Zemstvo militia of 1812
Engraving by Ukhtomsky based on a painting by Luchaninov "Father Blessing His Son for the Militia"
Years of existence	-
A country	Russian empire Russian empire
Type	Irregular troops
Includes	Counties: 1st (Moscow) 2nd (St. Petersburg) 3rd (Reserve)
Number	More than 400 thousand people
Commanders
Notable commanders	F. Rostopchin (1st district)

In total, more than 400 thousand militias were deployed, from which districts were formed: 1st - for the defense of Moscow, 2nd - for the defense of St. Petersburg and 3rd - to form a reserve. The militia warriors were organized into foot and horse regiments and squads, divided into battalions, hundreds and dozens. Part of the militia operated in 1813-1814 even outside Russia - near Danzig and during the blockade of Dresden and Hamburg.

The formation of a militia from the peasantry followed the pattern of recruitment, but without the responsibilities of a regular army. Representatives of the nobility (officers) enrolled in the militia voluntarily. The militia took part in some military operations, but mostly performed menial work in the form of building bastions, palisades, digging ditches, etc.

Moscow People's Militia

On July 6, 1812, the highest manifesto of Emperor Alexander I was issued, ordering the nobles to form a militia from their serfs, join it themselves and choose a commander over themselves. On the same day as the manifesto, an appeal was issued to “Our Mother Capital, Moscow,” containing an appeal to Muscovites to organize a militia. The fact that no other city in the empire received special treatment not only flattered Muscovites, but also indicated special attention to the ancient capital on the part of the supreme power.

On July 12, 1812, Alexander I arrived in Moscow. A committee was immediately formed to organize the Moscow militia, consisting of Arakcheev, Balashov and Shishkov, chaired by Rostopchin. The committee developed regulations on the organization of Moscow military force, which later served as a model for other provinces. According to it, two subcommittees were created: the first - to organize the reception of militias, the second - to organize the reception of money, provisions, fodder, weapons and other necessary property. Both were presided over by a military governor.

The Moscow military force was to be represented by mounted and foot Cossack and Jaeger regiments. A special uniform was assigned to the militia: Russian gray caftans knee-length, long trousers, shirts with a slanted collar, a scarf, a sash, a cap and greased boots. In winter, a sheepskin sheepskin coat was supposed to be worn under a caftan. A cockade with the motto was placed on the headdress: “ For faith and the king" The officers wore a regular army uniform. Regimental and battalion commanders were not given any salaries. by the importance of the title... and out of zeal for the Fatherland" Militia officers were awarded in the same way as army officers; ordinary militia officers were awarded a special medal for bravery, with a lifetime allowance. All maimed militiamen who had no income were given a pension. Serfs voluntarily provided by nobles were accepted into the militia. Retired officers retained their previous rank, and civilian officials joined with the loss of one class rank.

The starting point for the gathering of the people's militia was a meeting of the Moscow merchants and nobility on the occasion of the emperor's arrival in the ancient capital, held in the Slobodsky Palace on July 15, 1812. Representatives of the noble and merchant classes were housed in different halls. Many contemporaries later recalled this event with delight, considering it the pinnacle of Russian patriotism. Here is how Rostopchin described the behavior of Moscow merchants:

...I was amazed by the impression that reading the manifesto made. Anger showed up first; but when Shishkov reached the place where it is said that the enemy is coming with flattery on his lips, but with chains in his hand, then indignation burst out and reached its apogee: those present hit themselves on the head, tore out their hair, broke their hands, it was clear as tears of rage flowed down these faces, reminiscent of the faces of the ancients. I saw a man grinding his teeth. Over the noise, you couldn’t hear what these people were saying, but they were threats, screams of rage, groans. It was a unique spectacle of its kind, because the Russian man expressed his feelings freely and, forgetting that he was a slave, became indignant when he was threatened with the chains that the stranger was preparing, and preferred death to the shame of being defeated.

The highest manifesto of July 18, 1812 appointed 17 provinces, divided into three districts, to organize the militia: the first - for the defense of Moscow, the head of which was Rostopchin, the second - for the protection of St. Petersburg and the third reserve. In addition to Moscow itself and the Moscow province, the Moscow district also included Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Ryazan, Tula, Kaluga and Smolensk provinces.

The Moscow province in July-September provided the largest militia in Russia - about 28,000, against 12-15 thousand in the neighboring provinces, and this despite the fact that there were fewer landowner peasants in it (305,248) than in Tverskaya (332,656), Vladimirskaya (312,935), Ryazan (353,225), Tula (400,812), Kaluga (318,353) and Smolensk (373,277).

Rostopchin’s propaganda activities greatly contributed to the patriotic upsurge among Muscovites, which allowed the capital province to field the largest zemstvo army in Russia. The militia of the Moscow province was assembled in just a month, and by August 26 its formation was practically completed, although it continued until August 30, when 5 districts of the province came under the control of the military command. On August 18, in Ruza, Mozhaisk and Vereya, that is, cities directly close to the site of the future general battle, there were eight infantry and three ranger regiments, with a total number of 24,709 warriors, and by the day of the battle about 28 thousand. As of August 20, in the Moscow province there were up to 2,200 militias in short supply, that is, no more than 8% of the expected number.

On August 10, Count Morkov took command of the Moscow military force. The next day, three regiments set out for Mozhaisk. On August 14, Rostopchin expected to send 16,000 warriors there. By August 26, about 25 thousand militias were at the disposal of the Russian army, at least 19 thousand of whom took direct part in the Battle of Borodino. The Moscow militia (about 30% of the personnel) was armed with almost all serviceable firearms available in the city arsenal.

Many militias showed themselves heroically at Borodino. Lieutenant Colonel Roslavlev with his battalion of the 2nd Jaeger Regiment repelled enemy attacks several times and was wounded by a cannonball fragment; Chamber cadet Baranov, captains Luludak and Prince Volkonsky, Lieutenant Colonel Karaulov and a number of other militia officers were named worthy of emulation for their unparalleled bravery in battle. Major Korsakov and Second Lieutenant Durov showed an example of courage. Ordinary warriors distinguished themselves no less: Anisim Antonov, Kondrat Ivanov, Savely Kirillov and many other unknown heroes.

After the Battle of Borodino, 6,000 Moscow militias accompanied convoys with the wounded to Moscow, suppressing riots and looting. On August 29, the 1st-3rd Jaeger Regiments, 1st-3rd and 5th-7th Foot Regiments, a total of about 14,000 people from the Moscow Militia, were distributed among the regiments of the 1st and 2nd Armies to make up for losses. The 4th and 8th foot regiments were attached to

Original taken from partizan_1812 in "Sim Victory", or the People's Militia of 1812 (Guessing Game, Part 3)

Another feature of the Patriotic War was the formation of the militia. This is not particularly surprising to us; The militia can be compared to a conscript army, which is formed in addition to the professional one in case of extreme need. In the 20th century, the mobilization of the population in the event of a major war became commonplace, but for that time it was unusual.

Militia in 1812. Artist I. Arkhipov. 1982

The militia of 1812 was assembled on the basis of the Manifesto of Alexander I of July 6 (18), 1812 and his appeal to the residents of the “Most Throne Capital of our Moscow” with a call to become the founders of this “people's armament.” The widespread convocation of zemstvo militias that began was limited by the Manifesto of July 18 (30) “On the Formation of a Temporary Internal Militia” to 16 central provinces adjacent to the established theater of military operations, which were divided into three districts. The first district (Moscow, Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Ryazan, Tula, Kaluga, Smolensk provinces) was intended to protect Moscow. The second district (St. Petersburg and Novgorod provinces) provided “protection” of the capital. The Volga provinces of the third district were supposed to serve as a reserve for the first two militia districts.

The general management of the formation of militias was carried out by a Special Committee under the emperor. The heads of the three militia districts were appointed by decrees of the emperor, and the entire leadership of the provincial militias, from the commander to the commanders of the regiments (detachments), was elected by the local nobility and presented for the highest approval. The military department provided assistance in training warriors and provided them with firearms and ammunition. The Ministry of Finance controlled the spending of funds collected for the militia.

On July 25 (August 6), 1812, Alexander I approved the report of the Holy Governing Synod, according to which the Russian Orthodox Church allocated 1.5 million rubles for the organization of the St. Petersburg and Moscow militias, all laity and clergy were called upon to donate to the collection of the militia; and “clergymen, children of clergy and clergy and seminarians” were allowed to be released into warriors. More than 400 people from the clergy signed up for the militia.

The procedure for collecting the zemstvo army was established in the “Report on the composition of the Moscow military force”, the highest approved on July 14 (26), - the rules for organizing the Moscow militia. The local nobility was entrusted with its formation, leadership and obligatory personal service in it in general and officer positions. The militias were subject to disbandment “upon the expulsion of the enemy from our land,” and the officers and warriors who were in them were to be returned “to their primitive state and to their former duties.”

The creation of the zemstvo army began with the convening by the governor and provincial leader of the nobility of a congress of representatives of the “noble class” of all districts. It adopted the Regulations on the Militia, and also established its number, the procedure for selecting and equipping warriors, and the timing of their collection; elections were carried out for the chief of the provincial army and the commanders of the regiments (teams).

At the same time, the governor, together with the noble assembly, formed the Organizing Committee, which was directly involved in the formation of the militia. In their activities, militia committees had the right to contact any “places and persons and demand assistance and assistance from anyone.”

Each landowner was obliged to submit a certain number of equipped and armed warriors from his serfs to the militia within a specified time frame. The unauthorized entry of serfs into the militia was a crime. The selection of warriors was carried out by the landowner or peasant communities by lot.

Blessing of the militia of 1812. Artist I. Luchaninov. 1812
For this painting in 1812 I.V. Luchaninov received a gold medal of the first dignity and the title of artist with a certificate of the first degree

The reception of warriors and horses was carried out in gathering places in the counties by special commissions consisting of an official (officer) from the militia, the leader of the county nobility, the mayor and the doctor. The physical and age requirements for the militia, as a temporary army, were reduced compared to recruiting sets.

When he was the head of the St. Petersburg militia, Kutuzov held a reception for warriors. Painting by artist S. Gerasimov.

The warriors of the provincial militias were united into regiments of mounted and foot Cossacks (in the provincial militias formed according to the Manifesto of July 18 (30), 1812, Cossacks meant not representatives of the Cossack military class, but lightly armed horse or foot warriors), as well as foot rangers (in In the 2nd district the regiments were called squads). Foot regiments were divided into battalions, battalions into hundreds and tens. Horse regiments - hundreds, hundreds - dozens. The “Smolensk police” consisted of district militias, headed by a chief of a thousand, which in turn were divided into “five hundred”, hundreds and fifty. The militia of each province was under the command of its own commander.

The highest approved design of the banner of the St. Petersburg militia.

Provincial militias were equipped, armed and maintained before joining the active army from a special fund, which included mandatory cash and in-kind contributions, as well as donations. The bulk of the donations came from the estates and were made without fail: the nobility, merchants, townspeople, and peasant societies at their meetings established the total amount of the collection and distributed it among the members of their estate, depending on their property status. Often, however, people donated more than they were supposed to.

Fundraising for the militia and defense was carried out throughout Russia and amounted to about 100 million rubles in monetary terms, while government spending on the army during the Patriotic War and Foreign Campaigns amounted to 157 million rubles.

Chiefs of regiments (detachments) and battalion commanders were not entitled to pay “according to the importance of the rank in which they serve and by special power of attorney of the Emperor, out of zeal for the Fatherland.” Poor nobles were paid an allowance for equipment from the militia fund.

The norm for providing a warrior at the expense of the donor was the three-month rations established by the government for recruits sent to assembly points. His uniform consisted of a cloth caftan, trousers, shirt, boots and a cap with a brass cross and the inscription “For the Faith and the Tsar” on it.

Huntsman, foot and horse Cossacks of the Tver militia.
Colored lithograph by P. Ferlund 2nd based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid-19th century

Matveev is a warrior of the 1st squad of the St. Petersburg militia. Lithograph by V. Timm. 1850s

Foot Cossack and huntsman of the Moscow militia. Colored lithograph by P. Ferlund based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid-19th century

Mounted Cossack of the Moscow militia. Colored lithograph by P. Ferlund based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid-19th century

The militias lacked firearms, ammunition and military equipment, as they were primarily allocated to form reserve units of the regular army. Provincial troops received guns only when they were included in the active army. Therefore, after the end of the gathering, all the militias, except for the St. Petersburg militia, were armed mainly with edged weapons - pikes, spears and axes. By the beginning of December 1812, about 50 thousand guns were released to the militia from arsenals and arms factories.

The military training of warriors took place according to a shortened recruit training program; the instructors in the training were officers and lower ranks from the army and Cossack units located in the places where the provincial army was formed. The Moscow militia set out on a campaign in the second half of August, the St. Petersburg militia at the very beginning of September; consequently, the formation and preparation of the militia took only a month and a half or a little more. This speed is quite consistent with the pace of mobilization in July 1941.

The extraordinary circumstances associated with the retreat of the Russian armies to Moscow forced the government to give the “people's armament” a wider scope than originally envisaged in the Manifesto of July 18. In addition to the Zemstvo (peasant) militias, the formation of Cossack class militias also began, the structure of which was determined by the “Regulations of the Cossack Troops,” approved by Alexander I at the beginning of the 19th century.

In addition, temporary armed formations (regiments, squadrons and detachments) to strengthen the active army were formed on the private initiative of the nobility or merchants. The governor of the Pskov province is allowed to recruit Russian refugees from the Western regions captured by the enemy “on the basis of the rules of a temporary militia.” Armed detachments were created from the riflemen of the forest guards of the Western provinces, subordinate to the Forestry Department of the Ministry of Finance.

Warrior and chief officer of the merchant hundreds of the Moscow militia. Colored lithograph by P. Ferlund based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid-19th century

The convening of the militia, in comparison with the recruitment, allowed the government to mobilize over 200 thousand warriors for the war in a short time; from this number 74 infantry regiments, 2 battalions, 9 brigades (28 squads), 13 cavalry regiments and 3 hundreds were formed. In the remaining provinces and regions that were not called for militia by the Manifesto (including in Ukraine and the Don), about 104 thousand more people were collected, making up 16 infantry regiments and one battalion, 88 cavalry regiments and 3 squadrons. In total, up to 320 thousand warriors served in the militias of the Patriotic War of 1812 (including 50 thousand cavalry), according to other sources - up to 420 thousand. During the same period, 290 thousand recruits were collected into the Russian Army.

During the retreat of the Russian armies to Moscow, separate detachments of the Smolensk police, together with regular units, fought near Krasnoye, and then defended Smolensk. About 28 thousand warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias took part in the Battle of Borodino.

During the period that the Great Army was in Moscow, the Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Ryazan and Kaluga militias defended the borders of their provinces from enemy foragers and marauders and, together with army partisans, blocked the enemy in Moscow.

Part of the forces of the Tver and Yaroslavl provincial troops was part of the detachment of Adjutant General Baron F.F. Wintzengerode, who covered the road to St. Petersburg, about whom I wrote in the guessing game about partisans.

At the beginning of October, reinforcements from the corps of General P.Kh. Wittgenstein's 15 squads of the St. Petersburg militia (totaling about 15 thousand) allowed his troops to liberate Polotsk from the enemy.

Together with the Main Army, the retreating Napoleonic troops were pursued by militias of the Moscow, Smolensk, Tver, Yaroslavl, Tula, Kaluga, St. Petersburg and Novgorod zemstvo provincial troops, Don, Little Russian and Bashkir (militia) Cossack regiments, as well as individual battalions, squadrons and detachments .

At the end of 1812, the Volga reserve militia, reinforced by Cossack regiments and the Ryazan provincial army, was sent first to the Little Russian provinces, and then to Volyn, and did not participate in hostilities on Russian territory.

During critical periods of the war of 1812, provincial militias served as a reserve for units of the active army. The militia regiments of the Cossack troops significantly strengthened the light cavalry of Kutuzov’s armies and ensured the successful conduct of the “small war” and the pursuit of the retreating enemy.

But the main task of the zemstvo troops was to relieve field units from serving in rear garrisons, from guarding communications and escorting convoys and prisoners of war, from caring for the wounded and sick in hospitals and other non-combatant duties.

Insufficient military training and weapons did not allow the militia to be used as an independent fighting force. Therefore, they were assigned to army corps (Lieutenant General P.H. Wittgenstein, F.F. Steingeil), individual detachments (Adjutant General F.F. Wintzingerode, P.V. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, I.I. Novak, P. M. Volkonsky), where they retained their organizational independence (St. Petersburg, Novgorod militias, etc.), or, like the Moscow one, went to replenish them.

Provincial troops, reinforced by army and Cossack units, operated in independent corps (detachments) under the command of Lieutenant General N.V. Gudovich (united Chernigov-Poltava militia) and Lieutenant General P.A. Tolstoy (militia corps of the III district).

Zemstvo militias and cordons (self-defense units) from local residents of front-line provinces (Kaluga, Smolensk, Moscow, Vladimir, Ryazan, Tula, Pskov and Chernigov) fought enemy foragers, looters, deserters, and also performed police functions to maintain internal order. . They destroyed and captured 10-12 thousand enemy soldiers and officers.

Temporary armed formations of Tambov, Oryol and other provinces, which did not have to conduct military operations while maintaining order on their territory, provided local authorities with a favorable environment for conducting recruitment and organizing army supplies.

No matter how strange it may sound, after the end of hostilities on Russian territory, all provincial militias, except Vladimir, Tver and Smolensk, participated in the foreign campaigns of the Russian army in 1813-1814. The Moscow and Smolensk militias were disbanded only in the spring of 1813, and all other zemstvo troops only by the end of 1814. For example, the St. Petersburg militia returned home in June 1814. The special committee for internal militia affairs under the emperor and some provincial committees stopped working only in end of 1816

I.A. Ivanov. Return of the St. Petersburg militia. 1814

During the Battle of Borodino, a detachment of the Moscow militia (16-18 battalions, up to 10 thousand people in total) under the command of Morkov was on the left flank of the Borodino position in the area of ​​the village of Utitsa. During the battle, 4 battalions of militias who came with the 2nd and 3rd infantry corps joined him. In total, 19-20 thousand Moscow warriors were in battle formations at Borodino.

Banner of the Moscow Militia 1812. Colored lithograph by A. Petrovsky based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid-19th century.

Morkov's corps, which was in the 2nd line, did not enter the battle; separate battalions were sent for a counterattack to the village of Utitsa, and were also used to carry out the wounded. During the battle, 3.5-5 thousand warriors performed police functions in the near rear. On the evening of August 26 and in the following days, 6 thousand soldiers of the Moscow militia ensured the passage of convoys and transports with the wounded to Mozhaisk and further to Moscow, suppressed riots and cases of looting.

Moscow militias in battles on the Old Smolensk Road. Artist V. Kelerman. 1957

The St. Petersburg militia, although it did not participate in the Battle of Borodino, showed itself in the battle even more clearly than the Moscow one. Having left the city on September 3 (15), it passed through Tsarskoe Selo and moved towards Wittgenstein’s corps, which stood in front of Polotsk occupied by the French. When Pushkin wrote:

Do you remember: the army followed the army,
We said goodbye to our older brothers
And they returned to the shadow of science with annoyance,
Jealous of the one who dies
Walked past us...

he wrote specifically about the St. Petersburg militia.

Soon after the St. Petersburg and Novgorod militia joined Wittgenstein’s corps (September 29/October 11), he considered that he had enough strength to go on the offensive and began an attack on Polotsk. The attack on the city began on October 6/18. The bloody battle ended in victory for the Russians: over a thousand prisoners were captured, and the French left the city.

On October 8/20, Wittgenstein reported on the progress of the battles and noted that “... the St. Petersburg militia... to the admiration of everyone, fought with such despair and fearlessness that in no way lagged behind... the old soldiers, and most of all they acted perfectly in columns on bayonets... »

Marshal Saint-Cyr, who commanded the French in that battle, wrote in his memoirs: “Bearded men...fought with the greatest ferocity.” Note that the militia had the right not to shave their beards as a sign that they were in the army only for the duration of the war.

So you shouldn’t think that the militias only built flushes and carried the wounded, although these duties are the most important in war. (Look, Hemingway carried the wounded on a self-propelled cart, and was declared a veteran and a hero by his admirers. And one cannot deny them the right to do this.) But the militia fought like real soldiers; when necessary, they launched a bayonet attack.

And now, after a long introduction, I offer a militia guessing game.

1. The righteous warrior Theodore, as you know, was directly related to the Russian fleet. But what did he have to do with the militia of 1812?

2. Not everyone from the clergy class was allowed to join the militia. Some overcame this ban in a very decisive, extraordinary and controversial way, which usually had dire consequences for warriors returning from the war. What was this ban and how was it overcome?

3. Like the soldiers of the regular army, the militia could be awarded the insignia of the Military Order (soldier's St. George's Cross). What specific privilege did he give to militia cavaliers regarding military service?

4. In the autumn of 1812, a riot broke out among the Penza militia, who were preparing to go on a campaign. What caused this riot?

5. In “The Hussar Ballad” (and the play) there is a militia character. Who is this?

6. In one famous Russian novel there is a character who was a militiaman in another war in the 19th century. He cannot be called the central character of the novel, but he is quite noticeable, and his participation in the militia is described in sufficient detail. What kind of war is this and who is this character?

In the interests of truth and truth, I will say that the introduction to the guessing game and the guessing game itself are compiled on the basis of materials from that wonderful website of the Ministry of Defense, which I recently wrote about, the book by L.V. Melnikova “The Army and the Orthodox Church of the Russian Empire in the Era of the Napoleonic Wars,” which I have already mentioned more than once the classic Tarle, Alla Krasko’s interesting new book “The Forgotten Hero of the War of 1812, Field Marshal General P. H. Wittgenstein” and something else that I no longer remember.

THE PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1812 AND THE PEOPLE'S MILITARY OF RUSSIA

Tsegleev Eduard Alexandrovich
Vyatka State Agricultural Academy
Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of History and Philosophy

annotation
The article examines the patriotic movement in Russia during the Patriotic War of 1812. About 420 thousand people were recruited into the militia. Of these, 320 thousand took direct part in the hostilities. In addition to the people's militia in the narrow sense, we can talk about the existence of a militia in the broad sense in Russia in 1812. The whole country was essentially a militia camp. Everyone, from the emperor to the peasant, contributed to the best of his ability to the common cause of liberating Russia from the invaders.

THE PATRIOTIC WAR 1812 AND THE TERRITORIAL ARMY OF RUSSIA

Zegleev Eduard Alexandrovich
Vyatka State Agricultural Academy
Candidate of historical sciences, Associate professor of History and Philosophy chair

Abstract
The article deals with the patriotic movement in Russia during the Patriotic war 1812. The home guard attracted about 420,000 men. Among them 320,000 participated in the military operations. Besides the Home guard in the narrow sense of the word, its possible to say about the Russian Home guard of 1812 in the wide sense. The whole country was like an army camp. Everyone, from Emperor to peasant, according to their lights contributed to the common cause of liberation of Russia from the enemy.

During the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Liberation Campaign of 1813 - 1814. In Russia, about 420 thousand people were recruited into the militia. Of these, 320 thousand took direct part in the hostilities. The militias were actively involved in the construction of defensive fortifications, in the protection of various territories and objects from the penetration of enemy troops, and formed garrisons of cities and fortresses. The militias covered themselves with glory in battle. Lacking weapons, they defended with stoic courage and attacked with selfless courage.

Having provided great assistance to the regular army, the created people's militia justified itself politically. Representatives of all classes were involved in its formation in one form or another. Patriotism and a sense of belonging to the common cause of defending the Fatherland, even in the most difficult moments, instilled in people confidence in victory and an awareness of the need for sacrifice for its sake.

When the French entered Moscow on September 2, 1812, several patriots greeted them with cannon fire at the Kremlin gates. Before they died, 10 cannon shots were fired from both sides. On the same day, between 8 and 9 o'clock in the evening, a fire started in Moscow. Of course, in conditions of chaos, a fire could have occurred spontaneously, but there were also cases of deliberate arson. Thus, on September 24, 1812 in Moscow, a French military commission tried 26 arsonists who were caught on the spot and at the time of committing a “crime” with wicks, torches, phosphorus locks, sulfur and other incendiary means. Among them were 9 policemen, Lieutenant Ignatiev of the Moscow Regiment, soldiers, and Moscow townspeople. The high percentage of police and military personnel among arsonists, as well as the removal from Moscow on the eve of its abandonment of all fire extinguishing means, speaks in favor of the widespread version that the fire was organized by the commander-in-chief in Moscow F.V. Rostopchin, who declared on August 18, 1812 that if the French entered it, he would “turn the city to ashes.”

The province showed a firm determination to resist Napoleonic troops. When the news of Napoleon’s occupation of Moscow reached the Vyatka province, the clergy of Urzhum created their own militia, which, if the enemy approached the city, was supposed to repel him, and the residents of Elabuga “were all ready to arm themselves to defend the Fatherland and the throne.” In a difficult military-political situation, the residents of Vyatcha demonstrated their readiness to begin such a form of military self-organization as the creation of a general militia. This hidden resource of the province was used as a last resort and showed its effectiveness at the beginning of the 17th century.

Emperor Alexander I also showed fortitude, declaring in response to Napoleon’s proposal for peace: “I will grow a beard and would rather agree to eat potatoes with the last of my peasants than sign the shame of My Fatherland and My dear subjects, whose sacrifices I know how to appreciate.” The emperor’s firmness was also remarkable because defeatist sentiments were widespread at the court and among the St. Petersburg aristocracy at that time.

The main resource on which the system of the Russian Empire relied in extreme conditions, as shown by the events of September 1812, was the selfless determination of broad sections of the people to defend the independence of their country, the usual way of life (which should not be reduced only to serfdom). In this struggle, any forms of resistance were recognized as justified, including those condemned in Europe and not welcomed at court, such as the partisan movement and sabotage. An example of such a nationwide, total war for independence and its effectiveness has already been shown by Spain. Russian patriots were inspired by the example of the Spanish rebels. July 16, 1812 F.N. Glinka wrote in his diary: “It seems that in Russia, as well as in Spain, Napoleon will conquer only the land, not people.” And in a letter from Court Councilor Cristin dated July 20, it was said: “I hope that Russia will become a new Spain.” The total nature of the war that unfolded in the vastness of Russia was noted by D.P. Runich: “The Russian people did not defend their political rights in 1812. He fought in order to destroy the predatory animals that came to devour his sheep and chickens, to devastate his fields and granaries.”

On the eve of the war, French spies reported to Napoleon that in the event of war, he could “count on the peasants who would be very willing to side with the victorious French army, because they only dream of freedom.” Doctor Melivier, who lived in Russia for 20 years, assured Napoleon that “as soon as the French appear near Moscow, the peasants will rebel against their masters and all of Russia will be conquered.” It should be noted that similar concerns were expressed in Russia, in particular, by F.V. Rostopchin. In 1810, in a note “On the State of Moscow,” he wrote: “The difficult situation in Russia, the long wars, and most of all the example of the French Revolution produce despondency in the well-intentioned, indifference in the stupid, and freethinking in others. The insolence among the people is non-existent; and at any moment there will be a movement. The beginning will be robbery and the murder of foreigners (against whom the people are irritated), and after that there will be a revolt of the lordly people, the death of masters and the ruin of Moscow... It is difficult to find half of Pozharsky in Russia; there are hundreds ready to follow in the footsteps of Robespierre and Santerre.”

There were indeed isolated facts of sympathy for Napoleon and espionage for the French. Thus, in July 1812, in one of the Moscow taverns, former student Urusov said that “Napoleon’s arrival in Moscow will serve the general well-being,” for which he was beaten by visitors and handed over to the police. In September 1812, a French spy, a peasant from the Vitebsk province Rachkov, was detained in the Nizhny Novgorod province, while he was inspecting fortresses for a reward of 100 rubles promised to him. . His four accomplices managed to escape, presumably to the Vyatka province, where a search for them was carried out until 1814. It must be said that in 1812, among the indigenous inhabitants of the Russian province, in particular, the Vyatka province, there were no facts of sympathy for Napoleon, much less espionage for the French, at all.

Peasant revolts, caused by the difficult socio-economic situation of the peasants, took place in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. a common occurrence. So, in 1807, the peasants of the Sarapul district of the Vyatka province were worried about their inclusion in the Kama factories. However, the dynamics of changes over the years in the number of peasant unrest in Russia are interesting. In 1801 – 1805 there were 45 of them, in 1806 - 1810. – 38, in 1811 – 1815. – 36, in 1816 – 1820. – 87. These data indicate that during the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Liberation Campaign of 1813-1814. the number of peasant unrest was smaller compared to other periods. Contrary to the fears of F.V. Rostopchin, the peasants did not follow “in the footsteps of Robespierre and Santerre,” but first of all stood up to defend their country.

This is evidenced by the powerful partisan movement against the occupiers from Belarus to the Moscow province. The very fact that hundreds of thousands of armed serfs, gathered into the militia, did not rebel “against their masters” and did not go over to the side of the “victorious French army”, but they themselves defeated it, became an eloquent answer to both foreign “experts” of Russia and domestic skeptics.

Thus, in addition to the people's militia in the narrow sense, we can talk about the existence in Russia in 1812 - 1814. militias in the broad sense. The whole country was essentially a militia camp, where everyone, from the emperor to the peasant, by virtue of his status and to the best of his ability, contributed to the common cause of liberating Russia and Europe from the invaders.

In the post-war period, those who served in the militia were respected and honored, and their relatives and friends felt especially proud of them. So, in 1838, in a letter to A.I. To Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, the archpriest of the Vyatka Spassky Cathedral and the rector of the Vyatka theological schools, Pyotr Orlov, reported on his brother, the clergyman Gabriel Orlov, who joined the militia, courageously fought with the French in 1813 and died in 1815 from his wounds.

The militia of 1812 aroused the interest of state and public figures in Russia for many post-war decades. In 1836, Senator Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky turned to the Vyatka governor Tyufyaev with a request to provide information about the Vyatka militia, which he needed to write a book about the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Liberation War of 1813 - 1814. In 1847, the Chief Manager of Communications, Kleinmichel, made a similar request to the Vyatka governor Sereda. In 1883, veterans were invited to Moscow for the consecration of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, built in memory of the Patriotic War of 1812, including militiamen who had awards for distinction in the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Liberation Campaign of 1813-1814. .

Bibliography

1. Gauthier Yu.V. The French in Moscow // Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912: In 5 volumes - M., 1912. - T. 4.
2. Kataev I.M. Fire of Moscow // Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912: In 5 volumes - M., 1912. - T. 4.
3. Melgunov S.P. Who burned Moscow? // Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912: In 5 volumes - M., 1912. - T. 4.
4. Melgunov S.P. Rostopchin - Moscow Commander-in-Chief // Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912: In 5 volumes - M., 1912. - T. 4.
5. State Archive of the Kirov Region (GAKO). F.582. Op. 81. D. 1 130.
6. Dovnar-Zapolsky M.V. The attitude of Emperor Alexander I to the Patriotic War and his role in it // Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912: In 5 volumes - M., 1912. - T. 3.
7. Alekseev V.P. People's War // Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912: In 5 volumes - M., 1912. - T. 4.
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13. Sivkov K.V. War and censorship // Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912: In 5 volumes - M., 1912. - T. 4.
14. Semevsky V.I. Peasant unrest in 1812 // Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912: In 5 volumes - M., 1912. - T. 4.
15. GAKO. F. 583. Op. 602. D.461. Ll. 1 – 13.
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18. Beskrovny L.G. Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812 // Questions of history. – 1972. – No. 1.
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21. GAKO. F. 582. Op. 15. D. 87.

Peasant unrest in 1812 and the people's militia

And now a few words about the patriotism of the common people of the Russian Empire.

In the corresponding chapter of his book “People's Militia in the Patriotic War of 1812” V.I. Babkin writes:

“The treacherous invasion of Napoleonic hordes into Russia stirred up the powerful patriotic forces of the masses. The first to act were the Lithuanian and Belarusian peasants, who were attacked by the French occupiers before others.”

We have already talked about Napoleon’s “treachery”. Now - about Lithuanian and Belarusian peasants.

Let's start with the fact that the territory of Lithuania and Belarus (previously it was the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and then the Polish-Lithuanian state of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) in the 18th century was divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia. Accordingly, most of Lithuania and Belarus were annexed to Russia. It is clear that in such conditions the Lithuanian population could not experience any special enthusiasm for the Russians.

On the one hand, Emperor Alexander promoted the development of the Lithuanian and Belarusian provinces, annexed to Russia after the divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, on the other hand, under the influence of Russian nationalists, violations constantly took place there, weighing heavily on the local population. Alexander's hesitations ranged from the idea of ​​restoring the Principality of Lithuania for its subsequent reunification with Poland to the plan to completely Russify it.

In short, life was not easy for people in Lithuania and Belarus.

As historian I.Yu. writes in the article “The Ghost of Great Lithuania”. Kudryashov, “until recently, the point of view was taken seriously, according to which the peoples who then inhabited the Russian Empire almost in unison rose up against the French invaders<…>It turned out that the overwhelming majority of the population of the western provinces was ready to enthusiastically put their necks under the sweetest yoke of Orthodoxy and serfdom. Everything was not so clear.”

When Napoleon entered Vilna, he was met by a huge crowd of people who greeted him as their liberator. By the way, the first regiment of the Great Army to enter the capital of Lithuania was the 8th Lancers regiment under the command of Dominik Radziwill.

“Undoubtedly, this was one of the most solemn moments in the life of Vilna and, at the same time, an extremely subtle tactical move on the part of Napoleon, who did not bind himself with any statements or promises in relation to Lithuania, but seemed to testify to this by sending to liberate the city from Russian rule descendant of Lithuanian princes."

Napoleon's ceremonial entry into the city

When on June 26 (July 8) the vanguard of Davout’s French corps entered Minsk, the marshal, after greeting the local gentry, said that Napoleonic’s army did not want to oppress the Belarusians, but had come to return their homeland to them. He was greeted with applause and illumination. On the same day, the vanguard of Jerome Bonaparte’s troops, the division of the Polish cavalry of General Rozhnetsky, entered Novogrudok. And in the evening, accompanied by an orchestra, infantry and a regiment of Polish cavalry led by Prince Jozef Poniatowski himself and General Dombrowski.

Soon Napoleon created the Principality of Lithuania. It was formed on the territory of Vilna, Grodno, Minsk provinces and Bialystok region, which made up four departments. The capital became Vilna, where 35,000 people lived.

While organizing temporary administration in the newly formed principality, Napoleon was forced to stay in Vilna.

This temporary administration was “a mixture of forms of French administration with the local order of things.” It was entrusted to local residents, but under the leadership of the French.

Bearing the name of the government commission of Lithuania, it consisted of seven prominent residents of Lithuania (Stanislav Soltan, Karl Prozor, Jozef Sierakowski, Alexander Sapieha, Franz Jelski, Alexander Potocki, Jan Sniadecki) and was directly dependent on the French commissioner (Baron Bignon), who was to served as an intermediary between Lithuania and Napoleon.

The power of this commission, extended to the Vilna, Grodno, Minsk and Bialystok provinces, was limited to the management of local parishes, the delivery of provisions and fodder for the army and the organization of the Vilna municipal guard and gendarmerie throughout Lithuania.

The highest military power in the principality belonged to the Governor-General, Count Dirk van Hohendorp, appointed by Napoleon, and a military governor acted in each department. In the Vilna department, he became the future famous military theorist and historian General Antoine-Henri Jomini, in Grodno - General Jean-Antoine Brun, in Minsk - General Joseph Barbanegr (then - Polish General Mikolay Bronikovsky), in Bialystok - General Jacques-Joseph Ferrier .

Dirk van Hoogendorp

By order of Napoleon, a national guard was created in the cities (in Vilna it numbered 1,450 people, and retired Colonel Kozelsky became its commander).

In addition, Napoleon ordered the formation of several Belarusian-Lithuanian regiments according to the Polish model. And they were created. In particular, the Uhlan Guards Regiment consisted of only the nobility; in other regiments, nobles were appointed officers.

Historian I.Yu. Kudryashov writes:

“The new-born state machine worked creakingly from the first days. General Hohendorp was very dissatisfied with the work of the new authorities: “They do nothing.” As a result, on August 24 he was appointed head of the commission. “Military power and civil power must be combined,” Napoleon wrote about this. Not everything went well among the French themselves either. Hohendorp and General Jomini did not get along with each other. The conflict was quickly resolved in favor of the senior rank - on August 30, Jomini was removed from the post of Vilna governor and sent to an equivalent position in scorched Smolensk.”

But what about the Lithuanian and Belarusian peasants who allegedly opposed the Napoleonic invaders first?

As noted by the same I.Yu. Kudryashov, “The population provided support to the new regime and resistance to the Russian army. Here are just some facts: Shavel landowners armed themselves and defended their lands from the Russians; the inhabitants of the Pinsk district did not supply horses and oxen for the removal of food and artillery, then they rebelled and prevented the Russians from evacuating the warehouses; A detachment under the command of Tvardovsky attacked the convoys of Tormasov’s army and took 80 prisoners. Fabian Gornicz captured the convoy of the Uhlan regiment of the Russian army, equipped and armed his detachment, and General Mirbach, a participant in the 1794 uprising, assembled a detachment of 2,000 people within a few days, from which he formed a Jaeger regiment and 3 squadrons of cavalry. In the town of Krozhi, peasants mobilized to export grain unharnessed their horses and went into the forest; Bogush, an inhabitant of the Mozyr district of the Minsk province, hid a transport of 12 oxen in the forest, intended for the Russian army, and then handed it over to the French; Pyotr Bilinsky, manager of the Viktorishka estate (on the Vilno-Oshmyany road), armed the peasants and, surrounding a group of Russian marauders who were plundering the estate, captured 55 people and escorted them to Vilna.”

It turns out that the peasants of the western provinces of the Russian Empire were sincerely waiting for Napoleon, hoping that he would free them from serfdom. Not only did they not oppose the “Napoleonic invaders,” on the contrary, they greeted the French with even more enthusiasm than the local gentry.

I.Yu. Kudryashov writes:

“The great nobility also showed maximum enthusiastic activity, and the youth were equally energetic. Some of the minor nobility, having lost their profitable service under Alexander, reacted negatively to the French. There was no unity in the views of the clergy. If Catholic and especially Uniate priests supported Napoleon, then the Orthodox clergy, which predominated in Belarus, remained for the most part on the side of the Russian Tsar.”

Speaking about the “mighty patriotic forces of the masses,” we should not forget that in 1812 many Belarusian-Lithuanian natives served in the Russian army. So, with the beginning of the war, their desertion began to take on threatening proportions. Deserters joined the ranks of the troops formed by Napoleon. For example: the 18th Infantry Regiment of Alexander Khodkevich alone received 354 people.

Note that at the end of the war, the Belarusian-Lithuanian regiments took part in the hostilities: the 22nd and 23rd infantry regiments, as well as the 18th Uhlan regiments were almost completely destroyed near Novosverzhen, the guards regiment of Jan Konopka died in the battle near Slonim (he himself the general was captured, and after the war he lived in Warsaw), other units defended Vilna, and then retreated to Warsaw and Konigsberg.

Lithuanian-Tatar cavalry in the service of Napoleon

Minsk historian M. Goldenkov claims that about 25,000 natives of Belarusian lands fought for Napoleon. Moreover, in the 2nd and 3rd Russian armies there were up to 32,000 people.

According to M. Goldenkov, “The distribution of Belarusians into two opposing camps is quite easy to explain: some did not lose hope of regaining their lost freedom, others resigned themselves, considered themselves part of the Russian Empire, or simply fulfilled their military duty and oath to the Russian Tsar.”

Now - about Russian peasants.

As A.P. writes in his book “Napoleon: Attempt No. 2”. Nikonov, “The soldiers of Napoleonic army, like the Germans later in 1941, were simply shocked by the poverty in which Russian peasants lived. And the complete absence of all ideas about human dignity. General Compan wrote that in France pigs live better than people in Russia.”

It was difficult to expect patriotic feelings in the modern sense of the word from such an enslaved and extremely downtrodden people.

To make it clear, let's look at some facts.

After Emperor Alexander’s call to repel the enemy and gather a militia, no one from many villages joined the militia at all. There were a great many such “deviators”, and the composition of those “exposed” often did not meet any requirements. Mostly people who were sick, old and crippled were “sacrificed” to the militia. M. Goldenkov states: “Yes, there was an upsurge of patriotic spirit among the nobility. Especially young men were eager to fight, but in the villages, hamlets and hamlets of the vast expanses of Russia, no one was eager to go to war.”

In the cities, too, because those wishing to join the militia from among the urban population had to first pay all taxes, and then be “under arms” at their own expense. Naturally, there were few of them.

The decree of Emperor Alexander emphasized the temporary nature of the convened militia. It said:

“The entire internal force now constituted is not a militia or a conscription, but a temporary militia of the loyal sons of Russia, organized as a precaution to reinforce the army and for the proper protection of the fatherland<…>After the need has passed, that is, after the enemy has been expelled from our land, everyone will return with honor and glory to their original state and to their former duties.”

The fact is that the country's leadership was very afraid of a revolt of the serfs.

For example, in St. Petersburg, in connection with the proposed departure of ministries from the capital, the following considerations were expressed:

“Everyone who has serf servants knows that this race of people is usually dissatisfied with their masters. If the government is forced to leave the capital, then before the invasion of the barbarians could follow, these domestic people, incited by violent minds, living here without any wealth or kinship, of which there are quite a lot here, in conjunction with the mob, will plunder, ruin, and devastate everything.” .

Future Decembrist V.I. Shteingel, who joined the militia in 1812, noted that “In Moscow alone there are ninety thousand street servants alone, ready to take up the knife, and the first victims will be our grandmothers, aunties, sisters.”

Accordingly, recruitment into the militia was strictly “filtered”, and there was no rush to arm the militia.

Landlord peasants could be warriors of the militia, but they did not have the right to join the militia voluntarily. As noted by V.I. Babkin, “a militia warrior was regarded only as a “gift” from the landowner, contributed for the defense of the Fatherland.” A special explanation was even made on this topic:

“The call for those wishing to [serve] for the benefit of the Fatherland cannot be extended<…>on the courtyard people and landowner peasants, who are directly at the disposal of their owners, and it depends on their will to declare any donation for the common good.”

However, such volunteers were known (for example, a certain Ivan Konkov, who belonged to the landowner Minina), but they were declared “runaways” for this, returned to their owners and severely punished.

Russian militias

M. Goldenkov emphasizes:

“The patriotism of common people without lordly approval, as we see, was not only not encouraged, but even punished.”

The serf-landowners basically sent into the militia (let us emphasize - they sent by force) only those of their peasants who were either heavy drunkards or who were simply of no use to the estate. In this regard, when accepting warriors, it was proposed not to reject “not in height, not in anything, if only he were healthy.”

In the Moscow province, as noted by V.I. Babkin, it was allowed to accept even crooked people into the militia, “just not on the right eye, if only the fingers were intact.”

The owner of thousands of peasants, Count V.G. Orlov ordered the manager of the Usolsk estate:

“Observing the queue between peasants for recruitment, drunkards, spendthrifts, fragile for the estate should not be spared at all, even if there was no queue.”

Theoretically, people represented in the militia should have been provided with clothing in the prescribed form, weapons and provisions for three months. But not everyone did this. For example, Prince P.V. Meshchersky “donated” 23 warriors without any uniform, in only his own clothes. He also transferred exhausted horses for the cavalry regiment to the militia.

“Patriotic” approach, nothing to say...

As is known, the recruitment of militia was announced in the 16 Russian provinces closest to the theater of military operations, divided into three districts. At the same time, funds were being collected in these 16 provinces for the war.

Military historian M.I. Bogdanovich makes the following assessment:

“Based on the available insufficient information about the donations made by the sixteen provinces that participated in the Militia of 1812, the total amount of donations is over thirty-six million rubles; but we can safely assume that each of the provinces that were part of the first two districts donated at least 4 million rubles, and the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Smolensk and Tula provinces - much more; from among the provinces of the third district, Penza donated up to 21/2 million, and the others, with the exception of Kazan and Vyatka, donated up to 11/2 million rubles. According to this rough calculation, the provinces, having fielded 220 thousand warriors, sacrificed about sixty million rubles in money, supplies and supplies.”

There are other figures regarding the size of the militia.

For example, the Soviet historian P.A. Zhilin writes:

“The total number of militias in all three districts was 192,976. Of the nearly 200,000-strong militia army, 147,000 people took a direct part in the fight against the enemy during Napoleon’s stay in Moscow.”

According to calculations by V.I. Babkina, total in Russia "within a few weeks a militia army of 420,297 men was created."

But according to information from N.A. Troitsky, “more than 120 thousand militias joined the regular army and began fighting”, the rest “remained in reserve and performed very important security functions.”

As you can see, the figures vary widely and (especially among Soviet historians) do not inspire much confidence.

According to eyewitnesses, a significant part of those taken into the militia were “due to old age and state of health, she is completely unfit for military service”. There were many people aged 50–60 years and at the same time "in scabs and weakness of strength." The warriors had neither hats nor boots. There is no need to talk about decent weapons at all...

Matveev - warrior of the 1st squad of the St. Petersburg militia

For example, the warriors of the Moscow militia in the Mozhaisk district received only 5 rifles, 4 pistols, 34 sabers, 1600 pikes and 11 worthless cannons; in Kolomna district - 9 guns, 29 sabers, 11 cutlasses and 485 pikes. And so on in all counties.

Unfortunately, there were practically no real volunteers in the militia. For example, the future Decembrist D.I. Zavalishin recorded the words of one of these “volunteers”:

“If, gentlemen, you had told us then that there would be a reduction in service, that they would not force you into a coffin with sticks, that upon retirement you would not carry a bag, and that children would not be irrevocably accepted as soldiers, well, for that we would have went".

These are what they looked like in 1812 "the mighty patriotic forces of the masses." And it would be difficult to expect anything different from completely powerless people, practically slaves.

It should be noted that the provinces that were not among the sixteen “chosen” made donations of money, food, etc.

General M.I. Bogdanovich states:

“From the information that has reached us about this glorious era, we can conclude that the offerings from the provinces that were not included in the three militia districts amounted to at least 25 million rubles. But just as many of the donations in kind are not valued and are not even included in the available records, there is no doubt that these supplies, together with cash offerings, exceeded the shown number by at least one and a half times.”

The same military historian makes the final conclusion:

“Consequently, Russia, despite several recruitments made during 1811 and the first half of 1812, despite the devastation of many regions of the empire by the enemy,<…>brought a total benefit of at least one hundred million rubles.”

ON THE. Troitsky names a similar figure:

“In general, the population of the country donated 100 million rubles, that is, an amount equal to all the military expenditures of the empire for 1812 according to the state budget.”

Such figures look very serious, but we should not forget that money for the war was provided mainly by wealthy merchants and landowners. But, donating millions, they immediately returned them, “selling their goods quickly and at exorbitant prices.” On top of everything else, unprecedented theft flourished, and millions supposedly collected for the needs of the army went anywhere, but not into the army treasuries.

In this sense, General A.P. cites a simply egregious case in his “Notes”. Ermolov. According to him, General N.O. Laba, the chief provisions officer of the army, reported to the Minister of War that a warehouse containing several thousand quarters of oats and 64,000 pounds of hay had been burned in Velizh. All this was allegedly done with the laudable intention of denying the enemy the opportunity to take advantage of all this. But then it turned out that all this was a deception committed for the purpose of profit: the empty warehouse was burned, and money from the treasury was pocketed. On this occasion, combat general Ermolov said that “for such brazen robbery it would be worthy to burn the commission agent himself along with the store.”

There were a great many similar cases. This gave the historian E.V. Tarle has every right to write the following sorrowful words:

“The quartermaster unit was very poorly organized. Theft was indescribable."

As for the radical proposal of General Ermolov, it was useless: it was impossible, as E.V. writes. Tarle, “burn the entire provision department in its entirety.”

In 1812, the serf peasantry numbered 23 million people, or about 44% of the empire's population.

The living conditions of most serfs were simply monstrous, and, speaking about popular patriotism in 1812, many historians, as A.I. writes. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, “they are actively hushing up the realities of serfdom, trying in every possible way to embellish it.”

For what? Yes, to create the same myth about the “club of the people’s war.”

In fact, the peasants were extremely dissatisfied with their situation and their masters.

Historian E.V. Tarle states:

“Of course, the class struggle, the struggle of the serf peasantry against the landowners, did not stop in 1812, just as it did not stop for a single year, not for a single month both before and after 1812. But expelling the enemy from Russia became the top priority for the Russian peasantry throughout the second half of 1812.

The predator who invaded Russian borders brought the peasants not freedom, but new heavy chains. And the Russian peasantry understood this very well and appreciated it.

If the Russian serf peasantry very soon became convinced that they could not expect liberation from Napoleon, then it does not follow that in 1812 there was no peasant movement against serfdom in Russia at all. It undoubtedly existed, but the overwhelming majority of its hopes did not connect with the invasion<…>

The general impression is this: the peasants in 1812, in one place or another, rebelled against the landowners, as in previous and subsequent years. But the presence of an enemy army in the country, of course, did not strengthen, but, on the contrary, weakened the movement against the landowners. The mercilessly robbing enemy decisively diverted the attention of the peasants from the landowners, and the thought of the impending destruction of Russia, of the enslavement of the entire Russian people by a foreign predator and rapist came more and more to the fore.<…>The feeling of homeland flared up among the people, especially after the death of Smolensk.”

In fact, this is all just another myth. Peasant unrest flared everywhere in Russia in 1812, and no enemy distracted the attention of the peasants from their main enemies - the landowners.

Even the Soviet historian V.I. Babkin admits that the peasants fought in 1812 “simultaneously with the enemy and with the local landowners. They attacked estates and took away grain.”

Accordingly, in 1812, the landowners were more afraid not of the French, but of the rebellion of their serfs. As a result, as E.V. writes. Tarle, “Very many of the landowners simply ran away from their villages to the capitals and provincial cities.” The French military authorities took Russian landowners under their protection and allocated special detachments to suppress peasant unrest.

On the other hand, Napoleon perfectly understood the “hidden reserves” of this phenomenon and even wrote to his stepson, General Eugene de Beauharnais:

“Let me know what kind of decree and proclamation could be issued in order to incite an uprising of peasants in Russia and win them over to our side.”

They say that, already in Moscow, Napoleon ordered to find in the surviving archives everything that related to the peasant revolt of 1773–1775. At the same time, he was especially interested in the latest appeals of Emelyan Pugachev. Even drafts of similar appeals to the Russian people were written.

V.N. Kurdyumov. Looting of a landowner's estate

V.V. Vereshchagin. Caught rioters. Hands covered in gunpowder? Shoot!

And Napoleon, talking with Madame Marie-Rose Aubert-Chalmet, the owner of a very large Moscow store of women's clothing and luxury goods, asked her:

– What do you think about the liberation of Russian peasants?

She replied that, in her opinion, perhaps one third of them would appreciate this benefit, while others would not even understand what they were trying to say.

“But conversations following the example of the first would carry others along,” Napoleon objected.

“Sir, give up this delusion,” his interlocutor assured him. – It’s not like in Europe here. The Russian is distrustful, it is difficult to induce him to revolt. The nobles would not be slow to take advantage of this moment of hesitation. These new ideas would immediately be presented as anti-religious and wicked. It would be difficult, even impossible, to captivate them.

Ultimately, Napoleon abandoned his intention to try to incite a rebellion among the Russian peasants, because their protests against their masters took place without special efforts on his part.

Then he said:

– I am waging only a political war against Russia... I could arm the largest part of its population against her by proclaiming the emancipation of the slaves; in many villages I was asked for this. But when I saw the brutalization of this large class of the Russian people, I abandoned this measure, which would have handed over many families to death and the most terrible torment.

Nevertheless, as Soviet historians have calculated, in 1812 there were 67 anti-serfdom uprisings in Russia, but M. Goldenkov is sure that “This figure is greatly underestimated and needs clarification.”

In particular, the peasants of the village of Trostyany, Borisov povet, killed their landowner Glazko along with his entire family of nine people. The act of reprisal against the landowner was committed under the following circumstances. As the French approached, the peasants fled into the forest, followed by the landowner, but he continued to demand that they perform backbreaking work and subject them to punishments even more inhuman than before. In response to this, the angry peasants dealt with the landowner, and at the same time with his family. At the same time, the corpses of all those killed were dumped in the courtyard of the landowner's estate and burned at the stake. The manor's house and all outbuildings were also burned.

In the Lepelsky district, the rebel peasants of the landowner Malyshev destroyed the estate of their master, took bread and 5,000 rubles of money from him, the peasants of the Porkhovsky and Novorzhevsky districts, united in a detachment, attacked the village of Kostomary at night, killed the landowner Kalubakin and took away the master's property...

In the Vitebsk province there was not a single district where the peasants did not oppose their landowners.

The Marquis de Pastore, appointed intendant of the Vitebsk province by Napoleon, says in his “Notes”:

“Attachment to the land, the obligation to give part of one’s working time to the masters, the requirement of the master’s permission to marry, the prohibition to marry a woman from another estate, punishment at the master’s discretion, merciless corporal punishment at his peremptory order, the possibility of a complete change in the fate of a person who has grown old in engaging in some kind of craft, and turning it over to soldiers or sailors - we find all this in the cold climate of Belarus.”

The Marquis complains that a terrible disorder reigned in the villages of the Vitebsk province as a result of the peasant uprising, which “they were inspired that freedom is nothing more than extreme self-will.”

It is known that the Vitebsk Polish nobles turned to Napoleon with a request to suppress the unrest that violated their rights.

Peasant uprisings were also suppressed by Russian troops. For example, the peasants of the Polotsk district defeated the punitive detachment of Lieutenant Kvitkovsky, sent to pacify their uprising. It was later suppressed by a cavalry squadron allocated by General P.Kh. Wittgenstein.

Peasants of Drizinsky district, “having gathered in large numbers and settled in a large forest, they used it to attack various enemy transports and landowners.” And this uprising was suppressed by military force. The organizers of the performance, Kovzel and Guzik, were court-martialed and “ to the abstinence of others executed by death».

It should be said that Alexander I took precautionary measures long before the war: seeing that war with Napoleon was inevitable, and fearing popular uprisings, he ordered punitive detachments to be placed in advance in each province to suppress them - "half a battalion of 300 people each."

During the war, peasant revolts against their landowners and arson of estates took place in the Minsk province. The French governor of the city of Borisov, responding to the requests of these landowners, already at the end of July 1812 was forced to send a punitive detachment to the Esmonsky volost.

Peasant unrest occurred in Smolensk, Kostroma, Kaluga, Oryol, Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Saratov and other provinces.

Even in the Moscow province there were unrest. For example, on one estate in the vicinity of Mozhaisk, peasants killed the Scottish manager, plundered and burned the landowner's house and fled to the forests and neighboring villages. And on the estate of Count M.A. Dmitriev-Mamonov, two peasants convinced their comrades that they no longer belonged to the count, since Bonaparte was in Moscow and now he was their sovereign.

In Arkhangelsk, on the estate of Prince N.B. Yusupov, where the owner collected an excellent collection of works of art, the peasants strewn the gardens with fragments of statues made of Carrara marble by famous Italian sculptors. Calm was restored only by a detachment of mounted police.

Similar examples could be given for a very long time.

M. Goldenkov absolutely correctly says that “The war with Napoleon, like a litmus test, clearly demonstrated the true attitude of the majority of peasants towards their masters and that, in principle, any conqueror can be regarded by a slave as a liberator.”

Let us emphasize once again that regular Russian troops were very often used to suppress peasant uprisings. For example, in the Pskov province, the rebel peasants of the landowner Repninsky captured the village of Kamenki, and then formed a detachment of 1000 people who began to destroy the landowners' estates. To suppress it, General P.Kh. Wittgenstein was forced to send an entire regiment. His commander tried to persuade the peasants to go home peacefully, but this did not help. As a result, armed reprisals followed and the main “disturbers” were executed.

In the Dorogobuzh district, the peasants declared themselves free, but a military detachment under the command of Colonel Dibich was sent to pacify them, on whose orders the peasant leaders of this uprising were shot.

As we see, in all these cases, Russian peasants clearly did not fight against the “French occupiers.” In fact, it was more like a civil war...

As noted by V.I. Babkin, “There are known cases when the nobility, in the interests of preserving their class privileges, took the path of treason, often turning to the enemy for assistance. This is what the nobles of the Vitebsk province did, for example. Frightened by the rebellious peasants, they turned to the French governor in Vitebsk, General Charpentier, for military assistance. And Napoleonic’s governor sent punitive detachments of French troops to the villages, who mercilessly dealt with Russian peasants, restoring the privileges of the landowners.”

The same thing happened in the Smolensk region.

But in the Volokolamsk district, the local administration turned out to be powerless against the rebel peasants, and General F.F. Winzengerode, rightfully considered the first Russian army partisan, allocated as many as two regiments of regular troops.

The anti-serfdom uprising of the warriors of the Penza militia, which took place in December 1812 in three cities of the province - Insar, Saransk and Chembar, is also well known.

The head of the Penza militia was retired Major General N.F. Kishensky. And the reason for the uprising was a rumor that suddenly spread among the warriors that there was a royal decree declaring freedom to all participants in the war, but the noble commanders were hiding this decree.

There was another serious reason for the warriors’ dissatisfaction: they were very poorly fed.

This was the main reason for the uprising. Pogroms were carried out: the property of nobles, merchants and commoners was plundered. At the same time, local residents actively helped the warriors.

Penza landowner I. Shishkin, an eyewitness to the events, later wrote about the goals of this uprising:

“They wanted, having exterminated the officers, to go with a whole militia to the active army; appear directly on the battlefield, attack the enemy and defeat him; Then<…>as a reward for your service, beg for forgiveness and eternal freedom from the possession of the landowners.”

Regular troops were once again sent to suppress this uprising, in which up to 7,200 people took part. As a result, the main participants in the unrest (more than 300 people in total) were punished with spitzrutens, sticks and whips. According to eyewitnesses, “The blood of the guilty warriors flowed for three days, and many of them lost their lives under the blows of the executioners! Of the surviving warriors who remained after punishment, some were sent to hard labor, some to settlement, and others to eternal service in further Siberian garrisons.”

The abandonment of Moscow caused strong irritation among the common people against Emperor Alexander. His sister, Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna, wrote to her brother from Yaroslavl:

“Discontent has reached its highest degree, and your person is far from being spared. Judge the rest by what comes to my attention. You are openly accused of the misfortune that has befallen your state, of the ruin of general and private individuals, and finally, of the fact that both Russia and you personally have been dishonored. Not just one class of the population, but everyone unanimously shouts against you.”

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1812 MIRF. Part 13. P. 241.

18:07 — REGNUM

The problem of the history of the people's militias of 1812 occupied a special place in Russian historiography. The literature addressed issues related to the procedure for their formation, financing, provision of uniforms and food. The people's militia was created even earlier, in 1806-1807, on the basis of which a new militia would be created in 1812 at a decisive moment in Russian history.

The militia of 1806, called the “Zemstvo army” or “militia” in the manifesto, was formed in seven regions, including 31 provinces, and numbered 612 thousand warriors in its ranks. It was created on the following grounds: each landowner, “state-owned village” and petty bourgeois society, within a two-week period, had to provide the required number of people armed, uniformed and provided with a three-month salary and food.

The warriors enlisted in the militia, before they marched to the units of the active army, had to remain in their villages, on the landowners' estates and, "while living in their peasant life, correct all those duties that they are obliged to do under the zemstvo and volost administration." The command staff of the militia was elected by the nobility. The commander-in-chief of the regional militia was appointed by the emperor “from among the individuals who, through loyalty, service and merit, acquired a public power of attorney.” All local administrative authorities were subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the regional militia. All his orders concerning the formation of the militia were to be carried out, as defined in the manifesto, “with precision, fidelity and haste.”

However, the full power that was vested in the commander-in-chief of the regional militia was intended primarily to, as stated in the manifesto, “in the event of a violation of order and tranquility, where you recognize the usual measures of landowner and judicial action as insufficient to quickly speed up the disobedient and where You will find it necessary to set an example of severity and cut off the attempt at the very root.” Consequently, the commander-in-chief of the militia had unlimited rights to suppress peasant uprisings in the areas where the militia was formed.

The militia of 1806 had a complete organization that determined the mutual relations of the commanders and the order of supply. The first conscription of warriors for military service took place in the spring of 1807, during a period of increased danger of an invasion of Napoleonic troops into Russia. But soon the Tilsit Peace was concluded. The enemy no longer threatened to invade, and therefore there was no longer any need to maintain such a large militia. According to the manifesto of September 27, 1807, it was dissolved. But in violation of his promise not to convert warriors into recruits, the tsar allowed 177 thousand of the 200 thousand soldiers who were to return home to be converted into recruits. The preservation of the recruitment system made itself felt with particular force in 1812.

The task of forming people's militias as one of the reserves of a large active army arose already at the first stage of the war. The militia was the second source of manning the active army.

Before the appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief, this source of strength of the Russian people was not widely used to fight the enemy. The tsarist government and the Ministry of War expected to wage the war relying only on the army. Tsarism and the landowners did not believe in the strength of their serf people and were afraid of them.

To defeat the enemy in the just Patriotic War of 1812, Kutuzov included in the content of his strategy as its most important element the attraction of the broad masses of the people by organizing the partisan movement and creating a mass militia.

On July 6, 1812, a manifesto was published on the convening of the militia, which called on the Russian people against the enemy in military operations: “Russian people! Brave offspring of the brave Slavs! You have repeatedly crushed the teeth of lions and tigers rushing at you, unite everyone: with the cross in heart and with weapons in hands, no human forces will defeat you." The Russian people greeted him with great patriotic enthusiasm. The call to join the militia found a particularly wide response among the peasantry. Tens of thousands of peasants sought to join the ranks of the militia. They viewed service in the militia as a feat, the reward for which would be liberation from serfdom.

According to the manifesto of July 18 “On the Formation of a Temporary Internal Militia,” the government decided to limit the area for the formation of the militia to 16 provinces in the central part of Russia and the Volga region. At the same time, it was based on the following considerations: firstly, it was necessary to preserve areas for the next recruitment drives; secondly, the government sought to ensure that the patriotic movement caused by the creation of the militia did not get out of the control of the nobility. The creation of a militia was supposed to be a matter only for the nobility.

The militia provinces were distributed in three districts as follows. The first district included the provinces: Moscow, Vladimir, Kaluga, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tula, Tver and Yaroslavl; in II - St. Petersburg and Novgorod; in III - Nizhny Novgorod, Kostroma, Kazan, Vyatka, Simbirsk and Penza.

The manifesto set specific objectives for each district. The militia of the 1st district was required to take “the fastest active measures to assemble, arm and organize the internal forces that should protect our capital city, Moscow, and the borders of the entire district.” The task of the militia of the 2nd district was to reinforce the troops supporting the St. Petersburg direction. The 3rd district was ordered only to “prepare, recruit and appoint people, but before the order, do not gather them and do not take them away from rural work.” Thus, initially the militia of the III district was assigned the role of reserve. The 1st militia district was headed by infantry general Count F.V. Rostopchin, the 2nd militia district was headed by infantry general Count M.I. Golenishchev - Kutuzov; 3rd (reserve) militia district, headed by Lieutenant General Count P.A. Tolstoy.

The formation of the militia took place with great enthusiasm. In Moscow it began immediately upon receipt of the manifesto. On July 28 (August 9), the head of the Moscow militia was elected. He became a military, honored general, an associate of Suvorov I.I. Markov. At the same time, 2 committees were established: one for enrolling in the militia, providing it with weapons and food, the other for accepting donations from the population. Moscow and the Moscow province provided the largest number of militias - 12 regiments with a total number of 25.8 thousand people. The composition of the militia is peasants, courtyard people, artisans, townspeople, intellectuals, nobles. There were poets among the Moscow militias V.A. Zhukovsky, P.A. Vyazemsky, A.S. Griboyedov, editor of "Russian Messenger" S.N. Glinka and other famous people in Russia.

In mid-July, the formation of a people's militia began in the St. Petersburg and Novgorod provinces. In the St. Petersburg province, as in the Moscow province, the highest standard for the representation of warriors in the militia was adopted. In total, it was planned to supply 13,643 people from the St. Petersburg province. The militia was made up of mounted and foot soldiers.

Simultaneously with the St. Petersburg militia, the Novgorod militia was also created. On July 14, the noble assembly decided to form a militia of 10 thousand people with the participation of the city population. A Militia Committee was immediately elected. On July 21, a noble meeting with the participation of district leaders elected regiment commanders. A general from the infantry was elected head of the Novgorod militia N.S. Svechin. Other officer ranks were elected by the nobility in the districts. Hundreds and thousands of peasants, artisans and patriotic townspeople were nevertheless deprived of the opportunity to voluntarily join the militia. The creation of infantry, cavalry, and artillery reserves and the massive nature of the militia made it possible for Kutuzov to successfully solve one of the central strategic problems.

At the time of the counter-offensive of the Russian army, the militia of the 1st district took part in all famous battles: the Battle of Tarutino, the Battle of Maloyaroslavl, the Battle of Red, the Battle of Vyazma, the Battle of Berezina. Also, the militia independently liberated many cities and villages. Many militias were busy escorting prisoners. And after the enemy was expelled from the Russian borders, most of the militia of the 1st district remained in the provinces, where they began to restore what had been destroyed.

Wittgenstein in the St. Petersburg direction, before the militia came to his location, he suffered great setbacks; he was unable to capture Polotsk. For three months, Wittgenstein's corps distracted significant enemy forces with its active actions. At the end of September, the corps was reinforced by warriors of the St. Petersburg and Novgorod militias and units of Lieutenant General Steingel.

October 6, 1812 arrived - the day of the battle for the liberation of Polotsk, which coincided in time with the Battle of Tarutino. Early on a cloudy morning, cannon shots and the crackle of a rifle were heard in the forest near Yurevichi - the vanguard of the lieutenant general entered the battle Berg. After fierce battles, the left bank of the river. Polota was cleared of the enemy.

On October 7, 1812, the enemy tried to attack the vanguard of the Russian troops in the morning, but was repulsed. Under Russian artillery fire, the French were forced to abandon the outer line of defense. Meanwhile, the detachment of Major General Alekseeva, which included the 15th squad, attacked the enemy at Struyna. Having lost the outer line of fortifications, the enemy retreated to the city. Realizing that it would not be possible to stay in Polotsk, the French commander Saint-Cyr decided on the night of October 8 to begin crossing the river. Dvina. However, he failed to do this in a calm atmosphere.

At 2 a.m. on October 7–8, the assault began. The first to burst into the city engulfed in flames were units of Major General Vlastova, Dibich and Colonel Roediger. Following the vanguard, the 12th squad, despite heavy rifle fire, crossed the bridge “100 steps long, leading to the outpost at the Poloti River, rushed to the palisades, cut them down with axes and was the first to enter the city.” Having burst into the city, she entered into hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. Following the 12th squad, the 14th, 3rd and 9th squads entered.

The enemy put up fierce resistance on the streets of Polotsk. He clung to every house, and a real battle unfolded on the main street. The enemy battery opened fire on the ranks of Russian soldiers. However, this did not stop the warriors of the 12th squad. “Three times the Russian militias, who formed the front of the attack, rushed to the guns, three times they were repulsed... now they have already captured several of our guns. They remain the winners. Our soldiers, exhausted from fatigue and from deprivation, covered with wounds, are retreating,” - the French marquis wrote in his memoirs Pastori. By the morning of October 8, the entire city was cleared of the enemy.

On November 4, 1812, Wittgenstein read a letter from Kutuzov to the troops, which highly appreciated the successes of the Russian army near Polotsk and Chashniki.

On November 10, Wittgenstein’s corps, after an eight-day rest, set out from the town of Chashniki. On November 14, Wittgenstein’s main forces were joined by a detachment of Adjutant General Golenishchev-Kutuzov. Through the captured colonel of the hussar regiment they learned that Napoleon is located near Borisov and that his troops are crossing the river. Berezina under cover of the hull Victor. On November 15, Wittgenstein’s corps, together with the militia, marched towards Borisov. Steingel's detachment, operating in the vanguard, cut off part of the rearguard of Victor's corps, and in the evening at Borisov the enemy was attacked by the main forces and defeated. Large trophies and prisoners were captured.

In the battle of November 15, the 2nd brigade of the Novgorod militia, and especially the 4th, 6th and 11th squads, operating in the vanguard of General Shteingel, distinguished themselves.

The next day, November 16, Lieutenant General Berg's units began the battle at the crossing of the Berezina. From the first position the enemy was knocked out by 10 o'clock. To attack the second, stronger position, reinforcements were required. Here the detachment of the major general arrived in time Foka, who took on strong enemy counterattacks and repulsed them with grapeshots. The enemy then launched a desperate cavalry attack with four squadrons. However, the Voronezh regiment and the 15th squad of the St. Petersburg militia, having allowed the enemy to come very close, opened friendly fire and shouted “Hurray!” struck with bayonets, promptly rescuing their guns.

The Novgorod warriors did not lag behind in courage and fearlessness. In all battles, the document testifies, these warriors were “in the most dangerous places, maintaining courage, and were extremely brave.”

On November 17, at dawn, the fighting resumed. The enemy, with the remnants of the troops that survived the crossing, having almost completely lost their convoy and artillery, fled for their lives. But, retreating, he destroyed the bridge behind him. The restoration of the bridge again fell to the militia. But in order to begin restoration work, it was necessary to clear the space in front of the bridge, which “was cluttered for more than a square mile with a convoy consisting of carriages, carriages, droshky, wagons and carts loaded with the stolen wealth of Moscow... The entire battle site and the entire space, occupied by the convoy was littered with dead or dying...", Shteingel testifies. Three squads of the St. Petersburg militia had to spend the whole day clearing the path to the bridge.

On November 20, Wittgenstein's troops and Chichagova connected. On December 17, Wittgenstein's corps reached the border with Prussia and occupied Jurburg. The 13th and 15th squads of the St. Petersburg militia were left here to perform garrison service. The 14th squad of the St. Petersburg militia was left for the same purposes in Vilkomir, the 10th and 11th squads under the command of a colonel were left in Kaidany Alalykina. The colonel's 8th squad was assigned to escort prisoners. Dubeysky.

So, in mid-December, the fighting of the militia of the 2nd District within Russia ended. The St. Petersburg and Novgorod militias, together with Wittgenstein’s troops, entered Prussian territory. In heavy battles, 814 people were killed, 710 missing and 1,524 wounded from the ranks of the militia.

The unprecedented defeat of Napoleonic hordes in Russia served as a signal for the liberation of the peoples of Europe. Napoleon's defeat shook the foundations of his empire and then predetermined its collapse. At the end of the Patriotic War, the militia’s combat activities as a reserve force do not stop. Together with the army, many militia regiments went on foreign campaigns and took part in the liberation of the peoples of Western Europe from the Napoleonic yoke.

junior researcher at the exhibition department of the State Institution "National Historical and Cultural Museum-Reserve "Nesvizh" (Belarus) Karpach Olga Nikolaevna

LIST OF SOURCES AND REFERENCES

1. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812: Sat. doc. M., 1962.

2. Babkin V.I. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962.

3. Beskrovny L. Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962.

4. Zhilin P.A. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. M., 1968.

5. Zhilin P.A. Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1928.

6. Tarle S.V. 1812 M., 1961.

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