The defeat of the Western Front is the heaviest defeat of the Red Army in the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and commanders, a huge amount of military equipment and equipment were lost in the encirclement between Bialystok and Minsk. Captured enemy documents, declassified only at the beginning of the 21st century (TsAMO, f. 500, op. 12462, d. 606, 625) allow us to look at this tragedy from a new, previously unknown side.
((direct))
The Western Special Military District, on the basis of whose command and troops the Western Front was deployed, was the second (after the Kyiv Special Military District) military district of the USSR in terms of numbers and combat power. In accordance with the pre-war plans of the high command of the Red Army, the following tasks were set for the troops of the Western Front:
“By striking the left wing of the front in the general direction of Sedlec, Radom will help the Southwestern Front to defeat the enemy’s Lublin-Radom group... On the 3rd day of the operation, seize Sedlec with mobile units and on the 5th day, cross the river. Vistula ( attack to a depth of about 120 km. – M.S.); with the main forces on the 8th day to reach the river. The Vistula is ready to cross it. In the future, keep in mind the actions on Radom ( 200 km southwest of Brest. – M.S. ) with the aim of completely encircling the enemy’s Lublin group in cooperation with the Southwestern Front.
To ensure the main attack of the front, launch an auxiliary attack in the direction of Bialystok - Warsaw, with the task of capturing Warsaw and moving the defense to the river. Narev.
The stubborn defense of the armies of the right wing of the front in the river sector. Neman, Ostroleka firmly cover the directions to Lida and Volkovysk - Baranovichi.”
Non-mobilized units
The war that began on the morning of June 22 found the troops of the Western Front on the move, at a time when they did not have time to either complete the deployment of the planned offensive group or begin building an improvised defensive group. In the randomly formed “first echelon” of the front (3rd, 10th, 4th armies) there were 13 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions, 4 mechanized corps (that is, 8 tank and 4 motorized divisions). Another 11 rifle divisions were on the march, at a distance of 100 to 350 km from the border, with the task of reaching the planned deployment areas by July 1. The two emerging mechanized corps (17th and 20th), located in the depths of the front formation (in the Baranovichi and Borisov areas, respectively), were “mechanized” only in name. Three armies (22nd, 20th, 21st) of the Second Strategic Echelon were deployed in the deep operational rear of the front on the line Vitebsk, Smolensk, Gomel. The concentration of these reserve armies of the Civil Code should have been completed only by July 3–5.
For the offensive in Belarus, the enemy concentrated Army Group Center (9th and 4th field armies, 3rd and 2nd tank groups). This was the most powerful group of German troops, surpassing the other two Wehrmacht army groups on the Eastern Front (“North” and “South”) combined in terms of the number of tanks and tank divisions. The outlines of the border and the road network suggested a very obvious plan of operation: delivering two powerful strikes with tank formations under the base of the “Bialystok bulge”, followed by encircling the entire group of Soviet troops. The 2nd Panzer Group under the command of Colonel General Heinz Guderian, after breaking through the front in the Brest area, was supposed to attack in two directions: Baranovichi - Minsk and Slutsk - Bobruisk. The 3rd Panzer Group, under the command of Colonel General Hermann Hoth, broke through the front north of Grodno (that is, in the defense zone of the Baltic Special Military District) and, after capturing Vilnius, developed an offensive to the southeast, through Molodechno to Minsk.
Army Group Center consisted of 31 infantry, 9 tank, 1 cavalry and 7 “calculated” (including motorized units and Waffen-SS formations) motorized divisions. Formally speaking, the numerical superiority of the Wehrmacht was very modest - 48 German divisions against 43 Soviet (two cavalry divisions of the Red Army are counted here as one “calculated division”). The attacking side (Wehrmacht) did not have quantitative superiority in tanks. Thus, the four mechanized corps of the Western Front (excluding the emerging 17th and 20th MKs, tank regiments of cavalry divisions and hundreds of light amphibious tanks as part of rifle divisions) had 2345 tanks, and the tank divisions of the GA "Center" had a total of 1936 tanks (to this number should also be added 280 self-propelled guns of various types as part of separate divisions of “assault guns” and self-propelled “tank destroyers”).
However, it is necessary to take into account that the German troops were completely mobilized, while it was not possible to complete the transfer of formations and units of the Red Army to wartime states within the framework of the hidden mobilization that began in May 1941 under the guise of the “Great Training Camp”. The rifle divisions of the Western OVO, with a staff strength of 14.5 thousand people, had 10–12 thousand personnel each; Motorized formations could only be fully equipped with cars and tractors (artillery tractors) after the announcement of open mobilization. The planned time frame for complete mobilization was 1–2 days for rifle divisions, 3–5 days for tank and motorized divisions.
Was defeat inevitable?
In such a situation, the outcome of the defensive operation in Belarus (if we take into account only military operational considerations, leaving everything else out of the equation) was determined mainly by two factors.
Firstly, the ability of units and formations of the first operational echelon of the Western Front to delay, relying on natural (the Bug, Biebzha, Neman rivers) and man-made (about 500 pillboxes of the Grodno, Osovetsky, Zambrovo and Brest fortified areas) defensive lines, the offensive of numerically superior enemy forces on 3–4 days. This would make it possible to complete the main part of the mobilization activities, replenish the troops with personnel and vehicles, and also significantly strengthen the defense by bringing 11 fresh “second echelon” rifle divisions to the front.
Secondly, the ability of the 6th mechanized corps to deliver a powerful counterattack. This almost fully equipped mechanized corps was stationed in the Bialystok area (that is, in the very center of the “Bialystok bulge”) and even before the start of hostilities received 1,131 tanks (including 452 of the latest T-34 and KV), 294 tractors/tractors, 4,779 vehicles and 1042 motorcycles. Probably the most promising could be the attack of the 6th MK towards Warsaw, which was separated from the then western border of the USSR by less than 100 km along the highway. In Warsaw there were the headquarters of the Civil Aviation Center "Center", the most important logistical supply bases for the enemy, and a large railway junction. By decisively massing forces in the directions of the main attack (at the bases of the “Bialystok salient” in the area of Brest and Grodno), the German command inevitably weakened the center of its operational formation, where 10 infantry divisions stretched “in a thread” covered a section of the border with a length of 150 km. According to all the canons of military science, such a “thread” could not withstand the concentrated attack of a thousand tanks.
Unfortunately, none of the tasks set by the front command was solved; the counterattack of the 6th and 11th mechanized corps was reduced to scattered and uncertain attempts to stop the advance of the German infantry in the area south of Grodno (Sidra, Kuznitsa, Indura), which the enemy assessed as “individual attacks (10–20 tanks each) of local importance.” On the evening of June 25, the command of the Western Front gave the order for a general retreat to the Lida-Slonim-Pinsk line, but for the demoralized and already practically uncontrollable troops, this order only served as an impetus for the start of a disorderly retreat, and the columns stretching for tens of kilometers became a defenseless target for German aircraft.
On June 27–28, German “tank wedges” closed the encirclement near Minsk. According to Soviet historians, of the 44 divisions of the Western Front, 24 were completely defeated, the remaining 20 divisions lost from 30 to 90 percent of their forces and assets. The final report from the headquarters of the GA “Center” states that in the Bialystok-Minsk region, 3,188 tanks, 1,830 guns were destroyed or captured, and 338.5 thousand people were captured. Irreversible (killed and missing) enemy losses turned out to be 35–40 times less.
“The surprise at crossing the border was completely successful”
Now let’s turn to the documents in which German officers subordinate to the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, recorded the results of each day of the campaign to the east that began so victoriously for the Wehrmacht.
22nd of JuneThe offensive is developing successfully. The enemy offers mostly weak resistance. It seems that he is taken by surprise. Bridges across the Bug River: they captured the bridge near Koden, the railway bridge near Brest and the Fronolov bridge. By 6.00, the advanced attacking units had advanced mainly to a depth of 4–5 km east of the Bug River. Drogichin is busy. In Brest, especially in the fortress, resistance is intensifying...
47 AK ( army corps. –M.S.) crossed the road Kremenets - Brest. Captured prisoners of war are happy that they were captured. Russian soldiers are in a bad mood...
General impression of the enemy: along the entire front of the 9th Army the resistance is still weak, in some places light artillery is firing...
The surprise at crossing the border was completely successful. From about 9.00, enemy resistance began to partially intensify. In some areas there is still only scattered resistance from a poorly controlled enemy...
On this side of the Neman River, units of eight enemy divisions were installed, which were not fully prepared for defense and were literally dumbfounded by our offensive. The enemy's plans have not yet been established...
At the first contact of all corps with the enemy, his resistance is insignificant. The Russians are firing weak artillery...
The Russian soldiers are in a bad mood, in particular due to poor food supplies. The soldiers don't want to hear anything about politics...
June 23According to a report from the 1-C department of the 4th Army headquarters, the enemy did not change the method of conducting combat operations. With weak artillery operations, the enemy fights stubbornly and desperately in places. There have been no reports yet of defectors or Russian soldiers who have surrendered. The number of prisoners is still small...
The enemy continues to retreat, offering resistance that is barely worth mentioning. The advanced detachments of our tank units crossed the state border and have already gone deep into enemy territory up to 100 km, without encountering serious resistance...
The enemy continues to retreat in front of the 3rd Panzer Group to the east and in the direction of Vilnius and in some places offers weak resistance...
Enemy resistance was noted only in the area of N. P. ( locality. – M.S.) Olita ( Alytus. – M.S.), where the 3rd Panzer Group encountered the 5th Tank Division ( tank division. – M.S.) Russians (to yesterday's report of 80 destroyed Russian tanks, another 60 were added today, so the total number of destroyed Russian tanks was 140)...
The enemy's actions took on a more systematic character. In the Lomza sector, the 8th, 2nd and 27th divisions retreat to the Biebrza River line. The testimony of the prisoners confirms that the enemy intends to hold this position...
Russians often fight to the last, and in some cases, in order to avoid being captured, they prefer to shoot themselves (presumably on the orders of political instructors). The enemy is suffering heavy losses in manpower, the number of prisoners is insignificant...
The enemy's retreat was established on June 23 through Vilnius to the southeast, east and northeast. The destruction of bridges by the enemy was not found anywhere...
June 24Combat tactics. As one would expect, in most cases the enemy defends himself staunchly and does not surrender even in the most hopeless situations. It seems that the Russians were led to believe that the Germans were shooting every prisoner...
In the first half of the day and at noon, the 20th AK was attacked by enemy tank units ( This is the first message about the beginning of the counterattack of the 6th mechanized corps. – M.S.). U N. Sidra village 162nd Infantry Division ( infantry division. – M.S.) a tank attack from N. was repulsed. n. Sokulka, as a result of which 7 tanks were destroyed. Enemy tank formation (about 150 tanks) from the side of the village. n. Indura attacked the 256th Infantry Division near the village. n. Kuznitsa. The fight is still going on...
Tank battles continue to the south and southwest of Grodno. The numbers of enemy tank formations have not yet been clarified. Perhaps this is the 7th or 9th TD. The enemy attacks the 256th Infantry Division in the direction of Kuznitsa and parts of the 8th AK in the northern direction towards Grodno...
Heavy fighting is taking place near Varen and west of Vilnius. At the moment, about 1,500 people have been captured. In the area of Varena, Olita, Vilnius, 60 aircraft were captured, some of them were not damaged. At the moment, no Russian aviation activity has been observed. At the Varena station a carriage with an explosive agent was seized ( toxic substances. – M.S.). Their analysis data will follow later...
June 25During the night n. The villages of Sidra and Dombrova from the west and south were attacked presumably by two enemy divisions using tanks and cavalry. Yesterday's tank attacks on Kuznitsa and the area south of Grodno appear to be over. Large motorized columns are moving along the roads Indura - Ross and Indura - B. Berestovitsa in an unknown direction...
In battles south of Grodno, 67 enemy tanks were destroyed, of which 20 were destroyed by batteries of self-propelled “assault guns”, 20 by artillery and 27 by anti-aircraft gun fire. The data is preliminary, it is still being clarified...
South-west of Grodno on the Dombrova-Sidra-Kuznitsa line, enemy tank attacks continue from the southern, southwestern, southern and eastern directions. Data on the number of destroyed tanks has not yet been received...
The tank battles near Grodno were not a large planned offensive, rather they were individual attacks (10–20 tanks each) of local significance. The counterattack was intended to stop the German advance on Indura. Sometimes people in civilian clothes were found in damaged tanks. Abandoned tanks were found in the forests...
From the testimonies of the Ukrainians who defected, it became clear that they thought that the Germans were shooting all the prisoners, and only German leaflets explained to them their mistake. The contents of the leaflets are actively discussed among Russian soldiers...
South of Voronovo, 200 Cossacks came over to our side...
June 26Leaflets were found among defectors and prisoners as passes, which is the first visible result of the action of the leaflets...
Undamaged tanks without crews discovered in the forests allow us to conclude that the crews are waiting in reliable shelters for the moment to attack ( The German staff officers did not find any other explanation for the presence of intact tanks abandoned by the crews. – M.S.)…
At 15.30, a 50-km convoy of equipment from all types of troops was discovered, moving in an easterly direction, from Bialystok to Volkovysk.
Enemy resistance was noted only on the left flank of the 4th Army southwest and south of Bialystok, as well as in the area of operations of the 2nd Tank Group near Baranovichi. On June 26, there were no more attempts to break through enemy troops on a large scale. There was a general tendency towards retreat in an easterly direction. Large columns are moving along all the main roads from the Bialystok area in an eastern direction...
The number of prisoners currently reaches approximately 18 thousand people...
Tragic ending
June 29In some cases, the enemy still puts up stubborn and fierce resistance. Mainly strives for a breakthrough and retreat to the east. There is no sense of unified leadership of the breakthrough and withdrawal operation...
A very large percentage of Russian troops hid in a vast, not completely combed area of forests, fields, swamps, etc. The fact that Russians in most cases try to avoid capture by all possible means is facilitated by their fear of being immediately shot or subjected to bullying upon capture. as well as the opportunity to escape from a huge, vast battlefield without much difficulty...
30 JuneWhile the encirclement is being completed and the rear area is being combed, the enemy is still putting up desperate resistance. The enemy’s artillery and aviation are inactive...
The enemy in the Minsk area appears to be demoralized. It no longer offers any organized resistance, but still, in groups of up to a regiment, from time to time strikes in order to release its encircled troops, sometimes with the support of tanks...
Yesterday, enemy attack aircraft repeatedly carried out raids on the command post of the 3rd Tank Group, there were losses...
Soldiers of the 17th Infantry Division captured near the city of Lida ( rifle division. – M.S.) testified that they received orders to remove their insignia, buttonholes and, if possible, change into civilian clothes...
The testimony of prisoners allows us to conclude that the majority of political commissars in the troops avoid capture by fleeing during the battle (presumably in civilian clothes)...
July 1The Slonim - Volkovysk - Pruzhany area has been cleared of the remnants of the enemy, who is putting up fierce but unorganized resistance. A lot of weapons (primarily guns), equipment and horses fell into our hands. The Russians suffered huge losses in manpower, there were few prisoners...
On the night of June 30 to July 1, stubborn fighting continued only near Zelva; in other areas the enemy offered little resistance, and in part there are signs of complete demoralization. The number of prisoners and trophies increases. Their total number is still difficult to establish. It is advisable to continue distributing leaflets. There are many cases of joyful meeting by the population of our troops...
In previous battles, the main forces of the Russian army operating in front of the army group front were destroyed. Given the disproportionately large enemy losses in manpower, the number of prisoners, according to preliminary data, exceeded 90 thousand people. Today there are 1,800 captured or destroyed tanks, 1,000 captured guns, as well as a huge number of other trophies.
3 JulyIn battles to destroy the enemy in the Bialystok - Volkovysk region, 116 thousand prisoners of war, 1,505 guns, 1,964 tanks, 327 aircraft have been captured, destroyed or captured to date. Their number is increasing. Other trophies cannot be counted. According to incomplete data, the losses of the 4th, 9th armies and 3rd tank group are: 221 officers and 2655 soldiers were killed, 389 officers and 7125 soldiers were wounded, 20 officers and 945 soldiers were missing...
4th of JulyThe enemy in Nalibokskaya Pushcha no longer had the strength to provide noticeable resistance, and from July 3 he began to come over to our side in ever increasing numbers. Prisoners and defectors testify that the troops were left without food and demoralized. Only where the commissars remain do they decide to resist...
5'th of JulyThe number of prisoners in the army group's zone of action up to July 4 inclusive reached 217 thousand and is increasing more and more...
It has already become clear that the envelopment of the Bialystok ledge by German troops threatens the troops of the Soviet Western Front with complete encirclement. Around noon on June 25, the Soviet 3rd and 10th armies received orders from front headquarters to retreat. The 3rd Army was supposed to retreat to Novogrudok, the 10th Army to Slonim. On June 27, Soviet troops left Bialystok. To preserve their escape routes, they fought in the area of Volkovysk and Zelva.
At this time, the German 39th motorized corps, advancing in the operational void, reached the approaches to Minsk on June 25. Three tank divisions (7th, 20th and 12th), totaling up to 700 tanks, broke through to the capital of Belarus; the next day they were joined by the 20th motorized division. On June 26, Molodechno, Volozhin and Radoshkovichi were occupied. The German 7th Panzer Division bypassed Minsk from the north and headed towards Borisov. On the night of June 27, its advance detachment occupied Smolevichi on the Minsk-Moscow highway.
Minsk was defended by the 44th Rifle Corps of Divisional Commander V. A. Yushkevich, which occupied the positions of the Minsk fortified area, as well as the 2nd Rifle Corps (commander - Major General A. N. Ermakov); In total, there were 4 Soviet rifle divisions in the Minsk area. On June 27, command of the troops defending Minsk was taken by the headquarters of the 13th Army (commander - Lieutenant General P. M. Filatov), which had just emerged from attack in the Molodechno region. The People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko gave the order: under no circumstances should Minsk be surrendered, even if the troops defending it are completely encircled. On the same day, the Soviet 100th Rifle Division launched a counterattack on Ostroshitsky Gorodok north of Minsk, but was repulsed.
On June 28, at about 17.00, units of the German 20th Panzer Division broke into Minsk from the north-west. Two divisions of the 44th Rifle Corps remained to hold positions west of Minsk, while the 2nd Rifle Corps withdrew east of Minsk to the Volma River line.
As a result of the envelopment of the German 2nd and 3rd tank groups in Nalibokskaya Pushcha, the remnants of the 3rd, 10th and parts of the 13th and 4th armies were surrounded. By July 8, the fighting in the Minsk “cauldron” was over.
Consequences
During the offensive, the enemy achieved serious operational successes: inflicted a heavy defeat on the Soviet Western Front, captured a significant part of Belarus and advanced to a depth of over 300 km. Only the concentration of the Second Strategic Echelon, which took positions along the river. The Western Dvina and Dnieper helped delay the Wehrmacht's advance towards Moscow in the Battle of Smolensk.
In total, in the Bialystok and Minsk "cauldrons" 11 rifle, 2 cavalry, 6 tank and 4 motorized divisions were destroyed, 3 corps commanders and 2 division commanders were killed, 2 corps commanders and 6 division commanders were captured, another 1 corps commander and 2 division commanders disappeared without lead.
On July 11, 1941, the report of the German High Command summed up the results of the battles of Army Group Center: in two “cauldrons” - Bialystok and Minsk 324,000 people captured , including several major generals, 3332 tanks captured , 1809 guns and numerous other war trophies. .
Moral effect
The defeat at Minsk had a strong psychological impact on the Soviet leadership. On June 28, J.V. Stalin told members of the Politburo
Lenin left us a great legacy, and we, his heirs, screwed it all up...
Battle of Bialystok-Minsk |
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Belarus, USSR |
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Decisive German victory Encirclement of the Soviet Western Front |
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Opponents |
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Commanders |
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F. von Bock |
D. G. Pavlov |
Strengths of the parties |
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1.45 million people 15.1 thousand guns and mortars 2.1 thousand tanks 1.7 thousand aircraft |
790 thousand people 16.1 thousand guns and mortars 3.8 thousand tanks 2.1 thousand aircraft |
About 200,000 killed, wounded, captured |
341,073 irretrievable losses 76,717 sanitary losses |
Battle of Bialystok-Minsk- the name of the border battle on the central sector of the Soviet-German front during the Great Patriotic War on June 22 - July 8, 1941. As a result of the battle, the main forces of the Soviet Western Front were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28, German troops took Minsk.
Plans and strengths of the parties
Germany
The German command delivered the main blow in the Moscow direction with the forces of Army Group Center (commander - Field Marshal F. von Bock) and the 2nd Air Fleet (commander - Field Marshal A. Kesselring). The plan was to strike with strong flank groups against a relatively weak center.
- 3rd Panzer Group (2 army and 2 motorized corps, a total of 4 tank, 3 motorized and 4 infantry divisions), advancing from the Suwalki area.
- 2nd tank group (3 motorized and 1 army corps, a total of 5 tank, 3 motorized, 1 cavalry, 6 infantry divisions and 1 reinforced regiment), advancing from the Brest area.
The 2nd and 3rd groups were supposed to connect and encircle Soviet troops west of Minsk. At the same time, infantry formations consolidated into two armies:
- 4th Army advancing from the Brest area
- 9th Army
(a total of 7 army corps, 20 infantry divisions), launched an offensive against the encirclement and were supposed to unite east of Bialystok. The creation of "double pincers" was a favorite Wehrmacht tactic throughout the 1941 campaign.
The tasks of the Luftwaffe included the defeat of Soviet aviation in the very first days of the war and the conquest of complete air supremacy.
USSR
The USSR's plans for the initial period of the war have not been precisely established. According to one version (Yu. Gorkov), the border Soviet armies were supposed to cover the mobilization and deployment of the main forces, in the process of building a strategic defense to Moscow. According to another (M. Meltyukhov), the plans to cover the border districts were just a cover for mobilization and deployment and preparation for a possible strategic offensive operation. The Soviet Western Special Military District, transformed into the Western Front (commander - Army General D. G. Pavlov), consisted of three armies:
- The 3rd Army under the command of Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov (4 rifle divisions and a mechanized corps consisting of 2 tank and 1 motorized division) occupied a defensive area in the Grodno region
- The 10th Army under the command of Major General K.D. Golubev (the most powerful, consisted of 2 rifle and 2 mechanized corps, one of them in full combat readiness, as well as 1 cavalry corps, a total of 6 rifle, 2 cavalry, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions) were located in the Bialystok ledge
- The 4th Army under the command of Major General A. A. Korobkov (4 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions) covered the area in the Brest region.
The newly created 13th Army under the command of Lieutenant General P. M. Filatov was supposed to take over the defense line on the southern face of the Bialystok ledge, but its headquarters had just begun moving to the east.
The war found the Red Army on the move. The troops of the second echelon of the Western OVO began to advance to the border. So, just before the war, the headquarters of the 2nd Rifle Corps arrived from near Minsk to the Belsk region on the southern front of the Bialystok ledge, where it was supposed to be subordinate to the headquarters of the new 13th Army; The 44th Rifle Corps, consisting of three rifle divisions (from Smolensk, Vyazma and Mogilev, respectively), was transferred to the same army from near Smolensk.
The 21st Rifle Corps, consisting of three rifle divisions, began moving from Vitebsk to the Lida area and was subordinate to the headquarters of the 3rd Army.
The 47th Rifle Corps began moving from Bobruisk to the Obuz-Lesna area, where the field control of the Western Front was deployed just before the war.
In addition, the transfer of the 22nd Army from the Ural Military District (3 rifle divisions arrived in the Polotsk area by the beginning of the war) and the 21st Army from the Volga Military District (by the beginning of the war several also arrived in the Gomel area) began to be transferred to the territory of the Western OVO. rifle divisions). These troops did not take part in the Battle of the Border, but played a large role in the next stage of the war.
Actions of the parties
Beginning of the German offensive
The German 3rd Panzer Group (commander - Colonel General G. Hoth) delivered the main blow in Lithuania, in order to defeat the Soviet troops located there and go behind the Soviet Western Front. On the very first day, the motorized corps reached the Neman and captured bridges in Alytus and Myarkin, after which they continued the offensive on the eastern bank. The battle for Alytus between combat detachments of the German 39th Motorized Corps and the Soviet 5th Tank Division turned out to be one of the most difficult of the entire war.
The German 9th Army operating to the south (commander - Colonel General A. Strauss) attacked the Soviet 3rd Army (commander - Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov) from the front, drove it back and occupied Grodno the next day. A counterattack by the Soviet 11th Mechanized Corps near Grodno on the first day of the war was repulsed.
On the front of the Soviet 10th Army, the enemy carried out diversionary actions, but on the southern front of the Bialystok ledge, with three corps (in the first echelon), the German 4th Army (commanded by Field Marshal G. von Kluge) delivered a crushing blow in the direction of Belsk. The three Soviet rifle divisions defending here were driven back and partially scattered. At noon on June 22, in the Bransk area, the Soviet 13th Mechanized Corps, which was in the process of formation, entered into battle with German troops. By the end of the day, Soviet troops were driven out of Bransk. The entire next day there was a battle for this city. After repelling Soviet counterattacks on June 24, German troops continued their offensive and occupied Belsk.
In the Brest area, the Soviet 4th Army was attacked by the 2nd Panzer Group (commander - Colonel General G. Guderian). Two German motorized corps crossed the river. Bug north and south of Brest, the 12th Army Corps, consisting of 3 infantry divisions, was attacking the city directly. Within a short time, Soviet formations located in Brest itself, the fortress and military towns around Brest (2 rifle and 1 tank divisions) were defeated as a result of artillery strikes and air raids. Already by 7.00 on June 22, Brest was captured, but in the Brest Fortress and at the station the resistance of Soviet units continued for another month.
On the evening of June 22, the commander of the North-Western, Western and South-Western Fronts received “Directive No. 3” signed by the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal Timoshenko, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Zhukov and a member of the Main Military Council Malenkov, which ordered that “by delivering a powerful counterattack” destroy the advancing enemy and by June 24 occupy the Polish cities of Suwalki and Lublin. On June 23, representatives of the high command, Marshals B. M. Shaposhnikov and G. I. Kulik, then Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, flew to the headquarters of the Western Front.
On June 23, units of the Soviet 14th Mechanized Corps and the 28th Rifle Corps of the 4th Army counterattacked German troops in the Brest area, but were driven back. German motorized corps continued the offensive towards Baranovichi and in the Pinsk direction and occupied Pruzhany, Ruzhany and Kobrin.
On June 24, a Soviet counterattack began in the Grodno area with the forces of a formed cavalry-mechanized group (KMG) under the command of the deputy front commander, Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin. The combat-ready 6th Mechanized Corps (more than 1,000 tanks) of Major General M. G. Khatskilevich and the 6th Cavalry Corps were involved in the counterattack, but the air supremacy of German aviation, poor organization of the strike, an attack on a prepared anti-tank position and the destruction of the rear led to that German troops managed to stop the troops of KMG Boldin. The 11th Mechanized Corps of the 3rd Army operated separately, which even managed to reach the outskirts of Grodno.
The German 20th Army Corps was temporarily forced to take up defensive positions, but the remaining German corps of the 9th Army (8th, 5th and 6th) continued to cover the main forces of the Soviet army in the Bialystok salient. Due to the failure of the counterattack and the actual start of the encirclement at 20.00 on June 25, I.V. Boldin gave the order to stop the attacks and begin a retreat.
Bialystok "cauldron"
The Bialystok salient, in which the Soviet troops were stationed, was shaped like a bottle with the neck facing east and supported by the only Bialystok-Slonim road. By June 25, it had already become clear that the envelopment of the Bialystok ledge by German troops threatened the troops of the Soviet Western Front with complete encirclement. Around noon on June 25, the Soviet 3rd and 10th armies received orders from front headquarters to retreat. The 3rd Army was supposed to retreat to Novogrudok, the 10th Army to Slonim. On June 27, Soviet troops left Bialystok. To preserve their escape routes, they fought in the area of Volkovysk and Zelva.
However, on June 28, German troops occupied Volkovysk. Some German divisions went over to defense with an “inverted front” at the Slonim, Zelva, Ruzhany line. Thus, the escape routes of the 3rd and 10th armies were cut off, and the troops that managed to withdraw from the Bialystok ledge found themselves surrounded in several “cauldrons” between Berestovitsa, Volkovysk, Mosty, Slonim and Ruzhany. The fighting in this area reached particular tension on June 29-30. Fierce fighting, according to the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder, pinned down the entire center and part of the right wing of the German 4th Army, which had to be reinforced by the 10th Panzer Division. In his war diary, he cited the impressions of the German Inspector General of Infantry Ott about the battles in the Grodno region:
On July 1, 1941, units of the German 4th Army came into contact with units of the 9th Army, completing the complete encirclement of Soviet troops retreating from the Bialystok salient.
On July 3, command of the infantry divisions of the 4th Army was taken over by the headquarters of the 2nd Army (commander - Colonel General M. von Weichs, who, along with the commander of the 9th Army A. Strauss, led the German troops at the final stage of the battle). The commander of the 4th Army, Field Marshal General G. von Kluge, led the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups, which continued the offensive to the east.
Until the end of June, fighting continued in the Brest Citadel. On June 29, German aircraft dropped two 500-kilogram bombs and one bomb weighing 1,800 kg on the Eastern Fort (the last center of resistance of Soviet troops). The next morning, the headquarters of the German 45th Infantry Division reported the complete capture of the Brest Fortress. The division claimed the capture of 7,000 prisoners, including 100 officers, while its own losses amounted to 482 killed (including 32 officers) and over 1,000 wounded (more than 5% of the total killed on the entire Eastern Front by 30 June 1941).
Defense of Minsk and the Minsk “cauldron”
Meanwhile, German motorized corps advancing east encountered the second echelon of the Soviet Western Front on June 24. The 47th motorized corps of the German 2nd Panzer Group encountered three Soviet divisions in the Slonim area, which delayed it for a day, and the 57th motorized corps of the 3rd Panzer Group faced the 21st Rifle Corps in the Lida area.
At this time, the German 39th motorized corps, advancing in the operational void, reached the approaches to Minsk on June 25. Three tank divisions (7th, 20th and 12th), totaling up to 700 tanks, broke through to the capital of Belarus; the next day they were joined by the 20th motorized division. On June 26, Molodechno, Volozhin and Radoshkovichi were occupied. The 7th German Panzer Division bypassed Minsk from the north and headed towards Borisov. On the night of June 27, its advance detachment occupied Smolevichi on the Minsk-Moscow highway.
Minsk was defended by the 44th Rifle Corps of Divisional Commander V. A. Yushkevich, which occupied the positions of the Minsk fortified area, as well as the 2nd Rifle Corps (commander - Major General A. N. Ermakov); In total, there were 4 Soviet rifle divisions in the Minsk area. On June 27, command of the troops defending Minsk was taken by the headquarters of the 13th Army (commander - Lieutenant General P. M. Filatov), which had just emerged from attack in the Molodechno region. The People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko gave the order: under no circumstances should Minsk be surrendered, even if the troops defending it are completely encircled. On the same day, the Soviet 100th Rifle Division launched a counterattack on Ostroshitsky Gorodok north of Minsk, but it was repulsed.
Meanwhile, on June 26, the German 47th Motorized Corps of the 2nd Panzer Group occupied Baranovichi, approaching Minsk from the south. On June 27, he captured Stolbtsy, and on June 28, Dzerzhinsk.
On June 28, at about 17.00, units of the German 20th Panzer Division broke into Minsk from the north-west. Two divisions of the 44th Rifle Corps remained to hold positions west of Minsk, while the 2nd Rifle Corps withdrew east of Minsk to the Volma River line.
As a result of the envelopment of the German 2nd and 3rd tank groups in Nalibokskaya Pushcha, the remnants of the 3rd, 10th and parts of the 13th and 4th armies were surrounded. By July 8, the fighting in the Minsk “cauldron” was over.
Consequences
During the offensive, the enemy achieved serious operational successes: inflicted a heavy defeat on the Soviet Western Front, captured a significant part of Belarus and advanced to a depth of over 300 km. Only the concentration of the Second Strategic Echelon, which took positions along the river. The Western Dvina and Dnieper allowed to delay the advance of the Wehrmacht towards Moscow in the Battle of Smolensk.
In total, in the Bialystok and Minsk "cauldrons" 11 rifle, 2 cavalry, 6 tank and 4 motorized divisions were destroyed, 3 corps commanders and 2 division commanders were killed, 2 corps commanders and 6 division commanders were captured, another 1 corps commander and 2 division commanders disappeared without lead.
On July 11, 1941, a summary of the German High Command summed up the results of the battles of Army Group Center: in two “cauldrons” - Bialystok and Minsk, 324,000 people were captured, including several senior generals, 3,332 tanks, 1,809 guns and other numerous military personnel were captured trophies.
Moral effect
Lenin left us a great legacy, and we, his heirs, have it all fucked up…
The Soviet Information Bureau did not report the surrender of Minsk.
Execution of generals
Stalin placed all the blame for the defeat of the Soviet Western Front on the front command. On June 30, the front commander, Army General D. G. Pavlov, and other generals were arrested. After a short investigation, Pavlov was sentenced to death. Along with him, on July 22, the following were shot: the chief of staff of the front, Major General V. E. Klimovskikh, and the chief of communications of the front, Major General A. T. Grigoriev. The chief of artillery of the front, Lieutenant General N.A. Klich and the commander of the 14th mechanized corps, Major General S.I. Oborin, were arrested on July 8 and then shot, the commander of the 4th Army, Major General A.A. Korobkov was removed on July 8, on The next day he was arrested and executed on July 22. After Stalin's death, all executed military leaders were posthumously rehabilitated and restored to military ranks.
Ruins of Minsk (July 1941)
Ruins of Minsk (July 1941)
The Battle of Bialystok-Minsk is the name of the border battle on the central sector of the Soviet-German front during the Great Patriotic War on June 22 - July 8, 1941. As a result of the battle, the main forces of the Soviet Western Front were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28, German troops took Minsk.
During the offensive, the enemy achieved serious operational successes: inflicted a heavy defeat on the Soviet Western Front, captured a significant part of Belarus and advanced to a depth of over 300 km. Only the concentration of the Second Strategic Echelon, which took positions along the river. The Western Dvina and Dnieper allowed to delay the advance of the Wehrmacht towards Moscow in the Battle of Smolensk.
In total, in the Bialystok and Minsk "cauldrons" 11 rifle, 2 cavalry, 6 tank and 4 motorized divisions were destroyed, 3 corps commanders and 2 division commanders were killed, 2 corps commanders and 6 division commanders were captured, another 1 corps commander and 2 division commanders disappeared without lead.
On July 11, 1941, the report of the German High Command summed up the results of the battles of Army Group Center: in two “cauldrons” - Bialystok and Minsk, 324,000 people were captured, including several senior generals, 3,332 tanks, 1,809 guns and other numerous military personnel were captured trophies. .
Contrary to today's point of view, the German military highly appreciated the fighting qualities of the Red Army.
After a month of fighting, Halder writes down the final and extremely unpleasant conclusion for the German command made by Field Marshal Brauchitsch: “ The uniqueness of the country and the unique character of the Russians gives the campaign a special specificity. First serious opponent».
The command of Army Group South comes to the same conclusion: “ The forces that oppose us are for the most part a determined mass, which in the tenacity of warfare is something entirely new in comparison with our former adversaries. We are forced to admit that the Red Army is a very serious adversary... The Russian infantry showed unprecedented tenacity, primarily in the defense of stationary fortified structures. Even in the event of the fall of all neighboring structures, some pillboxes, called upon to surrender, held out until the last man».
Propaganda Minister Goebbels, who before the invasion believed that “Bolshevism would collapse like a house of cards,” already wrote in his diary on July 2: “ On the Eastern Front: fighting continues. Strengthened and desperate enemy resistance... The enemy has many killed, few wounded and prisoners... In general, very difficult battles are taking place. There can be no talk of a “walk”. The Red regime mobilized the people. Added to this is the fabulous stubbornness of the Russians. Our soldiers can barely cope. But so far everything is going according to plan. The situation is not critical, but serious and requires every effort».
General Gunther Blumentritt:
« Now it was important for Germany's political leaders to understand that the days of the blitzkrieg were a thing of the past. We were confronted by an army whose fighting qualities were far superior to all other armies we had ever encountered on the battlefield. But it should be said that the German army also demonstrated high moral fortitude in overcoming all the disasters and dangers that befell it.»
| Return to date June 22 |
Comments:
As the experience of discussions with various types of “resunoids” (including on my website) has shown, these characters, as a rule, possessing considerable aplomb, monstrous self-esteem and devout faith in their military-historical “guru” (who belongs in the Kolyma tundra, but not about that now), at the same time they are very weak in geography, incompetent in materiel (as an example, one of the above-mentioned figures boldly classified the 122-mm A-19 hull gun as DIVISION artillery!) and are fairly “floating” in deployment forces of the parties on the eve of June 22, 1941. Since Rezun wrote that on the eve of the war Stalin “stuffed a bunch of armies into two ledges (Lvov and Bialystok)” - this means that this is what actually happened; Rezun believed these armies were intended to advance deep into German territory - which means that this is the holy truth and everyone who denies it are blasphemers who have encroached on the Highest Knowledge.
I confess - during her time, in the mid-90s, and I, having read “Icebreaker” and “M-Day”, became an apologist for Rezun for some time - however, not for long. Thank God, by the end of the 90s, the general public was offered a fair number of books dedicated to the Second World War, without agitprop fog and lies - on the basis of which Rezunov’s lies are exposed at once. And the fact that to this day there are people who seriously consider Rezun to be a historian is strange and surprising to me... However, “there are many things, friend Horatio, in the world that our sages never dreamed of.”
So, returning to the Bialystok ledge.
This is how Rezun wrote about him: “In Western Belarus, in the Bialystok region, the border bent in a sharp arc towards Germany. The Bialystok salient cut deeply into German-occupied territory. It was in this ledge that the main forces of the Western Front were concentrated. The Bialystok salient is a Soviet wedge driven deep into the body of Poland, conquered by Hitler. At the tip of the wedge was the super-powerful 10th Army of the Western Front.” Accordingly, Stalin assigned “super-powerful” tasks to this “super-powerful” army, located “at the tip of the wedge”... but WHERE was it supposed to advance? Our fugitive Stirlitz did not write about this. Hesitated to reveal Stalin's secret plans? Or did he simply not want to voice them - since they sharply diverged from his writings?
We will not challenge Rezunov’s nonsense. Yes, the 10th Army was “super powerful”. Yes, it included two mechanized, cavalry and two rifle corps. And its 9th Aviation Division could well have had 435 fighters. Let everything be as Rezun wrote. With the exception of one thing - the mobile corps of this army could ONLY ADVANCE deep into German-occupied Poland in ONE DIRECTION - TO THE NORTH. To Suwalki. AND WITH ONLY ONE PURPOSE - to cut off the communications of the enemy ATTACKING to the east-southeast (to Molodechno and further to Minsk). There COULD NOT BE any other tasks assigned to these mobile corps!
And I'll explain why.
Let's display a map of modern Poland. Did they take you out? Take a close look at its northeastern part; for the most part, these are the lands of the former East Prussia, which were transferred to Poland after 1945. What catches your eye first? MASURIAN LAKES. To the east of the line Graevo - Elk - Vengorzewo and almost to the Privislyanskaya Upland there is a huge array of lakes, forests, and swamps. Moreover, East Prussia in those years was simply stuffed with pillboxes, bunkers, forts and bunkers. As you know, after Germany’s defeat in World War I, it was allowed to maintain fortifications here. In 1922, the construction of defensive structures in East Prussia resumed and, with minor interruptions, continued until June 1941. All fortified areas were covered over a considerable distance by ditches, wooden, metal and reinforced concrete gouges. The basis of the Heilsberg fortified area alone consisted of 911 long-term defensive structures.
In other words, the hypothetical attack of the 10th Army on Elblag in order to cut off the East Prussian Wehrmacht group from Germany is nothing more than a very sophisticated method of suicide; In the best case, the army’s troops will reach the Mikolajki-Allenstein line and die there - just as Samsonov’s army died in the same places in 1914.
But maybe Rezun had in mind the attack of the 10th Army on Warsaw? From the point of view of the terrain, advancing strictly to the west from Bialystok is a very easy task: good roads, the absence of natural obstacles, the mechanized corps of the 10th Army can roll all the way to Warsaw along the table-flat Polish plain.
One question - WHY? The strike on Warsaw is a strike into the operational void: having occupied Mlawa and Ostroleka, the troops of the 10th Army broke away from their supply bases; they had no way to organize it quickly (another railway track), and opened their flanks for an attack from both the north , and from the south. The Germans, by the way, did not even have troops in this hypothetical direction of attack of the mechanized corps of the 10th Army! And then everything is very simple - the Russians are drawn into the corridor between the 9th and 4th armies of Army Group Center, the Germans with concentric attacks on Zambrov-Surazh cut them off from the supply lines and after three days they take them with their bare hands. That's it, out.
But if the mechanized corps of the 10th Army, in the event of the outbreak of war, strikes STRICTLY TO THE NORTH, on Suwalki, then a very, very interesting situation can develop here! The Germans have a huge number of troops in the Suwalki salient; therefore, these troops must be continuously supplied with all types of provisions. They go deep into Soviet territory - stretching their communications - and then the 6th and 13th mechanized and 6th cavalry corps of the 10th Army strike at the base of their wedge! The Germans have NO field fortifications here, much less long-term fortifications - therefore, Russian tanks immediately cut into the endless columns of transport vehicles of the 9th Field Army and the 3rd Tank Group of the Germans and cause such chaos in the supply of German troops that already By the end of June 25, the advancing German troops had nothing to shoot and nothing to eat...
Unfortunately, this did not happen – for many reasons; but the troops of the 10th Army WAS an attempt to act according to an algorithm similar to the one described above! This means that it was precisely for this purpose, for a counterattack under the base of the German wedge, that the troops of the 10th Army were brought into the Bialystok ledge...