With the invasion of the USSR, the Germans and their allies very quickly realized that “they don’t belong here” - they had never encountered such dedication and from the enemy, sometimes bordering on madness, in any army of the countries they occupied. Although during 2 years of fighting in the Second World War unleashed by Nazi Germany, the Nazis captured almost all of Europe.
At first, the Germans, inspired by the successes on their fronts, were skeptical about the capabilities of the Red Army. That's why fascist Germany there was great hope for a blitzkrieg. At first, the Wehrmacht even had grounds for the successful implementation of its plans - a surprise attack by the enemy, confusion and inconsistency in the first days of the war led to a massive retreat of the Red Army. But within a month, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Halder, would note in his diary the “original character of the Russians” and write that the Wehrmacht “for the first time faced a serious enemy.” The rabid propagandist of Nazi Germany, Goebbels, who specialized in producing and introducing professional lies into the minds of people, even he very quickly (a week after the start of the Great Patriotic War!) appreciated the merits of the Russian soldier. In 1939, he spoke of the Red Army as poorly led, even worse equipped and armed—in short, “of no value [militarily].”
And in June 1941, a completely different entry appears in his diary - about the bravely defending Russians and their command, acting better than in the first days of the war. “They fight like hell...” Memories of the enemy’s fighting qualities among the Germans and Soviet soldiers vary somewhat. Among the surviving Nazis (or in written documents found from the dead) there are numerous references to the fearlessness and perseverance of the Russians, sometimes reckless, in the opinion of the Germans. Our veterans often casually note good preparation and the discipline of the Germans, but they certainly add that this was not enough in the war to win victory. The Germans respected Russians (in fact, representatives of all nationalities of the USSR; Russians simply predominated among soldiers and officers) for their endurance and courage. The Nazis got rid of the ideological prejudice about the racial superiority of the German nation over other nations almost in the first months of the war with the Soviet Union. One despairing German wrote home about “... damned peasants fighting like hell,” another reported about “a new generation of Russians, strong and courageous,” a third lamented that “at Stalingrad we forgot how to laugh,” because “... Ivan did not retreat even one step." As our veterans recall, if the Germans retreated in the attack of the Soviet infantry, they fled to their fortified defensive line without attempting to counterattack. The Nazis noted the opposite trend among the enemy - often the Russians fought to the last bullet, even when surrounded.
Their contempt for death amazed the Germans. Massive attacks of the Russians, when, despite the losses, they over and over again, like an avalanche, went to enemy positions, drove the enemy machine gunners crazy and terrified the rest of the “Hans”. The Russians were at home in their homeland, and they survived hunger, cold and various everyday difficulties better than the enemy. German officers and soldiers admired the ability of the Russians to literally make watercraft out of nothing in a short time to cross the river or build bridges. From disdain to respect By 1943, German soldiers and officers had even more reasons to respect the Russian soldier - having become more experienced in battles, he was no longer inferior in anything, and increasingly surpassed the enemy in combat qualities. Surviving Member Battle of Stalingrad wrote that “we no longer talked about the Ivans with disdain... - enemy soldiers are improving daily in close combat, street battles, and skillfully camouflaging themselves...”. As German General Blumentritt later noted, the fatal mistake of the German command during the attack on the USSR was that the Germans had absolutely no idea who they were going to fight with - they did not know either the mentality of the Russian soldier or the geographical features of the enemy’s country. The very first battles of the Great Patriotic War forced the Nazis to rethink their previous attitude towards the Russians as worthless warriors. ... The Soviet soldier, like Pushkin’s uncle, forced himself to be respected, and, indeed, “could not have come up with a better idea.” Yes, he didn’t need to invent it - while liberating populated areas from the Nazis, the soldiers and officers of the Red Army saw how the invaders mocked the civilian population, shooting, hanging and burning hundreds, thousands of people alive. Noble rage and thirst for revenge became the driving force that the invaders did not and could not have.
Soldiers of the Red Army on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War fought for the country and their families. This is not even discussed. However, they also had additional incentives that contributed to their success in carrying out combat missions.
Money is no barrier to heroism
Probably not everyone knows that Soviet soldiers received wages during the Great Patriotic War, and their exploits were encouraged not only with orders and medals, but also with cash bonuses. However, this should not in any way diminish the heroism of our soldiers, who were more than once in the face of death.
What was the monetary allowance (that’s what they called the salary at the front) during the Great Patriotic War? Patriotic War? The lowest official salary was for a private - 17 rubles per month, a platoon commander received 620 - 800 rubles, a company commander - 950 rubles, a battalion commander - 1100 rubles, an army commander - 3200 rubles, a front commander - 4000 rubles. In guards units, officers could count on one and a half salaries, and privates - on double salary. Even the employees of the penal battalion were entitled to a monetary allowance - 8.5 rubles per month. The soldiers who were in the hospital received the same amount.
It is curious that the sniper, contrary to popular belief, did not receive anything for the destroyed enemies; he could count on a salary in accordance with his rank. However, a sniper sergeant who served for three years was entitled to a 200-ruble salary. However, given the high mortality rate among snipers, a rare lucky one could live to see promotion.
The salary did not always depend on the position held. For example, a pilot with the rank of Hero Soviet Union could receive more than the commander of his regiment - about 2000 rubles. Various types of allowances – guards, front-line, and for pilots – for each flight had a significant impact on the amount of pay.
The German command, unlike the Soviet one, was stingy in paying monetary rewards to its military. For success in battle, Wehrmacht soldiers received only orders. Only at the end of the war could a fighter earn extraordinary leave or a food parcel for a feat accomplished.
Soviet soldiers were paid not only on the front line, but also in partisan detachments. Most often this concerned the leadership of those formations that were part of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. Commanders of various kinds of partisan units could receive from 500 to 750 rubles. Sometimes bonuses were paid for the disabling of German equipment, for example, trains with ammunition and people.
How did the financial motivation of Red Army soldiers differ depending on the type of troops?
In the air
The first to be affected by the monetary incentive system were the pilots. After the bombing of Berlin on the night of August 7-8, 1941, each member of the crew of the Soviet aircraft, by order of Stalin, was given 2,000 rubles, the same amount was received by the pilots who bombed Helsinki, Bucharest and Budapest.
From August 19, 1941, financial rewards extended to all USSR air forces. At first, for a downed enemy plane there was a single bonus of 1,000 rubles for everyone, later the payments were differentiated: for a downed bomber they paid 2,000 rubles, for a transport plane - 1,500 rubles, for a fighter - 1,000 rubles, a steam locomotive destroyed from the air was quoted cheaper - only 750 rubles.
The record for the most “highly paid” battle was set on May 4, 1945, when the Baltic Fleet air group pilot Mikhail Borisov successfully attacked the German battleship Schlesien in the roadstead, after which the crew was forced to scuttle the ship. Borisov was awarded a prize of 10,000 rubles.
On the land
After a successful experiment with aviation, the Soviet leadership decided to reward the ground forces with money. There was only one criterion here - a destroyed enemy tank. After the “Kharkov disaster,” Stalin needed to somehow stir up the army, and he issued order No. 0528 on the creation of anti-tank destroyer units, which stated that “for each knocked out tank, the gun commander and gunner - 500 rubles, the rest of the crew - 200 rubles".
If a group of soldiers participated in the destruction of an enemy tank, then the bonus amount rose to 1,500 rubles and was divided equally among all soldiers. But if the hit turned out to be heavy german tank, then the amount of payments increased to 5,000 rubles.
Rewards were also paid for the repair and evacuation of their own tanks. According to Stalin's order of February 25, 1942, for quick and high-quality routine repairs of a heavy KB tank, they paid 350 rubles, for repairs of a medium T-34 tank - from 250 to 500 rubles, for repairs of light tanks - from 100 to 200 rubles. Typically, at least 70% of the total amount of payments was intended for bonuses to the workers of the unit.
In the summer of 1943, on the eve of the battle on Kursk Bulge into the payment system ground forces adjustments were made: “Set the bonus at 1000 rubles. to each soldier and commander for personally knocking out or setting fire to an enemy tank using individual means of combat.”
On the sea
The sailors had their own gradation when paying remuneration. For the destruction of a destroyer or submarine, the commander and navigator of a Soviet ship received 10 thousand rubles each, and crew members - 2.5 thousand each. The sinking of a German transport ship cost less, respectively 3 and 1 thousand rubles, a patrol ship - 2 thousand and 500 rubles, a tugboat - 1 thousand and 300 rubles.
The salaries of Soviet sailors varied similarly: the commander of a naval base earned 2,400 rubles per month, the commander of a trawling brigade - 1,900 rubles, the commander of a submarine - 2,100 rubles, the commander of a boat division - 1,500 rubles, the commander of a leader - from 1,400 to 1500 rubles, commander of the operational unit of the Marine Communications Point of the reconnaissance department of the fleet headquarters - 1100 rubles, minesweeper commander - 1200 rubles, assistant minesweeper commander - 1050 rubles, battery commissar - 1300 rubles, boatswain on a patrol ship - 750 rubles.
Between the rear and the front
How could the war participants spend the money they earned? During the hostilities, Voentorg continued its work, bringing auto shops to the front line. Soldiers and officers in improvised markets could purchase many essential goods: razors, needles and threads, pencils and notepads. They most often bought food from the local population.
Compared to pre-war times, the cost of goods has increased at least 10 times. In state stores, many goods were sold at pre-war prices, but it was almost impossible to buy anything here. The market is another matter. But the prices there were different. Thus, half a liter of vodka cost from 300 to 800 rubles (in a state store its price was only 30 rubles). The price for a loaf of bread ranged from 300 to 400 rubles, for a kilo of potatoes they paid 90 rubles, for a pack of Kazbek cigarettes - 75 rubles, for a glass of shag - 10 rubles. A kilogram of salted lard was sold for 1,500 rubles.
Voentorg, which worked on the front line, maintained pre-war prices. Many soldiers and officers, believing that their families had a harder time, sent the money they earned home. There were often cases when money earned in blood never reached those who were at the epicenter of the fighting.
“From my salary, I only received two payments at home; I didn’t receive anything at the front. When the war ended, five months later, no one received anything. And some commanders carried bags full of red thirty. While I was traveling to Crimea by train after demobilization, I accidentally saw that our finance chief had his things scattered around. He was drunk, I accidentally saw a bag full of money, then I thought in horror: “That’s where our money is!” recalled nurse V. M. Vasilyeva.
Joy on the Frontline
Although money was a good incentive for the successful completion of combat missions, its importance should not be overestimated. Musicians and actors played an equally important role in raising the morale of military personnel, who more than once gave concerts on the front line. They, too, as the famous song says, brought victory closer as best they could.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Eremenko gratefully recalled these artists, “who, through fearlessness and selfless work, raised the morale of the soldiers, playing plays and concerts in the front line, sometimes right at the forefront. The artists knew how to ignite the hearts of the fighters, breathe will into them, and sometimes knew how to make them laugh.”
Where would we be without the legendary front-line hundred grams? War veteran Mikhail Zavorotny tells how a sergeant major arrived with a can and poured “some kind of muddy liquid” onto the squad. And then they measured it out to everyone using the cap of a 76-mm shell: whether it was 100 or 50 grams and what strength, no one knew. He drank, “bit” his sleeve, that’s all the “drunkenness.” But it was easier and more fearless to fight such doping.
According to front-line soldier Nikolai Posysaev, military life was unthinkable without tobacco. Moreover, their unit received quite decent tobacco, pressed into briquettes. There were also German cigarettes, but most smokers believed that they were weak and did not have the same effect as native tobacco.
But perhaps the most powerful emotional stimulus in the war was the fair sex. Beautiful and not very beautiful, but they brightened up the leisure time of their comrades at the front and inspired them to heroic deeds. Nikolai Posysaev admits that, as a rule, women who went to the front soon became the mistresses of officers. But everyone was afraid of female snipers, the front-line soldier jokingly noted.
The Red Army was created, as they say, from scratch. Despite this, she managed to become a formidable force and win the civil war. The key to success was the construction of the Red Army using the experience of the old, pre-revolutionary army.
On the ruins of the old army
By the beginning of 1918, Russia, which had survived two revolutions, finally emerged from the First World War. Her army was a pitiful sight - soldiers deserted en masse and headed to their homes. Since November 1917, the Armed Forces did not exist de jure - after the Bolsheviks issued an order to dissolve the old army.
Meanwhile, on the outskirts of the former empire, new war- civil. In Moscow the battles with the cadets had just died down, in St. Petersburg - with the Cossacks of General Krasnov. Events grew like a snowball.
On the Don, generals Alekseev and Kornilov formed the Volunteer Army, in the Orenburg steppes the anti-communist uprising of Ataman Dutov unfolded, in the Kharkov region there were battles with cadets of the Chuguev Military School, in the Yekaterinoslav province - with detachments of the Central Rada of the self-proclaimed Ukrainian Republic.
Labor activists and revolutionary sailors
The external, old enemy was not asleep either: the Germans intensified their offensive on the Eastern Front, capturing a number of territories of the former Russian Empire.
At that time, the Soviet government had at its disposal only Red Guard detachments, created locally mainly from labor activists and revolutionary-minded sailors.
During the initial period of general partisanship in the civil war, the Red Guards were the support of the Council of People's Commissars, but it gradually became clear that voluntariness should be replaced by the conscription principle.
This was clearly shown, for example, by the events in Kyiv in January 1918, where the uprising of the working detachments of the Red Guard against the power of the Central Rada was brutally suppressed by national units and officer detachments.
The first step towards the creation of the Red Army
On January 15, 1918, Lenin issued a Decree on the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The document emphasized that access to its ranks is open to all citizens of the Russian Republic at least 18 years of age who are ready to “give their strength, their lives to defend the won October Revolution and the power of the Soviets and socialism.”
This was the first, but half-hearted step towards creating an army. So far it was proposed to join it voluntarily, and in this the Bolsheviks followed the path of Alekseev and Kornilov with their voluntary recruitment of the White Army. As a result, by the spring of 1918, no more than 200 thousand people were in the ranks of the Red Army. And its combat effectiveness left much to be desired - most of the front-line soldiers were resting at home from the horrors of the World War.
A powerful incentive to create a large army was given by the enemies - the 40,000-strong Czechoslovak corps, which in the summer of the same year rebelled against Soviet power along the entire length of the Trans-Siberian Railway and overnight captured vast areas of the country - from Chelyabinsk to Vladivostok. In the south of the European part of Russia, Denikin’s troops were not asleep; having recovered from the unsuccessful assault on Ekaterinodar (now Krasnodar), in June 1918 they again launched an attack on Kuban and this time achieved their goal.
Fight not with slogans, but with skill
Under these conditions, one of the founders of the Red Army, people's commissar in military and naval affairs, Leon Trotsky proposed moving to a more rigid model of army formation. According to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on July 29, 1918, military conscription was introduced in the country, which made it possible to increase the number of the Red Army to almost half a million people by mid-September.
Along with quantitative growth, the army also strengthened qualitatively. The leadership of the country and the Red Army realized that slogans alone that the socialist fatherland was in danger would not win the war. We need experienced personnel, even if they do not adhere to revolutionary rhetoric.
IN en masse The so-called military experts, that is, officers and generals of the tsarist army, began to be drafted into the Red Army. Their total number during the Civil War in the ranks of the Red Army was almost 50 thousand people.
The best of the best
Many later became the pride of the USSR, such as Colonel Boris Shaposhnikov, who became Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of the Army General Staff, including during the Great Patriotic War. Another head of the General Staff of the Red Army during World War II, Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky entered the Civil War as a staff captain.
Another effective measure to strengthen the middle command ranks were military schools and accelerated training courses for Red commanders from among soldiers, workers and peasants. In battles and battles, yesterday's non-commissioned officers and sergeants quickly rose to become commanders of large formations. Suffice it to recall Vasily Chapaev, who became a division commander, or Semyon Budyonny, who headed the 1st Cavalry Army.
Even earlier, the election of commanders was abolished, which had an extremely harmful effect on the level of combat effectiveness of units, turning them into anarchic spontaneous detachments. Now the commander was responsible for order and discipline, albeit on an equal basis with the commissar.
Kamenev instead of Vatsetis
It is curious that a little later whites also joined the conscript army. In particular, the Volunteer Army in 1919 largely remained so only in name - the ferocity of the Civil War imperiously demanded that opponents replenish their ranks by any means.
Former colonel Joakim Vatsetis was appointed the first commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR in the fall of 1918 (since January 1919, he simultaneously led the actions of the army of Soviet Latvia). After a series of defeats for the Red Army in the summer of 1919 in European Russia, Vatsetis was replaced in his post by another tsarist colonel, Sergei Kamenev.
Under his leadership, things went much better for the Red Army. The armies of Kolchak, Denikin, and Wrangel were defeated. Yudenich's attack on Petrograd was repulsed, Polish units were driven out of Ukraine and Belarus.
Territorial police principle
By the end of the Civil War, the total strength of the Red Army was more than five million people. The Red Cavalry, initially numbering only three regiments, over the course of numerous battles grew to several armies that operated on widely extended communications of countless fronts of the civil war, serving as shock troops.
The end of hostilities required a sharp reduction in the number of personnel. This, first of all, was needed by the country's war-depleted economy. As a result, in 1920-1924. demobilization was carried out, which reduced the Red Army to half a million people.
Under the leadership of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs Mikhail Frunze, most of the remaining troops were transferred to the territorial-militia principle of recruitment. It consisted in the fact that a small part of the Red Army soldiers and unit commanders carried out permanent service, and the rest of the personnel were called up for five years for training sessions lasting up to a year.
Strengthening combat capability
Over time, Frunze's reform led to problems: the combat readiness of the territorial units was much lower than the regular ones.
The thirties, with the advent of the Nazis in Germany and the Japanese attack on China, began to smell distinctly of gunpowder. As a result, the USSR began transferring regiments, divisions and corps to a regular basis.
This took into account not only the experience of the First World War and the Civil War, but also participation in new conflicts, in particular, the clash with Chinese troops in 1929 on the Chinese Eastern Railway and Japanese troops on Lake Khasan in 1938.
The total number of the Red Army increased, the troops were actively rearming. This primarily concerned artillery and armored forces. New troops were created, for example, airborne troops. Mother infantry became more motorized.
Premonition of World War
Aviation, which had previously performed mainly reconnaissance missions, was now becoming a powerful force, increasing the proportion of bombers, attack aircraft and fighters in its ranks.
Soviet tank crews and pilots tried their hand at local wars taking place far from the USSR - in Spain and China.
In order to increase prestige military profession and convenience of service in 1935, personal military ranks- from marshal to lieutenant.
The final line under the territorial-militia principle of recruiting the Red Army was drawn by the law on universal conscription of 1939, which expanded the composition of the Red Army and established more long terms services.
And there was a big war ahead.
At the first stage of the Civil War of 1917 - 1922/23, two powerful opposing forces took shape - “red” and “white”. The first represented the Bolshevik camp, whose goal was a radical change in the existing system and the construction of a socialist regime, the second - the anti-Bolshevik camp, striving for a return to the order of the pre-revolutionary period.
The period between the February and October revolutions is the time of formation and development of the Bolshevik regime, the stage of accumulation of forces. The main tasks of the Bolsheviks before the outbreak of hostilities in the Civil War: the formation of a social support, transformations in the country that would allow them to gain a foothold at the top of power in the country, and the defense of the achievements of the February Revolution.
The Bolsheviks' methods in strengthening power were effective. First of all, this concerns propaganda among the population - the slogans of the Bolsheviks were relevant and helped to quickly form the social support of the “Reds”.
The first armed detachments of the “reds” began to appear on preparatory stage– from March to October 1917. The main driving force of such detachments were workers from industrial regions - this was the main force of the Bolsheviks, which helped them come to power during the October Revolution. At the time of the revolutionary events, the detachment numbered about 200,000 people.
The stage of formation of Bolshevik power required the protection of what was achieved during the revolution - for this, at the end of December 1917, the All-Russian emergency commission, headed by F. Dzerzhinsky. On January 15, 1918, the Cheka adopted a Decree on the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and on January 29, the Red Fleet was created.
Analyzing the actions of the Bolsheviks, historians do not come to unanimous opinion about their goals and motivation:
The most common opinion is that the “Reds” initially planned a large-scale Civil War, which would be a logical continuation of the revolution. The fighting, the purpose of which was to promote the ideas of the revolution, would consolidate the power of the Bolsheviks and spread socialism throughout the world. During the war, the Bolsheviks planned to destroy the bourgeoisie as a class. Thus, based on this, the ultimate goal of the “reds” is world revolution.
V. Galin is considered one of the fans of the second concept. This version is radically different from the first - according to historians, the Bolsheviks had no intention of turning the revolution into a Civil War. The goal of the Bolsheviks was to seize power, which they succeeded in during the revolution. But continuation of hostilities was not included in the plans. Arguments of fans of this concept: the transformations that the “Reds” planned demanded peace in the country; at the first stage of the struggle, the “Reds” were tolerant of other political forces. A turning point regarding political opponents occurred when in 1918 there was a threat of losing power in the state. By 1918, the “Reds” had a strong, professionally trained enemy - the White Army. Its backbone was the military of the Russian Empire. By 1918, the fight against this enemy became purposeful, the army of the “Reds” acquired a pronounced structure.
At the first stage of the war, the actions of the Red Army were not successful. Why?
Recruitment into the army was carried out on a voluntary basis, which led to decentralization and disunity. The army was created spontaneously, without a specific structure - this led to low level discipline, problems in managing large numbers of volunteers. The chaotic army was characterized by high level combat effectiveness. Only in 1918, when Bolshevik power was under threat, did the “Reds” decide to recruit troops according to the mobilization principle. From June 1918, they began to mobilize the military of the tsarist army.
The second reason is closely related to the first - the chaotic, unprofessional army of the “Reds” was opposed by organized, professional military men who, at the time of the Civil War, participated in more than one battle. The “Whites”, with a high level of patriotism, were united not only by professionalism, but also by an idea - the White movement stood for a united and indivisible Russia, for order in the state.
Most characteristic The Red Army is homogeneous. First of all, this concerns class origin. Unlike the “whites,” whose army included professional soldiers, workers, and peasants, the “reds” accepted only proletarians and peasants into their ranks. The bourgeoisie was subject to destruction, so an important task was to prevent hostile elements from joining the Red Army.
In parallel with military operations, the Bolsheviks implemented a political and economic program. The Bolsheviks pursued a policy of “red terror” against hostile social classes. IN economic sphere“War communism” was introduced - a set of measures in the internal policy of the Bolsheviks throughout the Civil War.
The Reds' biggest wins:
- 1918 – 1919 – establishment of Bolshevik power in the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia.
- Beginning of 1919 - The Red Army launches a counteroffensive, defeating Krasnov’s “white” army.
- Spring-summer 1919 - Kolchak’s troops fell under the attacks of the “Reds”.
- Beginning of 1920 - the “Reds” ousted the “Whites” from the northern cities of Russia.
- February-March 1920 - defeat of the remaining forces of Denikin’s Volunteer Army.
- November 1920 - the “Reds” ousted the “Whites” from Crimea.
- By the end of 1920, the “Reds” were opposed by disparate groups of the White Army. Civil War ended in victory for the Bolsheviks.
Since only a few Soviet sources openly mention Operation Mars itself, only a few list the reasons for its failure. Zhukov’s incomplete and inaccurate memoirs say the following: “Understanding the reasons for the failed offensive of the Western Front troops, we came to the conclusion that the main one was an underestimation of the difficulties of the terrain, which was chosen by the front command for delivering the main attack.
War experience teaches that if the enemy’s defenses are located in a well-observed area where there are no natural shelters from artillery fire, then such defenses can be easily destroyed by artillery and mortar fire, and then the offensive will certainly be successful.
If the enemy’s defenses are located in poorly observed terrain, where there are good shelters behind the reverse slopes of the heights, in ravines running perpendicular to the front, it is difficult to smash such defenses with fire and break through, especially when the use of tanks is limited.
In this particular case, the influence of the terrain on which the German defenses were located, well hidden behind the reverse slopes of rough terrain, was not taken into account.
Another reason for the failure was the lack of tank, artillery, mortar and aviation assets to ensure a breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses.
The front command tried to correct all this during the offensive, but failed to do so. The situation was complicated by the fact that the German command, contrary to our calculations, significantly strengthened its troops here, transferring them from other fronts.
As a result of all these factors, a group of troops of the Kalinin Front, having made a breakthrough south of Bely, found itself alone” (14).
Zhukov's explanation is nothing more than an excuse. In his memoirs, he not only ignored the planning and conduct of the November operation, but also focused on the Western Front, keeping silent about the true reasons for the defeat. The command of the Western and Kalinin Fronts had an excellent assessment of the terrain in the Rzhev area; the cause of subsequent difficulties was bad weather, and not ignorance of the terrain features. Supporting artillery was also sufficient: Generals Purkaev and Konev had fire support that was commensurate with, if not superior to, the support of their comrades in the Stalingrad area. Zhukov is right about only one thing. He himself, the front command and Soviet intelligence underestimated the size of the German reserves, confident that they were all sent to Stalingrad. But, one way or another, Zhukov gives a completely unsatisfactory explanation of the reasons for this defeat.
The few Soviet authors of memoirs that mention Operation Mars are more frank in their assessments. But apparently, due to the official ban, they all ignored the broader context of the operation. The commander of the 6th Tank Corps, General Getman, who was ill throughout the operation, subsequently wrote: “The attack was carried out on fortified positions occupied by enemy tank forces, in wooded and swampy terrain and difficult meteorological conditions. Both of these favored the enemy. We lacked proper interaction with the infantry and reliable artillery and aviation support. The infantry lagged behind the tanks.
The suppression of enemy strongholds, especially their anti-tank weapons, by artillery fire and air strikes was not sufficiently organized. This led to tank brigades suffering heavy losses.
The corps, as already mentioned, did not have its own artillery, with the exception of an anti-tank fighter regiment. Our means of reconnaissance and communications were weak, which negatively affected command and control. All this made it difficult to complete tasks in many ways” (15).
The most outspoken of the memoirists, the commander of the 1st Mechanized Corps, General Solomatin, criticized the army command even more actively:
“When considering the actions of the 1st Mechanized Corps on the Kalinin Front, it should be borne in mind that the encirclement of the corps and some rifle brigades of the 6th Rifle Corps by the enemy might not have happened. These troops could still be withdrawn when there was a clear threat of encirclement. However, the commander of the 41st Army, apparently not without instructions from the front command, believed that it was important to hold the captured area until a new offensive was launched, and he expected to defeat the enemy who had broken through and reunite with the corps. During offensive operations such a decision is quite acceptable if it is very profitable and the command has enough forces and means to break through the encirclement created by the enemy. However, in in this case The commander's plan was not fully realized due to the significant numerical superiority of the German troops operating against the 41st Army. That is why the corps was given the order to leave the enemy’s rear” (16).
Solomatin listed in detail the mistakes of the command of his corps and the army to which he was subordinate. First of all, he attributed the German victory to the timely arrival of large tank reserves, mistakenly believing that they had a numerical superiority over the forces of the 41st Army. He further indicated that Soviet troops it was not possible to complete the maneuver, since the German defense was never broken through across a sufficiently wide area. Without saying it directly, he blamed the defeat on the army commander, who focused on capturing Bely and failed to drive German troops out of this strategically important “corner post.”
On November 26, as soon as the development of success began, Solomatin wrote, the army commander weakened the 1st Mechanized Corps, recalling the 19th Mechanized Brigade from it and throwing it into battle in the area of prepared enemy fortifications south of Belyi. Soon after this, according to Solomatin, Tarasov worsened his mistakes. Having kept two separate mechanized brigades in reserve for too long, Tarasov sent them in two divergent directions at a time when their combined efforts under the command of Solomatin could help either completely break through the German defenses or isolate the enemy garrison in Bely. And finally, when Solomatin’s two tank brigades reached the Vladimirskoye-Bely highway, encountered German reserves and were forced to go on the defensive, Tarasov refused to replace them with rifle troops that could maneuver on the flank and behind enemy lines (17).
Colonel D.A. Dragunsky, chief of staff of a tank brigade in Katukov's 3rd mechanized corps and a future outstanding commander of Soviet armored forces, became even more personal in his criticism - even to the point of accusing his brigade commander of incompetence.
“It turned out that things were not going well in the 1st mechanized brigade of our corps. The commander of this brigade, infantryman Colonel Ivan Vasilyevich Melnikov, clearly underestimated the advantages that the use of tanks and mechanized troops provided. The chief of staff of the 1st brigade was not highly organized. Control in battle was disrupted. The tank regiment of this brigade acted in isolation from the motorized battalions; the latter, lacking tank and artillery support, were stuck in the snow. Contact with two battalions was lost. All these facts had a negative impact on the affairs of the corps as a whole, which seriously worried General Katukov” (18).
Soon after the events described, Dragunsky was appointed chief of staff of the 1st mechanized brigade.
A year after the operation, the Department for the Use of War Experience of the General Staff of the Red Army prepared a detailed secret analysis of the actions of the cavalry-mechanized group of the 20th Army. It said in a scathing and scathing manner that the group's actions were clumsy and poorly supported by the army. The following was said about the last futile attempt of the 6th Tank Corps to break out of the encirclement: “Here, as before, the interaction of units advancing from the front (1st Guards Rifle Division) and operating from the rear (remains of the 6th Tank Corps ), there was no organization and the units acted discordantly. The 1st Guards Rifle Division did not support the attacks of the 6th Tank Corps, and its remnants, suppressed by a numerically superior enemy, were mostly destroyed in Mal. Kropotovo, unable to even get out of the battle due to lack of fuel” (19).
Having branded the entire operation a failure, criticism frankly and dispassionately assesses the causes of this disaster:
“The main reasons for the failure to introduce a cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough were as follows.
The attack on the right wing of the Western Front was carried out on a narrow front. There were no strong auxiliary strikes in other areas. The offensive of the left wing of the Kalinin Front was also unsuccessful. All this made it possible for the enemy to freely maneuver his reserve. The element of surprise was absent due to poor camouflage discipline, as a result of which the enemy knew in advance about the impending attack and was able to bring up the necessary reserves.
The strike group of the 20th Army did not penetrate the tactical depth of the enemy's defense due to poorly organized interaction between infantry, artillery and aviation. The leading edge was not accurately defined, as a result of which the enemy’s fire system was not suppressed during the period of artillery preparation. Units of the 20th Army acted sluggishly and indecisively. The offensive of the 20th Army and the actions of the cavalry-mechanized group were not properly supported by aviation.
It should be noted that the introduction of cavalry-mechanized groups, when the infantry managed to wedge only 4 km into the depth of the enemy’s defense, is impractical on a narrow front. Attempts to introduce a cavalry-mechanized group without completing a breakthrough of the enemy's defense lead to significant losses. In this operation, the tank corps lost about 60% of its strength while trying to break through the enemy’s defenses, and the powerful cavalry-mechanized group was actually exhausted by ineffective attacks by the undefeated enemy defenses” (20).
No matter how straightforward and accurate the General Staff's criticism was, it nevertheless missed the point that the premature introduction of armored vehicles into too crowded a bridgehead also prevented the subsequent advance of supporting artillery. As a result, the forces developing success had to engage in battle with a counterattacking enemy without adequate fire cover. Moreover, pressure from Zhukov, as well as front and army commanders, demanding success in this and other sectors, led to repeated, suicidal, costly frontal attacks, which soon led to a decrease in the combat effectiveness of the shock units. Unfortunately, for obvious reasons, names are rarely mentioned in criticism of the General Staff. Other aspects of the operation have not been analyzed.
Soviet archival documents confirm the presence of these problems, and also indicate many others. Some materials highlight difficulties with training, equipment, and personnel, which undoubtedly had a negative impact on the combat operations of the Soviet troops. For example, these documents indicate that many tank crews, especially drivers, did not have sufficient training; many Red Army soldiers lacked the warm uniforms necessary in the cold. On November 24, Major General Dobryakov, chief of the logistics staff of the Western Front, sent an order to the chiefs of the logistics services of the 20th and 31st armies, as well as the deputy commanders for the logistics of the 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, with an order to resolve such problems. The short text of the order is as follows: “Member of the Military Council of the Western Front, Comrade. Bulganin ordered, under your personal responsibility, to issue felt boots to the troops of the front line by 22:00 on November 24, 1942” (21).
In addition, the appallingly high losses in the Soviet ranks forced the Red Army command to recruit officers who had previously been declared unfit for combat service due to health reasons or age. For example, on December 13, the headquarters of the Western Front issued order No. 019 to implement an earlier order of the People's Commissariat of Defense:
“Order to the troops of the Western Front.
Active Army
The front commander ordered: In accordance with NKO order No. 0882, all commanding personnel previously recognized as partially fit for combat service due to health reasons should also be re-examined.
The command personnel, recognized during re-examination as fit for combat service, should be used to fill vacant positions in active army units, in accordance with their training...
Beginning headquarters of Western France gene. - Colonel Sokolovsky" (22).
Reporting of Red Army combat operations was incomplete and inaccurate at best. The order, issued on December 3 by the 8th Guards Rifle Corps and addressed to subordinate formations, indicates unsatisfactory reporting, due to which senior commanders are unable to assess the true combat readiness of the troops. The order noted: “In all operational documents, most formations do not fully reflect the losses of their troops, trophies and losses of the enemy.” “Late submission or inaccurate data,” it further states, “will be subject to strict action” (23).
Apparently, the situation did not change, because on December 15, Lieutenant Colonel Sidorov, deputy chief of staff of the 20th Army, sent another message to the 8th Guards Rifle Corps: “To the chiefs of staff of the 8th Guards rifle divisions. sk 12/15/42. It has been established that a number of divisions untimely or do not at all submit combat reports, operational reports and other operational documents to the headquarters of 20A and the army’s air control center” (24). A week later, the chief of staff of the 20th Army again demanded a detailed report on the progress of the operation from the ill-fated rifle corps (25). This time the corps presented it (see Appendices).
Numerous archival documents indicate that security measures during negotiations were not observed during the operation. For example, the order to the troops of the 41st Army dated January 10, 1943 states:
“Despite repeated orders to troops 41A about the categorical requirement to comply with the order of the USSR NKO No. 0243... during the operation, commanders at various levels, including the commander of the 6th Tank Tank, did not observe precautions, spoke openly on the air, without resorting to encryption... which German radio intelligence took advantage of .
Commander of 41A, Major General Managarov Member of the Military Council of 41A, Major General Semenov Chief of Staff of 41A, Major General Kancelson” (26).
Other documents claim that the precautions necessary for the operation to be carried out effectively had already been breached - with the start of the operation having to be delayed several times. For example, a report on the progress of hostilities of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps noted: “Due to the postponement of the start of the operation, the enemy discovered our preparations, which was established from a survey of prisoners, as a result of which the enemy had time to take countermeasures, first strengthening the mine fields, carried out trench work in the depths, and later advanced a number of fresh divisions” (27).
The chief of logistics of the 20th Army, Colonel Novikov, criticized the units subordinate to the army for careless camouflage and poor blackout during preparation for the attack. Army Order No. 0906 dated November 25 states: “Despite a number of orders and instructions on blackout and the importance of this event, cases of blackout violations still occur. The areas where units and institutions are located are unmasked by a large number of fires, firing of stoves during the daytime, etc., which is noted by our pilots” (28).
With customary thoroughness, the Soviet command, especially the commissars, criticized the behavior of their subordinates during the operation. One report from the political instructor of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps emphasizes the “negligent and irresponsible attitude towards carrying out combat missions” shown in the 150th Rifle Brigade by brigade engineer Kremin, who “did not ensure a timely investigation of the crossing site across Vazuza and delayed the crossing.”
“There are shortcomings in the offensive. A big drawback in combat practice is the unsatisfactory organization of reconnaissance. Intelligence is poorly prepared, intelligence officers are often not assigned specific tasks, and people are sent hastily. For example, the headquarters of the 26th Guards Infantry Division launched an attack on the village. Zherebtsovo, without reconnaissance of the enemy’s forces or their firing points” (29).
The final report, prepared a few weeks later by the same political instructor, noted other organizational shortcomings:
“...There are serious shortcomings in the unclear organization of interaction with artillery and tanks. On December 6, 1942, rifle units went on the attack and occupied the third part of the village of Zherebtsovo. By order, the infantry was supported by tanks. However, the tanks appeared when the enemy, with a strong counterattack, pushed our units back to their original position.
On 12/12/42, before our units attacked the village of Zherebtsovo, a strong one and a half hour preparation was given. It turned out that some of the units of the 148th brigade during the period of artillery preparation were not even able to take their starting positions.
The Germans apparently studied our offensive tactics. While the artillery barrage was going on, they hid in dugouts, and when the artillery barrage ended, they crawled out of the cracks and opened hurricane fire and repulsed the attack” (30).
Even such unpleasant moments as the unworthy actions of individual commanders and staff officers did not escape the watchful gaze of picky commissars. In a report dated December 7, one commissar complains that “the front line fighters receive their allotment of vodka extremely irregularly” (31). Just on November 12, the NGO increased the size of vodka rations in the Red Army, timing this event to coincide with the beginning of Zhukov’s offensive (32). In another report, dated December 12, the commissioner scolds the commander of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps: “The corps commander, Major General Zakharov, undeservedly, without any reason, awarded the medals “For Courage” and “For Military Merit” to the drivers, cooks, and adjutants serving him. and the military paramedic cohabiting with him” (33). Later, the General Staff included many similar criticisms (with the exception of names) in volumes of studied “war experience” intended to improve the performance of all Red Army troops.
Numerous reports contained complaints about the unstable and low morale of Soviet soldiers and commanders. In an attempt to strengthen the morale of the Russian riflemen, the political instructor of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps issued an order to all troops on November 27: “The soldiers and commanders of the 148th brigade witnessed the brutal massacre of three wounded captured Red Army soldiers by the Nazi scoundrels... upon examination of the corpses, it was possible to establish that the fighters had gunshot wounds and were burned while still alive. The fascist monsters wrapped the wounded in rags and oakum soaked in flammable liquid, and thrown into the fire. This fact is widely used for conversations with fighters. He was passed on to the advancing soldiers along the chain” (34). Undoubtedly, he awakened hatred of the Germans in the hearts of Soviet soldiers, but at the same time forced them to think with fear about their own fate.
Soviet commanders had to accept special measures to remove numerous dead and wounded from the battlefield so that the consequences of the massacre do not frighten the living. Sometimes this could not be done in a timely manner, as evidenced by the terrible order of the commander of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, Major General Zakharov, and the corps chief of staff, Colonel Posyakin:
“Despite my repeated orders and demands, unit commanders and their political deputies still do not pay attention to the issue of funerals of soldiers and commanders who died a brave death for our Motherland. As a result of this, the corpses of killed soldiers and commanders were left unburied on the battlefield. The corpses of killed enemy soldiers and officers are not buried. I order:
1) ...during 2 and 3.12.42, bury on the battlefield the corpses of soldiers and commanders in the zones and areas of action of units and bury the corpses of enemies, dragging them into shell craters” (35).
At times, harsh measures were required to maintain discipline, if not morale. So, on November 30, 1942, the political instructor of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps sent the following report to the headquarters of the 20th Army: “Fulfilling the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227, units and subunits are mercilessly dealing with cowards and alarmists. In the 148th separate rifle brigade, for alarmism and cowardice, fleeing from the battlefield, the deputy commander for the political unit of the machine gun company of the 2nd battalion, senior political instructor M.M. Emtsov... In the 150th brigade, there were 3 cases of self-mutilation” (36). But extreme measures did not always work, as evidenced by another report from the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, which sums up unusual incidents during the operation: “In total, in November-December 1942, 123 emergency incidents were recorded in the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, including including 28 desertions, 11 self-harm..." (37).
The same problems arose among the officers of the corps, which is not surprising, given the high mortality rate among the command. On December 30, Captain Moiseenko, secretary of the Military Council of the 20th Army, reported to Major General Ksenofontov, the new commander of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps:
“The Military Council received information: on the night of December 14, 1942, the head of the 1st department of the headquarters of the 8th Guards sk Guard, Colonel Andrianov, arrived very drunk at KP 254sd, who could not clearly explain why he came, but said a lot of nonsense. The drunken Andrianov was put to bed. In the 148th Rifle Brigade, on December 19, the chief of staff of the brigade artillery, Major Fedorov, got drunk, started a brawl in the kitchen and wounded cook Chernovalenko in the stomach with a pistol shot, and shot through Lieutenant Danilov’s tunic, party card and money. Fedorov was expelled from the party... Army commander Lieutenant General Khozin ordered:
…2) Andrianov and Fedorov, if there were no similar cases in the past, should be punished disciplinary procedure, and if there were immoral cases, bring them to justice. Deliver the execution” (38).
Drunkenness among officers, no matter how widespread it was, was an inevitable consequence of a disciplinary system that did not allow any manifestations of weakness on the part of officers. This cruel discipline is clearly evidenced by Order No. 0081 of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, dated 12/13/42, 20.00, where, in particular, we read: “Warn all command personnel that leaving combat lines without an order will be considered betrayal and treason to the Motherland... full readiness for defense, report to me personally at 8.00 on December 14, 1942. On the occupied lines, in the event of an enemy attack, die, but do not retreat a single step, destroy the enemy” (39). German intelligence reports listed numerous enemy flaws. The 9th Army's reconnaissance report on November 30 indicated that Russian artillery was providing insufficient support to the advancing infantry: “There was no coordination of advance and fire, and as the attack progressed, the inconsistency between the infantry and artillery only intensified.” But the same report noted the “spectacular appearance of tank regiments assigned to rifle divisions and brigades,” which, according to the report’s compilers, was supposed to correct previous mistakes and ensure the interaction of advancing tanks and infantry (40). German reports also reported that the Russians brought armored vehicles and cavalry into the battle prematurely, even before the infantry managed to break through the enemy defenses. Moreover, the Germans realized that the Soviet command constantly underestimated the strength of the enemy, a tendency that the reports called “organically inherent in the Russians.” Apparently, these mistakes led to disagreements within the circles of the Russian command. Another Ninth Army intelligence report, prepared on December 9, confirmed that the Russians had underestimated the strength of the Germans and, as a result, fresh operational reserves introduced by the Germans at strategic points during the operation caught the Russians by surprise. The new report cited intercepted documents saying that Russian forces had lost almost half of their original fighting strength (41).
An intelligence report prepared for the 9th Army on December 15 stated that the Russians had already suffered a serious defeat and were "bleeding out." Model's staff intelligence attributed the enemy's failures to mistakes by his command:
“The enemy command, which demonstrated experience and flexibility at the stage of preparation and launch of the offensive, in strict accordance with Stalin’s orders No. 306 and 325, as the operation progressed, again showed its previous weakness. The enemy learned a lot, but once again proved his inability to take advantage of strategically favorable situations. The same picture is repeated when operations that began with local victories turn into a senseless, disorderly bombardment of positions of a fixed front line in the same places where heavy losses were suffered and unforeseen situations arose. This inexplicable phenomenon occurs repeatedly. But even in extremes, Russians are not logical: they trust their natural instinct, and it dictates the use of massive strikes, “steam roller” tactics and a blind pursuit of their goals regardless of changes in the situation” (42).
The 9th Army's report noted that the Russians tended to bring newly received, poorly prepared replacements into battle and to unite broken formations, creating a force for new attacks (43). Criticizing the overly harsh tactics of the Russians, the authors of the report pointed out that the 130th Infantry Brigade attacked in squadrons and “company after company was destroyed” (44). Similar events were observed in the secondary sector of the chanting flank of the 22nd Soviet Army: “The 262nd Rifle Division attacked on November 25 with all battalions in deployed formation in accordance with Stalin’s orders.” She remained in the same order, although “by the evening she had lost half of the fighters” (45). What this report does not mention is that the ferocious Russian attacks forced the Germans to retreat several kilometers to the rear.
Noting the decline in Russian morale, the report of the 9th Army testifies:
“The enemy’s combat reliability is low on average. In November, almost half of the replenishment were representatives of national minorities. In many units, mismanagement and mistreatment led to alienation between officers and their subordinates. A report dated November 18, 1942 from the 262nd Infantry Division mentions that 22 people in the regiment died from exhaustion. The order to the troops of the Kalinin Front dated November 4, 1942 notes “the execution of Red Army soldiers indiscriminately, for minor offenses”” (46).
German critics have repeatedly emphasized the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian infantry and artillery reinforcements. Describing the Russian attempts to implement Stalin's Order No. 325 on effective joint actions of tanks and infantry, they noted:
“The joint actions of tanks and infantry still leave much to be desired. The weakness of the command of tank forces is manifested in the fact that after an attack fails or is repelled, it is repeated in the same place, after a predictable time, without the slightest change in tactics. For this reason, the effectiveness of using support artillery does not increase. According to the commanders of the tank forces, the order, according to which the commanders of the tank companies no longer lead the attacks, but remained at observation posts in the rear, caused a slowdown in the pace of the attack. He also made it difficult for command, since only the company commander had a radio, and he had no communication with his subordinates. Thus, attacks often turned into isolated strikes in individual sectors.
Insufficient efficiency was demonstrated on November 25 and 26 at Gredyakino (Eastern Front), when an entire tank brigade with 58 tanks rolled into a German minefield and was seriously damaged. Replenishment of materiel arrived very quickly, especially on the Eastern Front. However, the replenishment of personnel was noticeably inferior in material terms. For example, the replenishment of the 200th tank brigade traveled for only five hours before going into battle” (47).
On the other hand, the Germans noted and highly appreciated the new Russian methods of restoring and repairing tanks on the battlefield with the help of new “repair and restoration armored vehicles” that accompanied the tanks going on the attack. The report states that the newly formed tank transport support battalion "provided ammunition and fuel supplies to the battlefield" (48). As for artillery support, in addition to its shortcomings on the Eastern (Vazuz) Front, the Germans noted that there was almost no concentrated fire in the Belyi sector from the moment the success developed until December 12, when German counterattacks were already in full swing.
Although operational and tactical shortcomings, as well as miscalculations of leadership at various levels, clearly contributed to the defeat of the Soviet troops, Operation Mars failed mainly for strategic reasons. The blame for it was placed on generals Zhukov, Konev and Purkaev, who developed the operation and monitored its progress, on Headquarters and the General Staff, who approved Zhukov's plan, and on the army commanders who tried to implement it. But under the rigid command system that existed in the Red Army at the end of 1942, the main responsibility for victory or defeat lay with the representative of the Headquarters who developed the strategic plans. In Operation Mars, such a commander was General Zhukov, who coordinated the actions of Soviet troops throughout the western direction.
Zhukov’s desire to destroy Army Group Center, which arose near Moscow in 1941 and 1942. and near Rzhev in August 1942, almost grew into obsession. This obsession gave him misplaced optimism and left him deaf to the possibility of defeat and its strategic consequences. Simply put, he forgot that another outcome was possible, and planned an unnecessarily large two-stage operation, setting himself the grandiose goal of the complete destruction of the vaunted German Army Group Center. During the planning process, Zhukov's optimism only intensified. In the end, Zhukov fell into self-deception and was completely convinced that all his predictions would come true. The tempting prospects of a strategic victory for Operation Jupiter had a negative impact on the planning of Operation Mars and prevented the latter from clearly seeing its achievable goals. This was clearly evidenced by last-minute changes in the disposition of forces (namely, the transfer of the 2nd Mechanized Corps to the Velikiye Luki sector) and Zhukov’s persistent pursuit of a spectacular victory.
Once Operation Mars began, Zhukov was fully committed to success, and his inherent stubbornness (intensified by envy of Vasilevsky) prevented him from adjusting his goals from a position of realism and not having too high hopes that were not appropriate to the circumstances. Instead, the warrior Zhukov demanded even greater determination from commanders and soldiers in battle. With fear remembering the unenviable fate of their predecessors who suffered a fiasco, the commanders of Zhukov’s armies, corps and divisions mercilessly threw their troops into battle, often forgetting in the heat of the attack about the cruel lessons of the beginning of the war. As one might expect, spectacular victories in some sectors were accompanied by terrible carnage in others. In the end, the battles everywhere turned into a massacre, and the operation failed. Tellingly, Zhukov remained optimistic until the very end, squeezing enthusiasm and blood from his exhausted troops to the last drop. It is also characteristic that after the failure of the operation, Zhukov immediately decided to resume his crusade at the first opportunity. However, what ultimately impressed Stalin about Zhukov was his optimism and perseverance.