Briefly about the article: The history of battleships and battlecruisers - the most powerful combat vehicles ever created by man.
Twilight of the Giants
Latest generation battleships
A lifeless Concordian dreadnought floated past us. The battleship was hit hard, and it’s hard for me to imagine what else, other than the armor-piercing silimite shells of other battleships, could so disfigure the mighty flying fortress.
Alexander Zorich “Tomorrow is war”
The largest warships have always been considered the beauty and pride of the state, the embodiment of the strength, wealth and technical excellence of the state. But boom and bust always go hand in hand. In the 30-40s of the 20th century, heavy artillery ships reached the limit of perfection. This means that they could no longer develop further, keeping up with the times. We present to your attention the story of the rise and fall of the most powerful fighting machines created by man.
"Treaty of the Five Powers"
In 1922, Great Britain, the USA, France, Japan and Italy entered into an agreement on the limitation of arms at sea - the so-called “Washington Treaty”.
Surprisingly, the main inspirer of disarmament was England - the strongest naval power, making the greatest sacrifices in accordance with the treaty. While other states parted with only a few obsolete ships and limited the construction of new ones, the British “let under the knife” half of their battle fleet.
The past and future of the artillery ship.
The reasons for such “generosity” were, of course, predominantly economic. The war depleted the kingdom's resources. In any case, the British were forced to make their “Great Fleet,” where 400,000 sailors served, half as large.
Tactical considerations also played a role. At the beginning of the 20th century, England thoughtlessly built ships, trying to maintain a two-fold superiority over the Germans. The classic dreadnought had a speed of about 20 knots and was not suitable for active operations. For shelling coastal targets, monitors with a shallow draft were much better suited. The only purpose of the battleship was to fight similar enemy ships. And if the enemy did not come out to fight, the ship became only a “financial destroyer.”
Parade of "irons" of the English "Grand Fleet".
No one was particularly eager to get into a fight, and the English and German fleets stood at their bases for almost the entire war. It turned out there was nothing to fight for: the German fleet from Hamburg could not threaten England’s communications; The British saw no point in invading the North Sea.
Running boar
Speed solved not only the problem of the battleship's mobility, but also significantly reduced its vulnerability. The projectile's flight time at a distance of 20-25 km reaches 40 seconds. During this time, the battleship shifted by 2-3 corps and, noticing the flash of an enemy salvo, could change course.
An increase in speed by one and a half times also reduced the number of enemy submarines that managed to intercept the ship. The accuracy of torpedo fire was also significantly worse. Destroyers, whose speed at that time most often was 35-37 knots, could practically not be dangerous. In order to catch up with the fleeing giant, they needed to spend 2-3 hours in the range of its guns.
At a distance of 20-40 kilometers, even the colossus of a battleship turns into a small moving target.
Fast battleships
By the end of the war, it became clear that the battleship, with the same level of armor and armament, should have a speed of at least 27 knots. More powerful machines would increase the ship's displacement to approximately 45,000 tons, but few such giants would be required. Faster ships are easier to transfer from one theater of operations to another. Instead of waiting years for a pitched battle with enemy battleships, a fast ship could participate in operations, accompanying and supporting cruisers.
But the Washington Treaty, among other things, prohibited the construction of ships with a displacement of over 35,000 tons. A fast battleship did not fit into this framework. As a result, in the 20-30s, the powers did not even use the established limit on the number and total displacement of battleships. The limitations still did not allow the creation of a ship with capabilities that met the requirements of the time. The consequences of the Great Depression also had an impact.
Until the end of the 30s, the British launched only Rodney and Nelson - ships of no outstanding merit: well armed (9,406 mm guns) and protected, but slow-moving. The Americans decided on 3 similar Maryland-class battleships. The Italians, French and Japanese did not build anything. The Germans were bound by the Versailles restrictions. And in the USSR socialism was built.
The situation revived only in the last pre-war years. As soon as there was a smell of gunpowder, the powers rushed to arm themselves, unanimously throwing away Washington's restrictions. But it was already too late. In total, only 23 fast battleships were built during the pre-war and war years.
Dry numbers do not give a completely adequate idea of the combat effectiveness of these ships. Thus, in terms of the ratio of protection, speed, armament and displacement, the Littorio looks the most advantageous. But if Italian ship armor by that time was the best in the world, then the guns of this country were of very low quality.
"Rodney" (Nelson type). Participant in the hunt for the Bismarck.
In one respect, it was the Italians who demonstrated the overwhelming advantage of a fast battleship over a conventional one. During the battle of Matapan, the Vittorio Veneto received a torpedo in the stern, lost half of its propellers and sank into the water along the deck... But even after that, the old English Valiant could not catch up with it.
On the other hand, formally undistinguished German battleships, due to their well-thought-out design, showed incredible survivability under enemy fire. The British fired about 40 shells with a caliber of 356-406 mm into the Bismarck. Moreover, the last shots were fired from a distance of only 2500 m. In addition, the battleship was hit by 4 torpedoes. But after the war, an examination of the hull lying at the bottom showed that the Bismarck sank as a result of the discovery by the crew of the Kingstons.
The Tirpitz also unpleasantly surprised the enemy. It remained afloat after four 2-ton mines laid by saboteurs exploded under the bottom. The British were able to “get” it only with bombs weighing 5.5 tons. The Tirpitz did not sink immediately, but after 3 direct and several close hits. By the way, Roma, the last of the three Littorio-class battleships, disappeared under water after being hit twice by bombs weighing 1,800 kg.
"Littorio". The Italians were better at building ships than fighting them.
If you ask yourself which project was the best, you will have to admit that most types of high-speed battleships were approximately equal in strength. The European ones had better protection, the American ones had more powerful weapons. The title of best ship in the class is traditionally claimed by Yamato and Iowa. Moreover, one can hardly doubt that the much more powerful Japanese battleship would have easily emerged victorious from the duel.
Gigantism did not make the Yamato a lumbering monstrosity like the German Mouse supertank. Careful selection of the hull shape provided it with even better maneuverability than many other battleships, acceptable speed and the ability to operate in shallow water.
"Tirpitz". A gloomy mass.
For their part, the Iowas were distinguished by better balanced characteristics, and would have surpassed the Yamato in performing any combat mission (except, in fact, the battle with the Yamato). The speed of these ships is sometimes even stated as 33 knots. The wave raised by a battleship at full speed posed a serious threat to the destroyers accompanying it. But sometimes it was also life-saving: experienced captains specifically sent their ships into it so that the water that washed over the decks would extinguish the fires.
"Yamato" in battle.
Soviet Union
By the beginning of World War II, the USSR had only three old battleships built during the empire. One of them was based in Sevastopol in order to, on occasion, neutralize the Turkish battle cruiser Yavuz (formerly the German Goeben). The other two in the Baltic were preparing to add volleys of their guns to the fire of Kronstadt's coastal batteries. After all, the indicators of “Marat”, “Paris Commune” and “October Revolution” looked modest even by the standards of the First World War. This state of affairs did not seem acceptable to the Soviet leadership. The “Great Shipbuilding Program” adopted in 1938 provided for the construction of 15 giant battleships of the “Soviet Union” type. But by the summer of 1941, only 4 were laid down. The country's industry was not yet ready to produce either armor or vehicles for battleships. After the victory, completion of the Soyuz did not resume. Both because of the devastation, and because it became known: at a significantly higher cost, Soviet battleships and battle cruisers would have been no better than the American Iowas and Alaskas.
"Marat". Displacement 22,000 tons, speed 21 knots, 12 305 mm guns, 225 mm armor.
Battlecruisers
Another option for a heavy artillery ship were the battlecruisers that appeared at the beginning of the 20th century. With the same displacement and armament as battleships, ships of this type had lighter armor, but increased speed to 25-29 knots. It was assumed that the combination of agility and weapons would allow the battlecruiser to participate in both raids and battles.
But in reality, for patrolling communications, the battlecruisers turned out to be over-armed. Guns with a caliber of 343-381 mm could only be needed to fight battleships. But the armor did not allow the cruiser to engage in battle with them. Also in Battle of Tsushima The first to go to the bottom was the battle cruiser Oslyabya. In the Battle of Jutland, the British lost 3 battlecruisers, but not a single battleship. The Germans also lost an old battleship and a battlecruiser.
However, after the First World War, the flagship of Her Majesty's fleet was the battle cruiser Hood - the largest and closest ship to the ideal of a “fast battleship”. But the result of his meeting with a real high-speed battleship - the Bismarck - was quite predictable. After the second hit, the Hood exploded. Whereas the battleship Prince of Wales, even having received 5 shells from Bismarck, left the battle only due to a technical malfunction.
Battlecruisers of World War II: Hood and Gneisenau.
The new generation battlecruisers were designed only for combat with other cruisers, which made it possible to reduce the caliber of their guns. By the beginning of the war, the French had built Dunkirk and Strasbourg, while the Germans acquired Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. And if the French ships were distinguished primarily by the original placement of weapons (the main caliber in two 4-gun turrets on the bow, auxiliary guns on the stern), then the German version was distinguished by armor that was absurdly powerful for a battlecruiser. Having limited themselves to protection only from the fire of 203 mm guns, the Germans would have received a truly ideal “cruiser killer” with a speed of 34-35 knots.
The original characteristics of the Scharnhorsts were connected with the fact that, having freed themselves in 1935 from Versailles (but not Washington!) restrictions, the Germans tried to get both a full-fledged battleship and a raider at once. Moreover, within the permitted 35,000 tons. Naturally, the result left much to be desired.
French battle cruiser Dunkirk.
Battlecruisers were also designed in other countries. But the American Alaska and Guam (undoubtedly the best ships in their class) appeared only towards the end of the war, and did not have time to take part in hostilities. Two Soviet Kronstadt-class cruisers were not completed.
"Pocket" battleships
The classification of the German ships of the Deutschland series is an old subject of controversy. Can they be considered battlecruisers?
There's really nothing to argue about here. The Germans themselves used the definition of “panzership” only to circumvent the Versailles restrictions. After the start of the war, the Deutschlands were immediately assigned to the class of heavy cruisers, which was clearly indicated by both their displacement and armor.
The cruiser Deutschland (Germany) was later renamed Lützow. To reduce moral damage in the event of its sinking.
Battleship vs aircraft carrier
Nowadays, it is often argued that by the beginning of World War II, the battleship was an obsolete type of ship. The outcome of the battles was determined by aircraft carriers, because the most powerful guns They hit a maximum range of 40-45 km, and carrier-based aircraft are capable of detecting and attacking the enemy at a distance of 300-400 km.
But the strategists of the 40s did not share this point of view, rightly believing that comparing a battleship with an aircraft carrier was as absurd as comparing it with a submarine. No one disputed the advantages of naval aviation, but on land airplanes did not replace guns. Only in Japan did the production of battleships cease in 1943. In the USA and Great Britain, battleships were built until the end of the war.
Aircraft carriers aroused justifiable mistrust among admirals. After all, aviation is active only during the day and only in good weather. During the night, the high-speed battleship managed to strike and go beyond the reach of the torpedo bombers. The best sailors - the British and Japanese - prepared to fight at night. And preferably in severe storm conditions. The exercises of the navies of these nations were of such an extreme nature that they often led to the loss of ships. Right down to battleships.
The displacement of modern aircraft carriers exceeds 90,000 tons. Yamato's record has been broken.
But it’s hard to learn, but it’s easy to fight. At night, the Japanese used ordinary binoculars to detect American ships earlier than the Americans were able to spot the enemy using radar. The British conducted convoys through the Strait of Sicily in weather such that enemy destroyers sent to intercept disappeared in the waves, radioing: “We are drowning, long live Italy!”
According to the pre-war ideas of British, Japanese, German and American admirals, an aircraft carrier was supposed to constantly accompany 2-3 battleships, carrying out reconnaissance and protecting them from air attacks. Accordingly, he was forced to act regardless of the weather and approach the enemy at the same distance as his “wards”. And this, in turn, required the ship to be equipped with powerful armor, even at the expense of the number of aircraft on board. The Japanese went the furthest, arming some of their aircraft carriers with 8-inch cannons.
Aircraft carriers would remain an auxiliary force in the battle fleet. But in 1941, Admiral Yamamoto made a revolutionary decision to use them independently and on a massive scale. Only by choosing the time and place of battle at its own discretion could naval aviation fully exploit its advantages. Having lost battleships at Pearl Harbor, the Americans were forced to adhere to the same tactics. The British remained unconvinced for a long time.
Admiral Yamamoto.
American aircraft sank the giant Yamato and Musashi, a fact often seen as proof of the superiority of aircraft carriers. Indeed, neither the most powerful anti-aircraft artillery (24 universal 127-mm guns and up to 150 25-mm machine guns) nor barrages from 460-mm guns saved the battleships from the armada of bombers. But... no aircraft carrier could have held out for so long against a quarter of the forces deployed on the Yamato. The only thing was that the battleship was not designed to operate under conditions of complete enemy air dominance.
Jean Bart, the last of the battleships built, was laid down before the war.
Universal caliber
In the 1930s, 12-20 universal guns of 114-133 mm caliber, intended for fire at both surface and air targets, became the standard armament of battleships. The exceptions were the German Scharnhorsts and Bismarcks. Their creators were so sure that fighting destroyers required a caliber of at least 150 mm that they even tried to install 6-inch guns on their own destroyers.
Naturally, the battleship also received 12 of these guns. Another 14-16 anti-aircraft guns were intended to combat aviation. As a result, the total weight of the auxiliary artillery salvo in relation to the weight of the main caliber salvo was 26% for the Scharnhorst, instead of 3-13% for “normal” battleships. Undoubtedly, " standard kit"Auxiliary artillery with less weight would better protect the ship from attacks both from the sea and from the air.
Anti-aircraft fire.
Post-war years
With the last salvos of World War II, the history of battleships basically ended. Although they were still under construction. In 1946, the British launched the Vanguard, an unremarkable ship that differed from its King George-class brethren only in its speed increased to 30 knots and armed with eight 381-mm cannons taken from old dreadnoughts. In 1950, the French completed the construction of the same type as Richelieu, Jean Bart.
In the USSR, new battleship projects continued to be developed until 1953. But none of the plans were translated into metal. As a result, the flagship Soviet fleet the Novorossiysk remained - the captured Italian battle cruiser Giulio Cesare (Cavour class), born in 1914.
In 1955, in the harbor of Sevastopol, the Novorossiysk was destroyed by an underwater explosion of unknown origin. Such an explanation as “sabotage by foreign intelligence services” can apparently be thrown out of the window. For this ship no longer represented any combat (or even propaganda) value. In the very near future, like other battleships, it was expected to be scrapped.
"Novorossiysk" after the disaster.
By the end of the 50s, not only old battleships, but also most of the newest ones had already been cut into metal. The Americans felt sorry for only 4 Iowas. They decided to preserve them until the occasion. As a result, the eternal rest of these battleships turned out to be very restless. The Iowas fought off the coast of Korea, then they were “awakened” during the Vietnam War. They then supported the landing of American troops in Lebanon. In 1984, they even decided to put the battleships back into service “on a permanent basis”, re-equipping them with 32 Tomahawks. It was assumed that with the help of cruise missiles and guns they would be able to protect aircraft carriers and hit ground targets.
The Iowas would still have served... If the USSR had not collapsed.
In their latest “rebirth,” the Iowas combined artillery and missile weapons.
It is worth mentioning another quality of the battleship, which in 1984 seemed to the Americans an important advantage. A battleship looks more impressive than an aircraft carrier and, unlike it, can approach a hostile coast close enough for the natives to notice the US military presence with the naked eye.
Space Force battleship.
Is this why battleships do not let go of the human imagination and still remain the flagships of space squadrons in fantasy novels and electronic games?
Any warship is a kind of exhibition of the achievements of the military-industrial complex of its time. Its weapon design incorporates the results of the most advanced research in science, engineering and technology. The twentieth century was truly the “golden age” of military shipbuilding, and it all began with the mighty battleships and dreadnoughts.
Vessels with steam engines replaced sailing ships in the mid-19th century. The first battle of the newest armored warships equipped with steam engines took place during civil war in USA. In March 1862 armadillo northerners " Monitor"and the ship of the southerners" Virginia"Fought in battle on the Hampton Roads roadstead. At that time, the use of such ships bordered on experimentation. The combat tactics of ships with such serious weapons and protection simply did not exist. Battleships will become the main striking power of the fleets of the world's leading naval powers only in 30-40 years. At the beginning of the 20th century, ships of this class will be named in memory of recent sailing ships of the past.
Multi-deck battleship for three centuries it was the basis of the combat power of the sailing navies of the world. From the time of the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century until the Battle of Jutland in 1916, the outcome of the war at sea was decided by an artillery duel, so the ships lined up so that during the salvo of their guns they would be turned broadside towards the enemy in order to achieve maximum fire power. Ironclads were also designed for linear combat. During naval battles these large ships with powerful weapons lined up in a battle line, following in the wake.
Armadillos and battleships operated as part of the squadron's combat formation. They were intended for the destruction of enemy ships and artillery bombardment of targets on the coast.
squadron battleship "Peter the Great"
On May 5, 1869, a significant event took place at the Admiralty Shipyard in St. Petersburg - the first ship was laid down for the Russian fleet. Russian Empire, and in the world there is a parapet-tower ship. It was designed by Admiral Popov. In England, which was then considered the mistress of the seas, a ship of the new “dreadnought” type was laid down six months later.
What was different about the squadron armadillo « Peter the Great» from their predecessors sailing ships and paddle steamers. Firstly, the first Russian battleship was armed with two two-gun turrets, the caliber of each gun was 305 mm, and the barrel length reached 30 calibers. The armament also included 14 smaller caliber artillery pieces and two torpedo tubes. The thickness of the ship's armor belt and artillery turret varied from 203 to 365 mm. The hull of the battleship was made of metal using a special checkered system. The ship had a double bottom and was separated by watertight bulkheads to ensure unsinkability. Two steam engines with a power of more than 8000 hp. helped the battleship reach speeds of up to 14 knots.
Technical characteristics of the squadron battleship "Peter the Great":
Length - 98 m;
Width - 19 m;
Draft - 8 m;
Displacement - 10105 tons;
Cruising range - 3600 miles;
Crew - 440 people;
In Russia, the construction of battleships, which became a source of pride and a symbol of the military power of the state, was carried out on an unprecedented scale. By the beginning of the 20th century, as part of the Russian imperial fleet there were 17 heavy squadron battleships. The largest of them were " Petropavlovsk», « Tsesarevich», « Retvizan», « Peresvet», « Victory», « Poltava», « Sevastopol», « Chesma" And " Emperor Nicholas I».
battleship "Poltava"
battleship "Tsesarevich"
battleship "Retvizan"
battleship "Pobeda"
battleship "Sevastopol"
battleship "Emperor Nicholas I"
battleship "Peresvet"
One of the most tragic pages in the history of the Russian fleet is connected with the beginning of the Russian-Japanese War. On the night of January 27, 1904, without a declaration of war Japanese destroyers attacked Russian warships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. As a result of the surprise attack, they were disabled armadillos « Retvizan», « Tsesarevich" and cruiser " Pallas" Soon, Vice Admiral Makarov, one of the outstanding naval commanders of that time, arrived in Port Arthur. He took the most decisive measures to prepare the fleet for active combat operations, and on March 31, the Pacific squadron came out to meet the Japanese fleet. However, the battleship Petropavlovsk, on which Admiral Makarov was, was blown up by Japanese mines and sank. The admiral died. Twice more Russian ships attempted to escape from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, and both times they ended in failure - the squadron died.
In August 1904, the Japanese fleet landed troops and began the siege of Port Arthur. Four months later the city was surrendered. After the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron, the 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet was formed on the basis of the Baltic Fleet. It was headed by Vice Admiral Zinovy Rozhdestvensky. The squadron included about 30 ships, armed with 228 artillery pieces. Having completed a six-month sea voyage to the Far East, the warships approached the Tsushima Islands, where the Japanese fleet of Admiral Togo was waiting for them. It consisted of about 120 warships, armed with over 900 artillery pieces. The firepower of the Japanese fleet was 4.5 times greater than that of the Russian squadron. The outcome of the upcoming battle was predetermined. The vast majority of Russian warships were lost in battle with superior enemy forces.
The tragedy of Port Arthur and Tsushima forced Russian shipbuilders to reconsider the concept of building large armored ships. In 1907, the Russian Empire approved a program for the construction of four new type of battleships - battleships. About 40 ship designs were reviewed, eight of them from well-known foreign shipyards. In April 1907, Emperor Nicholas II approved one of four options for the shipbuilding program developed by the Naval Admiralty. Its goal was to replenish the naval personnel lost during the Russo-Japanese War. It was planned to build seven battleships of a new, so-called dreadnought type, making all of them obsolete armadillos.
The flagship of the series of dreadnoughts was the Sevastopol, with a displacement of 23,000 tons. The ship was armed with 12 305 mm caliber guns, 16 120 mm caliber guns, and four torpedo tubes. By the beginning of the First World War, three more battleships of this series had been built and put into service in the fleet - “ Petropavlovsk», « Poltava" And " Gangut" Subsequently, three additional battleships of the modernized series were built. During the First and Second World Wars, the firepower of battleships was mainly used for artillery support of ground forces in coastal areas.
. In this article we will talk about battlecruisers and the projects of the so-called high-speed battleships, which were supposed to replace two classes of ships at once, actually, battleships and battlecruisers.Grosskreuzer program
Despite the fact that in Germany there was a discussion on the topic that it was time to combine two classes of ships, battleships and battlecruisers into one class - fast battleships, work was still underway on projects for new battlecruisers.
At a meeting with the German Kaiser, the head of the German Imperial Naval Office, Eduard von Capelle, presented preliminary designs for armored and battlecruisers, known under the code names GK1, GK 2 and GK 3 cruisers and L1, L2, and L3 battlecruisers. In all projects, 380 mm guns were chosen as the main caliber. The average caliber was supposed to consist of sixteen 158 mm guns, 8 guns per side.
According to the preliminary design, the armored cruiser GK1 was supposed to have a displacement of 34,000 tons and a length of 235 meters. The power of the cruiser's power plant was supposed to be 110,000 hp. With such machines, the cruiser was supposed to reach a speed of 29 knots. According to the GK2 project, the cruiser should have been much larger:
- Displacement - 38,000 tons;
- Length - 243 meters;
- Machine power - 120,000 hp.
- Maximum speed - 29.5 knots.
The sketch of the cruiser GK3 had the same dimensions, like the cruiser according to the GK2 project, however, the engine power on this ship was planned to be slightly less - 115,000 hp. and accordingly, the cruiser had a lower speed - 29 knots. The main focus on these cruisers was their armor.
These projects were carefully assessed by German admirals. And if von Kapelle was inclined towards the cruiser of the GK1 project, then the commander of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, was more to the liking of the GK3 project.
Actually, there was no consensus on the issue of the future cruiser in Germany; there were heated debates all the time about what the maximum speed of the cruisers should be and what its armor should be. In the period from May to July 1916, another one was developed, new project cruisers - GK 6.
The cruiser had a displacement of 26,500 tons, a length of 235 m and the same protection as the cruiser of the GK 3 project. However, Scheer and the German Imperial Navy Office did not like the GK6 project. In their opinion, the cruiser's speed was insufficient, and the armament and armor did not take into account the experience of Jutland.
The German admirals suggested that the engineers consider installing a fifth turret with a pair of 380 mm guns on the cruiser or, as an alternative, rearming the cruiser with eight 420 mm guns as the main caliber.
Meanwhile, the difficult military situation in Germany led to a sharp slowdown in work on new projects and delayed their completion to 1920-21.
- Project GK1, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 19 April 1916;
- Project GK2, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 19 April 1916;
- Project GK3 Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Date of development April 19, 1916;
- Project GK6, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 5 July 1916;
- Project GK6a, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 1916;
- Project GK7, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 1916;
- Project GK8, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 1916;
- Project GK8a, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 1916;
- Project GK9, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 1916;
- Project GK10, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 1916;
- Project GK11, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 1916;
- Project GK12, Main armament 8 x 38 cm, Development date 1916.
Grosskampfschiffe program
Assessing the experience of the Battle of Jutland, it became obvious that the ships should continue to grow in size. However, in Germany, the growth in the size of warships was limited by the size of the stocks in Wilhelmshaven. It was not possible to build larger ships at these shipyards:
- Length - 235 m;
- Width - 31 m;
- Precipitation - 9.5 m.
For the construction of larger ships, new slipways were required, as well as deepening of the fairways in the Jade and Elbe rivers.
However, these restrictions did not stop design work. It was necessary to understand, at least, to what size the shipyards needed to be increased. According to preliminary estimates, it became clear that the future high-speed battleship would have to have a displacement of at least 20,000 tons more than that of the Mackensen-class battlecruisers.
Side view of the battlecruiser Mackensen. Estimated view according to the drawings.
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By developing the design of dreadnought-type battleships, the United States in the second decade of the 20th century took a leading position in this area in world shipbuilding. In 1911, the world's largest battleships, Wyoming and Arkansas, were launched. With a design displacement of 26,000 tons, a speed of 20.5 knots and side armor thickness of 280 mm, these ships carried a dozen 12750 guns in six turrets with 21 5751 mine countermeasures guns.
In the same year, the first American super-dreadnoughts were laid down. They were “New York” and “Texas” (27,000 tons, speed 21 knots, 10 14745 guns in five turrets with similar anti-mine artillery). In terms of firepower, they surpassed all their foreign contemporaries. However, even at the time of order, these battleships did not fully meet the tactical views that had formed in the US Navy.
By that time, many new ideas had matured overseas. Most of them were expressed in the summer of 1908 at the naval conference in Newport. The starting point was the belief that artillery combat distances would soon increase significantly due to the rapid improvement of fire control means. A number of completely logical conclusions followed from this.
Firstly, with increased distances to the target, it is beneficial to switch from 12-inch guns, standard for most countries, to artillery systems of increased caliber. The heavier the projectile, the slower it loses speed when moving in the air and the better it retains its armor-piercing properties. As a result, it was decided to arm promising US battleships with 14-inch (356 mm) guns.
Secondly, at long distances the number of hits is expected to be relatively small. In such conditions, a fatal defeat can be caused not by high-explosive shells (as at Tsushima), but only by armor-piercing shells capable of penetrating the vital centers of the ship, covered with heavy armor. Hence, the advisability of maintaining intermediate and thin armor on battleships was questioned.
Since the main danger is posed by armor-piercing shells, it was first necessary to provide reliable protection against them.
Under these circumstances, thin armor became unnecessary and sometimes harmful. It did not protect against armor-piercing shells, but could activate their fuses, thereby causing even greater destruction. Consequently, powder magazines, artillery towers, boilers, vehicles and steering mechanisms had to be covered with the heaviest possible armor, even at the expense of its weakening in other places.
Other proposals were also widely discussed in naval circles. For example, try oil as a boiler fuel or change the layout, moving away from the location of the towers in the middle part of the hull. Nobody liked the last circumstance. With five towers, the firing angles of the middle installation were smaller than those of the end and elevated ones. In addition, between the machines and boilers there was a group of cellars. They were surrounded by steam pipes on both sides, which was not conducive to maintaining a stable temperature of the charges.
The optimal way out of the situation was considered to be the introduction of three-gun installations, while simultaneously reducing the number of towers to four or even three. Along with other advantages, this reduced the weight per barrel of the main caliber.
However, the path to the implementation of all the listed ideas and intentions turned out to be gradual and quite lengthy. First of all, it was necessary to create 14-inch guns, which was fraught with design problems and difficult to predict in terms of timing. “Wyoming” and “Arkansas” did not have time to receive such weapons without the risk of disrupting the construction schedule. Especially for them, 12750 Mk.7 guns were developed, lengthened from 45 to 50 calibers in comparison with the previous 12745 Mark 6. 14-inch guns were finally installed on the battleships New York and Texas.
Ships of this type carried 10 14745 Mk.1 Mod 1 systems in five two-gun turrets. The caliber was half an inch larger than that of modern English battleships, which had a dozen 13.5745 barrels and were proudly called super-dreadnoughts.
Thus, the New York and the Texas, when they entered service in the spring of 1914, could be considered the strongest ships in the world. Otherwise, these battleships repeated the Wyoming design, replacing the middle pair of linearly elevated towers with one. Their displacement, general arrangement and armor have changed slightly. Only the belt along the waterline became one inch thicker, and the gun turrets received very solid armor cover.
In terms of the power plant, the Americans seemingly took a step back, returning to triple expansion steam engines instead of turbines. This measure was of a wait-and-see nature and was associated with the insufficient efficiency of the turbine plants of that time. The requirement for a long cruising range, which was very important for US ships, explained such a relapse. Overall, New York and Texas were successful battleships and served in the US Navy for more than 30 years, taking an active part in both world wars.
However, even at the design stage it was clear that these ships would become the last American dreadnoughts created according to traditional canons.
By 1910, the concept of uniformly thick armor was widely accepted in American naval circles. The General Council of the Navy, the Bureau of Ordnance, and the US Navy's Bureau of Construction and Repair discussed it for several years. recent years. It was expected that artillery ranges would continue to increase. More recently, this has led to the disappearance of medium-caliber artillery from battleships. At long distances she found herself out of the game. Logically, the same fate should have befallen thin armor. 15-20 years ago there was practically no such thing on battleships.
Heavy steel-iron plates covered only vital parts in a relatively small area.
Thin armor appeared as a response to the proliferation of rapid-fire medium-caliber guns. A hail of their shells carrying a high explosive charge could very quickly destroy unarmored extremities and superstructures, rendering the enemy ship incapable of combat, depriving it of control and propulsion, or even leading to its death. At the turn of the century, medium artillery almost acted as the main weapon of battleships. In turn, the light and durable Harvey and Krupp armor, which replaced steel-iron armor, made it possible to cover a significant area of the side with thin and medium plates.
Thus, in the 90s of the 19th century, a distributed reservation system was formed, justified at limited combat distances using medium artillery. This protection scheme was inherited by the dreadnoughts.
With the increase in artillery combat distances and the transition to arming battleships with only large guns, the chain of new technical solutions regarding vertical armor had to move in the opposite direction. At the same time another one appeared important aspect- a projectile fired from a great distance reached its target, falling along a steep trajectory. As a result, the relative probability of hitting the horizontal surfaces of the ship increased. The armor-piercing ability of the projectile increased. As protective measure it was necessary to strengthen the armor of decks, tower roofs and deckhouses.
From the circumstances described above in different countries mixed conclusions were drawn. National naval doctrines and tactical views had an impact. For example, the German fleet was going to fight in the North Sea, where visibility was limited three-quarters of the days of the year. For this reason, the Germans focused on medium and short combat distances. The US Navy is another matter. His theater of war was to be the ocean expanses at low latitudes. There, excellent visibility prevails during daylight hours. In this regard, it was advisable to open fire at the limit of the guns' reach.
So, in 1910, the Americans began searching for a prototype of a new ship - an ideal battleship capable of supporting US national interests in the 20th century and intended to be implemented according to the 1912 program financial year(FY1912). The hull and general location of the New York were taken as a basis.
We started with modernizing the armored deck system. In May 1910, the Design and Repair Bureau prepared a preliminary design known as the "Improved New York." It was the same smooth-deck ship with a freeboard rising from stern to bow, with a displacement of 27,500 tons, two pipes and coal heating of 16 boilers in four compartments. Type machine installation was not determined.
Its power of 37 thousand horsepower should have provided the battleship with a speed of about 23 knots. It seems that the designers were trying to get a fast ship, having information about the Russian and Italian dreadnoughts being built.
The belt armor of the “improved New York” had a thickness of 279 mm (11") and consisted of two rows of plates. Its upper part, 3.35 meters (11 feet) wide, as on previous types of battleships, was called a casemate. The lower belt covered the waterline area. It had a width of 2.44 meters, of which one quarter rose above the water. In the underwater part there was a wedge-shaped reduction in thickness to 229 mm (9") at the lower edge. The ledge began in the middle of the armor plate two feet below the waterline.
Along the plane of the upper edges of the casemate, the waist armor was covered with a second deck. She was the only armored one. Its thickness was not specified in the preliminary design. The third deck was not armored, but was waterproof.
At a distance of about 20 feet (6.1 meters) from the side, it curved down at an angle of 45° and extended in the form of bevels to the junction with the lower edge of the belt. At the bend there was a longitudinal vertical bulkhead, which was armorless and covered all spaces from the bottom to the armored deck. According to calculations, such a deck system increased the rigidity of the hull. As usual, coal pits served as additional protection (in the space between the bevel of the third deck and the side, as well as behind the vertical bulkhead).
There was no side armor above the second deck. There was no upper casemate. The chimneys were covered with only two-inch (50.8 mm) slabs.
The main artillery of the improved New York, consisting of a dozen 14" caliber barrels, was housed in four three-gun turrets. General location resembled the British battlecruiser Tiger. The two bow towers were linearly elevated. The third stood, as on previous battleships, between the boiler room and the engine rooms, but was raised on a high barbette. This made it possible to shoot over the aft (fourth) turret. The steam lines went around the middle group of cellars with all the attendant disadvantages. The developers were hesitant to move the third turret further aft for fear of causing overstress to the hull.
The anti-mine battery of the “improved New York” consisted of 17 5751 barrels. Nine of them were located on the second deck behind the unarmored side in the bow (4 pieces) and stern (5 pieces). The rest stood higher: one each on the roofs of towers No. 2 and No. 3, and six in the superstructure. At least the last eight guns were freed from flooding, which greatly affected the mine-resistant artillery of previous projects. The armament was completed by four underwater torpedo tubes. All of the above was still very far from the future “Nevada”.
In June 1910, the General Council issued official specifications for a promising battleship with the following characteristics: 12 356 mm guns, speed 21 knots and additional requirements for armor.
It was ordered to pay special attention to covering chimneys. The size of the ship was not established, but by default it was understood that it should not significantly exceed 27,000 tons (this displacement was passed with great difficulty through Congress on June 24, 1910 for battleships No. 34 and No. 35 of the FY1911 program - the future "New York" and "Texas").
The Bureau of Design and Repair commented on this task, pointing out that the new arrangement of the armor deck, with an increase in its thickness, will ensure an increase in the overall strength of the hull, but a belt of 11" (279 mm) can no longer be considered sufficient. Such plates were pierced by the 12750 Mk.7 gun from a distance 15,000 yards (13.7 km), and the 14-inch caliber will hit them at all combat ranges.
Behind the waist armor there was no barrier to the shells that penetrated it, except for coal, the presence of which was not guaranteed. In general, the requirements for the project looked clearly unbalanced - powerful weapons with relatively weak structural protection. To serve as reliable cover at combat distances, the belt must be much thicker - about 356 mm.
In response, the General Council proposed strengthening the side protection by armoring the slopes of the third deck and the vertical bulkhead 6.1 meters from the waist with homogeneous slabs of one and a half inches (38 mm). It was assumed that an armor-piercing projectile would explode in this space, and thin armor would stop the fragments. Later experiments showed that such weak additional protection is ineffective. But in 1910 they did not know this.
By the end of the year, the size of the future ship was established - as expected, 27 thousand tons. In the fall, Secretary of the Navy Meyer issued a regular (annual) report. This document contained estimates and calculations for the battleship of the FY1912 program. They were based on the New York project. The cost of the hull and machinery of new capital ships was set at the same level - $6 million. It was precisely this cost estimate that automatically limited the displacement to approximately 27 thousand tons. It was necessary to fit all new ideas into this tonnage. And as the project developed, they became more and more numerous.
The fleet already had four dreadnoughts, including the five-turret Delaware and North Dakota. Information about the experience of their operation began to appear. In September 1910, it became clear that the cooling system of the middle group of cellars was not efficient enough. More heat powder charges of the third tower in comparison with the other four led to increased dispersion of shells in a salvo.
This had a particularly strong effect at long shooting distances. The time has come to finally solve the old layout problem. The new design's modified armor deck system increased hull rigidity, allowing gun turrets to be grouped aft behind the engine compartments.
A little later, at the end of November 1910, the General Council officially chose oil (mazut) as the only fuel for future battleships. Strong supporters this decision were the then head of this department, the hero of the Spanish-American War and the nation's favorite, Admiral George Dewey, as well as the commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Rear Admiral Schroeder.
Positive experience in the use of oil has already accumulated. On the battleship "Delaware" mixed heating of boilers was organized. Coal was clearly inferior in comparison to oil. Labor-intensive transportation from bunkers to furnaces, regular cleaning of the latter from slag (on full speed ahead every three hours), prolonged dilution of vapors and afterburning of residues, painful rush jobs with bunkering, dirt and corrosive coal dust (especially on optics), the problem with the accumulation of flammable gas in coal pits, requiring additional ventilation, numerous grimy and undisciplined stoker brethren, and so on. With oil heating, everything was significantly simplified. Refueling could be carried out even at sea.
According to the calculations of the chief engineer of the Delaware, 212 stokers and coal carriers could be replaced by a staff of 24 people. This results in savings in space (cubbies, supplies), weight and money. And of course, the transition to oil heating provided increased autonomy. Steam production per unit weight of fuel increased by 55%, and per unit grate area - by 25%. In addition, oil (fuel oil) fills the volume of fuel storage more compactly.
They could be reduced in size and weight, use double-bottom compartments for fuel, and make the bulkheads truly watertight, eliminating the doors and ports needed to transfer and transport coal. In 1910, these advantages seemed obvious. The Navy Engineering Bureau enthusiastically supported the proposal to switch to oil heating. According to calculations for a New York-class ship, such a step promised a reduction in the mass of the boilers from 671 to 500 tons. The boiler room became compact, allowing one pipe to be used. The top weight was reduced and space was freed up in the superstructures.
By the way, the British decided to switch to liquid fuel boilers later, but were even able to get ahead of the Americans - battleships of the Queen Elizabeth type began to enter service in January 1915. But there was no oil in England itself. The United States, on the contrary, possessed a significant part of the world's proven reserves of “black gold” and the most powerful oil refining industry. On both the west and east coasts, advanced communications made this fuel even more accessible than coal.
However, hesitation and doubt continued for more than two years. At that time, some of the properties of oil raised concerns that were more related to the established practices of military shipbuilding. First of all, the ships were deprived of their traditional side protection from coal bunkers.
Placing compartments with flammable liquid in the path of an underwater explosion also seemed dangerous. Storing fuel oil in the double bottom cavity entailed a lower center of gravity and an increase in metacentric height. As a result, gusty rocking of the ship was expected, interfering with gun fire. The Bureau of Design and Repair took an extremely cautious position in this regard - the battleship projects that were started were completed in the old fashioned way (for example, Texas and New York were laid down in April and September 1911, however, with coal boilers).
Oil boilers significantly saved the tonnage of future American battleships.
No less useful was the transition to placing the main artillery in three-gun turrets. Naturally, one barrel accounts for significantly less direct armor weight. In addition, the length of the ship and its citadel is reduced, space on the deck is freed up, and it becomes easier to form superstructures and place anti-mine artillery.
Multi-barrel turrets appeared in the US Navy a long time ago. The two-tiered bicaliber monsters of pre-dreadnoughts such as Virginia and Kearsarge cannot be called successful. However, they allowed us to gain experience in solving complex problems of feeding projectiles. At one time, the project of three-gun turrets for the battleships South Caroline and Michigan was considered. But even the task for the development of such installations was not officially issued. Alternatively, on these first American dreadnoughts it was embodied exclusively good option with two end pairs of linearly elevated two-gun turrets.
Then, in March 1910, calculations were made for three-gun mounts for 12750 Mk.7 guns for the FY1911 ship project. However, this time things did not come to practical steps. In addition, almost simultaneously with the new 12750 Mk.7 gun, the 14745 Mk.1 artillery system appeared.
It was decided to install it on the 1911 FY battleships in five spirit gun towers. The development of a preliminary design for an “improved New York” with four three-gun turrets did not mean anything. The Bureau of Design and Repair, as usual, took a cautious position, giving preference to proven technical solutions that guarantee compliance with the planned ship construction deadlines.
The terms of reference for the development of a three-gun turret for guns 14745 were approved on January 31, 1911. These installations had to be placed in a body of the same size, and therefore it was necessary to reduce their dimensions and weight as much as possible. The new turret could be only slightly larger than a two-gun one. Four months later, on May 31, 1911, the Secretary of the Navy approved the FY1912 program battleship project. It featured three-gun turrets. However, the time frame for the readiness of such installations was completely unclear.
The Bureau of Design and Repair suggested not to rush (this department insisted on five two-gun turrets, which in reality amounted to a repetition of the “New York” in the version with oil boilers). If unexpected delays with three-gun installations occurred, serious complications could arise. In this case, the shipbuilding companies had the right to make financial claims.
The issue was finally resolved after a report from the fleet intelligence service. On June 17, she reported that she had information about ongoing projects of foreign battleships with three-gun turrets. Two days later, the Secretary of the Navy officially stopped all attempts to reverse the move.
07/11/1911 the Armament Bureau reported that the first copy of the new turret, intended for testing, can be expected only by April next year. That is, three months after the planned signing of the contract for the construction of two FY1912 ships. The situation was fraught with great risk.
With strict restrictions on weight and dimensions, designing such an artillery installation looked like an extremely difficult task. Lieutenant Commanders Petingil and Smith were involved in its solution. The work of his men was personally supervised by the new chief of the arms bureau, Admiral Nathan Twyning, who took this post on May 25, 1911. In the end, the efforts of the tower designers were crowned with success. A characteristic feature of their brainchild was a very dense layout. All three trunks had a common cradle and simultaneously moved in a vertical plane.
Unlike designs with separate gun guidance, the Americans called this turret not a three-gun turret, but a triplex turret. An obvious disadvantage of such a scheme was the increased likelihood of disabling the entire complex with one shell hit. Plus, three gun ports located close together created a large unprotected opening in the armor. Inside the two-gun turrets there was an armored partition between the right and left gun compartments. Their vertical guidance mechanisms and loading system could operate independently.
Triplex did not provide such an opportunity. It had a single gun compartment, was brought out seamlessly to the loading angle and then moved in the same way to a given elevation. A shell that penetrated inside the tower would inevitably disable the entire system. They decided to compensate for this by strengthening the armor. At first they wanted to increase the thickness of the front plate to 20" (508 mm). Later they decided to limit it to 18 inches (457 mm).
The experimental copy of the triplex tower was still late. In fact, it was not ready until August 1912. By this time, the project of battleship No. 38 of the FY1913 program with four such towers (the future “Pennsylvania”) had already passed the approval stage, and ships No. 36 and No. 37 of FY1912 were about to be laid down.
Now we will return to the turn of 1910-1911 to trace the vicissitudes of the formation of the most remarkable part of the Nevada-class battleship project - their layout and structural protection. So, the size of the future ships was set (27,000 tons), the first prototype in the form of an “improved New York” was examined, and directions for its improvement were outlined.
The General Council authorized the transition to oil heating of boilers, demanded that the cover of chimneys be strengthened, and that protection from shells be provided on the underwater part of the trajectory. The last task arose from the same prerequisites for the growth of battle distances. A projectile fired from afar flies along a steep trajectory and, falling near the side, can dive under the armor belt.
At the same time, it was prescribed to provide protection from Davis’s firing torpedoes (many spears were broken around this miracle weapon in those years, but it never appeared in the arsenals of the fleets). The General Council initially proposed in the design of the “improved New York” to add below the main waist armor a 5-inch underwater belt 4 feet wide (1.22 m), extended to the turn of the hold by a two-inch bulkhead made of homogeneous armor. However, there were categorical objections from the Navy Armament Bureau, which was responsible for armoring the ships. This department drew attention to a clear weakness at the junction of the main and lower belts.
It's better to just continue the main belt down a couple of feet. However, heterogeneous armor plates with a wedge-shaped reduction in thickness could not be thinner than 6.5-7 inches (165-178 mm) along the lower edge. Otherwise, for technological reasons, it was impossible to make their front surface hard enough. The General Council itself refused to extend the belt with two-inch armor. There was no experimental data on such an underwater protection scheme, and he decided to make do with a conventional bulkhead of 38.1 mm, sufficiently distant from the outer side.
These details of the new battleship had been discussed in detail by November 1910. The Bureau of Construction and Repair consistently sought to deviate minimally from the design of the 1911 ship, that is, from the New York class. The main argument was the displacement, set at 27 thousand tons, as well as the vague timing of the readiness of the three-gun turret. The shipbuilding department believed that the characteristics of the new battleship declared by the General Council would require a large ship size for its implementation. According to rough calculations, the increase in displacement was at least 1000, and most likely 3000 tons with the attendant costs.
The figure is clearly unrealistic to pass through Congress. The Bureau of Construction and Repair reminded the General Council that it had only approved the New York project in July, and now it was demanding the impossible within the same size of the ship and its price. There followed a rather caustic response. The General Council of the Fleet regretted that it did not intervene in a timely manner in the design process of the battleship of the FY1911 program. But now it is on the analysis of the shortcomings of this project that new requirements are based, which are not subject to revision.
At the same time, it was proposed to return once again to the question of choosing the type of main power plant. The Bureau of Construction and Repair wanted to keep triple expansion steam engines on the 1912 battleship. The General Council took the initiative to review this decision in connection with the upcoming transition to oil heating of boilers. Fuel oil provided a significant weight gain and an increase in cruising range.
This could compensate for the low efficiency of steam turbines of that time. However, they have not yet decided to completely abandon piston engines. It was considered advisable to equip only one of the two ships of the FY1912 program with turbines. Thus, a basis was formed for comparing the types of main power plant (GPU). Once, a similar experiment had already taken place on the battleships Delaware (steam engines) and North Dakota (Curtis turbines). Now it was repeated under conditions of oil heating of boilers.
In the winter of 1910-1911, the design and repair bureau developed a new preliminary design, in which it tried, as far as possible, to take into account all the requirements of the General Council in terms of structural protection. In comparison with the “improved New York”, the thickness of the belt along the waterline increased from 279 to 305 mm. Above was a casemate made of 6.5-inch (165 mm) armor plates.
It protected part of the anti-mine artillery, but mainly, as before, was intended to cover chimneys. The latter were enclosed in armored casings 38.1 mm (1.5") thick and 2.44 m (8") high. Additional protection for them was provided by an inch (25.4 mm) upper deck above the boiler compartments. Adjoining the waist armor along the waterline from below was another belt, which had a thickness of 127 mm (5"). The main caliber consisted of 12 14745 guns in four turrets. To reduce flooding, the designers tried to slightly raise the anti-mine artillery, represented by 21 5751 barrels.
For this purpose, a long forecastle was introduced. It housed 14 guns: ten in the central armored casemate and four behind the unarmored side in the bow. Two cannons were placed openly in the superstructure. The five others are behind the unarmored side in the stern. The power plant, the power of which was not specified in the project, could have been piston engines or Curtis turbines. The latter were somewhat inferior in efficiency to the units of the Parsons system, but were more compact, which gave a weight gain due to slightly shorter engine rooms.
The main drawback of this first interpretation of the General Council's requirements was the very large excess of the specified displacement - by two thousand tons. Similar project could not succeed in Congress. An attempt was made to reduce the size of the ship without significantly changing the parameters. This is exactly the version the design and repair bureau presented on February 13, 1911. No information has been preserved about its details.
It is known that the ship still turned out to be very large - approximately 28,000 tons with a length of 179.2 or 179.34 meters, respectively, with Curtis and Parsons turbines. Only four docks could accommodate it: in New York, Norfolk, Puget Sound and Pearl Harbor. As a result, this version of the project was rejected. Next, the design and repair bureau concentrated its efforts towards reducing the length of the future battleship and eliminating thin and intermediate armor. I had to abandon the underwater belt and the upper casemate. The anti-mine battery now had no armor cover.
Meanwhile, Congress approved the construction of battleships No. 36 and No. 37 under the FY1912 program. The legislative act of 03/04/1911 read: “The President is hereby authorized to build two battleships of the first class, carrying no less heavy armor and weapons than any ship of this class, having the maximum possible speed and range at a cost of six million for each ship without taking into account armor and weapons."
By this time, quite a lot of developments already existed that met the basic requirements of the General Council of the Fleet.
During the month of March, the design and repair bureau presented eight new versions of the 1912 battleship (the so-called “spring projects”). The speed in different versions varied within a modest range of 20-21 knots, and the number of 14-inch guns varied from 8 to 12 barrels, including an unusual version from 03/17/1911 with 11 guns (turret No. 4 is two-gun, the rest are three-gun).
A characteristic feature of the reservation system of all these prototypes was strict compliance with the “all or nothing” principle. Towers, barbettes, cabins and chimneys received very powerful cover. The thickness of the belt armor was at least 13 inches (330 mm) with an increased width and a new method of installation. The slabs were now oriented vertically with their long sides and stood in one row. As a result, the longitudinal joint, which was weak point old side belt design.
Under these circumstances, the armament of 12 14745 cannons in four triplex towers was again unable to be packed into 27,000 tons. Of course, it was not difficult to create an 8-gun version (all turrets are two-gun). However, a battleship with such a main battery (but of a smaller displacement) was already rejected at the ship design stage of the FY1911 program. He didn’t get through even now, despite the particularly thick armor.
The same applies to the design with nine guns in three turrets. The General Council could not allow the firepower of the new ship to be reduced in comparison with the New York. As a result, on March 30, he chose the option with a 356-mm belt along the waterline, a speed of 20.5 knots and 10 main battery guns in four turrets of two types: the end turrets are three-gun, and the elevated ones are two-gun. The project was dated March 11th. The onboard reservation here had a remarkable feature. The plane-parallel part, 356 mm thick, occupied only 4 feet (1.22 m) in width.
The structural waterline passed right in the middle of this section, and above and below a wedge-shaped decrease in thickness began with ledges on the inner surface of the slab. The waist armor converged to 279 and 203 mm, respectively, at the upper and lower edges. The belt of the project dated March 17 had a similar cross-sectional configuration of the armor plates. All other options provided for belt slabs with a wedge-shaped reduction in thickness only in the underwater part.
The slightly lower speed of the project chosen by the General Council in comparison with a similar-sized 21-knot ship (project dated March 9, 1911) gave a weight gain of 255 tons. This was equivalent to an inch in thickness or a foot and a half (0.46 m) in belt width. In the version chosen by the General Council, the first alternative was implemented with a simultaneous increase in the armoring of the conning tower.
The armor and fragmentation decks were adjacent to the corresponding edges of the belt at the top and bottom. Both carried armor 38.1 mm (1.5") thick. The fragmentation deck at the sides ended with bevels. They were reinforced to two inches (50.8 mm). Behind the waist armor there was a longitudinal bulkhead of the same thickness, connected to the fragmentation deck along its break lines.
Such horizontal protection was soon considered insufficient by the designer himself. The Bureau of Design and Repair proposed increasing the displacement by 500 tons, thereby increasing the armor deck to three inches (76.2 mm). At the same time, the length of the ship increased to 175.3 meters with a minimal weight increase in the hull structures. This option was already close to the protection scheme for the future Nevada. However, there were still quite a few changes to come.
First of all, in June the Armaments Bureau announced the impossibility of creating armor plates with a wedge-shaped reduction in thickness towards two ends. An unpleasant alternative was the use of a double-row belt, as on previous types of American battleships. In this case, a long horizontal joint again appeared, weakening the structure. The designers sought to avoid this.
They preferred to use vertical slabs of a simpler configuration with a decrease in thickness only under water. To compensate for the weight, it was necessary to sacrifice one inch of armor in the plane-parallel part. Now the slabs at a depth of 0.61 meters (2") below the waterline acquired a wedge-shaped decrease in thickness from 330 to 203 mm.
The following month, the design and repair bureau proposed to abandon the two-inch armor of the internal bulkhead, strengthening the side protection due to it. The thickness of the belt was increased to 343 mm (13.5"), and the width (or height) - to 5.3 meters. The project of the future Nevada was completed by the abandonment of the rotary fire control post on the roof of the conning tower. It was poorly armored and gave reliable protection fragile artillery instruments. Further, the project was no longer subject to significant changes, although proposals were made, and various kinds of concerns continued to excite minds.
First of all, the naval tests of new guns and ammunition, carried out on March 21-22, 1911, provided the basis for debate. The target was the old battleship "San Marcoe" (formerly "Texas", completed on 08/15/1895). The devastating effect of 356 mm shells exceeded all expectations. When the test results were evaluated, the almost completed 1912 battleship project began to seem insufficiently protected to many.
The later versions of the “spring projects” were apparently the result of such fears. Moreover, the possibility of increasing the thickness of the side belt to 431 mm was studied by reducing firepower, speed (no higher than 20 knots) and range (6000 miles). Fortunately, things did not come to the realization of such ideas, and they did not redo the almost finished, well-balanced project.
A similar fate befell the various proposals that emerged after the Navy held a broad discussion of the future “ideal battleship” in the fall of 1911. Many comments were made, for example, regarding the vulnerability of the triplex tower or the device on new ships with a clipper stem. The most vehement criticism was the low position of the 5-inch artillery.
In fact, the designers did not eliminate the shortcoming that was obvious at that time. Large ships such as the Delaware and Utah were already in service. Their mine artillery, as before, was heavily flooded. The dreadnought commanders rightly demanded that such an obvious flaw be eliminated in the new project. However, there was no time for this anymore. The anti-mine artillery remained in the same (“wet”) positions, including an inconvenient installation above the sternpost.
Contracts for the construction of battleships No. 36 (Nevada) and No. 37 (Oklahoma) were concluded on January 22, 1912, respectively, with Fore River Shipbuilding Co. (Quincy, Massachusetts) and New York Shipbuilding Corp. (Camden, New Jersey). According to the plan, the ships were to be delivered to the fleet in three years. The construction cost of the two combat units amounted to a total of $13,645,360. This figure does not include costs of $9,304,286. for the purchase of armor and weapons. The total cost of "Nevada" was $11,401,073.04, and "Oklahoma" was $11,548,573.28.
Battleships No. 37 and No. 36 were laid down on October 26 and November 4, 1912, respectively. The planned construction period for both ships was exceeded by approximately a year. It took a particularly long time to complete the construction of the Oklahoma afloat, which entered service on May 3, 1916. Nevada was completed almost two months earlier - on March 11.
And on the last day of spring the Battle of Jutland took place. Its largely unexpected results, which revealed the weakness of the armor of English ships, aroused in most countries the keenest interest in the design of new US battleships.