording Japan's renunciation of rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was the peace treaty signed in September 1951 at an international conference in San Francisco with the victorious powers.

In the text of this document, summing up the results of the Second World War, in paragraph “C” in Article 2 it was clearly written: “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905."

However, already during the San Francisco Conference, the desire of Japanese government circles to question the legitimacy of the borders established between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of the defeat of Japanese militarism was revealed. At the conference itself, this desire did not find open support from other participants and, above all, from the Soviet delegation, as is clear from the text of the agreement given above.

However, in the future, Japanese politicians and diplomats did not abandon their intention to revise the Soviet-Japanese borders and, in particular, to return the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago to Japanese control: Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai (I.A. Latyshev explains that in Habomai actually consists of five small islands adjacent to one another). The confidence of Japanese diplomats in their ability to carry out such a revision of borders was associated with the behind-the-scenes and then open support for the mentioned territorial claims to our country that US government circles began to provide to Japan - support that clearly contradicted the spirit and letter of the Yalta agreements signed by the US President F. Roosevelt in February 1945.

Such an obvious refusal of US government circles from their obligations enshrined in the Yalta agreements, according to I.A. Latyshev, was explained simply: “... in conditions of further strengthening “ cold war", in the face of the victory of the communist revolution in China and armed confrontation with the North Korean army on the Korean Peninsula, Washington began to consider Japan as its main military foothold in the Far East and, moreover, as its main ally in the struggle to maintain the dominant position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. And in order to tie this new ally more tightly to their political course, American politicians began to promise him political support in acquiring the southern Kuril Islands, although such support represented a departure of the United States from the above-mentioned international agreements designed to consolidate the borders established as a result of the Second World War.”

The Japanese initiators of territorial claims to the Soviet Union received many benefits from the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference to sign the text of the peace treaty along with other allied countries participating in the conference. This refusal was motivated by Moscow’s disagreement with the United States’ intention to use the treaty to maintain American military bases on Japanese territory. This decision of the Soviet delegation turned out to be short-sighted: it began to be used by Japanese diplomats to create the impression among the Japanese public that the absence of the Soviet Union’s signature on the peace treaty exempted Japan from complying with it.

In subsequent years, the leaders of the Japanese Foreign Ministry resorted to reasoning in their statements, the essence of which was that since representatives of the Soviet Union did not sign the text of the peace treaty, then the Soviet Union has no right to refer to this document, and the international community should not give consent to the ownership the Soviet Union, the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, although Japan renounced these territories in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty.

At the same time, Japanese politicians also referred to the absence in the agreement of a mention of who would henceforth own these islands.

Another direction of Japanese diplomacy boiled down to the fact that “... Japan's refusal of the Kuril Islands, recorded in the agreement, does not mean its refusal of the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago on the grounds that Japan... does not consider these islands to be Kuril Islands. And that, when signing the agreement, the Japanese government considered the allegedly named four islands not as the Kuril Islands, but as lands adjacent to the coast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido.”

However, at the first glance at Japanese pre-war maps and directions, all the Kuril Islands, including the southernmost ones, were one administrative unit called “Chishima”.

I.A. Latyshev writes that the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the conference in San Francisco to sign, along with representatives of other allied countries, the text of a peace treaty with Japan was, as the subsequent course of events showed, a very unfortunate political miscalculation for the Soviet Union. The absence of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan began to contradict the national interests of both sides. That is why, four years after the San Francisco Conference, the governments of both countries expressed their readiness to enter into contact with each other to find ways to formally resolve their relations and conclude a bilateral peace treaty. This goal was pursued, as it initially seemed, by both sides in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that began in London in June 1955 at the level of ambassadors of both countries.

However, as it turned out during the negotiations that began, the main task of the then Japanese government was to use the Soviet Union’s interest in normalizing relations with Japan in order to achieve territorial concessions from Moscow. In essence, it was about the open refusal of the Japanese government from the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the part where the northern borders of Japan were determined.

From this moment, as I.A. writes. Latyshev, the most ill-fated territorial dispute between the two countries, detrimental to Soviet-Japanese good neighborliness, began, which continues to this day. It was in May-June 1955 that Japanese government circles took the path of illegal territorial claims against the Soviet Union, aimed at revising the borders established between both countries as a result of World War II.

What prompted the Japanese side to take this path? There were several reasons for this.

One of them is the long-standing interest of Japanese fishing companies in gaining control of the sea waters washing the southern Kuril Islands. It is well known that the coastal waters of the Kuril Islands are the richest region of the Pacific Ocean in fish resources, as well as other seafood. Fishing for salmon, crabs, seaweed and other expensive seafood could provide Japanese fishing and other companies with fabulous profits, which prompted these circles to put pressure on the government in order to get these richest marine fishing areas entirely for themselves.

Another motivating reason for the attempts of Japanese diplomacy to return the southern Kuril Islands under its control was the Japanese understanding of the exceptional strategic importance of the Kuril Islands: whoever owns the islands actually holds in his hands the keys to the gates leading from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of Okhotsk.

Thirdly, by putting forward territorial demands on the Soviet Union, Japanese government circles hoped to revive nationalist sentiments among broad sections of the Japanese population and use nationalist slogans to unite these sections under their ideological control.

And finally, fourthly, another important point was the desire of the Japanese ruling circles to please the United States. After all, the territorial demands of the Japanese authorities fit well into the belligerent course of the US government, which was directed sharply against the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries. And it is no coincidence that US Secretary of State D. F. Dulles, as well as other influential US political figures, already during the London Soviet-Japanese negotiations began to support Japanese territorial claims, despite the fact that these claims obviously contradicted the decisions of the Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers.

As for the Soviet side, Japan’s advance of territorial demands was viewed by Moscow as an encroachment on the state interests of the Soviet Union, as an illegal attempt to revise the borders established between both countries as a result of the Second World War. Therefore, Japanese demands could not but meet with resistance from the Soviet Union, although its leaders in those years sought to establish good neighborly contacts and business cooperation with Japan.

Territorial dispute during the reign of N.S. Khrushchev

During the Soviet-Japanese negotiations of 1955-1956 (in 1956, these negotiations were moved from London to Moscow), Japanese diplomats, having encountered a firm rebuff to their claims to South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands, began to quickly moderate these claims. In the summer of 1956, the territorial harassment of the Japanese came down to the demand for the transfer to Japan only of the southern Kuril Islands, namely the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai, which represented the most favorable part of the Kuril archipelago for life and economic development.

On the other hand, at the very first stages of the negotiations, the short-sightedness in the approach to Japanese claims of the then Soviet leadership, which sought to speed up the normalization of relations with Japan at any cost, was revealed. Without a clear idea of the southern Kuril Islands, much less their economic and strategic value, N.S. Khrushchev, apparently, treated them as small bargaining chips. Only this can explain the naive judgment among the Soviet leader that negotiations with Japan could be successfully completed if only the Soviet side made a “small concession” to Japanese demands. In those days N.S. Khrushchev imagined that, imbued with gratitude for the “gentlemanly” gesture of the Soviet leadership, the Japanese side would respond with the same “gentlemanly” compliance, namely: it would withdraw its excessive territorial claims, and the dispute would end with an “amicable agreement” to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.

Guided by this erroneous calculation of the Kremlin leader, the Soviet delegation at the negotiations, unexpectedly for the Japanese, expressed its readiness to cede to Japan the two southern islands of the Kuril chain: Shikotan and Habomai, after the Japanese side signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Although willingly accepting this concession, the Japanese side did not calm down, and for a long time continued to persistently seek the transfer of all four South Kuril Islands to it. But she was unable to negotiate big concessions then.

Khrushchev's irresponsible "gesture of friendship" was recorded in the text of the "Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations", signed by the heads of government of both countries in Moscow on October 19, 1956. In particular, in Article 9 of this document it was written that the Soviet Union and Japan “...agreed to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, negotiations on concluding a peace treaty. At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan with the fact that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan." .

The future transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan was interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's readiness to give up part of its territory in the name of good ties with Japan. It is no coincidence, as it was emphasized more than once later, that the article dealt with the “transfer” of these islands to Japan, and not about their “return,” as the Japanese side was then inclined to interpret the essence of the matter.

The word “transfer” was intended to mean the intention of the Soviet Union to cede part of its territory to Japan, and not Japanese territory.

However, the inclusion in the declaration of Khrushchev’s reckless promise to present Japan with an advance “gift” in the form of part of Soviet territory was an example of the political thoughtlessness of the then Kremlin leadership, which had neither the legal nor the moral right to turn the country’s territory into a subject of diplomatic bargaining. The short-sightedness of this promise became obvious over the next two or three years, when the Japanese government in its foreign policy set a course for strengthening military cooperation with the United States and increasing Japan’s independent role in the Japanese-American “security treaty”, the spearhead of which was quite definitely directed towards Soviet Union.

The hopes of the Soviet leadership that its willingness to “hand over” two islands to Japan would prompt Japanese government circles to renounce further territorial claims to our country were also not justified.

The very first months that passed after the signing of the joint declaration showed that the Japanese side did not intend to calm down in its demands.

Soon, Japan had a new “argument” in the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, based on a distorted interpretation of the content of the said declaration and the text of its ninth article. The essence of this “argument” was that the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations does not end, but, on the contrary, presupposes further negotiations on the “territorial issue” and that the recording in the ninth article of the declaration of the Soviet Union’s readiness to transfer to Japan upon the conclusion of a peace treaty the islands of Habomai and Shikotan still does not draw an end to the territorial dispute between the two countries, but, on the contrary, suggests the continuation of this dispute over two other islands of the southern Kuril Islands: Kunashir and Iturup.

Moreover, at the end of the 50s, the Japanese government became more active than before in using the so-called “territorial issue” to fan unkind sentiments towards Russia among the Japanese population.

All this prompted the Soviet leadership, headed by N.S. Khrushchev, to make adjustments to his assessments of Japanese foreign policy, which did not meet the original spirit of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Shortly after the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed the anti-Soviet “security treaty” on January 19, 1960 in Washington, namely on January 27, 1960, the USSR government sent a memorandum to the Japanese government.

The note stated that as a result of Japan’s conclusion of a military treaty, weakening the foundations of peace in the Far East, “... a new situation is emerging in which it is impossible to fulfill the promises of the Soviet government to transfer the islands of Habomai and Sikotan to Japan”; “By agreeing to transfer the indicated islands to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty,” the note further stated, “the Soviet government met the wishes of Japan, took into account the national interests of the Japanese state and the peace-loving intentions expressed at that time by the Japanese government during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations.”

As was then indicated in the cited note, given the changed situation, when the new treaty is directed against the USSR, the Soviet government cannot help ensure that by transferring to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which belong to the USSR, the territory used by foreign troops is expanded. By foreign troops, the note meant the US armed forces, whose indefinite presence on the Japanese islands was secured by a new “security treaty” signed by Japan in January 1960.

In the subsequent months of 1960, other notes and statements by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet government were published in the Soviet press, indicating the reluctance of the USSR leadership to continue fruitless negotiations regarding Japanese territorial claims. From that time on, for a long time, or more precisely, for more than 25 years, the position of the Soviet government regarding the territorial claims of Japan became extremely simple and clear: “there is no territorial issue in the relations between the two countries” because this issue has “already been resolved” by previous international agreements.

Japanese claims in 1960-1980

The firm and clear position of the Soviet side regarding Japanese territorial claims led to the fact that during the 60-80s, none of the Japanese statesmen and the diplomats failed to draw the Soviet Foreign Ministry and its leaders into any extensive discussion about Japanese territorial harassment.

But this did not mean at all that the Japanese side accepted the Soviet Union’s refusal to continue discussions on Japanese claims. In those years, the efforts of Japanese government circles were aimed at developing the so-called “movement for the return of the northern territories” in the country through various administrative measures.

It is noteworthy that the words “northern territories” acquired a very loose content during the development of this “movement”.

Some political groups, in particular government circles, meant by “northern territories” the four southern islands of the Kuril chain; others, including the socialist and communist parties of Japan - all the Kuril Islands, and still others, especially from among the adherents of far-right organizations, not only the Kuril Islands, but also South Sakhalin.

Beginning in 1969, the government map office and the Ministry of Education began publicly “correcting” maps and textbooks that began to color the southern Kuril Islands as Japanese territory, causing the Japanese territory to “grow” on these new maps, as the press reported. , 5 thousand square kilometers.

For processing public opinion country and drawing as many Japanese as possible into the “movement for the return of the northern territories”, more and more new efforts were used. For example, trips to the island of Hokkaido in the area of the city of Nemuro, from where the southern Kuril Islands are clearly visible, began to be widely practiced by specialized groups of tourists from other parts of the country. The programs of stay of these groups in the city of Nemuro in mandatory included “walks” on ships along the borders of the southern islands of the Kuril ridge with the aim of “sad contemplation” of the lands that once belonged to Japan. By the early 1980s, a significant proportion of the participants in these “nostalgic walks” were schoolchildren, for whom such voyages were counted as “study trips” provided for in school curricula. At Cape Nosapu, located closest to the borders of the Kuril Islands, with funds from the government and a number of public organizations, a whole complex of buildings intended for “pilgrims” was built, including a 90-meter observation tower and an “Archival Museum” with a tendentiously selected exhibition designed to convince uninformed visitors in the imaginary historical “validity” of Japanese claims to the Kuril Islands.

A new development in the 70s was the appeal of the Japanese organizers of the anti-Soviet campaign to the foreign public. The first example of this was the speech of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in October 1970, in which the head of the Japanese government tried to drag the world community into a territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, in the 70-80s, attempts by Japanese diplomats to use the UN rostrum for the same purpose were made repeatedly.

Since 1980, on the initiative of the Japanese government, the so-called “Northern Territories Days” began to be celebrated annually in the country. That day was February 7th. It was on this day in 1855 that a Russian-Japanese treaty was signed in the Japanese city of Shimoda, according to which the southern part of the Kuril Islands was in the hands of Japan, and the northern part remained with Russia.

The choice of this date as the “day of the northern territories” was meant to emphasize that the Treaty of Shimoda (annulled by Japan itself in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, as well as in 1918-1925 during the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia) allegedly still retains its significance.

Unfortunately, the position of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union regarding Japanese territorial claims began to lose its former firmness during the period that M.S. was in power. Gorbachev. In public statements, there were calls for a revision of the Yalta system of international relations that emerged as a result of World War II and for the immediate completion of the territorial dispute with Japan through a “fair compromise,” which meant concessions to Japanese territorial claims. The first frank statements of this kind were made in October 1989 from the lips of the people's deputy, rector of the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute Yu. Afanasyev, who, during his stay in Tokyo, declared the need to break the Yalta system and speedily transfer to Japan the four southern islands of the Kuril chain.

Following Yu. Afanasyev, others began to speak out in favor of territorial concessions during trips to Japan: A. Sakharov, G. Popov, B. Yeltsin. In particular, the “Program for a Five-Stage Resolution of the Territorial Issue,” put forward by the then leader of the interregional group, Yeltsin, during his visit to Japan in January 1990, was nothing more than a course toward gradual, time-stretched concessions to Japanese territorial demands.

As I.A. Latyshev writes: “The result of long and intense negotiations between Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in April 1991 was the “Joint Statement” signed by the leaders of the two countries. This statement reflected Gorbachev’s characteristic inconsistency in his views and in protecting the national interests of the state.

On the one hand, despite the persistent harassment of the Japanese, the Soviet leader did not allow the inclusion in the text of the “Joint Statement” of any language that openly confirmed the readiness of the Soviet side to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. He also did not refuse the notes from the Soviet government sent to Japan in 1960.

However, on the other hand, the text of the “Joint Statement” nevertheless included rather ambiguous wording, which allowed the Japanese to interpret them in their favor.”

Evidence of Gorbachev’s inconsistency and instability in defending the national interests of the USSR was his statement about the intention of the Soviet leadership to begin reducing the ten thousand military contingent located in disputed islands, despite the fact that these islands are adjacent to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, where four of the thirteen divisions of the Japanese “self-defense forces” were stationed.

Democratic time of the 90s

The August 1991 events in Moscow, the transfer of power into the hands of Boris Yeltsin and his supporters and the subsequent withdrawal of the three Baltic countries from the Soviet Union, and later the complete collapse of the Soviet state, which followed as a result of the Belovezhskaya agreements, were perceived by Japanese political strategists as evidence of a sharp weakening our country's ability to resist Japanese claims.

In September 1993, when the date of Yeltsin’s arrival in Japan, October 11, 1993, was finally agreed upon, the Tokyo press also began to direct the Japanese public to abandon excessive hopes for a quick resolution of the territorial dispute with Russia.

Events associated with Yeltsin’s continued tenure at the head of the Russian state, even more clearly than before, showed the inconsistency of the hopes of both Japanese politicians and Russian Foreign Ministry leaders for the possibility of a quick solution to the protracted dispute between the two countries through a “compromise” involving concessions of our country to the Japanese. territorial harassment.

Followed in 1994-1999. The discussions between Russian and Japanese diplomats did not, in fact, introduce anything new into the situation that arose at the Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute.

In other words, the territorial dispute between the two countries reached a deep impasse in 1994-1999, and neither side could see a way out of this impasse. The Japanese side, apparently, did not intend to give up its unfounded territorial claims, because none of the Japanese statesmen was able to decide on such a step, which was fraught with inevitable political death for any Japanese politician. And any concessions to the Japanese claims of the Russian leadership became even less likely in the conditions of the balance of political forces that had developed in the Kremlin and beyond its walls than in previous years.

A clear confirmation of this is the increasing frequency of conflicts in sea waters, washing the southern Kuril Islands - conflicts during which, throughout 1994-1955, repeated unceremonious incursions of Japanese poachers into Russian territorial waters were met with harsh rebuff by Russian border guards, who opened fire on border violators.

I.A. speaks about the possibilities of resolving these relations. Latyshev: “Firstly, the Russian leadership should have immediately abandoned the illusion that as soon as Russia ceded the southern Kuril Islands to Japan, ... the Japanese side would immediately benefit our country with large investments, preferential loans, and scientific and technical information. It was precisely this misconception that prevailed in Yeltsin’s circle.”

“Secondly,” writes I.A. Latyshev, “our diplomats and politicians both in Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s times should have abandoned the false assumption that Japanese leaders could in the near future moderate their claims to the southern Kuril Islands and come to some kind of “reasonable compromise” in the territorial dispute with our country.

For many years, as discussed above, the Japanese side never showed, and was unable to show in the future, a desire to renounce its claims to all four southern Kuril Islands.” The maximum that the Japanese could agree to is to receive the four islands they demand not at the same time, but in installments: first two (Habomai and Shikotan), and then, after some time, two more (Kunashir and Iturup).

“Thirdly, for the same reason, the hopes of our politicians and diplomats for the possibility of persuading the Japanese to conclude a peace treaty with Russia, based on the “Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations” signed in 1956, were self-deception. It was a good delusion and nothing more.” The Japanese side sought from Russia an open and clear confirmation of the obligation written down in Article 9 of the said declaration to transfer to it the islands of Shikotan and Habomai upon the conclusion of a peace treaty. But this did not at all mean that the Japanese side was ready to end its territorial harassment of our country after such confirmation. Japanese diplomats considered establishing control over Shikotan and Habomai only as an intermediate stage on the way to taking possession of all four South Kuril islands.

Russia's national interests required in the second half of the 90s that Russian diplomats abandon the course of illusory hopes for the possibility of our concessions to Japanese territorial claims, and, on the contrary, instill in the Japanese side the idea of the inviolability of Russia's post-war borders.

In the fall of 1996, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put forward a proposal for “joint economic development” by Russia and Japan of those very four islands of the Kuril archipelago that Japan so persistently claimed, which was nothing more than another concession to pressure from the Japanese side.

The allocation by the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry of the southern Kuril Islands to a certain special zone accessible to entrepreneurial activity Japanese citizens, was interpreted in Japan as an indirect recognition by the Russian side of the “validity” of Japanese claims to these islands.

I.A. Latyshev writes: “Another thing is annoying: in the Russian proposals, which envisaged wide access for Japanese entrepreneurs to the southern Kuril Islands, there was not even an attempt to condition this access on Japan’s consent to the corresponding benefits and free access of Russian entrepreneurs to the territory of the areas of the Japanese island of Hokkaido close to the southern Kuril Islands. And this demonstrated the lack of readiness of Russian diplomacy to achieve equality of rights between the two countries in their negotiations with the Japanese side. business activity in each other's territories. In other words, the idea of “joint economic development” of the southern Kuril Islands turned out to be nothing more than a unilateral step by the Russian Foreign Ministry towards the Japanese desire to master these islands.”

The Japanese were allowed to conduct private fishing in the immediate vicinity of the shores of precisely those islands that Japan claimed and claims. At the same time, the Japanese side not only did not grant Russian fishing vessels similar rights to fish in Japanese territorial waters, but also did not undertake any obligations to ensure that its citizens and vessels comply with the laws and regulations of fishing in Russian waters.

Thus, ten years of attempts by Yeltsin and his entourage to resolve the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute on a “mutually acceptable basis” and sign a bilateral peace treaty between both countries did not lead to any tangible results. The resignation of B. Yeltsin and the accession to the presidency of V.V. Putin alerted the Japanese public.

President of the country V.V. Putin is in fact the only government official authorized by the Constitution to determine the course of Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute between the two countries. His powers were limited by certain articles of the Constitution, and in particular those that obliged the president to “ensure the integrity and inviolability of the territory” of the Russian Federation (Article 4), “to protect the sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the state” (Article 82).

In the late summer of 2002, during his short stay in the Far East, where Putin flew to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, the Russian president said only a few words about his country's territorial dispute with Japan. At a meeting with journalists in Vladivostok on August 24, he said that “Japan considers the southern Kuril Islands to be its territory, while we consider them our territory.”

At the same time, he expressed his disagreement with the alarming reports of some Russian media that Moscow is ready to “return” the named islands to Japan. “These are just rumors,” he said, “spread by those who would like to get some benefits from this.”

The visit of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to Moscow took place in accordance with previously reached agreements on January 9, 2003. However, Putin’s negotiations with Koizumi did not make any progress in the development of the territorial dispute between the two countries. I.A. Latyshev calls the policy of V.V. Putin is indecisive and evasive, and this policy gives reason to the Japanese public to expect a resolution of the dispute in favor of their country.

The main factors that need to be taken into account when solving the problem of the Kuril Islands:

the presence of the richest reserves of marine biological resources in the waters adjacent to the islands;
underdeveloped infrastructure on the territory of the Kuril Islands, the virtual absence of its own energy base with significant reserves of renewable geothermal resources, the lack of its own vehicles to ensure freight and passenger transportation;
proximity and virtually unlimited capacity of seafood markets in neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region;
the need to preserve the unique natural complex of the Kuril Islands, maintain local energy balance while maintaining the cleanliness of the air and water basins, and protect the unique flora and fauna. When developing a mechanism for the transfer of islands, the views of local civilian population. Those who remain must be guaranteed all rights (including property rights), and those who leave must be fully compensated. It is necessary to take into account the readiness of the local population to accept the change in the status of these territories.

The Kuril Islands have important geopolitical and military-strategic significance for Russia and affect Russia’s national security. The loss of the Kuril Islands will damage the defense system of Russian Primorye and weaken the defense capability of our country as a whole. With the loss of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the Sea of Okhotsk ceases to be our inland sea. In addition, in the Southern Kuril Islands there is powerful system Air defense and radar systems, fuel depots for refueling aircraft. The Kuril Islands and the adjacent waters are a one-of-a-kind ecosystem with the richest natural resources, primarily biological.

The coastal waters of the Southern Kuril Islands and the Lesser Kuril Ridge are the main habitat areas for valuable commercial species of fish and seafood, the extraction and processing of which is the basis of the economy of the Kuril Islands.

It should be noted that at the moment Russia and Japan have signed a program for the joint economic development of the South Kuril Islands. The program was signed in Tokyo in 2000 during the official visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Japan.

“Socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands of the Sakhalin region (1994-2005)” in order to ensure the comprehensive socio-economic development of this region as a special economic zone.

Japan believes that concluding a peace treaty with Russia is impossible without determining the ownership of the four South Kuril Islands. This was stated by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this country, Yoriko Kawaguchi, speaking to the public of Sapporo with a speech on Russian-Japanese relations. The Japanese threat hanging over the Kuril Islands and their population still worries the Russian people today.

Statement Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe about the intention to resolve the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands and again attracted the attention of the general public to the so-called “problem of the Southern Kurils” or “northern territories”.

Shinzo Abe's loud statement, however, does not contain the main thing - original solution, which could suit both sides.

Land of the Ainu

The dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands has its roots in the 17th century, when there were neither Russians nor Japanese on the Kuril Islands.

The indigenous population of the islands can be considered the Ainu, a people whose origins are still debated by scientists. The Ainu, who once inhabited not only the Kuril Islands, but also all the Japanese islands, as well as the lower reaches of the Amur, Sakhalin and the south of Kamchatka, have today turned into a small nation. In Japan, according to official data, there are about 25 thousand Ainu, and in Russia there are just over a hundred of them left.

The first mentions of the islands in Japanese sources date back to 1635, in Russian sources - to 1644.

In 1711, a detachment of Kamchatka Cossacks led by Danila Antsiferova And Ivan Kozyrevsky first landed on the northernmost island of Shumshu, defeating a detachment of local Ainu here.

The Japanese also showed more and more activity in the Kuril Islands, but no demarcation line and no agreements existed between the countries.

Kuriles - to you, Sakhalin— us

In 1855, the Shimoda Treaty on trade and borders between Russia and Japan was signed. This document for the first time defined the border of the possessions of the two countries in the Kuril Islands - it passed between the islands of Iturup and Urup.

Thus, the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands came under the rule of the Japanese emperor, that is, the very territories around which there is a dispute today.

It was the day of the conclusion of the Shimoda Treaty, February 7, that was declared in Japan as the so-called “Northern Territories Day”.

Relations between the two countries were quite good, but they were spoiled by the “Sakhalin issue”. The fact is that the Japanese claimed the southern part of this island.

In 1875, a new treaty was signed in St. Petersburg, according to which Japan renounced all claims to Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril Islands - both Southern and Northern.

Perhaps, it was after the conclusion of the 1875 treaty that relations between the two countries developed most harmoniously.

Exorbitant appetites of the Land of the Rising Sun

Harmony in international affairs, however, is a fragile thing. Japan, emerging from centuries of self-isolation, was rapidly developing, and at the same time its ambitions were growing. The Land of the Rising Sun has territorial claims against almost all its neighbors, including Russia.

This resulted in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which ended in a humiliating defeat for Russia. And although Russian diplomacy managed to mitigate the consequences of military failure, nevertheless, in accordance with the Portsmouth Treaty, Russia lost control not only over the Kuril Islands, but also over South Sakhalin.

This state of affairs did not suit not only Tsarist Russia, but also the Soviet Union. However, it was impossible to change the situation in the mid-1920s, which resulted in the signing of the Beijing Treaty between the USSR and Japan in 1925, according to which the Soviet Union recognized the current state of affairs, but refused to acknowledge “political responsibility” for the Portsmouth Treaty.

In subsequent years, relations between the Soviet Union and Japan teetered on the brink of war. Japan's appetite grew and began to spread to the continental territories of the USSR. True, the defeats of the Japanese at Lake Khasan in 1938 and at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 forced official Tokyo to slow down somewhat.

However, the “Japanese threat” hung like a sword of Damocles over the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.

Revenge for old grievances

By 1945, the tone of Japanese politicians towards the USSR had changed. There was no talk of new territorial acquisitions—the Japanese side would have been quite satisfied with maintaining the existing order of things.

But the USSR gave an undertaking to Great Britain and the United States that it would enter the war with Japan no later than three months after the end of the war in Europe.

The Soviet leadership had no reason to feel sorry for Japan - Tokyo behaved too aggressively and defiantly towards the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s. And the grievances of the beginning of the century were not forgotten at all.

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. It was a real blitzkrieg - the million-strong Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria was completely defeated in a matter of days.

On August 18, Soviet troops launched the Kuril landing operation, the goal of which was to capture the Kuril Islands. Fierce battles broke out for the island of Shumshu - this was the only battle of the fleeting war in which the losses of Soviet troops were higher than those of the enemy. However, on August 23, the commander of the Japanese troops in the Northern Kuril Islands, Lieutenant General Fusaki Tsutsumi, capitulated.

The fall of Shumshu became the key event of the Kuril operation - subsequently the occupation of the islands on which the Japanese garrisons were located turned into acceptance of their surrender.

Kurile Islands. Photo: www.russianlook.com

They took the Kuril Islands, they could have taken Hokkaido

On August 22, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East, Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, without waiting for the fall of Shumshu, gives the order to troops to occupy the Southern Kuril Islands. The Soviet command is acting according to plan - the war continues, the enemy has not completely capitulated, which means we should move on.

The initial military plans of the USSR were much broader - Soviet units were ready to land on the island of Hokkaido, which was to become a Soviet zone of occupation. One can only guess how the further history of Japan would have developed in this case. But in the end, Vasilevsky received an order from Moscow to cancel the landing operation in Hokkaido.

Bad weather somewhat delayed the actions of Soviet troops in the Southern Kuril Islands, but by September 1, Iturup, Kunashir and Shikotan came under their control. The Habomai island group was completely taken under control on September 2-4, 1945, that is, after the surrender of Japan. There were no battles during this period - the Japanese soldiers resignedly surrendered.

So, at the end of World War II, Japan was completely occupied by the Allied powers, and the main territories of the country came under US control.

Kurile Islands. Photo: Shutterstock.com

On January 29, 1946, Memorandum No. 677 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, excluded the Kuril Islands (Chishima Islands), the Habomai (Habomadze) group of islands, and Shikotan Island from Japanese territory.

On February 2, 1946, in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Yuzhno-Sakhalin Region was formed in these territories as part of the Khabarovsk Territory of the RSFSR, which on January 2, 1947 became part of the newly formed Sakhalin Region as part of the RSFSR.

Thus, de facto, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands passed to Russia.

Why didn't the USSR sign a peace treaty with Japan?

However, these territorial changes were not formalized by a treaty between the two countries. But the political situation in the world has changed, and yesterday’s ally of the USSR, the United States, turned into Japan’s closest friend and ally, and therefore was not interested in either resolving Soviet-Japanese relations or resolving the territorial issue between the two countries.

In 1951, a peace treaty was concluded in San Francisco between Japan and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, which the USSR did not sign.

The reason for this was the US revision of previous agreements with the USSR, reached in the Yalta Agreement of 1945 - now official Washington believed that the Soviet Union had no rights not only to the Kuril Islands, but also to South Sakhalin. In any case, this is exactly the resolution that was adopted by the US Senate during the discussion of the treaty.

However, in the final version of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan renounces its rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. But here, too, there is a catch - official Tokyo, both then and now, states that it does not consider Habomai, Kunashir, Iturup and Shikotan to be part of the Kuril Islands.

That is, the Japanese are sure that they really renounced South Sakhalin, but they never renounced the “northern territories”.

The Soviet Union refused to sign a peace treaty not only because its territorial disputes with Japan were unresolved, but also because it did not in any way resolve similar disputes between Japan and the then USSR ally, China.

Compromise ruined Washington

Only five years later, in 1956, the Soviet-Japanese declaration on ending the state of war was signed, which was supposed to be the prologue to the conclusion of a peace treaty.

A compromise solution was also announced - the islands of Habomai and Shikotan would be returned to Japan in exchange for unconditional recognition of the sovereignty of the USSR over all other disputed territories. But this could happen only after the conclusion of a peace treaty.

In fact, Japan was quite happy with these conditions, but then a “third force” intervened. The United States was not at all happy about the prospect of establishing relations between the USSR and Japan. The territorial problem acted as an excellent wedge driven between Moscow and Tokyo, and Washington considered its resolution extremely undesirable.

It was announced to the Japanese authorities that if a compromise was reached with the USSR on the “Kuril problem” on the terms of the division of the islands, the United States would leave the island of Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu archipelago under its sovereignty.

The threat was truly terrible for the Japanese - we were talking about an area with more than a million people, which has the greatest historical significance for Japan.

As a result, a possible compromise on the issue of the Southern Kuril Islands melted away like smoke, and with it the prospect of concluding a full-fledged peace treaty.

By the way, control over Okinawa finally passed to Japan only in 1972. Moreover, 18 percent of the island’s territory is still occupied by American military bases.

Complete dead end

In fact, there has been no progress in the territorial dispute since 1956. During the Soviet period, without reaching a compromise, the USSR came to the tactic of completely denying any dispute in principle.

In the post-Soviet period, Japan began to hope that Russian President Boris Yeltsin, generous with gifts, would give up the “northern territories.” Moreover, such a decision was considered fair by very prominent figures in Russia - for example, Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Perhaps at this moment the Japanese side made a mistake, instead of compromise options like the one discussed in 1956, they began to insist on the transfer of all the disputed islands.

But in Russia the pendulum has already swung in the other direction, and those who consider the transfer of even one island impossible are much louder today.

For both Japan and Russia, the “Kuril issue” has become a matter of principle over the past decades. For both Russian and Japanese politicians, the slightest concessions threaten, if not the collapse of their careers, then serious electoral losses.

Therefore, Shinzo Abe’s declared desire to solve the problem is undoubtedly commendable, but completely unrealistic.