Original taken from sluza_2 in Marshall S.F. Akhromeev
I will repeat with the post
Transmission Glance. 1990 Topic: What kind of army do we need?
Marshal of the USSR S.F. Akhromeev is visiting. Presenters Dmitry Zakharov and Alexander Lyubimov
Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeev(May 5, 1923 - August 24, 1991) - Soviet statesman and military leader, Hero of the Soviet Union (1982), Marshal of the Soviet Union (1983).
Began military service in 1940, entering the naval school. Joined the CPSU in 1943. During the Great Patriotic War - commander of a Marine Corps platoon, adjutant, battalion chief of staff, battalion commander, fought on the Stalingrad, Leningrad, 4th Ukrainian and Southern fronts. He was awarded for his participation in the defense of Leningrad during the siege.
After the war, commander of a tank battalion, chief of staff and commander of a tank regiment, deputy commander, chief of staff and commander of a tank division.
Graduated in 1952 Military Academy armored and mechanized forces and in 1967 the Military Academy of the General Staff.
Since 1967, 1st Deputy Commander and Army Commander, Chief of Staff - 1st Deputy Commander of the Far Eastern Military District.
Since 1974 - deputy chief, since 1979 - first deputy chief, and in 1984-1988. - Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR.
He led the planning of military operations in Afghanistan at all stages, including the withdrawal of troops.
Winner of the Lenin Prize in 1980 for the research and development of new automated control systems for the Armed Forces. Since 1981 - candidate, and in 1983-1990. - Member of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1982 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1983 he received the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Since 1988 - Advisor to the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council, since May 1989 - Advisor to the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court. Since March 1990 - Advisor to the President of the USSR.
In 1984-1989 - Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In March 1989, he was elected people's deputy of the USSR from the Balti region. District No. 697 (Moldavian SSR). Member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the USSR Armed Forces Committee on Defense and Security.
As Chief of the General Staff, he repeatedly participated in negotiations that put an “end” cold war. At the same time, his disagreements with M. S. Gorbachev grew; he expressed disagreement with military reform and the weakening of Soviet military power, and therefore “resigned” from his post. He repeatedly spoke at meetings of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as well as in the press with articles where he spoke about the danger of a rapid conquest of the USSR by NATO countries. In March 1990, he was appointed Advisor to the President of the USSR on Military Affairs
“He understood that a lot of things were already being done incorrectly, to the detriment of the interests of our country, but, being an honest man himself, he was sure that other people should be like that, believing that all this was being done due to a misunderstanding, according to someone’s biased reports.” (Army General M. Gareev).
On August 19, he returned to Moscow from Sochi, where he spent his vacation with his wife Tamara Vasilievna and grandchildren, and met with Gennady Yanaev. He supported the State Emergency Committee’s Appeal and offered his assistance, although he was not a member of the committee. He spent the night at his dacha, where he lived youngest daughter with my family.
On August 20, he worked in the Kremlin and in the building of the Ministry of Defense, collecting information about the military-political situation in the country. Prepared a plan of activities that needed to be carried out in connection with the introduction of a state of emergency.
On the night of August 20-21, I spent the night in my office in the Kremlin. From his office he called his daughters and wife in Sochi.
“I was sure that this adventure would fail, and when I arrived in Moscow, I was personally convinced of this.<...>Let at least a trace remain in history - they protested against the death of such a great state” (from the notebook of S. F. Akhromeev).
On August 22, he sent a personal letter to Gorbachev.
“Why did I come to Moscow on my own initiative - no one called me from Sochi - and started working at the Committee? After all, I was sure that this adventure would be defeated, and when I arrived in Moscow, I was once again convinced of this. The fact is that, starting in 1990, I was convinced, as I am convinced today, that our country was heading towards destruction. Soon she will be dismembered. I was looking for a way to say this out loud. I thought that my participation in ensuring the work of the “Committee” and the subsequent related proceedings would give me the opportunity to speak directly about this. It probably sounds unconvincing and naive, but it is true. There were no selfish motives in this decision of mine" (Marshal Akhromeev, from personal letter M. S. Gorbachev).
On August 23, Sergei Fedorovich attended a meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Affairs.
August 24, 1991 at 21:50 In office No. 19 "a" in building 1 of the Moscow Kremlin, the security officer on duty Koroteev discovered the corpse of Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev (born in 1923), who worked as an adviser to the President of the USSR.
“I remember a detail that struck me in the publication about the suicide of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Advisor to the President of the USSR, Marshal Akhromeyev. After the first unsuccessful attempt - the rope broke - Sergei Fedorovich came to his senses (he was unconscious for about 20 minutes), left his Kremlin office, found a colleague from whom he had borrowed a small amount of money the day before, returned the debt to him and after that completed his plan. end."
He left letters to his family members, as well as a note saying that he was leaving this life, unable to see the collapse of everything he had dedicated his life to.
“I cannot live when my Fatherland is dying and everything that I have always considered the meaning of my life is being destroyed. Age and my past life give me the right to leave this life. I fought until the end. Akhromeev."
He was buried at Troekurovskoye Cemetery. Soon after his death, his grave was plundered, from where a marshal's uniform with awards was stolen, which was never subsequently discovered.
“Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev was my friend. His suicide is a tragedy that reflects the convulsions that are shaking the Soviet Union. He was a communist, a patriot and a soldier. And I believe that is exactly what he would say about himself” (American Admiral William D. Crowe).
[edit] From the life of Marshall
During an internship in the USSR in the second half of the 70s, Condoleezza Rice, who was interested in the interaction of leading military-political structures, “counted all the windows in the Ministry of Defense building in Moscow to estimate how many people could work there,” “Her rating is five thousand. Later, during her work in the National Security Service under Bush Sr., the accuracy of this assessment was confirmed to her by one of her negotiating partners, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev.”
He was a strong supporter of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Together with G. M. Kornienko believed that “to count on the fact that the PDPA will be able to remain in power after the withdrawal Soviet troops from the country - not realistic. The maximum that could be hoped for was for the PDPA to take a legitimate, but very modest place in the new regime.” Cm. .
According to V.I. Boldin, Akhromeev confirmed that “military intelligence has approximately the same data as the KGB” about “suspicions of connections with the intelligence services of foreign countries” of Politburo member A.N. Yakovlev.
In 1991, the Soviet Marshal Akhromeyev assessed the USSR’s losses in the Great Patriotic War this way: Patriotic War: “If we count all those killed in hostilities, that is, military personnel and partisans who did not return home from the war, then there will be 8 million 668 thousand 400 people... Of these in 1941 - 3 million 138 thousand...”.
“The USSR produced 20 times more tanks than the United States in the 1970s.”
Question from G. Shakhnazarov, assistant to the CPSU Secretary General M. Gorbachev (1980s): “Why is it necessary to produce so many weapons?”
Answer from Chief of the General Staff S. Akhromeyev: “Because at the cost of enormous sacrifices, we created first-class factories, no worse than those of the Americans. Are you going to order them to stop working and produce pots?”
From Yegor Gaidar’s book “The Death of an Empire.”
Marshal Akhromeev
On August 24, 1991, Advisor to the President of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeev, committed suicide in his Kremlin office. The next day, almost all funds mass media were full of reports about this tragic event.
Sergei Fedorovich was born on May 5, 1923 in the village of Vindrey, Torbeevsky district (now the Republic of Mordovia). In the Red Army since 1940. During the Great Patriotic War in July - December 1941, S.F. Akhromeev, as part of a united cadet rifle battalion, participated in the battles for Leningrad. After graduating from school in the active army: from October 1942 to February 1943 he commanded a rifle platoon, then a senior adjutant of a rifle battalion, an assistant chief of staff of a rifle regiment, a senior adjutant of a motorized rifle battalion of a tank brigade, and from July 1944 he commanded a battalion of machine gunners of a self-propelled artillery brigade. He took part in battles with the Nazi invaders on the Leningrad, Stalingrad, Southern and 4th Ukrainian fronts. At the end of the war, from June 1945, S.F. Akhromeev was deputy commander, then commander of a tank battalion, chief of staff of a self-propelled tank and mechanized regiment, commander of a tank regiment, deputy commander of a motorized rifle division, then chief of staff of a tank division. After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff, he worked his way up from Chief of Staff to First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Armed Forces THE USSR. March 25, 1983 S.F. Akhromeev was awarded the title “Marshal of the Soviet Union” (he became the only one in history who became the Marshal of the Soviet Union, being the first deputy, and not the chief of the General Staff).
Death messages
In his suicide letter addressed to his family, Sergei Fedorovich explained his last act as follows: “For me, the main thing has always been the duty of a warrior and a citizen. You were in second place. Today, for the first time, I put my duty to you first. I ask you to go through these days with courage. Support each other. Don’t give your enemies a reason for gloating.” This meant that after the failure of the State Emergency Committee, which was actively supported by the marshal, he believed that he would be arrested, and wanted to spare his family the associated humiliation. Information about the reasons for what happened is supplemented by a farewell note found in the Marshal’s Kremlin office: “I cannot live when my Fatherland is dying and everything that I have always considered the meaning in my life is being destroyed. Age and my past life give me the right to die. I fought until the end."
“I’m a bad master at preparing a suicide weapon...”
Akhromeev’s body was discovered around 10 p.m. The security officer on duty informed the commandant of this building that there was no light in office No. 19a, and the key was sticking out of the door. Then the officers opened the office... Since the commandant was none other than Mikhail Barsukov, who during Yeltsin’s time became Boris Nikolayevich’s favorite for a while and headed first the Main Security Directorate, and then the Federal Security Service, some journalists then put forward a version of whether it was he who caused this death and organized? But, according to other authors, Mikhail Ivanovich, a pedantic service worker and an extremely cautious person, was least suitable for such secret improvisations. Detectives who entered Akhromeyev’s office after midnight filmed a corpse in a marshal’s uniform sitting on the floor near the battery. steam heating.
Address to the President
After the arrest at the airfield of the members of the Emergency Committee flying to Gorbachev in Foros, the marshal expected that any minute they would come to arrest him too, because of all Mikhail Sergeevich’s assistants and advisers, he was the only one who actively supported the putschists. Therefore, on August 22, Sergei Fedorovich wrote a letter to the President of the USSR, in which he considered it his duty to tell with soldierly directness about his participation in the activities of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. From this letter it is clear that, while resting in a military sanatorium in Sochi, until the morning of August 19, the Marshal did nothing at all I didn’t know about the State Emergency Committee. Having heard on television in the morning about its creation, on his own initiative he immediately flew on a passenger plane to Moscow. That same day at 18 o’clock he was already in the Kremlin at his workplace, and at 20 o’clock he met with Vice President Gennady Yanaev. Akhromeev told him that he agreed with the program set out by the Committee in its address to the citizens of the USSR, and offered his services as an adviser to the acting President of the USSR. On Yanaev’s instructions, Akhromeev, together with Oleg Baklanov, began collecting and analyzing the current situation. During August 20-21, he prepared two reports of this kind. In addition, having visited on August 20 at about 15:00 the Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov in his office on the fifth floor of the Arbat Pentagon, Sergei Fedorovich was present when the deputy The Minister of Defense, Army General Vladislav Achalov, reported to Dmitry Timofeevich his thoughts on the plan to seize the “White House,” which then housed the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. “It is clear to me that as Marshal of the Soviet Union I violated Military Oath and committed a military crime,” Akhromeev gave an extremely strict assessment of his actions. “I committed no less a crime as an adviser to the President of the USSR.” But if the marshal was so clearly aware that he was following a criminal path, why did he take it? “I was sure that this adventure would be defeated, and when I arrived in Moscow, I was once again convinced of this,” he writes in the same message to Gorbachev. — Since 1990, I have been convinced that our country is heading towards destruction. She will all be dismembered. I was looking for a way to say this out loud. I thought that my participation in ensuring the work of the “Committee” and the subsequent related proceedings would give me the opportunity to speak directly about this. It probably sounds unconvincing and naive, but it is true. There were no selfish motives in this decision of mine..."Senior investigator for especially important cases of the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office Leonid Proshkin, who was studying the circumstances of the marshal's death, ultimately concluded: "The persons responsible for the death of Akhromeyev or in any way there are no persons involved in it,” after which the case was closed “for lack of corpus delicti.”
Soldier of Duty
The leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense paid last respects to the Marshal of the Soviet Union in the morgue of the Military Hospital named after. Burdenko, none of the generals considered it necessary to go to the Troyekurovskoye cemetery. And they buried the marshal without the ritual due to his rank. Could Sergei Fedorovich have imagined that the Russian prosecutor’s office would also drop the criminal case brought against him for participation in the activities of the State Emergency Committee “due to the lack of corpus delicti”? Former USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who was not at all Akhromeev’s friend, on many of the most important disarmament issues, stood on fundamentally different positions, responded to the death of his opponent in negotiations with the Americans with the following expression of feelings towards him in an interview with journalists: “A soldier of duty, this was immediately obvious.” And the chairman of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces William Crowe wrote in Time magazine: “Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev,” wrote the US admiral, “was my friend. His suicide is a tragedy reflecting the convulsions that are shaking the Soviet Union. He was a communist, a patriot and a soldier. And I believe that this is exactly what he would say about himself. For all his great patriotism and devotion to the party, Akhromeev was a modern man who understood that much in his country was a mistake, and much must be changed if the Soviet Union was to continue to remain a great power .He made great efforts to reduce tensions between the militaries of our two countries."
August 24 was the anniversary of his assassination. Although it’s late, I want to tell you about it. Time is running, and there are already many people who do not know who Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev was... From so many worthy people I heard stories about this unique and bright man, a brave and honest Patriot. He deserves not to be forgotten!
Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeyev is a major military leader who served in the Armed Forces for 51 years, who went through the Great Patriotic War from the first to the last day, who did a lot for the development of the country's defense in peacetime.
According to the official “version,” Marshal Akhromeyev committed “suicide.” From the very beginning, the strange “suicide” of Marshal Akhromeyev raised strong doubts and a lot of questions among many who did not believe in his suicide.
August 24, 1991, at 9:50 p.m. In office No. 19 “a” in building 1 of the Moscow Kremlin, the security officer on duty discovered the body of Marshal of the Soviet Union, Advisor to the President of the USSR, Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeyev. The deceased was completely military uniform with insignia.
Next, I will give excerpts from the wonderful book by Viktor Stefanovich KOZHEMYAKO “Murders as a Sacrifice of “Democracy””, which I recommend to everyone who is interested in modern history our long-suffering Motherland. Anyone interested can read it in more detail on the Internet.
“Many are still haunted by his largely mysterious death... Remembering the victims of August 1991, the media usually name three who died in a very unclear situation on the Garden Ring and who, it seems, became the last Heroes of the Soviet Union. Much less often they write and say that there were three more. Those who committed suicide. They are not considered victims, much less heroes. What kind of heroes are there if they killed themselves! It should be noted that even when this happened (and suicides followed one after another immediately after the defeat of the “putsch”), many believed: these were not suicides, but organized murders. In order to eliminate particularly objectionable and, for some, especially dangerous witnesses. Today, this conviction has not diminished in a significant part of the public consciousness. And there is no doubt: no matter how much time passes and no matter what additional arguments confirming the reality of suicides are published, the opinion that these were murders, at least a shadow, will remain. Such are the foggy and somewhat mystically mysterious, inexplicable circumstances of that entire August story - different things can often be assumed, but it turns out to be impossible to prove a lot, to prove one hundred percent and firmly. At least for now. I knew and in the course of this work I became even more convinced: the case “in fact of death”, closed five years ago, raises a number of very serious questions! Therefore, they must be staged publicly. The image of this man is so bright and unique in many of its merits, and his tragedy is so characteristic of the time of so-called perestroika that we have experienced, that, I think, to understand this tragedy means to better understand the time. In my mind, he became one of the most bitter victims of the troubled times, marked by the sign of the most insidious betrayal. And one of the most noble heroes of all time...
From the investigation materials: “... August 24, 1991 at 21:50. in office No. 19 “a” in building 1 of the Moscow Kremlin, the security officer on duty Koroteev discovered a corpse Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev (born in 1923), who worked as an adviser to the President of the USSR. The corpse was in a sitting position under the window sill of the office window. The corpse's back rested on a wooden grate covering a steam heating radiator. The corpse was wearing the uniform of a Marshal of the Soviet Union. There was no damage to the clothing. On the neck of the corpse there was a sliding loop made of synthetic twine, folded in half, covering the entire circumference of the neck. The upper end of the twine was secured to the handle window frame adhesive tape type "scotch tape". No bodily injuries were found on the corpse, other than those associated with hanging...” Conclusion of a forensic medical examination in this case It seems clear: no signs were found that could indicate murder. Witnesses were interviewed - none of them named the killer. This, it turns out, is quite enough to write down with absolute categoricality: “There are no persons guilty of the death of Akhromeyev or in any way involved in it.” And now the Deputy Prosecutor General of the RSFSR E. Lisov, the same Evgeny Kuzmich Lisov, who, together with his chief prosecutor Stepankov, played the main role in preparing the “trial of the State Emergency Committee,” is in a hurry to end the case of Akhromeyev’s death. “In the absence of a crime event”... Honestly, I can’t get rid of the impression that by the end of the year they were in a hurry to “get it over with.” Was that the goal? Has the task been given? Stop, close and quickly forget. But there were so many dark and contradictory things left in the case, so many facts literally screaming to be explained somehow! But... the “unfavorable” facts are simply not mentioned in the final resolution...
Let us reconstruct the chronicle of some of the events immediately preceding the fateful day - August 24, 1991. On August 6, in agreement with President Gorbachev, his adviser Akhromeev went on another vacation to Sochi. There, in a military sanatorium, he heard on the morning of the 19th about the events in Moscow. And I immediately made a decision: to fly. In the evening he was already at his workplace in the Kremlin...
I am stating all this according to the text of his letter to Gorbachev (“To the President of the USSR, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev”), where the marshal later reported on the degree of his participation in the actions of the State Emergency Committee. Other evidence contained in the case confirms these facts. The letter is dated August 22. The failure of the State Emergency Committee is already obvious, and Akhromeev writes that he is ready to bear responsibility. However, there is no repentance in the letter. And not a word about suicide. So, if the letter is genuine and if suicide did happen, the decision about it became final not on the 22nd, but later? According to the investigation materials, six notes were found on the desktop in Akhromeyev’s office after his death. So, according to the dates, the first two refer to August 23. One, farewell, to the family. The second is addressed to Marshal Sokolov and Army General Lobov with a request to help with the funeral and not to leave family members alone during their difficult days. How did this penultimate day of his life pass for him, when (if, again, there is no doubt that he killed himself) he mentally said goodbye to life and the people most dear to him? There was a difficult meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security Affairs. And Sergei Fedorovich behaved unusually, as eyewitnesses remember. If before he always spoke and was generally very active, this time he sat through the entire meeting in one position, without even turning his head or saying a word. single word. There are other, similar testimonies from those who saw him at work. Dark face, noticeably depressed. He was writing something in his office, trying to prevent those entering from seeing what he was writing. One can assume: those same notes. Dying... In a word, there seem to be signs of the end that was brewing and being prepared by him. But there are many serious reasons for doubt! First of all (almost everyone has this from the very beginning) the question arises: why did the marshal choose such an unusual method of suicide for a military man? Hanging himself, and like this - in a sitting position, on a piece of twine tied to the handle of the window frame... This is not the military way. They say that in the criminal world, in prisons, they often resort to this method of self-destruction, but how does Akhromeev know about it? The investigation focuses on the fact that the marshal handed over his pistol when leaving the post of Chief of the General Staff; He also handed over weapons, which were later presented to him by distinguished foreign guests. That's right, I did. However, he had sleeping pills and tranquilizers, which, as his daughter rightly noted in her testimony to the investigation, allowed him to die much less painfully. Why didn't you resort to them? Why, when preparing for death, did he choose the place of death not in the apartment, which was empty at that time, since the family was at the dacha, but (very strange!) in the Kremlin office?
Both daughters of Sergei Fedorovich, with whom he spent the last evening and morning of the last day at the dacha, did not notice in him the slightest sign of impending trouble. When leaving, he promised his youngest granddaughter to take her to the swing after lunch, meaning he was going to be home by lunchtime on that Saturday. The daughters can’t wrap their heads around what happens next. After all, after the expected call from her mother from Sochi, Tatyana Sergeevna immediately called her father and said that they were going to the airport to meet him. It was at 9.35 - it turns out that just at the time when he was preparing to put the noose on himself. But we still had a good conversation, and his voice was cheerful, even cheerful! However, if this fact, like something from the previous one, can be motivated by the exceptional willpower and self-control of the marshal, then, when studying the two thick red volumes provided to me at the military college Supreme Court Russia, I came across facts that I could no longer explain. At least relative to the same morning on August 24th. In the testimony of Nikolai Vasilyevich Platonov, the driver of the General Staff motor depot, who worked with the marshal and then brought him to Moscow from his dacha, I read: “We arrived at the Kremlin. Akhromeev said: “Go to the base, I’ll call you.” And he didn’t call. At 10 o'clock 50 min. I called him in the Kremlin and asked for time off for lunch. He let me go and told me to be at the base at 13.00. I didn’t talk to him or see him again.” I involuntarily emphasized the time in this extract: 10 o’clock. 50 min. But at 10 o'clock. 00 min. Akhromeev, according to his note, woke up after an unsuccessful attempt on his life and was going to “do it all again”! Tell me, is it time to pick up the phone in response to a phone call and talk to the driver? And why?
Here is another testimony - from Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, also an adviser to the President of the USSR. His office at number 19 “b” was located in a common corridor with Akhromeev’s office 19 “a”. Zagladin testifies about the day of August 24th as follows: “I was at work from 10 to 15 hours. Maybe a little longer. I didn’t see Akhromeev. His office was open, I determined this by the fact that people were entering and leaving the office, but I don’t know who, I thought that it was Akhromeyev coming and going, since the secretaries did not work on Saturday... When I left, There was no key sticking out of Akhromeyev’s door. I turned off the light in the corridor between our offices (there small corridor) and left. It was quiet in Akhromeyev’s office. I left the office at approximately 15-15.20. I remember for sure that there was no key in Akhromeyev’s door, otherwise I would not have turned off the light in the corridor.” The key... The investigator asks again about this key: “Please clarify!” And Zagladin, repeating the same thing, explains: “Usually, when S.F. Akhromeev was in the office, the key was sticking out of the door with outside" So, at 15.00 or 15.20 there was no key in the door, and at 21.50, when the officer on duty passed by the office, it was the key that caught his attention! When did he appear at the door? And who entered and left the office after 10 o'clock in the morning?
In the testimony of Kremlin security officer Vladimir Nikolaevich Koroteev, who, while inspecting the offices in the evening, discovered S.F. Akhromeev “without signs of life”, then I read: “I reported the discovery to the commandant of the Presidential Residence M.I. Barsukov.” Badgers? Mikhail Ivanovich?! Yes, the same one. One of the two people closest to Yeltsin for several years recent years, mentioned all these years in the inextricable and meaningful connection “Korzhakov - Barsukov”. A native of the KGB, who eventually headed the new, Yeltsin, special service... Was it by chance that he appeared at the scene of Akhromeyev’s death that mysterious night? And when did it appear? According to his testimony, Koroteev reported to him about 24 hours later. However, Koroteev himself calls a different time - 21 hours 50 minutes. Moreover, he directly says that he discovered the corpse (remember, “without signs of life”?). But in Barsukov’s testimony it happens differently! “...Koroteev V.N. reported to me that in 19 "a", the office of Advisor to the President of the USSR S.F. Akhromeev, the key is in the keyhole, and there is no light in the office and that he asks me to come... I went up to the 2nd floor at 19 "a ", looked into the office. I saw the adviser on the floor at the window in an unnatural position...” So, it turns out that Koroteev didn’t even look into the office, and Barsukov discovered the body? A strange discord that casts doubt on everything else in this testimony: The following question naturally arises: who was he then, Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov? Officially, by position, he is the commandant of the commandant’s office of Corps No. 1 of the Kremlin. Koroteev calls him the commandant of the Presidential Residence. Of course, the President of the USSR. But wasn’t he already working for the President of Russia, who seemed to be Gorbachev’s antipode? In fact, one of the future odious couple of Yeltsin’s confidants has already been inseparably following his “master” through the corridors and basements of the “White House” in those August days and was even photographed next to him on a “historic” tank. The other one at this time is in the Kremlin corridors, where Yeltsin will soon enter victoriously. Someone probably had to prepare the place. There are many secrets, very many, hidden in the corridors of power... So, what actually happened on August 24, 1991 in the Kremlin - suicide or murder? If murder, then what caused it and how was it committed? If it was suicide, then why did Akhromeev, a man of rare courage, strong-willed and life-loving, commit it? Above, I have already named many arguments that arise from a careful study of the investigation materials and raise very serious doubts that the marshal’s death was voluntary. Conversations with people close to him strengthen such doubts. His wife Tamara Vasilyevna never believed and still categorically does not believe in suicide. Daughters Natalya and Tatyana do not believe. Army generals Valentin Varennikov and Mikhail Moiseev, who studied and worked next to him, do not believe long years who knew him well. Yes, many people I talked to don’t believe it. One of the main arguments against suicide is the character of the person. “I will frankly say that a person like Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev could not, simply is not capable of, committing suicide.” This is what Georgy Gennadievich Malinetsky, son-in-law and husband of Tatyana’s daughter, says while giving testimony. He had the opportunity to come into contact with the character of his father-in-law more in an everyday, family environment, but for him, the marshal’s enormous willpower and fortitude, and his unshakable natural optimism are undeniable. In a word, the strongest inner rod, as if specially created and hardened for difficult military service. Let's listen to my wife. She knew Sergei Fedorovich since childhood - they studied at the same school. Knows his character and life, probably better than anyone. -Have you ever seen him in different states, related to the service? - We roamed a lot. After the war and the Academy of Armored Forces - Far East, then Belarus, Ukraine, again Belarus and again the Far East... You know, he, as a commander responsible for very large groups of people in the troops, had the most difficult situations, all kinds of emergencies. Naturally, he was worried, sometimes he was very worried, because he is not made of iron. But in confusion, and even more so in panic, I never saw him. That’s why I don’t believe that I could commit suicide...
Yes, fate tested him to the breaking point more than once, but he persevered. Few people know that Akhromeev, at that time the first deputy chief of the General Staff, one of the few in the military leadership, strongly objected to the entry of our troops into Afghanistan. Few people know what role our army played in eliminating the consequences Chernobyl disaster, and Akhromeev, then the Chief of the General Staff, became one of the leading organizers of these works, unprecedented in scale and complexity. So what happens? He survived the Great Patriotic War, Afghanistan, and Chernobyl, but here, when there is no war, no nuclear reactor accident, he suddenly shows an incomprehensible weakness.
Marshal Akhromeyev considered suicide for a military man to be a weakness! He allowed it only in one case: when you are a carrier of information of the highest secrecy and cannot prevent yourself from being captured by the enemy. For torture, and especially modern psychotropic drugs, make it possible to “extract” a lot from a person, even against his will... Even then, soon after the fateful August 1991, a version arose that Akhromeev was forced to commit suicide, threatening reprisals against his family. This idea is suggested, in particular, by the lines from the letter addressed to the family. farewell letter: “For me, the main duty of a warrior and a citizen has always been. You were in second place... Today for the first time I put my duty to you first..." If we imagine that he heard the final and now very specific threat of reprisals against his family when he arrived at work on the last morning, then they get an explanation and a calm his leaving home, and his intention to be there for dinner when his wife and granddaughter arrive from Sochi, and a note in which he explains to someone about the unsuccessful first attempt to kill himself. By the way, those with whom he talks could have offered him this method of suicide used in the criminal world. Who needed to remove the marshal and why? Eat different variants answer to this question. But what it all boils down to is that he knew too much and became too inconvenient for many. It is known, for example: at that critical moment he was preparing to speak at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which was scheduled for August 26. His honest and direct word posed a serious danger to those who at that time began the decisive act of implementing their insidious plans.
Akhromeev has repeatedly said that his political struggle as a deputy and public figure could threaten the well-being of his family, his freedom, and possibly his life. After the article was published in " Soviet Russia“Whoever is in the way of the generals,” he said, called at work and threatened with violence. What's there phone calls and anonymous letters! They threatened quite unequivocally, even from the newspaper pages. Everything shook inside me when, in one of the drafts of Akhromeyev’s speech in the Supreme Soviet, where he intended to speak, in particular, about the campaign of persecution and slander organized against him by the “democratic” press, I read: they call him a war criminal, they write that Akhromeev must suffer the “fate of Speer and Hess.” Both of them, as is known, were convicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal, and Hess, sentenced to life imprisonment, eventually died in a noose. How many people immediately understood the meaning and ultimate goal of these deafening psychic attacks? How many stood up against them? Looking back, let's face it: no, not many. Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev was one of the first to stand up. Decisively and boldly, as soldiers rose into battle under enemy fire, and as he himself rose more than once at the front. His wife said this: “He understood the words “first think about the Motherland, and then about yourself” literally and followed them all his life. They were not pompous phrases for him. And then he felt that a threat had suddenly loomed over his homeland again.
Shortly before his death, the marshal wrote: “They are pursuing a very definite political line. Our entire past is being reshaped. But without a worthy past there cannot be a normal present, there cannot be a future. The destructive work of the newly minted democrats will cost the Fatherland dearly... (and further) In relation to me today, the press organs, from the newspaper Izvestia to Literaturnaya Gazeta, have launched a real persecution, day after day, a deliberate lie. It is completely useless to talk about any kind of justice. Their goal is one - to silence me. It won’t work!” How often do I remember these prophetic words of his today! However, it is now obvious to many how right those who warned that we could lose a normal present and future were. And at that time they tried to discredit these warnings in the eyes of people, so that people simply would not listen to them.
For his greatest modesty and ascetic unpretentiousness, Akhromeyev was called a Spartan by his friends. Who, having transferred to the position of presidential adviser, refused a one and a half times increased salary. Who, even saying goodbye to life, did not forget that he owed a few rubles to the canteen, and in one of the last notes he asked to return it by attaching money.
Soon after Akhromeev's death, the publishing house " International relationships “His last book, co-authored with former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Kornienko, “Through the Eyes of a Marshal and Diplomat,” was published. A critical look at foreign policy before and after 1985. It came out in a very small edition, and even then I’m surprised they released it then! Reading Sergei Fedorovich’s diary, I saw with what persistence, despite ill health and being busy with many other things, he worked on the book all these last months, giving himself tasks literally every day. As if he was afraid that he wouldn’t have time to speak out. So this book, somewhat confessional, together with the diary helps to more concretely imagine his very difficult relationship with those whose “team” he was part of, and to better understand the drama of the situation in which he was placed. The topic is bitter and big. Let me take one fact as an example. It is known that Akhromeyev, as chief of the General Staff and then adviser to the country's president on military issues, took an active part in preparing the most important Soviet-American negotiations related to arms reduction. In 1987, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was on the agenda. “A stubborn struggle”, “intense confrontation”, “a real duel” - such expressions are not uncommon in Akhromeyev’s book. It is clear that it was not easy to conduct business in such a way that agreement was reached and decisions were ultimately made, but without prejudice to our state interests, but the Americans did not forget about their benefit for a minute! This time, the most serious tug-of-war arose over the Soviet Oka missile, called the SS-23 in the West. Why? The missile is new, the latest achievement of our military-technical thought. The Americans are interested in us not having it. But it does not fall under the terms of the contract. Medium-range missiles are subject to elimination - from 1000 to 5500 kilometers and shorter - from 500 to 1000. The maximum tested range of the Oka is 400 kilometers. And yet... she was destroyed! How could this happen? Akhromeev, of course, firmly stood his ground, parrying all the cunning tricks of the American side. As always. It was not for nothing that the American military who dealt with him respected him so much for his patriotism and the highest professionalism. So now, in the end, they were asked: well, let's be honest - we will ban all missiles in the range not from 500, but from 400 to 1000 km. Then a barrier would be put in place to create a modernized American Lance-2 missile with a range of 450-470 km. Parity would be maintained. However, having arrived in Moscow, US Secretary of State Shultz raised the question with Shevardnadze about subsuming the SS-23 under the concept of “shorter-range missiles.” And he receives the answer: this will not be a problem for us. Representatives of the General Staff were not even invited to the meeting of experts that took place that same evening at the Foreign Ministry. And during Gorbachev’s conversation with Shultz the next day, the inclusion of the SS-23 in the concept of “shorter-range missile” was already spoken of... as a settled issue. Without any reservations, the lower range limit should decrease for Americans too! Akhromeev writes in the book: “At the conversation held on April 23, M.S. Gorbachev with J. Shultz, my participation was not planned, and that half of it, during which the aforementioned agreement on the Oka missile was consolidated, took place without my participation. However, in the middle of their conversation, I was quite unexpectedly called Secretary General to clarify some of the circumstances of the negotiations in Reykjavik as part of the Nitzke-Akhromeyev working group. I gave the necessary explanations and was left for the conversation; the conversation began about specific issues of the future treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. I learned about the solution to the issue of the Oka missile during the first stage of this conversation only the next day from the newspapers, after reading a message about the meeting of M.S. Gorbachev with J. Shultz, and even indicating that the Chief of the General Staff was present at the conversation.” That's how it is! He was invited to the second part of the conversation, apparently, in order to give just such a message in the newspapers. But in essence - they deceived. Both him and everyone. “The military leadership was outraged by what happened,” notes Akhromeyev. He writes with the utmost restraint, although you can feel that even after a while there is something bubbling in his soul. Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov, who was Akhromeev’s first deputy on the General Staff, told me about the immediate reaction: “I came from Afghanistan, where I was on a long business trip, and went straight to him. And he, as if anticipating my first question, literally rushed towards me: “Don’t think that I did this!” It was obvious that he was in great pain. Reasons for torment arose more and more often. However, in specific situations like this, and when assessing the current situation of the country as a whole, he will not be able to say directly for a long time: Gorbachev is to blame. It is already clear to him, of course, that the matter is not only in “interregionals”, in the so-called democratic opposition. He sees his opponents already in the country's leadership. He already calls them by name: Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Medvedev... But for Gorbachev he still finds excuses - probably he is being “set up”. The drama of an honest man who lives according to his conscience and has no idea that conscience can be elastic, that you can think one thing, say another, and do a third. A drama of trust and loyalty! Meanwhile, as I already felt then, and now I understand quite clearly, for Gorbachev and the people really close to him, Akhromeyev was not “one of his own.” And it became more and more unacceptable.
In his diary notes, intense thought beats, and his assessments of what is happening are increasingly sharper, more and more definite. "1. People have lost perspective - faith in the President and the CPSU. 2. Break everything, they broke everything - they did nothing. Bedlam, there is no order. 3.1985-1991. When was it better? What do you want to convince us of?!! 4. No raw materials, no components. Production is disrupted. Everything was sold to Romania.” This recording was apparently made after a trip to Moldova, from where he was elected people's deputy of the USSR. The year 1991 has already begun. And he can no longer avoid a direct answer to the question about Gorbachev’s guilt. Long before August, somewhere in the spring, while working on a speech in the Supreme Council, he writes down: “About M.S. GORBACHEV. After 6 years of M.S. Gorbachev's tenure as head of state, the fundamental question became: HOW DID IT HAPPEN THAT THE COUNTRY WAS ON THE EDGE OF DESTRUCTION? What are the objective reasons for the current situation; they should have appeared regardless of who would have led the country in 1985, and what is to blame for Gorbachev’s policies and practical activities? In 1985-1986 M.S. Gorbachev and other members of the Politburo behaved like frivolous schoolchildren. And this was done by serious people? Who and why organized the anti-army campaign in the country? How should we deal with our past today? In short, everything was done to ensure that a crisis of confidence occurred in the country. Who needed it and why? On whose part was this frivolity or malice involved? The answer is clear: “Gorbachev’s path did not happen. The country is thrown into chaos." I see that Akhromeyev, as a man of exceptional honesty, cannot believe in evil intent until the last moment. However, the inadmissibility of Gorbachev’s continued presence in the leadership of the country is already undeniable for him: “WHAT SHOULD M.S. WRITE ABOUT? There is one step left before resignation. M.S. himself is primarily to blame. - his opportunism and compromise... Resignation is inevitable. M.S. Gorbachev is dear, but the Fatherland is dearer.” * * * Did he write this to Gorbachev? For sure. Either wrote it or expressed it. The already mentioned Engver, in the words of Sergei Fedorovich himself, conveys his credo as a presidential adviser: to say not what Gorbachev wants to hear, but what actually exists. But why didn’t he publicly demand Gorbachev’s resignation? Georgy Markovich Kornienko, who was working on the book with Akhromeev at the time, recalls that Sergei Fedorovich considered it unethical to publicly speak out personally against the president, since he was “in office”: he was his advisor! Three times he wrote statements about his own resignation. He referred to deteriorating health, the consequences of injury and concussion, which was true. But an even greater truth was that the position of adviser to the main leader of the state, in which he hoped to do a lot of useful things for the state, now, in a critical situation, did not allow him to do what was perhaps necessary - to publicly speak out against the leader himself. And Gorbachev did not give him his resignation, I think, precisely because he knew: then he would speak without any “self-restraints.” By the way, Akhromeev was going to write his next book about Gorbachev. I can imagine what a book it would be!.. But on August 19 he will rush to Moscow not to personally speak out against Gorbachev. For the Fatherland! Three days later he would write to him, who remained officially president: “The fact is that since 1990 I have been convinced, as I am convinced today, that our country is heading towards destruction, it will soon be dismembered. I was looking for a way: to say it loudly.” And then, again, as an adviser to the president (not relieved of this damned position!), he writes about his responsibility for participating in the work of the State Emergency Committee... I have long wanted to hear from Gorbachev’s lips what he felt when he learned about the tragic death of Akhromeev What do you feel and think about this now? Catch in Moscow former president country, and now - a personal fund is very difficult. “On September 10, Mikhail Sergeevich flies to Germany. He won't be back until the 25th. But on the 30th it will fly away again. In America. This is until October 12th. And on the 19th again to America...” And yet, after four months of my persistent calls, the conversation took place. What did I hear? Gorbachev, according to him, had a hard time dealing with Akhromeyev’s death. Treated him with great respect and trust. He repeated it twice: “I believed him.” He called him a man of morals and conscience: “He will blush, but will directly say everything he thinks.” And his arrival in Moscow then, in August, was perceived “as a blow.” - It was a difficult situation for the President and the Secretary General. On the one hand, close people opposed it. On the other hand, the Russian government, the Russian leadership was gaining strength, they believed that they were on horseback. I had to go to the Russian Supreme Council... The conversation was moving further and further away from Akhromeyev - Gorbachev was talking about himself, and I had to interrupt him with a question that particularly worried me: - Tell me, don’t you have at least some feeling of guilt before the marshal ? After all, his death was, one way or another, a consequence of the tragic situation into which the country was plunged. I wrote to you: “Soon she will be dismembered.” - I didn’t and don’t have any feelings of guilt. This echoed within me: “it wasn’t and isn’t”, “it wasn’t and isn’t”!.. He said that he was going to invite Akhromeyev for a conversation, but “was finished” - he was just meeting in the Russian Supreme Council, and then he made a statement on relinquishing his powers as Secretary General. And I thought: it seems that on the day of his death Gorbachev made this statement that shocked me - he renounced the party, essentially announcing its dissolution! Did Sergei Fedorovich manage to hear? What a blow this was for him... There is hardly any need to comment further on the conversation with Gorbachev. Maybe there was only one word that cut me sharply: “Akhromeyev was a big worryer.” This word, casually and carelessly thrown, in my opinion, expressively characterizes both the one about whom it is said and the one who said it. When your question: “Suicide or murder?” - with whom I addressed many, asked Army General M. Gareev, Makhmut Akhmetovich answered like this: - In any case, it was a murder. He was killed by meanness and betrayal, by what they did to the country. - But he wasn’t the only one who faced this! If you admit that he could have laid hands on himself, why him? - He is the most conscientious of us. Well, only the conscientious will understand this. And for those in whose understanding conscience is an abstract concept, it will remain a strange “worrier.” * * * “I can’t live when my Fatherland is dying and everything that I considered the meaning of my life is being destroyed, and my past life gives me the right to die. I fought until the end." Whether he accepted death voluntarily or by force, the main thing in these last words is: The Fatherland is perishing! He gave everything he could for it. In the end, surrounded by enemies and betrayed, he gave his life. During the Great Patriotic War, of which he was a brave fighter, they wrote about the heroes: “He gave his life for his Motherland.” Soon after his death, as he foresaw, the Motherland would be dismembered. It turns out that his struggle and death were in vain? I think no. We once spoke about our fallen heroes, like about Gorky’s Falcon: “Even if you died!.. But in the song of the brave and strong in spirit, you will always be a living example...” Nowadays these words are rarely heard. “The battlefield after the battle belongs to the marauders” - the title of one of the modern plays quite accurately indicates who the masters of life are today. In this sense, the desecration of Akhromeyev’s grave (an unheard-of, monstrous desecration!) became ominously symbolic - it marked, so to speak, the entry into a new era. But it won't always be like this. We will continue the battle for the Motherland; children will then take the place of their fathers in this battle. And they should know: in our time there were not only “heroes” of Foros and Belovezhiya. There was Marshal Achromee. It is impossible to imagine him fitting into the “new regime.”
Opposition fighters from various, sometimes incompatible directions come to Akhromeyev’s grave - he seems to unite them all. Also, I think, with my high authority I could have united him in life if he had remained alive. Maybe that's why they didn't leave him alive?
Today there is no honor. But in the current political and moral lawlessness, when selfish intrigues and gang warfare rule the roost, a bright example of people for whom the Motherland is truly dearer than their own lives is especially necessary. Let's remember that we had such people. Let's believe that they will definitely come. Russia will be saved by them.
From the book by Viktor Stefanovich KOZHEMYAKO “Murders as a Sacrifice of “Democracy””.
In the distant days of August 1991, the death of Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeyev went virtually unnoticed, remaining in the shadow of the loud steps of the “victorious democracy.” The winners then tried not to advertise this death. If it was reported in those days, it was only in the sense that the late Sergei Akhromeyev felt guilty and responsible for joining the “putschists.” The further the events of those years move away from us, the less politicized assessments of what is happening reach us, however, the circumstances of the tragic death of the USSR Marshal, who was known and loved in the army, still remain not completely clear and understandable.
Usually, remembering the victims of the August 1991 coup, information appears in the media about 3 victims who became victims of rather strange events on the Garden Ring and became one of the latest Heroes Soviet Union. Much less often in the press they remember the names of three more victims who committed suicide. It is not customary to classify them as victims, much less as heroes, although in Lately the assessment of their actions is seriously revised by society. But then many thought, what kind of heroes were they if they committed suicide and who were they? One Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR is a member of the “notorious” State Emergency Committee, the second is the head of the affairs of the CPSU Central Committee, a terry “Partocrat”, the third is a Marshal of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s adviser on military issues, who also supported the State Emergency Committee.
It is necessary to note the fact that when all this happened (and suicides followed one after another after the failure of the “putsch”), many began to think that these were not suicides, but murders organized by someone, the purpose of which was to eliminate important and witnesses who are particularly objectionable to someone.
All three suicides had enough bright personalities, but one of them, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Akhromeyev, was such a unique and bright figure that his tragedy is most characteristic of that time, which is called perestroika and allows us to better understand that time and the events of those days. Akhromeev was a combat marshal who participated in the Great Patriotic War from the first to the last day and went through the entire army career from platoon commander to chief of the General Staff. In 1980, he was awarded the Lenin Prize for the research and creation of new automated aircraft control systems.
According to famous writer, publicist and historian Roy Medvedev, Marshal Akhromeev was very worthy person and was very highly respected both in the army and among party members. The marshal was a strong supporter of the speedy withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Together with the Deputy Head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs G. M. Kornienko, he believed that it was not worth counting on the PDPA being able to stay in power; the maximum that can be counted on is that the PDPA could take a legitimate, but at the same time modest place in a new mode.
It so happened that the first major obituary in memory of the deceased marshal was written not in the USSR, but in the USA, and it was published in Time magazine. It was written by Admiral W. Crowe, who at one time served as chairman of the US Chief of Staff Committee. Crowe wrote that Akhromeev was devoted to the ideals of communism and was very proud of the fact that everything he had was not much more than what he carried on himself. His narrow ideas about capitalism were main reason our disputes with him. At the same time, with all his devotion to the party and great patriotism, Sergei Akhromeyev was a modern man who understood perfectly well that much in the USSR was a mistake, and much must change if the USSR was still going to remain a great power. Crowe noted Akhromeyev's contribution to controlling arms proliferation, creating and working on constructive Soviet-American relations, reducing global tensions and the nuclear race, which lasted 45 years. He called Akhromeev a man of honor. Words from the title of the obituary “Communist. Patriot. “Soldier”, the marshal’s relatives engraved on the monument to the marshal.
Suicide or murder
According to the official version, which was adhered to by the investigator for especially important cases of the Prosecutor General's Office of Russia Leonid Proshkin, who was investigating the death of Sergei Akhromeyev, events developed as follows. On August 6, 1991, Marshal Akhromeyev and his wife were on regular leave, which they spent on the territory of a military sanatorium in the city of Sochi. At the same time, he knew nothing about the preparation of the State Emergency Committee and the plans of its participants. Already on the morning of August 19, having learned from television programs about what was happening in the country, he immediately flew to Moscow, where on the same day he had a meeting with Vice-President of the USSR Gennady Yanaev and became part of the headquarters of the State Emergency Committee, where he began work on the collection and subsequent analysis of information about the military-political situation in the state.
On August 24, 1991, Akhromeev arrived at his own office in the Kremlin and, being in a state of depression after the failure of the State Emergency Committee initiative, decided to commit suicide. At 9:40 a.m. he made his first attempt, after which he left a note about it. “I am a bad master at preparing a suicide weapon. The first attempt (at 9.40) was unsuccessful. The cable broke. I woke up at 10.00. I’m going to have the strength to do it all again.” On the evening of the same day, the body of the Marshal of the Soviet Union was discovered in his personal account, he hanged himself. A team of investigators was called to the scene, led by Proshkin, who arrived in the Kremlin at 23:27 and recorded what he saw on video. The marshal was sitting on the floor by the office window. His neck was tied with synthetic twine, the free end of which was attached to the handle of the window frame. At the same time, in his office there was perfect order, no signs of a struggle were found. At his workplace, Akhromeev left suicide letters and notes - 6 in total. A survey of people who were in contact with Akhromeev, an inspection of the scene of the incident and the contents of the suicide notes and data from the examination allowed Proshkin to conclude that Sergei Akhromeev took his own life of his own free will.
However, if you carefully study the case materials, which were collected in 2 fairly weighty folders, a sufficient number of questions arise. The case contains many inconsistencies and elementary contradictions that were recorded during the investigation. It is possible to cite only a few quotes from this case so that you too may have some doubts about the correctness of the investigation’s conclusions.
“On August 24, 1991, in office No. 19a in building 1 of the Moscow Kremlin at 9:50 pm, the security officer on duty Koroteev found the corpse of USSR Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev (b. 1923), who worked as an adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev on military issues” (from report).
“We arrived in the Kremlin. Sergei Akhromeyev said: “Go to the base, I’ll call you.” And he never called. At 10:50 minutes in the morning I called him in the Kremlin and asked him for lunch, after which he let me go and told me to be at the base at 13:00” (from the testimony of the Kremlin driver N.V. Platonov).
“I was at my workplace from 10 to 15 o’clock, I didn’t see Sergei Akhromeyev, but his office was open, I determined this fact by the fact that people were entering and leaving the marshal’s office, but I don’t know who it was. I assumed that it was the marshal himself who came in and out, since the secretaries did not go to work on Saturdays. When I was leaving the building, I noticed that there was no key in the door of Akhromeyev’s office... I remember for sure that there was no key in the office door, otherwise I would not have turned off the light in the corridor” (from the testimony given by Advisor to the President of the USSR V.V. Zagladin).
“The duty officer V.N. Koroteev reported to me (about 24 hours) that in office 19a of Advisor to the President of the USSR S.F. Akhromeev, a key was inserted into the keyhole, and the light in the office was not on and that he asked me to come to the place.” (from the testimony given by the commandant of Corps 1 of the Kremlin, M.I. Barsukov).
“I heard from one of the security representatives, whose name is Sasha, that he saw the marshal alive at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon on Saturday” (testimony of A.V. Grechina, assistant to the adviser to the President of the USSR).
Already from the above quotes it follows that, having woken up after an unsuccessful suicide attempt at 10 o’clock in the morning (from Akhromeyev’s note), the marshal calmly talks with the driver at 10:50 and is even planning to go somewhere around 13:00. Again, after 10 o’clock in the morning, someone repeatedly enters and leaves the marshal’s office. One of the Kremlin guards, Sasha, sees the marshal alive and well around 14:00. And Zagladin, who leaves the Kremlin at about 15:00, says that there was no key in the door of the marshal’s office, while at 21:50 the key appears from somewhere. The presence of these facts already seems to be sufficient grounds for the investigation to continue and try to answer the questions that arose during the questioning of witnesses.
At the same time, there are other issues in this case that do not fit very well into official version what happened. Firstly, the method of suicide itself raises questions, which is extremely uncharacteristic for a military man. The method is also surprising - the marshal hanged himself while sitting. This method is usually used in the criminal world, as people hang themselves in prisons because of “ architectural features» cameras. However, not only did Akhromeev himself reach such a method, but he also ignored more traditional version with a ceiling that seemed to have specially equipped hooks for heavy chandeliers.
Secondly, when Proshkin received an order to investigate the circumstances of the marshal’s death, the investigators were not allowed to the scene of the incident for a long time and were not allowed to take witnesses with them, who eventually became KGB officers who were on duty in the same building where the office was located Marshal.
Thirdly, immediately before the tragedy of August 23, Sergei Akhromeev completed work on the text of his speech at the upcoming session of the Supreme Council, which was scheduled to take place on August 26, 1991. He discussed his speech with his daughter (who even saved a draft of the speech). The Marshal was going to convey to the public and deputies information and facts of betrayal of the interests of the state by some senior officials from the country's leadership. If on August 26 Akhromeev was going to speak publicly before deputies, why did he hang himself on the 24th..
Given these circumstances, a number of researchers and friends of the marshal suggested that Akhromeyev was pushed to commit suicide. Perhaps he was threatened with subsequent repressions or the arrest of family members (at that time it was still possible to believe this) and was offered the only possible way out of the situation - suicide. The performers, in accordance with their professional experience, determined the method of suicide for him, handing over synthetic twine taken from the secretaries' room and, possibly, locking the marshal alone for some time.
This version, which remains only a version, is capable of at least somehow providing answers to some questions. In addition, the fact that Akhromeev began to be blackmailed with the well-being of his family is involuntarily suggested by one of his suicide notes, in which he writes to his relatives: “For me, the main duty of a warrior and a citizen has always been. You were in second place. Today, for the first time, I put my duty to you first. I ask you to bravely survive these days..."
However, investigator of the Prosecutor General's Office Leonid Proshkin did not consider this version or similar ones. According to him, there were no grounds for this, since there were no clear motives for killing Akhromeyev. He had not heard about the upcoming speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It seems strange that a professional of such a level should have overlooked such a serious fact that could have changed the whole matter.
Today it can be argued that Akhromeyev’s possible killers had reasons for this. He was right hand Gorbachev and knew a lot, he knew where and who was selling Soviet weapons, he knew the whole plot of the betrayal of the strategic interests of the USSR in Europe, how the equipment and assets of the Western groups of forces of the USSR were stolen. His incriminating evidence could have been murderous, but the marshal took all his secrets with him.
Information sources:
-http://www.e-reading-lib.org/chapter.php/1009735/216/Nepomnyaschiy_-_100_velikih_zagadok_russkoy_istorii.html
-http://www.peoples.ru/military/commander/ahromeev/history.html
-http://www.stoletie.ru/kultura/tajna_marshala_ahromejeva_2011-08-26.htm
Source - Wikipedia
Akhromeev, Sergei Fedorovich (May 5, 1923, village of Vindrey, Tambov province - August 24, 1991, Moscow) -Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1983). Hero of the Soviet Union (1982).
Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (1984-1988).
Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev was born in the village of Vindrey, Spassky district, Tambov province, into a peasant family. In 1940 he graduated from the 1st Special Naval School in Moscow. He began his military service in 1940, entering the Higher Naval School named after M.V. Frunze.
Member of the CPSU(b) since 1943, in 1983-1990. member of the CPSU Central Committee (since 1981 - candidate member of the Central Committee).
After completing one course at the naval school, from July 1941 he was at the front. During the Great Patriotic War he fought: - from July to December 1941 - as a cadet of the united cadet rifle battalion on the Leningrad Front, he was wounded; - cadet in the lieutenant course at the 2nd Astrakhan Infantry School, enrolled in August 1942, graduated in 1942, - from 1942 - commander of a rifle platoon of the 197th Army Reserve Regiment of the 28th Army on the Stalingrad and Southern Fronts, - from 1943 - adjutant senior rifle battalion of the 197th army reserve regiment on the 4th Ukrainian Front.
Since July 1944 - commander of a motorized battalion of machine gunners of the 14th self-propelled artillery brigade of the Reserve of the High Command in the Kharkov and Moscow military districts. He graduated from the Higher Officer School of Self-Propelled Artillery of the Armored and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army (1945).
He was awarded for his participation in the defense of Leningrad during the siege.
After the war, from June 1945 he was deputy commander of a self-propelled artillery battalion of SU-76 installations, from September 1945 - commander of a tank battalion of the 14th separate tank regiment of the training center, from February 1947 - commander of a battalion of ISU-122 installations of the 14th heavy self-propelled tank regiment of the 31st Guards Mechanized Division in the Baku Military District.
In 1952 he graduated from the Military Academy of Armored and Mechanized Forces of the Soviet Army named after I.V. Stalin. Since July 1952 - chief of staff of the 190th self-propelled tank regiment in the 39th Army of the Primorsky Military District. Since August 1955, he commanded tank regiments in the Far Eastern Military District. From December 1957 - deputy commander, chief of staff, and from December 1960 - commander of the 36th Tank Division in the Belarusian Military District. Since April 1964, commander of a training tank division.
In 1967 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. From July 1967 to October 1968 - chief of staff - first deputy commander of the 8th Tank Army.
From October 1968 to May 1972 - commander of the 7th Tank Army in the Belarusian Military District.
From May 1972 to March 1974 - chief of staff - first deputy commander of the Far Eastern Military District. In 1973 he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces named after K.E. Voroshilov.
From March 1974 to February 1979 - Head of the Main Operations Directorate (GOU) of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
From February 1979 to September 1984 - First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In this post, he traveled to Afghanistan many times to plan and direct the combat operations of Soviet troops.
From September 1984 to December 1988 - Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. He expressed disagreement with military reform and the weakening of Soviet military power, and therefore “resigned” from his post.
He led the planning of military operations in Afghanistan at all stages, including the withdrawal of troops.
At the army headquarters in Kabul, the military leadership often gathered for all kinds of meetings. By the way, Marshal Akhromeyev, then Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was at these planning meetings every day at five in the morning, without holidays or weekends.
B. I. Tkach
Since December 1988 - Advisor to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, since May 1989 - Advisor to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Since March 1990, Advisor to the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev on military affairs. Also, since December 1988 - Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
In 1984-1989 - deputy of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the Moldavian SSR. In March 1989, he was elected people's deputy of the USSR from the Balti territorial district No. 697 (Moldavian SSR). Member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the USSR Armed Forces Committee on Defense and Security. He repeatedly spoke at meetings of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as well as in the press with articles where he spoke about the danger of a rapid conquest of the USSR by NATO countries.
“Marshal Akhromeev was a worthy military leader and was highly respected in the army and in the party,” noted Roy Medvedev, pointing out: “The Marshal was discouraged by the behavior of the President of the USSR, who stopped giving his adviser and assistant any instructions and constantly postponed the decision of a number of important army issues.” problems that Akhromeev considered urgent. In the end, Akhromeyev submitted his resignation in June 1991, but Gorbachev was slow to resolve this issue.”
He understood that much was already being done incorrectly, to the detriment of the interests of our country, but, being an honest man himself, he was sure that other people should be like that, believing that all this was being done due to a misunderstanding, according to someone’s biased reports.
Army General M. Gareev
On August 19, having learned about the State Emergency Committee in the morning, he returned to Moscow from Sochi, where he spent his vacation with his wife Tamara Vasilievna and grandchildren, and met with Gennady Yanaev. He supported the State Emergency Committee’s Appeal and offered his assistance, managing military issues. He spent the night at his dacha, where his youngest daughter lived with her family. On August 20, he worked in the Kremlin and in the building of the Ministry of Defense, collecting information about the military-political situation in the country. Prepared a plan of activities that needed to be carried out in connection with the introduction of a state of emergency. On the night of August 20-21, I spent the night in my office in the Kremlin. From his office he called his daughters and wife in Sochi.
I was sure that this adventure would be defeated, and when I arrived in Moscow, I was personally convinced of this.<…>Let at least a trace remain in history - they protested against the death of such a great state.
from the notebook of S. F. Akhromeev
Why did I come to Moscow on my own initiative - no one called me from Sochi - and started working at the Committee? After all, I was sure that this adventure would be defeated, and when I arrived in Moscow, I was once again convinced of this. The fact is that, starting in 1990, I was convinced, as I am convinced today, that our country was heading towards destruction. Soon she will be dismembered. I was looking for a way to say this out loud. I thought that my participation in ensuring the work of the “Committee” and the subsequent related proceedings would give me the opportunity to speak directly about this. It probably sounds unconvincing and naive, but it is true. There were no selfish motives in this decision of mine.
Marshal Akhromeyev, from a personal letter to M. S. Gorbachev
On August 23, Sergei Fedorovich attended a meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Affairs.
August 24, 1991 at 21:50 In office No. 19 “a” in building 1 of the Moscow Kremlin, the security officer on duty discovered the body of Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeyev. The deceased was in full military uniform with insignia.
According to Roy Medvedev: “As can be judged from the notes, the marshal was thinking about suicide already on August 23, but there were some hesitations. But it was on the evening of August 23 that B. N. Yeltsin signed in the presence of Gorbachev a decree suspending the activities of the CPSU in Russian Federation. Late in the evening on the same day and on the night of August 24, demonstrators seized the buildings of the CPSU Central Committee on Old Square. Episodes of these events could be seen on television, and Akhromeev could know more.”
But as for Akhromeev, everything is literally in the case. And all the notes, and this ribbon on which he hanged himself. And a note about how the ribbon broke for the first time... I am sure that Akhromeev committed suicide. I knew Sergei Fedorovich well. He could not come to terms with what happened to his country.
Marshal D. T. Yazov
Army General Valentin Varennikov expressed doubt about the suicides of Akhromeyev and B.K. Pugo.
S. F. Akhromeev left letters to members of his family, as well as a note where he said that he was leaving this life, unable to see the collapse of everything to which he had dedicated his life.
I cannot live when my Fatherland is dying and everything that I have always considered the meaning in my life is being destroyed. Age and my past life give me the right to die. I fought until the end. Akhromeev. August 24, 1991
For me, the main duty of a warrior and a citizen has always been. You were in second place... Today for the first time I put my duty to you first...
From a farewell letter to family
Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev was my friend. His suicide is a tragedy that reflects the convulsions that are shaking the Soviet Union. He was a communist, a patriot and a soldier. And I believe that is exactly what he would say about himself.
American Admiral William D. Crowe
He was buried at Troekurovskoye Cemetery.
Statements
He was a strong supporter of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Together with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR G. M. Kornienko believed that “it is not realistic to count on the fact that the PDPA will be able to remain in power after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. The maximum that could be hoped for was for the PDPA to take a legitimate, but very modest place in the new regime.”
According to the chief of staff of the USSR President V.I. Boldin, Akhromeev confirmed that “military intelligence has approximately the same data as the KGB” about “suspicions of connections with the intelligence services of foreign countries” of Politburo member A.N. Yakovlev.
In 1991, Marshal Akhromeyev assessed the military losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War as follows: “If we count all those who died in hostilities, that is, military personnel and partisans who did not return home from the war, then there will be 8 million 668 thousand 400 people... Of which in 1941 - 3 million 138 thousand...”
“The USSR produced 20 times more tanks than the United States in the 1970s.”
Question from G. Shakhnazarov, assistant to the CPSU Secretary General M. Gorbachev (1980s): “Why is it necessary to produce so many weapons?”
Answer from Chief of the General Staff S. Akhromeyev: “Because at the cost of enormous sacrifices, we created first-class factories, no worse than those of the Americans. Are you going to order them to stop working and produce pots?”
From Yegor Gaidar’s book “The Death of an Empire.”
The second question is about a plant that produces ballistic missiles or missile stages in the United States. We named the plant in Utah, you disagreed. Let there be a plant in Orlando, Florida.
Schultz: - This is Disneyland!
Akhromeev: - Let the inspectors look at it too.
Books
Akhromeev, S. F., Kornienko G. M. Through the eyes of a marshal and a diplomat. - M.: International relations, 1992.
Awards
Soviet awards
Hero of the Soviet Union (05/07/1982)
4 Orders of Lenin (02/23/1971, 02/21/1978, 04/28/1980, 05/07/1982)
Order of the October Revolution (01/07/1988)
2 Orders of the Red Star (09/15/1943, 12/30/1956)
Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class (04/06/1985)
Order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd degree (04/30/1975)
Jubilee medal “For military valor. In commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin"
Medal "For Military Merit"
Medal "For Distinction in Protecting the State Border of the USSR"
Medal "For the Defense of Moscow"
Medal "For the Defense of Leningrad"
Medal "For the Defense of Stalingrad"
Medal "For victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945"
Jubilee medal "Twenty years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945"
Jubilee medal "Thirty years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945"
Jubilee medal "Forty years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945"
Medal "For Strengthening the Military Commonwealth"
Jubilee medal "30 years of the Soviet Army and Navy"
Anniversary medal "40 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Anniversary medal "50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Anniversary medal "60 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Jubilee medal "70 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Medal "In memory of the 800th anniversary of Moscow"
Medal "In memory of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad"
Medal "For Impeccable Service" 1st class.
Winner of the Lenin Prize in 1980 for the research and development of new automated control systems for the Armed Forces.
Foreign awards
MPR (Mongolia):
Order of Sukhbaatar (1981)
Medal "30 years of victory over Japan" (1975)
Medal "40 years of victory at Khalkhin Gol" (1979)
Medal "60 years of the Armed Forces of the Mongolian People's Republic" (1981)
GDR (German Democratic Republic):
Order of Scharnhorst (1983)
Medal "Brotherhood in Arms" 1st class (1980)
Medal "30 years" People's Army GDR" (1986)
NRB (Bulgaria):
Order "Georgi Dimitrov" (1988)
Order of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 1st class (1985)
Order "September 9, 1944" 1st class with swords (1974)
Medal "For Strengthening Brotherhood in Arms" (1977)
Medal "30 years of Victory over Nazi Germany"(1975)
Medal “40 Years of Victory over Fascism” (1985)
Medal “90 years since the birth of Georgiy Dimitrov” (1974)
Medal "100 years since the birth of Georgiy Dimitrov" (1984)
Medal "100 years of liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke" (1978)
Czechoslovakia:
Order of Victorious February (1985)
Medal "30 years of the Slovak National Uprising" (1974)
Medal "40 years of the Slovak National Uprising" (1984)
Vietnam:
Order of Military Merit, 1st class (1985)
DRA (Afghanistan):
Order of the Red Banner (1982)
Order of the Saur Revolution (1984)
Medal "From the Grateful Afghan People" (1988)
Cuba:
Medal “20 Years of the Revolutionary Armed Forces” (1976)
Medal "30 Years of the Revolutionary Armed Forces" (1986)
DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea):
Medal "40 Years of Liberation of Korea" (1985)
SR Romania:
Medal "For Military Valor" (1985)
PRC (China):
Medal of Sino-Soviet Friendship (1955)
Poland (Poland):
Medal "Brotherhood in Arms" (1988)
Military ranks
Colonel - awarded 12/08/1956,
Major General of Tank Forces - 04/13/1964,
Lieutenant General of Tank Forces - 02/21/1969,
Colonel General - 10/30/1974,
Army General - 04/23/1979,
Marshal of the Soviet Union - 03/25/1983.