Submarines dictate the rules in naval warfare and force everyone to meekly follow the routine.
Those stubborn people who dare to ignore the rules of the game will face a quick and painful death in the cold water, among floating debris and oil stains. Boats, regardless of flag, remain the most dangerous combat vehicles, capable of crushing any enemy.
I bring to your attention a short story about the seven most successful submarine projects of the war years.
Boats type T (Triton-class), UK
The number of submarines built is 53.
Surface displacement - 1290 tons; underwater - 1560 tons.
Crew - 59…61 people.
Working immersion depth - 90 m (riveted hull), 106 m (welded hull).
Full surface speed - 15.5 knots; in underwater - 9 knots.
A fuel reserve of 131 tons provided a surface cruising range of 8,000 miles.
Weapons:
- 11 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber (on boats of subseries II and III), ammunition - 17 torpedoes;
- 1 x 102 mm universal gun, 1 x 20 mm anti-aircraft "Oerlikon".
HMS Traveler
A British underwater Terminator capable of knocking the crap out of any enemy's head with a bow-launched 8-torpedo salvo. The T-type boats had no equal in destructive power among all the submarines of the WWII period - this explains their ferocious appearance with a bizarre bow superstructure, where additional torpedo tubes were located.
The notorious British conservatism is a thing of the past - the British were among the first to equip their boats with ASDIC sonars. Alas, despite their powerful weapons and modern detection means, the T-class high seas boats did not become the most effective among the British submarines of World War II. Nevertheless, they went through an exciting battle path and achieved a number of remarkable victories. “Tritons” were actively used in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean Sea, destroyed Japanese communications in the Pacific Ocean, and were spotted several times in the frozen waters of the Arctic.
In August 1941, the submarines "Tygris" and "Trident" arrived in Murmansk. British submariners demonstrated a master class to their Soviet colleagues: in two trips, 4 enemy ships were sunk, incl. "Bahia Laura" and "Donau II" with thousands of soldiers of the 6th Mountain Division. Thus, the sailors prevented the third German attack on Murmansk.
Other famous T-boat trophies include the German light cruiser Karlsruhe and the Japanese heavy cruiser Ashigara. The samurai were “lucky” to get acquainted with a full 8-torpedo salvo of the Trenchent submarine - having received 4 torpedoes on board (+ another one from the stern tube), the cruiser quickly capsized and sank.
After the war, the powerful and sophisticated Tritons remained in service with the Royal Navy for another quarter of a century.
It is noteworthy that three boats of this type were acquired by Israel in the late 1960s - one of them, INS Dakar (formerly HMS Totem) was lost in 1968 in the Mediterranean Sea under unclear circumstances.
Boats of the "Cruising" type XIV series, Soviet Union
The number of submarines built is 11.
Surface displacement - 1500 tons; underwater - 2100 tons.
Crew - 62…65 people.
Full surface speed - 22.5 knots; in underwater - 10 knots.
Surface cruising range 16,500 miles (9 knots)
Submerged cruising range - 175 miles (3 knots)
Weapons:
- 2 x 100 mm universal guns, 2 x 45 mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic guns;
- up to 20 minutes of barrage.
...On December 3, 1941, German hunters UJ-1708, UJ-1416 and UJ-1403 bombed a Soviet boat that tried to attack a convoy at Bustad Sund.
Hans, can you hear this creature?
- Nain. After a series of explosions, the Russians lay low - I detected three impacts on the ground...
-Can you determine where they are now?
- Donnerwetter! They are blown away. They probably decided to surface and surrender.
The German sailors were wrong. From the depths of the sea, a MONSTER rose to the surface - the cruising submarine K-3 series XIV, unleashing a barrage of artillery fire on the enemy. With the fifth salvo, Soviet sailors managed to sink U-1708. The second hunter, having received two direct hits, began to smoke and turned to the side - his 20 mm anti-aircraft guns could not compete with the “hundreds” of the secular submarine cruiser. Scattering the Germans like puppies, K-3 quickly disappeared over the horizon at 20 knots.
The Soviet Katyusha was a phenomenal boat for its time. Welded hull, powerful artillery and mine-torpedo weapons, powerful diesel engines (2 x 4200 hp!), high surface speed of 22-23 knots. Huge autonomy in terms of fuel reserves. Remote control of ballast tank valves. Radio station capable of transmitting signals from the Baltic to Far East. An exceptional level of comfort: shower cabins, refrigerated tanks, two seawater desalinators, an electric galley... Two boats (K-3 and K-22) were equipped with Lend-Lease ASDIC sonars.
But, oddly enough, neither the high characteristics nor the most powerful weapons made the Katyusha effective - in addition to the dark K-21 attack on the Tirpitz, during the war years the XIV series boats accounted for only 5 successful torpedo attacks and 27 thousand brigades. reg. tons of sunk tonnage. Most of the victories were achieved with the help of mines. Moreover, its own losses amounted to five cruising boats.
K-21, Severomorsk, today
The reasons for the failures lie in the tactics of using Katyushas - the powerful submarine cruisers, created for the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, had to “tread water” in the shallow Baltic “puddle”. When operating at depths of 30-40 meters, a huge 97-meter boat could hit the ground with its bow while its stern was still sticking out on the surface. It was not much easier for the North Sea sailors - as practice has shown, the effectiveness of the combat use of Katyushas was complicated by the poor training of personnel and the lack of initiative of the command.
It's a pity. These boats were designed for more.
“Baby”, Soviet Union
Series VI and VI bis - 50 built.
Series XII - 46 built.
Series XV - 57 built (4 took part in combat operations).
Performance characteristics of boats type M series XII:
Surface displacement - 206 tons; underwater - 258 tons.
Autonomy - 10 days.
Working immersion depth - 50 m, maximum - 60 m.
Full surface speed - 14 knots; in underwater - 8 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 3,380 miles (8.6 knots).
Submerged cruising range is 108 miles (3 knots).
Weapons:
- 2 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 2 torpedoes;
- 1 x 45 mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic.
Baby!
Mini-submarine project to quickly strengthen the Pacific Fleet - main feature M-type boats now have the ability to be transported by rail in a fully assembled form.
In the pursuit of compactness, many had to be sacrificed - service on the Malyutka turned into a grueling and dangerous undertaking. Heavy living conditions, a strong “bumpiness” - the waves mercilessly threw the 200-ton “float”, risking breaking it into pieces. Shallow diving depth and weak weapons. But the main concern of the sailors was the reliability of the submarine - one shaft, one diesel engine, one electric motor - the tiny “Malyutka” left no chance for the careless crew, the slightest malfunction on board threatened death for the submarine.
The little ones quickly evolved - the performance characteristics of each new series were several times different from the previous project: the contours were improved, the electrical equipment and detection equipment were updated, the dive time was reduced, and the autonomy increased. The “babies” of the XV series no longer resembled their predecessors of the VI and XII series: one-and-a-half-hull design - the ballast tanks were moved outside the durable hull; The power plant received a standard two-shaft layout with two diesel engines and underwater electric motors. The number of torpedo tubes increased to four. Alas, Series XV appeared too late - the “Little Ones” of Series VI and XII bore the brunt of the war.
Despite their modest size and only 2 torpedoes on board, the tiny fish were simply distinguished by their terrifying “gluttony”: in just the years of World War II, Soviet M-type submarines sank 61 enemy ships with a total tonnage of 135.5 thousand gross tons, destroyed 10 warships, and also damaged 8 transports.
The little ones, originally intended only for operations in the coastal zone, have learned to fight effectively in open sea areas. They, along with larger boats, cut enemy communications, patrolled at the exits of enemy bases and fjords, deftly overcame anti-submarine barriers and blew up transports right at the piers inside protected enemy harbors. It’s simply amazing how the Red Navy were able to fight on these flimsy ships! But they fought. And we won!
Boats of the “Medium” type, series IX-bis, Soviet Union
The number of submarines built is 41.
Surface displacement - 840 tons; underwater - 1070 tons.
Crew - 36…46 people.
Working immersion depth - 80 m, maximum - 100 m.
Full surface speed - 19.5 knots; submerged - 8.8 knots.
Surface cruising range 8,000 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 148 miles (3 knots).
“Six torpedo tubes and the same number of spare torpedoes on racks convenient for reloading. Two cannons with large ammunition, machine guns, explosive equipment... In a word, there is something to fight with. And 20 knots surface speed! It allows you to overtake almost any convoy and attack it again. The technique is good...”
- opinion of the commander of the S-56, Hero of the Soviet Union G.I. Shchedrin
The Eskis were distinguished by their rational layout and balanced design, powerful armament, and excellent performance and seaworthiness. Initially a German project from the Deshimag company, modified to meet Soviet requirements. But don’t rush to clap your hands and remember the Mistral. After the start of serial construction of the IX series in Soviet shipyards, the German project was revised with the goal of a complete transition to Soviet equipment: 1D diesel engines, weapons, radio stations, a noise direction finder, a gyrocompass... - there were none in the boats designated “series IX-bis”. foreign made bolt!
The problems with the combat use of the "Medium" type boats, in general, were similar to the K-type cruising boats - locked in mine-infested shallow water, they were never able to realize their high combat qualities. Things were much better in the Northern Fleet - during the war, the S-56 boat under the command of G.I. Shchedrina made the transition through the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, moving from Vladivostok to Polyarny, subsequently becoming the most productive boat of the USSR Navy.
An equally fantastic story is connected with the S-101 “bomb catcher” - during the war years, the Germans and Allies dropped over 1000 depth charges on the boat, but each time the S-101 returned safely to Polyarny.
Finally, it was on the S-13 that Alexander Marinesko achieved his famous victories.
S-56 torpedo compartment
“Cruel alterations in which the ship found itself, bombings and explosions, depths far exceeding the official limit. The boat protected us from everything..."
- from the memoirs of G.I. Shchedrin
Gato type boats, USA
The number of submarines built is 77.
Surface displacement - 1525 tons; underwater - 2420 tons.
Crew - 60 people.
Working immersion depth - 90 m.
Full surface speed - 21 knots; submerged - 9 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 11,000 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 96 miles (2 knots).
Weapons:
- 10 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 24 torpedoes;
- 1 x 76 mm universal gun, 1 x 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun, 1 x 20 mm Oerlikon;
- one of the boats, USS Barb, was equipped with a multiple launch rocket system for shelling the coast.
Ocean-going submarine cruisers of the Getou class appeared at the height of the war in the Pacific Ocean and became one of the most effective tools of the US Navy. They tightly blocked all strategic straits and approaches to the atolls, cut all supply lines, leaving Japanese garrisons without reinforcements, and Japanese industry without raw materials and oil. In battles with the Gatow, the Imperial Navy lost two heavy aircraft carriers, lost four cruisers and a damn dozen destroyers.
High speed, lethal torpedo weapons, the most modern radio equipment for detecting the enemy - radar, direction finder, sonar. The cruising range allows for combat patrols off the coast of Japan when operating from a base in Hawaii. Increased comfort on board. But the main thing is the excellent training of the crews and the weakness of Japanese anti-submarine weapons. As a result, the "Getow" mercilessly destroyed everything - it was they who brought victory in the Pacific Ocean from the blue depths of the sea.
...One of the main achievements of the Getow boats, which changed the whole world, is considered to be the event of September 2, 1944. On that day, the Finback submarine detected a distress signal from a falling plane and, after many hours of searching, found a frightened and already desperate pilot in the ocean . The one who was saved was one George Herbert Bush.
The cabin of the submarine "Flasher", memorial in Groton.
The list of Flasher trophies sounds like a naval joke: 9 tankers, 10 transports, 2 patrol ships with a total tonnage of 100,231 GRT! And for a snack, the boat grabbed a Japanese cruiser and a destroyer. Lucky damn thing!
Electric robots type XXI, Germany
By April 1945, the Germans managed to launch 118 submarines of the XXI series. However, only two of them were able to achieve operational readiness and go to sea in the last days of the war.
Surface displacement - 1620 tons; underwater - 1820 tons.
Crew - 57 people.
Working depth of immersion is 135 m, maximum depth is 200+ meters.
Full speed in the surface position is 15.6 knots, in the submerged position - 17 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 15,500 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 340 miles (5 knots).
Weapons:
- 6 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 17 torpedoes;
- 2 Flak anti-aircraft guns of 20 mm caliber.
U-2540 "Wilhelm Bauer" permanently moored in Bremerhaven, present day
Our allies were very lucky that all the forces of Germany were sent to the Eastern Front - the Krauts did not have enough resources to release a flock of fantastic “Electric Boats” into the sea. If they appeared a year earlier, that would be it! Another turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The Germans were the first to guess: everything that shipbuilders in other countries are proud of - large ammunition, powerful artillery, high surface speed of 20+ knots - is of little importance. The key parameters that determine the combat effectiveness of a submarine are its speed and cruising range when submerged.
Unlike its peers, “Electrobot” was focused on being constantly under water: a maximally streamlined body without heavy artillery, fences and platforms - all for the sake of minimizing underwater resistance. Snorkel, six groups of batteries (3 times more than on conventional boats!), powerful electric. engines full speed, quiet and economical electric. "sneak" engines.
The stern of U-2511, sunk at a depth of 68 meters
The Germans calculated everything - the entire Elektrobot campaign moved at periscope depth under the RDP, remaining difficult to detect for enemy anti-submarine weapons. At great depths, its advantage became even more shocking: 2-3 times greater range, at twice the speed of any wartime submarine! High stealth and impressive underwater skills, homing torpedoes, a set of the most advanced detection means... “Electrobots” opened a new milestone in the history of the submarine fleet, defining the vector of development of submarines in the post-war years.
The Allies were not prepared to face such a threat - as post-war tests showed, the “Electrobots” were several times superior in mutual hydroacoustic detection range to the American and British destroyers guarding the convoys.
Type VII boats, Germany
The number of submarines built is 703.
Surface displacement - 769 tons; underwater - 871 tons.
Crew - 45 people.
Working immersion depth - 100 m, maximum - 220 meters
Full surface speed - 17.7 knots; submerged - 7.6 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 8,500 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 80 miles (4 knots).
Weapons:
- 5 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 14 torpedoes;
- 1 x 88 mm universal gun (until 1942), eight options for superstructures with 20 and 37 mm anti-aircraft guns.
* the given performance characteristics correspond to boats of the VIIC subseries
The most effective warships ever to roam the world's oceans.
A relatively simple, cheap, mass-produced, but at the same time well-armed and deadly weapon for total underwater terror.
703 submarines. 10 MILLION tons of sunk tonnage! Battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes and enemy submarines, oil tankers, transports with aircraft, tanks, cars, rubber, ore, machine tools, ammunition, uniforms and food... The damage from the actions of German submariners exceeded all reasonable limits - if only Without the inexhaustible industrial potential of the United States, capable of compensating for any losses of the allies, German U-bots had every chance to “strangle” Great Britain and change the course of world history.
U-995. Graceful underwater killer
The successes of the Sevens are often associated with the “prosperous times” of 1939-41. - allegedly, when the Allies appeared the convoy system and Asdik sonars, the successes of the German submariners ended. A completely populist statement based on a misinterpretation of “prosperous times.”
The situation was simple: at the beginning of the war, when for every German boat there was one Allied anti-submarine ship, the “sevens” felt like invulnerable masters of the Atlantic. It was then that the legendary aces appeared, sinking 40 enemy ships. The Germans already held victory in their hands when the Allies suddenly deployed 10 anti-submarine ships and 10 aircraft for each active Kriegsmarine boat!
Beginning in the spring of 1943, the Yankees and British began to methodically overwhelm the Kriegsmarine with anti-submarine equipment and soon achieved an excellent loss ratio of 1:1. They fought like that until the end of the war. The Germans ran out of ships faster than their opponents.
The whole history of the German “seven” is a formidable warning from the past: what threat does a submarine pose and how high are the costs of creating an effective system to counter the underwater threat.
A funny American poster of those years. "Hit the pain points! Come serve on submarine fleet- we account for 77% of the sunk tonnage!" Comments, as they say, are unnecessary
The article uses materials from the book “Soviet Submarine Shipbuilding”, V. I. Dmitriev, Voenizdat, 1990.
The outcome of any war depends on many factors, among which, of course, weapons are of considerable importance. Despite the fact that absolutely all German weapons were very powerful, since Adolf Hitler personally considered them the most important weapon and paid considerable attention to the development of this industry, they failed to inflict damage on their opponents that would significantly influence the course of the war. Why did it happen? Who is at the origins of the creation of a submarine army? Were the German submarines of World War II really that invincible? Why were such prudent Nazis unable to defeat the Red Army? You will find the answer to these and other questions in the review.
general information
Collectively, all equipment in service with the Third Reich during World War II was called the Kriegsmarine, and submarines made up a significant part of the arsenal. Underwater equipment became a separate industry on November 1, 1934, and the fleet was disbanded after the war ended, i.e., having existed for less than a dozen years. In such a short period of time, German submarines of World War II brought a lot of fear into the souls of their opponents, leaving their huge mark on the bloody pages of the history of the Third Reich. Thousands of dead, hundreds of sunk ships, all this remained on the conscience of the surviving Nazis and their subordinates.
Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine
During World War II, one of the most famous Nazis, Karl Doenitz, was at the helm of the Kriegsmarine. The Germans certainly played an important role in World War II, but without this man this would not have happened. He was personally involved in creating plans to attack opponents, participated in attacks on many ships and achieved success in this path, for which he was awarded one of the most significant awards of Nazi Germany. Doenitz was an admirer of Hitler and was his successor, which did a lot of harm to him during the Nuremberg trials, because after the death of the Fuhrer he was considered the commander-in-chief of the Third Reich.
Specifications
It is easy to guess that Karl Doenitz was responsible for the condition of the submarine army. German submarines in World War II, photos of which prove their power, had impressive parameters.
In general, the Kriegsmarine was armed with 21 types of submarines. They had the following characteristics:
- displacement: from 275 to 2710 tons;
- surface speed: from 9.7 to 19.2 knots;
- underwater speed: from 6.9 to 17.2;
- diving depth: from 150 to 280 meters.
This proves that the German submarines of World War II were not just powerful, they were the most powerful among the weapons of the countries that fought with Germany.
Composition of the Kriegsmarine
The warships of the German fleet included 1,154 submarines. It is noteworthy that until September 1939 there were only 57 submarines, the rest were built specifically to participate in the war. Some of them were trophies. Thus, there were 5 Dutch, 4 Italian, 2 Norwegian and one English and French submarines. All of them were also in service with the Third Reich.
Achievements of the Navy
The Kriegsmarine inflicted considerable damage on its opponents throughout the war. For example, the most effective captain Otto Kretschmer sank almost fifty enemy ships. There are also record holders among ships. For example, the German submarine U-48 sank 52 ships.
Throughout World War II, 63 destroyers, 9 cruisers, 7 aircraft carriers and even 2 battleships were destroyed. The biggest and most remarkable victory for German army Among them can be considered the sinking of the battleship Royal Oak, whose crew consisted of a thousand people, and its displacement was 31,200 tons.
Plan Z
Since Hitler considered his fleet extremely important for Germany’s triumph over other countries and had extremely positive feelings towards it, he paid considerable attention to it and did not limit funding. In 1939, a plan was developed for the development of the Kriegsmarine for the next 10 years, which, fortunately, never came to fruition. According to this plan, several hundred more of the most powerful battleships, cruisers and submarines were to be built.
Powerful German submarines of World War II
Photos of some surviving German submarine technology give an idea of the power of the Third Reich, but only weakly reflect how strong this army was. The majority of the German fleet consisted of Type VII submarines; they had optimal seaworthiness, were of medium size, and most importantly, their construction was relatively inexpensive, which is important in
They could dive to a depth of 320 meters with a displacement of up to 769 tons, the crew ranged from 42 to 52 employees. Despite the fact that the “sevens” were quite high-quality boats, over time, Germany’s enemy countries improved their weapons, so the Germans also had to work on modernizing their brainchild. As a result of this, the boat received several more modifications. The most popular of these was the VIIC model, which not only became the personification of Germany's military power during the attack on the Atlantic, but was also much more convenient than previous versions. The impressive dimensions made it possible to install more powerful diesel engines, and subsequent modifications were also distinguished by durable hulls, which made it possible to dive deeper.
German submarines of the Second World War were subject to constant, as they would say now, upgrades. Type XXI is considered one of the most innovative models. An air conditioning system and additional equipment were created in this submarine, which was intended for a longer stay of the crew under water. A total of 118 boats of this type were built.
Kriegsmarine performance results
German submarines of the Second World War, photos of which can often be found in books about military equipment, played a very important role in the offensive of the Third Reich. Their power cannot be underestimated, but it is worth considering that even with such patronage from the bloodiest Fuhrer in world history, the German fleet did not manage to bring its power closer to victory. Probably, good equipment and a strong army were not enough; for Germany’s victory, the ingenuity and courage that the brave soldiers of the Soviet Union possessed was not enough. Everyone knows that the Nazis were incredibly bloodthirsty and did not disdain much on their way, but neither an incredibly equipped army nor a lack of principles helped them. Armored vehicles, a huge amount of ammunition and the latest developments did not bring the expected results to the Third Reich.
Friedrich Ruge, Vice Admiral, Commander of the German Navy, cites little-known facts about the combat operations of the German Navy during the Second World War, analyzes the military situation in Europe, compares the strategies of Germany, Great Britain, the USA, Japan, France, and Italy. The author conducts a study of the structure of the high command of Germany, Great Britain and other European countries, the relationship between the German Navy and Adolf Hitler, and gives vivid portraits of the commanders-in-chief of the German Navy, Vice Admiral Raeder and Grand Admiral Doenitz.
* * *
The given introductory fragment of the book Navy of the Third Reich. 1939-1945 (Friedrich Ruge) provided by our book partner - the company liters.
SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
All these plans and thoughts lost their meaning when Hitler, contrary to his original intentions, entered the war with Great Britain and France already in September 1939. In the book Mein Kampf, he criticized the Kaiser's empire for the fact that, having begun to expand the fleet, it put England's dominance of the seas is threatened. But now he himself had crowned his political victory in the Sudetenland crisis by breaking the Anglo-German naval agreement just three and a half years after it had come into force. It was impossible to show the English more clearly and crudely that he was creating again Navy, which could ultimately become as dangerous for them as during the First World War. Thus, the only real achievement of the policy of appeasement was eliminated by the creation of a clear threat to the vital interests of England. It is not surprising, then, that the people who had yielded to Hitler at Munich stood firm now that their last warning, the agreement with Poland, had been ignored.
Hitler was now faced with the very situation he wanted to avoid. True, the situation turned out to be better than in 1914, since Russia, Italy and Japan maintained friendly neutrality, and the economic situation and the situation with food supplies in Germany itself were better. However, the degree of its military preparedness was still far from the desired level, especially in the navy - the most important means of combating British sea power. None of the main ships laid down in accordance with Plan Z were ready enough for it to make sense to spend effort on completing at least one of them. They were scrapped so that the metal could be used for other purposes.
MARINE INTERESTS OF THE WARRING PARTY
At the beginning of the war, the total tonnage of the world's merchant fleet was 68 million gross register tons (GRT) and the bulk of it was distributed as follows:
Germany's total imports were 56.5 million tons, of which 29 million tons came from maritime transport. The most important militarily was the import of iron ore from Northern Sweden, amounting to 11 million tons per year. In the summer, this ore was delivered from Luleå by Baltic Sea; and in winter - from Narvik along the Norwegian coast and along the North Sea. There was every reason to believe that these routes would continue to go from the territorial waters of neutral countries to the German-controlled zone. Another important import was oil as fuel and industrial raw material.
However, with the outbreak of war, the British very quickly established an effective blockade of merchant shipping, which quickly cut off Germany from sources of supply of various ores and metals, as well as timber, rubber, wool, tea, coffee, cocoa and citrus fruits (to name only the main goods).
The German government took some measures in advance, creating stockpiles of the most important materials for the war, as well as a trade agreement with Russia to supply enough food and oil for minimal consumption. But this had to be paid at a high price, including the transfer to Russia of the unfinished heavy cruiser Lützow.
And finally, at the very moment when England began to join forces with other opponents of Germany, the latter lost its main fishing grounds, and annual fish production fell from 700 to 150 thousand.
Still, in general, Germany was less dependent on the sea in 1939 than in 1914. The only way to quickly inflict irreparable damage on it was to prohibit the import of ore from Northern Sweden, either by naval forces or by landing operations.
It became more difficult for German warships to penetrate the Atlantic than in the First World War. Although the British fleet in 1939 was smaller than in the previous war, every German ship intending to sail had to cross the British air patrol zones located around Iceland. At first, bad weather and fog, frequent in these places, especially along the edge of floating ice, hindered the British, but the constant improvement of radar equipment provided them with “eyes” for observation both at night and in fog.
On the other hand, the United Kingdom itself - the heart of the British Empire - was even more dependent on the sea than during the First World War, since by that time the population had grown, but the internal resources of the British Isles had not. It is true that sufficient quantities of coal and some of the necessary iron ore were mined on the islands, but the production of coal depended on corresponding imports of timber. Every year it was necessary to import 11 million tons of wood, 8 million tons of iron ore, a significant part of food and all liquid fuels (12 million tons of the latter were needed). It was on the preservation of imports, which amounted to 68 million tons in 1938, that determined whether England would survive the war or not. For this purpose, the country had a merchant fleet, the tonnage of which, including coastal shipping, was 21 million gross tons. However, in war time this figure fell to 15.5 million GRT, including 2 million GRT attributable to small coastal vessels used mainly for the transportation of coal.
The remaining 6 million GRT was used to transport troops, fuel and other supplies for the armed forces. English shipyards were able to annually commission new ships with a carrying capacity of approximately 1 million gross tons. Since it could be assumed that the British would also have a foreign merchant fleet at their disposal, it was logical to assume that the minimum level of imports necessary for England's existence during the war could be ensured.
France was entirely dependent on the sea for oil and communications with its North African colonies - especially for the transport of troops and food, since its own Agriculture was in poor condition.
MILITARY SITUATION AND PLANS OF GERMANY
The specter of a war on two fronts loomed before Germany again, but this time the main forces were concentrated against a weaker enemy in the east. The German army in this direction had 54 divisions, including tank and motorized ones. Only 8 regular and 25 reserve divisions were left to defend the Western Wall - a risk that was justified by subsequent events or, more precisely, the lack of events. Against the Polish fleet, consisting of four large destroyers, a minelayer, five submarines and a number of small ships, the German fleet concentrated superior forces in the Bay of Danzig, including the old battleship Schleswig-Holstein, several cruisers and destroyers, seven small submarines and a large number of minesweepers.
The plan was to crush the Polish navy and prevent it from taking any active action. Once the war began, it was psychologically very important to use any means possible to achieve initial success. Under powerful pressure, the artificially created naval position of the Polish fleet at the exit from the Polish corridor completely collapsed. Three Polish destroyers left for England even before hostilities began, and the remaining ships acted extremely ineffectively. They either laid defensive minefields or did nothing at all instead of attacking the numerous German ships. Polish surface ships were disabled in port by German naval aviation after the Polish mine mine "Grif" laid mines without putting them in a combat position.
Thus, when England and France declared war on Germany on September 3, German cruisers and destroyers could be safely sent to the North Sea, leaving the Schleswig-Holstein and minesweepers to continue military operations in the east. The Baltic group completed its tasks.
But the operation was not without losses on the German side; Polish coastal batteries and army units defended themselves staunchly and courageously. The operation to eliminate the resistance of the Polish fleet dragged on because the interaction between the German army and navy was not worked out in advance and turned out to be unsatisfactory. For example, the weakly fortified Westerplatte peninsula (at the mouth of the Vistula River, was captured on September 7 only after the battleship Schleswig-Holstein had to shell it several times). Only after this was it possible to use Danzig as a supply base. Gdynia fell on September 14, the heights at Oxhoft capitulated on September 18. This result could have been achieved several days earlier if, during the fighting, it had been possible to achieve interaction between the heterogeneous forces of the Germans. As a result, two German divisions were engaged in this operation longer than necessary, which, fortunately, did not have any consequences. negative consequences, since the French were unable to exploit Germany’s weakness in the west and organize an offensive.
The fortified positions on the Hel Spit were surrendered on October 2 after repeated shelling by Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesien. German minesweepers also took part in these bombings, approaching the Polish artillery at very short distances. They also successfully carried out mine sweeping, but were unable to find Polish submarines. The minesweepers blocked Hel, took prisoners, escorted German transport ships heading to East Prussia, and lost only one ship - the M-85. The Polish fleet lost a destroyer, a minelayer and several gunboats and minesweepers. All six Polish submarines escaped to neutral or allied ports.
The Polish war became dress rehearsal the German Navy, especially for minesweeper flotillas, showing that their equipment, artillery, personnel and tactics were very effective, with the exception, however, of the fight against submarines.
Yet this war was no more than a minor incident for the German navy, considering the seriousness of the situation in which it found itself as a result of Hitler's strategy. He was now involved in a big war, and alone, without Italy. The catastrophic inequality of the navies of the warring countries is shown in the following table:
NUMBER COMPOSITION OF FLEETS
(autumn 1939)
1 Including 2 battleships that were under reconstruction.
MARINE AVIATION
To compensate to some extent for the lack of large ships, the construction of which takes a long time, it would be possible to create naval aviation, but Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering objected to this. Beginning in 1935, the Navy transferred excellent specialists to the Luftwaffe, in return Goering committed to supply the Navy with 62 squadrons (approximately 700 aircraft) by 1942, which it needed to carry out its missions. Although these units were actually part of the VI Air Command (Naval), their ground and support services remained under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. It was assumed that they would promptly submit to the commander-in-chief of the naval forces of the fleet both during exercises in peacetime and during military operations. However, in 1938 the Luftwaffe apparently "discovered" the sea, and in November the Navy was informed that the Air Force considered itself entirely responsible for all operations over the sea. Admiral Raeder believed that this entire area should be completely subordinated to the fleet, but Hitler did not support him. In addition, after the resignation on disciplinary grounds of General Werner von Blomberg, there was no longer a competent Minister of War who could act as an arbiter. Goering’s idea prevailed: “Everything that flies is mine.”
The document, signed by the two commanders-in-chief on January 27, 1939, marked the end of unified leadership of the war at sea. The only concession to the navy was the leadership of air reconnaissance over the sea, as well as the tactical actions of aviation when ships collide with enemy naval forces. All the rest air Force left under their control: mine laying from the air, air strikes on the merchant fleet at sea and in ports, air strikes on bases and shipyards. It was assumed that to solve combat missions the fleet would receive the following naval aviation units:
9 seaplane squadrons for long-range reconnaissance;
18 multi-purpose squadrons for reconnaissance, anti-submarine operations, etc.;
12 carrier aircraft squadrons;
2 squadrons of shipborne ejection aircraft.
When the war began, only 14 long-range reconnaissance and multi-purpose squadrons and one squadron of catapult aircraft were in service. And by that time the Luftwaffe had prepared for the war at sea only 6 air groups of He-111 bombers instead of 13, which were considered sufficient to meet the needs of the fleet. Moreover, the Luftwaffe had its own rules regarding the encoding of navigation charts, encryption codes and radio wavelengths, which further complicated interaction with the fleet.
The design of special aircraft for naval warfare was reduced to a minimum, and at the beginning of the war the construction of carrier-based aircraft was completely abandoned. The aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin was never completed because Germany did not have the appropriate aircraft for it. In early 1942, someone on Hitler's staff put forward a plan to convert Europa, Potsdam and Gneisenau into auxiliary aircraft carriers, and the rest into 8 bombers and 12 fighters. Technically, this plan was feasible, but it also had to be abandoned due to the lack of carrier-based aircraft.
Cooperation in the field of naval weapons was also unsatisfactory. Already in 1931, the Navy had developed a method for installing magnetic bottom mines from an aircraft by parachute, but in 1936, under pressure from Goering, after the mine had passed operational tests, all developments were transferred to the Luftwaffe. But the Air Force never showed interest in them until Rear Admiral Witold Rother, who was no longer involved in the development of this type of weapon, convinced General Ernst Udet to continue this work. In 1938–1939 it was decided to make big number aviation mines (up to 50 thousand pieces) by the spring of 1940. However, during the war, the Luftwaffe developed its own magnetic mine, which did not require a parachute. Of course, this was an important advantage, but by the time it began to be used, the mine fuse was already outdated, so it did not pose much of a danger to the enemy.
The Air Force believed that bombs were the most effective anti-ship weapon. For its part, the fleet gave preference to the aircraft torpedo and developed a rather promising model of the Norwegian torpedo. But of course, this development did not receive any support from Goering. Only later, during the war, when the advantages of the torpedo over the bomb were clearly revealed, did Goering show interest in these developments. Following this, the fleet, on the initiative of Admiral Bakenkeler, transferred all workshops, training grounds and 350 of their personnel to the Luftwaffe.
The sea was an unfriendly environment for the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, and he never sought to understand or know it. It is therefore not surprising that the Air Force followed its own course in this matter, which led to disastrous consequences during the war. Often both branches of the armed forces achieved successful cooperation at lower levels of command, but this could not compensate for the difference in the views of senior leadership. In its short history, the Luftwaffe had failed to develop any understanding of how to wage war at sea, or of the capabilities possessed by an adversary with naval superiority.
OPERATIONAL PLANS
It should not be assumed that the fleet was always infallible in its judgments and actions. But it should be noted that only he properly assessed the threats emanating from England and took appropriate measures to wage a merciless fight on English sea lanes. The reason for the desire to conduct primarily a submarine war was the hopeless lag of the German fleet in surface ships. In Directive No. 1 of the OKW (O.K.W.), dated August 31, 1939, Hitler gave the following instructions in the event of England and France entering the war against Germany:
"The Navy aims to destroy the merchant fleet, mainly the English one."
After some provisions concerning the issue of exclusion zones, the directive prescribes:
“The Baltic must be protected from enemy invasion. The commander-in-chief of the navy decides whether the straits leading to the Baltic Sea should be mined for this purpose.”
This is followed by instructions for the air force: “The main task of the Luftwaffe is to prevent enemy air forces from acting against the German army or against German territory. It is necessary to be prepared to launch air strikes on British ships carrying out import shipments; as well as on military enterprises and transport ships transporting troops to France. Every opportunity must be used to attack concentrations of British warships, especially battleships and aircraft carriers. Do not strike London without my order. Strikes against England must be planned in such a way as to avoid insufficient results due to the partial use of strike forces."
The wording of the directive for the Luftwaffe seems rather unfortunate. The order to the navy to “target the destruction of the merchant fleet” also did not receive any elaboration in subsequent directives. It was given as a general direction for action, and the navy immediately realized that, under existing circumstances, the best way to achieve the result was to use submarines. Therefore, his efforts were concentrated on building as many submarines as possible.
CONSTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES
Before the start of the war, the plan called for the construction of nine submarines per month, including three small, four medium and two large. As soon as the war began, the chief designer of the fleet was given every opportunity to increase this production rate, which did not meet military requirements, to 29 boats per month in the shortest possible time. To achieve this, all work on the construction of battleships, with the exception of Bismarck and Tirpitz, was stopped. This decision immediately yielded results, but did not receive Hitler's support. During the autumn and winter of 1939/40, Admiral Raeder repeatedly appealed to Hitler to give top priority to the submarine program, but all was in vain. The Admiral was forced to repeatedly protest against the transfer of materials and manpower to the Army and Air Force for the approved submarine construction program.
Hitler constantly avoided these issues and postponed his decision until the end of the campaign in France. Most of all, he was concerned about the safety of Ruhr industry. Before committing himself to a decisive battle with England, he wanted to establish himself on the European continent. For his part, Raeder considered England the main enemy, which must be inflicted maximum damage from the very beginning if Germany is to survive this mortal struggle.
Raeder is blamed for the failure of the submarine program during the period when he was at the head of the fleet, while in 1943 Admiral Doenitz received from Hitler everything he needed to greatly expand it. But by that time the situation had changed radically, and the threat posed by England was duly assessed everywhere. Moreover, by that time submarines, a radically new design, developed after a series of bitter failures, seemed to be the only weapon with which it was possible to deliver a fatal blow to the enemy. But in 1939–1940. Hitler believed that by defeating France he could force England to sue for peace. Therefore, submarine warfare did not seem so important to him, and he gave priority to strengthening the army and air force. It was because of these reasons that in the first years of the war it turned out to be impossible to achieve the planned target of building 29 boats per month. Indeed, in March 1940 the plan was temporarily reduced to 25 boats per month, and in the summer of that year, after Hitler approved it, it was finally approved at this level.
The above did not mean, however, that new submarines would quickly join the combat formation. The time required to obtain a combat-ready submarine from the moment of laying down to the completion of crew training is as much as two years - sometimes even more. Consequently, there could be no question of counting on any significant increase in submarine forces before the end of 1941. Nevertheless, the headquarters of the leadership of the war at sea, not wanting to leave England alone for such a long time, decisively abandoned its weak fleet - the surface ships and submarines are against its merchant shipping.
It was obvious that in this struggle the small German surface fleet had no chance of achieving decisive success. On the contrary, in the case of a traditional naval war, he would quickly fall victim to superior enemy forces. Therefore, the Navy's plan was to strike at the weakest points in the enemy's defenses, namely, to strike decisively and quickly at the British sea lanes and avoid any direct confrontation with their superior forces. The directive of the headquarters of the leadership of the war at sea dated August 4, 1939 obliged German ships to disrupt the enemy’s sea communications and destroy its merchant ships with all available means:
“You can attack enemy warships, even inferior ones, only if it is necessary to achieve the main goal.”
“Frequent changes in the situation in the operating area will cause uncertainty and delays in enemy merchant fleet voyages, even if material success is not ensured. The periodic appearance of German warships in remote areas further disorganizes the enemy.”
In the first volume of his book The Second World War, Winston Churchill comments on these provisions as follows: “The British Admiralty would have to accept these ideas with regret.”
The Navy's plan was for pocket battleships and later armed merchant raiders to operate on all oceans, while battlecruisers and cruisers would tie up the bulk of the British fleet in the northern North Sea and the waters around Iceland. The command staff of the naval war knew that such actions were associated with a significant risk of losses. However, supported by submarine activity and minelaying, they were perhaps the best course of action for the fleet in anticipation of the growth of the submarine force.
Thus, with regard to Germany, the first phase of the war at sea from September 1939 to the spring of 1941 can be characterized as a very energetic use of weak forces.
STATUS AND INTENTIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN
Britain's strategic goals stem from its victory in the First World War, which, like all other English wars since the late 16th century, was secured by its battlefleet. The surrender of the German fleet at Scapa Flow was, although less spectacular, no less effective defeat of the enemy than the Battle of Trafalgar. In its calculations, England had always relied on battleships and did not see any reason to change this approach. True, the appearance of submarines meant the creation of a new and extremely dangerous weapons. But during the war of 1914–1918, after the initial great success of submarine warfare on Britain's sea lanes, the situation was eventually remedied by a return to the convoy system that had proved its effectiveness in previous centuries. The impact of submarines on the battle fleet was essentially irritating. They did not cause them any damage and did not interfere with their long-range blockade of Germany. During the First World War, not a single modern large ship of any of the warring countries was lost as a result of submarine attacks.
After that war, asdik was created - a sonar for search work under the water. It became an effective means of detecting submerged submarines. Since a conventional submarine had a low underwater speed and could remain submerged only for a limited time, theoretically, if detected, it could not escape the depth charges of its pursuers. In the autumn of 1939, two hundred British ships were equipped with sonar; five years later, their number had grown to three thousand, attack methods were significantly improved and a new type of anti-submarine corvette was created with short construction times. Therefore, by the beginning of the war, the British believed that the threat posed by German submarines would be fairly limited.
Although the striking power of aviation was constantly increasing, the British did not think that it would seriously interfere with the actions of surface ships. Their navy failed to create its own independent integrated naval aviation. In England, as in Germany, the Royal Air Force constituted the third branch of the armed forces. To solve combat missions at sea, the forces of the fighter, bomber and coastal commands were involved. Only carrier-based aircraft were directly subordinate to the fleet. When the naval war began, this mechanism began to work with great difficulty, but still it functioned better than the corresponding structures in Germany.
In England, it was believed that German submarines and perhaps one pocket battleship would enter the Atlantic, since, they believed, Germany would be forced to use the remaining ships to guard vital sea lanes in the Baltic Sea. In general, the tasks of the English fleet can be formulated as follows:
1. Protection of sea communications:
a) from surface ships, blocking their possible breakthrough from the North Sea;
b) from submarines, first by organizing anti-submarine defense of the British Isles and protecting the routes of transport ships in areas dangerous for navigation and then moving on to a system of convoy formation.
2. Suppression of German shipping on ocean routes.
From the northern naval base of Scapa Flow, British ships could control the exits from the North Sea and at the same time effectively protect their own merchant fleet and small anti-submarine warfare ships. The insignificant Heligoland Bight was supposed to be patrolled only by British submarines and aircraft; for large ships this area was dangerous due to the threat of mines, attacks by submarines and aircraft.
In general, this plan was not very active, but in the period 1914–1918. it has proven its success against a much stronger enemy. It should be noted that it was directed only against Germany, since it was initially assumed that when Italy entered the war, the British would immediately begin offensive operations in the Mediterranean against their fleet. Churchill was soon captivated by the idea of sending large ships with a specially reduced draft to the Baltic Sea, as was planned in the previous war. But just as then, circumstances made it impossible to implement this plan, and therefore Operation Catherine was cancelled.
In general, the British were confident that their fleet would have broad missions, but would not have a serious opponent. However, these rather conservative military plans soon proved untenable. Sonars have not been able to become an absolute antidote to submarines. The number of escort ships was insufficient, and German submarines, aircraft and mines proved more dangerous than expected. The German fleet was more active than expected. It soon became obvious that the English fleet was face to face with a very serious enemy.
LEADING STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES
In combat, tactical decisions are usually made very quickly, for example during a tank attack, in an air battle with a rapidly changing situation, or during a torpedo attack. In this case, the unit commander usually relies on his experience and assessment of the situation. The situation is different with operational decisions concerning large military formations and made only after several hours or even days of reflection and preparation. The commander responsible for such decisions has the support of a well-trained staff with whom he can discuss combat missions and to whom he can delegate many specific tasks. In the German armed forces, combat commanders at the tactical and operational levels, as a rule, had very good training, as evidenced by the events of the first years of the war.
A completely different situation arises when making strategic decisions on which the outcome of a campaign or an entire war depends. Because of their importance, such decisions are made by the theater commander-in-chief based on political directives or even directly by the political leader. It goes without saying that such decisions can only be made after thorough preparatory work involving the best minds on specific issues. There is usually plenty of time to discuss all the issues thoroughly, and it is very rare that you have to strategize while looking at your watch.
During World War I, Germany never developed a grand strategy. With the rebirth of the nation after 1933, General Blomberg became Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. The leadership of the armed forces (OKW), together with the operational leadership headquarters formed later, was supposed to develop a unified military strategy and coordinate the actions of the three types of armed forces. The premature resignation of the compromised Blomberg was a very serious blow to this system, which had not yet been fully formed. Now Hitler, in addition to his functions as head of state and political leader, became commander in chief. Of course, above the military leadership itself there must be an authorized political body or a war cabinet, but even before the outbreak of war, Hitler's dictatorial behavior increasingly pushed the cabinet into the background, and its last meeting took place in 1938. It was obvious that Hitler wanted to take control political, military and economic affairs of the country into their own hands. He failed to understand that he was not able to single-handedly solve the many new problems that were constantly arising. And in the end he never turned into a true statesman, but remained a revolutionary and a prophet, who was always more concerned about the absolute obedience of his supporters, rather than the capabilities of his partners.
It is therefore not surprising that his closest military associate, General Alfred G. Jodl, Chief of Staff of the OKW Operations Command, often failed to implement his ideas. In any case, Jodl's staff was too weak and one-sided to direct a global war; the navy there was represented by a small group of staff officers, so a landward way of thinking prevailed there, which undoubtedly corresponded to Hitler's continental concepts. Despite these shortcomings, this organization initially worked satisfactorily in terms of its own military planning. But subsequently, when the high command began to exercise direct control over the conduct of combat operations in individual theaters of military operations, it not only exceeded its capabilities, but also ceased to fulfill its direct functions of general management, control and search for mutually acceptable solutions. Having become head of state, political leader, commander-in-chief of the armed forces and, later, commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Hitler was unable to fulfill numerous duties related to these activities. Thus, there was no guarantee that important strategic issues would be thoroughly examined from all points of view in order to make decisions based on a thorough analysis of the situation. This deficiency became especially serious when the problems to be solved went beyond the boundaries of the continental war, which was inevitable in a war with great naval powers.
GERMAN NAVY AND ITS ORGANIZATION
At the head of the naval forces was Grand Admiral Raeder. He firmly and clearly led the fleet. In strategic and operational planning and other issues, he relied on the headquarters of the war at sea, headed by Rear Admiral Otto Schniewind. This headquarters directly supervised cruising operations in remote areas, including organizing the supply of ships. To carry out such operations, the headquarters received the necessary intelligence information from all parts of the world. Operations in the North Sea were led by Naval Group West under the command of Admiral Alfred Saalwechter, and in the Baltic by Naval Group East, led first by Admiral Konrad Albrecht (during the war in Poland) and then by Admiral Rolf Karls . Both groups were also responsible for water security within their zones, including mine sweeping, anti-submarine warfare, escort and aerial reconnaissance. Independent services, headed by senior officers, were responsible for coastal defense and the organization of coastal fleet basing.
Admiral Hermann Böhm, commander of the fleet in peacetime, headed naval forces in the North Sea - in the main theater of military operations. The submarine forces were commanded by Rear Admiral Doenitz, who directed the submarine war in accordance with the general directives of the naval headquarters.
It may seem that the number of commands, given the small number of available forces, was excessive. But this was inevitable if the naval war command staff wanted to free itself from everyday routine and intended to exercise general leadership, including the preparation of directives when the general situation changed. In general, the headquarters carried out these tasks successfully, although problems sometimes arose, especially when the boundaries of the division of responsibility were unclear. Apparently this is a common occurrence. In general, the people in the active units felt that there was energetic and competent leadership at the center, that they were well cared for and that their legitimate demands would always receive the necessary response at high headquarters. This confidence greatly ensured the efficiency and unity of action of the navy.
STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH HIGH COMMAND
After Churchill became Prime Minister in April 1940, power in England was in the hands of a strong and decisive man who was also known for his tendency to take on too much responsibility. With minor changes in the management system, he created a structure that fully allowed him to demonstrate his knowledge and abilities, without allowing despotism. Upon assuming the post of Prime Minister, he also received the king's consent to take up the specially created post of Minister of Defense, the limits of whose powers and responsibilities were constitutionally undefined - a typical British situation.
As prime minister, Churchill presided over a war cabinet that initially met almost daily, but over time began to meet less and less frequently. It was here that the grand strategy of the war was formed. The War Cabinet included four other members: Churchill's predecessor as Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister without Portfolio. The armed forces were represented by General H.L. Ismay is the head of the military department of the secretariat of the war cabinet. This department consisted of specially selected officers from the three branches of the armed forces, and in many ways it resembled the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW. Like Jodl, Ismay held his post throughout the war. He represented Churchill on the Chiefs of Staff Committee, composed of the heads of the armed services; however, as Secretary of Defense, Churchill was also chairman of the committee responsible for developing military strategy. Other defense matters - in particular weapons - were dealt with by the Defense Committee, which included the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Minister of Aviation Industry, the Navy Minister, the Air Minister, the Minister of War - all civilians, and, by invitation, three Chiefs of Staff types of armed forces. Since Churchill chaired and Ismay attended the meetings of all three committees, and other officials attended two of them, consistency of strategy was guaranteed. In the experienced hands of Churchill, the former Secretary of the Navy, the issues of war at sea could not be underestimated.
The submarine fleet of the Kriegsmarine of the Third Reich was created on November 1, 1934 and ceased to exist with the surrender of Germany in World War II. During its relatively short existence (about nine and a half years), the German submarine fleet managed to fit itself into military history as the largest and deadliest submarine fleet of all time. German submarines that inspired terror in captains sea vessels from the North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope and from the Caribbean Sea to the Strait of Malacca, thanks to memoirs and films, have long become one of the military myths, behind the veil of which they often become invisible real facts. Here are some of them.
1. The Kriegsmarine fought with 1,154 submarines built in German shipyards (including the U-A submarine, which was originally built in Germany for the Turkish Navy). Of the 1,154 submarines, 57 submarines were built before the war, and 1,097 were built after September 1, 1939. The average rate of commissioning of German submarines during World War II was 1 new submarine every two days.
Unfinished German submarines of type XXI on slips No. 5 (in the foreground)
and No. 4 (far right) of the AG Weser shipyard in Bremen. In the photo in the second row from left to right:
U-3052, U-3042, U-3048 and U-3056; in the near row from left to right: U-3053, U-3043, U-3049 and U-3057.
On the far right are U-3060 and U-3062
Source: http://waralbum.ru/164992/
2. The Kriegsmarine fought with 21 types of German-built submarines with the following technical characteristics:
Displacement: from 275 tons (type XXII submarines) to 2710 tons (type X-B);
Surface speed: from 9.7 knots (XXII type) to 19.2 knots (IX-D type);
Submerged speed: from 6.9 knots ( type II-A) up to 17.2 knots (type XXI);
Immersion depth: from 150 meters (type II-A) to 280 meters (type XXI).
The wake of German submarines (Type II-A) at sea during maneuvers, 1939
Source: http://waralbum.ru/149250/
3. The Kriegsmarine included 13 captured submarines, including:
1 English: “Seal” (as part of the Kriegsmarine - U-B);
2 Norwegian: B-5 (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UC-1), B-6 (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UC-2);
5 Dutch: O-5 (before 1916 - British submarine H-6, in the Kriegsmarine - UD-1), O-12 (in the Kriegsmarine - UD-2), O-25 (in the Kriegsmarine - UD-3 ), O-26 (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UD-4), O-27 (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UD-5);
1 French: “La Favorite” (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UF-1);
4 Italian: “Alpino Bagnolini” (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UIT-22); "Generale Liuzzi" (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UIT-23); "Comandante Capellini" (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UIT-24); "Luigi Torelli" (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UIT-25).
Kriegsmarine officers inspect the British submarine Seal (HMS Seal, N37),
captured in the Skagerrak Strait
Source: http://waralbum.ru/178129/
4. During World War II, German submarines sank 3,083 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 14,528,570 tons. The most successful Kriegsmarine submarine captain is Otto Kretschmer, who sank 47 ships with a total tonnage of 274,333 tons. The most successful submarine is U-48, which sank 52 ships with a total tonnage of 307,935 tons (launched on 22 April 1939, and on 2 April 1941 received heavy damage and did not participate in hostilities again).
U-48 is the most successful German submarine. She is in the picture
almost halfway to its final result,
as shown by white numbers
on the wheelhouse next to the boat emblem (“Thrice black cat”)
and the personal emblem of the submarine captain Schulze (“White Witch”)
Source: http://forum.worldofwarships.ru
5. During World War II, German submarines sank 2 battleships, 7 aircraft carriers, 9 cruisers and 63 destroyer. The largest of the destroyed ships - the battleship Royal Oak (displacement - 31,200 tons, crew - 994 people) - was sunk by the submarine U-47 at its own base at Scapa Flow on 10/14/1939 (displacement - 1040 tons, crew - 45 people).
Battleship Royal Oak
Source: http://war-at-sea.narod.ru/photo/s4gb75_4_2p.htm
Commander of the German submarine U-47 Lieutenant Commander
Günther Prien (1908–1941) signing autographs
after the sinking of the British battleship Royal Oak
Source: http://waralbum.ru/174940/
6. During World War II, German submarines made 3,587 combat missions. The record holder for the number of military cruises is the submarine U-565, which made 21 trips, during which it sank 6 ships with a total tonnage of 19,053 tons.
German submarine (type VII-B) during a combat campaign
approaches the ship to exchange cargo
Source: http://waralbum.ru/169637/
7. During World War II, 721 German submarines were irretrievably lost. The first lost submarine is the submarine U-27, sunk on September 20, 1939 by the British destroyers Fortune and Forester off the coast of Scotland. The latest loss is the submarine U-287, which was blown up by a mine at the mouth of the Elbe after the formal end of World War II (05/16/1945), returning from its first and only combat campaign.
British destroyer HMS Forester, 1942
More than 70 thousand dead sailors, 3.5 thousand lost civilian ships and 175 warships from the Allies, 783 sunken submarines with a total crew of 30 thousand people from Nazi Germany - the Battle of the Atlantic, which lasted six years, became the largest naval battle in the history of mankind . “Wolf packs” of German U-boats went hunting for Allied convoys from the grandiose structures erected in the 1940s on the Atlantic coast of Europe. Aviation in Great Britain and the United States tried unsuccessfully to destroy them for years, but even now these concrete colossi loom fearsomely in Norway, France and Germany. Onliner.by talks about the creation of bunkers where the submarines of the Third Reich once hid from bombers.
Germany entered World War II with only 57 submarines. A significant part of this fleet consisted of outdated Type II small boats, designed to patrol only coastal waters. It is obvious that at this moment the command of the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) and the country's top leadership did not plan to launch a large-scale submarine war against their opponents. However, the policy was soon revised, and the personality of the commander of the submarine fleet of the Third Reich played no small role in this radical turn.
In October 1918, at the end of the First World War, during an attack on a guarded British convoy, the German submarine UB-68 was counterattacked and damaged by depth charges. Seven sailors were killed, the rest of the crew was captured. It included Chief Lieutenant Karl Doenitz. After his release from captivity, he made a brilliant career, rising to the rank of rear admiral and commander of the Kriegsmarine submarine forces by 1939. In the 1930s, he concentrated on developing tactics that would successfully combat the convoy system, of which he fell victim early in his service.
In 1939, Doenitz sent a memorandum to the commander of the Third Reich Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, in which he proposed using the so-called Rudeltaktik, “wolf pack tactics,” to attack convoys. In accordance with it, it was planned to attack an enemy sea convoy with the maximum possible number of submarines concentrated in advance in the area where it passed. At the same time, the anti-submarine escort was dispersed, and this, in turn, increased the effectiveness of the attack and reduced possible casualties from the Kriegsmarine.
“Wolf packs,” according to Doenitz, were to play a significant role in the war with Great Britain, Germany’s main rival in Europe. To implement the tactics, the rear admiral assumed, it would be enough to form a fleet of 300 new type VII boats, capable, unlike their predecessors, of long ocean voyages. The Reich immediately launched a grand program for the construction of a submarine fleet.
The situation changed fundamentally in 1940. First, by the end of the year it became clear that the Battle of Britain, which was aimed at forcing the United Kingdom to surrender only through aerial bombing, was lost by the Nazis. Secondly, in the same 1940, Germany carried out a rapid occupation of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and, most importantly, France, receiving at its disposal almost the entire Atlantic coast of continental Europe, and with it convenient military bases for raids across the ocean. Thirdly, the U-boat type VII required by Doenitz began to be introduced en masse into the fleet. Against this background, they acquired not just significant, but decisive importance in the effort to bring Britain to its knees. In 1940, the Third Reich entered into unrestricted submarine warfare and initially achieved phenomenal success in it.
The goal of the campaign, which was later called the “Battle of the Atlantic” at the instigation of Churchill, was to destroy the ocean communications that connected Great Britain with its allies overseas. Hitler and the Reich's military leadership were well aware of the extent of the United Kingdom's dependence on imported goods. The disruption of their supplies was rightly seen the most important factor to bring Britain out of the war, and the main role in this was to be played by the “wolf packs” of Admiral Doenitz.
For their concentration, the former Kriegsmarine naval bases on the territory of Germany proper with access to the Baltic and North Seas turned out to be not very convenient. But the territories of France and Norway allowed free access to the operational space of the Atlantic. The main problem was ensuring the safety of the submarines at their new bases, because they were within the reach of British (and later American) aviation. Of course, Doenitz was well aware that his fleet would immediately be subjected to intense aerial bombardment, survival of which became for the Germans a necessary guarantee of success in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The salvation for the U-boat was the experience of German bunker building, in which the Reich engineers knew a lot. It was clear to them that conventional bombs, which only the Allies possessed at the beginning of World War II, could not cause significant damage to a building reinforced with a sufficient layer of concrete. The problem with protecting submarines was solved in a costly, but quite simple way: ground bunkers began to be built for them.
Unlike similar structures designed for people, the U-Boot-Bunker was built on a Teutonic scale. A typical lair of “wolf packs” was a huge reinforced concrete parallelepiped 200-300 meters long, internally divided into several (up to 15) parallel compartments. In the latter, routine maintenance and repair of submarines was carried out.
Particular importance was attached to the design of the bunker roof. Its thickness, depending on the specific implementation, reached 8 meters, while the roof was not monolithic: concrete layers reinforced with metal reinforcement alternated with air layers. Such a multilayer “pie” made it possible to better dampen the energy of the shock wave in the event of a direct bomb hit on the building. Air defense systems were located on the roof.
In turn, thick concrete lintels between the internal compartments of the bunker limited possible damage even if a bomb did break through the roof. Each of these isolated “pencil cases” could contain up to four U-boats, and in the event of an explosion inside it, only they would become victims. Neighbors would suffer minimal or no harm at all.
First, relatively small bunkers for submarines began to be built in Germany at the old Kriegsmarine naval bases in Hamburg and Kiel, as well as on the Heligoland islands in the North Sea. But their construction gained real scope in France, which became the main location of Doenitz’s fleet. From the beginning of 1941 and over the next year and a half, giant colossi appeared on the Atlantic coast of the country in five ports at once, from which “wolf packs” began to hunt for Allied convoys.
The Breton city of Lorient in northwestern France became the Kriegsmarine's largest forward base. It was here that Karl Doenitz’s headquarters was located, here he personally met each submarine returning from a cruise, and here six U-Boot-Bunkers were erected for two flotillas - the 2nd and 10th.
Construction lasted a year, it was controlled by the Todt Organization, and a total of 15 thousand people, mostly French, participated in the process. The concrete complex in Lorient quickly showed its effectiveness: Allied aircraft were unable to inflict any significant damage on it. After this, the British and Americans decided to cut off communications through which the naval base was supplied. Over the course of a month, from January to February 1943, the Allies dropped tens of thousands of bombs on the city of Lorient itself, as a result of which it was 90% destroyed.
However, this did not help either. The last U-boat left Lorient only in September 1944, after the Allied landings in Normandy and the opening of a second front in Europe. After the end of World War II, the former Nazi base began to be successfully used by the French Navy.
Similar structures on a smaller scale also appeared in Saint-Nazaire, Brest and La Rochelle. The 1st and 9th Kriegsmarine submarine flotillas were located in Brest. The overall size of this base was smaller than the “headquarters” in Lorient, but the largest single bunker in France was built here. It was designed for 15 compartments and had dimensions of 300x175x18 meters.
The 6th and 7th flotillas were based in Saint-Nazaire. A 14-penal bunker, 300 meters long, 130 meters wide and 18 meters high, was built for them, using almost half a million cubic meters of concrete. 8 out of 14 compartments were also dry docks, which made it possible to carry out major repairs of submarines.
Only one, the 3rd, Kriegsmarine submarine flotilla was stationed in La Rochelle. A bunker of 10 “pencil cases” with dimensions of 192x165x19 meters was enough for her. The roof is made of two 3.5-meter concrete layers with an air gap, the walls are at least 2 meters thick - in total, 425 thousand cubic meters of concrete were spent on the building. It was here that the film Das Boot was filmed - probably the most famous movie about German submariners during the Second World War.
In this series, the naval base in Bordeaux stands out somewhat apart. In 1940, a group of submarines, not German, but Italian, the main allies of the Nazis in Europe, was concentrated here. Nevertheless, here too, by order of Doenitz, the program for the construction of protective structures was carried out by the same “Todt Organization”. The Italian submariners could not boast of any particular success, and already in October 1942 they were supplemented by the specially formed 12th Kriegsmarine flotilla. And in September 1943, after Italy left the war on the side of the Axis, the base called BETASOM was completely occupied by the Germans, who remained here for almost another year.
In parallel with the construction in France, the command of the German Navy turned its attention to Norway. This Scandinavian country was of strategic importance for the Third Reich. Firstly, through the Norwegian port of Narvik, iron ore, vital for its economy, was supplied to Germany from the remaining neutral Sweden. Secondly, the organization of naval bases in Norway made it possible to control the North Atlantic, which became especially important in 1942 when the Allies began sending Arctic convoys with Lend-Lease goods to the Soviet Union. In addition, they planned to service the battleship Tirpitz, the flagship and pride of Germany, at these bases.
So much attention was paid to Norway that Hitler personally ordered the local city of Trondheim to be turned into one of the Reich's Festungen - "Citadels", special German quasi-colonies through which Germany could further control the occupied territories. For 300 thousand expatriates resettled from the Reich, they planned to build a new city near Trondheim, which was to be called Nordstern (“North Star”). Responsibility for its design was assigned personally to the Fuhrer's favorite architect, Albert Speer.
It was in Trondheim that the main North Atlantic base for the deployment of the Kriegsmarine, including submarines and the Tirpitz, was created. Having begun the construction of another bunker here in the fall of 1941, the Germans unexpectedly encountered difficulties unprecedented in France. Steel had to be brought in; there was also nothing to produce concrete from on site. The extended supply chain was constantly disrupted by the efforts of the capricious Norwegian weather. In winter, construction was forced to stop due to snow drifts on the roads. In addition, it turned out that the local population was much less willing to work on the great construction site of the Reich than, for example, the French did. It was necessary to attract forced labor from specially organized nearby concentration camps.
The Dora bunker, measuring 153x105 meters into just five compartments, was completed with great difficulty only by the middle of 1943, when the successes of the “wolf packs” in the Atlantic began to quickly fade away. The 13th Kriegsmarine Flotilla with 16 Type VII U-boats was stationed here. Dora 2 remained unfinished, and Dora 3 was abandoned altogether.
In 1942, the Allies found another recipe for fighting the Dönitz Armada. Bombing bunkers with finished boats did not produce results, but shipyards, unlike naval bases, were much less protected. By the end of the year, thanks to this new goal, the pace of submarine construction slowed down significantly, and the artificial decline of the U-boat, which was increasingly accelerated by the efforts of the Allies, was no longer replenished. In response, German engineers seemingly offered a way out.
In unprotected factories scattered throughout the country, it was now planned to produce only individual sections of boats. Their final assembly, testing and launching were carried out at a special plant, which was nothing more than the same familiar bunker for submarines. They decided to build the first such assembly plant on the Weser River near Bremen.
By the spring of 1945, with the help of 10 thousand construction workers - prisoners of concentration camps (6 thousand of whom died in the process), the largest of all U-Boot-Bunkers of the Third Reich appeared on the Weser. The huge building (426×97×27 meters) with a roof thickness of up to 7 meters inside was divided into 13 rooms. In 12 of them, a sequential conveyor assembly of the submarine from ready-made elements was carried out, and in the 13th, the already completed submarine was launched into the water.
It was assumed that the plant, called Valentin, would produce not just a U-boat, but a new generation U-boat - Type XXI, another miracle weapon that was supposed to save Nazi Germany from imminent defeat. More powerful, faster, covered with rubber to impede the operation of enemy radars, with the latest sonar system, which made it possible to attack convoys without visual contact with them - it was the first truly underwater a boat that could spend the entire military campaign without a single rise to the surface.
However, it did not help the Reich. Until the end of the war, only 6 of the 330 submarines that were under construction and in varying degrees of readiness were launched, and only two of them managed to go on a combat mission. The Valentin plant was never completed, suffering a series of bomb attacks in March 1945. The Allies had their own answer to the German miracle weapon, also unprecedented - seismic bombs.
Seismic bombs were a pre-war invention of the British engineer Barnes Wallace, which found its application only in 1944. Conventional bombs, exploding next to the bunker or on its roof, could not cause serious damage to it. Wallace's bombs were based on a different principle. The most powerful 8-10-ton shells were dropped from the highest possible height. Thanks to this and the special shape of the hull, they developed supersonic speed in flight, which allowed them to go deeper into the ground or pierce even the thick concrete roofs of submarine shelters. Once deep within the structure, the bombs exploded, in the process producing small local earthquakes sufficient to cause significant damage to even the most fortified bunker.
Due to the high altitude of their release from the bomber, accuracy was reduced, but in March 1945, two of these Grand Slam bombs hit the Valentin plant. Having penetrated four meters into the concrete of the roof, they detonated and led to the collapse of significant fragments of the building's structure. The “cure” for the Doenitz bunkers was found, but Germany was already doomed.
At the beginning of 1943, the “happy times” of successful hunting by “wolf packs” on allied convoys came to an end. The development of new radars by the Americans and the British, the decryption of Enigma - the main German encryption machine installed on each of their submarines, and the strengthening of convoy escorts led to a strategic turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic. U-boats began to die in dozens. In May 1943 alone, the Kriegsmarine lost 43 of them.
The Battle of the Atlantic was the largest and longest naval battle in human history. In six years, from 1939 to 1945, Germany sank 3.5 thousand civilian and 175 warships of the Allies. In turn, the Germans lost 783 submarines and three-quarters of all the crews of their submarine fleet.
Only with the Doenitz bunkers the Allies were unable to do anything. Weapons that could destroy these structures appeared only at the end of the war, when almost all of them had already been abandoned. But even after the end of World War II, it was not possible to get rid of them: too much effort and expense would have been required to demolish these grandiose structures. They still stand in Lorient and La Rochelle, in Trondheim and on the banks of the Weser, in Brest and Saint-Nazaire. Somewhere they are abandoned, somewhere they are turned into museums, somewhere they are occupied by industrial enterprises. But for us, the descendants of the soldiers of that war, these bunkers have, above all, a symbolic meaning.
