The history of the problem is well known. Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered to the Allies in August 1945. The Declaration limited Japanese sovereignty to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and smaller islands as designated by the Allies. The problem was to draw the state border between Japan and the Soviet Union, based on new political realities, and also to consolidate it in a peace treaty.
However, the coalition allies had already begun to be drawn into the Cold War, and the first clashes between the United States and the USSR took place in East Asia around Korea and Japan. Thus, international settlement Japanese question was not completed. According to Article 2 of the Peace Treaty concluded on September 8, 1951, Japan renounced all rights, title and claims to Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin, however, the agreement did not indicate in whose favor this refusal was carried out. The Soviet Union took part in the Peace Conference, but refused to sign the treaty. During the conference, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru emphasized that the southern Kuril Islands, Kunashir and Iturup were recognized Russian Empire as Japanese territory, while the islands of Shikotan and Habomai were part of Hokkaido and, accordingly, Japan [Sanfuransisuko 1951: 302-303]. More than fifty years have passed since then, but a peace treaty between Russia and Japan has not been concluded.
Naturally, the parties repeatedly made attempts to reach an agreement. Among other things, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro negotiated with the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev in 1955-1956. However, they were never able to come to an agreement on the issue of the Peace Treaty, limiting themselves to signing a Joint Declaration, according to which two smaller islands, the Habomai and Shikotan ridges, were to pass to Japan along with the signing of the Peace Treaty. In 1960, the Soviet Union unilaterally abandoned the Joint Declaration after Japan signed a new Security Treaty with the United States.
Since then, the Kuril Islands complex has been the subject of a dispute between the two capitals, with the Japanese side insisting that the "Northern Territories" were not part of the ceded Kuril Islands. The PCT is generally perceived in Japan as the “four island problem”, in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration signed by President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro in October 1993.
PST has become the object of serious research by many scientists [see. Kimura 2001; Wada 1999; Iwashita 2005]. However, most of them focused on the consideration of bilateral relations between Japan and the USSR (since 1991 - Russian Federation), while the positions of the USA and Great Britain, who were the main initiators of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in best case scenario very little attention was paid. Thus, the PST is still perceived as a subject of bilateral geopolitical dialogue.
The Cold War, of course, has not been discounted and continues to play important role, however, is considered a peripheral factor, which is perceived by most analysts as an ideological and geopolitical confrontation between the USA and the USSR, the center of which was Europe, while Asia occupied a secondary place. The PST did not owe its existence to the Cold War, but was largely influenced by it and was largely shaped by its events. Without understanding the essence of the Cold War in Asia and its consequences for the PST, it is impossible to understand the origin, evolution and Possible Solution the specified problem.
The Cold War in Asia has specific features. Unlike Europe, where a bipolar system emerged after the emergence of NATO in 1949 and the Warsaw Bloc in 1956, Asia went through a series of dramatic transformations, within which national liberation movements, decolonization, civil wars and even revolutions, and their apogee was the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 and the invasion of communist North Korea into South Korea in June 1950. The Korean War became the reason why Japan did not sign a Peace Treaty with all interested parties .
The San Francisco Peace Treaty left unresolved territorial disputes between China, the USSR and both Koreas. The end of the Korean War and Khrushchev's new doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" contributed to a softening of the Asian political climate. However, active hostilities were replaced by a real cold war, both within the states themselves and at the international level. In Japan, the internal Cold War was no less severe than in other countries, and the issue split the new Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Moscow, as will be shown below, opinions were also divided, although to a lesser extent. As a result, the process of agreeing on a peace treaty with the USSR was interrupted.
Origins of PST in post-war Asia
The PST is generally believed to have its origins in the Yalta Conference of the Allies in January-February 1945 and the subsequent military occupation of the Kuril Islands by the Soviet Union, when Roosevelt and Churchill made concessions to Stalin in exchange for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan. However, careful research shows that this problem is a much more complex and profound issue that came to light even before the US-UK-USSR coalition took shape. It originates from the pre-war geopolitical games of Moscow and Tokyo in 1939-1941, from the period marked by the resignation of the USSR Foreign Minister M. Litvinov and the arrival to this post of V. Molotov, whose geopolitical guidelines are well illustrated by the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”, concluded in August 1939
It was Molotov who raised the issue of the Kuril Islands in 1940, hinting at their possible transfer to the Soviet Union during negotiations with Japan on the Non-Aggression Pact, which were subsequently scrapped [Alexandrov-Agentov 1994: 54]. In his comments to the Japanese version of this document, he tied the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact to “the return of the previously lost territories of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands” [Tikhvinsky 2005: 269]. Molotov's remark shows that he did not know or chose to forget that the “Northern Territories” never belonged to Russia. Such a proposal was naturally rejected by Japan, and instead a Neutrality Pact was signed in April 1941. The Kuril Islands have become a latent problem in relations between Tokyo and Moscow.
Soviet foreign policy was based not only on ideology, but also on geopolitical thinking, which was professed by the “inflexible” Molotov, and even by such “pro-Western” diplomats as Deputy Foreign Ministers I. Lozovsky and I. Maisky. In December 1941, immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Lozovsky noted the possibility of revising the entire Soviet border after victory over the Axis powers. He especially emphasized that the USSR should not allow a situation to arise after the war when “Japanese warships will cut off our access to the Pacific Ocean,” mentioning, in particular, the Kuril Straits. Lozovsky's idea was voiced to Stalin and Molotov before the arrival of British Foreign Secretary Eden. By the beginning of 1942, the Soviet Politburo created two commissions to work on a peace treaty and the configuration of the post-war world order [Documents 1995: 114-115]. In January 1944, Deputy Minister Maisky delivered a report “On a Preferred Future World Order,” which was mainly devoted to Europe, with Asia mentioned only in passing. The report recommended that the Soviet Union refrain from participating in the war with Japan, but it contained persistent calls to “return” South Sakhalin (taken from Russia in 1905) and “hand over to us” the Kuril Islands (ceded to Japan under the Treaty of 1875) [ Documents 1995: 125, 133; Soviet 1999: 20, 35]. Thus, the “Yalta decision” was hatched in Moscow a year before the corresponding conference was held.
The Japanese side was also engaged in geopolitical calculations. Faced with Germany's defeat, the Japanese leadership resorted to the mediation of the Soviet Union. The Neutrality Pact was in force until April 1946, although Molotov warned Japanese Ambassador Sato on April 5, 1945 that the Pact would not be extended [Slavinsky 1995: 304]. The Japanese authorities were ready to cede the “Northern Kuriles”, wanting Stalin to meet them halfway. However, this maneuver was in vain. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan.
Contradictions in views on the occupation of Japan are noticeable already in Directive No. 1 of President Truman of August 15, 1945, according to which the United States was to occupy the main part of Japan, and the Soviet Union - only South Sakhalin; The Kuril Islands were not even mentioned in it. The next day, Stalin wanted to obtain an occupation zone in Northern Hokkaido and was met with a firm refusal. Thus, conflicts began between the former allies over the occupation of Japan, especially the Kuril Islands. A modern Russian historian also believes that conflicts between former allies over Japan and China originate from that period [Essays 2002: 333]. By October 1945, Stalin had taken a hostile stance toward the United States on issues such as control of Japan and Korea. The meeting of the three foreign ministers in Moscow in December 1945 marked a transition from allied relations to confrontation.
Korean War, San Francisco Treaty and PCT
The Peace Treaty with Japan took place in September 1951 in San Francisco amid growing Cold War tensions and fighting in Korea. The Soviet Union sent a delegation to San Francisco, but refused to sign the Treaty mainly due to the fact that representatives of the People's Republic of China were not invited to the Conference [Kapitsa 1996: 125]. In the context of the deteriorating military situation, the Japanese Communist Party also appealed to the Soviet Union with a request not to sign the Treaty [Shimotomai 2004].
Some of its features are also associated with the position of the Eastern Bloc states, which had a negative attitude towards the Treaty. Thus, in Article 2, Japan renounced its rights to six territories, including the Kuril Islands, but it did not indicate in favor of which states the renunciation was carried out. This issue was studied by Professor Hara Kimie and other researchers [Hara 2005]. Some see this as a "trap" set by John Foster Dulles (the main author of the Treaty and the architect of the Conference) to prolong Japan's security dependence on the United States by maintaining its differences with its neighbors, especially the Soviet Union.
Opinion on the Taiwan issue was also divided, with Britain recognizing the Communist government of China and the US supporting the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek. With the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, Japan quickly transitioned from a defeated enemy to an important regional ally in the eyes of the United States. The agreements reached at the San Francisco Conference, including the Security Treaty, were economically favorable enough for Japan to focus on rebuilding its economy. Meanwhile, Stalin became mired in the Korean War, which continued until his death in March 1953.
Negotiations under bipolar conditions (1955–1972)
During the Cold War, PST became part of an intense rivalry, a zero-sum game. However, a number of attempts have been made to resolve this issue. From a historical point of view, the detente that followed Stalin's death opened up the possibility of a change of position, especially for the Soviet leadership.
The leaders who succeeded Stalin, most notably Khrushchev, professed a different approach to the outside world. It was expected that East Asia would also be influenced by Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence", which replaced Stalin's belief in the inevitability of war between the communist and capitalist worlds.
Bipolarity also gave rise to internal differences in views on relations with the USSR, which was especially noticeable in Japan, where in December 1955 a faction was formed in the LDP under the leadership of Yoshida, which opposed the new approach of the Hatoyama-Kono faction to resolving relations with the USSR.
In October 1954, Khrushchev visited Beijing to discuss with Mao Zedong a new policy of "peaceful coexistence" in Asia, and they issued a joint declaration in which both demonstrated their intention to normalize relations with Japan.
In January 1955, a little-known Soviet official A. Domnitsky personally met with Hatoyama. Following this event, the Asian socialist states unanimously declared their desire to normalize relations with Japan. Even the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK expressed a similar intention in his statement of February 25, 1955 [Shimotomai 2006: 159].
The negotiation process is well documented by Professor Tanaka Takahiko and other scholars, and is also described in the memoirs of Ambassador Matsumoto Shunichi and journalist Kubota Masaaki [Tanaka 1995]. Khrushchev first hinted at the possibility of returning the smaller islands, Habomai and Shikotan, to Japan in August 1955. At the negotiations that took place in London [Kubota 1983: 32-34], Japan's position was quite flexible. Matsumoto himself was inclined to conclude a peace treaty on the above conditions. However, a chain reaction followed within the Japanese elite, and Tokyo began to raise the bar, which was a common occurrence domestic policy Cold War period.
The term PST, which had been in oblivion for several years, suddenly came into use again when Shimoda Takezo, head of the treaty department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, used it in a speech in parliament on March 10, 1956. Under the leadership of his superior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and former diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru, Takezō played perhaps a key role in shaping the term. Against the backdrop of increased domestic political pressure, Shigemitsu sought to take control of the negotiation process and began a new round of discussions in 1956, demanding that Moscow resolve the issue based on the return of all four islands. Faced with stiff resistance from the Soviet authorities, Shigemitsu changed his position and in August 1956 was already inclined to conclude a peace treaty on the terms of the return of only Habomai and Shikotan. However, the Japanese cabinet rejected his proposal.
Here the logic of the Cold War intervened. On September 7, 1956, Dulles informed Shigemitsu that if Japan agrees to sign a peace treaty with the USSR on the terms of returning only two islands, then the United States may not return Okinawa to Japan [Tanaka 1995: 266].
According to a declassified CPSU document concerning policy towards Japan, a week before Prime Minister Hatoyama's visit in October 1956, the USSR Foreign Ministry reported that a group of parliament members led by Ikeda openly resisted attempts at rapprochement with Moscow, despite the fact that that some circles, including the business community of the Kansai region, are favorable to improving relations with the communist bloc [Report 1956]. The Cold War and the zero-sum game had reached their climax, and Hatoyama decided to go to Moscow to sign only the Joint Declaration. This is evidenced by a number of documents published both in Japan and in Russia. Among other things, part of the documents devoted to the negotiations of October 1956 was published in Moscow in 1996 [Source 1996: 116]. There is a difference between the Russian and Japanese versions: the first omits the phrase "including the territorial issue" after the words "negotiations on a peace treaty", while the second contains the mentioned phrase; the corresponding document was published in March 2005 by Ishikawa, former secretary of Kono Ichiro, in the materials of his personal archive [Asahi Shimbun 03/15/2005]. There was a noticeable difference of opinion between Prime Minister N. Bulganin and Foreign Minister A. Gromyko, who included the specified wording in the text, on the one hand, and Khrushchev, who insisted on its exclusion, on the other.
Indeed, the diversity of opinions within the Soviet elite was all too obvious. In his memoirs, Khrushchev criticizes Stalin for his "inability" to conclude a peace treaty. Gromyko also criticized Molotov at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957 for preventing the rapprochement of positions with Japan [Molotov 1998: 231]. Molotov denies this statement. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Central Committee of the CPSU, including the USSR ambassadors to the PRC (Yudin) and the DPRK (Puzanov) stated that “class enemies such as Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov” were against reconciliation with Germany and Japan [Molotov 1998: 595], although Malenkov seemed to be a reformist. Perhaps Khrushchev's reform intentions encountered hidden resistance from the nomenklatura elite. One of the negotiators of those years, academician S. Tikhvinsky, still criticizes Khrushchev’s “voluntarism” [Tikhvinsky 2001: 155]. Tikhvinsky was Matsumoto's counterpart in London. He described Khrushchev's new course at the London negotiations as "voluntarism." However, he changed his point of view somewhat in 2006, when he criticized Khrushchev not for not raising the issue of the two smaller islands, but for the fact that he denounced the 1956 Declaration in 1960. Obviously, the change in position was due to new policy of President Putin.
I tend to attribute the difference of opinion to the fact that in October 1956 Khrushchev was faced - in the form of mass riots in Poland and Hungary - with the consequences of his campaign to debunk Stalin's cult of personality, as well as the North Korean crisis, which arose under the influence of leadership style and the cult of personality Kim Il Sung. V. Kovyzhenko, at that time - head. the Japanese sector of the international department of the CPSU Central Committee was also busy monitoring the situation in North Korea [Shimotomai 2006; Lankov 2002: 154-93].
The absence of the above-mentioned individuals from the signing ceremony of the Joint Declaration on October 19 gave Japan the opportunity to play on the differences of opinion between Khrushchev and Bulganin-Gromyko. Ambassador Matsumoto secured Bulganin’s consent to simultaneously publish the Gromyko-Matsumoto letter, which contained the wording “peace negotiations, including the territorial issue (emphasis added)” [Tanaka 1995: 150].
In 1960, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke set a course for rapprochement with the United States on the basis of a revised Security Treaty. Then the USSR unilaterally abandoned the Joint Declaration, thereby distancing itself even further from Japan.
Under the leadership of the pro-American Ikeda government in 1961, a new concept was formulated, the essence of which was that disputed islands were not part of the Kuril ridge. In other words, from a diplomatic decision, the PST turned into a propaganda tool for provoking anti-Soviet sentiment among the Japanese people [Wada 1999: 275].
Negotiations on the PTA during the period of "détente"
Only fundamental shifts in the configuration on the world stage could change the balance of power between Tokyo and Moscow. The bipolar system that emerged during the Cold War became increasingly "multilateral" by the 1970s, with the economic rise of Japan and the European Community. In the Asian context, it acquired new dynamism when the US-China détente in 1972 took the Cold War in Asia into a new dimension. This shift left the Soviet elites in a state of shock, and they began to reassess their relations with Japan. China's rise in status and its ensuing rivalry with the USSR opened a new window of opportunity to discuss the PTA.
Moscow sought to counter the US-China rapprochement with its recognition of Japan as a new economic power. Associate Professor S. Vasilyuk believes that Japan and the USSR had common interests - China and oil [Vasilyuk 2005]. In addition, after the "oil shock" Japan was in dire need of the energy resources of Siberia. Moscow and Tokyo held a series of negotiations that began with Gromyko's visit to Tokyo in January 1972, a month before Nixon's trip to China. The culmination of the negotiations was the visit of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to Moscow in October 1973.
During his visit, Gromyko not only smiled, but also did not behave in the usual manner of the Soviet leadership, which treated the PST as “an already solved problem.” During talks with Prime Minister Sato Eisaku on January 27, he hinted at a possible return to the “1956 formula.” If you believe Kapitsa’s memoirs, Prime Minister Sato did not answer anything to this, but in turn hinted at the possibility of Japanese assistance in implementing the project to build a pipeline from Irkutsk to Nakhodka.
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai also supported Japan's "just" demand for the return of the Northern Territories, and China continued to follow this line throughout the 1970s. Moscow was unable to prevent the normalization of relations between Japan and China in October 1972, but Soviet diplomats saw that Japan was unwilling to move forward on this issue. Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi made it clear during his visit to Moscow in October 1973 that Japan and China were not holding secret negotiations, and their relationship did not influence ties between the USSR and China.
The apogee of “détente” in relations between the USSR and Japan came when General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Prime Minister Tanaka confirmed that “after the end of the war, unresolved issues remained.” According to Kapitsa, they agreed to continue working to conclude a Peace Treaty in 1974. However, nothing came of this, and subsequently the misunderstanding even intensified: Tanaka insisted that the “unsolved problem” covered four islands, and Brezhnev and his circle were of the opposite opinion .
In 1974, Tanaka was forced to resign due to the Lockheed scandal and was replaced by Miki Takeo. As a dissident from the LDP, Miki also sought to find a solution to the PST, but his government turned out to be weak and divided. In December 1976, Fukuda Takeo became the new prime minister.
New course Fukuda was called "multilateral", which meant the lack of orientation towards clearly defined forces. He sought to use economic leverage to achieve foreign policy goals. China and ASEAN, as well as the USSR, were “natural targets” of his efforts. Despite the expansion of economic cooperation, political relations remained stagnant. By 1978, Sino-Soviet relations were so damaged that China insisted on including an anti-hegemony clause (which was aimed at the Soviet Union) in its Treaty with Japan. The USSR, in turn, proposed concluding a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation instead of a Peace Treaty.
Japan was inclined to sign an agreement with dynamic and reformist China, rather than with the gerontocratic and stagnating USSR. Japanese businessmen were more interested in the Chinese rather than the Soviet market, and their economic success reduced the need for Soviet energy supplies. Thus, even such a small chance for a settlement was missed, and the cautious optimism of the early 1970s gave way to pessimism by the end of the decade. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 completely damaged Soviet-Japanese relations.
Beginning in 1981, Japan began to celebrate February 7 (the day the Treaty of Shimoda was signed in 1855) as “Northern Territories Day,” reminding the Japanese of the Russian occupation. This delayed the resolution of the issue even further.
Perestroika and the end of the USSR
Perestroika of 1985-1991 gave a new chance for improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. Its initiator, Mikhail Gorbachev, was more popular among the Japanese than among his own compatriots. Mutual perception has changed radically. Relations with the Soviet Union began to be widely and openly discussed in Japan. However, both sides were unable to agree on a settlement of the “unresolved issue” [Panov 1992].
Until the 1980s, Soviet leaders perceived the territorial issue as part of separate geopolitical games that could only be played by the Secretary General and his advisers. During the Cold War, the "territorial question" could be resolved relatively easily, subject to a decision on the part of the Secretary General, since internal political resistance was unlikely. However, by 1991, it began to seem that even the country's most popular and powerful leader was unable to resolve this issue. On the one hand, perestroika provided an unprecedented chance, but, on the other hand, it limited the possibilities of its implementation.
At the first stage, in 1985-1988, the beginning of perestroika greatly influenced Japanese-Soviet relations, but this was followed by silence on both sides. At the second stage, in 1989-1991, both sides assigned big hopes for the upcoming first official visit of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to Japan, but in fact it was too late for Gorbachev to get closely involved in resolving this issue.
The period of “stagnation” in Soviet-Japanese relations left a difficult legacy for both states. After Tanaka's visit in 1973, for almost twenty-five years, not a single leading Japanese leader who could make decisions visited Moscow. Only in 1998 did Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo come to Russia on an official visit. Between 1985 and 1991 the only Japanese Prime Minister who had any understanding or experience of contacts with the Soviet Union was Nakasone Yasuhiro.
Under Uno Sosuke, who served as Foreign Minister in the government of Takeshita Noboru, a new concept of “extended equilibrium” was born in Gaimusho.
Japan's foreign ministers have had little influence on the country's foreign policy due to their generally short tenure in office. All important decisions were actually prepared and made by the Foreign Ministry staff. Abe Shintaro's influence even increased after he left the post of Foreign Minister and remained until illness limited his capabilities.
The initial reaction to Gorbachev as the new Soviet leader was indifference. Prime Minister Nakasone himself, who in March 1985 came to the funeral of Gorbachev's predecessor K. Chernenko, was an exception. During the visit of USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze to Tokyo in January 1986, some changes emerged. During this period, Gorbachev made several significant adjustments to domestic and foreign policy and delivered his historic speech in Vladivostok in July 1986. Behind the scenes, Shevardnadze boldly proposed “returning to 1956,” thereby acknowledging the existence of the territorial issue and the possibility of the return of Habomai and Shikotan . However, Gromyko criticized Shevardnadze’s position, and Gorbachev also did not support it [Kovalenko 1996: 209].
In 1987, the gulf separating the two states became even wider. Gorbachev's planned visit to Japan was postponed, and even visits by the USSR Foreign Minister became rare events. As a result, the Japanese Foreign Ministry adopted a “wait and see” approach. Former Japanese Foreign Ministry employee Togo Kazuhiko in his recent work refers to the opposition of some forces that resisted the expansion of Japanese-Soviet relations [Togo 2007].
In 1989-1991 started in both countries new stage. Despite the fact that on top level relations reached a dead end, the initiative began to come from the scientific community, which was a new phenomenon in Soviet politics. In June-July 1988, a number of scientists came out with fresh ideas and views on bilateral relations. By 1990, their position acquired a more encouraging character; they formulated arithmetic theories from “two plus alpha” (G. Kunadze) to three (V. Zaitsev) and, ultimately, four islands (A. Zagorsky).
What is striking is the growth in the number of researchers in both countries who began to complement the leading role of foreign affairs agencies, although they could not replace it. Concepts and wording have also changed. By the end of 1989, both sides were moving toward a positive outcome. It was a delayed reaction to the radical shift in Western perceptions and the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe that marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War.
At the instigation of Shevardnadze, who in January 1989 offered LDP General Secretary Abe contacts at the party level, the ruling party represented by the LDP entered the game on the Japanese side. Abe's new policy was to reduce the role of the "territorial issue" and expand the scope of Soviet-Japanese relations. During his conversation with Gorbachev in January 1990, Abe did not even mention the words “territorial issue” and suggested that “problems that cause headaches be solved with wisdom,” which was praised by Gorbachev.
Such diversity characters in Japanese politics coincided with the emergence of new political figures in the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin, who led the radical opposition in the Supreme Council, visited Japan in January 1990 and proposed a “five-stage solution.” Although this was perceived as a tactical maneuver, in fact it became a manifesto of new political forces that were quickly gaining strength and by the beginning of 1991 began to pose a real threat to Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership.
Despite Abe's unexpected death, his successor Ozawa Ichiro inherited his approach to relations with the Soviet Union. In April 1990, his mentor, Kanemaru Shin, dared to talk about the return of only two islands. Ozawa linked the territorial issue with other points, such as economic cooperation. His idea was not naive, as it was later characterized by critics who called it “an economic way to buy islands” [Gorbachev 1995: 264; Kozyrev 1995: 295]. In general, this plan consisted of “economic cooperation with Japan in response to the political initiatives of the Soviet side.” This approach was directly reflected in Academician Shatalin’s “500 Days” economic reform program, published in the summer of 1990. By the mid-1990s, both sides began to express cautious optimism.
Meanwhile, the Cold War in Asia began to wind down. This was evidenced not only by the warming in relations between Beijing and Moscow, but even more so by the USSR's recognition of South Korea after the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which helped to significantly ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK was dissatisfied with the normalization of relations between South Korea and the USSR. At the same time, Kim Yong Nam, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, in response to Shevardnadze’s desire to recognize South Korea, hinted at the DPRK’s possible support for Japan in its attempt to regain the “Northern Territories” [Shimotomai 2004: 160].
However, by the fall of 1990, the political climate in Moscow had changed again. Gorbachev has lost his influence. The era of the CPSU ended, and the presidential system that replaced it did not function properly. A similar trend was observed in foreign policy. By the 1990s, the once powerful and monolithic Politburo was replaced by amorphous structures [Ligachev 1992: 4; Klyutikov 1996]. Their interaction and modus operandi varied from case to case and were poorly coordinated. Former Foreign Minister Kozyrev in his memoirs emphasized this phenomenon in connection with the “Japanese problem” in 1990-1993.
As the "sovereign republics" declared their independence, the collapse of the USSR became increasingly possible, and Gorbachev's relationship with Yeltsin became increasingly complex. Gorbachev had to fight with two opposition forces: the growing "Soviet bureaucratic" opposition from his own circle and the "republican democratic" opposition. Although Gorbachev called his policies "centrist", by February 1991 he was in direct conflict with Yeltsin's radical approach. Reactionary-conservative sentiments intensified within Gorbachev’s team. Russian foreign policy experts such as Kozyrev and Kunadze openly opposed Gorbachev's initiatives towards Japan.
The most typical example of an increase in the number of actors on the Japanese side is Ozawa’s visit to Moscow in March 1991. During the trip, Ozawa directly offered “impressive economic assistance in exchange for the islands,” which caused exactly the opposite effect.
Gorbachev's official visit to Japan in April was important, but less significant than expected. Gorbachev really turned to the history of states; he handed over lists of Japanese prisoners of war and other prisoners who died in Siberia, and also promised to introduce a visa-free regime for former residents of the Northern Territories. The parties agreed to continue negotiations on a peace treaty using “positive elements of previous agreements,” and also openly discussed the applicability of the 1956 Declaration and the relationship between the Kuril Islands and the “four islands.” This was the state of affairs before, after a failed coup attempt in August 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus unilaterally announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
Klitin A.
Of course, everyone knows the military bloc NATO - a bloc created to counter the spread of communism, which includes the United States, Canada, Turkey and their European allies. After the collapse of the USSR, the goals of the alliance changed, but it is still discussed in the media in connection with its expansions to the east in 1999, 2004 and 2009.
However, not everyone knows that to contain and counter communism, 4 more blocs were created in Asia: SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization), CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), ANZUS (Australia - New Zeeland - USA) and ANZUK (Australia - New Zeeland-United Kingdom). This created the impression that the Soviet Union and other communist countries were surrounded by pro-American anti-communist regimes, but in reality, due to the different goals of the members of these military alliances and weak organization they, in fact, did nothing to contain communism.
CENTO (Central Treaty Organization)
The Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact) was created at the initiative of the United States and Great Britain in 1955 to counter communism and prevent its penetration into the Middle East region. Its participants were Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq (withdrew in 1958), Iran and Pakistan. The United States was not a member of CENTO, but had observer status in it and, being a member of its main committees, actively participated in the work of this bloc. CENTO was originally intended to include Arab states, but due to hostile relations with US ally Israel and fresh memories of their time as colonies of Great Britain and France, the Arab countries (with the exception of Iraq) refused to join the union.
The main bodies of CENTO were: the Permanent Council of Ministers (sessions were held annually), the Secretariat ( general secretary since 1971 N. Assar, Iran), military committee, committee for combating “subversive activities”, economic committee and communications committee; there was a Joint War Planning Staff, as well as a number of subcommittees and technical groups.
From the very beginning, this organization was torn apart by contradictions. The United States saw the main goal of CENTO as containing the Soviet Union, Great Britain saw the organization of uninterrupted supplies of Middle Eastern oil to Europe, and Pakistan joined CENTO to receive support in the confrontation with India. The activities of the Central Treaty Organization were also complicated by the fact that the United States refused to officially become a member of this organization, as they feared a negative reaction from Arab states and the Soviet Union, as well as Israeli demands for security guarantees. The lack of consolidation of the members of the Central Treaty Organization is also shown by the fact that during the Suez crisis of 1956, all Muslim countries participating in the Baghdad Pact condemned the aggression against Egypt, and Iraq and Pakistan demanded that Great Britain be expelled from this organization.
The next test of CENTO's strength was the fall of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958 and its subsequent withdrawal from this organization. It was from this moment that this organization received the name CENTO (before that it was called the “Baghdad Pact”), and the headquarters of this organization was moved from Baghdad to Ankara.
Muslim member countries of CENTO have repeatedly protested the US policy towards this organization, believing that the US does not take this bloc seriously. The grounds for this were Washington’s refusal to provide military assistance to CENTO member countries and to modernize their defense system. The US did consider CENTO an alliance of minor importance, as it considered conflict between the USSR and US allies in the Middle East unlikely. In addition, the US and UK never shared with their Central Treaty Organization allies their plans for waging war in the event of a conflict with the USSR, partly because they did not trust their Muslim allies. Mistrust arose from the fact that the United States was critical of the military potential of its allies in Southwest Asia, believing that their armies would only be needed for primary deterrence Soviet troops. Also, with all the loyalty of the Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the United States considered him a weak, vain ruler, and after 1958 (taking into account the increasingly increasing social stratification in Iran) they seriously began to fear his overthrow. All this could not suit the Islamic states participating in CENTO, who, as the US Embassy in Tehran reported, believe that Washington perceives them as “children.”
In addition, contradictions between Iran and Pakistan intensified over the province of Balochistan, captured from it by the British in 1896 and included in Pakistan.
The CENTO organization did not prevent the USSR from strengthening its influence in South-West Asia and Africa: the USSR supplied weapons to Arab countries, helping them in the confrontation with Israel, and established friendly relations with Egypt, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Mozambique. To be fair, it should be noted that Moscow’s friendly relations with Somalia and Sudan did not last long, and Egypt took a pro-Western orientation with Anwar Sadat coming to power in 1971, but US alliances with many third world countries were also not durable.
“For us, the Soviet threat overshadowed everything, but Pakistan was more concerned about its relations with India than with the USSR and China. The Baghdad Pact itself was more important for establishing relations between its members than for repelling Soviet aggression. Neither in SEATO nor in the Baghdad Pact were we bound to their members by the same commonality of purpose that bound us within the European Defense Union,” wrote Henry Kissinger.
This bloc ceased to exist after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the withdrawal of this country from CENTO. After this event, the member countries of CENTO decided to dissolve the Central Treaty Organization, since without Iran the existence of this bloc was meaningless.
SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)
This bloc was created through the efforts of the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, its creation was recorded by the Manila Pact of September 8, 1954. The members of SEATO were the USA, Great Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia and Pakistan (the latter was accepted on the condition that it persuaded Ceylon (Sri Lanka) to join this organization, but failed to fulfill its promise). The main body of SEATO was the Council of Ministers, which included the foreign ministers of the member states of this bloc or their deputies. Subordinate to the Council of Ministers was the military planning committee. SEATO's headquarters were in Bangkok. Like CENTO, this bloc was supposed to help contain communist states and prevent the emergence of communist regimes in Southeast Asia.
The need to create this bloc for the West was dictated by the rapid spread of communism in Asia: the formation of the PRC in 1949, the formation of the DPRK and the subsequent Korean War of 1950-1953, unrest in Indonesia and Malaya (future Malaysia), as well as the creation of a communist regime in northern Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh. All this contributed to the growing concern of Western countries and their Asian allies and led to the creation of this bloc.
This bloc was supposed to become a projection of NATO in Southeast Asia; all participating countries agreed that in the event of an attack on one of the parties to this treaty, the remaining participants would come to its aid. In addition to military exercises, economic and cultural ties between its participants were strengthened within the framework of this bloc. However, in terms of its effectiveness, it never reached the level of NATO, as Henry Kissinger writes in the above passage.
During the Vietnam War, 5 members of SEATO assisted the South Vietnamese regime in the fight against North Vietnam, but this could not prevent the unification of North and South Vietnam under the rule of the communist regime of Ho Chi Minh. France and Pakistan condemned the entry of American troops into Vietnam and did not support their allies. After the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, the question arose about the feasibility of the existence of this organization - Pakistan (1973) and France (1974) announced their withdrawal from the organization. Also, the dilapidated SEATO was unable to stop the Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot from coming to power in Cambodia, although South Vietnam and Cambodia were on the list of territories protected from communism. In 1977, this organization was dissolved and finally ceased to exist.
ANZUK (Australia-New Zeeland-United Kingdom)
ANZUK is a military-political bloc created in 1971 on the initiative of Great Britain in order to protect Malaysia and Singapore, which were also members of this organization. He justified the presence of British troops in Asia, which corresponded to the interests of Great Britain in this region. Was considered by the United States as a conduit for its interests in Southeast Asia, an allied bloc that could provide assistance in the fight against communism. However, the Australian government, which came to power in 1974, began to reduce the number of Australian armed forces in Singapore. This prompted the collapse of ANZUK, and in 1974 the decision was made to dissolve it.
ANZUS (Australia-New Zeeland-United States)
On September 1, the Pacific Security Pact was signed between representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, giving rise to the ANZUS bloc. Initially, this agreement was concluded due to fears of Australia and New Zealand that Japan would attack them again after some time. However, article three of this treaty directly stated that in the event of an attack on Australia or New Zealand, the United States would only be obliged to consult with its allies; they would have to decide for themselves whether to intervene in the conflict or not. However, according to the Australian website skwork.com, it was called a great diplomatic success for Australia, helped reduce its dependence on Britain, and placed Australia at the "center of politics." All parties to this treaty later joined SEATO and fought together in Korea and Vietnam.
However, in 1985, New Zealand refused to accept a US Navy ship with nuclear weapons, which was regarded in Washington as a betrayal. America has suspended its commitments to New Zealand. In 1987, New Zealand declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The military alliance between the United States and Australia continues to this day.
Sources:
- http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/38169 //Definition of the CENTO organization
- http://www.inoforum.ru/forum/index.php?s=96614f238a324d246f718f5d8c010791&showtopic=24379&st=10&p=1084553entry1084553 //Help on CENTO and SEATO
- http://www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00013/00013part3c.htm //Views and concepts of regional security in Russia and the USSR
- http://sun.tsu.ru/mminfo/000063105/323/image/323-163.pdf //US Policy in connection with the transformation of the Baghdad Pact and the formation of the CENTO bloc. V.P. Rumyantsev
The second half of the twentieth century is a time of great confrontation between two military-political blocs. On the one hand, this is NATO, and on the other hand, the Department of Internal Affairs. The forerunner of this confrontation was the Korean War of 1950-1953.
Beginning of confrontation
Second World War allowed countries to unite different views on the socio-political structure, economic development. All this was done for the sake of victory over the common enemy - fascism. However, then the paths of the former allies diverged. During the war years, the USSR strengthened significantly in all respects, and other countries, primarily the United States, were forced to reckon with this. The final stage war took place on Far East. Here, American and Soviet troops inflicted a crushing defeat on the Imperial Japanese Army. The consequence of this was the liberation of Korea from Japanese troops - and at the same time the occupation of this country by allied forces at that time. The north of the peninsula was controlled by Soviet and Chinese troops, and its southern part came under the rule of American authorities.
"Appetites" of Korean leaders
According to the Allied plans, the division into zones of occupation was a temporary phenomenon. In the near future it was planned to combine both parts into a single whole. However, both the American and Soviet sides took advantage of the opportunity and began to hastily strengthen their influence in the parts of the peninsula allotted to them. In the south, with the support of the occupation administration, elections were held and Korean authorities were organized, headed by Syngman Rhee. He adhered to authoritarian methods of management. Moreover, his political views were reactionary. He was one of the initiators of the events that later became known as the Korean War. Its second direct initiator was the protege of the Soviet-Chinese forces, Kim Il Sung. Both sides announced the need to unite, but each wanted to do it under its own leadership. But no matter how strong these desires were, the real reason for this confrontation was the gradual deterioration of relations between the USSR and the USA.
Geopolitical puzzle
On the part of the Soviet Union, there were fears that the United States, by subjugating Korea, would thereby pose a direct threat to the Far Eastern borders. After all, the peninsula had a land border with the USSR, and the Soviets did not want to have a hostile state at their side. The Americans, in turn, expressed alarm about the unification of Korea under the leadership of the “North,” since this threatened their interests in Asia and, in addition, drove the United States out of the Sea of Japan. Therefore, these two superpowers were the true orchestrators of events on the peninsula. Of course, we cannot ignore the contradictions between Korean leaders. But they were of a secondary nature. As the Soviet-American contradictions intensified, including at the UN negotiation platforms, the rhetoric of the leaders of the “North” and “South” became increasingly harsh. They did not mince words. At the same time, each side threatened to unite the country with bayonets. The Korean War was approaching at alarming speed.
On the verge of confrontation
The government of Syngman Rhee had a very modest military potential and, without American reinforcement, could not resist the northerners. To avoid a direct clash between American and Soviet troops, in 1948 they were completely withdrawn from the peninsula. Only military advisers remained in the relevant parts of the country. While the southerners were verbally threatening Kim Il Sung, he was intensively preparing for a clash. Since 1948, the number of North Korean troops has gradually increased. USSR helped military equipment. However, Stalin rejected the request to provide assistance to the “North” with manpower, fearing the start of a new global conflict. For two years - from 1948 to 1950 - there were intensive consultations between Moscow and Pyongyang, the climax of which was Kim Il Sung's visit to the USSR. Similar actions were taking place between Seoul and Washington. The contradictions reached such intensity that the outbreak of hostilities was only a matter of time.
Korean War 1950-1953
At the end of June 1950, the northern troops went on the offensive. The Korean War began, which lasted almost three years. The first stage of hostilities is marked by the complete superiority of the North. Within a few months, his troops penetrated deeply into the territory of the south of the peninsula. The government and senior officials left Seoul in a hurry. By the end of the year 1950, the war in Korea acquired global significance. The Americans understood that it was necessary to provide urgent help to the southerners. A number of decisions were carried out through the UN, which the countries of the socialist bloc sharply condemned. Despite this, the United States insisted on its own, and under the auspices of the United Nations began urgently supporting Seoul. American and British troops, as well as military equipment began to arrive in Korea. Soon the successful offensive of the North was stopped, and South Korean troops, with the support of UN forces, launched a counteroffensive.
Military pendulum of luck
The war in South Korea under these conditions became a threat to the defeat of the “North”. The USSR and China could not allow this. Therefore, the Soviet Union sent military specialists and a large number of technology. China, in turn, began sending mass “volunteers” to the Korean front, the number of which reached a million people.
The war in Korea became protracted. Neither side of the conflict could achieve a military victory. Both Washington and Moscow began to understand this. Throughout 1951-1952 there were fighting With with varying success. Confidence grew in the futility of solving the problem by military means.
The change of leadership in the USA and the USSR was of no small importance for ending the war. Eisenhower, who became president at the end of 1952, took active steps to end the conflict, and in March 1953, J.V. Stalin died. The Presidium of the Central Committee spoke in favor of ending the war.
Fragile world
After intense negotiations, a ceasefire and prisoner exchange was agreed upon in July 1953, but the US war in Korea did not end there. To this day, the American military guards the borders of the Republic of Korea. The result of the agreement was the separation of the warring parties along the 38th parallel, i.e., the “status quo” that existed before the start of the war was achieved. North Korea and South Korea a peace treaty has not yet been signed, and clashes on the border are not uncommon these days.
Cold War in Asia. The arena of the Cold War was not only Europe, but also Asia.
During the war with Japan, Soviet troops occupied the territories of Manchuria and North Korea. In 1946, control of Manchuria and captured Japanese weapons were transferred to the Chinese communists, which significantly strengthened their position.
In China since the late 1920s. there were two states and two governments. The national government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, controlled 70% of the country's territory in 1946 and was recognized by the majority of countries in the world and represented on the UN Security Council. The Chinese communists, supported by the USSR, created their own system of laws in the areas they called liberated, introduced their own currency, and carried out reforms leading to the establishment of equal land use.
The war between the “two Chinas” resumed immediately after the defeat of Japan. Attempts to reconcile them, made in 1945-1947, did not lead to any results. By the end of 1949, despite US support for Chiang Kai-shek's regime, the Chinese civil war ended in communist victory. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed between the USSR and China. Remnants of anti-communist forces under the command of Chiang Kai-shek under cover naval forces The US evacuated to the island of Taiwan.
The transformation of the USSR into a superpower, which, as Washington believed, controlled not only Eastern Europe, but also China with its population of hundreds of millions, and the USSR’s testing of an atomic bomb in 1949, which deprived the United States of its nuclear monopoly,” caused panic in Washington. In assessing the international situation, the US ruling circles were convinced that further expansion of the borders of the socialist camp controlled by the USSR would lead to an irreversible change in the balance of forces in the world in its favor.
In the context of the emerging military confrontation between the USA and the USSR in Asia, the signing of a single peace treaty between the former allies and Japan turned out to be impossible. In September 1951, in San Francisco, the United States and its allied countries signed a peace treaty with Japan, which did not prohibit it from entering into military alliances and did not limit its armed forces. Simultaneously with the peace treaty, the United States signed a “security treaty” with Japan. According to this treaty, the United States received the right to maintain military bases in Japan, while guaranteeing the protection of its territory and the stability of democratic institutions. Japan gave up its former overseas possessions, including the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin. However, since the USSR did not sign a peace treaty as a sign of protest against the Japanese-American military alliance, it did not include a clause recognizing these territories as part of the USSR.
Thus, the outbreak of the Cold War did not make it possible to clearly record the results of the Second World War, which in subsequent decades became a source of additional friction in the international arena.
“Third World” is a conventional name for developing states - countries in Africa and a number of regions of Asia, whose people, during the liquidation of colonial systems, created nation-states and embarked on the path of independent development. Somewhat earlier, this path was chosen by the peoples of Latin America.
Despite the differences between the countries of the “third world” in terms of socio-political structure, most of them have a lower level of economic and cultural development compared to the industrial powers of Europe, North America, Japan and the most developed countries of the former “socialist bloc”. Third World countries are the poorest, as measured by their per capita income, and are concentrated mainly in Asia, Oceania, Africa and Latin America.
The main result of the development of the “third world” countries by the end of the 20th century. can be considered an increase in their economic gap with Western countries.
In the countries of the former colonies of the West (more than 130 states), in the past, due to violent changes in the social structure, economic life was stagnant, and backward political relations remained. Most developed countries treat them as sources of raw materials, sales markets and a profitable place for investment. Elimination of their backwardness as