Who ruled the country after Lenin. From Lenin to Putin: what and how Russian leaders were sick

Lavrentiy Pylych Beria
Didn't justify the trust.
Remained from Beria
Just fluff and feathers.

(folk ditty 1953)

How the country said goodbye to Stalin.

During his lifetime, Stalin appeared in the Soviet state, where atheism denied any religion - an “earthly god.” Hence his “sudden” death was perceived by millions of people as a tragedy on a universal scale. Or, in any case, the collapse of all life until this Judgment Day - March 5, 1953.

“I wanted to think: what will happen to all of us now?” the front-line writer I. Ehrenburg recalled his feelings that day. “But I couldn’t think. I experienced what many of my compatriots probably experienced then: numbness.” Then there was a nationwide funeral, a nationwide mourning of millions of Soviet citizens, unprecedented in scale in world history. How did the country cope with this death? This was best described in poetry by the poetess O. Berggolts, who lost her husband during the repressions after serving time on false charges:

“My heart bleeds...
Our beloved, our dear!
Grabbing your headboard
The Motherland is crying over You.”

A 4-day mourning period was declared in the country. The coffin with Stalin's body was carried into the Mausoleum, over the entrance to which two names were inscribed: LENIN and STALIN. The end of Stalin's funeral was heralded by lingering beeps at factories across the country, from Brest to Vladivostok and Chukotka. Later, the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko said about this: “They say that this multi-tube howl, from which the blood ran cold, resembled the hellish cry of a dying mythical monster...”. The atmosphere of general shock, the expectation that life could suddenly change for the worse, hovered in the public atmosphere.

However, there were other moods caused by the death of the seemingly immortal Leader. “Well, this one has died...” Uncle Vanya, a legless disabled medal-bearer, addressed his 13-year-old neighbor, who had brought her felt boots to be repaired and then seriously pondered for two days whether she should go to the police or not” (Quoted from Alekseevich. S. Enchanted by Death .).

Millions of prisoners and exiles, languishing in camps and living in settlements, received this news joyfully. “Oh joy and triumph!” the exiled Oleg Volkov later described his feelings at that time. “The long night will finally dissipate over Russia. Just - God forbid! Reveal your feelings: who knows how else it will turn out?... When the exiles meet, they do not dare express their hopes, but they no longer hide their cheerful gaze. Three cheers!"

The palette of public sentiments in the country frozen by the Stalinist dictatorship was varied, but on the whole the atmosphere of general shock dominated, the expectation that life could change for the worse overnight. However, it became clear that with the death of the one who was considered a superman and an “earthly god,” power was now deprived of its divine aura. Since all of Stalin’s successors at the top looked like “mere mortals” (according to E.Yu. Zubkova).

New collective leadership headed by G. Malenkov

Stalin had not yet died, lying in an unconscious position, when his closest associates began an open and behind-the-scenes struggle for power at the very top. To some extent, the situation of the early 20s was repeated among the party leadership, when Lenin was hopelessly ill. But this time the count was in days and hours.

When on the morning of March 4, 1953, a “government message about the illness of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ... Comrade Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin” was broadcast on Moscow radio, it was reported there, in particular, that “... the serious illness of Comrade Stalin will entail more or less less long-term non-participation in leadership activities...” And as it was further reported that government circles (party and government) “... take seriously all the circumstances associated with Comrade Stalin’s temporary departure from leading state and party activities.” This is how the party and state leadership explained to the population the convening of an urgent Plenum of the Central Committee on the distribution of power in the country and the party at the time of the incapacity of the leader who was in a coma.

According to historian Yuri Zhukov, a great expert on this issue, already on the evening of March 3, some kind of agreement was reached among Stalin’s comrades-in-arms regarding the occupation of key posts in the party and government of the country. Moreover, Stalin’s associates began to divide power among themselves, when Stalin himself was still alive, but could not stop them from doing this. Having received news from the doctors about the hopelessness of the sick leader, his comrades-in-arms began to divide their portfolios as if he were no longer alive.

The joint meeting of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet began its work on the evening of March 5, again when Stalin was still alive. There, power roles were redistributed as follows: the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which had previously been occupied by Stalin, was transferred to G. M. Malenkov, who, in fact, from now on acted as the No. 1 figure in the country and represented it abroad.

Malenkov’s first deputies were L.P. Beria, V.M. Molotov, N.I. Bulganin, L.M. Kaganovich. However, for a number of reasons, Malenkov did not become the new sole leader of the party and state. Politically “clever” and the most educated, Malenkov, due to his personal qualities, was not capable of becoming a new dictator, which cannot be said about his political “ally” - Beria.

But the power pyramid itself, which had developed under Stalin, has now undergone decisive changes by his comrades, who no longer took into account the will of the leader who passed away late in the evening (at 21.50 Moscow time) on March 5. The distribution of key roles in power structures was carried out privately, with Beria and Malenkov playing the main role in this. According to the historian R. Pihoy (who has worked well archival documents), back on March 4, Beria sent Malenkov a note in which the most important government posts were distributed in advance, which were approved at a meeting the next day on March 5.

The Stalinist secretariat, elected at the 19th Congress, was abolished. The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, consisting of 25 members and 10 candidates, was reduced to 10 members (consisting of Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, Molotov and Mikoyan) and 4 candidates; most of them entered the government.

Younger Stalinist promoters were immediately relegated to the background. This, like the very fact of the return of Molotov, previously disgraced, to the political Olympus under Stalin (he was returned to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR) was a kind of sign of the beginning of the rejection of Stalin’s last political reshuffles. According to Yuri Zhukov, the inclusion of Molotov required the expansion of a new narrow leadership to the “five” - Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich. This organization of power was subsequently presented as “collective leadership,” which was largely temporary in nature, formed on the basis of a balance of conflicting views and interests of the then top leadership.

L. Beria gained enormous power and headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, united after the merger of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, which became a kind of super-ministry that also carried out a number of national economic tasks. The well-known political figure of the Soviet era, O. Troyanovsky, in his memoirs gives the following description: “Although immediately after Stalin’s death, Malenkov was considered the number one figure as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in fact, Beria played the leading role. I never encountered him directly, but I knew from eyewitness accounts that he was an immoral man who did not disdain any means to achieve his goals, but had an extraordinary mind and great organizational abilities. Relying on Malenkov, and sometimes on some other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he consistently worked to consolidate his leadership.”

N.S. became the third key figure in the collective leadership, after Malenkov and Beria. Khrushchev, who already in the last years of Stalin's rule had great political influence.

In fact, already in March 1953, 3 main centers were formed in the highest echelons of the party, headed by Stalin’s associates - Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev. In this struggle, everyone relied on and exploited their own nomenklatura capabilities associated with the peculiarities of the situation in the party-state system. Malenkov’s base was the government of the country, Beria’s base was the security agencies, Khrushchev’s was the party apparatus (Pyzhikov A.V.).

In the established triumvirate (Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev), Beria became the second person in the state. Beria, now heading all the all-powerful punitive agencies in the country, had all the necessary information - a dossier on all his associates, which could be used in the fight against his political competitors (Zhilenkov M.). From the very beginning, the triumvirators began to carefully revise Stalin's policies, starting with the refusal of sole decision-making. Moreover, the key role in this was played by Malenkov and Beria, and not Khrushchev, as is commonly believed.

Already in Malenkov’s funeral speech at Stalin’s funeral on March 9, 1953, which spoke about foreign policy problems, the thought “untraditional” for the Stalin era appeared about “the possibility of long-term coexistence and peaceful competition of two different systems - capitalist and socialist.” In domestic policy, Malenkov saw the main task as “steadily achieving further improvement in the material well-being of workers, collective farmers, intelligentsia, all Soviet people"(quoted from Aksyutin Yu.V.).

The day after Stalin’s funeral (March 10), Malenkov invited the ideological secretaries of the Central Committee M.A. Suslov and P.N. Pospelov, as well as the editor-in-chief of Pravda D.T., to an extraordinary closed meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Shepilov. At this meeting, Malenkov told everyone present about the need to “stop the policy of the cult of personality and move on to the collective leadership of the country,” reminding members of the Central Committee how Stalin himself strongly criticized them for the cult implanted around him (quoted from Openkin L.A.). This was the very first stone thrown by Malenkov to debunk Stalin’s personality cult, followed by others. Already from March 20, 1953, Stalin’s name ceased to be mentioned in the headlines of newspaper articles, and his citations were sharply reduced.

Malenkov himself voluntarily withdrew part of his powers when, on March 14, 1953, he resigned from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee, transferring this post to Khrushchev. This to some extent divided the party and state authorities, and, of course, strengthened the position of Khrushchev, who gained control over the party apparatus. However, at that time the center of gravity was greater in the government apparatus of the Council of Ministers than in the party Central Committee, which of course did not please Khrushchev.

The socio-economic program of the triumvirate received in the first official report of G.M. Malenkova at the meeting of the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 15, 1953. From Malenkov’s speech: “The law for our government is the obligation to relentlessly care for the welfare of the people, for the maximum satisfaction of their material and cultural needs...” (“Izvestia” 1953).

This was so far the first test of strength in further correction of the Stalinist model of economic development, with its traditional priority in favor of heavy and military industry. In 1953, the mandatory minimum production of workdays on collective farms, introduced in May 1939, was abolished.

Beria - the mysterious reformer

Lavrentiy Beria began to show even greater reformist ardor. He, being a power-hungry and cynical man, at the same time, of course, had great organizational talent, probably one of the best in the post-war USSR. On March 27 of this year, on his initiative (Beria wrote a note on amnesty to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on March 26), an amnesty was announced for prisoners whose sentence did not exceed 5 years, as well as minors, women with children and pregnant women. A total of 1.2 million prisoners were released (except for political prisoners convicted of “counter-revolutionary crimes”), although this immediately had a negative impact on the crime rate, which literally jumped in the cities.

Due to the increasing number of crimes, units were brought into Moscow internal troops, horse patrols appeared (Geller M.Ya. Nekrich A.M.). On April 2, Beria submitted a note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, in which it was clear that the charges against S. Mikhoels were falsified, and he himself was killed. The note actually named Stalin, Abakumov, Abakumov’s deputy Ogoltsov and former minister MGB of Belarus Tsanava. This was the first serious accusation against the divine idol, Stalin.

On April 4, the “case of poisoning doctors” was discontinued, and a week later the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution “On violation of laws by state security bodies,” thereby opening the possibility of reconsidering many cases. On April 10, 1953, again on the initiative of Beria, the Central Committee of the CPSU cancels the previously adopted decisions to justify the repressed and completely closes the so-called “Mingrelian case” (Resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 9, 1951, and March 27, 1952). It was on Beria’s initiative that the dismantling of Stalin’s Gulag began. The largest “great construction projects” built by the hands of prisoners, such as the Salekhard-Igarka railway in the tundra, the Karakum Canal and the underwater tunnel (13 km) to Sakhalin, were abandoned. The Special Meeting under the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor's Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Supreme Court received the right to review decisions in cases of special jurisdiction (“troikas”, Special Meeting and boards of the OGPU).

On April 4, Beria signed an order that prohibited the use, as it was written in this document, of “savage “interrogation methods” - brutal beatings of those arrested, round-the-clock use of handcuffs on hands turned behind the back, prolonged sleep deprivation, confinement of those arrested undressed in a cold punishment cell.” . As a result of these tortures, the defendants were driven to moral depression, and “sometimes to the loss of human appearance.” “Taking advantage of this condition of the arrested,” the order said, “the falsifying investigators slipped them prefabricated “confessions” about anti-Soviet and espionage-terrorist activities” (quoted by R. Pihoya).

Another part of Beria’s mass amnesty policy was the decree of May 20, 1953, which lifted passport restrictions for citizens released from prison, which allowed them to find work in major cities. These restrictions, according to various estimates, affected three million people (Zhilenkov M.).

The April revelations of illegal state security practices, coupled with the death of the main architect of repression, Stalin, caused a lively protest response in the camps and exiles, as well as among the relatives of prisoners. Complaints and petitions for reconsideration of cases literally poured in from all over the country to newspaper editorial offices, the prosecutor's office and party bodies. There was unrest in the camps themselves. On May 26, 1953, an uprising broke out in Norilsk Gorlag, which was brutally suppressed by troops, and the number of those killed was several hundred people.

Beria knew firsthand about the nationalist underground in the western republics of the USSR, since he long years he was mercilessly suppressed. Now he proposed more flexible methods in national politics, such as: indigenization, partial decentralization of the union republics, some allowance for national and cultural characteristics. Here his innovation was expressed in proposals for a broader replacement of Russians in leadership positions in the Union republics with national personnel; the establishment of national orders and even the possibility of creating national military units. In an atmosphere of intense political struggle for power in the Kremlin, Beria, thus, also expected to receive support and support from the national elites in the union republics of the USSR. Subsequently, such Beria initiatives on the national question were regarded as “bourgeois-nationalist”, as inciting “enmity and discord” between the peoples of the USSR.

The omnipresent Beria tried to carry out reforms in foreign policy. He was clearly trying to stop what had started " cold war"with the West, the fault for unleashing which, in his opinion, lay with the inflexible Stalin. His boldest proposal was to unite Germany from its two parts - eastern (under the control Soviet troops) and Western-controlled by the Anglo-Americans, allowing a unified German state to be non-socialist! Such a radical proposal by Beria was met with objection only by Molotov. Beria also believed that in other countries of Eastern Europe Socialism should not be rapidly imposed on the Soviet model.

He also tried to restore relations with Yugoslavia, which had been damaged under Stalin. Beria believed that the break with Tito was a mistake, and planned to correct it. “Let the Yugoslavs build what they want” (according to S. Kremlev).

The fact that the partial dismantling of the punitive system began to be actively carried out by Beria with the support of Malenkov and other high-ranking members of the party and Soviet leadership today does not raise any doubts in anyone. The debate is based on Beria’s “liberal” reformism. Why did the main “punisher of the country” of recent decades turn out to be the most “liberal” of all Stalin’s associates? Traditionally, many authors and biographers (mostly of the liberal camp) of Beria were inclined to consider his reform initiatives solely as the desire of the initially “vicious villain and intriguer” to wash away the image of the main “Stalinist executioner.”

Of course, such motives were present in the real, and not the “mythological-demonic” Beria (as he was represented in the 90s). However, it would be wrong to explain all of Beria’s reformism in the short period of 1953 with these motives. Even during Stalin’s lifetime, he more than once expressed the enormous danger for the country in continuing the course of “tightening the screws” and especially the super-exploitation of the collective farm peasantry. However, being a careful and diligent person, Beria carried out all Stalin’s instructions as energetically and efficiently as possible, which earned him the respect of the “master”.

But with the passing of the charismatic Stalin, Beria, being the person most knowledgeable about the mood of Soviet citizens, well understood the need to abandon many of the most odious repressive features of the Stalinist system. The country, compressed like a spring, living for a long time under wartime laws, was in dire need of respite and, finally, easier life.

At the same time, he, as a strong, power-hungry personality, certainly laid claim to the role of Stalin's main successor. But to do this, he had to bypass his many rivals in the collective leadership, especially such political heavyweights as Malenkov (to whom he was formally subordinate). And it was possible to bypass them only by seizing the initiative for reformatory changes in the country. And Beria did this well at first.

In fact, under the weak-willed Malenkov, Beria became the shadow ruler of the country, which, of course, could not but cause deep discontent among many of his “comrades-in-arms.” The very logic of the struggle that unfolded in the highest echelons of power indicated that it was necessary to eliminate a dangerous rival who could turn into a “new Stalin.” It is not surprising that yesterday’s political comrades of Beria (especially Malenkov) are joining forces to bring down the most dangerous political figure, Beria, through a conspiracy.

Neither ideological disputes, nor possibly different opinions on the further development of the USSR or its foreign policy were not the motive for this game; the decisive role here was played by fear of Beria and the secret police belonging to him (E.A. Prudnikova). The leaders from the collective leadership were very concerned about Beria’s plans to curtail the influence of the party and subordinate party structures to government bodies, and those, in turn, to the all-powerful Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

As evidenced by documents of that time, the leading role in the conspiracy against Beria was played by Khrushchev and Malenkov, relying on the party activists and all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. It was they who brought into action the most significant political component - the army, or rather the military leadership, and, above all, Marshals N.A. Bulganin and G.K. Zhukov (Alexey Pozharov). June 26, 1953 during a meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which then developed into a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, since all its members were present.

At this meeting, Khrushchev voiced accusations against Beria: of revisionism, an “anti-socialist approach” to the situation in the GDR, and even of espionage for Great Britain in the 20s. When Beria tried to protest the charges, he was arrested by a group of generals led by Marshal Zhukov.

Hot on its heels, the investigation and trial of the all-powerful marshal from Lubyanka began. Along with Beria’s real crimes in organizing “illegal repressions” (which, by the way, were organized by all his “accusers”), Beria was charged with a whole set of standard charges for that time: espionage for foreign states, his hostile activities aimed at eliminating the Soviet workers peasant system, the desire for the restoration of capitalism and the restoration of the rule of the bourgeoisie, as well as moral decay, abuse of power (Politburo and the Beria case. Collection of documents).

His closest associates from the security agencies ended up in the “Beria gang”: Merkulov V.N., Kobulov B.Z. Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Ya., Dekanozov V.G., Vlodzimirsky L.E. They were also repressed.

From Beria’s last words at the trial on December 23, 1953: “I have already shown the court what I plead guilty to. I hid my service in the Musavatist counter-revolutionary intelligence service for a long time. However, I declare that, even while serving there, I did nothing harmful. I fully admit my moral and everyday decay. The numerous relationships with women mentioned here disgrace me as a citizen and former party member. ... Recognizing that I am responsible for the excesses and distortions of socialist legality in 1937-1938, I ask the court to take into account that I did not have any selfish or hostile goals. The reason for my crimes is the situation of that time. ... I don’t consider myself guilty of trying to disorganize the defense of the Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War. When sentencing me, I ask you to carefully analyze my actions, not to consider me as a counter-revolutionary, but to apply to me only those articles of the Criminal Code that I really deserve.” (Quoted from Janibekyan V.G.).

Beria was shot on the same day, December 23, in the bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District in the presence of the USSR Prosecutor General R. A. Rudenko. The first shot, on his own initiative, was fired from his personal weapon by the Colonel General (later Marshal Soviet Union) P. F. Batitsky (according to the memoirs of prosecutor A. Antonov-Ovseenko). As in the recent past, the massive demonization of Beria’s image in the Soviet press caused violent indignation among Soviet citizens, who literally began to compete with each other in the sophistication of branding the “fierce enemy” more strongly. That's how gr. Alekseev (Dnepropetrovsk region) expressed his righteous anger about Beria in poetic form:

"I don't ask, I demand by right
Wipe you snake off the face of the earth.
You raised the sword to my honor and glory,
Let it fall on your head." (TsKhSD. F.5. Op. 30. D.4.).

Beria turned out to be a convenient scapegoat for everyone, especially for his comrades, who also had blood on their hands. It was Beria who was blamed for almost all the crimes of the Stalin era. Especially the destruction of the leading cadres of the party. They say that it was he who, having ingratiated himself into Stalin’s trust, deceived the “great leader.” Acting through Stalin, Beria killed many innocent people.

It is significant that at that moment Stalin was beyond criticism. According to A. Mikoyan, who commented on the time before the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956): “We did not immediately give the correct assessment of Stalin. Stalin died, we didn’t criticize him for two years... We didn’t psychologically reach such criticism then.”

Khrushchev vs. Malenkov

The fall of Beria marked the end of the first triumvirate. The prestige and influence of Khrushchev, the main organizer of the anti-Beria conspiracy, increased significantly. Malenkov had lost his support in party circles and was now increasingly dependent on Khrushchev, who relied on the party apparatus. Khrushchev could not yet dictate his decisions, but Malenkov could no longer act without Khrushchev’s consent. Both still needed each other (Geller M.Ya., Nekrich A.M.).

The struggle between the two political heavyweights took place over socio-economic programs. The initiator of the new course was initially G. Malenkov. In August 1953, Malenkov formulated a new course, which provided for the social reorientation of the economy and the priority development of light industry (group “B”).

On August 8, 1953, Malenkov made a speech at the VI session of the USSR Supreme Council in which he noted the poor state of agriculture and called: “The urgent task is to sharply increase the population’s supply of food and industrial goods - meat, within two to three years, fish, oil, sugar, confectionery, clothing, shoes, dishes, furniture.” In his speech, Malenkov proposed halving the agricultural tax for collective farmers, writing off arrears from previous years, and also changing the principle of taxation of village residents.

The new prime minister also called for changing the attitude towards the personal farming of collective farmers, expanding housing construction, and developing trade turnover and retail trade. In addition, significantly increase investment in the development of the light, food, and fishing industries.

Malenkov’s proposals, fateful for millions of the people, were accepted. The fifth five-year plan that began in 1951 was eventually revised in favor of light industry. During the transformations, the size of collective farmers' personal plots increased 5 times, and the tax on them was halved. All old debts from collective farmers were written off. As a result, over 5 years the village began to produce 1.5 times more food. This made Malenkov the most popular politician of that time among the people. And the peasants even had a story that Malenkov was “Lenin’s nephew” (Yuri Borisenok). At the same time, Malenkov’s economic course was cautiously perceived by the party and economic elite, brought up on the Stalinist approach of “heavy industry at any cost.” Malenkov’s opponent was Khrushchev, who at that time defended a slightly adjusted old Stalinist policy, but in favor of the preferential development of group “A”. “Narodnik” Khrushchev (as Stalin once called him) was much more conservative in his political programs than Beria and Malenkov at the time.

But Malenkov finally called for a fight against the privileges and bureaucracy of the party and state apparatus, noting “complete neglect of the needs of the people”, “bribery and corruption of the moral character of a communist” (Zhukov Yu. N.). Back in May 1953, on the initiative of Malenkov, a government decree was adopted that halved remuneration for party officials and eliminated the so-called. “envelopes” - additional remuneration that is not subject to accounting (Zhukov Yu.N.).

This was a serious challenge to the main owner of the country, the party apparatus. Malenkov literally played “with fire”; it is not surprising that he immediately alienated the masses of the party elite, who were accustomed to consider themselves the main administrator of state property. And this, in turn, gave N.S. Khrushchev a chance, acting as a defender of the interests of this party and economic elite and relying on it, to neutralize another competitor in the struggle for power.

Historian Yuri Zhukov cites facts indicating that party officials literally bombarded Khrushchev with requests for the return of additional payments for them in envelopes and an increase in their amounts. As in the 20s, rivalry between leaders was only disguised political programs, but most of all it took place between the leaders of two political forces: the government-economic apparatus, represented by Malenkov, and the party, represented by Khrushchev. Obviously, the second force was more powerful and more consolidated.

Already in August 1953, Khrushchev made a “knight’s move”, he was able to return the previously canceled “envelopes” to the party workers and returned the unpaid amounts to the party officials for 3 months. The support of bureaucrats from the Central Committee, regional committees and city committees elevated Khrushchev to the pinnacle of power. As a result, the September Plenum of the Central Committee, having restored the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee, immediately gave it to Khrushchev, his “defender”. As Khrushchev’s son-in-law Adzhubey pointed out, “he only seemed like a simple-minded person and even wanted to look like that” (Boris Sokolov).

From that time on, Khrushchev, relying on the powerful support of the party apparatus, began to confidently bypass his main rival, Malenkov. Khrushchev was now making up for lost time, trying to win the approval of the popular masses. That is why at the September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev essentially repeated Malenkov’s proposals - to support rural development and stimulate the development of light industry, but on his own behalf.

The fact that the party bureaucracy was on Khrushchev’s side and fully supported him is evidenced by this fact. In November 1953, a meeting was held in the Central Committee, in which G. Malenkov once again made a speech condemning bribery among employees of the apparatus. According to the memoirs of F. Burlatsky, there was a painful silence in the hall, “bewilderment was mixed with fear.” It was broken only by Khrushchev’s voice: “All this, of course, is true, Georgy Maximilianovich. But the apparatus is our support.” The audience responded to this remark with stormy and enthusiastic applause.

By the end of 1953, the situation in party and government circles was such that there was no longer a triumvirate, but not even a duumvirate (Malenkov and Khrushchev). Khrushchev outplayed Malenkov on the “main field” itself, becoming the head of the party, the backbone of Soviet statehood. However, Khrushchev's leadership throughout the country was not yet so obvious. The form of collective leadership was preserved, and Malenkov, as prime minister, had even greater weight in government circles. But his power and influence in the state was much inferior to the authority of Khrushchev, a more ambitious and powerful man. Khrushchev became the new leader of the entire country, in which the processes of de-Stalinization were increasingly gaining momentum.

Russian history

Topic No. 20

USSR AFTER STALIN in the 1950s

LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN (1953–1955)

At the end 1952 MGB authorities arrested a large group Kremlin doctors, who were accused of deliberately killing the leaders of the party and state (in 1945 - 1st Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee and Chairman of the Sovinformburo Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov, in 1948 - Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov). Most of those arrested were Jews by nationality, which gave rise to the statement about “the discovery of a Zionist terrorist group of murderous doctors” “associated with the international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization “Joint”.” A TASS report about this was published in Pravda on January 13, 1953. “The pests were exposed” by the doctor Lydia Timashuk, who was awarded the Order of Lenin for this (in April 1953, after Stalin’s death, the award decree was canceled “as incorrect”). The arrest of the doctors was supposed to be the end of the anti-Semitic campaign in the USSR: after the public execution of the killer doctors, bring down mass repressions on all Jews, deport them to Siberia, etc. The arrest of the doctors was carried out with the sanction of Stalin, among those arrested was Stalin’s personal physician, Professor V.N. Vinogradov, who, having discovered a cerebral circulation disorder and multiple minor cerebral hemorrhages in the leader, said that Stalin needed to retire from active work. Stalin regarded this as a desire to deprive him of power (in 1922, he did the same with Lenin, isolating him in Gorki).

Organizers "doctors' affairs" were L.P. Beria and the new Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev, the executor was the head of the investigative unit of the MGB, Major Ryumin. In this way, Stalin was deprived of the help of the most qualified doctors, and the first serious hemorrhage in the brain became fatal for him.

(A month after Stalin’s death, a message from the Ministry of Internal Affairs was published about the verification of this case, about the illegality of the arrests, about the use of unacceptable investigative methods prohibited by Soviet laws in the MGB. The doctors were released, Major Ryumin was arrested and executed in the summer of 1954, six months after Beria. )

March 2, 1953 Stalin was struck by a blow at his dacha in Kuntsevo near Moscow, and for about half a day he was not given any help. Stalin's condition was hopeless (“Cheyne-Stokes breathing”). Without regaining consciousness, Stalin died at 21.50 March 5, 1953. From March 1953 to October 1961, Stalin's body was in the Mausoleum next to Lenin's body. On the day of the funeral (March 9), a stampede broke out in Moscow, hundreds of people died or were maimed.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR(Stalin's successor as head of government) became Georgiy Maximilianovich Malenkov. His first deputies were L. P. Beria, V. M. Molotov, N. A. Bulganin and L. M. Kaganovich.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR(formally this was the position of the head of state) On March 15, at the session of the Supreme Council, it was approved Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and MGB were merged within the framework of the new Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Minister of Internal Affairs again (after 1946) became Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. In 1953, an amnesty was held, and many criminals were released (“Cold Summer of ’53”). The crime rate in the country increased sharply (a new surge after 1945–1947). Beria intended to use this situation to strengthen the powers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for his own purposes.

Minister of Foreign Affairs again (after 1949) became Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov(A. Ya. Vyshinsky, who held this position, was sent to the USA by the permanent representative of the USSR to the UN, where he died of a heart attack).

Minister of War remained (since 1947, replacing Stalin himself in this post). His first deputies were Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky.

Thus, after the death of Stalin, the period of disgrace for V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov and G. K. Zhukov ended.

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was the only one of the secretaries of the Central Committee who was part of the highest party leadership - the Bureau of the Presidium. It was decided to relieve him of his duties as 1st Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee so that he could concentrate on his work in the Central Committee. In fact, Khrushchev became head the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, although he has not formally become First Secretary yet. G. M. Malenkov and L. P. Beria, actually leading the country after Stalin’s death, intended to concentrate power in the Council of Ministers - the government of the USSR. They needed the party apparatus to strictly implement government decisions. In Khrushchev they saw a simple performer who did not claim power. (They made the same mistake as Zinoviev and Kamenev, who in 1922 recommended Stalin for the post Secretary General Central Committee of the RCP(b).)

Beria and Malenkov understood the need for changes in the country, but while maintaining the essence of the regime. Beria took the initiative to normalize relations with Yugoslavia, Malenkov called for taking care of the material and cultural needs of the people. But the leadership of the party and state were afraid that Beria, relying on the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, would sooner or later want to take all power into his own hands and eliminate all his rivals. The initiator of the elimination of Beria was Khrushchev. Malenkov was the last to agree to eliminate his friend Beria.

IN June 1953 Beria was arrested at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee in the Kremlin. The arrest was made by 6 officers led by Marshals Zhukov and Moskalenko. Before this, all the security in the Kremlin was replaced by the military, and Zhukov brought the Tamanskaya and Kantemirovskaya tank divisions into Moscow to prevent possible actions by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to free Beria. The people were informed that the Plenum of the Central Committee, held on July 2–7, exposed “the agent of the British and Musavatist (bourgeois Azerbaijani) intelligence services, the enemy of the people Beria,” who “earned trust” in the leadership of the party and state, sought to “put the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party” and establish their personal power in the country. Beria was removed from all posts, expelled from the party, convicted by a military tribunal (chaired by Marshal I.S. Konev) and in the end December 1953 shot.

IN September 1953 Khrushchev was elected 1st Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The term “cult of personality” began to be mentioned in the press for the first time. They began publishing verbatim reports of the Central Committee Plenums (glasnost). The people got the opportunity to visit the Kremlin museums. The process of rehabilitation of innocently convicted people has begun. Khrushchev's popularity grew, the military and the party apparatus were behind him. In fact, Khrushchev became the first person in the state.

In 1955 Malenkov announced his unwillingness to take up the post of head of government. New Chairman Council of Ministers became Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, and Malenkov became Minister of Power Plants.

Even Malenkov, in his first speeches as head of government, spoke about the need to increase the production of consumer goods (group “B”) and about the priority of group “B” over group “A” (production of means of production), about changing attitudes towards agriculture. Khrushchev criticized the rapid pace of development of Group B, saying that without powerful heavy industry it would be impossible to ensure the country's defense capability and the rise of agriculture. In the economy, the main one was the agrarian problem: there was a shortage of grain in the country, although Malenkov stated at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952 that “the grain problem in the USSR has been solved.”

Task No. 1. Was G. M. Malenkov right when he spoke about the priority of group “B” over group “A”?

September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee decided: increase purchase price for agricultural products (for meat - 5.5 times, for milk and butter - 2 times, for vegetables - 2 times and for grain - 1.5 times), take off debt from collective farms, reduce taxes on personal farms of collective farmers, not to redistribute income between collective farms (equalization was condemned). Khrushchev stated that improving the lives of the people is impossible without improving agriculture and improving the lives of collective farmers. Were mandatory supplies reduced agricultural products to the state, reduced(later cancelled) homestead taxes. This led to greater interest among collective farmers in production, and the supply of cities improved. The number of poultry on peasant farms increased and cows appeared. By the spring of 1954, 100 thousand certified specialists were sent to collective and state farms.

Touching upon the grain problem, Khrushchev said that Malenkov’s statement at the 19th Party Congress about its solution was not true, and that the shortage of grain was hampering the growth of production of meat, milk and butter. Solving the grain problem was possible in two ways: first - increase in yield, which required fertilizers and improved farming standards and would not give immediate returns, the second - expansion of cultivated areas.

In order to immediately increase grain production, it was decided to develop virgin and fallow lands in Kazakhstan, Southern Siberia, the Volga region and the Southern Urals. People landed right in the steppes, in off-road conditions, without basic amenities, lived in tents in the winter steppe, and lacked equipment.

February-March (1954) Plenum of the Central Committee approved the decision on development of virgin lands . Already in the spring of 1954, 17 million hectares of land were raised and 124 grain state farms were created. The leaders of Kazakhstan, who insisted on preserving traditional sheep farming, were replaced: Panteleimon Kondratyevich became the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Ponomarenko, and the 2nd secretary is Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. In 1954–1955 350 thousand people went to work in 425 virgin state farms on Komsomol vouchers. In the record year of 1956, virgin lands produced 40% of the country's total grain. At the same time, grain production in the arid steppes required a high level of farming and was highly dependent on weather conditions. Subsequently, extensive (without the introduction of scientific achievements and new technologies) farming methods led to the depletion of the fertile soil layer and a drop in yields due to wind erosion of the soil.

Thus, Khrushchev’s attempt to solve the grain problem within the framework of the collective farm system failed, but grain production increased, which made it possible to eliminate grain queues and begin the free sale of flour. However, there was not enough grain for the needs of livestock farming (for fattening beef cattle).

Task No. 2. Was the development of virgin lands in the USSR justified?
XX CONGRESS OF THE CPSU. ITS SOLUTIONS AND IMPORTANCE

C February 14 to 25, 1956 The 20th Congress of the CPSU took place, which determined the final turn towards de-Stalinization Soviet society, liberalization domestic economic and political life, expansion of foreign policy relations and establishment friendly relations with a number of foreign countries

The report at the congress was made by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Basic provisions international part of the report:

a) it has been established that it has formed and exists world socialist system(“socialist camp”);

b) a desire is expressed cooperation with everyone social democratic movements and parties (under Stalin, social democracy was considered the worst enemy of the labor movement, since it distracted workers from the revolutionary struggle with peaceful slogans);

c) it is stated that transition forms various countries to socialism can be diverse, including the possible way for communists and socialists to win a parliamentary majority based on the election results and carry out all the necessary socialist transformations through peaceful, parliamentary means (under Stalin, such statements would have resulted in accusations of opportunism);

d) the principle is emphasized peaceful coexistence two systems (socialist and capitalist), strengthening trust and cooperation; socialism does not need to be exported: the working people of capitalist countries will themselves establish socialism when they are convinced of its advantages;

d) danger of war remains, but her there is no more inevitability, since the forces of peace (the socialist, labor movement, the countries of the “third world” - the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America) are stronger than the forces of war.

The report provided an analysis of the internal economic situation of the USSR and tasks in the field of economics have been set:

A) electrify the entire national economy, accelerate the electrification of railways;

b) create a powerful energy, metallurgical and machine-building base in Siberia and on Far East;

c) in the VI Five-Year Plan (1956–1960) increase production industrial products by 65%, catch up with developed capitalist countries in terms of production per capita;

G) in agriculture to bring the annual grain harvest to 11 billion poods (1 pood = 16 kg), to fully provide the country with potatoes and vegetables in 2 years, to double meat production in five years, focusing on development pig farming;

e) sharply increase crops corn, primarily to provide livestock with feed (Khrushchev, working after the war as 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, saw that corn produces high yields; it was a mistake to spread corn crops in those areas where it had never been cultivated before and could not produce high harvests - in Belarus, the Baltic states, Tula, Leningrad regions etc.); in 1953, there were 3.5 million hectares under corn, and in 1955 – already 17.9 million hectares.

Decisions of the XX Congress in the field of social policy:

a) transfer all workers and employees during the VI Five-Year Plan to a 7-hour working day with a 6-day working week; from 1957, begin transferring certain sectors of the economy to 5-day workweek with 8-hour workday;

b) increase the volume housing construction 2 times due to its transfer to an industrial footing (transition to large-panel housing construction, when house elements are produced at house-building plants and only assembled into a single whole at a construction site). Khrushchev called for the creation of a socialist architectural style– durable, economical, beautiful. This is how “Khrushchev” houses appeared with separate apartments of a small area, but they were also a great joy for those who moved there from communal apartments and post-war barracks;

c) Khrushchev called for an increase production of household appliances and to expansion catering networks to liberate the Soviet woman;

d) from September 1, 1956 was canceled introduced in 1940 tuition fee in high schools, technical schools and universities;

d) it was decided raise the salary low-paid workers by 30% and increase the minimum wage pensions up to 350 rub. (from February 1, 1961 - 35 rubles); It was considered advisable for the salaries of enterprise managers to depend on the results achieved.

In the report of the Central Committee, the name of Stalin was mentioned with respect: the report was approved by the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, in which the majority was against exposing the cult of personality, primarily V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov, K. E. Voroshilov, L. M. Kaganovich, themselves involved in mass repressions. Khrushchev believed that it was necessary to tell the truth and repent in order to restore the trust of ordinary communists and ordinary people in the party leadership. Despite the objections of Stalin's associates, Khrushchev gathered on the evening of the last day of the congress (February 25) closed meeting, at which he made a report "On the cult of personality and its consequences", in which for the first time he openly linked “deviations from Leninist norms of party life” and what was happening in the country lawlessness and arbitrariness in the name of Stalin. Khrushchev’s speech was a courageous step, because he himself, unconditionally believing Stalin, signed sanctions for the destruction of “enemies of the people.”

The delegates to the congress learned for the first time about many things: about the characterization of Stalin given by Lenin in the addition to the “Letter to the Congress”; that most of the delegates to the 17th Party Congress (1934) were exterminated for “counter-revolutionary crimes”; that the confessions of many prominent figures of the party and state about their participation in sabotage and espionage were extracted from them under torture; about the falsification of Moscow trials in the 30s; about torture with the permission of the Party Central Committee (Stalin’s letter to the NKVD of 1937); that Stalin personally signed 383 “execution” lists; about violation of collective management norms; about Stalin’s gross miscalculations during the war, etc. By decision of the congress, a commission was formed to investigate the circumstances of the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov.

What we know today in every detail came as a shock to the delegates of the congress. Khrushchev's report was kept secret for the Soviet people until 1989, although it was immediately published in the West. The text of the report was read to the communists at closed party meetings; notes were not allowed. After such meetings, people were taken away with heart attacks. Many lost faith in what they lived for (the suicide of the writer Alexander Fadeev in 1956 was caused, in particular, by this circumstance). The lack of clarity in the assessment of the Stalinist regime led to a pro-Stalin demonstration of Georgian youth in Tbilisi in October 1956, which was shot.

Based on the decision of the XX Congress June 30, 1956 a resolution of the Central Committee was adopted “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences”. There, Stalin’s “individual mistakes” were condemned, but the system he created was not questioned; neither the names of those guilty of lawlessness (except Beria) nor the facts of lawlessness themselves were named. It was stated that the cult of personality could not change the nature of our system. After this decision began mass rehabilitation illegally repressed. They were released without returning the confiscated property and were given compensation in the amount of 2 months' earnings before arrest. Executioners and informers, meanwhile, continued to work in their places, avoiding punishment.

Task No. 3. What decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU could not in principle be adopted under Stalin and why?
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR

From the mid-50s. an era has begun scientific and technological revolution (STR). First of all, it was expressed in the use atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as well as in the development outer space. In 1954, the world's first Obninskaya nuclear power plant, at the end of the 50s. was put into operation nuclear icebreaker"Lenin". Scientific and technological revolution in the USSR developed within the framework military-industrial complex.

October 4, 1957 the first one was launched artificial satellite Earth. In the USSR, increasingly powerful ballistic missiles were developed and tested. After test flights of dogs Laika (without a lander), and then Belka and Strelki (returned to Earth) April 12, 1961 man flew into space for the first time - Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin(flew away as a senior lieutenant, after 108 minutes of flight - 1 orbit around the Earth - landed as a major).

The era of scientific and technological revolution was accompanied by qualitatively new disasters. In 1957, a radioactive release occurred at the Mayak plant in the Chelyabinsk region, and the radioactive trace was not eliminated, and the consequences of the contamination are still felt. In 1960, a ballistic missile exploded at launch. Marshal M.I. Nedelin, several generals, hundreds of engineers, soldiers, and officers were burned alive.

The oil and gas industry developed rapidly, and oil and gas pipelines were built. Priority was given to the construction of ferrous metallurgy enterprises.

In the mid-50s. It became clear that over-centralized economic management, when any minor issues are resolved only at the ministry level, does not justify itself and slows down the development of production. In addition, the ministries duplicated each other's activities. Cross-transportation of the same goods was carried out through different ministries. In 1957, the economic council reform began . The entire territory of the USSR was divided into 105 economic regions, in each of which territorial economic management bodies were established - national economic councils (economic councils). Each economic council included one or more regions and developed as a single economic system devoid of departmental contradictions. Economic councils received the right independent planning, could establish mutual direct economic ties. The need for the existence of large all-Union ministries disappeared, about 60 ministries were eliminated, their functions were transferred to economic councils; There were only 10 most important ones that could not be divided (Ministry of Defense, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Communications, Communications, etc.).

In 1957–1958, when the ministries had already been abolished and the economic councils had not yet been formed, the national economy worked most efficiently, as it was out of the control and tutelage of the expanding bureaucratic apparatus. Dissatisfaction with the economic council reform was primarily expressed by officials who lost their positions. Gradually, workers from the abolished ministries became part of the apparatus of economic councils or sectoral departments of the State Planning Committee, and the size of the bureaucratic apparatus that managed the economy remained virtually unchanged.

Task No. 4. What are the positive and negative aspects of the economic council reform in the USSR?

At enterprises in the 50s. appeared communist labor brigades, but the incentives were still only moral (a pennant for winning the competition), the salary was time-based - almost the same for both the leaders and the laggards.

In the field of agriculture, the reform consisted of 1958 all equipment of state machine and tractor stations (MTS) was mandatory sold to collective farms. Only large, wealthy farms benefited from this, as it was convenient and profitable for them to maintain their own equipment. Most of the rest did not have the funds to either buy equipment or maintain it, so when they were forced to buy equipment, they found themselves on the verge of ruin. In addition, machine operators did not want to move along with their equipment to collective farms and looked for another job in the city so as not to worsen their standard of living. The debts of bankrupt collective farms were written off and they were turned into state farms - state agricultural enterprises.

N. S. Khrushchev’s visit to the USA once again convinced him of the need to develop corn (after visiting the fields of farmer Garst, who grew hybrid corn). A new wave has begun corn campaign: corn was sown as far as Yakutia and the Arkhangelsk region. The blame for the fact that it did not grow there was shifted to the local leadership (“they let things take their course”). At the same time, American varieties of corn produced good harvests in Ukraine, Kuban and other southern regions of the country.

At the end of the 50s. The 1st Secretary of the Ryazan Regional Party Committee Larionov announced that he would increase meat procurement in the region by 3 times in one year. As a result, all the collective farm dairy cattle in the region, cattle seized from the population, and cattle purchased in other regions with huge bank loans were put to slaughter. On next year There was a sharp drop in the level of agricultural production in Ryazan and neighboring regions. Larionov shot himself.

Khrushchev personally traveled around the country and supervised agriculture. WITH 1958 started again struggle with personal subsidiary farms. Collective farmers trading in markets were called speculators and parasites. Townspeople were prohibited from keeping livestock. In the mid-50s. personal farms provided 50% of the meat produced in the country, in 1959 - only 20%. Another campaign was the fight against waste on a state scale (“there is no need to create museums everywhere where Pushkin visited”).

In 1957 they were expanded budgetary rights of the union republics, the functions of the State Planning Committee were partially transferred to them. By the end of the 50s. began equalizing the pace of their development. Industrial development in Central Asia and Kazakhstan was ensured labor force from the central regions of Russia, and unemployment appeared among the local population traditionally employed in agriculture. Lands between the republics of Central Asia were redistributed without taking into account national composition residents and their wishes. All this became the basis for interethnic conflicts in the future. IN 1954 Crimea was transferred from the RSFSR into Ukraine to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. The decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was not even supported by an official act of government bodies.

By the end of 1958, there were some disruptions in the implementation of the VI Five-Year Plan. IN January 1959 took place XXI (Extraordinary) Congress of the CPSU, who accepted seven year plan development of the national economy for 1959–1965. (last 2 years of the VI Five-Year Plan + VII Five-Year Plan) to establish a long-term perspective of economic planning. The seven-year plan provided for: an increase in industrial production by 80% (actual implementation - 84%), an increase in agricultural production by 70% (actual implementation - 15%). By the end of the seven-year plan, it was planned to catch up and surpass the United States in agricultural production per capita, and by 1970 - in industrial production.

Historians call the dates of Stalin's reign from 1929 to 1953. Joseph Stalin (Dzhugashvili) was born on December 21, 1879. Many contemporaries of the Soviet era associate the years of Stalin’s reign not only with the victory over Nazi Germany and the increasing level of industrialization of the USSR, but also with numerous repressions of the civilian population.

During Stalin's reign, about 3 million people were imprisoned and sentenced to death. And if we add to them those sent into exile, dispossessed and deported, then the victims among the civilian population in the Stalin era can be counted at about 20 million people. Now many historians and psychologists are inclined to believe that Stalin’s character was greatly influenced by the situation within the family and his upbringing in childhood.

The emergence of Stalin's tough character

It is known from reliable sources that Stalin’s childhood was not the happiest and most cloudless. The leader's parents often argued in front of their son. The father drank a lot and allowed himself to beat his mother in front of little Joseph. The mother, in turn, took out her anger on her son, beat and humiliated him. The unfavorable atmosphere in the family greatly affected Stalin's psyche. Even as a child, Stalin understood a simple truth: whoever is stronger is right. This principle became the future leader’s motto in life. He was also guided by him in governing the country.

In 1902, Joseph Vissarionovich organized a demonstration in Batumi, this step was his first in political career. A little later, Stalin became the Bolshevik leader, and his circle of best friends includes Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (Ulyanov). Stalin fully shares Lenin's revolutionary ideas.

In 1913, Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili first used his pseudonym - Stalin. From that time on, he became known by this last name. Few people know that before the surname Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich tried on about 30 pseudonyms that never caught on.

Stalin's reign

The period of Stalin's reign begins in 1929. Almost the entire reign of Joseph Stalin was accompanied by collectivization, mass death of civilians and famine. In 1932, Stalin adopted the “three ears of corn” law. According to this law, a starving peasant who stole ears of wheat from the state was immediately subject to capital punishment - execution. All saved bread in the state was sent abroad. This was the first stage of industrialization of the Soviet state: the purchase of modern foreign-made equipment.

During the reign of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, massive repressions of the peaceful population of the USSR were carried out. The repressions began in 1936, when the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR was taken by N.I. Yezhov. In 1938, on the orders of Stalin, his close friend Bukharin was shot. During this period, many residents of the USSR were exiled to the Gulag or shot. Despite all the cruelty of the measures taken, Stalin's policy was aimed at raising the state and its development.

Pros and cons of Stalin's rule

Minuses:

• strict board policy:
• the almost complete destruction of senior army ranks, intellectuals and scientists (who thought differently from the USSR government);
• repression of wealthy peasants and the religious population;
• the widening “gap” between the elite and the working class;
• oppression of the civilian population: payment for labor in food instead of monetary remuneration, working day up to 14 hours;
• propaganda of anti-Semitism;
• about 7 million starvation deaths during the period of collectivization;
• the flourishing of slavery;
• selective development of sectors of the economy of the Soviet state.

Pros:

• creation of a protective nuclear shield in the post-war period;
• increasing the number of schools;
• creation of children's clubs, sections and circles;
• space exploration;
• reduction in prices for consumer goods;
• low prices for utilities;
• development of industry of the Soviet state on the world stage.

During the Stalin era it was formed social system USSR, social, political and economic institutions appeared. Joseph Vissarionovich completely abandoned the NEP policy and, at the expense of the village, carried out the modernization of the Soviet state. Thanks to the strategic qualities of the Soviet leader, the USSR won the Second World War. The Soviet state began to be called a superpower. The USSR joined the UN Security Council. The era of Stalin's rule ended in 1953. He was replaced as Chairman of the USSR Government by N. Khrushchev.

General secretaries of the USSR chronological order

General secretaries of the USSR in chronological order. Today they are simply part of history, but once upon a time their faces were familiar to every single inhabitant of the vast country. Politic system in the Soviet Union was such that citizens did not elect their leaders. The decision to appoint the next secretary general was made by the ruling elite. But, nevertheless, the people respected government leaders and, for the most part, took this state of affairs as a given.

Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin)

Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, better known as Stalin, was born on December 18, 1879 in the Georgian city of Gori. Became the first General Secretary of the CPSU. He received this position in 1922, when Lenin was still alive, and until the latter’s death he played a minor role in government.

When Vladimir Ilyich died, the race for the highest post began serious fight. Many of Stalin's competitors had a much better chance of taking over, but thanks to tough, uncompromising actions, Joseph Vissarionovich managed to emerge victorious. Most of the other applicants were physically destroyed, and some left the country.

In just a few years of rule, Stalin took the entire country into a tight grip. By the beginning of the 30s, he finally established himself as the sole leader of the people. The dictator's policies went down in history:

· mass repressions;

· total dispossession;

· collectivization.

For this, Stalin was branded by his own followers during the “thaw”. But there is also something for which Joseph Vissarionovich, according to historians, is worthy of praise. This is, first of all, the rapid transformation of a collapsed country into an industrial and military giant, as well as the victory over fascism. It is quite possible that if the “cult of personality” had not been so condemned by everyone, these achievements would have been unrealistic. Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin died on the fifth of March 1953.

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was born on April 15, 1894 in the Kursk province (Kalinovka village) into a simple working-class family. He took part in the Civil War, where he took the side of the Bolsheviks. Member of the CPSU since 1918. At the end of the 30s he was appointed secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

Khrushchev headed the Soviet state shortly after Stalin's death. At first, he had to compete with Georgy Malenkov, who also aspired to the highest position and at that time was actually the leader of the country, presiding over the Council of Ministers. But in the end, the coveted chair still remained with Nikita Sergeevich.

When Khrushchev was secretary general, the Soviet country:

· launched the first man into space and developed this area in every possible way;

· was actively built up with five-story buildings, today called “Khrushchev”;

· planted the lion's share of the fields with corn, for which Nikita Sergeevich was even nicknamed “the corn farmer.”

This ruler went down in history primarily with his legendary speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, where he condemned Stalin and his bloody policies. From that moment on, the so-called “thaw” began in the Soviet Union, when the grip of the state was loosened, cultural figures received some freedom, etc. All this lasted until Khrushchev was removed from his post on October 14, 1964.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was born in the Dnepropetrovsk region (village of Kamenskoye) on December 19, 1906. His father was a metallurgist. Member of the CPSU since 1931. He took the main post of the country as a result of a conspiracy. It was Leonid Ilyich who led the group of members of the Central Committee that removed Khrushchev.

The Brezhnev era in the history of the Soviet state is characterized as stagnation. The latter manifested itself as follows:

· the country's development has stopped in almost all areas except military-industrial;

· The USSR began to seriously lag behind Western countries;

· citizens again felt the grip of the state, repression and persecution of dissidents began.

Leonid Ilyich tried to improve relations with the United States, which had worsened during the time of Khrushchev, but he was not very successful. The arms race continued, and after the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, it was impossible to even think about any reconciliation. Brezhnev held a high post until his death, which occurred on November 10, 1982.

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was born in the station town of Nagutskoye (Stavropol Territory) on June 15, 1914. His father was a railway worker. Member of the CPSU since 1939. He was active, which contributed to his rapid rise up the career ladder.

At the time of Brezhnev's death, Andropov headed the State Security Committee. He was elected by his comrades to the highest post. The reign of this Secretary General covers a period of less than two years. During this time, Yuri Vladimirovich managed to fight a little against corruption in power. But he didn’t accomplish anything drastic. On February 9, 1984, Andropov died. The reason for this was a serious illness.

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko was born in 1911 on September 24 in the Yenisei province (village of Bolshaya Tes). His parents were peasants. Member of the CPSU since 1931. Since 1966 - deputy of the Supreme Council. Appointed General Secretary of the CPSU on February 13, 1984.

Chernenko continued Andropov’s policy of identifying corrupt officials. He was in power for less than a year. The cause of his death on March 10, 1985 was also a serious illness.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was born on March 2, 1931 in the North Caucasus (the village of Privolnoye). His parents were peasants. Member of the CPSU since 1952. He proved himself to be an active public figure. He quickly moved up the party line.

He was appointed Secretary General on March 11, 1985. He entered history with the policy of “perestroika,” which included the introduction of glasnost, the development of democracy, and the provision of certain economic freedoms and other liberties to the population. Gorbachev's reforms led to mass unemployment, the liquidation of state-owned enterprises, and a total shortage of goods. This causes an ambiguous attitude towards the ruler on the part of citizens of the former USSR, which collapsed precisely during the reign of Mikhail Sergeevich.

But in the West, Gorbachev is one of the most respected Russian politicians. He was even awarded Nobel Prize peace. Gorbachev was Secretary General until August 23, 1991, and headed the USSR until December 25 of the same year.

All deceased general secretaries of the Soviet Union Socialist republics buried near the Kremlin wall. Their list was completed by Chernenko. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev is still alive. In 2017, he turned 86 years old.

Photos of the secretaries general of the USSR in chronological order

Stalin

Khrushchev

Brezhnev

Andropov

Chernenko

With the death of Stalin - the “father of nations” and the “architect of communism” - in 1953, a struggle for power began, because the one he established assumed that at the helm of the USSR there would be the same autocratic leader who would take the reins of government into his own hands.

The only difference was that the main contenders for power all unanimously advocated the abolition of this very cult and the liberalization of the country’s political course.

Who ruled after Stalin?

A serious struggle unfolded between the three main contenders, who initially represented a triumvirate - Georgy Malenkov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR), Lavrentiy Beria (Minister of the United Ministry of Internal Affairs) and Nikita Khrushchev (Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee). Each of them wanted to take a place in it, but victory could only go to the candidate whose candidacy was supported by the party, whose members enjoyed great authority and had the necessary connections. In addition, they were all united by the desire to achieve stability, end the era of repression and gain more freedom in their actions. That is why the question of who ruled after Stalin’s death does not always have a clear answer - after all, there were three people fighting for power at once.

The triumvirate in power: the beginning of a split

The triumvirate created under Stalin divided power. Most of it was concentrated in the hands of Malenkov and Beria. Khrushchev was assigned the role of secretary, which was not so significant in the eyes of his rivals. However, they underestimated the ambitious and assertive party member, who stood out for his extraordinary thinking and intuition.

For those who ruled the country after Stalin, it was important to understand who first of all needed to be eliminated from the competition. The first target was Lavrenty Beria. Khrushchev and Malenkov were aware of the dossier on each of them that the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who was in charge of the entire system of repressive bodies, had. In this regard, in July 1953, Beria was arrested, accusing him of espionage and some other crimes, thereby eliminating such a dangerous enemy.

Malenkov and his politics

Khrushchev's authority as the organizer of this conspiracy increased significantly, and his influence over other party members increased. However, while Malenkov was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, key decisions and policy directions depended on him. At the first meeting of the Presidium, a course was set for de-Stalinization and the establishment of collective governance of the country: it was planned to abolish the cult of personality, but to do this in such a way as not to diminish the merits of the “father of nations.” The main task set by Malenkov was to develop the economy taking into account the interests of the population. He proposed a fairly extensive program of changes, which was not adopted at the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Then Malenkov put forward these same proposals at a session of the Supreme Council, where they were approved. For the first time after Stalin’s autocratic rule, the decision was made not by the party, but by an official government body. The CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo were forced to agree to this.

Further history will show that among those who ruled after Stalin, Malenkov would be the most “effective” in his decisions. The set of measures he adopted to combat bureaucracy in the state and party apparatus, to develop the food and light industry, to expand the independence of collective farms bore fruit: 1954-1956, for the first time since the end of the war, showed an increase in the rural population and an increase in agricultural production, which for many years decline and stagnation became profitable. The effect of these measures lasted until 1958. It is this five-year plan that is considered the most productive and effective after the death of Stalin.

It was clear to those who ruled after Stalin that such successes would not be achieved in light industry, since Malenkov’s proposals for its development contradicted the tasks of the next five-year plan, which emphasized the promotion

I tried to approach problem solving from a rational point of view, using economic rather than ideological considerations. However, this order did not suit the party nomenklatura (led by Khrushchev), which practically lost its predominant role in the life of the state. This was a weighty argument against Malenkov, who, under pressure from the party, submitted his resignation in February 1955. His place was taken by Khrushchev's comrade-in-arms, Malenkov became one of his deputies, but after the 1957 dispersal of the anti-party group (of which he was a member), together with his supporters, he was expelled from the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Khrushchev took advantage of this situation and in 1958 removed Malenkov from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, taking his place and becoming the one who ruled after Stalin in the USSR.

Thus, he concentrated almost complete power in his hands. He got rid of the two most powerful competitors and led the country.

Who ruled the country after the death of Stalin and the removal of Malenkov?

Those 11 years that Khrushchev ruled the USSR were rich in various events and reforms. The agenda included many problems that the state faced after industrialization, war and attempts to restore the economy. The main milestones that will remember the era of Khrushchev’s reign are as follows:

1. The policy of virgin land development (not supported by scientific study) increased the number of sown areas, but did not take into account climatic features that hampered the development of agriculture in the developed territories.
2. The “Corn Campaign,” the goal of which was to catch up and overtake the United States, which received good harvests of this crop. The area under corn has doubled, to the detriment of rye and wheat. But the result was sad - climatic conditions did not allow for a high yield, and the reduction in areas for other crops provoked low harvest rates. The campaign failed miserably in 1962, and its result was an increase in the price of butter and meat, which caused discontent among the population.
3. The beginning of perestroika was the massive construction of houses, which allowed many families to move from dormitories and communal apartments to apartments (the so-called “Khrushchev buildings”).

Results of Khrushchev's reign

Among those who ruled after Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev stood out for his unconventional and not always thoughtful approach to reform within the state. Despite the numerous projects that were implemented, their inconsistency led to Khrushchev's removal from office in 1964.

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