35 See other: Bokhanov A.N. The bourgeois press of Russia and big capital. End of the 19th century - 1914 M., 1984.
37 See: Currency reform: Collection of opinions and reviews. St. Petersburg, 1896; Currency reform: Reports and debates in the III Department of the VEO. Verbatim report. St. Petersburg, 1896.
38 Currency reform... P. 222-232.
39 Currency reform... P. 232-248.
42 Guryev A.N. Currency reform in Russia. P. 136.
45 See: Melnikov M.V. Discussion of the project of monetary reform in the Finance Committee and the State Council in 1896-1897 // Domestic History. 2007. No. 6. P. 131-138.
48 Konyagin M.Yu. S.F. Sharapov: criticism of the government course and program of reforms. The end of the 19th - the beginning of the 20th century: dis. ...cand. ist. Sci. M., 1995. P. 45-58.
M.S. Chudakova
SECRET AGENT OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (1907-1917)
Until the beginning of the 20th century. Russian political police used mainly external surveillance and censorship. The emergence of a mass revolutionary movement, and then political parties, necessitated the creation of a wide network of agents.
Many figures in political investigation then realized the importance of setting up secret agents: S.V. Zubatov, G.M. Trutkov, P.I. Rachkovsky. The latter, in a note “On the conditions of activity of the Russian political police,” noted that it was necessary to immediately “begin the correct organization of internal agents so that in this way
establish rational and fully achieving its goal supervision of opposition elements in the capitals and in all outstanding cultural centers of the empire. In this way, the Police Department will receive accurate and comprehensive information about the situation of the revolutionary movement from all points, and the investigative activity will not be based only on luck, as until now, but will acquire a strict system.”1
In February 1907, the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent out two documents to subordinate investigative agencies, which outlined the forms and methods of work of the political investigation to expose state crimes - instructions for organizing external (spy) and internal intelligence surveillance. They finally put the use of “internal intelligence” agents as the basis for Russian political investigation, and assigned external surveillance a supporting role.
“Inside intelligence” agents were often recruited from among those arrested. One of them was assigned to an employee, who, having gained trust, persuaded them to give frank testimony2. Others were interested financially or, in the presence of compromising materials, in the return of freedom. Still others were influenced by convictions, using ideological differences with party comrades. Those most suitable were those involved or suspected of political affairs, those who were alone, those in difficult financial conditions, and those who had returned without permission from exile. Head of the Moscow Security Department P.P. Zavarzin believed: “The most reliable employee for the search is the non-party type, introduced into the environment being surveyed through its organizations gradually, starting from the lowest to the highest”3.
A person scheduled for recruitment was secretly detained on the street and taken to the head of the search for a conversation. This task was performed by spies. This method was resorted to in cases where there was sufficient evidence for his further detention. If an agreement could not be reached, the detective authorities considered it expedient to liquidate the entire group.
“Cooperation,” noted A.I. Spiridovich, is a complex phenomenon; The reasons that push people to betray their loved ones, acquaintances, and often friends are different. They must be either very low or, conversely, very high.”4 The instructions also provided for the use of those who “being convinced of the futility of their personal revolutionary activities, need money and, although they do not radically change their convictions, simply undertake to sell their comrades for the sake of money”5. Spiridovich wrote: “Receiving several tens of rubles a month for reporting information about your organization twice a week is not difficult, if your conscience allows it.”6
One day, a “conscious Bundist” came to Spiridovich with a pile of proclamations and explained that he had been distributing literature throughout the country for more than two months.
districts, and the committee did not fulfill its promise to buy him galoshes. “His anger at the deception with galoshes was so great that I, first of all, gave him new galoshes,” Spiridovich wrote. - And then he failed his comrades, failed with some kind of frenzy. That’s what the galoshes did.”7
The secret police assigned the main role in “covering” the illegal activities of various parties and organizations to their secret employees - agents of “internal intelligence.” The instructions ordered the heads of security departments to have agents in each revolutionary group existing in a given area, and several in one organization. This also solved the problem of checking the reliability of information, since the agents did not know about each other’s existence. Colonel von Antonius in September 1913 informed the head of the Moscow security department about the Social Democratic organization of Yaroslavl: “According to newly received intelligence information, the mass obtained by the worker Andrei Zvezdov through the printers of Vakhrameev’s Phoenix tobacco factory turned out to be unsuitable for the hectograph,” the mass will be prepared in at home with the help of a lead bleaching plant worker A.A. Dunaevs. Yarchukova. And most importantly: “The development of the information provided continues through cross-sectional internal observation”8.
The methods of recruiting secret personnel were similar to the methods of acquiring domestic agents in general. There were those who became agents of their own free will, offering their services to the secret police. The motives in such cases were different: from revenge, material factors to “ideological” reasons. The exception was those who expressed a desire to become a secret employee for the purpose of secretly assisting revolutionary organizations. Zavarzin testified: “Those who offered their services for secret work were persons who were in fact sent by the camp under investigation to the investigative agency for its disorganization, reconnaissance, and even committing murders of the leaders of the investigative business”9. However, this could not always be realized, since political intelligence agencies checked candidates for such work.
Thus, the head of the St. Petersburg provincial gendarme department in March 1914 reported about the son of the Moscow merchant B. Gertsyk, “known for his political unreliability”: “Having lived abroad for a long time, he intends to offer services to investigative agencies as a secret employee, so that such by actually assisting criminal organizations”10. Gertsyk’s attempt to offer his services to the head of the St. Petersburg security department failed. Probably, the gendarmes received information about Gertsyk’s true intentions from a secret employee or informant of foreign agents.
However, very often the “bad faith” of a secret employee was revealed after the operation. This is what happened with the Afa agent.
Nasyev." In May 1907, information about the weapons depot was received from the head of the Samara provincial gendarme department, Colonel Bobrov. The Central District Security Department11 responded immediately, notifying the Police Department: “In view of Colonel Bobrov’s message about the upcoming departure of many revolutionaries from Saratov, Syzran and Samara to Kineshma to dismantle a weapons depot, I ask Colonel Bobrov to accompany the persons traveling for the said purpose as agents, handing them over to Captain Treshchenkov in Nizhny ... I am sending my detectives to Kineshma. The liquidation will be carried out by Colonel Mochalov (Head of the Kostroma Provincial Gendarmerie Directorate - M. Ch.)”12. In turn, Lieutenant Colonel Bobrov reported to the head of the Moscow security department that the secret employee “Afanasyev”, who gave this information, was also in Kineshma. However, on June 15, Mochalov telegraphed to the Police Department: “The weapons depot in the Kineshma area has not been discovered at this time. The arrival of any persons was not detected by external surveillance. The secret employee under the pseudonym “Afanasyev” was not in Kineshma.” On June 14, 28, Kazan tradesman P.P. was arrested in Kostroma. Gluzman, “who collaborated under the pseudonym “Afanasyev” on suspicion of political blackmail”15. A little later, the head of the Kostroma gendarme department informed the head of the Moscow security department that the information from the same employee about the death sentence imposed by the Moscow regional committee (of an unknown party) on the Razorenov factory managers Gribkov and Ustinov was fictitious16.
The basis for checking the information received from the agent was usually the duration and quality of his work for the local gendarmerie department or security department, his level of awareness (depending on his position in the organization), as well as data on his dishonesty during his work in another political investigation body. “Not all investigative agencies attach serious importance to the latter circumstance,” the Police Department noted in a dispatch dated January 27, 1914.” “In reports about political unreliability,” it was further noted, “often indicated as reliable information that, having been received from an unscrupulous employee and being in fact fictitious, can undeservedly cause serious and irreparable harm to the official and social position of the unreliable”17.
“Secret employees caught in dishonest search services are especially dangerous. Familiar with the requirements of the search, they began to blackmail and systematically lie,” Zavarzin noted in his memoirs18. Investigative agencies exchanged information about agents who had lost trust19. In the card index compiled by the OGPU in 1949 based on archival documents of the Kostroma provincial gendarmerie department,
government, out of 99 secret employees of the political investigation bodies of the province, 38 people were considered untrustworthy20.
There was a constant exchange of agents between search agencies who, for some reason, could not continue working in a particular area. For example, in case of failure. Thus, the head of the Penza provincial gendarme department turned in January 1908 with a request to his Yaroslavl colleague to arrange for a secret employee of “Petukhov” to go to Yaroslavl: “He intends to come to you with an offer of services... Having provided valuable services in Penza, and according to him information was successfully clarified and the party group was liquidated, the employee of “Petukhov” is now, due to his shaky position in the party, forced to leave the city of Penza”21.
The head of the Kostroma provincial gendarme department asked to strengthen the staff of surveillance agents through mutual exchange. However, he especially noted: “The agents from Yaroslavl have all failed, and therefore, due to the proximity and frequency of relations between the observed Yaroslavl and Kostroma, they are unlikely to be useful here”22.
The completeness of the information obtained by the agent depended on the degree of trust in him on the part of his “party comrades.” And trust depended on the behavior of the agent himself. The head of the Tver provincial gendarme department, General Schlichting, wrote: “Some of the agents do not fully understand their roles in the secret search. In some cases, they show their hostility towards people who sympathize with revolutionary ideas.” As a result of this behavior, they “represent themselves as something like guards and police officers.” When communicating with anti-government elements, employees must “display, albeit silently, that they are not their opponents, in order to gain trust”23.
Based on an interview with a secret employee, the gendarmerie officer compiled intelligence notes. For the purpose of secrecy, the agents signed their reports with pseudonyms, and in the agent notes they were mentioned along with the other revolutionaries in the third person. However, this order was not always observed, and the Police Department jealously monitored this: “There is information about the absence of the most primitive conspiracy in the organization of internal agents; secret employees appear by real names in the papers passed from hand to hand in the offices. They are known not only to everyone around them, but even to spies, to whom employees are indicated to facilitate observation. This situation has already led to failure and is intolerable. I demand the immediate removal from the files, of course, of all traces of information about active internal agents and their nicknames.” The heads of security departments and provincial gendarmerie departments were ordered to keep such documents in their possession, “and when assigning external surveillance, not to detect the service of employees. A safe house should not
be known to no one except you and your closest assistant. If necessary, it can be protected only by the most selected agents.”24
Secret employees were valued and protected, provided - if necessary to hide - with passports, indicating a safe place of residence. Heads of political investigation agencies have repeatedly warned about the danger of a disregard for the lives of employees25. Spiridovich noted that any, even the most devoted employee, comes to a turning point when he has a desire to repent and atone for his guilt: “Here the employee conceived the idea of taking revenge on the gendarmerie officer for his fall, although in most cases the latter was not to blame . This moment inevitably came to every employee, excluding those who were truly ideological.” He recommended not only supporting the employee, removing him from the revolutionary environment, but also placing him away from politics. “The consequences of delay in this matter,” he testified, “were grave.” The revolutionaries set conditions for those suspected of treason to atone for their guilt by participating in terrorism. This is how Colonel Cotten was shot, this is how Colonel Karpov and Lieutenant Colonel Sudeikin were killed. “Working as a secret agent,” Zavarzin emphasized, “requires constant concentration, observation and special forethought”26.
In addition to internal surveillance agents, the staff of gendarmerie departments and security departments included external surveillance agents - spies and supervisors. The Police Department instructions of 1907 defined spying as one of the means of covert investigation through surveillance of persons involved in the revolutionary movement. It was indicated that the staff of internal and external agents should work interconnectedly, although “under no circumstances should the spies know persons who are secret employees, and vice versa”27.
The work of internal agents would not be as effective without external surveillance. And vice versa: the latter was most often established precisely on the “instructions” of a secret employee. The importance of caring for the spy personnel has always been emphasized in the circulars of the Police Department: “The failure of the spies not only paralyzes the development of incoming intelligence instructions, but due to the close connection of external surveillance with intelligence information, it leads to the exposure of the personnel of the internal agents, thus depriving the investigative agency of funds for conducting a political investigation"28.
To strengthen the composition of external surveillance agents, the heads of the provincial gendarmerie departments were charged with selecting the best reserve non-commissioned officers no older than 30 years29. Preference was given to persons who completed military service in the year they entered the field. The agents could not be persons of Polish or Jewish nationality. Their training was carried out at those security departments where it was most clearly
an external surveillance service was installed. Yaroslavskoye was one of these30.
High demands were also placed on the personal qualities of the filer31. He must be “reliable, sober, courageous, frank, but not a talker, disciplined, conscientious about his work, in good health, with good eyesight, hearing and memory, and such an appearance that would enable him not to stand out from the crowd.” Thus, in 1907, the Yaroslavl security department employed 6 civilian spies from among non-commissioned officers32. At the same time, the staff of the Kostroma provincial gendarme department had only 3 external surveillance agents33, in 1913 - 14 non-commissioned officers, 7 of whom were spies34.
Successful surveillance presupposed that the spy had a certain minimum knowledge: “what is a state crime, what is a revolutionary, the inconsistency of the teachings of revolutionary parties, the tasks of spy surveillance.” “There are known cases,” noted the instructions of the Police Department, “when external agents appeared at revolutionary gatherings and meetings, but, unable to speak, and also, being completely unfamiliar with the party program, failed and even paid with their lives.”35 It was considered desirable to attract to the service people “intelligent, educated and people who are thoroughly knowledgeable both about the programs of political parties and about the peculiarities of the activities of their individual members.” It was pointed out to the filer that “the totality of absolutely accurate information conveyed by him leads to the success of observation, while distortion of the truth in reports and, in particular, the desire to hide failures in his work will lead to a false trail and deprive the filer of the opportunity to distinguish himself”36. He must know not only all districts of the city, but also the opening hours of enterprises, the uniforms of officials and students37.
The instructions of 1907 ordered that the spies be familiarized with the entire observed group. This made it possible not only “to have an idea of the importance of this or that person in observation” (having seen a serious person being observed unaccompanied, they could leave their post as “less important” and “take him into observation for transfer to lost agents”), but also “ hide yourself from one of them accidentally passing by.” The filer was not supposed to be known by sight, which is why the instructions forbade meeting the observed eyes, “because the eyes were the most memorable”38. This was especially important for small towns, where spies quickly became known.
Much attention was paid to the choice of observation location, behavior and clothing of the spotter. A special “manual” on the use of makeup was published39.
The most “interesting persons to observe” were included in the summary of external surveillance data. Based on these data, a cartogram was compiled. Having it, the head of the secret agency had to introduce 1-2 employees into the circle of acquaintances of the observed employees. Thus the external
observation turned into internal. The “Summary of observation results in Yaroslavl for the group of the Northern Committee of the RSDLP from December 1, 1904 to January 1, 1908” is indicative. 205 people came into the field of view of the gendarmes. By spying on “Rezva” (N.A. Didrikil), 27 committee members were identified, and “Pushkinskaya” (?) - 23 people40. At the same time, 14 were identified through intelligence, and 4 were taken under observation after the meeting.
Heads of local search agencies, interested in the effective work of spies, expressed their ideas for improving external surveillance. The head of the Yaroslavl provincial gendarme department believed that greatest benefit observation organized in major cities, and “in minor provincial ones it mostly gives a negative result” and entails failures of internal agents. He noted the undesirability of frequent changes of agents, since “new ones must familiarize themselves with the city, for which a lot of time must be spent”41. It is no coincidence that during the abolition of the Yaroslavl security department in 1913, they decided to “refresh the contingent of spies, since they had become known to the observed element and could not work usefully for the cause”42.
And yet, despite all the measures taken, failures of surveillance agents were not uncommon. “The mass of wounded, tortured and killed detectives during daily service did not stop their colleagues from continuing to work with obvious danger to their lives,” recalled Zavarzin43. The Police Department analyzed the reasons for the ineffective work of the spies, informing local detective authorities about its findings by issuing circulars and instructions44. They were explained, firstly, by the lack of means for conspiracy (for example, suitable costumes for each individual occasion and makeup supplies). Most of the spies, using their own funds, could purchase no more than one seasonal suit, in which they went out to work every day, attracting the attention of not only revolutionaries, but also city dwellers. They became noticeable due to the wrong choice of observation location (for example, a street where no one usually walks), behavior inappropriate to the situation or clothing, and neglect (or ignorance) of the rules of secrecy.
Failures were caused by the spies' ignorance of the programs of political parties and organizations, their charters, as well as the inability to maintain a conversation due to a low educational level. Infiltrating revolutionary gatherings, they quickly gave themselves away.
Finally, failures were often the result of inconsistency in the actions of the security department and the general police: they often not only did not help each other in political investigation, but also deliberately harmed their rival. For example, the following fact is typical: the police sent summonses to appear in court to Yaroslavl agents Kuznetsov and Rachkov,
in which their place of service and rank were precisely indicated. But if Kuznetsov lived under his own name (therefore, handing him such a summons had some justification), then the attempt to hand it to Rachkov, who lived under forged documents, was a grave mistake. Even worse: not finding Rachkov at his place of residence in Yaroslavl, the police turned to his relatives for information (and according to the rules established in the security department, the spy’s family should not have known about his occupation). As a result, the police “failed” not only the illegal apartment of the spy, but also him himself45. Moreover, both officers were in good standing in the department and were considered the most experienced.
Often the local police “let down” the surveillance agents sent from the capital and provincial cities. So, in March 1910, a dispatch came to the Yaroslavl security department, which described a similar case. While on a business trip to one of the district towns, the spies, despite presenting their agent cards at the first request of the local police, were persecuted by the bailiff. The latter, gathering a crowd with his cry, demanded an explanation of who they were and for what purpose they had arrived. Later, local police made a noise in the hotel room where the visiting spies were staying. As a result, the latter were forced to leave the city46.
In order to prevent such failures, the Police Department and the Central District Security Department pointed out the undesirability of involving spies as witnesses in cases carried out by the gendarmerie department. The instructions, dated 1916, specified that surveillance agents could be questioned as witnesses “no other than on the premises of the investigative agency where such agents are employed”47. They especially emphasized the inadmissibility of entering into the protocol information about the official position and activities of agents, as well as circumstances relating to methods of external surveillance48. Also in 1916, the Police Department noted in its circular: “When interrogating surveillance agents, of course, do not allow the persons conducting the inquiry to present them with demands for an explanation... of their possible relationship to internal agents, as well as explanations regarding their official position." The interrogation of observation agents could only be carried out if the charges were based solely on their testimony. There was no need for it when “the person they were accompanying was wanted according to a circular from the Police Department”49. The latter, in his circulars, ordered local detective agencies to carry out appropriate work with general police officials, since surveillance agents who often arrived at the scene did not have documents with them.
Significant assistance in external surveillance was also provided by the second category of agents - supervisors (police and station). They must-
The main task was to collect information from hotel servants, maids, and janitors. Thus, the observation covered not only the streets of the city, but also train stations, hotels, and residential buildings.
The Police Department noted in 1907 that thanks to skillfully conducted external surveillance, “sometimes without the help of internal agents,” it “was able to uncover the most dangerous enterprises of revolutionary circles and liquidate secret printing houses. Such fruitful results are obtained as a result of the training and mental development of the spies.” Particular attention was paid to this after 1907. The number of surveillance agents increased sharply. There were about 70,050 of them throughout the empire. According to Zavarzin, in Russia there were just over 1,000 surveillance agents; their number in the provinces ranged from 6 to 40. In both capitals, from 50 to 100 agents went to work daily51.
In addition to full-time secret agents, the secret police also had freelance employees - informants, “side” and auxiliary agents. Freelance informants were persons who “covered” from the inside the activities of a party or organization or reported on the mood of workers and employees at the informant’s place of work, service or study. Some informants did not provide information systematically, for which they received a one-time reward. - they were called “pieces”. Zubatov did not value them highly: “Drive the “pieces” away, these are not workers, these are corrupt skins”52. But they were not always driven away.
They became informants either of their own free will or under duress from the detective authorities. Secret agents, infiltrated or recruited into the revolutionary organization, informed the head of the search about its members who were hesitant and did not have a firm position. The ranks of the security department offered such information to atone for their guilt by informing. People of unsteady political convictions and psychologically weak became informants. Or, on the contrary, ardent supporters of the existing order: those who, for whatever reason, wanted to “atone” for the authorities.
If the recruitment was successful, then this organization still functioned for some time, while its composition was clarified with the help of a new informant. Then, when liquidated, the informant either left the city under a plausible pretext, or was briefly arrested along with everyone else. As an “experienced employee” of the organization, he, as a rule, became a member of the initiative group to restore previous ties. Thus, initially new organization was controlled by the secret police. An informant who worked in a revolutionary organization before its liquidation most often approached the newly created group with a request to transfer him to another organization. The informant was co-opted to a higher committee (city or provincial level). After liquidation everything
was repeated from the beginning (unless, of course, the underground fighters managed to expose the agent).
“Anti-government communities” thus found themselves increasingly engulfed in a system of human surveillance. Unlike full-time secret employees, such an agent always had a permanent place of work, and information was not his main source of livelihood.
“Side” agents were not members of party organizations, but were in contact with them. The emergence of this type of agent was caused primarily by the difficulties of penetrating the underground party organization from the outside. The “side” agent could work much longer, without arousing suspicion for years. Most often, these were the owners of safe houses, eateries where revolutionaries gathered, as well as intermediaries in relations between organizations.
Auxiliary freelance agents either lived primarily in rural areas, or served in hotels and furnished rooms. The 1907 instruction provided for the “acquisition” of such agents in cities and villages in which “at the current time, the conduct and reception of political propaganda is most possible.” “Secret agents should be sought out by police officers personally or through especially trusted persons and capable officials of the police entrusted to them.” Particular attention was paid to people “who, due to their development, abilities, occupations and position, had the opportunity to monitor the life and moods of the masses (postal department officials, paramedics)”53.
Inquiries were made about persons wishing to work as auxiliary agents at the provincial gendarmerie department. Those recruited for service should be “instilled in being strictly truthful when transmitting information, since each information will be subjected to verification.” The agent was given a nickname with which he signed reports and receipts for receiving money. Every two to three months, as well as in especially important cases, he had to have a personal meeting with police officials. It was not recommended for such agents to determine a permanent salary: “For information that, upon verification, turns out to be thorough and useful, they will be given a reward from 1 to 15 rubles”54.
Such agents were “acquired” from among local clerks, janitors, passport officers, doormen and other hotel servants. As a rule, the local supervisor maintained contact with them55. Particular attention was paid to monitoring houses. The Yaroslavl provincial gendarmerie department demanded that the number of auxiliary agents in the districts should not exceed 1056. But in the Romanovo-Borisoglebsky district there were 42 of them, in the Mologsky district - 28. The number of auxiliary agents was constantly growing. By 1912, under the Yaroslavl provincial gendarmerie administration, there were already 4,957 of them.
In 1917, the Novotorzhsky district of the Tver province was served by 17 agents, of which three provided information on the city and 12 on the volosts. 6 out of 18 volosts did not have their own agents. Two agents served the Kamensk stationery factory58. The overall leadership of police officials in the districts regarding the “acquisition” of auxiliary agents belonged to the police officer.
However, denunciation by private individuals was not welcomed. The Police Department warned local investigative agencies that if the facts are not confirmed by anything other than a denunciation, it is necessary to “verify the validity of the accusation behind the scenes.” The investigation should have started only if the initial information was confirmed by secret verification. Particular attention should have been paid to the study of denunciations of people “occupying a well-known social or judicial position.” The same applied to denunciations by workers against employers, and by subordinates against bosses. It was required to “always take measures to find out whether the reason for the denunciation lies in the personal relationship of the applicant to the accused”59.
Thus, in last decade Since the existence of the Russian autocracy, secret agents have become the most important component of the system of secret political investigation in Russia. Based on her information, the mechanism of activity of the punitive-investigative apparatus and the surveillance system were changed, and its organs were reorganized.
Notes
1 Peregudova Z.I. Political investigation of Russia (1880-1917). M., 2000. P. 196.
I Agafonov V.K. Foreign secret service. Petrograd, 1918. P. 187.
3 Zavarzin P.P. The work of the secret police // “Security”: Memoirs of the heads of security departments. T. 1. M., 2004. P. 418.
4 Spiridovich A.I. Notes of a gendarme. M., 1991. P. 193.
5 Agafonov V.K. Decree. op. P. 196.
6 Spiridovich A.I. Decree. op. pp. 193-194.
7 Ibid. P. 194.
8 State Archives of the Yaroslavl Region (GNAO). F. 912. Op. 1. D. 438.
9 Zavarzin P.P. Decree. op. P. 419.
10 State Archives of the Tver Region (GATO). F. 920. Op. 1. D. 80. JI. 15.
II District security departments (according to the Regulations of December 14, 1906) were established in St. Petersburg (Northern - for 5 provinces), Moscow (Central - for 12 provinces), Samara (Volga region - for 11 provinces) and etc. They existed until 1914.
12 GA RF. F. 280. Op. 1. D. 3051. L. 58.
13 Ibid. L. 68.
14 Ibid. L. 75.
15 Ibid. L. 113.
16 Ibid. L. 159.
17 GATO. F. 927. Op. 1. D. 1849. L. 3.
18 Zavarzin P.P. Decree. op. P. 419.
19 GATO. F. 927. Op. 1. D. 1849. L. 11.
20 Center for Documentation of Contemporary History of the Kostroma Region (CDNIKO). F. 3656. Op. 3. D. 21. L. 2-119.
21 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 90. L. 25.
22 GA RF. F. 280. Op. 1. D. 3051. L. 2.
23 GATO. F. 927. Op. 1. D. 2343. L. 12-12v.
24 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 64.
25 Spiridovich A.I. Decree. op. P. 195.
26 Zavarzin P.P. Decree. op. P. 419.
27 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 63. L. 7.
28 GAYAO. F. 906. Op. 4. D. 1067. L. 62.
29 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 63. L. 16.
30 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 90. L. 6.
31 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 63. L. 16.
32 GAYAO. F. 906. Op. 4. D. 661. L. 262-263.
33 GARF. F. 280. Op. 1. D. 3051. L. 2.
34 State Archive of the Kostroma Region (GAKO). F. 749. Op. 1. D. 417.
35 GAYAO. F. 906. Op. 4. D. 661. L. 37.
36 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 63. L. 16.
37 Ibid. L. 16ob.
38 Ibid. L. 18.
39 Klimov. Course notes on the use of makeup in detective work. Kielce, b.g.
40 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 78. L. 7-19.
41 GAYAO. F. 906. Op. 4. D. 661. L. 136.
42 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 463. L. 38.
43 Zavarzin P.P. Decree. op. P. 430.
44 GAYAO. F. 906. Op. 4. D. 100. L. 136-137.
45 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 201. L. 3.
46 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 295. L. 4.
47 GAYAO. F. 906. Op. 4. D. 1067. L. 62.
48 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 63. L. 32.
49 GAYAO. F. 906. Op. 4. D. 1067. L. 62 ob..
50 Koznov A.P. The Bolsheviks' struggle against the subversive actions of the Tsarist secret police in 1910-1914. // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1988. No. 9. P. 97.
51 Zavarzin P.P. Decree. op. P. 431.
52 Spiridovich A.I. Decree. op. P. 50.
53 GAYAO. F. 912. Op. 1. D. 297. L. 38.
54 Ibid. L. 38ob.
55 Ibid. L. 20.
56 Ibid. L. 68.
57 GAYAO. F. 906. Op. 5. D. 7. L. 20-22 vol.
58 GATO. F. R-1318. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 209, 210.
If you are an agent of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, then you will never receive a life sentence for a serious crime. And punishment in the form of imprisonment cannot be imposed on an agent for a period greater than half the maximum term of imprisonment provided for by law for this crime.
Full-time secret employees, illegal officers. Who are AGENTS, how are they recruited and how do they work.
Many media outlets wrote about this wild story that happened in the village of Dymer, Kyiv region. While climbing the stairs in the high-rise building where he rented an apartment, a 33-year-old Kiev official discharged a traumatic pistol at four teenage girls.
13-year-old Vika was hit in the head by a bullet. It’s a miracle that the girl was saved, Kyiv doctors say. The bastard himself showed clear knowledge of legal literacy: he acted proactively, being the first to report what happened to the police. They say the 14-year-old girls attacked him themselves, and he was forced to defend himself.
The behavior of the police officers shocked all the residents of the house where the emergency occurred: law enforcement officers talked to him and... released him. Without even taking a written undertaking not to leave. Motive: allegedly, a criminal case was initiated based on fact, and therefore there is no reason to detain the suspect. The citizen immediately changed his place of residence. After the scandal became public, the Ministry of Internal Affairs put the citizen on the wanted list.
As it turned out, a native of the city of Priluki, Chernihiv region, Karpenko Andrey Viktorovich, born in 1978, has a law enforcement officer ID. It is for this reason, perhaps, that the police do not provide the media with his photograph and do not indicate the characteristics of the wanted person.
Another "werewolf"? Why not. The instructions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on operational investigative activities are an indulgence for the most bloodthirsty murderers in the modern history of Ukraine.
"3. STAFF SECRET EMPLOYEES AND PERSONS CONFIDENTIALLY COOPERATING WITH OPERATIONAL UNITS
3.1. To solve the problems of operational investigative activities, operational units of internal affairs bodies are given the right to have public and secret staff and freelance workers, as well as to establish confidential cooperation with persons on the principles of voluntariness.
Establishing confidential cooperation with military personnel and personnel of the intelligence agencies of Ukraine is prohibited.
3.2. It is prohibited to involve medical workers, clergy, and lawyers in carrying out the tasks of operational investigative activities if the person in relation to whom they must perform these tasks is their patient or client.
3.3. Persons who are involved in carrying out the tasks of operational-search activities are under the protection of the state. Persons who confidentially cooperate with operational units are subject to social and legal guarantees provided for in Articles 12 and 13 of the Law of Ukraine “On Operational-Investigative Activities”.
3.4. Full-time secret employees.
3.4.1. A full-time secret employee is a person in command of an operational unit who performs long-term (strategic) tasks to combat crime on the basis of conspiracy.
3.4.2.Illegal officer- this is a person of the commanding staff of an operational unit who, in order to perform tactical tasks with a secret affiliation with operational units, is briefly introduced into an organized group or criminal organization.
3.4.3. The conditions of service, legal and social protection of a full-time secret employee and an illegal officer are regulated by a separate Regulation approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The procedure for selecting and organizing work with regular secret employees and illegal officers is regulated by a separate regulatory act of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
3.5. Persons who confidentially cooperate with operational units of internal affairs bodies, based on the nature of cooperation and tasks, are divided into agents, residents, keepers of safe houses or safe houses, and informants.
The following have the right to give permission to engage in confidential cooperation and to terminate it:
- Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, first deputy ministers, first deputy minister - head of the GUBOP, deputy minister - head of the criminal police;
— Heads of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Kiev and the Kiev region, Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in the regions, Sevastopol and in transport, their first deputies, first deputies - heads of departments, (departments) of the BOP, deputies - heads of the criminal police;
- Heads of city, district, linear internal affairs bodies, their first deputies, deputies - heads of the criminal police.
3.6. Agent.
3.6.1. An agent is a legally capable person who is at least 18 years of age, in terms of its business qualities and intelligence capabilities, it systematically fulfills the tasks of the operational unit to receive and provide information on the prevention, exposure, disclosure of crimes and persons involved in them, the search for criminals, missing persons and other information that is important for solving the problems of operational investigative activities based on a voluntary subscription (Appendix No. 2) for confidential cooperation for a monthly monetary reward.
As an agent, a person can be involved in confidential cooperation on the basis of a voluntary subscription, but without obligatory monthly monetary remuneration.
3.6.2. The employees of the operational unit, based on the state of the operational situation and the assigned operational tasks, select a candidate for confidential cooperation as an agent. The candidate can be selected from among informants, as well as persons who are capable of providing information relevant to solving the problems of operational-search activities.
H.6.3. A candidate for confidential cooperation is checked against the records of persons confidentially cooperating with the operational units of the internal affairs bodies, operational reference records, and, if necessary, fingerprint and other records of the internal affairs authorities, at their current and former places of residence. Through the operational service unit and other operational capabilities, his lifestyle and connections are being studied.
3.6.4. In the process of checking a candidate, studying his intelligence capabilities, he is given one-time assignments to cover the lifestyle of persons in respect of whom information has been received about their involvement in illegal actions, familiarization with the contents of certain documents, etc. The results of the execution of such orders are documented in certificates.
3.6.5. The employee of the operational unit reports the results of studying the candidate for establishing confidential cooperation to the relevant manager specified in clause 3.5 of the Instructions. The report indicates: background information, personal and business qualities of the candidate, his intelligence capabilities, the content of the information received from him and the results of its verification, proposals on the feasibility of establishing confidential cooperation, what tasks will be solved.
3.6.6. The manager studies the materials of the candidate’s verification, its completeness and the compliance of the candidate’s capabilities with the performance of those tasks for the solution of which confidential cooperation is established with him. Having recognized the verification carried out as sufficient and agreed with the need to establish confidential cooperation, the manager gives written permission to the employee of the operational unit to conduct a special conversation with the candidate and determines the need for personal participation in it.
3.6.7. Having received permission, the employee of the operational unit, under an official (reasonable) pretext, invites the candidate to the internal affairs body to conduct a special conversation with him.
A special conversation with the candidate is carried out, as a rule, by an employee of the operational unit who selected and screened him, face to face, with the purpose of the invitation encrypted in front of other employees of the operational unit.
3.6.8. During a special conversation, an employee of the operational unit establishes a trusting relationship with the candidate, emphasizes the importance of the information received from him, finds out his attitude towards the internal affairs bodies, the fight against crime and the need for secret work to perform certain tasks, etc.
If the candidate demonstrates openness and understanding of the need to work behind the scenes, he is encouraged to work confidentially with the operational unit. If he agrees, a subscription to confidential cooperation is accepted, the amount of monetary reward is agreed upon, he chooses a pseudonym with which he will sign messages, methods of emergency communication are discussed, and the need to maintain secrecy is explained.
If a candidate avoids a sincere conversation during a conversation, shows a reluctance to continue it, or expresses a negative attitude towards the participation of citizens in the fight against crime, an offer of confidential cooperation is not made to him, and the conversation ends with clarification of the issues that were the reason for the invitation.
3.6.9. The employee of the operational unit reports the results of the special conversation in a report agreed upon with the immediate supervisor, to which the verification materials and the candidate’s signature are attached, to the relevant manager specified in clause 3.5 of the Instructions. After their consideration, the manager, if agreed, approves the establishment of confidential cooperation with the citizen and signs the relevant accounting documents.
If a decision is made that it is inappropriate to establish confidential cooperation, the candidate’s verification materials are attached to the nomenclature file through correspondence to attract confidential cooperation.
3.7. Taking into account reconnaissance and other capabilities, agents can be used for:
3.7.1. Developments of persons suspected of committing crimes.
3.7.2. Execution of route tasks.
3.7.3. Developments of persons held in temporary detention centers (IVS), reception centers, special detention centers, and rooms for detainees.
3.7.4. Providing operational cover and encryption of enterprises, apartments, etc., which operate under a cover and are used for operational purposes (as owners of such enterprises, keepers of trap apartments, etc.).
3.8. With the help of agents the following tasks are solved:
3.8.1. Penetration into organized groups and criminal organizations or operational investigation of individuals to establish their criminal activities, as well as the facts of committing crimes, their connections.
3.8.2. Identification of persons prone to committing crimes, studying their lifestyle, identifying criminal intentions and actions in order to prevent, suppress and solve crimes.
3.8.3. Studying the financial and economic activities of enterprises, institutions and organizations, regardless of their form of ownership, identifying violations, abuses and illegal actions in the economic sphere.
3.8.4. Identification of latent crimes and the persons who committed them.
3.8.5. Obtaining and recording factual data that can be used as evidence in criminal cases.
3.8.6. Searching for criminals and identifying missing persons.
3.8.7. Establishing places for storing weapons, drugs and stolen property, ensuring compensation for losses caused by crimes.
3.8.8. Identification of the causes and conditions conducive to the commission of crimes.
3.8.9. Solving other problems of operational-search activities.
3.9. An agent who provided information that contributed to the solving of a high-profile crime or decision complex tasks operational investigative activities may be additionally encouraged by monetary rewards.
3.10. An agent who is part of an organized group or criminal organization does not have the right to incite or provoke their members to commit crimes.
3.11. If a person who has committed an unlawful act as part of this organized group or criminal organization is involved as an agent in the development of an organized group or criminal organization, the head of the relevant internal affairs body may file a petition for a reduced sentence for this person or for release from criminal liability if:
3.11.1. The information provided by a person contributed to the prevention, suppression or detection of grave and especially grave crimes committed by an individual, an organized group or a criminal organization.
3.11.2. The information could not be obtained from other sources.
3.12. Cooperation with an agent is of a conspiratorial nature.
3.13. An operational unit employee teaches an agent:
— Methods of establishing and maintaining trusting relationships and contacts with persons who may be involved in the commission of illegal acts;
— Identifying signs of preparation and commission of crimes;
— Methods of recognizing persons belonging to a criminal environment by external signs and behavior;
— Features of communication with persons prone to committing crimes;
- Actions in the event of complications in the situation when performing tasks, suspicions arise in the criminal environment about his confidential cooperation with the operational unit, carrying out an inspection, in particular provocations, or offering double-dealing or participation in a crime, committing crimes by persons under investigation in the presence of an agent;
— Behavior in the event of an agent being detained as a suspect, offers to cooperate with other employees of operational units;
— Methods of using certain technical means and techniques of secrecy.
3.14. Agents generally do not need to know each other.
3.15. In order to encrypt a person confidentially collaborating with an operational unit, cover documents may be issued to him.
3.16. To obtain work experience, an agent can apply for a job at an enterprise operating according to legend, created by an operational unit.
3.17. The compilation, registration, storage, transfer (forwarding) and destruction of documents containing information about persons involved or planned to be involved, or previously involved in confidential cooperation for the purpose of performing the tasks of operational-search activities and the results of their work are carried out according to the rules of secret office work.
All handwritten documents, with the exception of those written directly by persons involved in confidential cooperation, are drawn up on the pages of special notebooks or sheets (forms) previously registered with secret security agencies (Appendix No. 27).
It is prohibited to write agent messages using carbon paper and make copies of them.
All materials obtained as a result of covert operational investigative activities are registered with secret security agencies.
The operational information logs (Appendix No. 7) record agent messages, operational notes, extracts from them, reports from operational workers on information received from informants and persons specified in clause 3.5.4 of this Instruction. Registration of other prepared reports, plans, certificates, memorandum certificates, registration sheets, requirements for verification of operational records, tasks, reports, conclusions, messages, questionnaires, lists, resolutions, as well as completed and signed cards (registration, information retrieval, characteristics cards, operational accounting, on operational activities) is carried out in the journal of outgoing and internal circulation of documents of the internal affairs body (division).
Materials that make it possible to establish the personal data of persons involved in confidential cooperation, or persons who are being developed in operational investigative cases, are sent to other operational units marked “Personally.”
Registration, conversion of such materials, maintaining nomenclature files with correspondence in relation to persons confidentially cooperating with the operational units of the internal affairs bodies are carried out personally by the heads of departments (departments) of documentary support and the regime of the UMVST, the heads of the sensitive sectors (parts) of the structural divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, heads of security-secret departments (units) of structural divisions of the GUMVD, Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, city, district departments, city district authorities, and in case of their illness, vacation - employees specially designated by orders of the heads of internal affairs bodies.
Envelopes are printed only by those officials to whom they are addressed.
Registration of other materials obtained as a result of covert operational-search activities is carried out by employees of secret security agencies.
3.18. An operational unit employee receives information from agents during personal meetings, usually at a safe house or safe house, at an appointed place. Meetings or communication with the agent are carried out on a separate schedule, but at least once a month.
Reception of an agent on the premises of an internal affairs agency or operational unit is permitted in case of emergency, with the obligatory legend of the meeting.
3.19. Meetings or communication with an agent in the event of his illness, threat of decryption, detention or arrest, long-term absence that prevents him from completing his tasks, upon a reasoned report from an employee of the operational unit and with the permission of the head of the internal affairs agency or operational unit may be terminated for a period of up to four months.
After the end of the period for stopping meetings or communication with the agent, the employee of the operational unit examines the possibility of resuming them and the advisability of further cooperation with the agent, which he reports to the manager who allowed such termination. In exceptional cases, this period may be extended for another four months. In such cases, cash payments to the agent do not stop.
3.20. The meeting or communication with the agent is usually carried out by the employee of the operational unit who attracted him to confidential cooperation. The transfer of a communications agent to another employee of an operational unit is carried out with the permission of the relevant head of the internal affairs agency or operational unit with the consent of the agent.
3.21. During the period of vacation, training, long business trip, illness of an employee of an operational unit, meetings with agents who are in touch with him, with their consent, are carried out by the head of the operational unit or, by his decision, by another employee of this unit.
In the absence of an employee of the operational unit for more than three months, as well as when he is transferred to a job not related to operational investigative activities, dismissed from the internal affairs bodies on the instructions of the head of the internal affairs body or operational unit, the agent (resident, holder of a safe house), with his consent, can be transferred for temporary or permanent communication to another employee of the operational unit.
3.22. During the execution of a route assignment by an agent or his participation in the investigation of persons held in temporary detention centers, reception centers, special reception centers of another internal affairs body, as well as in the case of traveling for a long period to another area, this agent, in case of consent, without transfer personal and office files (Appendices No. 3, 4) are transferred for temporary communication to the head of the corresponding operational unit at the place of his stay. In such cases, the agent is instructed on how to establish communication.
3.23. The information received from the agent accepted for temporary communication no later than five days after registration, registration in the log of operational information and the implementation (if necessary) of extracts from it is sent to the operational unit in which the agent is in permanent communication, as an appendix to the certificate of execution results they have tasks.
3.24. To carry out complex tasks of developing persons suspected of committing serious, especially serious crimes, or in connection with participation in the development of an agent previously embedded in an organized group or criminal organization, with the written permission of the head of the internal affairs agency or operational unit is allowed (subject to mutual written consent) mutual decoding of agents to each other. A note about such decryption is made in the personal files of these agents. Communication with paired agents is carried out by managers or the most experienced employees of operational units.
3.25. It is prohibited to give an agent a task to provoke a person (persons) against whom an operational-search case has been opened, or other persons to commit illegal actions, including with the direct participation of the agent, with the exception of initiating certain actions in connection with the conduct of operational combinations related to operational procurement, controlled delivery, etc., and allow him to store on his person or at home, at his place of work or service, items, documents, photographs indicating his confidential cooperation with the operational unit.
3.26. The agent, as a rule, in his own hand, in any form, from a third party, in the presence of an employee of the operational unit or a resident, describes in writing the results of the task. At the same time, he notes: when, from whom and under what circumstances the information became known to him, who else was familiar with it and to what extent. The agent, if available, may include samples of raw materials or products, documents, photographs, sketches, etc. in his message, which are recorded as attachments to the message (operational note) in the operational information log.
Based on the analysis of the information received, the operational unit employee or resident gives the agent the next task, explaining the procedure for its implementation and the method of transmitting the information received, stipulating the time and place of the next meeting. The agent signs the information provided and the received task with his pseudonym.
3.27. The employee of the operational unit formalizes the information received in the office in an undercover message (Appendix No. 5), noting in it the measures to verify it. If during a meeting with an agent an employee of the operational unit was not able to formalize the information provided in writing, it is drawn up in an agent note (Appendix No. 6). The content of messages should not reveal information about the identity of the agent. An employee of the operational unit takes measures to identify persons passing through the agent’s information, sets out information about them in the form of a certificate for his message and plans measures to verify the information received.
3.28. An agent message or agent note, after registration, is registered in the operational information log (Appendix No. 7) and within 24 hours is reported to the head of the internal affairs agency or operational unit.
3.29. Responsibility for the timeliness, completeness of accounting, quality of filling out accounting documents, and preventing information leakage rests with the heads of operational units. Log books of persons confidentially cooperating with operational units and the operational information received are kept and personally entered into by the employee of the operational unit in charge of the records.
3.30. Information drawn up in an undercover report or undercover note is added to the agent’s official file, and copies (extracts from them) together with the materials of their verification are added to the operational investigative file or the control proceedings file.
The extraction is registered under a separate number in the operational information logbook, while the original message (agent message, agent note) and the operational information logbook indicate the number of extracts made, to which case they were attached or where they were transferred.
3.31. The period for verifying the information received should not exceed ten days, and, if necessary, can be extended by the head of the operational unit, but not exceed forty-five days.
3.32. Operational information received from persons confidentially cooperating with operational units of internal affairs bodies, relevant for the prevention, detection of a crime or search for a criminal in the service territory of another operational unit or falling within the competence of the Security Service of Ukraine, other units carrying out operational investigative activities, is sent them by decision of the head of the internal affairs body or operational unit in the form of an extract with cover letter with recommendations on security measures to prevent decryption of information sources. The original messages and the operational information log indicate the number of such statements, where and by what outgoing number they were sent.
3.33. An agent who was introduced into an organized group or criminal organization for the purpose of preventing or identifying its criminal activities is subject to criminal liability only for the commission within its composition of an intentional especially grave crime involving violence against the victim, or an intentional grave crime involving the infliction of a serious bodily injury. damage to the victim or the occurrence of other grave or especially grave consequences. He cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment, and a sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed on him for a period greater than half the maximum term of imprisonment provided for by law for this crime.
3.34. Cooperation with the agent is terminated in the following cases:
3.34.1. Refusal of the agent from further cooperation.
3.34.2. Illness of the agent (more than six months in a row), which does not allow him to solve the tasks of the operational unit.
3.34.3. Conscription into the Armed Forces, travel abroad for permanent residence, training, employment in law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor's office, the court.
3.34.4. Loss of the agent's ability to provide covert assistance.
3.34.5. Systematic evasion of the agent from confidential cooperation, ignoring the undertaken obligations to fulfill the tasks of the operational unit.
3.34.6. If information about the agent’s confidential cooperation has become known to third parties.
3.34.7. Double-dealing or deliberate misinformation on the part of the agent.
3.34.8. Deliberate disclosure by an agent of forms and methods of operational investigative activities known to him and information that can be used to commit illegal actions.
3.34.9. Conviction of the agent to imprisonment.
3.34.10. Gross violation by the agent of the requirements of secrecy.
3.34.11. Agent's death.
3.35. Termination of cooperation with an agent is documented by a report from the employee of the operational unit with whom he was in contact, with the addition, if necessary, of relevant materials about the reason for termination of cooperation, agreed upon and approved by the relevant manager specified in subsection 3.5 of the Instructions.
3.36. A decision on the need to terminate confidential cooperation between an employee of an operational unit and an agent may be preceded by a meeting between the head of this operational unit and the agent. During a conversation with the agent, the manager clarifies the validity of the need to terminate confidential cooperation and non-disclosure of information that became known to them during cooperation.
Termination of confidential cooperation is formalized by a conclusion, which is approved by the manager who gave permission to establish such cooperation (Appendix No. 12).
His personal and work files are transferred within a month to the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
3.37. If, in connection with the performance of the tasks of an operational unit, disability or death of an agent occurs, he or his close relatives are subject to the benefits provided in such cases for employees of operational units."
(To be continued - Who are residents and informants. Their tasks. How to maintain a safe house and what to do with it if it “burns down”).
One of the most complex and painful issues related to the problems of political investigation in pre-revolutionary Russia is the issue of disclosing secret agents. Attempts continue, often without sufficient evidence, to broadly interpret this problem. Moreover, there are often cases when we are talking not only about the purely quantitative side of the matter, but also about specific historical figures.
An analysis of the work of the Extraordinary Investigative Commission of the Provisional Government, as well as a number of other commissions created after the February Revolution, can help clarify these issues.
The question of exposing persons who betrayed their organization, comrades in struggle, has always worried revolutionary organizations, which created a whole system of conspiracy that made the work of the political police difficult1.
Revolutionary organizations created commissions, party courts, inter-party courts2, which considered issues of provocation, and the results of this work were published in the pages of the party press, issued as separate leaflets with a portrait and biography of the traitor.
Party organizations themselves tried to send their people to the political investigation bodies. The fact of N.V. joining the service in the III Department of the People's Will is widely known. Kletochnikova. He managed to obtain materials on 385 people, of whom 115 were permanent secret employees, although not all of them worked in revolutionary organizations3. And this was not the only case of attempts by revolutionaries to penetrate the secrets of political investigation. Burtsev4 did a lot of work to identify secret agents in the party ranks.
The names of secret employees exposed before the revolution are widely known: Azef, Geckelmann-Landesen-Harting,
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Zhuchenko-Gerngross, Bryandinsky, Zhitomirsky, who acted in the midst of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Social Democratic movements.
After the February Revolution, when materials from the Police Department, security departments, search centers, State Housing Administration and Railway Administration became available, a new stage began in exposing secret employees.
From March to October 1917, in St. Petersburg, Moscow and many other cities, by decree of the Provisional Government and orders of the executive committees of local Soviets, commissions were created that directly or indirectly dealt with issues of secret agents. Let's name the main ones: Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry to investigate illegal actions of former ministers and others officials(Petrograd); Commission for the management of the archive of foreign agents in Paris; Commission for Providing a New System (Moscow); Commission for the analysis of cases of the former Police Department of institutions subordinate to it (Petrograd) and a number of local commissions.
Local commissions were named differently. Thus, in Sveaborg in April 1917, a “section” was created under the name “Protection of People’s Freedom of the Sveaborg Fortress”. Its task included: suppression of counter-revolutionary actions on the territory of Sveaborg, identification of secret agents serving in political investigation institutions5.
By the decision of the Executive Committee of the Vyborg Council of Soldiers’ and Workers’ Deputies, a section “Protection of People’s Freedom” was created in the Vyborg fortress region, one of the tasks of which was the development of secret archives and the identification of secret agents6.
In October 1917, by resolution of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Kronstadt Fortress, the Extraordinary Investigative Commission of the Executive Committee was created. The main goal of the commission is to investigate cases related to the secret agents of the Kronstadt Gendarmerie Directorate. The commission included representatives of political parties and public organizations. All cases of secret employees, after their collection, research and formation from the commission, were transferred to a public democratic court7.
Local commissions worked in close cooperation with the capital commissions. The capital's commissions had many areas of work. Locals, as a rule, select documents for metropolitan commissions, identify materials about secret agents, publish lists with their names in the press, take enforcement action against secret agents
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- arrest, recognizance not to leave, temporary ban on participating in public and political life.
In some cities, archival commissions were created under the executive committees. The commissions were purposefully engaged in putting materials in order and identifying secret agents.
IN historical literature the best known is the “Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry to investigate the actions of former ministers and other officials,” with which the above-mentioned commissions worked closely. It was created on March 4, 1917. On March 12, the Regulations on its status and functions were published8.
The commission was established under the Minister of Justice, who performed the functions of the Prosecutor General. The commission was headed by a chairman with the rights of a fellow minister of justice. They appointed Moscow attorney N.K. Muravyov. The commission had a wide range of tasks. The main task, as its name suggests, is to investigate “those actions of the highest ranks of the old system that appear criminal even according to the laws in force even at that time.” Based on the tasks of the commission9, it had a complex structure and numerous divisions. The largest structure, which conducted the investigation of “illegal actions in office by former ministers and other officials,” had 30 investigative10 units. Each investigative unit had its own range of issues and its own specialization. Thus, investigative part No. 1 investigated the illegal activities of officials to extend (in 1905-1906) the validity of the “Regulations on measures to protect state order and public peace” of August 14, 1881, introduced by Alexander III as temporary. Investigative part No. b dealt with issues of violations of the law by the Minister of Justice I.G. Shcheglovitov. Investigative part No. 7 was related to the actions of the Minister of Internal Affairs A.D. Protopopova. Investigative unit No. 10 examined materials about the actions of officials in the “fight against the popular movement in February - March 1917.” Investigative part No. 13 was related to the investigation into the activities of G.E. Rasputin and his influence on Nicholas II in the field of government.
As for secret agents, there was no such investigative part, but the issue of agents periodically came to the attention of investigators. This was due to the expansion of the topics of questions during investigative actions. Increasingly, questions began to be raised about the methods of political investigation and the actions of Department officials
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police. Questions were raised about secret agents and the provocative methods of their work.
Since the ESK had at its disposal some ministers of internal affairs and fellow ministers, directors and vice-directors of the Police Department, arrested in the first days of the revolution, many questions about provocation and secret agents were addressed to them. Almost every Minister of the Interior and Department employee was asked questions related to the current instructions for working with secret agents. The ChSK tried to find out how far the defendants went, paying for the work of those whose activities, from the point of view of the law, were criminal (that is, secret employees engaged in revolutionary activities).
In this regard, there was a conversation about the former revolutionary and secret employee E.N. Shornikova and her role in creating a case against members of the Social Democratic faction of the Second State Duma. Much time was devoted to Malinovsky, a Social Democrat and leader of the Social Democratic faction of the IV State Duma.
According to the conditions of elections to the State Duma, persons who had previously been convicted in criminal cases could not run for it. How did Malinovsky, who was twice tried for burglary in his youth, end up a member of the State Duma?! Wasn’t this known to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, did party comrades know this?! There are many questions regarding the Malinovsky case: representatives of the political investigation, members of the State Duma, former party colleagues were interrogated, V.I. Lenin, N.K. Krupskaya".
Subsequently, materials about Malinovsky collected in the ChSK formed the basis of his case, completed in the revolutionary tribunal.
Raising questions about provocation, secret cooperation, demanding documents from local commissions, the ChSK aroused and directed the work of local commissions in this direction.
The ChSK was never able to prove the illegality and abuse of power by representatives of the political investigation. Almost all those interrogated did not admit that they had violated the law, pointing to state necessity and the fact that Western democracy, for reasons of the same state necessity, uses the services of secret employees who “cover” the activities of “organizations undesirable from the point of view of the bourgeois state”12.
“There is no other way in any of the civilized states in Europe. Republicans also have agents
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states, France, for example,” said the former director of the Department Beletsky13.
Later, another representative of the political investigation, Zavarzin, who worked for 18 years in the security departments of Moscow, Warsaw, Odessa, was also at one time arrested by the ChSK, but successfully avoided long prison sentences like his colleagues, wrote: “Is it possible to do without internal agents and how can they do it?” replace?.. The answer is definite. It cannot be replaced by anything, and therefore it is necessary and exists in all countries of the world without exception”14.
The main work to identify secret agents was carried out in St. Petersburg by the “Special Commission to examine the activities of the former Police Department and its subordinate institutions (district security departments, security departments, gendarmerie departments and search centers) for 1905-1917”15 and in Moscow by the security commission new system under the Executive Committee of Moscow public organizations16.
The “Special Commission” has its own background. On March 10, 1917, the “Commission for the Analysis of Cases of the Former Police Department” was formed in St. Petersburg.
The tasks of the commission were:
1. Collect and title all files and papers of the former Police Department.
2. Put them in order, make an inventory.
3. Satisfy without delay the demands for the issuance of cases and papers needed for the Extraordinary Investigative Commission and the Ministry of Internal Affairs 17. Pavel Eliseevich Shchegolev, a revolutionary, journalist, editor of a number of legal magazines dedicated to the history of the revolutionary movement: “Byloe”, “ Past years."
As a specialist who researched the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he repeatedly spoke before the employees of the ChSK commission, “revealing the topic of the Police Department.”
From time to time he was invited by the chairman of the ChSK Muravyov to commission meetings and acted as an expert on some documents.
By decree of the Provisional Government of June 15, 191718, a “Special Commission...” was created on the basis of the “Commission for the Analysis of Cases of the Former Police Department...” The scope of its activities was significantly expanded.
The Resolution of the Provisional Government clearly defined the tasks of the “Special Commission...”:
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a) research of all cases related to political investigation in the archives of the Police Department and its subordinate institutions;
b) relations with executive committees and commissions; working in the field based on data from local archives, and in the absence of such work in the field, taking measures to protect and develop local archives;
c) applying for materials and information related to the political investigation to all government and public institutions;
d) satisfying the requirements of government bodies and public institutions for certificates related to “pre-political investigation”.
The main areas of activity of the Special Commission were: .
a) clarifying the composition of the secret agents of the intelligence agencies of the empire19;
b) search for documents, their selection for the ChSK.
Based on the Regulations on the Special Commission, the materials of the Police Department were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice20, and the management of the archive was entrusted to the chairman of the commission. The “Special Commission...” included the “Archival Commission”. Soon the “Special Commission” began to receive archives from institutions subordinate to the Police Department.
For closer interaction between the “Special Commission” and the ChSK, Shchegolev was included in the Extraordinary Investigative Commission, in addition to the existing four members provided for by the Regulations of the ChSK.
From the very beginning, the “Special Commission” had at its disposal the documents of the Police Department, which by that time had been brought into relative order, and two of the most valuable files of the Department: the general card file and the card file of secret employees.
Before analyzing the work of the commission itself, it is necessary to dwell on the characteristics of the materials and documents that were made available to the commissions created by the Provisional Government.
In the first days of the revolution, institutions whose activities were associated with the punitive policies of the autocracy suffered especially hard. A lot of materials were lost these days. The indignation of the popular masses manifested itself in a wide variety of forms, including the destruction of police stations, security departments, judicial buildings, and prisons. In a number of cases, these actions were fueled and directed by disguised gendarmes. There was an unspoken order from the police authorities that required
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subordinates, in the event of mass unrest, in the event of a threat of seizure of police stations, political investigation institutions, destroy agent materials, censorship. In Petrograd, the documents of the Petrograd provincial gendarmerie administration were almost completely destroyed. The institution, whose history began in 1867, left us with a legacy of only 270 units. file 21. 6058 files remained from the Petrograd Security Department22. A.A. Blok, who appeared in Petrograd in March 1917, shocked by what he saw, wrote to his mother: “The Lithuanian castle and the District Court have burned to the ground, all the beauty of their facades, licked by fire, is striking, all the abomination that disfigured them from the inside has burned out”23.
The materials of the Moscow Security Department were quite badly damaged, the pogrom of which began on March 1, 1917. The crowd that broke into the premises broke cabinets and file cabinets, threw documents into the street and lit fires. Files, albums, catalogues, photographs were burning24. “His own” hand also worked here. During the defeat of the Moscow Security Department, all structures were practically untouched, except for one - the intelligence department, where the materials of intelligence reports were stored, the file cabinet of the intelligence department, from which it would be possible to identify secret agents. Only former employees of this department knew where the documents of their department were located. Participated in the destruction of materials of an undercover nature former boss Moscow security department Martynov. But the bulk of the materials still survived.
The documents of other structures of the Moscow Security Department were practically not damaged. The files of both the leaders of the revolutionary movement and the personnel of the Security Department have been preserved. But during the period of confusion, when the security of the archive had not yet been established, figures of the revolutionary movement came there to take documents, a photograph of themselves as a souvenir. Subsequently, some of these documents were handed over to the museum, to the “Society of Political Prisoners and Exiled Settlers.” Currently, the fund of the Moscow Security Department totals 51,236 units. hr. Among the surviving documents, especially important was a single nominal and thematic card index for materials from the Moscow and Moscow district security departments.
There were attempts to set fire to the Police Department building.
The events of the February Revolution associated with the destruction of documents had the consequence that there are still different opinions about the degree of safety of documents of the Police Department and its Special Department, where materials about secret agents were kept. Famous historian V.V. Maksakov, touching on this issue in one of his articles,
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writes that almost until March 10, the materials of the [Police Department] were guarded by officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and therefore some of the materials were stolen and destroyed25. Based on this, later researcher B.K. Ehrenfeld wrote: “...Although the Provisional Government subsequently ordered the protection of police archives, it was from that moment that their deliberate, systematic destruction and plunder by interested parties began. As a rule, volunteers were involved in the analysis of archives on political matters, and among them were often former security guards who took a particularly energetic part in “putting things in order.” archival documents"26.
In N.V. Izmailov’s memoirs about the Pushkin House, published in 1981, there is an interesting passage dedicated to the fate of the materials of the Police Department. The author quite correctly points to people who were concerned about the safety of materials from Fontanka, 16 (among them were Academician S.F. Oldenburg and Shchegolev). But what is surprising is his statement that “everything that was saved was loaded onto a sleigh on March 3 and taken to Vasilyevsky Island to the Academy of Sciences”27.
Was everything as the named and unnamed authors describe? Let's start by clarifying the question: was the sleigh alone enough to take out the documents?! The memoirs of one of the police commissioners, B. Ignatiev, concerning the protection of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police Department have been preserved. He reports that the people's militia was created in the early days of the revolution. With his detachment, he guarded the area where the house of the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Police Department was located. He was greatly impressed by the premises of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the minister's office. In the office, on the table, one might say, there was order; there were several torn papers lying around. In the minister’s mansion, his documents were “rummaged through,” but “the things were almost untouched, the slightly broken and damaged things gave the impression of deliberateness, that is, a simulation of destruction, and a very thrifty one at that...” “In the building of the Police Department, the destruction was somewhat greater.. It was immediately obvious that they were looking for something there and, moreover, they knew what exactly, because many cabinets and tables had not been touched at all... In a word, everything gave the impression not of destruction, but of a search carried out with experienced hands"28.
Due to the good organization of security, the attempts of the pogromists to penetrate from the outside into the premises of the Police Department were practically unsuccessful, although, as Ignatiev describes, it was sometimes difficult to maintain the defense. Already after
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As soon as the premises of the Police Department were taken under guard, a group of well-known representatives of science came to Commissioner Ignatiev, who proposed, in order to preserve the safety and full scientific use of documents, to move the materials of the Police Department to the Academy of Sciences.
However, the academicians did not have permission from the new authorities to move.
In his memoirs, Ignatiev describes in some detail several meetings with representatives of the Academy of Sciences who wanted to transport documents. Ignatiev could not dispose of the documents; the people's militia allowed the transportation of materials only when Academician Oldenburg received the appropriate powers from the Provisional Government29.
On March 3, they actually began to remove documents from Fontanka, 16 30. Materials that had already been deposited in the archive were removed, and not current office work: documents of the III Division and materials of the Department from 1880 to 1905. “Transportation of the archive took more than 2 weeks,” writes Ignatiev. So, of course, it was impossible to get by with just sleighs. Some of the materials remained in place. There was only movement from floor to floor.
This is how legends about lost archives are born. The special department, contrary to the assertion in historical literature31, was not damaged. This department of the Department was in a special position; it was well isolated from other structures, occupying the entire 4th floor on Fontanka, 16. There was a special access system. Even many employees of the Special Department could not always freely access all department premises32 and, accordingly, they could not know the location of the documents.
Due to the fact that the living quarters of some employees were located in the yard of the Police Department, it was possible to destroy documents, and some of the files were actually destroyed. The documents of the units located in the outbuildings facing Panteleimonovskaya Street were damaged. These were materials from the following structures of the Police Department: 5th office work - files on figures of the revolutionary movement who were subject to administrative deportation; 8th office work, where correspondence related to the criminal investigation was located.
There was also an attempt to destroy the Police Department's file cabinet, which was the key to almost all of its documents. As noted earlier, this card index was created in 1907, when the question arose about organizing a single alphabet in the Department. The card index survived. During the days of the revolution,
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A small part of the card index with surnames starting with the letter “A” was damaged, and approximately 10% of the cards were destroyed.
In the Special Department of the Department, two file cabinets were kept, one of them was merged into the general one in 1907. The other file cabinet for “top secret materials” remained in the department. Now it is called the file cabinet of “secret employees.” The content matches the title. But it is worth mentioning that in the “top secret” correspondence, not only secret employees were sometimes mentioned. And although cards for such persons should have been sent to a general file cabinet, this file file still contains information about persons who were not related to secret agents. As a rule, access to this file was always strictly limited. The above-mentioned card index contains 19,223 cards for persons involved in “top secret” cases of the Special Division of the Police Department. The main part of the persons included in it are secret employees, auxiliary agents, applicants, and tricksters.
For almost every secret employee, several cards were created: for the real last name, the nickname of the secret employee, and the illegal last name (if there was one).
Sometimes cards were drawn up only for the nickname. Some heads of local political investigation, when recruiting, according to instructions, reported to the Department the nickname, which party they work for, profession, payment, but did not always report the last name. Therefore, some cards have not yet been deciphered, but they do not concern major party figures.
Although the materials of the Police Department were dispersed to different addresses in the days of March 1917, they ultimately ended up in the same hands. By order of the Provisional Government, they were transferred to the jurisdiction of the already mentioned Special Commission for the Analysis of Cases of the Police Department.
The special commission worked until October 25, 1917. In April 1918, its materials and functions were transferred to the “Special Commission at the Secret Department of the Historical and Revolutionary Archives in Petrograd.” The commission went down in history as the Tyutchev commission, since it was headed by N.S. Tyutchev, famous revolutionary, populist, Socialist Revolutionary. She continued to systematize and describe materials from the Police Department, develop documents on secret agents, and respond to requests from the field.
At the end of 1919 the commission was abolished. Further development of materials continues at the “secret table” of the historical-revolutionary archive in Petrograd. However, let's go back to March 1917.
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As mentioned above, the development of materials on secret agents was carried out in almost all the largest cities of Russia.
Enormous work was carried out in Moscow by the “Commission for Ensuring a New System,” established under the executive committee of Moscow public organizations. It was created by a resolution of the executive committee of March 20, 1917. The chairman of the commission was Moscow Commissioner N.M. Kishkin. The chairman’s friend is attorney-at-law V.N. Malyantovich. The commission included commissioners, sworn attorneys S.P. Simeon and A.D. Godin.
The main tasks of the commission were:
1. “Prevention and suppression of counter-revolutionary actions.”
2. Identification of persons who were secret employees of the Moscow Security Department and the Moscow Provincial Gendarmerie Directorate. Due to the fact that materials from political investigation institutions evacuated from Poland ended up in Moscow and some provincial cities, at the initiative of the Polish public they were also subject to processing.
The commission for ensuring the new system included two boards: investigative and advisory. The investigative board carried out all the current work of the commission. Its composition included: a fellow chairman of the commission, a commissioner, and members appointed by the Executive Committee of Moscow public organizations. The composition of the board was changed and replenished through the co-optation of persons who had legal training, with a unanimous decision of the board to introduce these persons.
The advisory board consisted of the chairman of the commission, his colleague, and all members of the investigative board. Its members included representatives of the Moscow Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and representatives of various parties: Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Bund, Socialist Revolutionaries, etc. The board also included members of two subdepartments: 1) the bureau for the development of secret archives; 2) a commission to investigate the activities of secret employees working in Polish party organizations.
The advisory board considered “all issues of a fundamental nature, developed instructions for the activities of the investigative board and decided cases that were in the proceedings of the commission, which were not submitted for consideration by the Inter-Party Conscientious Court.” These were mainly questions of an organizational nature about the arrest of secret employees, spies, officers who served in the State Housing Department and
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security departments, release from custody, summons for interrogation, medical examination of prisoners.
The Commission for Ensuring the New System was an “investigative type” institution that enjoyed the right to apply various measures of public protection. The commission had the right to take a written undertaking not to leave this or that person and, if it considered this person dangerous at the moment, then it had the right to take him into custody.
The commission initially exercised the right of arrest based on warrants from the chief of police A.M. Nikitin and Commissioner of the Provisional Government in Moscow Kishkin. Subsequently, with the consent of the authorities, arrests were carried out on orders signed by a fellow chairman of the commission. The arrest orders of the commission were carried out through the chief of police.
As mentioned above, the Advisory Board included two subsections that worked on an autonomous basis. One of the subdepartments was called the Bureau for the Development of Secret Political Archives, which began functioning on April 20, 1917. The Bureau developed materials from the Moscow Security Department (MOO), which it received from the Commission for the Development of Archives of Political Affairs 3Z, formed in early March 1917. It, in turn, was formed under the Executive Committee of Moscow Public Organizations under the chairmanship of S.P. Melyunova (???). Initially, the duties of the Commission included monitoring the transportation of all political archives to a secure location, security, development of archives, development of the intelligence department of the Moscow Security Department to identify secret agents. The materials they prepared went to the employees of the Bureau for the Development of Secret Archives, who made inquiries, made extracts, copies, and prepared material for the investigative board.
The final authority to make a final decision in cases involving secret employees of the Moscow Security Department was the Inter-Party Conscientious Court, the regulations of which were developed by the Commission for Ensuring the New System and on April 19, 1917 approved by the Executive Committee of Public Organizations. The court included representatives from the RSDLP (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks), the Bund, Socialist Revolutionaries, Trudoviks, People's Socialists, Cadets - one representative from each party. The court's ruling was made by a majority vote of the court's members.
Preparing cases for hearing, reporting at the meeting, secretarial duties - everything was carried out by members of the investigative board.
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Court hearings were scheduled by the Commission as cases were prepared for hearing. The court in its verdicts characterized the activities of the defendant as a secret employee. As a measure to neutralize the defendants, the court issued a decision to deprive them of public trust. It provided for deprivation of the right to participate in political, public, and professional organizations. Those found guilty were deprived of active and passive voting rights during elections to the Constituent Assembly.
In relation to persons who posed a danger at the moment, the court issued a ruling on detention, but not later than until the day of the convening of the Constituent Assembly. The court's jurisdiction extended only to secret employees of the Moscow Security Department. Cases involving secret employees of the Moscow Provincial Gendarmerie Directorate were not submitted to the Inter-Party Conscientious Court for consideration. Completed by the Commission's investigation, they, by agreement with the Moscow Provincial Executive Committee, were transferred to the Executive Committee for consideration. Cases involving officials of gendarmerie departments and security departments were sent to judicial institutions. The inter-party court functioned from May 20 to July 17, 1917 and dealt with 33 cases during this time. Three people were rehabilitated by the court, three cases were sent for further investigation, 27 people were found guilty and were subject to restrictions in social and political rights. Of these, 15 people were released from custody, and 12 were supposed to be in custody until the convening of the Constituent Assembly34.
One of the first documents that came into the possession of the Commission and formed the basis of its work to identify and search for secret employees was a list of secret employees of the Moscow Security Department compiled by the Police Department. As cases were resolved, brief information about all secret employees identified on the basis of archival documents was published by the Commission.
In total, from March to October 1, 1917, 40 lists were published both in the form of separate brochures and in periodicals, in the newspaper “Bulletin of the Provisional Government” No. 35, 36, 84, 86 and 94 for June - July 1917.
The second subsection of the Advisory Board was the Commission to Investigate the Activities of Secret Employees Working in Polish Party Organizations. She occupied an autonomous position. Representatives of Polish public organizations worked in this subdepartment. They had at their disposal materials from that part of the political investigation institutions that were evacuated to Moscow during the war35.
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The investigation into these cases presented great difficulties due to the lack of the entire complex of materials in Moscow, although the necessary documents and confirmation were provided by the Special Commission for the Analysis of Cases of the Police Department. Obviously, the lack of employees involved in this matter and the inconsistent composition of the subdepartment also had an effect. However, Polish representatives were able to compile a list of 48 people who had sufficiently substantiated material confirming their cooperation with the Warsaw and Lublin State Housing Department, the Warsaw and Lodz security departments 36.
Lists of these persons were published by the Commission for Ensuring the New System. But this was only part of the material prepared and developed by them.
On July 16, 1917, the Provisional Government issued a decree on the elimination of non-judicial arrests. The decree stated: “To prohibit, under penalty of criminal liability, all government and public institutions, as well as officials and private individuals, without exception, from subjecting anyone to detention or restricting the rights to freely choose their place of residence and enjoy the freedom of Slovaks outside the procedure specified in the current laws.
To suppress arrests made extrajudicially before the day the decree was issued, provincial and regional commissions were established under the chairmanship of one of the members of the district court. The commission was deprived of the right to make new arrests; it was only given the right to retain previously arrested persons until October 20, until the convening of the Constituent Assembly. This decree practically established complete immunity for those employees who were not arrested before July 20, the day the decree was published.
Upon receipt of this decree, the activities of the Inter-Party Court were suspended, and the activities of the New System Commission itself became practically useless. The New System Commission tried to achieve in Petrograd the cancellation of the decree or its suspension for Moscow. But all attempts were unsuccessful.
The liquidation period of the Commission's activities begins in July and continues until October 1. The materials were received by the Commission until September 20 and until September 21, and investigations were carried out on them.
Materials from the foreign agents of the Police Department remained in Paris. The Russian revolutionary emigration in Paris and the Provisional Government were concerned about the safety of these documents. By decree of the Provisional Government, a Commission was created to analyze the archives of the former
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foreign agents. The commission had practically the same tasks as all commissions of that time: disassembling and describing documents, compiling lists of secret employees, fulfilling requests from the emergency commission of inquiry.
The Commission was headed by attorney at law E.I. Rapp. The members of the commission were V.K. Agafonov, M.M. Levinsky, S. Levitsky, M.P. Veltman, M.N. Pokrovsky. The commission was assisted by Weller, L.P. Gomel, S.I. Ivanov, Billit, Struzhetsky. Menshikov was invited as a consultant. Most of the Commission are revolutionaries from emigrant circles.
While analyzing materials from “foreign agents” and compiling lists of secret employees, members of the Commission spent a lot of time analyzing documents: reports, notes, lists of secret employees. They managed to establish the names of many secret employees who were initially known only by nicknames. Constant communication was established between the Paris commission, on the one hand, and the ChSK, on the other. Almost the entire set of documents was deciphered, most of them thanks to materials from the Police Department. Unfortunately, the documents from the foreign secret police did not return to Russia.
After the October Revolution, work to identify secret agents continued. As mentioned above, this work was carried out in the secret department of the historical-revolutionary archive in Petrograd.
The work of identifying secret agents was constantly under the strict control of the GPU. There was a special interest in persons working in political investigation institutions; they were looking for both secret and full-time employees of these institutions. On December 9, 1925, the OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars sends an official letter to the Central Archives of the RSFSR signed by Deputy Chairman G.G. Yagoda, the head of SOOGPU Deribas and the head of the 4th department Genkin, which spoke of the need to centralize and strengthen the work to identify “all provocateurs, secret employees and related categories” (“untrustworthy”, “who gave frank testimony”). It was said about the need to connect this work with the interests of SOOGPU, with the interests of an “operational nature”38. A work plan was also proposed to identify materials and compile a complete “card alphabet” for secret employees by last name and nickname.
December 25, 1925, head of the Central Archives of the RSFSR M.N. Pokrovsky raised the question of the need to transfer documents from the Police Department fund from Leningrad to
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Moscow. This was done at the suggestion of the OGPU, which was interested in analyzing the documents of the fund39. With the transfer of materials to Moscow, to the Archive of Revolution and Foreign Policy, this archive becomes a center for identifying and clarifying lists of secret agents. The same archive receives the funds of the Special Commission for the Development of Cases of the Police Department and the materials of the Commission for Ensuring a New System. At the same time, lists of secret employees, collections of copies of documents on them, and certificates are received from the provincial archives and from the Regional Executive Committees.
Thanks to local materials, secret officers known to the Police Department only by nicknames are being deciphered. The material available in the archive for a particular person is combined with the received documents. Based on the existing file of secret employees of the Police Department, two more working files are created, where all available information is entered. One file is for names, the other is for nicknames.
The name card created in the archive for a secret employee included the surname, first name, patronymic, and nickname of the secret employee. The card indicated the basic identifying information of the employee, if they could be found: year, place of birth, class, position, rank, in what years, in which political investigation agency he worked, how much he received. As a rule, the card contained several references: to a prepared certificate compiled from archive materials, to materials sent from the field, to materials from the Commission for Ensuring a New System and the Special Commission for the Analysis of Cases of the Police Department.
Over time, the guidelines for carrying out this work changed; during a frontal review of cases, prison doctors and doctors who witnessed the death of prisoners after execution, priests, and persons who gave frank testimony in agreement with their comrades began to be taken into account and registered. So, the famous doctor F.P. turned out to be in the file cabinet. Haaz and the revolutionary populist doctor S. Goloushev. Witnesses who spoke at the trial, representatives of military counterintelligence, postal officials involved in reading letters, persons suspected of espionage, and members of Black Hundred organizations were registered. The line between secret agents and employees of political intelligence agencies began to blur. The files of secret employees began to include spies, employees of gendarmerie institutions, and executioners.
The inevitable consequence of such a broad interpretation of the tasks by the compilers of the card index was that the card index included many people who had nothing to do with the secret
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agents. In part, the inaccuracies and errors were explained by the fact that some archivists did not always know the professional language of correspondence of pre-revolutionary political investigation institutions well enough.
In his practice, the author had to prove more than once that a fairly large number of people who were in the file cabinet were not involved in secret agents. These persons were identified in connection with the conduct of reference work. Therefore, there is no guarantee that there are no more similar names left in the file cabinet. Among the persons whose non-involvement in secret agents was proven was Nina Ferdinandovna Agadzhanova, a professional revolutionary, a party member since 1905. She was included in the card index on the basis of information about her in a illustrated letter.
In several of her articles, the author has already touched upon the fate of the Russian writer, friend of M. Gorky, Ivan Yegorovich Volnov, who, due to ignorance of the Oryol archivists of the intricacies of gendarmerie terminology, was also included in the number of secret employees, as the “author of intelligence information” obtained by the Oryol GZHU by intercepting it letters to relatives 40. The famous revolutionary Lydia Khristoforovna Gobi, after the end of the III Congress of the RSDLP, returned from abroad, came to Kiev and lived for several days at the Lionskaya Hotel. The spies who established surveillance of the revolutionary gave her the nickname “Lyonskaya”. The archivists, who were identifying documents for secret agents based on materials from the Kyiv State Housing Department, mistook the nickname of external surveillance for her nickname as a secret employee. This is how a “new” secret employee of Gobi appeared in the file cabinet. A lot of time passed before this matter was resolved. This list can be continued further.
By the beginning of 1941, all work on reviewing materials and compiling cards and certificates was completed. As was required back in 1925, the archive now had three file cabinets related to secret agents: a file cabinet of the Police Department (Special Department) by nicknames and surnames; a file of secret employees only by nicknames, a file of secret employees only by last name. The latter has 22,800 cards. It included all the secret employees who worked in party organizations and social movements in Russia, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states (mainly during the period 1880-1917), partly persons who gave frank testimony during interrogations. As mentioned above, the file cabinets included executioners, prison doctors, interrogation witnesses, spies, counterintelligence workers, and some representatives of monarchist organizations. That is
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all those categories of persons in whom the authorities were interested. But by this time interest in these individuals had already dried up. The war has begun.
Based on the collected material, in 1943-1945, on the initiative of TsGIAM (former archive of the Revolution and Foreign policy, and currently the Department for the storage of documents on the history of the Russian Empire of the Civil Aviation of the Russian Federation), it was supposed to publish a directory for secret employees, to include in it all the persons who passed through the mentioned card index. The work was delayed due to the small number of employees and their poor training, as the archive workers themselves admitted. In addition, some doubts arose about the sufficient validity of the arguments against some individuals. The directory has not been prepared.
After a long break, TsGIAM of the USSR returned to this work again in 1957-1959. This was due to rehabilitation. In addition, after the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, quite a lot of publications were published, where sometimes secret employees looked like real revolutionaries,” and the revolutionaries were accused of collaboration. The archive raised the issue of publishing a small edition, mainly for archives and publishing houses, of a reference book where it was supposed to name the names of secret employees working in the Social Democratic movement. However, this work was not completed.
As you can see, employees of various commissions and archivists did a lot of work to identify secret agents. But has it been summed up how many secret employees worked in the political investigation agencies?! How many auxiliary agents, tricksters, were there?
Agafonov, a member of the commission for examining cases of foreign agents in Paris, was the first to speak out on this issue. In his book, he gave two figures, both approximate and not documented. The first figure concerned the secret agents of the foreign secret police, about which he wrote: “As the study, still far from complete, has shown, of the archives of “foreign agents” ... through their hands in the period 1905 - 1917. about a hundred “secret employees” (“provocateurs”) passed through, to one degree or another involved in the “internal coverage” of their fellow revolutionaries, and sometimes in direct provocation; the percentage is quite significant, if we take into account that political emigrants during this time in Western Europe there were no more than 4 - 5 thousand" 41.
It is worth noting that Agafonov operates with numbers quite easily. According to other sources, there were at least 20,000 revolutionaries abroad 42.
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The first figure - "about 100" secret employees - is given over a period of 12 years. Agafonov accurately indicates the presence of foreign agent employees in 1913 - 23 people, but “of them 10 retired from work.” Moreover, in foreign agents, as a rule, agents worked for more or less a long time and, obviously, the figure of 100 people in 12 years is more or less realistic.
Very serious doubts, however, are raised by another figure, which concerns the total number of secret agents presumably on the eve of February 1917. Agafonov writes about this: “...At the gendarme corps there was another corps - secret employees, in number (30 - 40 thousand) approaching the composition of the army corps in wartime" 43.
What are his statements based on?! What period is this figure taken for? The above phrase of Agafonov is not based on calculations, reports, figures, but is given after the text of numerous circulars of the Police Department published by him, in which local political investigation institutions were ordered to engage in the acquisition of secret agents, auxiliary agents in all levels of society and in party organizations.
Agafonov’s figure was clearly taken out of thin air, but it was repeated by Shchegolev at the trial of the provocateur I.F. Okladsky in Supreme Court, when he said: “I believe that the army of secret employees is expressed in 35 - 40 thousand” 44.
So how many secret employees were there? 30, 35, 40 thousand?!
WITH light hand Agafonov, this figure has been passed from book to book for more than 80 years. None of the authors question it.
To answer the question posed, I would like to return to the 20s, when employees of the OGPU, based on materials from the Central Archive of the RSFSR, the Leningrad and local archives of the OGPU, published a list of secret employees, informants, auxiliary agents, which contained 4305 names 45. But this is where the work on The publication of lists of secret employees did not end. In 1929, the 2nd part of the list of secret employees of the former security departments and gendarmerie departments was published, which included 5,472 people 46.
In the author's opinion, these two lists reflect the real number of secret employees over the years of the existence of the Police Department. This is confirmed by the author’s own calculations, made from the files of secret employees available in the archive. The file cabinet of the Special Department stored in the RF Civil Code, containing cards for secret employees of the Russian Empire
P. 235.
and persons involved in “top secret” cases, has at its disposal 19,223 cards. Moreover, for almost every person, as mentioned above, there are 2, sometimes 3 cards. In this regard, we can safely say that no more than 10,000 secret employees were recorded in the files of the Special Department for the entire period 1880-1917.
The second card index, the creation of which was described in detail above, was compiled by surname and contains 22,800 cards. However, given that many secret employees (approximately 30%) had 2 or even more last names (in case of failure or threat of failure of a secret employee, he was usually given a passport under a different name). The actual number of persons included in the file was significantly less. In addition, while working with the card index, the author tried to count the number of people included in it, but who were not secret employees. There were a total of 7,770 people. Thus, excluding repetitions and the above-mentioned persons, we arrive at the same figure - about 10,000 people.
As for the third card index, also compiled during the Soviet period by nicknames, it basically repeats the card index discussed above. Since, however, many of the persons included in the second card index did not have nicknames (doctors, priests, counterintelligence officers, etc.), the total number of cards in it is smaller.
If we turn to two lists of secret employees issued by the OGPU in 1926-1929, “List of secret employees, informants and auxiliary agents of former security departments and gendarmerie departments,” which gives the agency for the entire period of activity of the Police Department, that is, from the 80s years, we find that the total number of persons in these publications is 9777 people.
Unfortunately, these reference books were classified as secret and were not available to researchers working on this issue. The lists include all categories of secret employees: internal agents, auxiliary agents, tricksters. Here were people who had worked both for a few days and for several years.
It is worth noting that Agafonov’s argument that the Police Department constantly insisted on acquiring secret agents and therefore the agents grew into an army plays against the figure he named. The department insisted on acquiring agents precisely because the process of acquisition and agency was difficult to get off the ground. In the end, the Department issued a circular directly affecting the heads of civil housing departments and security departments. The circular stated that the abilities of the head of the investigative agency would be assessed
P. 236.
the presence of secret agents. And what did this lead to? Unable to obtain agents, the officers began to resort to completely prohibited measures. S. Chlenov, who actively worked with the materials of the Moscow Security Department and the State Housing Department in 1917, writes that after another categorical order from St. Petersburg in 1911 to have informants among the population “placed between two fires, the gendarmes began to compile fictitious lists, including in them those persons to whom they usually turned for various certificates. Thus, both the local gendarmes and the provincial administrations found themselves with lists of their acquaintances, volost elders, clerks, elders, walkers, foremen, heads of various workers’ offices, and many of them were given nicknames without their knowledge, under which they were listed as informants, not receiving, however, no monetary reward. With the outbreak of the revolution in many places in the province, these lists caused quite large misunderstandings, until the latter were clarified as a result of the investigation of each individual case by the Commission for Ensuring the New System”47.
The example given concerned city and county police. A rather interesting example of a similar plan is given by Members about the secret agents of the Railway Department. When checking the railway committees, documents showed that “the search for railways by the time of the revolution it was still at the level of handicraft production. ...On the Moscow-Mozhaisk distance of the Aleksandrovskaya road, ...including the main workshops, there have been 5 employees over the past three years, the names of four of them were established and their carriers were arrested. Upon investigation, it turned out that of those arrested, only one was actually an informant. The remaining three were real “dead souls”, registered as employees without their consent, in order to demonstrate to their superiors that the acquisition of secret agents was proceeding quite intensively and successfully...”48
The secrecy of documents about secret agents for many years has led to the temptation for some researchers to re-read the biographies of a number of prominent political figures and try to find dark spots in their past.
There is especially great interest in party leaders of the first years of Soviet power. In the 20s and 30s, rumors about a particular person often spread through the Russian emigration. Thus, former officials of the Kyiv Security Department accused L.B. of provocation. Rosenfeld - Kamenev. V.V. Shulgin in his book brought to public attention his long-standing
236
conversation with G.S. Khrustalev-Nosar about L.D. Bronstein and his alleged connections in 1905 49 with the Police Department. Familiarity with these accusations prompts some researchers to repeat them today.
Questions are beginning to be discussed about whether Sverdlov 50, Kalinin, Stalin were secret police agents.
As for Frunze, they refer to Tukhachevsky’s words that Frunze’s death on the operating table was “agreed” with him, since allegedly by that time his connections with the secret police had been discovered 51.
Or maybe it was just the opposite? The version was spread in order to divert suspicion from the true culprits of the death. The pre-revolutionary period of Frunze’s life and his arrests do not confirm the stated version. There is not even any indirect data in the reports of various State Journalists about his secret work. And could it be that a secret employee was given a death sentence and sent to hard labor? It is worth noting that Nikolaevsky, who reported this in a letter to B. Souvarine, collected enormous archival material about the figures of the Russian revolution. But, unfortunately, in his articles and letters he more than once expressed similar versions, which in one way or another became known to him, without a critical approach to them.
Continuing the question about the number of secret employees, it is worth noting that the number of secret employees I mentioned does not, unfortunately, answer many questions related to the quantitative composition of internal agents. The fact is that this figure applies to the entire period of the existence of the Police Department and it does not say much about the number of agents operating at any given time period. There has been practically no agent who has been in this service for the entire existence of the Department. The service life varied, as already mentioned, from several months to 10 years. Accordingly, the number of agents operating at the moment was several times less than the figure mentioned above.
There are differences in estimates of this number. Thus, Zavarzin, in his memoirs, regarding the number of secret agents, wrote: “In all the investigative agencies of the empire before the coup, there were a total of several hundred secret employees in their current activities”52.
Some foreign researchers also come to the same conclusions.
One of the authors of the book “Fontanka, 16”, Ch. Ruud, having analyzed some materials and reports of representatives of the political investigation of tsarist Russia, notes that in 1909 in St. Petersburg
P. 238.
there were no more than 200 secret employees, and in Moscow in 1912 there were 159 agents. In large cities there were from 10 to 30 secret employees. Ch. Ruud comes to the conclusion that 1500 - 2000 people worked throughout Russia 53.
The author's own research leads to approximately the same conclusions. Analyzed financial reports political investigation institutions with lists of secret employees and persons included in this system for October - December 1916 and January 1917. 54 The total number of persons receiving monthly payment was 1,579 people; in addition to the general count, a count was carried out for individual categories of persons. Here are his results:
1. Secret employees working in party organizations and social movements - 520 people.
2. Auxiliary agents, not members of the organization, but sometimes close to them - 372 people.
3. Informants - 108 people.
4. Persons who provide information periodically and receive payment for this information, the so-called “pieces” - 169 people.
5. Applicants and random applicants - 46 people.
6. Some heads of the State Housing Administration gave general lists for all categories of employees at once; it turned out that there were 364 people.
Based on the data obtained, we can make an unambiguous conclusion that the number of secret employees who were members of party organizations or who had more or less constant contacts with them hardly exceeded 1000 people. In making this assessment, the author proceeded from the fact that the majority of persons from the last category did not belong to the number of permanent secret employees, since the very fact of submitting general lists testified to the desire of their compilers to cover up with these figures their failures in acquiring the most valuable categories of secret agents.
To summarize all that has been said, it can be stated that the documentary base reflecting the presence of secret agents during the existence of the Police Department allowed the commissions of the Provisional Government and archivists of the Soviet period to identify almost the entire list of secret employees.
At the same time, insufficient professionalism and especially the intervention of the internal affairs bodies of the Soviet period contributed to the “dilution” of the created file cabinets by a significant number of persons who were not secret employees. All this created and still creates serious obstacles to working with these materials, requiring special care and professionalism from all those who come into contact with them.
238
A note by A. Blok, discovered in the fund of the Extraordinary Investigative Commission of the Provisional Government. Compiled after a conversation with the former director of the Police Department S.P. Beletsky on July 6, 1917. Alexander Blok's autograph is published for the first time.
239
Notes
1 See: Ehrenfeld B.K. Heavy front. From the history of the Bolsheviks' struggle with the Tsarist secret police. M., 1983; him. From the history of the Bolshevik Party’s struggle against the subversive activities of the Tsarist secret police // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1979. No. 12; Koznov A.P. The struggle of the Bolsheviks against the subversive agents of tsarism during the period of reaction (1907 - 1910) // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1986. No. 12; him. The Bolsheviks' struggle against the subversive actions of the Tsarist secret police in 1910-1914. // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1988. No. 9; Ansimov N.N. The struggle of the Bolsheviks against the political secret police of the autocracy (1903-1917). Sverdlovsk, 1989; Pavlov D.B. Socialist-Revolutionaries-maximalists in the first Russian revolution. M., 1989.
2 The most famous judicial investigation commission of the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party on the Azef case in 1909-1910. GA RF. F. 1699.
3 Archives of “Land and Freedom” and “Narodnaya Volya”. M., 1930, S. 160 - 224; Past (Paris). 1908. No. 7. P. 146-152; No. 8. pp. 156-158. 1909. No. 9-10. pp. 248-251.
4 GA RF. F. R-5802 (personal fund of V.L. Burtsev).
5 Ibid. F. 1658.
6 Ibid. F. 1791. Op. 4. D. 16. L. 2.
7 Ibid. F. 1657. The materials of the court sessions of the public democratic court, its protocols, and decisions have been preserved.
8 Bulletin of the Provisional Government No. 1 (46) dated March 5 (18), 1917; dated March 12, 1917 See: Collection of laws and orders of the Provisional Government SU No. 61, department. 1st Art. 362 dated 03/04/1917; SU No. 61, dept. 1 of March 16, 1917, Art. 363, app. from 03/11/1917. See: GA RF. F. 1467. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 1.
9 For more information about the commission, see: Shchegolev P.E. Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government of 1917 // The Fall of the Tsarist Regime. Verbatim reports. M.; L., 1924. T. 1. P. XXVI-XXVII: Zavadsky SV. At the great turning point // Archives of the Russian Revolution. M., 1991. T. 11 - 12; Demyanov A. My service under the Provisional Government // Archive of the Russian Revolution. M., 1991. T. 3 - 4: Romanov A.F. Emperor Nicholas II and his government (according to the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry) // Russian Chronicle. Book 2. Paris, 1922; Avrekh A.Ya. Extraordinary investigative commission of the Provisional Government: plan and execution // Historical notes. No. 118. M., 1990 P. 72-101.
10 GA RF. F. 1467. Op. 1. D. 228-564.
11 See Rosenthal I. S. “Provocateur” (career of Roman Malinovsky). M., 1994. See: The case of the provocateur Malinovsky. M., 1992. S. 46-54. (Testimony given on May 26, 1917 in Petrograd); GA RF. F. 1467. Op. 1. D. 38.
12 Avrekh A.Ya. Extraordinary investigative commission of the Provisional Government: plan and execution. P. 89.
13 The fall of the tsarist regime. Verbatim reports. M.-L., 1924. T. 3. P. 273.
14 Zavarzin P.P. The work of the secret police. Paris, 1924. P. 21.
15 GA RF. F. 503.
16 Ibid. F. 504.
17 Ibid. F. 1791. Op. 4. D. 5. L. 1.
18 Ibid. F. 1467. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 4-4v.; Bulletin of the Provisional Government No. 88 of June 24, 1917
19 Collection of laws of the Provisional Government. St. Petersburg, 1917. Art. 363.
20 GA RF. f. 1791. Op. 4. D. 8. L. 9.
21 Ibid. F. 93. Op. 1-2. 1859-1916
22 Ibid. F. 111. Op. 1-5. 1877-1917. See: Svatikov S.G. Russian political investigation abroad. Rostov-on-Don. 1921. P. 3. :
23 Blok A.A. Collected works. T. 8 (letters 1898-1921). M.; L., 1963. P. 480. Letter dated March 23, 1917
24 See: Archival matter. Vol. XIII. M., 1927. P. 29.
25 Ibid. P. 27.
26 Ehrenfeld B.K. Heavy front. M., 1983. P. 9.
27 Izmailov N.V. Memories of the Pushkin House (1918 - 1928) // Russian literature. 1981. No. 1. P. 91.
28 GA RF. f. 1463. Op. 3. D. 418. L. 15-17.
29 Ibid.
30 Sidorova M.V. Archives of the central bodies of political investigation of Russia in the 19th - early 20th centuries. (III department of se.i.v.k. and DP Ministry of Internal Affairs) - dissertation for the scientific degree of candidate of historical sciences. M., 1993. P. 132.
31 Ehrenfeld B.K. Heavy front. From the history of the Bolsheviks' struggle with the Tsarist secret police. M., 1983. S. 8 - 9; Ansimov N.N. The struggle of the Bolsheviks against the political secret police of the autocracy 1903 - 1917. Sverdlovsk, 1989. P. 16, writes: “In the last hours of the tsarist regime, all the most secret papers of the Special Department of the Police Department were burned”; The volume of the Police Department's fund is 301,569 cases, of which more than 42 thousand are materials from the Special Department.
32 GA RF. F. 102. 00. 1902. D. 444. Lit. A.L. 7.
33 Ibid. F. 1791. Op. 4. D. 7. L. 1-7.
34 members of the Security Council. Moscow secret police and its secret agents. M., 1919. P. 4-5.
35 Ibid. P. 59.
56 Ibid. pp. 83-92.
37 Newspaper “Russian News”. 1917. July 20 (August 2). No. 164.
38 hectares of the Russian Federation. F. 5325. Op. 1. D. 214. L. 5-6; right there. D. 169. L. 100-102; see: Korneev V.E., Kopylova O.N. Archives in the service of the totalitarian state (1918 - early 1940s). P. 14; Dobrovskaya A.V. Preface // Guide. T. 1. Funds of the State Archive of the Russian Federation on the history of Russia in the 19th - early 20th centuries. 1994. S. X.
39 GA RF. F. R-5325. Op. 1. D. 169. L. 6-7.
40 Peregudova Z.I. An important source on the history of the revolutionary movement // Historical experience of the Great October Revolution. M., 1986. P. 381; Kaptelov B.I., Peregudova Z.I. Was Stalin an agent of the secret police? // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. P. 91.
41 Agafonov V.K. Foreign secret service. Pg. 1918. P. 4.
42 See: Svatikov. Foreign agents... M., 1941. P. 5.
43 Agafonov V.K. Foreign secret service. P. 216.
44 The trial of the traitor provocateur Okladsky. L., 1925. P. 25.
45 List of secret employees, informants, auxiliary agents, former security departments and gendarmerie departments. Part 1. M., 1926.
46 Ibid. Part 2. OGPU. M., 1929.
47 Security Council members. Moscow secret police and its secret agents. pp. 53-54.
48 Ibid. P. 57.
49 Shulgin V.V. What don't we like about them? About anti-Semitism in Russia. Paris, 1929. P. 281.
50 Lipratnikov Yu. Was Sverdlov an agent of the secret police // newspaper “Situation”. 1991. No. 1.
51 Domestic history. 1998. No. 1. P. 27.
52 Zavarzin P.P. The work of the secret police. Paris, 1924. L. 20.
53 Ruud Ch., Stepanov S.A. Fontanka, 16. M., 1996. P. 104.
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Tactics of acquisition of intelligence apparatus by entities carrying out operational investigative activities
The only way to get rid of dragons
- is to have your own.
Evgeny Schwartz
Legal connections between people are established
consciously and are the result of thoughtful
human activity.
VC. Babaev
Serednev Vladimir Anatolievich- postgraduate student of the Department of Criminal Procedure and Forensics of Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky. (NNSU, Nizhny Novgorod)
Annotation: The article discusses the tactics of establishing operational contact with citizens, and their further involvement in confidential cooperation with authorities carrying out operational investigative activities. The psychological characteristics of the types of confidants are also given.
Keywords: Operational search activity, tactics, agent, cooperation, information, assistance, recruitment, contract.
Introduction
This work is devoted to the study of issues of legal regulation of citizens’ assistance to bodies carrying out operational investigative activities.
Experience in the fight against crime shows that it is impossible to ensure the detection of crimes and the inevitability of the responsibility of criminals without countering their criminal activities with a targeted set of operational-search measures and investigative actions, without using data obtained through operational-search methods as auxiliary information, without involving citizens in assistance in the fight against crime. Receipt necessary information about the facts of crimes and criminal activity of individuals is possible almost only through covert penetration into the criminal environment using appropriate intelligence and search methods.
It should be noted that in Russia the opinion has taken root that hiding dashing people from the authorities, sympathizing with and helping the persecuted is good. Therefore, in the understanding of a significant part of our compatriots, informing government authorities about such persons was an informer, an unpleasant, vicious, flawed person. Meanwhile, in the world, an informant, an informant who reports information to the authorities about illegal actions, is a common occurrence, a reality of everyday life, to which the majority of the population generally treats favorably or neutrally, as well as the use of other special methods of work by authorized government bodies. This can be explained by the centuries-old traditional law-abiding nature of citizens and a fairly high level of public legal awareness. Even the Roman emperors had entire units of secret agents (“deliberators-informants”). When Richelieu was Special attention paid attention to obtaining secret information, including from a very good agent Charles d, Artagnan (the prototype of the hero of the novel about the three musketeers) [P.24,141]. The name of Daniel Defoe (author of the famous novel about Robinson Crusoe) is rarely mentioned in the press as the head of the English secret service, and who previously worked unsuccessfully as an agent. Outstanding successes in organizing secret work belong to Napoleon. Among the staff agents was Mata Hari, who could name among her lovers Canaris, who mercilessly and cruelly betrayed her most valuable agent.
The well-known scientist and criminal investigation practitioner I.I. Karpets, justifying the need for undercover work and defending it from sweeping criticism, noted: “I think that when they loudly shout about “shame” both towards the work itself and the agents, this is hypocrisy. When “the condemners are silent” - too. For, trying to be holier than the Pope, they understand in their souls that they still cannot do without this in the fight against crime. I believe that a realistically thinking person will come to terms with its necessity, realizing that the benefits of such work are obvious... Let us accept it as a given of social life. And it must be implemented by those who will suffer this fate in such a way as to minimize its negative consequences and bring maximum benefit to people.” In this regard, V.T. is absolutely right. Tomin and A.P. Popov, when they competently assert that “it is not the policeman who collaborates with an informant (agent) who is immoral... the law enforcement officer who, due to failure to use the operational and other opportunities provided to him, leaves evil unpunished and justice trampled upon, is immoral.” "
Historical and modern aspects of intelligence work.
Historical experience shows the need for the institution of cooperation between individuals and government agencies carrying out operational investigative activities, the use of which made it possible to prevent many crimes, including, which is especially relevant for the modern period, cruel Act of terrorism and other grave and especially grave crimes. In this regard, a more balanced and objective assessment of the nature of detective work and its core - undercover work - appears to be forming in the public consciousness. Nowadays, it is becoming common knowledge that rewards are awarded for information about persons who have committed a crime.
It should be noted that throughout the history of the Russian Empire, and even during the Soviet period, there was no corresponding legal regulation of the conduct of operational investigative activities in Russia. Only at the end of the twentieth century did Russian law enforcement agencies receive the necessary legislative framework, ensuring the proper organization of operational investigative activities and creating conditions for the acquisition of intelligence apparatus by entities carrying out operational investigative activities. Including the creation of conditions guaranteeing legal and social protection for persons providing confidential assistance to law enforcement agencies.
Previously, the legislative acts of the USSR and the RSFSR contained only indications of the possibility of conducting operational-search activities. Thus, in Article 29 of the Fundamentals of Criminal Proceedings of the USSR and Union Republics, it was stated that the bodies of inquiry are entrusted with taking the necessary operational investigative measures in order to detect signs of crimes and the persons who committed them. A similar provision was enshrined in Article 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR adopted in 1960. It seems clear that earlier operational-search activities, without having their own “open” law, took guidance for action from the instructions contained, as a rule, in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR. At the legislative level, the concept of operational investigative measures was not disclosed, but a “cult of secrecy” developed in relation to operational investigative activities. Even the names of the main normative documents regulating the conduct of operational investigative activities were not made public, such as: “On the state and measures to improve the practice of conducting cases of operational development and operational verification”, “Manual on intelligence work of the police” (Order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1974 No. ), “Manual on intelligence and operational work of the operational apparatus of the ITU of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR” (Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR of December 27, 1974), etc.
For the first time, first with the adoption of the Law of the RSFSR of April 18, 1991 “On the Police” and the Law of the Russian Federation of March 13, 1992 “On operational investigative activities in the Russian Federation” in Russian history a deviation was made from the practice of legal regulation of operational investigative activities of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies exclusively by closed (secret) departmental regulatory legal acts, and citizens providing assistance to bodies carrying out operational investigative activities received legal guarantees of protection from the state.
Currently, operational investigative activities are regulated by a number of laws, the main one of which is the Federal Law of August 12, 1995 No. 144-FZ “On operational investigative activities” (hereinafter referred to as the Law on Operational Investigative Activity). Guided by this Federal Law, on May 22, 1996, on the basis of Order No. 004 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the “Manual on the basics of the organization and tactics of the internal police department” was adopted. Since this legal act is “closed” (secret), since it contains information containing state secrets, we will try to consider such a sensitive topic as “tactics”, minimizing the risks of disclosing secret information. “Manual on the basics of the organization and tactics of the Internal Affairs Inspectorate of Internal Affairs”, details issues related to the involvement of citizens with their consent in cooperation; payment of monetary rewards to persons providing assistance to bodies carrying out operational investigations; carrying out covert operational-search activities; tactics of introducing and removing an agent into a cell of a pre-trial detention center to carry out intra-cell development (ICD); monetary compensation to agents for wear and tear personal clothing when working in isolation cells, etc. We can say that this normative act is a kind of “operational search code,” but classified as “top secret.”
Speaking about tactics in general in operational intelligence operations, it should be noted that, according to G. Schneikert, “Tactics is an inevitable adequate means in the fight against cunning criminals.” To successfully fulfill the tactical goals of acquiring an intelligence apparatus, it is advisable to take into account not only the personal qualities of the subject of operational-search activity, but it is also necessary to be guided by the moral and ethical standards of the relationship between this subject and the persons involved in his field of activity. It is impossible to take into account all the nuances of the personal relationships of an operational officer in federal laws and regulations. It is impossible to regulate in detail relationships with agents, residents, proxies, and keepers of safe houses. And the entire spectrum of relationships with citizens involved in the field of activity of an operational officer is practically not amenable to comprehensive legal regulation. All these and other problems can be resolved only if operational workers comply with the legal culture.
A systematic analysis of the factors underlying the decision to involve individuals in secret cooperation, and subsequent work with it, places serious demands on the employees themselves. This is, first of all, competence, high professionalism, legal culture and legal awareness. Among the traits necessary for specific operational investigative work, special mention should be made: honesty, integrity and objectivity, the ability to inspire trust in people, sociability, tact, willingness to take responsibility, good knowledge of the peculiarities of the criminal world, the ability to conduct confidential conversations, authority and respect not only among their colleagues, but also among people in the criminal environment. Obviously, for secret activity, these traits acquire certain, primarily psychological qualities.
The main types of assistance include: 1) vowel; 2) unspoken (confidential); 3) anonymous assistance. Assistance can be provided free of charge or on a paid basis. Depending on the duration of the operational-search relationship, one-time, short-term and long-term assistance is distinguished.
As can be seen from the law, two terms are used: “assistance” and “cooperation”. In this regard, it is necessary to indicate the meaning of each concept. Assistance usually means assistance, support in any activity, in any matter. To cooperate means to work together, to take part in a common cause, to be a collaborator. Cooperation is understood as Team work.
Persons providing assistance to bodies carrying out operational investigative activities are obliged to keep secret information that becomes known to them during the preparation or conduct of operational investigative activities, and do not have the right to provide knowingly false information to these authorities. Persons assisting bodies carrying out operational investigative activities, as a rule, have information containing state secrets, the disclosure of which could cause irreparable damage to both the preparation and conduct of operational investigative activities and other relations protected by law. Information constituting a “state secret” is specified in the law “On State Secrets”.
The use of the assistance of individuals by bodies carrying out operational investigative activities fully complies with the principles enshrined in Article 3 of the Law on Operational Investigation. According to this article, operational investigative activities are based on the constitutional principles of legality, respect and observance of human and civil rights and freedoms, as well as on the principles of secrecy and a combination of public and covert methods and means.
Those who provide assistance to bodies carrying out operational investigative activities on a contract basis must meet a number of requirements: special requirements, which are determined by departmental regulations of these bodies.
Confidential cooperation can also be carried out on a non-contractual basis and be expressed in providing the entities carrying out operational investigative activities with information available to them, office or residential premises belonging to them to solve the tasks of operational investigative activities through operational investigative activities. In more detail than in the Law on Operational Investigations, the issues of confidential assistance of individuals to bodies carrying out operational investigative activities are disclosed in the “Manual on the Basics of Organization and Tactics of Operational Investigations of Internal Affairs”, which is secret and contains information related to state secrets.
Motivation and psychological classification of agents.
Operational workers are obliged to study the personality and business qualities of their future secret assistants, to determine their abilities and capabilities for specific activities. At the same time, it is necessary to find out his social and psychophysiological qualities, the presence of real opportunities to provide covert assistance: profession, official position, criminal experience, knowledge of the lifestyle of criminals, jargon, his own role in the criminal environment and relevant connections, etc.
When involving a person in tacit cooperation, it is important to establish the motivation for cooperation, since it may act as a direct cause of his behavior. Motive is a predominantly conscious internal urge of an individual to behave in a certain way, aimed at achieving certain goals that satisfy certain human needs. The mechanism of motivation is very complex. It includes needs, expectations, incentives, attitudes, etc. The starting point, of course, is the need, which appears in the form of claims and expectations. Various incentives are aimed at satisfying needs. Based on the characteristics of unspoken cooperation, the motivation mechanism may require not only, and sometimes not so much, material reward as an expectation of another kind. This is a sincere desire to assist in exposing criminals, to “bring to light” those operating in enterprises, organizations, and institutions. These may be needs for self-realization (self-expression), personal needs (respect from others, recognition of autonomy, independence, etc.), the desire to satisfy one’s ambitions to a certain extent. The opportunity to evade criminal liability, this desire is not without meaning. Legislation on the basis of Part 4 of Art. 18 of the Law on Operational Investigation provides for the possibility of evading criminal liability: “A person from among the members of a criminal group who has committed an unlawful act that did not entail serious consequences, and was brought into cooperation with the body carrying out operational investigative activities, actively contributed to the detection of crimes, compensated for the damage caused or who otherwise makes amends for the harm caused is exempt from criminal liability.”
The very fact of attraction evokes complex and often contradictory psychological feelings in a person. Most often, on the one hand, he internally understands the correctness of the ideas and goals of cooperation, and they may coincide with his motivation, on the other hand, he seriously doubts the propriety and morality of his decision and is even often afraid of the upcoming, so unknown and complex activity. It is in such a situation that the condition of confidentiality of the relationship with an explanation to the person of his situation will help in choosing the right decision.
Among the methods of motivation, special mention should be made of the presence of coercive motivation, which is based on the use of power and threats. Influencing a person by force of these methods is in itself immoral, and if consent is obtained under their influence, then such assistance in the work will be very short-term, unpromising and, to a certain extent, dangerous due to the possibility of deliberate misinformation, double-dealing and others negative consequences. In this regard, it is no coincidence that the legislator insists on the voluntary consent of the person to participate in the preparation or conduct of operational investigations.
Based on the motivation of persons providing assistance to subjects carrying out operational intelligence activities, agents can be conditionally classified into 5 main psychological types.
1.)"FAIR", these include persons who, fulfilling their civic duty, consider it necessary to inform law enforcement agencies about persons engaged in illegal activities. This category of people sincerely wants to help law enforcement agencies in the fight against crime. But being essentially honest people who, as a rule, do not have criminal experience and, accordingly, connections in a criminal environment, the activities of this category of persons are ineffective. This does not mean that the help of these persons should be neglected in any case, if you want to assist the entities carrying out operational investigations to consider this issue.
2.) "CHATTERS", these include people who like to boast about existing information; their pride and overestimation of their own capabilities knows no bounds. Providing information to the subjects carrying out operational intelligence activities increases their authority in their own eyes, according to the principle “You’re the boss sitting here and don’t know anything, but I know, I know everything about everyone...” Information from this category of agents, as a rule, is superficial in nature, consists mostly of gossip, but sometimes brings positive results for solving the problems of operational intelligence. The issue of monetary remuneration is considered secondary; as a rule, they attach little importance to the financial side of their activities.
3.) "SELF", this category of agency speaks for itself from the name. These are people who have a great “love” for money. Regardless of intelligence abilities and capabilities, this category of people, as a rule, has a certain percentage of “double-dealers.” Here you need to indicate what is possible as a violation of the contract of engagement as an agent. According to which, the agent must be in operational contact with a certain full-time public employee carrying out operational investigations and follow his instructions, provide him with information about crimes. So is “double-dealing” in the form of a complete betrayal of the interests of operational-search activities. As for the first case, in this aspect it can be pointed out that persons of this psychological type are always looking for someone who will give them the most reward for providing them with operational information that helps solve the crime. As a result, agents of this category very often report the operational information they have (sometimes valuable for solving a crime) to several operational employees at once, wanting to receive a reward from each of them. By their actions, creating problems in the implementation of operational accounting cases (OD, DPOP, OPD, etc.), as well as the opportunity to create confusion when paying remuneration in the documentation, with the documentary report of the operational employee. Moreover, such behavior of the agent, in fact, excludes his “secrecy” as a result of his failure to comply with one of the principles of operational intelligence - secrecy, as a result of which he begins to be “recognized on the street.”
What concerns the second case, which is a classic case of “double-dealing,” is nothing more than a betrayal of the interests of the fight against crime, and sometimes the disclosure of information containing state secrets for personal gain, for the purpose of enrichment. In such cases, the issue should be considered depending on the consequences that may arise as a result of the fact of “double-dealing” by the agent. From terminating a cooperation contract with an agent to bringing him to criminal liability (for example, if it is established that his actions have a direct causal relationship with the crime and the agent’s possible complicity in the commission of the crime). Submitting knowingly false information about the event of a crime and the persons who committed it to the operational unit of the body carrying out operational investigative activities may constitute a crime under Article 306 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (deliberately false denunciation).
As for the intelligence capabilities and the value of operational information received by this category of agents, we can say that everything depends on each specific case.
Speaking about the duration of covert assistance from this category of sources, it should be said that, as a rule, they are long-term in nature and mostly depend on the monetary resource available to the entity carrying out the operational activity.
4.) "DEBTORS" , this category of agents is the most controversial, both in terms of the Federal Law “On Operational Surveillance” and the genesis of its appearance. Persons in this category, as a rule, are persons who have committed an offense (administrative offense or crime). Possibly brought to administrative responsibility. Exempt from criminal liability on the basis of legislation, both in connection with the termination of a criminal case against a person and the further termination of criminal prosecution (Articles 27, 28, 28.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, Articles 75, 76 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), and on other grounds: suspended sentence (Article 73 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) or those who received punishment for committing a crime in the form of imprisonment with a deferred execution of the sentence (Article 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation), or maybe even a refusal to initiate criminal proceedings against this person (Article 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation ). This can include persons who are under criminal prosecution and there is a criminal case instituted; a procedural decision has not yet been made. According to Article 17 of the Federal Law “On Operational Investigation”, as stated above, persons can be involved in confidential cooperation only with their consent. When considering this category of persons, we see a moment, i.e. in one movement we have two opposite movements. In this regard, the question naturally arises, what is the proportion of the true expression of the voluntary will of the person who has expressed a desire to cooperate with entities carrying out operational investigative activities. This person may be driven not only and not so much by a feeling of guilt for the offense he has committed, but rather by a possible “mitigation of his fate” by law enforcement officers for providing assistance to the latter in the form of providing information related to solving the tasks of the operational investigation (Article 2 of the Law “On Operational Investigation”). Nevertheless, regardless of the subjective thoughts of people in this category, if they express a desire to assist the operational units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, law enforcement officers must not only meet them, they are obliged to do so. This category of persons, as a rule, feeling guilty for the offense committed and wanting to “appease” law enforcement agencies with great enthusiasm, fulfill the duties (and rights) assigned to them as an intelligence apparatus by the Federal Law “On Operational Investigation”; both obtain information to solve the problems of operational intelligence activities, and participate in operational investigative activities (Article 17 of the Federal Law “On Operational Investigations”). It seems that it should be said that this category of persons included in the intelligence apparatus is the most efficient, as a rule, they have previous criminal experience, connections in a criminal environment and, accordingly, high intelligence abilities. But it should be pointed out that the agents of this psychological group, as their personal interest is resolved, for example, the termination of a criminal case against them, or the presence of a resolution to refuse to initiate a criminal case, as a rule, begins to withdraw from fulfilling the duties stipulated by the contract on recruitment
5.) "AVENGERS", the category of persons of the intelligence apparatus, which is the most unreliable, depending on the duration of assistance, as a rule, is a case of short-term assistance. It is necessary to understand the concept of “avengers” not in the sense that this category of people takes revenge on the criminal world and fights against it. Not at all, quite the opposite. This category of persons, with the assistance of the authorities carrying out operational intelligence activities, is driven by revenge towards someone, envy, and competition in a criminal environment.
We examined conventionally taken psychological groups, the individuals from whom the intelligence apparatus of operational investigative activities consists. In this work, we did not dwell on the types and subgroups of persons included in these groups (categories). In fact, persons providing confidential assistance to operational units are both women and men, married and single; married and divorced; those with and without children, employed and unemployed, etc. It seems that this issue requires separate consideration.
Based on the indicated psychological categories of persons providing confidential assistance to the authorities carrying out operational investigative activities, the operational officer must assume: what positive and negative aspects when working with agents he may encounter in practical activities.
Tactics for establishing and developing psychological contacts.
Psychological contact is the process of establishing and maintaining mutual attraction between communicating persons. If people become interested and trust each other, we can say that psychological contact has been established between them. The communication process, as a rule, begins with acquaintance. If the pretext of getting to know each other turns out to be natural and understandable, then communication will improve and the conversation will proceed quite naturally and easily. If the preposition is not clear or unnatural, does not correspond to the situation, the development of contact is hampered, and its prospect remains rather unclear. In practical activities there are many most various techniques choosing a pretext for dating. Conventionally, they can be divided into two groups: the first - the active party in the acquaintance is the subject carrying out the operational activity, the second - the active party is the object that may be involved in cooperation. Depending on the situation and the personality of the person of interest, either the first or second group of techniques is suitable. However, in all cases, creativity, resourcefulness, originality and ingenuity are required. But we must always remember that the first impression, as research shows, is formed on the basis of perception: a) appearance; b) expressive reactions (facial expressions, gestures, gait); c) voices, speeches.
It should be noted that if we look at people only as a means to achieve our goals, then nothing can help us understand these people and attract their attention to us. In the practice of operational-search activities, a friendly and caring attitude towards the person of interest can be depicted using the provisions of the K.S. Stanislavsky system, the meaning of which is to carry out certain physical actions. These can be certain gestures, statements, etc. The complement is very important when said.
Trust and goodwill on the part of the object are the most essential conditions in the development of relationships. An object that has entered the phase of trust in the communication process gains confidence that, relying on its partner, it does not risk anything. The prerequisite for such a state of communication is mutual understanding and goodwill.
“The ability to conduct a conversation is a talent,” said the French writer Stendhal. “For success in life, the ability to communicate with people is much more important than having talent,” said the English naturalist and politician D. Lubbock. The inability of an operational officer to conduct the necessary business conversation with a person of interest will, of course, be a gap in his operational and professional activities.
Communication is a complex and multifaceted process that acts simultaneously as an information process, and as a process of interaction between individuals, and as a process of their empathy and mutual understanding. Human society, including law enforcement agencies, is unthinkable without communication. In the structure of communication in the classics, there are three interconnected sides:
1. Communicative The side of communication consists of the usual exchange of information between communicating subjects.
2. Interactive The side of communication is the organization of interaction between communicating individuals, i.e. in the exchange of not only knowledge, but also actions.
3.Perceptual side of communication, as a rule, means the process of communication partners perceiving each other and establishing good mutual understanding on this basis.
In the course of operational-search activities, an operational officer and a person of interest, having met, exchange with each other various ideas, ideas, moods, feelings, attitudes, etc. In the context of operational investigative activities, information is not only transmitted, but also formed, clarified, and even very often developed and improved.
Depending on the nature of the operational-investigative activity, in the process of which and about which communication is carried out, as well as depending on the sphere of public life and on the distance of communication between those communicating, one or another side of communication may predominate - communicative, interactive, perceptual.
Note that there are universal communication techniques that are effective in relation to various areas human life activity, including in operational investigative activities, in particular, tactfulness, friendliness, sense of humor, etc. It seems that techniques that are effective for unregulated, free communication may very often turn out to be unacceptable for official or business communication. Communication techniques usually develop spontaneously, in the process of active interaction with partners. This process is greatly influenced by established traditions and the general psychological climate of social groups in which the person of interest is included. If the person of interest to the operational officer belongs to any social group, and in the subject of the operational investigation he sees a person from a different social group, then this certainly does not contribute to the creation of the necessary psychological contact, an atmosphere of trust; in this situation, the conditions are not created for fulfilling the main task - obtaining operational information. In this situation, the operational officer needs to know the main roles of various subcultures, including those played by the person of interest to the operational officer in life, and direct this person to take a role position that would most contribute to the resolution of this situation.
Tactics for obtaining information in operational investigative activities.
It is necessary to forever understand that at the initial stage of preparing a person for recruitment, the general psychological basis on the basis of which it is possible to obtain information of interest is the theory of the unconscious. The term “unconscious” is used to designate such phenomena that occur in the human psyche without being conscious of it. A classic example of the “subconscious” in the human psyche is dreams.
The point of obtaining information through elicitation is to, based on the general patterns of mental activity, induce him to transfer information in one form or another to an operational officer. Since this subject, as a rule, does not want to consciously transmit information, he must be encouraged to transmit it unconsciously. It is known that the line between the conscious and the unconscious is very arbitrary. I.S. Kon notes “that protective mechanisms are designed to maintain a certain integrity, stability, identity of individual self-awareness in conditions where conflict various installations puts it at risk." Based on the general theoretical principles and practical experience developed by mankind, we can distinguish two main ways to obtain the necessary information:
First- this is an inducement of the subject to involuntary statements of facts of interest to the employee.
Second- inducing the person of interest to involuntary physical and expressive actions containing relevant information.
Within these methods, one can identify a number of specific techniques with the help of which the information necessary for law enforcement agencies is obtained.
Demonstration of specific objects that “revive” corresponding images in the memory of the interested person and encourage him to make involuntary statements. The basic rule for using this technique is to encourage an involuntary utterance when demonstrating objects that should be associated with objects that would resurrect in the memory of the person of interest the events to be clarified.
Using a related topic of conversation. This technique generally makes it possible to conduct a focused conversation without resorting to asking questions. The essence of this phenomenon is that practically identical reactions occur in a person to all words that are similar in meaning, i.e. belong to the same logical group, and are almost independent of their sound or spelling. Thus, using a related topic of conversation to obtain information of interest to an employee is to revive the impressions stored in the employee's memory of the person of interest, mask the actual meaning of the related topic, and as a result induce him to inadvertently convey relevant information.
Using the sense of significance of a specific person. People generally try to maintain and increase their self-esteem. By touching on this feeling, you can ensure that the person of interest, defending his prestige, speaks out on an issue of interest to the operational officer (for example, the desire to sincerely help the interlocutor; a feeling of gratitude in response to the partner’s statements; the desire to surprise the opponent; help the person of interest to defend his point of view, this helps him feel personal importance in the eyes of others).
Showing indifference. The essence of this technique is the artificial manifestation of indifference to information that the interlocutor attaches great importance and considers very important for himself. This may hurt the interlocutor’s pride, which encourages him to express additional information that may also be of interest to the operational officer. But in this situation, it is worth mentioning that a manifestation of indifference on the part of an employee can prompt the interlocutor to speak only in conditions of trust.
Use of emotional stress. In this technique, emotional stress should be understood as mental stress when a person’s control over his behavior weakens. Enter the person of interest, in a state of emotional stress you can ask unexpected question; make an inaccurate or false statement; report supposedly “important” information; show your knowledge of something. The basic rule for using this technique is: if the task is to expose or incriminate the interlocutor, an unexpected question should confuse the person of interest; if it is necessary to confuse him, then it is necessary to provide for this person a way out of this situation. The basic rule of application of the technique: the falsity of the statement must be outlined basically correctly. Only some specific detail of information can be distorted. This technique is most effective for people who consider themselves “experts” or great scholars; they will definitely try to clarify and supplement the statement of the operational officer. Using important information is information that can change a person's mood and help direct the conversation in the right direction. Showing awareness is used when some details of an issue and events are already known and additional information is needed.
Planting false evidence. It has long been known that a person trusts ideas that arise in his own head much more than those that are presented to him by others. Therefore, an operational officer should always try to influence indirectly the way of thinking of the person he is interested in, and try to avoid direct pressure on the person. It is necessary, as if inadvertently, to throw certain information at the object, from which it must itself draw a conclusion. The whole point is that the person the operational officer is interested in draws exactly those conclusions and conveys them to the listener that the operational officer was counting on.
Creating the image of a “simpleton”. The essence of this method is that the operational employee deliberately belittles his mental abilities in order to create a feeling of intellectual superiority in the object of interest. As a result, the object loses its vigilance and becomes more vulnerable and accessible in terms of receiving information of interest from it.
We have considered the main (classical) methods of obtaining information, but it should be said that the list of these methods is not limited, it can be considered as expansive. The development and addition of other theoretical methods should ensure in practice the most effective work of subjects carrying out operational activities.
Preparation for recruitment and recruitment.
To establish cooperative relationships with persons who have agreed to provide assistance on a confidential basis is the right of employees of bodies carrying out operational investigations. Therefore, the initiative for such cooperation, as a rule, comes from operational workers. Law enforcement officials must carefully study the biography, lifestyle, Family status, professional activity, connections and habits, as well as political, religious views and beliefs of the person of interest to the operational officer, which will help to further establish contact in order to persuade him to confidential cooperation.
Let’s try, with the help of operational psychology, to figure out with whom we have to “go on reconnaissance” tomorrow. Operational psychology is not entirely a science. It is partly an art, like general psychology itself. Recruitment itself is a very complex process and, for the most part, quite lengthy. The selection of an intelligence apparatus is one of the most delicate moments in the work of subjects carrying out operational investigations. An error in choice can result not only in the personal drama of a person who has expressed a desire to cooperate with operational units, but also in the failure of a carefully planned operational-search activity.
According to a pre-developed plan, a “casual” acquaintance is organized, during which the study of the object continues, its ideological processing is carried out in the direction of interest, that is, it is determined what can be used as the basis for recruitment. No one ever makes a recruitment offer at the first meeting - this is gross unprofessionalism. At this stage, personal contact is established with the development object, which allows you to better feel the candidate agent in the process of communication, organize a deeper study of him as a person, and check for objectivity information on questions to which the answers are already well known.
The main emphasis when selecting candidates should be on balanced people who do not seek cheap popularity. This must be a reasonable, self-possessed and strictly organized person, mastering the logic of persuasion, with a high level of optimism and stability of mood. A person being prepared for recruitment must also have excellent knowledge of the surrounding environment and have extensive connections in a wide variety of sectors of society. The defining characteristics of an object’s professional unsuitability for use are the following: rich imagination, a tendency to invent events that do not correspond to reality or to give one’s own interpretation of the current operational situation.
Only after thoroughly studying a specific person can you pick up the keys to him. In any case, it is necessary to act very delicately, unobtrusively, not to get into the soul with questions, as they say, to look for common points of contact and common interests, to carefully look at the object of development, to identify its life values and priorities, and most importantly, weaknesses and vulnerabilities, using which you can effectively influence him. Never force things. In the art of recruitment, oratory, coupled with knowledge of psychology, is of great importance. Here, as in love, you won’t be loved by force. Realizing his communication abilities, the operational employee must be a subtle master of dialogue, an experienced polemicist and a brilliant speaker, who is characterized by the desire to achieve close interaction with the development object. Very important in the recruiting conversation is the so-called availability effect. It is usually considered in three aspects: technical, emotional and semantic.
Key points of the recruitment interview
1. During the recruitment conversation, the operational officer must establish close psychological contact with the target. During the conversation, the operative must monitor the target’s reaction by external manifestations (facial expressions, gestures, etc.), by the degree of perception of the proposed theses (active, passive), thus maintaining constant feedback with the target.
2. You need to behave confidently during the event, demonstrating strong conviction in your words.
3. The gaze should be directed towards the object. In a frank challenge, you should never avoid looking the object into your eyes; in a visual duel, he should be the first to lower his eyes. But constantly looking at one point is also not recommended.
4. Monitor the clarity of your speech, do not speak too quickly and in no case monotonously.
5. From the very first words, carefully observe the target’s reaction. The emotional component of your speech should be considered from the point of view of relaxation and relieving the target of emotional stress. This is achieved, for example, with the help of an appropriate joke or a not too abstruse anecdote.
6. At the culmination of the conversation at the time of the recruitment offer, it is necessary to speak with conviction, confidence, with emphasis on every word.
7. Under no circumstances should you give your target any reason to suspect that your speech is difficult for you, that you are tired or at some moments feel insecure.
Signing a cooperation contract.
The Law on Operational Intelligence provides for the possibility of concluding contracts on assistance (cooperation) with adults with legal capacity, regardless of their citizenship, nationality, gender, property and social status, education, membership of public associations, attitude to religion and political beliefs, with the exception of those listed in Part .3 Article 17 of the Law on operational activity (deputies, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, clergy and authorized representatives, officially registered religious associations. Note that the ban applies to secret cooperation with these persons only under a contract).
The contract allows you to define and consolidate in detail the relationship of the parties, the conditions and types of cooperation. The list of contractual conditions is determined individually and depends on the nature of the work performed, the personal and business qualities of the person accepting the obligation to provide assistance to the internal affairs bodies, and his real opportunities to participate in operational operations. The contract may stipulate special conditions related to the results of participation in operational-search activities, including the preservation of information constituting a state secret. The procedure for concluding and executing a cooperation contract is regulated by the “Manual on the Fundamentals of the Organization and Tactics of ATS Operations Operations.” The contract comes into force from the moment it is signed by the parties, unless otherwise specified in the text of the contract itself. Remuneration to persons providing assistance is paid from financial resources allocated for operational investigative activities in accordance with Article 19 of the Law on Operational Investigation.
Currently, there is information about possible changes in the form of involving citizens in confidential cooperation. On the abolition of such an institution of agreement as a contract. Replacement of the latter with a card of the established sample, as well as a number of other changes.
Some scientists believe that a contract on assistance to persons and bodies carrying out operational investigative activities cannot be considered as an employment agreement, because in this case the confidential person must be considered as a subject not only of operational-search, but also of labor relations. They point out that allegedly there are no labor relations between the confidential person providing assistance under the contract and the internal affairs body, and the cooperation relations that develop in the process of carrying out operational investigative activities cannot be regulated by labor law. I think this is not entirely true. The confidential person must be considered as a subject not only of operational-search, but also of labor relations. Activity is an occupation, labor, and operational legal activity is a type of socially useful legal activity. In the case of long-term assistance to the bodies carrying out operational investigative activities, this person should be assigned a labor pension. But I think this is a topic for a separate study.
Conclusion
Having considered tactical and theoretical problems legal nature regulating the involvement of citizens in confidential cooperation with bodies carrying out operational investigative activities, conclusions can be drawn.
1. Without the involvement of individuals in assisting the bodies carrying out operational investigative activities, and, in particular, without intelligence work, the activities of law enforcement agencies lose their essence and cannot be effective.
2. Issues of legal regulation of citizens’ assistance to bodies carrying out operational investigative activities are only part of a more general problem related to the legal regulation of operational investigative activities in general.
3. The tactics of attracting citizens to confidential cooperation (recruitment) is one of the most complex psychological structural elements of operational intelligence. The conducted research indicates that there is insufficient legal regulation and doctrinal development of the issues of attracting individuals to assist the bodies carrying out operational intelligence activities.
4. Having considered only part of the issues of legal regulation and tactics of attracting individuals to assist the authorities carrying out operational investigative activities, only the first step has been taken towards studying this problem.
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An order on which divisions of the department will be able to engage in intelligence work.
In the famous song “Our service is both dangerous and difficult” there is a small understatement. In the line: “and at first glance it’s as if it’s not visible” is silent important nuance: some facets of police work should not be visible - not at first glance, not at third glance, not at any other.
How many agents have operatives infiltrated into criminal groups? What phones are monitored? Who is being monitored? All this is an important state secret. But we all know that the police do this kind of work. Without operational investigative powers, law enforcement service would not only be dangerous and difficult, but also largely hopeless. Often it is secret methods that often make it possible to bring a criminal to light, although, of course, law enforcement officers should also be able to work openly - with public methods.
Not all employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have the right to engage in secret work. Let’s say a local police officer cannot introduce his own person into a gang of local alcoholics. If he does this, it will not be within the framework of the law on operational-search activities.
The head of the passport office does not have the right to put a “tail” on citizens - even with all the desire. The investigator, by the way, also does not infiltrate the gangs; he is engaged in procedural work. Therefore, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has a lot of employees and departments whose work takes place outside safe houses.
A list of units entitled to secret work has always existed in the relevant departments. But the reform in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is now ending, many structures have changed, and in general, the entire regulatory framework of the department is now being revised. Therefore, the ministry has developed an order clearly defining the list of units and officials authorized to carry out operational investigative activities.
The prepared list includes 13 divisions. At the same time, some of them have the right to engage in operational work to the full extent established by the relevant law, while others have clearly discussed specific forms of work.
For example, in police special forces centers and units there must be specially designated employees involved in operational work. They have the right to carry out the following operational-search activities: “survey”, “inquiry”, “surveillance”, “person identification”, “inspection of premises, buildings, structures, areas and vehicles”; use of confidential assistance from citizens. It is not difficult to guess that in this way operatives from special forces units will be able to identify, say, instigators during riots. By the way, many special forces vehicles, including water cannon vehicles, are equipped with video cameras and microphones. They record everything that happens around them. Then this data can become evidence in court. And while some special forces will forcefully calm down a raging crowd (for example, heated football fans), others will identify the leaders and the most zealous. It’s not enough to get a photo, you also need to find out the person’s name.
The list includes well-known names - criminal investigation, internal security services, and the national bureau of Interpol. Secret work can be carried out in full by units ensuring the security of persons subject to state protection. The order does not include, and this is expected, the traffic police, licensing and permitting departments. They have never been included in such lists; their work is transparent.