History of creation
The development and adoption of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the late 1950s led to the need to create means of detecting the launches of such missiles in order to eliminate the possibility of a surprise attack.
Construction of the first radar stations early warning was carried out in 1963-1969. These were two radars of the Dnestr-M type, located in Olenegorsk (Kola Peninsula) and Skrunda (Latvia). The system was put into service in August. It was designed to detect ballistic missiles launched from the United States or from the Norwegian and North Seas. The main task of the system at this stage was to provide information about a missile attack for the missile defense system deployed around Moscow.
In 1967-1968, simultaneously with the construction of radars in Olenegorsk and Skrunda, the construction of four Dnepr-type radars (a modernized version of the Dnestr-M radar) began. Nodes were chosen for construction in Balkhash-9 (Kazakhstan), Mishelevka (near Irkutsk), and Sevastopol. Another one was built at the site in Skrunda, in addition to the Dnestr-M radar already operating there. These stations were supposed to provide a wider sector of coverage of the warning system, expanding it to the North Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.
At the beginning of 1971, based on the command post early detection A command post for a missile attack warning system was created in Solnechnogorsk. On February 15, 1971, by order of the USSR Minister of Defense, a separate anti-missile surveillance division began combat duty.
In the early 70s of the last century, new types of threats appeared - ballistic missiles with multiple and actively maneuvering warheads, as well as strategic cruise missiles that use passive (false targets, radar decoys) and active (jamming) countermeasures. Their detection was also made difficult by the introduction of radar signature reduction systems (Stealth technology). To meet the new conditions, in 1971-72, a project for a new early warning radar of the Daryal type was developed. In 1984, a station of this type was handed over to the state commission and entered combat duty in Pechora, Komi Republic. A similar station was built in 1987 in Gabala, Azerbaijan.
Space echelon early warning system
In accordance with the design of the missile attack warning system, in addition to over-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars, it was supposed to include a space echelon. It made it possible to significantly expand its capabilities due to the ability to detect ballistic missiles almost immediately after launch.
The lead developer of the space echelon of the warning system was the Central Research Institute "Kometa", and the Design Bureau named after them was responsible for the development of spacecraft. Lavochkina.
By 1979, a space system for early detection of ICBM launches was deployed from four US-K spacecraft (SC) (Oko system) in highly elliptical orbits. To receive, process information and control the system’s spacecraft, an early warning control center was built in Serpukhov-15 (70 km from Moscow). After flight development tests, the first generation US-K system was put into service in. It was intended to monitor continental missile-prone areas of the United States. To reduce exposure to background radiation from the Earth, reflections of sunlight from clouds, and glare, the satellites observed not vertically downward, but at an angle. To achieve this, the apogees of the highly elliptical orbit were located over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Additional benefit This configuration made it possible to observe the basing areas of American ICBMs on both daily orbits, while maintaining direct radio communication with the command post near Moscow, or with Far East. This configuration provided conditions for observation of approximately 6 hours per day for one satellite. To ensure round-the-clock surveillance, it was necessary to have at least four spacecraft in orbit at the same time. In reality, to ensure reliability and reliability of observations, the constellation had to include nine satellites. This made it possible to have the necessary reserve in case of premature failure of satellites. In addition, the observation was carried out simultaneously by two or three spacecraft, which reduced the likelihood of issuing a false signal from illumination of the recording equipment by direct sunlight or sunlight reflected from clouds. This configuration of 9 satellites was first created in 1987.
To ensure the solution of the tasks of detecting ballistic missile launches and communicating combat control commands to the strategic nuclear forces (Strategic Nuclear Forces), it was planned to create a Unified Space System (USS) on the basis of the US-K and US-KMO systems.
At the beginning of 2012, the planned deployment of high factory readiness radar stations (VZG radar) "Voronezh" is being carried out with the aim of forming a closed missile attack warning radar field at a new technological level with significantly improved characteristics and capabilities. Currently, new VZG radars have been deployed in Lekhtusi (one meter), Armavir (two decimeter), and Svetlogorsk (decimeter). The construction of a dual meter VZG radar complex in the Irkutsk region is underway ahead of schedule - the first segment of the south- east direction put on experimental combat duty, the complex with a second antenna panel for viewing the eastern direction is planned to be installed on the OBD in 2013.
Work on creating a unified space system (USS) is entering the home stretch.
Early warning stations of Russia on the territory of Ukraine
Unlike the early warning radars located in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan, leased by Russia and maintained by Russian military personnel, Ukrainian radars are not only owned by Ukraine, but also maintained by the Ukrainian military. Based on an interstate agreement, information from these radars, which monitor outer space over Central and Southern Europe, as well as the Mediterranean, is sent to the central command post of the early warning system in Solnechnogorsk, subordinate to the Russian Space Forces. For this, Ukraine received $1.2 million annually.
In February, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense demanded that Russia increase the payment, but Moscow refused, recalling that the 1992 agreement was for 15 years. Then, in September 2005, Ukraine began the process of transferring the radar station to the subordination of NKAU, bearing in mind the re-registration of the agreement in connection with the change in the status of the radar station. Russia cannot prevent American specialists from accessing the radar. At the same time, Russia would have to rapidly deploy new Voronezh-DM radars on its territory, which it did, putting nodes on duty near Krasnodar Armavir and Kaliningrad Svetlogorsk.
In March, Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoly Gritsenko said that Ukraine would not lease two missile attack warning stations to the United States in Mukachevo and Sevastopol.
In June 2006 CEO The National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU), Yuriy Alekseev, reported that Ukraine and Russia agreed to increase the service fee in the interests of the Russian side of the radar stations in Sevastopol and Mukachevo “one and a half times” in 2006.
Currently, Russia has abandoned the use of stations in Sevastopol and Mukachevo. The leadership of Ukraine decided to dismantle both stations over the next 3-4 years. The military units serving the stations have already been disbanded.
see also
- Over-the-horizon radar
Notes
Links
- History and current state of the Russian missile attack warning system
- History of the creation of a missile attack warning system, arms-expo.ru
| Soviet and Russian radar stations | |
|---|---|
| Radar of the Radio Technical Troops | "RUS-1" "RUS-2" "P-3""P-8 Volga" "P-10 "Volga-A""“P-14” “P-18 “Terek”” “P-20” “P-30” “P-35 “Drainage”” “P-37” “P-40” “P-70 “Lena-M” » “Resonance-N(E)” “Ring” “Caste” "5N59.19Zh6.35D6/36D6""Casta-2E" "Gamma-S1E" "Gamma-DE" "Defense-14""5N87" "Desna-M" "Adversary-GE" |
| Radio altimeters | "PRV-9" "PRV-10" "PRV-11" "PRV-13" « |
In the second half of the 50s, the development of the first domestic radar station "Dniester" began, designed for early detection of attacking ballistic missiles and space objects. This radar was tested at the Sary-Shagan test site, and in November 1962, the creation of ten such radars was ordered in the areas of Murmansk, Riga, Irkutsk and Balkhash (both to detect ballistic missile strikes from the United States, the waters of the North Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean, and to provide functioning of the PKO complex).
The creation of such a continuously functioning PRI complex made it possible for the leadership of the country and the Armed Forces to implement a retaliatory strike strategy in the event of a nuclear missile strike by a potential enemy, because the fact of a sudden, undiscovered missile attack was excluded.
The threat of early detection of the launch and flight of ballistic missiles, and therefore inevitable retaliation, forced the United States to negotiate with the USSR on the issues of reducing strategic weapons and limiting missile defense systems. The ABM Treaty, signed in 1972, was effective factor ensuring strategic stability in the world.
Subsequently, along with the grouping of over-the-horizon radar systems based on the Dnepr and Daryal radars, it was planned to include in the early warning system two nodes for over-the-horizon detection of ICBM launches from US missile bases (Chernobyl and Komsomolsk-on-Amur) and the US-K space system with spacecraft in highly elliptical orbits (with an apogee of about 40 thousand km) and ground-based points for receiving and processing information. The two-tier construction of the information means of the warning system, operating on various physical principles, created the prerequisites for its stable operation in any conditions and increasing one of the main indicators of its functioning - the reliability of the generation of warning information.
In 1976, the missile attack warning system as part of the early warning system command post with the new 5E66 computer and the Crocus warning complex, nodes RO-1 (Murmansk), RO-2 (Riga), RO-4 (Sevastopol), RO-5 ( Mukachevo), OS-1 (Irkutsk) and OS-2 (Balkhash) based on fifteen Dnepr radars, as well as the US-K system, were put on combat duty. Subsequently, the Daugava radar, the first radar with phased array (prototype of the future Daryal radar), was put into service and put on combat duty as part of the RO-1 node, and spacecraft in geostationary orbit were introduced into the US-K system (US system -KS) .
From the moment the US-K system was tested and put on combat duty until now, about a hundred launches of spacecraft with a thermal direction-finding detection system have been carried out into highly elliptical (spacecraft type 73D6) and stationary (spacecraft type 74X6) orbits. The launches were carried out from the Plesetsk and Baikonur cosmodromes, where special complexes were created for the pre-flight preparation of spacecraft.
In 1977, all formations and military units that ensure the operation of early warning systems were organizationally consolidated into a separate army of the early warning system (the first commander was Colonel General V.K. Strelnikov).
In 1984, the lead model of the Daryal radar, created at the RO-ZO (Pechora) node, was put into service Soviet army, and a year later - in 1985, the second sample of the Daryal radar was put into operation at the RO-7 node (Gabala, Azerbaijan).
In the 80s, it was planned to create three Daryal-U radars in the areas of Balkhash, Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk, two Daryal-UM radars in the Mukachevo and Riga areas, and work began on the development of the Volga series of radars to create a dual-band radar field SPRN.
In 1980, the development of a new high-performance domestic computer, M-13, began for the Daryal type radar. In 1984, after clarifying the appearance of the radar, making it possible to simplify and reduce the cost of mass production, a decision was made to create the head radar "Volga" in the western missile-hazardous direction in the Baranovichi region. In 1985, a decision was made to create a space system for detecting ballistic missile launches from US and Chinese missile bases, seas and oceans (USK-MO). In subsequent years, a fundamentally new combat program was introduced at all Dnepr radars, and the construction of three Daryal-U radars and two Daryal-UM radars was completed.
After the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (1986) and the cessation of operation of the first ZGRL unit "Duga-1", the question arises about the advisability of using the second ZGRL unit for its intended purpose
Missile attack warning system (MAWS)- a complex of special technical means detecting the launch of ballistic missiles, calculating their trajectory and transmitting information to the command center, on the basis of which the fact of an attack on a state using missile weapons is recorded and a prompt decision is made on response actions. In standby mode, the early warning system provides instrumental reconnaissance of the parameters of potential enemy missiles during their test and combat training launches. It consists of two echelons - ground-based radars and an orbital constellation of satellites.
History of creation
The development and adoption of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1950s led to the need to create means of detecting their launch in order to eliminate the possibility of a surprise attack.
Construction of the first early warning radars took place in 1965-1969. These were two radars of the “Dnestr-M” type, located at ORTU in Olenegorsk (Kola Peninsula) and Skrunda (Latvian SSR). On August 25, 1970, the system was put into service. It was designed to detect ballistic missiles launched from the United States or from the Norwegian and North Seas. The main task of the system at this stage was to provide information about a missile attack for the missile defense system deployed around Moscow.
At the same time, modernization of part of the SKKP stations was carried out at ORTU "Mishelevka" (Irkutsk region) and "Balkhash-9" (Kazakh SSR), and in the area of Solnechnogorsk (Moscow region) the Main Missile Attack Warning Center (MC PRN) was created. Special communication lines were laid between the ORTU and the Main Center of the PRN. On February 15, 1971, by order of the USSR Minister of Defense, a separate anti-missile surveillance division began combat duty. This day is considered the beginning of the functioning of the Soviet early warning system.
The concept of a missile attack warning system, adopted in 1972, provided for integration with existing and newly created missile defense systems. As part of this program, the Danube-3 (Kubinka) and Danube-3U (Chekhov) radars of the Moscow missile defense system were included in the warning system. V. G. Repin was appointed chief designer of the integrated early warning system.
In 1974, an improved “Dnepr” type radar was put into operation in Balkhash. It improved the accuracy of elevation measurements and work at lower angles, increased the range and throughput. According to the Dnepr project, the radar station in Olenegorsk was then modernized, and stations were built in Mishelevka, Skrunda, Sevastopol and Mukachevo (Ukrainian SSR).
The first stage of the integrated system, which included ORTUs in Olenegorsk, Skrunda, Balkhash and Mishelevka, entered combat duty on October 29, 1976. The second stage, which included nodes in Sevastopol and Mukachevo, entered combat duty on January 16, 1979. These stations provided a wider sector of coverage for the warning system, extending it to the North Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.
In the early 1970s, new types of threats appeared - ballistic missiles with multiple and actively maneuvering warheads, as well as strategic cruise missiles that use passive (false targets, radar decoys) and active (jamming) countermeasures. Their detection was also made difficult by radar signature reduction technologies (“Stealth”). To meet new requirements, a project for a Daryal type radar was developed in 1971-1972. It was planned to build up to eight such stations along the perimeter of the USSR, gradually replacing outdated ones with them.
In 1978, a modernized two-position radar complex was put into service in Olenegorsk, created on the basis of the existing Dnepr radar and new installation"Daugava" - a smaller receiving part of the "Daryal" project. Here, for the first time in the country, large-aperture AFARs were used.
In 1984, the first full-scale station of the Daryal type near the city of Pechora (Komi Republic) was handed over to the state commission and entered combat duty, a year later - the second station near the city of Gabala (Azerbaijan SSR). Both radars were accepted with imperfections and were completed during the work process until 1987.
By 1979, a space system for early detection of ICBM launches was deployed from four US-K spacecraft (SC) (Oko system) in highly elliptical orbits. To receive, process information and control the spacecraft of the system, an early warning command post was built in Serpukhov-15 (70 km from Moscow). After flight development tests, the first generation US-K system was put into service in 1982. It was intended to monitor continental missile-prone areas of the United States. To reduce exposure to background radiation from the Earth and reflections of sunlight from clouds, the satellites observed not vertically downward, but at an angle. To achieve this, the apogees of the highly elliptical orbit were located over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. An additional advantage of this configuration was the ability to observe the basing areas of American ICBMs on both daily orbits, while maintaining direct radio communication with the command post near Moscow or with the Far East. This configuration provided conditions for observation of approximately 6 hours per day for one satellite. To ensure round-the-clock surveillance, it was necessary to have at least four spacecraft in orbit at the same time. To ensure the reliability and reliability of observations, the constellation had to include nine satellites - this made it possible to have a reserve in case of premature failure of the satellites, as well as to observe simultaneously with two or three spacecraft, which reduced the likelihood of issuing a false signal from direct or reflected illumination of the recording equipment from the clouds with sunlight. This configuration of 9 satellites was first created in 1987.
To ensure the solution of the tasks of detecting ballistic missile launches and communicating combat control commands to the strategic nuclear forces (Strategic Nuclear Forces), it was planned to create a Unified Space System (USS) on the basis of the US-K and US-KMO systems.
As part of the state weapons development program, the planned deployment of highly prefabricated radar stations (VZG radars) of the Voronezh family is being carried out with the aim of forming a closed missile attack warning radar field at a new technological level with significantly improved characteristics and capabilities. At the moment, VZG radars of the meter range have been deployed in the Leningrad, Orenburg and Irkutsk regions, VZG radars of the decimeter range in the Kaliningrad region, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk and Altai territories. It is planned to commission new VZG radars in the Komi Republic, Amur and Murmansk regions.
In 2012, S. F. Boev was appointed General Designer of the national early warning system.
Russian early warning systems stations abroad
AzerbaijanThe Daryal radar near the city of Gabala was operated until the end of 2012 on a lease basis. In 2013, the equipment was dismantled and transported to Russia, the buildings were transferred to Azerbaijan.
Belarus
The Dnepr radar is operated on a lease basis and is under the jurisdiction of VVKO.
Latvia
In February 2005, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense demanded that Russia increase the payment, but was refused. Then, in September 2005, Ukraine began the process of transferring the radar station to the subordination of NSAU, with a view to re-registering the agreement in connection with the change in the status of the radar [ ] .
In December 2005, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko announced the transfer to the United States of a package of proposals regarding cooperation in the rocket and space sector. After the agreement was finalized, American specialists were to gain access to NKAU space infrastructure facilities, including two Dnepr radars in Sevastopol and Mukachevo. Since Russia in this case could not prevent American specialists from accessing the radar, it had to rapidly deploy new Voronezh-DM radars on its territory near Armavir and Kaliningrad.
In March 2006, Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoly Gritsenko said that Ukraine would not lease missile attack warning stations in Mukachevo and Sevastopol to the United States.
In June 2006, NKAU General Director Yuri Alekseev announced that Ukraine and Russia had agreed to increase “one and a half times” the fee in 2006 for servicing the radar stations in Sevastopol and Mukachevo in the interests of the Russian side.
On February 26, 2009, radar stations in Sevastopol and Mukachevo stopped transmitting information to Russia and began working exclusively in the interests of Ukraine.
In 2011, the Ukrainian leadership decided to dismantle both stations. The military units serving the stations were disbanded.
Russia completed construction new system missile attack warnings August 7th, 2016
I remember conversations that after the collapse of the USSR, half of the country was simply “blind” and not covered from the air. The military honestly admitted that there are holes in the control and surveillance system where they have no idea what is happening during combat duty.
The USSR had one of the best missile attack warning systems of its time. It was based on radars located on the territory of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Latvia and Ukraine. The collapse of the Union destroyed its integrity. In the Baltics, a fully operational Daryal-type station was demonstratively blown up shortly after gaining independence. According to experts, under pressure from NATO, Kyiv closed its Dnepr-type anti-missile radars. Another radar station was in Azerbaijan near the village of Gabala. It was considered the most powerful in the world. But she also stopped working. Only Belarus has fulfilled and is fulfilling the agreement with Russia regarding its Volga radar.
By 2000, Russia had effectively lost the ability to receive timely data on missile attacks. Moreover, back in the mid-1990s, with the degradation of the radio technical services of the Air Defense Forces, our country lost a single radar field.
If in the USSR the entire airspace over a huge country was monitored around the clock by numerous radar systems, then the Russian Federation was no longer able to do this.
This was not said, but it was not a secret either - the sky above new Russia turned out to be uncontrolled in many places. Not only light aircraft, but also large airliners could fly without any radar tracking. And it happened when a passenger plane, and even more so a helicopter, crashed somewhere in the taiga, they searched for it for weeks, since it was not known exactly where it disappeared.
And now...
And as Spetsstroy of Russia reports, in the Vorkuta area, work is actively underway on the construction of a new early warning radar complex for a missile attack warning system (SPRN) and space control “Voronezh-VP”.
The Voronezh-VP radar complex under construction consists of two meter and centimeter range radar stations. Meter stations have good practical experience. They have already been tested in Irkutsk and Orsk. The centimeter station will be tested for the first time in Vorkuta. The viewing range of the radar under construction is about 6,000 kilometers. She will begin combat duty in 2018.
The first such station, “Voronezh-M” (M stands for meter station), began to be built in May 2005 in the village of Lekhtusi Leningrad region. And already in December 2006, she was put on experimental combat duty. This became a world record for the speed of construction and commissioning, albeit a trial one, of such a complex radar complex.
As it turned out, specialists from the Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communications and other enterprises that are part of the specialized concern "Radio Engineering and Information Systems", developed not only the latest and very powerful radar, but also the first in the world to implement the technology of the so-called high factory readiness.
The radar, capable of detecting small-sized and high-speed targets at a distance of thousands of kilometers, has modular design, is assembled from blocks built and debugged at the factory. Previously, stations with similar characteristics were built in a period of five to nine years. Now for a year and a half.
The meter range stations very organically complement the Voronezh-DM decimeter range stations.
In February 2009, near the city of Armavir in Krasnodar region The first Voronezh-DM radar was put on experimental combat duty. The two radar buildings are as tall as a ten-story building. They contain, figuratively speaking, the electronic brain of the station. It is important that the most modern equipment is mainly domestically produced.
The huge screen of the command post displays a viewing sector in the southwestern and southeastern strategic directions from Europe to India. The Armavir radar is capable of detecting launches of ballistic and cruise missiles from the air, land and from submarines at a range of up to six thousand kilometers. The ultra-high-speed computer instantly determines the missile's flight path and the location where the warhead is likely to fall.
Just one Voronezh-DM near Armavir provides the information that was previously collected from three huge radar stations located on the territory of Azerbaijan and Ukraine.
The Voronezh-DM radar was created under the leadership of the general designer of the Research Institute of Long-Range Radio Communications Sergei Saprykin.
For RG readers, Sergei Dmitrievich revealed some secrets. According to him, the modular design of domestic radars with high factory readiness makes it possible to build and commission the most powerful radar systems anywhere in Russia in just one and a half to two years. They can be serviced by no more than two hundred specialists. For comparison, thousands of highly qualified specialists must serve and work at similar facilities built according to old designs.
Probably everyone knows that the United States is actively creating a European missile defense system. The Americans have always claimed the highest effectiveness of the missile defense that they imposed on the Europeans. However, information has recently emerged that the European missile defense system is not very effective. However, for our specialists this has never been a secret.
General Designer Sergei Saprykin believes, and there is no doubt about the competence of his opinion, that the Americans have only one single missile defense radar station, which has characteristics similar to those possessed by Voronezh-DM. This is a cyclopean-sized and very expensive to maintain UEWR radar, which is located on the island of Greenland and is part of the US national missile defense system. In appearance it is similar to the Soviet anti-missile radars of the Daryal type. It operates in the UHF range and has two antennas. There are no other radars similar in their characteristics to the capabilities of the Voronezh-DM, either in the United States or in other NATO countries. And in our country the assembly of such radars is put on a conveyor belt.
Russian technologies make it possible, for example, in the future to assemble modular radars not only for military purposes, but also those that will be able to monitor space hazards on a global scale, in particular, timely detect asteroids and large meteorites that are dangerously close to our planet. It turns out that Voronezh can defend not only Russia, but the entire Earth.
Currently, the construction of new generation radar stations of both meter and decimeter ranges is underway in the Orenburg region and in the Komi Republic. Radars of the Voronezh-DM type near Kaliningrad and Voronezh-M near Irkutsk entered combat duty. And two more radars near Krasnoyarsk and in the Altai Territory in the south of Central Siberia will begin to operate in experimental combat duty mode.
In the future, it is planned to build and put into operation several more radars of the Voronezh-M and Voronezh-DM types in the Amur region, not far from Orsk, Vorkuta and Murmansk. The range of these stations will be at least six thousand kilometers. Russia will gain radar protection not only in the air, but also in outer space.
sources
WITH The condition of the satellite component of the missile attack warning system (MAWS) does not inspire optimism. However, a few days ago a message flashed in the news: the early warning system is in order and the country is protected from attack from any direction. But what does the word “protected” mean if Russia does not have a global missile defense system? There is only an outdated missile defense system for Moscow, which will not be able to fend off a massive attack, although with a certain probability it will save the capital from one or two warheads. However, what crazy nation would dare to strike with such forces? The United States today also does not have a reliable missile defense system, although technologically they are capable of shooting down a warhead somewhere over Arctic Canada (figuratively speaking, this is more difficult than hitting a bullet with a bullet) .
There is only one defense against a nuclear attack on Russia: the threat of a retaliatory strike. A grim strategy of guaranteed, mutual destruction, born in the era of the Great Confrontation. The state of our nuclear forces described in the article. In the process of “getting up from their knees” they suffered significantly, but, apparently, they are still capable of destroying the United States. The problem is, will we have time to respond if America decides to launch a disarming strike? During such an attack, it should be noted that millions of people would die from radioactive fallout, even if only nuclear infrastructure facilities were chosen as targets.
A missile launched from the United States will reach its target in Russia in 27 to 30 minutes. The ability to retaliate before the launch silos are disabled and the missile submarines destroyed at the piers or sunk by hunter submarines at sea critically depends on how quickly and reliably the fact of a nuclear attack on Russia can be established. It is highly advisable to detect missile launches in order to have maximum time reserve. And this can only be done with the help of an early warning satellite constellation.
According to data from various sources, against 16 American early warning satellites, Russia today has only 2! The article below talks about three satellites, but one of them apparently has already stopped workinghttp://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1827540.html. We can only rely on ground-based early warning radars. Consequently, for most of the day, the early warning system does not see the territory of the United States and almost the entire waters of the World Ocean. This means that in the event of a nuclear attack, Russia will have less than 15 minutes to assess the situation and make a decision. This is too little!
Question: how did we get to this point? What did the government do in the “fat 2000s”, floating in petrodollars? Are you preparing for the Olympics in Sochi? Now the Ministry of Defense is cheerfully reporting on plans to restore the early warning satellite constellation. Let's hope they make it in time.
Dmitry Zotyev
The author of the following article is Fedor Chemerev, published on the websitehttp://gazeta.eot.su/article/kosmicheskiy-eshelon-sprn.
The last spacecraft Russian system Missile Attack Warning System (MAWS) was launched on March 30, 2012. Shortly before this, the circumstances of its creation were discussed on the forum of the “Cosmonautics News” magazine. The result of the discussion were the words of one of its participants:“About this car I would ask you not to delude yourself and not to mock” .
As bitter as it may be, these words can fully be applied to the entire space industry and, undoubtedly, to the space echelon of early warning systems. And this is extremely worrying.
By the mid-2000s, the first signs of the next round of space militarization appeared. In February 2004, the US Air Force report “U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan-2004". Later, the main provisions of the report were reflected in the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, known as the “Unified Perspective 2010,” which was further developed in the document “Unified Perspective 2020.” It is stated that main principle building the American armed forces - “all-encompassing dominance.” The US Army must be prepared to conduct large-scale military operations, including in space, with the most decisive goals.
An important place in plans for the development of technical means related to military space is given to the space echelon of the new generation of early warning systems.
From the early 1970s to the present day, the United States has been in service with the IMEWS (Integrated Missile Early Warning Satellite) system with spacecraft in geostationary orbits (GSO). The system's task is, together with ground-based radars, to detect launches of Soviet and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at the launch site.
Currently, nine IMEWS satellites are deployed over the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Oceans and the European zone, the viewing areas of which cover the entire strip along the equator. All of them are equipped with receivers infrared radiation, with the help of which missile launches are detected. The last satellite of this constellation was launched in December 2007.
The more modern SBIRS (“Space-Based Infrared System”) is intended to replace the IMEWS system. This is an integrated system consisting of four geostationary orbit (GEO) satellites, two highly elliptical orbit (HEO) satellites and ground points collection and processing of data and group management. As part of this system, it is planned to have up to 24 low-orbit Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. All SBIRS system spacecraft are equipped with infrared radiation receivers.
STSS low-orbit satellites are designed to detect strategic, tactical and operational-tactical missiles and support military formations and individual units. Their task is to accompany a rocket detected by high-orbit SBIRS or IMEWS satellites. Warheads and other missile fragments after their separation can be objects of detection and further tracking. In the future, STSS satellites will be equipped with laser locators to measure range and determine the target state vector.
As of March 2013, the combined SBIRS–STSS constellation is represented by seven satellites: GEO-1 (USA-230, 2011), GEO-2 (USA-241, 2013), HEO-1 (USA-184, 2006), HEO- 2 (USA-200, 2008), STSS-ATRR (USA-205, 2009), STSS Demo 1 (USA-208, 2009) and STSS Demo 2 (USA-209, 2009).
What is the situation with the Russian space warning system? According to the Internet resource "Strategic Nuclear Weapons of Russia", as of November 2013, our early warning system included two 74D6 type satellites in highly elliptical orbits (HEO) - Kosmos-2422 and Kosmos-2446 (US-KS system) and one in geostationary orbit - Cosmos-2479 (type 71X6, US-KMO system). These are the last satellites manufactured at the NPO named after. Lavochkina. Since the beginning of the 1990s, funding for work on the US-KS system has practically ceased, and by 1995, on the US-KMO system as well. The assembly of devices to support the orbital constellation was carried out from parts and assemblies left over from Soviet times. By now, these reserves have been exhausted.
Total - sixteen against three! This is the quantitative ratio of the forces of the United States and Russia in the space segment of early warning systems. What about quality? What can we oppose to “all-encompassing domination”?
It is believed that the Unified Space System (USS) project should say a new word in the fate of the space echelon of Russian early warning systems. The main developer of the system is JSC Kometa Corporation. This company specializes in creating command posts, global information and management systems for various purposes, development, production and operation of hardware and software for ground and aerospace control, monitoring and telecommunications systems.
"Kometa" has been the lead developer of the US-K, US-KS (Oko), US-KMO (Oko-1) systems since Soviet times. The lead developer of spacecraft for these systems was NPO im. Lavochkina. The All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Television (VNIIT) developed on-board television-type detection equipment, and the State Optical Institute named after. Vavilov (GOI) - heat-direction-finding equipment.
In NPO im. Lavochkin always insisted on the concept embedded in the US-K system. It provided for the presence of only four satellites in highly elliptical orbits (HEO), located so that the observation areas of individual devices would collectively cover all missile hazardous areas (ROR). In this case, each satellite must observe from the upper part of the orbit for 6 hours. The movement of the satellites was synchronized in such a way that at any moment in time any point of the ROR was under surveillance, and the satellites also insured each other. For this purpose, a device was created with a three-axis orientation system and the ability to control along all three axes. It could be delivered into orbit by a light Molniya-M rocket, which is three times cheaper than launching it into geostationary orbit using a heavy Proton-K rocket. Brilliant technical solution! Didn't it serve as the prototype for the HEO satellites of the new American SBIRS system?
However, due to problems with the detection equipment (they were eliminated only in 1984), the US-K had to be abandoned in favor of the US-KS system with eight satellites in the VEO and one, a safety satellite, in the GEO. The obvious shortcomings of the US-KS, essentially a temporary system, were the reason for the distrust on the part of a number of Comet specialists in the very idea of using highly elliptical spacecraft. Moreover, they were not used in the American IMEWS.
Perhaps these disagreements played a role in the fact that Kometa’s long-time partner, the NPO named after. Lavochkina is outside the EKS project. But there is another explanation. "Comet" needed partners with money. And they could have been available to those who, by the time the tender for the development of the spacecraft was held, already had sources of funding other than the state. At NPO im. Lavochkin there were none. And they were, for example, at the State Research and Production Space Center named after. Khrunichev - from commercial launches - until the supply of Protons has dried up. RSC Energia, a participant in international projects with the Mir and ISS orbital stations, also had good prospects.
Could it be otherwise in the conditions of very modest financing of protracted space programs? Gazprom probably proceeded from the same logic when it ordered the Yamal series satellites from Energia. And, thus, he financed the development of a new direction for Energia - modern unmanned spacecraft. And this intellectual and technological foundation is no less valuable than Gazprom’s finances.
One way or another, today it is Energia that is the lead developer of the EKS spacecraft. The spacecraft is apparently being built on the basis of the modularity of the universal unpressurized Yamal platform, which contains control, power supply, and thermal control systems that meet the requirements. The platform has been fully developed - Yamal has been operating for more than 9 years.
According to experts, Gazeta.Ru writes, the EKS will be able to detect the launches of not only ICBMs, submarine ballistic missiles, but also operational-tactical and tactical missiles, as well as maintain the system military communications. Energia has the resources necessary to create the spacecraft. But how long will this take?
Unfortunately, media reports that mention the EKS are not encouraging yet. Until recently, Energia had problems with the military. In November 2011, Kommersant.ru reported that the subject of the proceedings in the Moscow Arbitration Court was the failure to complete work on the Unified Supervision Code. And this is after they were postponed from June 2008 to May 2010!
From the publication in Krasnaya Zvezda dated February 3, 2014, it follows that the construction of the installation and testing building for EKS spacecraft (it is being carried out by Spetsstroy of Russia) is unlikely to be completed before the end of the year. The Interfax.ru message (September 3, 2013) is alarming that the head of one of the Spetsstroy departments, Alexander Belov, has been charged with theft large sum as part of the implementation of the GLONASS program. Reshuffles in the leadership of Roscosmos continue, and there is talk of reorganizing the rocket and space industry.
It is reported that three quarters of the electronics in Russian spacecraft are imported. Couldn’t it contain dangerous “special features”? In addition, at any moment the manufacturer of a chip or processor may stop producing them - and our hardware developers and programmers will find themselves in a very difficult situation.
All this contributes little to productive, rhythmic work. A time is running. Will the creators of the EKS have time to at least begin the first flight tests before the last Lavochka satellites fall down?
The situation is reminiscent of the beginning of 1999. By that time, the orbital group had also “disappeared.” However, at that time the remaining segments of the early warning system did not inspire optimism. Now the situation is better, the hopes of the military leadership are connected with over-the-horizon radars - work on their construction and placing them on experimental combat duty is going according to plan.
But it is important to understand that the absence of a space-based early warning system, and therefore the presence of “holes” in the warning system, can devalue Russia’s entire nuclear missile shield - our deterrent weapon. In addition, the unreliability of Russia's early warning system is a powerful argument for information and psychological warfare against us.
After the incident with the Korean Boeing 747, shot down by a Soviet fighter in September 1983, the USSR was accused of exceeding the required level of defense and almost cannibalism. “Having been burned by milk,” in May 1987, air defense troops allowed the sports plane of 18-year-old Matthias Rust to land on Red Square. And they became the subject of ridicule from the “world community” and some compatriots. As a result, the command staff of the USSR Armed Forces underwent significant changes. And then there was August 1991...
By the beginning of 1995, the Russian early warning system orbital constellation consisted of 11 satellites. And still, a mistake occurred - when on January 25, 1995, the Norwegian-American, as they later said, research four-stage rocket “Black Brant XII” was launched, the Russian early warning system qualified it as a nuclear missile attack. It came down to the “nuclear suitcase”. The world has experienced several unpleasant hours.
Three years later, on March 15 and 16, 1998, the Washington Post published two articles by D. Hoffman under the unifying title “Shattered Shield” (“Leaky Shield”) - about the degradation of the Russian early warning system.
A year later, the Rossiyskie Vesti newspaper started a discussion about Russian missile defense. During the discussion, a statement was made by T. Postol, an expert from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: “There are many Russian military installations that can be attacked from Alaska, and these installations will be destroyed, and the Russian military will not even know that there was a missile attack... The situation is very risky, because it could trigger a Russian decision to immediately retaliate, which will be based on unreliable information.”
So, step by step, the dominant opinion in Russian expert circles became a lack of confidence that Russia would be able to repel the aggressor in a timely and reliable manner. Is this why the discussion about Russian missile defense was started?
Now our relations with the United States have not improved at all. In this situation, gaps in the space echelon of early warning systems may become another basis for putting pressure on the Russian elites (they say that the statements of the Russian authorities about the power of the nuclear missile shield are a bluff; Russia will not be able to prevent a missile attack). And if the opinion really prevails among the elite and society that our shield is rusty and good for nothing, then the situation could worsen catastrophically.
There is still a year, maybe two. I would like to believe that the creators of the early warning system will make it in time. At these moments, only three “Lavochkin” satellites are protecting the borders of the Fatherland. Let us wish them success in their difficult service. And all the creators of early warning systems, especially those in whose hands the fate of spacecraft, have a responsibility to the country and people they are called upon to protect.
Fedor Chemerev