From Catherine I to Princess Tarakanova. Adventurers at the Russian throne

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The 37-year period of political instability (1725-1762) that followed the death of Peter I was called the “Era of Palace Revolutions.” During this period, state policy was determined by individual groups of the palace nobility, who actively intervened in resolving the issue of the heir to the throne, fought among themselves for power, and carried out palace coups. The reason for such intervention was the Charter on the Succession to the Throne, issued by Peter I on February 5, 1722, which abolished “both orders of succession to the throne that were in force before, both the will and the conciliar election, replacing both with personal appointment, at the discretion of the reigning sovereign.” Peter himself did not take advantage of this charter; he died on January 28, 1725, without appointing a successor. Therefore, immediately after his death, a struggle for power began between representatives of the ruling elite.
The decisive force in the palace coups was the guard, a privileged part of the regular army created by Peter (these are the famous Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments, in the 30s two new ones were added to them, the Izmailovsky and Horse Guards). Her participation decided the outcome of the matter: which side the guard was on, that group would win. The Guard was not only a privileged part of the Russian army, it was a representative of an entire class (the nobility), from whose midst it was almost exclusively formed and whose interests it represented.

1. Events of 1725 - 1762. Historical sketch.

Palace coups testified to the weakness of absolute power under the successors of Peter I, who were unable to continue reforms with energy and in the spirit of a pioneer and who could govern the state only relying on their entourage. Favoritism flourished in full bloom during this period. Temporary favorites received unlimited influence on state policy.
The only heir of Peter I in the male line was his grandson - the son of the executed Tsarevich Alexei Peter. But the wife of Peter I, Catherine, laid claim to the throne. Peter's two daughters, Anna (married to a Holstein prince) and Elizabeth, who was still a minor by that time, were also heirs. The issue of a successor was resolved by the quick actions of A. Menshikov, who, relying on the guard, carried out the first palace coup in favor of Catherine I (1725-1727) and became an all-powerful temporary worker under her.
In 1727, Catherine I died. According to her will, the throne passed to 12-year-old Peter II (1727-1730). The affairs of the state continued to be managed by the Supreme Privy Council. However, changes took place in it: Menshikov was removed and exiled with his family to the distant Western Siberian city of Berezov, and the Tsarevich’s educator Osterman and two princes Dolgoruky and Golitsyn entered the Council. Ivan Dolgoruky, who had a huge influence on the young emperor, became Peter II's favorite.
In January 1730, Peter II dies of smallpox, and the question of a candidate for the throne again arises. The Supreme Privy Council, at the suggestion of D. Golitsyn, chose the niece of Peter I, the daughter of his brother Ivan - the Dowager Duchess of Courland Anna Ioannovna (1730-1740). The throne to Anna was offered by the “supremes” under certain conditions - conditions according to which the empress actually became powerless a puppet.
The guards, protesting against the conditions, demanded that Anna Ioanovna remain the same autocrat as her ancestors. Upon arrival in Moscow, Anna was already aware of the mood of wide circles of the nobility and the guard. Therefore, on February 25, 1730, she broke her standards and “committed herself to sovereignty.”
Having become an autocrat, Anna Ioanovna hastened to find support for herself mainly among foreigners who occupied the highest positions at court, in the army and in the highest government bodies. A number of Russian surnames also fell into the circle of people devoted to Anna: relatives Saltykovs, P. Yaguzhinsky, A. Cherkassky, A. Volynsky, A. Ushakov.
Anna Biron's Mittava favorite became the de facto ruler of the country. In the system of power that developed under Anna Ioanovna without Biron, her confidant, a rude and vindictive temporary worker, not a single important decision.
According to Anna Ioanovna's will, her great-nephew, Ivan Antonovich of Brunswick, was appointed as her heir. Biron was appointed regent under him. A palace coup was carried out against the hated Biron just a few weeks later. His mother Anna Leopoldovna was proclaimed ruler under the young Ivan Antonovich. However, there were no changes in policy; all positions continued to remain in the hands of the Germans. On the night of November 25, 1741, the grenadier company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment carried out a palace coup in favor of Elizabeth - the daughter of Peter I - (1741-1761). Despite all the similarities of this coup with similar palace coups in Russia in the 18th century. (apex character, guard striking force), it had a number of distinctive features. The striking force of the November 25 coup was not just the guard, but the lower ranks of the guards - people from the tax-paying classes, expressing the patriotic sentiments of broad sections of the capital's population. The coup had a pronounced anti-German, patriotic character. Wide layers of Russian society, condemning the favoritism of German temporary workers, turned their sympathies towards Peter's daughter, the Russian heiress. A feature of the palace coup on November 25 was that Franco-Swedish diplomacy tried to actively intervene in the internal affairs of Russia and, in exchange for offering assistance to Elizabeth in the struggle for the throne, to obtain from her certain political and territorial concessions, which meant a voluntary renunciation of the conquests of Peter I.
Elizabeth Petrovna's successor was her nephew Karl-Peter-Ulrich - Duke of Holstein - the son of Elizabeth Petrovna's elder sister Anna, and therefore on his mother's side - the grandson of Peter I. He ascended the throne under the name of Peter III (1761-1762) on February 18, 1762 The Manifesto was published on granting “the entire Russian noble nobility liberty and freedom,” i.e. on exemption from compulsory service. The “Manifesto,” which removed the age-old conscription from the class, was received with enthusiasm by the nobility. Peter III issued Decrees on the abolition of the Secret Chancellery, on allowing schismatics who had fled abroad to return to Russia, with a ban on prosecution for schism. However, soon the policies of Peter III aroused discontent in society and turned metropolitan society against him. Particular dissatisfaction among the officers was caused by Peter III's refusal of all conquests during the victorious Seven Years' War with Prussia (1755-1762), which was waged by Elizaveta Petrovna. A conspiracy was ripe in the guard to overthrow Peter III. As a result of the latter, in the 18th century. In the palace coup carried out on June 28, 1762, the wife of Peter III was elevated to the Russian throne and became Empress Catherine II (1762-1796).

2. Reasons for palace coups.

The general prerequisites for palace coups include:
. Contradictions between various noble factions in relation to Peter's legacy. It would be a simplification to consider that the split occurred along the lines of acceptance and non-acceptance of reforms. Both the so-called “new nobility”, which emerged during the years of Peter thanks to their official zeal, and the aristocratic party tried to soften the course of reforms, hoping in one form or another to give a respite to society, and, first of all, to themselves. But each of these groups defended their narrow-class interests and privileges, which created fertile ground for internal political struggle.
. An intense struggle between various factions for power, which most often boiled down to the nomination and support of one or another candidate for the throne.
. The active position of the guard, which Peter raised as a privileged “support” of the autocracy, which, moreover, took upon itself the right to control the compliance of the personality and policies of the monarch with the legacy that its “beloved emperor” left.
. The passivity of the masses, absolutely far from the political life of the capital.
. The aggravation of the problem of succession to the throne in connection with the adoption of the Decree of 1722, which broke the traditional mechanism of transfer of power.
. The spiritual atmosphere that emerged as a result of the emancipation of the noble consciousness from traditional norms of behavior and morality pushed for active, often unprincipled political activity, instilled hope in luck and “omnipotent chance”, opening the way to power and wealth.
With the light hand of V. O. Klyuchevsky, many historians assessed the 1720s - 1750s. as a time of weakening of Russian absolutism. N.Ya. Eidelman generally considered palace coups as a kind of reaction of the nobility to the sharp increase in the independence of the state under Peter I, as historical experience has shown, he writes, referring to the “unbridledness” of Peter’s absolutism, that such a huge concentration of power is dangerous both for its bearer and for the ruling class itself." V.O. himself Klyuchevsky also associated the onset of political instability after the death of Peter I with the “autocracy” of the latter, who decided, in particular, to break the traditional order of succession to the throne (when the throne passed along a direct male descendant line) - by the charter of February 5, 1722, the autocrat was given the right to appoint himself successor at his own request. “Rarely has autocracy punished itself so cruelly as in the person of Peter with this law on February 5,” concluded Klyuchevsky. Peter I did not have time to appoint an heir for himself; the throne, according to Klyuchevsky, turned out to be given “to chance and became its toy”: it was not the law that determined who should sit on the throne, but the guard, which was the “dominant force” at that time.
The literature is dominated by discussions about the “insignificance” of the successors of Peter I. “The successors of Peter I, who reigned until 1762,” writes, for example, N.P. Eroshkin, the author of a textbook on the history of state institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia, turned out to be weak-willed and poorly educated people who sometimes showed more concern for personal pleasures than for the affairs of the state.” Recently, however, there has been a certain revision of estimates, which has led to the conclusion that in the second quarter of the 18th century. What is observed is not a weakening, but, on the contrary, a strengthening of absolutism. Thus, historian D.N. Shansky states: “absolutism as a system in these years steadily strengthened and acquired greater maturity compared to the previous period.” The very term “era” of palace coups, according to Shansky, should be rejected, since it does not reflect the basic essence of the period under consideration, the main trends in the development of the state.
With all this, the struggle for the throne and around the throne, of course, greatly influenced the situation in the country.
The first coup was the accession of Catherine I. The formation of these parties was inevitable. On the one hand, elements hostile to the transformations of the first quarter gradually concentrated. 18th century, dissatisfied with the power and entourage of the king, on the other hand, Peter’s companions who suddenly lost their support, people who were created by turbulent times. There was a division over the issue of succession to the throne. Of the contenders for the throne in the male line, there was only one grandson of Peter I, the son of Tsarevich Alexei - Pyotr Alekseevich (future Peter II). On the female side, Peter's last wife, Ekaterina Alekseevna Skavronskaya, had the greatest chances. Despite the consequences of the intrigue with Anna Mons's brother, the wife of the late king retained her influence and weight as the crowned wife of the sovereign.
The decree of February 5, 1722, which abolished the old rules of succession to the throne and ratified the personal will of the testator into law, contributed greatly to the ambiguity of the general situation. The figures of Peter the Great's era, who were always at odds with each other, temporarily rallied around Catherine's candidacy (A. D. Menshikov, P. I. Yaguzhinsky, P. A. Tolstoy, A. V. Makarov, F. Prokopovich, I. I. Buturlin, etc. ). Grouped around the grandson were mainly representatives of the high-born feudal aristocracy, now a few boyar families. Among them, the leading role was played by the Golitsyns and Dolgorukys, and they were also joined by some of Peter I’s associates (Field Marshal Prince B.P. Sheremetev, Field Marshal Nikita Repnin, etc.). Efforts by A.D. Menshikov and P.A. Tolstoy in favor of Catherine were supported by the guard.
The Life Guards - the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments - during this period represented the most privileged and generously paid stratum of the army. Both regiments were formed primarily from nobles. In particular, under Peter I there were up to 300 people in the life regiment among the rank and file of princes alone. The armed nobility at the imperial court was an important weapon in the struggle of court factions.
The reign of Anna Ioanovna (1730-1740) is usually assessed as a kind of timelessness; the empress herself is characterized as a narrow-minded, uneducated woman with little interest in state affairs, who did not trust the Russians, and therefore brought a bunch of foreigners from Mitau and from various “German corners”. “The Germans poured into Russia like rubbish from a leaky bag - they surrounded the courtyard, settled in the throne, and climbed into all the lucrative positions in government,” Klyuchevsky wrote.
Anna Ioanovna, although gifted with a sensitive heart and mind, did not have a strong will, and therefore easily put up with the leading role played by her favorite E. Biron at court and administration. But still, there is no reason to talk about a noticeable increase in the number of foreigners in the Russian service in the 30s of the 18th century. The historian T.V. Chernikova managed to prove that the Russian nobles were not worried about the “dominance of foreigners,” but about the strengthening under Anna Ioanovna of the uncontrolled power of foreign and Russian strongmen, the oligarchic claims of part of the nobility. At the center of the struggle that took place within the noble class, there was, therefore, not a national, but a political question. The version of “foreign dominance,” as Chernikova concludes, was born in the 40-90s of the 18th century, in connection with the opportunistic considerations of the then reigning monarchs, who were forced to somehow justify their seizure of the throne.
Traditionally, historical literature claims that the coup of 1741 was of a “patriotic”, “anti-German” nature and was the culmination of the struggle of the Russian nobility against “foreign dominance” in the country. In fact, the guards who participated in the conspiracy were inspired by the idea of ​​​​restoring strong autocratic power in Russia, which had been shaken under the infant emperor. It is worth pointing out the active role of the “foreigners” Johann Lestock and the French ambassador J. Chetardy in preparing the coup.
It is also important that under Elizabeth, among the ruling elite state apparatus There were no fundamental changes - only the most odious figures were removed. So, Elizabeth appointed A.P. as chancellor. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who was at one time Biron’s right hand and creation. The highest Elizabethan dignitaries also included brother A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin and N. Yu. Trubetskoy, who by 1740 was the Prosecutor General of the Senate. The observed certain continuity of the top circle of people who actually exercised control over the key issues of foreign and domestic policy testified to the continuity of this policy itself.
Palace coups are a special type of putsch (if you look at them “from the height of past years”), where everything is private, when an emperor, for example, is strangled during a friendly feast, like Peter the Third. These are feuds within one circle of people, one social circle, quite narrow and close to the emperor. This is a struggle between cliques of courtiers, this is a coup that does not affect the country. In this sense, the Decembrist uprising is much broader, because not only the guards are involved here, but also army regiments, and a very wide circle in the north and south.
Even the pre-revolutionary historian V.A. Myakotin developed the concept of this period. Its essence boiled down to the fact that 1) the broad masses of the people did not take part in palace coups; 2) at this time there was a steady strengthening of the economic and political role of the nobility; 3) the reasons for the coups stemmed from the strengthened positions of the nobles. Having survived the extremism of social democratic historiography of the pre- and post-revolutionary years, this concept, in a slightly modified form, entered Soviet historical literature.
The period of palace coups ends with the overthrow of Peter III and the accession of Catherine II. Historians see the reasons for palace coups in the decree of Peter I “on changing the order of succession to the throne”, in the clash of corporate interests of various groups of the nobility. The driving force behind the coups was the Guard. Palace coups did not pursue the goal of radical changes in the political structure; there was only a transfer of power from one group of nobles to another. The consequence of palace coups is the strengthening of the political and economic role of the nobility.
Thus, the reasons that determined this era of revolutions and temporary workers were rooted, on the one hand, in the state of the royal family, and on the other, in the peculiarities of the environment that managed affairs.

3. The social essence of palace coups.

A.L. Yanov, describing the orgy of palace coups after the death of Anna Ioannovna, notes: “In all this madness, however, there was a system. For... the St. Petersburg grenadiers or life guards, like the entire Peter the Great service elite behind them, did not set themselves the goal of the accession of the next “colonel”, but the abolition of compulsory service (while maintaining all privileges and property). In other words, the return of the aristocratic status that had once again been lost (for the “Petrine elite”, probably, the point was not at all in the return of this status, but only in its acquisition). They did not rest until they achieved their goal. And as soon as the only politically literate woman among the galaxy of Russian empresses, Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst, better known under the name of Catherine the Great, thought of the true reason for all this extraordinary political turmoil, the passions immediately subsided and yesterday’s arbitrariness was replaced by orderliness.”
Unfortunately, Yanov himself interprets this completely international process as specifically Russian, as “primordial Russian patterns of elite formation” (and as evidence of Russia’s alleged gravitation towards Europe with its high birth and independence of the position of the aristocracy from the will of the center). However, this process took place everywhere, in all bureaucratic societies, although in different forms, determined by the civilizational characteristics of these societies and other, mainly political, circumstances.
Palace coups did not entail changes in the political, much less social, system of society and boiled down to a struggle for power among various noble groups pursuing their own, most often selfish, interests. At the same time, the specific policies of each of the six monarchs had their own characteristics, sometimes important for the country. In general, the socio-economic stabilization and foreign policy successes achieved during the reign of Elizabeth created conditions for more accelerated development and new breakthroughs in foreign policy that will occur under Catherine II.
According to Klyuchevsky, the St. Petersburg Guards Barracks was a rival of the Senate and the Supreme Privy Council, the successor to the Moscow Zemsky Sobor. This participation of the guard regiments in resolving the issue of the throne had very important political consequences; First of all, it had a strong effect on the political mood of the guard itself. At first an obedient instrument in the hands of her leaders, Menshikov, Buturlin, then she wanted to be an independent mover of events, intervened in politics on her own initiative; palace coups became a preparatory political school for her. But the guard of that time was not only a privileged part of the Russian army, cut off from society: it had an influential social significance, was a representative of an entire class, from among which it was almost exclusively recruited. The guard served as the flower of that class, the layers of which, previously separated, under Peter I were united under the general name of nobility or gentry, and according to Peter's laws it was a compulsory military school for this class. Political tastes and aspirations, acquired by the guard through participation in palace affairs, did not remain within the walls of the St. Petersburg barracks, but spread from there to all noble corners, city and village. This political connection between the guard and the class that stood at the head of Russian society, and dangerous consequences What could happen from here was vividly felt by the powerful St. Petersburg businessmen of that time.
Therefore, simultaneously with the palace coups and under their obvious influence, two important changes are revealed in the mood of the nobility: 1) thanks to the political role that was imposed on the guard by the course of court affairs and so readily unlearned by it, such a demanding view of their importance in the state was established among the nobility, which he had not seen before; 2) with the assistance of this view and the circumstances that established it, both the position of the nobility in the state and its relationship to other classes of society changed.
The main point is that the nobility thirsted for these revolutions. In the ordinary nobility, mercilessly driven out of provincial estates into regiments and schools, thought was refined by inventing ways to leave science and service, while in the upper strata, especially in the government environment, minds worked intensely on more sublime subjects. The remnants of the old boyar nobility still survived here, forming a rather close circle of a few families. From the general political excitement, a kind of political program was developed here, a rather definite view of the order that should be established in the state was formed.
In the conditions of political, legal and economic unfreedom of the entire Russian society, including its highest circles (it should be remembered that the famous decree on the freedom of the nobility was adopted only in 1761), the problem of limiting the power of the monarch, that is, creating constitutional monarchy, seems to be gaining its supporters in all spheres of Russian society. It seems that Peter I was the first of the autocrats to understand this well. His creation of the Senate is nothing more than the beginning of work to create the foundations of the constitutional system. Paradoxical as it may sound, Russia should be considered the only state where this process did not take place under revolutionary pressure, but was a very deliberate and necessary step for the state and society on the part and on the initiative of the monarch himself.
This process has outlived its initiator. With the creation of the Supreme Privy Council and the limitation of the competence of the Senate only to issues of the highest judicial jurisdiction in Russia, the contours of the separation of powers emerge quite clearly, which, in our opinion, is undeniably one of the most important signs of constitutionalism. This process would be accompanied by the supposed division of supreme state power between the monarch and the Supreme Privy Council.
A contemporary and participant in those events, F. Prokopovich, describes in his memoirs the events and political sentiments of those years: “Many said that the scepter belongs to no one else but Her Majesty the Empress, just as the prophetic things and hers are, according to Her Majesty’s recent coronation . The Germans began to argue whether such a coronation gives the right, when in other nations queens are crowned, but for this reason they are not heirs?”
These discussions about succession to the throne were heard at spontaneous meetings of the highest circles of Russian society. Their participants were not competent to decide the issue of succession to the throne. The Senate had the authority to decide this issue. V.O. Klyuchevsky wrote well about its historical meeting: “While the senators were conferring in the palace on the issue of succession to the throne, guard officers somehow appeared in the corner of the meeting room, it is unknown who had been called here. They did not directly participate in the debates of the senators, but, like a chorus in an ancient drama, they expressed their judgment about them with sharp frankness, threatening to break the heads of the old boyars who would oppose Catherine’s accession.”
The Guard, and this is clear from subsequent events, was attracted by Menshikov and Buturlin. Her appearance both within the walls of the Senate and outside its walls was a compelling argument in resolving the issue of succession to the throne. It is possible that the threat of using military force, which, figuratively speaking, was in the air, also influenced the opinion of representatives of the former boyar families in the Senate. And yet, the main argument, in our opinion, was the new legal image of the monarchy that had formed in the public consciousness, according to which the practice of electing a tsar at the Zemsky Sobor actually ceased. According to the adopted legislation, the emperor himself was free to declare the heir to the throne. Naturally, in his choice he was limited by ruling house, an unspoken preference for male heirs still existed.
The Supreme Privy Council actually ruled the country during the reign of Elizabeth I and after the accession of Peter II. It was the first collegial governing body, although in general it lacked internal regulations. He was in some kind of intermediate state, either copying the tsar-autocrat, or the Boyar Duma. But, in any case, it was a new authority. Many procedural issues of its activities, like issues of other similar authorities, crystallized over the years, or even decades, when a certain tradition in their activities took shape. Naturally, one dominant personality placed great importance on the activities of the Supreme Privy Council. It is generally accepted that in the first two years it was His Serene Highness Prince Alexander Menshikov (1673-1729, Generalissimo. In 1718-1724 and 1726-1727 - President of the Military Collegium), in the remaining three years - Prince Dmitry Golitsyn ( 1665-1737, compiler of “standards.” In 1736, accused and convicted of participation in a conspiracy).
The “highest officials” rejected the candidacy of Peter I’s daughter Elizabeth as illegitimate on the sole grounds that she was born before her parents’ official marriage, and decided to invite Anna Ioanovna, rightly believing that it would be easier to come to an agreement with her regarding the division of power. This fact went unnoticed by many historians. Meanwhile, this is very important detail. In essence, the “conditions” represented the implementation in practice of contractual principles in the arrangement of the highest body of state power. V. Kobrin was absolutely right when he believed that the election of a monarch is “a kind of agreement between subjects and the sovereign, and therefore a step towards the rule of law.” It seems that it does not matter where the tsar was elected - at the Boyar Duma, the Zemsky Sobor or at the Supreme Privy Council. Another thing is that from today’s perspective, spontaneous elections, which are not clearly regulated by a special law on the procedure for their holding, of course, indicate only the very rudimentary state of the rule of law. And yet they were and, in our opinion, are strong confirmation of the existence of legal traditions of Russian statehood.
The Supreme Privy Council, if the plans of the “sovereigns” were successful, would assume the supreme power in the country, turning the empress into a bearer of purely representative functions. From a legal point of view, an analogy with the state principles of the British monarchy suggests itself here. However, the question remains unclear whether these innovations could take root on Russian state soil and whether political and legal life in Russia would turn into something similar to Poland, where the omnipotence of magnates, including the election of the king, significantly weakened the vertical of power. Did the highest circles of Russian society understand this? Obviously they understood, and a good reason for this, in our opinion, is the project of Prince A. Cherkassky on the state structure of Russia, developed in early February 1730. It was based on the concept of an associate of Peter I, the Russian historian V. Tatishchev.43 In its essence it was an alternative to the plans of the “sovereigns.”
Be that as it may, the result of Peter’s reforms, which took place in the conditions of eliminating the remnants and beginnings of class-representative democracy, suppressing the democracy of the Cossack circle and squeezing the juice out of the people, became a great military power that smelted more steel of excellent quality than advanced England.
But over time, the ruling class, which the Asian mode of production also forces to work hard, gets tired of trying their best, and when the main tasks were completed and the whip fell from the hands of the reformer, the “top” began organizing their own affairs. The time of stagnation has come, despite all the external dynamism of the “era of palace coups.” Factories operated by inertia, expeditions were sent, regiments marched, but little by little everything fell into disrepair. However, the inertia was so great that it gave Koenigsberg into the hands of Russia, and the great Kant himself took the oath of allegiance to the Russian crown.
Peter III, an agent of Prussia and the faithful “brother” of his leader in the Masonic lodge, Frederick II, is trying to resolve the crisis. This figure combines both Boris Godunov and Grishka Otrepiev in one person. Russia, despite the “stagnation,” is too strong for anyone to decide to intervene, but, acting through its agents, the West is achieving a lot - the army is weakened, the results of the conquests of the Elizabethan regiments are surrendered. Russian soldiers are going obediently to shed blood for German interests, against their recent ally, Denmark. The national feeling of the Russian person is humiliated and insulted.
This cannot continue for long and Peter is eliminated as a result of a palace coup. However, through the hands of this insignificant man, history has done a great thing - the decree “On the liberties of the nobility” was adopted (the role of this decree has already been discussed above). It would seem that this is a step back towards the restoration of feudalism. The nobleman is freed from subordination to the state, from the obligation of service and becomes a free master, master of his estate. But let's not mistake form for content. The Russian landowner is not a feudal lord at all and his estate is not a feudal possession, but normal full-blooded private property. He is not a steward of the land, but an owner operating in the conditions of the capitalist market, just as the slave-owner planters of America acted in the conditions of the market. Well, it’s true that they had fewer restrictions on the market.
So, another cycle has been completed.

One should not think that during the palace coups of the 20s-40s. There was only an unprincipled struggle for power, and only the coup of 1741 partially stood out from this series, since it took place under clearly expressed patriotic slogans of a return to the policies of Peter the Great and the struggle against foreign domination. The activities of the Supreme Privy Council cannot be interpreted one-sidedly. However, we will not claim that all his activities were positive and exclusively beneficial. We dwelled in detail on the controversial issues of the activities of this body in Chapter Three.
The issue of the conditions of 1730 is debatable. Some scientists believe that the adoption of standards would lead to the triumph of a self-interested oligarchy and would cause great harm to Russia. Others believe that restrictions on autocracy, even oligarchic ones, could contribute to the establishment of legal principles in Russian society and the state. Which once again indirectly confirms the idea we outlined above.
Nevertheless, the last of the coups ended with the accession of Catherine, whose century was called golden by many historians.


Literature.

1) Arslanov R. A., Kerov V. V., Moseikina M. N., Smirnova T. V. History of Russia from ancient times to the twentieth century, - M.: Norma, 2001
2) Minenko N. A. History of Russia from ancient times to the second half of the 19th century, Ekaterinburg: USTU Publishing House, 1995
3) Klyuchevsky V. O. Course of general history, - M.: Nauka, 1994
4) Alkhazashvilli D.M. The struggle for the legacy of Peter the Great, -M.: Gardariki, 2002
5) Chedzhemov S. Yu. From the history of the formation of the foundations of the constitutional system in Russia, -Vladikavkaz: Publishing house of VSU, 1997
6) Prokopovich F.P. A short story about the death of Peter the Great, St. Petersburg: Peter, 1991
7) Kobrin V.K. Time of Troubles- lost opportunities. History of the Fatherland: people, ideas, decisions. -M.: EKSMO, 1991
8) Lobanov A.V. Russian revolution and rhythms of history, M.: Stok-K, 1998

D. Zhukovskaya

The overstrain of the country's forces during the years of Peter's reforms, the destruction of traditions, and violent methods of reform caused an ambiguous attitude of various circles of Russian society towards Peter's legacy and created conditions for political instability.

From 1725, after the death of Peter, until Catherine 2 came to power in 1762, six monarchs and many political forces behind them replaced the throne. This change did not always take place peacefully and legally. Therefore, V. O. Klyuchevsky called this period “the era of palace coups.”

The main reason that formed the basis of the palace coups was the contradictions between various noble groups in relation to Peter's legacy. The split occurred along the lines of acceptance and non-acceptance of reforms. Both the new nobility, which emerged during the reign of Peter, and the aristocracy tried to soften the course of reforms. But each of them defended its narrow-class interests and privileges, which created fertile ground for internal political struggle. Palace coups were generated by an intense struggle between various factions for power. As a rule, it came down to the nomination and support of one or another candidate for the throne. At this time, the guard, which Peter raised as a privileged support of the autocracy, began to play an active role in the political life of the country. she now took upon herself the right to control the conformity of the personality and policies of the monarch with the legacy that the emperor left. The alienation of the masses from politics and their passivity served as fertile ground for palace intrigues and coups. To a large extent, palace coups were provoked by the unresolved problem of succession to the throne in connection with the adoption of the Decree of 1722, which broke the traditional mechanism of transfer of power.

Catherine's reign 1.1725 - 1727.

When Peter died, he left no heir. The opinion of the elite about his successor was divided: “chicks of Peter’s nest” A. D. Menshikov, P. A. Tolstoy, P. I. Yaguzhinsky, spoke for his second wife Ekaterina, and representatives of the noble nobility, D. M. Golitsyn, V. V. Dolgoruky , - for the grandson of Pyotr Alekseevich. The outcome of the dispute was decided by the guards who supported the empress.

The accession of Catherine led to a sharp increase in the role of Menshikov, who became the de facto ruler of the country. Attempts to somewhat curb his lust for power with the help of what was created under the empress

The Supreme Privy Council (SPC), to which the first collegiums and the Senate were subordinate, did not lead to anything.

The temporary worker decided to strengthen his position through the marriage of his daughter with Peter’s young grandson. P. Tolstoy, who opposed this plan, ended up in prison.

In May 1727, Catherine died, appointing Peter's grandson, Pyotr Alekseevich, as her successor.

Reign of Peter II.1727 - 1730.

Peter was declared emperor under the regency of the Military-Technical Cooperation. Menshikov's influence at court increased, he even received the rank of generalissimo. But, having alienated old allies and failed to gain new ones, he soon lost influence on the young emperor (with the help of the Dolgorukys and member of the military technical cooperation A.I. Osterman) and in September 1727 he was arrested and exiled with his family to Berezov, where he soon died. The overthrow of Menshikov was essentially a coup d'etat, since the composition of the military-technical cooperation changed (in which aristocratic families began to predominate), and Osterman began to play a key role; the regency of the military-technical cooperation was put to an end, Peter II declared himself the rightful ruler; a course was outlined aimed at revising Peter's reforms.

Soon the court left St. Petersburg and moved to Moscow, which attracted the emperor’s attention due to the presence of richer hunting grounds. The sister of the Tsar's favorite, Ekaterina Dolgorukaya, was engaged to the Emperor, but during preparations for the wedding, he died of smallpox. The question of succession to the throne arose again, since there was no will again.

The reign of Anna Ioannovna. 1730-1740

In the conditions of the political crisis, the Military-Technical Cooperation, which by that time consisted of 8 people (5 seats belonged to the Dolgorukys and Golitsyns), invited the niece of Peter I, Duchess of Courland Anna Ioannovna (a widow who did not have strong ties in Russia), to the throne. After a meeting in Mitau with V.L. Dolgoruky, Anna Ioannovna, agreeing to accept the throne, signed condition that limited her power:

Undertook to rule together with the military-technical cooperation, which was actually turning into supreme body governance of the country;

— without the approval of the Military Technical Cooperation, it did not have the right to pass laws, impose taxes, manage the treasury, declare war and make peace, grant and take away estates, ranks above the rank of colonel;

- the guard was subordinate to the military-technical cooperation;

- Anna undertook not to marry and not to appoint an heir;

- if any of these conditions were not met, she was deprived of the crown.

However, upon arriving in Moscow, Anna Ioannovna very quickly understood the difficult internal political situation (various noble groups proposed projects for the political reorganization of Russia) and, having found the support of part of the nobility and the guard, she broke the rules and restored the autocracy in full.

Politics A.I.:

— liquidated the military-technical cooperation, creating in its place a Cabinet of Ministers headed by Osterman;

- since 1735, the empress’s signature was equal to the signatures of three cabinet ministers,

— repressed the Dolgorukys and Golitsyns;

— satisfied some of the demands of the nobility:

a) limited the service life to 25 years,

b) canceled that part of the Decree on Single Inheritance, which limited the right of nobles to dispose of estates when transferred by inheritance;

c) made it easier to obtain an officer rank by allowing infants to enroll in military service

d) created a cadet corps of nobles, upon completion of which officer ranks were awarded.

- by decree of 1836, all working people, including civilian employees, were declared “eternally given away,” i.e., they became dependent on the owners of the factories.

Not trusting the Russian nobility and not having the desire or ability to delve into state affairs herself, A.I. surrounded herself with people from the Baltic states. The key role was played by her favorite E. Biron. Some historians call the period of A.I.'s reign "Bironovshchina", believing that its main feature was the dominance of the Germans, who neglected the interests of the state, demonstrated contempt for everything Russian and pursued a policy of arbitrariness towards the Russian nobility.

In 1740, A.I. died, appointing the son of Anna Leopoldovna’s niece, the baby Ivan Antonovich (Ivan YI), as heir. Biron was appointed regent under him. The head of the military college, Field Marshal Minich, carried out another coup d'etat, pushing aside Biron, but, in turn, was pushed out of power by Osterman.

The reign of Elizabeth Petrovna. 1741-1761.

On November 25, 1741, Peter's daughter, relying on the support of the guard, carried out another coup d'etat and seized power. The peculiarities of this coup were that E.P. had broad support from ordinary people of the cities and lower guards, and also that this coup had a patriotic overtones, because was directed against the dominance of foreigners, and foreign diplomats (the Frenchman Chetardie and the Swedish ambassador Nolken) tried to take part in its preparation.

Politics E.P.:

- restored the institutions created by Peter and their status: having abolished the Cabinet of Ministers, returned the significance of the highest state body to the Senate, restored the Berg - and Manufactory - Collegium.

- brought closer Russian and Ukrainian nobles, who were distinguished by their great interest in the affairs of the country. Thus, with the active assistance of I.I. Shuvalov, Moscow University was opened in 1755;

— internal customs were destroyed, import duties were increased (protectionism)

- on the initiative of I. Shuvalov, the transition began from the poll tax (a direct tax that was paid only by peasants and townspeople) to indirect taxes (which were also paid by all non-taxable classes).

— Income from the sale of salt and wine tripled;

- has been cancelled the death penalty

- social policy was aimed at transforming the nobility into a privileged class and strengthening serfdom, which was expressed in the landowners receiving the right to sell their peasants as recruits (1747) and exile them to Siberia (1760).

Russia entered the war against Prussia on the side of the coalition of Austria, France, Sweden and Saxony.

The Seven Years' War began in 1756, ended in 1763 and brought the army of Frederick II to the brink of disaster, and only the death of H.P. on December 25, 1761 saved Prussia from complete defeat. Her heir, Peter III, who idolized Frederick, left the coalition and concluded a peace treaty, returning to Prussia all the lands lost in the war.

During the 20 years of H.P.’s reign, the country managed to rest and accumulate strength for a new breakthrough, which occurred in the era of Catherine II.

Reign of Peter III. 1761 - 1762

E.P.'s nephew, Peter III (the son of Anna's elder sister and the Duke of Holstein) was born in Holstein and from childhood was brought up in hostility to everything Russian and respect for everything German. By 1742, he turned out to be an orphan and E.P. invited him to Russia, immediately appointing him as her heir. In 1745 he was married to the Anhalt-Zerbian princess Sophia Frederick Augustus (Ekaterina Alekseevna).

Peter alienated the nobility and the guards with his pro-German sympathies, unbalanced behavior, signing peace with Frederick, introducing Prussian uniforms, and his plans to send the guards to fight for the interests of the Prussian king in Denmark.

In 1762, he signed a manifesto granting liberty and freedom to the Russian nobility, which

Then he abolished the Secret search office;

- stopped persecuting schismatics,

- decided to secularize church and monastic lands,

- prepared a decree on the equalization of all religions.

All these measures met the objective needs of Russia's development and reflected the interests of the nobility.

But his personal behavior, indifference and even dislike for Russia, mistakes in foreign policy and insulting attitude towards his wife, who managed to gain respect from the nobility and the guard, created the preconditions for his overthrow. In preparing the coup, Catherine was guided not only by political pride, the thirst for power and the instinct of self-preservation, but also by the desire to serve Russia.

Russian foreign policy in the mid-18th century.

Objectives: maintaining access to the Baltic Sea; influence on Poland and the solution of the Black Sea problem.

1733-1734. As a result of Russia's participation in the "War for the Polish Heritage", it was possible to place the Russian protege Augustus 3 on the Polish throne.

1735-1739. As a result of the war with Turkey, Russia returned Azov.

1741-1743. The war with Sweden, which sought to take revenge for the defeat in the Northern War and return the coast Baltic Sea. Russian troops captured almost all of Finland and forced Sweden to abandon revenge.

1756-1762. Seven Years' War.

Russia found itself drawn into a war between two European coalitions - Russian-Franco-Austrian and Anglo-Prussian. The main reason is the strengthening of Prussia in Europe. In August 1757, the Russian army under the command of Field Marshal S. F. Apraksin, only thanks to the corps of P. A. Rumyantsev, defeated the Prussian army near the village of Gross-Jägersdorf. Without continuing the offensive, the army retreated to Memel. Elizabeth removed Apraksin. The new commander-in-chief V.V. Fermor occupied Koenigsberg in the winter of 1758. In the summer, in the battle of Zorndorf, the Russian army lost 22.6 thousand (out of 42 thousand), and the Prussian army lost 11 thousand (out of 32 thousand). The battle ended almost in a draw. In 1759, the Russian army was replenished with new cannons - “unicorns” (light, mobile, rapid-fire), General P. A. Saltykov became the new commander. On August 1, 1759, Russian-Austrian troops defeated the Prussian army near the village of Kunersdorf. P

In 1760, the detachments of Totleben and Chernyshov captured Berlin. Prussia's position was hopeless. Russia announced its intention to annex East Prussia. Peter 3, who ascended the throne after the death of Elizabeth, broke with his allies and made peace with Frederick, returning all the captured territories.

Results of the era of "palace coups"

Palace coups did not entail changes in the political, much less social, system of society and boiled down to a struggle for power among various noble groups pursuing their own, most often selfish, goals. At the same time, the policies of each of the six monarchs had their own characteristics, sometimes important for the country. In general, the socio-economic stabilization and foreign policy successes achieved during the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna created the conditions for more accelerated development.

The era of palace coups in Russia.

In 1725, Russian Emperor Peter I died without leaving a legal heir and without transferring the throne to the chosen one. Over the next 37 years, there was a struggle for power between his relatives - contenders for the Russian throne. This period in history is usually called " era of palace coups».

A feature of the period of “palace coups” is that the transfer of supreme power in the state was not carried out by inheriting the crown, but was carried out by guards or courtiers using forceful methods.

Such confusion arose due to the lack of clearly defined rules of succession to the throne in a monarchical country, which caused the supporters of one or another contender to fight among themselves.

The era of palace coups 1725-1762.

After Peter the Great, the following sat on the Russian throne:

  • Catherine I - the emperor's wife,
  • Peter II - grandson of the emperor,
  • Anna Ioannovna - the emperor's niece,
  • Ioann Antonovich is the great-nephew of the previous one,
  • Elizaveta Petrovna - daughter of Peter I,
  • Peter III is the nephew of the previous one,
  • Catherine II is the wife of the previous one.

In general, the era of revolutions lasted from 1725 to 1762.

Catherine I (1725–1727).

One part of the nobility, led by A. Menshikov, wanted to see the emperor’s second wife, Catherine, on the throne. The other part is the grandson of Emperor Peter Alekseevich. The dispute was won by those who were supported by the guard - the first. Under Catherine, A. Menshikov played a major role in the state.

In 1727, the Empress died, appointing the young Peter Alekseevich as successor to the throne.

Peter II (1727–1730).

Young Peter became emperor under the regency of the Supreme Privy Council. Gradually Menshikov lost his influence and was exiled. Soon the regency was abolished - Peter II declared himself ruler, the court returned to Moscow.

Shortly before his wedding to Catherine Dolgoruky, the emperor died of smallpox. There was no will.

Anna Ioannovna (1730–1740).

The Supreme Council invited the niece of Peter I, Duchess of Courland Anna Ioannovna, to rule in Russia. The challenger agreed to conditions limiting her power. But in Moscow, Anna quickly got used to it, enlisted the support of part of the nobility and violated the previously signed agreement, returning autocracy. However, it was not she who ruled, but the favorites, the most famous of whom was E. Biron.

In 1740, Anna died, having designated her great-nephew baby Ivan Antonovich (Ivan VI) as heir under regent Biron.

The coup was carried out by Field Marshal Minich, the fate of the child is still unclear.

Elizaveta Petrovna (1741–1761).

Seize power my own daughter Peter I was again helped by the guards. On the night of November 25, 1741, Elizaveta Petrovna, who was also supported by commoners, was literally brought to the throne. The coup had a bright patriotic overtones. His main goal was to remove foreigners from power in the country. Elizaveta Petrovna's policy was aimed at continuing her father's affairs.

Peter III (1761–1762).

Peter III is the orphaned nephew of Elizabeth Petrovna, the son of Anna Petrovna and the Duke of Holstein. In 1742 he was invited to Russia and became heir to the throne.

During Elizabeth's lifetime, Peter married his cousin, Princess Sophia Frederica Augusta of Anhalt-Zerb, the future Catherine II.

Peter's policy after the death of his aunt was aimed at an alliance with Prussia. The behavior of the emperor and his love for the Germans alienated the Russian nobility.

It was the emperor’s wife who ended the 37-year leapfrog on the Russian throne. She was again supported by the army - the Izmailovsky and Semenovsky Guards regiments. Catherine was brought to the throne as Elizabeth had once been.

Catherine proclaimed herself empress in June 1762, and both the Senate and the Synod swore allegiance to her. Peter III signed the abdication of the throne.

General characteristics of the era of palace coups

The era of palace coups is a time period (37 years) in the political life of Russia in the 18th century, when the seizure of political power was carried out by a series of palace coups. The reason for this was the lack of clear rules for succession to the throne, accompanied by the struggle of court factions and carried out, as a rule, with the assistance of guard regiments. The desire of the nobles and boyars to regain the power, freedom and privileges lost under Peter I. The overstrain of the country's forces during the years of Peter's reforms, the destruction of traditions, and violent methods of reform caused an ambiguous attitude of various circles of Russian society towards Peter's legacy and created conditions for political instability.
From 1725 after the death of Peter I and until Catherine II came to power in 1762, six monarchs and many political forces behind them replaced the throne. This change did not always take place peacefully and legally, which is why this period of V.O. Klyuchevsky, not entirely accurately, but figuratively and aptly called it “the era of palace coups.”

The struggle for power after the death of Peter I

Dying, Peter did not leave an heir, having only managed to write with a weakening hand: “Give everything...”. Opinion at the top about his successor was divided. “Chicks of Peter’s nest” (A.D. Menshikov, P.A. Tolstoy, I.I. Buturlin, P.I. Yaguzhinsky, etc.) spoke for his second wife Ekaterina, and representatives of the noble nobility (D.M.

Golitsyn, V.V. Dolgoruky and others) defended the candidacy of their grandson, Pyotr Alekseevich. The outcome of the dispute was decided by the guards who supported the empress.
The accession of Catherine 1 (1725-1727) led to a sharp strengthening of the position of Menshikov, who became the de facto ruler of the country. Attempts to somewhat curb his lust for power and greed with the help of the Supreme Privy Council (SPC) created under the empress, to which the first three collegiums, as well as the Senate, were subordinate, led nowhere. Moreover, the temporary worker decided to strengthen his position through the marriage of his daughter with Peter’s young grandson. P. Tolstoy, who opposed this plan, ended up in prison.
In May 1727, Catherine 1 died and, according to her will, 12-year-old Peter II (1727-1730) became emperor under the regency of the VTS. Menshikov's influence at court increased, and he even received the coveted rank of generalissimo. But, having alienated old allies and not gaining new ones among the noble nobility, he soon lost influence on the young emperor and in September 1727 he was arrested and exiled with his entire family to Berezovo, where he soon died.
A significant role in discrediting Menshikov’s personality in the eyes of the young emperor was played by Dolgoruky, as well as a member of the Military Technical Cooperation, the Tsar’s educator, nominated to this position by Menshikov himself - A.I. Osterman is a deft diplomat who knew how, depending on the balance of power and the political situation, to change his views, allies and patrons.
The overthrow of Menshikov was, in essence, an actual palace coup, because the composition of the military-technical cooperation changed, in which aristocratic families began to predominate (Dolgoruky and Golitsyn), and A.I. began to play a key role. Osterman; the regency of the military-technical cooperation was put to an end, Peter II declared himself a full-fledged ruler, surrounded by new favorites; a course was outlined aimed at revising the reforms of Peter I.
Soon the court left St. Petersburg and moved to Moscow, which attracted the emperor due to the presence of richer hunting grounds. The sister of the Tsar's favorite, Ekaterina Dolgorukaya, was engaged to Peter II, but during preparations for the wedding he died of smallpox. And again the question of the heir to the throne arose, because With the death of Peter II, the Romanov male line was cut short, and he did not have time to appoint a successor.

Prerequisites for palace coups

The main reason that formed the basis of the palace coups was the contradictions between various noble groups in relation to Peter's legacy. It would be a simplification to consider that the split occurred along the lines of acceptance and non-acceptance of reforms. Both the so-called “new nobility”, which emerged during the years of Peter thanks to their official zeal, and the aristocratic party tried to soften the course of reforms, hoping in one form or another to give a respite to society, and, first of all, to themselves. But each of these groups defended their narrow-class interests and privileges, which created fertile ground for internal political struggle.
Palace coups were generated by an intense struggle between various factions for power. As a rule, it most often came down to the nomination and support of one or another candidate for the throne.
At this time, the guard began to play an active role in the political life of the country, which Peter raised as a privileged “support” of the autocracy, which, moreover, took upon itself the right to control the conformity of the personality and policies of the monarch with the legacy that its “beloved emperor” left.
The alienation of the masses from politics and their passivity served as fertile ground for palace intrigues and coups.
To a large extent, palace coups were provoked by the unresolved problem of succession to the throne in connection with the adoption of the Decree of 1722, which broke the traditional mechanism of transfer of power.

Prerequisites for the palace coup

Causes of palace coups

1) Contradictions between various noble factions in relation to Peter’s legacy.

2) An intense struggle between various groups for power, which most often boiled down to the nomination and support of one or another candidate for the throne.

3) The active position of the guard, which Peter raised as a privileged support of the autocracy, which, moreover, took upon itself the right to control the compliance of the personality and policies of the monarch with the legacy that its beloved emperor left.

4) Passivity of the masses, absolutely far from the political life of the capital.

5) Exacerbation of the problem of succession to the throne in connection with the adoption of the Decree of 1722, which broke the traditional mechanism of transfer of power.

1) Moving away from the national political tradition, according to which the throne is only for the direct heirs of the king, Peter himself prepared a crisis of power.

2) Claimed the Russian throne after the death of Peter a large number of direct and indirect heirs;

3) The existing corporate interests of the nobility and family nobility were revealed in their entirety.

When analyzing the era of palace coups, it is important to pay attention to the following points.

Firstly, the initiators of the coups were various palace groups who sought to elevate their protégé to the throne.

Secondly, the most important consequence of the coups was the strengthening of the economic and political positions of the nobility.

Thirdly, the driving force behind the coups was the Guard.

Indeed, it was the guard during the period under review that decided the question of who should be on the throne.

Supreme Privy Council

SUPREME PRIVATE COUNCIL - the highest body of state power in the Russian Empire (1726-1730); created by decree of Catherine I Alekseevna on February 8, 1726, formally as an advisory body under the empress, in fact it decided all the most important state affairs. During the accession of Empress Anna Ivanovna, the Supreme Privy Council tried to limit the autocracy in its favor, but was dissolved.

After the death of Emperor Peter I the Great (1725), his wife Ekaterina Alekseevna ascended the throne. She was not able to independently govern the state and created the Supreme Privy Council from among the most prominent associates of the late emperor, which was supposed to advise the empress what to do in this or that case. Gradually, the sphere of competence of the Supreme Privy Council included the resolution of all the most important domestic and foreign policy issues. The collegiums were subordinate to him, and the role of the Senate was reduced, which was reflected, in particular, in the renaming from the “Governing Senate” to the “High Senate”.

Initially, the Supreme Privy Council consisted of A.D. Menshikova, P.A. Tolstoy, A.I. Osterman, F.M. Apraksina, G.I. Golovkina, D.M. Golitsyn and Duke Karl Friedrich of Holstein-Gottorp (son-in-law of the Empress, husband of Tsarevna Anna Petrovna). A struggle for influence ensued between them, in which A.D. won. Menshikov. Ekaterina Alekseevna agreed to the marriage of the heir to Tsarevich Peter with Menshikov’s daughter. In April 1727 A.D. Menshikov achieved the disgrace of P.A. Tolstoy, Duke Karl Friedrich was sent home. However, after the accession of Peter II Alekseevich to the throne (May 1727), A.D. fell into disgrace. Menshikov and the Supreme Privy Council included A.G. and V.L. Dolgorukovs, and in 1730 after the death of F.M. Apraksina - M.M. Golitsyn and V.V. Dolgorukov.

The internal policy of the Supreme Privy Council was aimed mainly at solving problems associated with the socio-economic crisis that the country was experiencing after the long Northern War and the reforms of Peter I, primarily in the financial sector. Members of the council (“the supreme leaders”) critically assessed the results of Peter’s reforms and were aware of the need to adjust them in accordance with the real capabilities of the country. The financial issue was at the center of the activities of the Supreme Privy Council, which the leaders tried to solve in two directions: by streamlining the system of accounting and control over state income and expenses and by saving money. The leaders discussed issues of improving the systems of taxation and public administration created by Peter, reducing the army and navy and other measures aimed at replenishing the state budget. The collection of poll taxes and recruits was transferred from the army to the civil authorities, military units were withdrawn from rural areas to cities, and some noble officers were sent on long vacations without payment of salary. The capital of the state was again moved to Moscow.

In order to save money, the leaders liquidated a number of local institutions (court courts, offices of zemstvo commissars, Waldmaster offices) and reduced the number of local employees. Some of the minor officials who did not have a class rank were deprived of their salaries, and they were asked to “feed from business.” Along with this, the positions of governor were restored. The leaders tried to revive domestic and foreign trade, allowed previously prohibited trade through the Arkhangelsk port, lifted restrictions on trade in a number of goods, abolished many restrictive duties, created favorable conditions for foreign merchants, and revised the protective customs tariff of 1724. In 1726, an alliance treaty was concluded with Austria, which determined Russia’s behavior in the international arena for several decades.

In January 1730, after the death of Peter II, the rulers invited the Dowager Duchess of Courland Anna Ivanovna to the Russian throne. At the same time, on the initiative of D.M.

Golitsyn, it was decided to carry out a reform of the political system of Russia through the actual elimination of the autocracy and the introduction of a limited monarchy of the Swedish model. To this end, the leaders invited the future empress to sign special conditions - “conditions”, according to which she was deprived of the opportunity to make political decisions on her own: make peace and declare war, appoint her to government posts, change the taxation system. Real power passed to the Supreme Privy Council, the composition of which was to be expanded to include representatives of the highest officials, generals and aristocracy. The nobility generally supported the idea of ​​limiting the absolute power of the autocrat. However, negotiations between the supreme leaders and Anna Ivanovna were conducted in secret, which aroused suspicion among the masses of nobles of a conspiracy to usurp power in the hands of the aristocratic families represented in the Supreme Privy Council (Golitsyns, Dolgorukies). The lack of unity among the supporters of the supreme leaders allowed Anna Ivanovna, who arrived in Moscow, relying on the guard and some of the court officials, to carry out a coup: on February 25, 1730, the empress broke the “conditions”, and on March 4, the Supreme Privy Council was abolished. Later, most members of the Supreme Privy Council (with the exception of Osterman and Golovkin, who did not support the Golitsyns and Dolgorukovs) were subjected to repression.

Causes of palace coups

It is believed that Peter I prepared the era of palace coups in Russia by issuing a decree on succession to the throne in 1722. This decree allowed any relative of the emperor, regardless of gender and age, to lay claim to the royal throne. Since families in the 18th century. were large, then, as a rule, there were many candidates for the imperial crown: wives and children, cousins, grandchildren and nephews... The absence of a single legal heir led to increased palace intrigues and a struggle for power.

Features of palace coups

Role of the Guard

In the struggle for power, the one who was supported by the guard, called upon to protect the capital and the imperial palace, won. It was the guard regiments that became the main force behind palace coups. Therefore, every contender for the throne, trying to enlist the support of the guards, promised them money, estates and new privileges.

In 1714, Peter I issued a decree prohibiting the promotion to officers of nobles who did not serve as privates in the guard.

Therefore, by 1725, in the guards regiments, not only the officers, but also the majority of the privates were from the nobility. Thanks to its social homogeneity, the guard was able to become the main force in palace coups.

The guards units during this period were the most privileged in the Russian army. The guards did not participate in hostilities and performed exclusively ceremonial and palace service in the capital. The salary of private guards was much higher than that of army and navy officers.

Favoritism

Often, as a result of a palace coup, persons unprepared to govern the state ended up on the throne. Therefore, the consequence of the coups was favoritism, that is, the rise of one or several favorites of the monarch, who concentrated enormous power and wealth in their hands.

Social system of Russia

An important feature of the palace coups should be noted: they did not lead to significant changes in the social system of Russia. Emperors and favorites changed, as did the emphasis in domestic and foreign policy, but the following always remained unchanged: a) the absolute power of the monarch; b) serfdom; c) political lack of rights of the people; d) a course to expand the privileges of the nobility at the expense of other classes. The stability of power was ensured by a growing and strengthening bureaucracy.

History of palace coups

On this page there is material on the following topics:

  • Video of palace coups after the death of Peter 1: sequence and reasons

  • The role of the guard in palace coups

  • The era of palace coups table the method of coming to power

  • The fourth palace coup in Russia

  • Explain why the palace coup of internal politics was ruled by the monarchy

Questions for this article:

  • Why was Peter I forced to issue a decree on succession to the throne?

  • What important events occurred in 1740, 1741, 1741 - 1743, 1756-1763, 1761, 1762?

  • What is a palace coup?

  • What are the causes and features of palace coups in Russia?

  • What role did the guard play in palace coups?

  • What is favoritism?

  • Make a table “The era of palace coups.”

  • How did the positions of the Russian nobility strengthen in 1725-1761?

Material from the site http://WikiWhat.ru

Palace coups: causes and main events

The death of Emperor Peter I in 1725 led to a long crisis of power. According to the figurative expression of V. O. Klyuchevsky, this period of our history was called “palace revolutions.” For 37 years from the death of Peter I to the accession of Catherine II (1725-1762), the throne was occupied by six reigning persons who received the throne as a result of complex palace intrigues or coups.

Reasons for palace coups:

1. moving away from the national political tradition, according to which the throne passed only to the direct heirs of the tsar, Peter himself prepared a “crisis of power” (by failing to implement the Decree of 1722 on the succession to the throne, without appointing an heir for himself);

2. after the death of Peter, a large number of direct and indirect heirs laid claim to the Russian throne;

3. the existing corporate interests of the nobility and high-born nobility manifested themselves in their entirety.

Palace coups, that they were not state coups, that is, they did not pursue the goal of radical changes in political power and government structure

When analyzing the era of palace coups, it is important to pay attention to the following points.

1. The initiators of the coups were various palace groups who sought to elevate their protégé to the throne.

2. The most important consequence of the palace coups was the strengthening of the economic and political positions of the nobility.

3.The driving force behind the coups was the Guard.

Catherine's reign I (1725-1727). The guard took Catherine's side.

In 1726, under Catherine I, the Supreme Privy Council was established, which, according to historian S. F. Platonov, replaced Peter the Great's Senate. The Supreme Privy Council included A.D. Menshikov, F. M. Apraksin, G. I. Golovkin, D. M. Golitsyn, A. I. Osterman and P. A. Tolstoy. The Council was not an oligarchic body limiting autocracy. It remained a bureaucratic, albeit very influential, institution in the system of absolutism, placed under the control of the empress.

During this period of time the following happened:

Reduction of bureaucratic structures;

Revision of customs tariff;

Changing the deployment of the army and its contents;

Elimination of the self-government system;

Restoring the importance of the county as the main territorial-administrative unit;

Changing the taxation system, reducing the capitation tax.

In general, the activities of Catherine I and her “supreme leaders” were characterized by a rejection of the broad reform program of Peter I and a reduction in the role of the Senate. Trade and industry, which lost financial and administrative support from the state in the post-Petrine era, were placed in unfavorable conditions. The beginning of an audit of the results of Peter's reforms.

Peter II (1727-1730). Shortly before her death in 1727, Catherine I signed a will that determined the sequence of succession to the throne. The closest heir was determined to be Peter II.

The throne was taken by 12-year-old Peter II under the regency of the Supreme Privy Council.

The Supreme Privy Council under Peter II underwent significant changes. In it, all affairs were carried out by four princes Dolgoruky and two Golitsyns, as well as A.I. Osterman. The Dolgorukies came to the fore. Peter II died on the day of his wedding (with Ivan Dolgoruky's sister Catherine). The Romanov dynasty was cut short in the male line. The question of the emperor had to be decided by the Supreme Privy Council.

The short stay in power of young Peter II did not make significant changes in the state and public life of Russian society. The relocation of the royal court from St. Petersburg to Moscow at the end of 1727, the abolition of the Chief Magistrate in 1728.

Anna Ioannovna (1730-1740). After long consultations, the leaders chose the senior line of the dynasty, associated with the brother of Peter I - Ivan V.

Golitsyn and V.L. Dolgoruky developed the so-called conditions - the conditions under which Anna Ioannovna could accept the Russian crown from the hands of the rulers:

No new laws should be issued;

Do not start a war with anyone and do not make peace with anyone;

Do not burden loyal subjects with any taxes;

Do not dispose of treasury revenues;

Noble ranks above the rank of colonel are not welcome;

The nobility's life, property and honor cannot be taken away;

Do not favor estates and villages.

Just two weeks after arriving in Moscow, Anna broke down in front of the leaders and declared “her perception of autocracy.” The Supreme Privy Council in 1731 was replaced by a Cabinet of three ministers headed by A. I. Osterman. Four years later, Anna Ioannovna equated the signatures of three cabinet ministers with one of her own.

Main directions of domestic policy:

Abolition of the Supreme Privy Council and the return of the Senate to its former significance;

The return of Peter's system of placing regiments in the provinces and the responsibility of landowners for payments to their peasants;

Continuation of the punitive policy towards the Old Believers;

Creation of a new body - the Cabinet of Ministers (1731);

Resumption of the activities of the Secret Chancellery;

The establishment of a cadet corps (1732), after which noble children received officer ranks;

Abolition of indefinite service for nobles (1736). In addition, one of the sons of a noble family was released from service to manage the estate.

During the reign of Anna Ioannovna, the autocracy was strengthened, the responsibilities of the nobles were reduced and their rights over the peasants were expanded.

Ivan VI Antonovich. After the death of Anna Ioannovna in 1740, according to her will, the Russian throne was inherited by her great-grandson, Ivan Antonovich. Anna's favorite E.I. Biron was appointed regent until he came of age, but less than a month later he was arrested by the guards on the orders of Field Marshal B.K. Minich. His mother Anna Leopoldovna was proclaimed regent for the royal child.

Elizaveta Petrovna (1741-1761). The next coup d'état was carried out with the direct participation of the guards of the Preobrazhensky Regiment.

The period of Elizabeth's reign was marked by the flourishing of favoritism. On the one hand, it was an indicator of the dependence of the nobility on royal generosity, and on the other hand, it was a unique, albeit rather timid, attempt to adapt the state to the demands of the nobility.

During the reign of Elizabeth, certain transformations were carried out:

1. there was a significant expansion of noble benefits, the socio-economic and legal status Russian nobility;

2. an attempt was made to restore some of the orders and government institutions created by Peter I. For this purpose, the Cabinet of Ministers was abolished, the functions of the Senate were significantly expanded, the Berg and Manufactory Collegiums, the chief and city magistrates were restored;

3. many foreigners were eliminated from the spheres of public administration and the education system;

4. a new supreme body was created - the Conference at the Highest Court (1756) to resolve important state issues, which largely duplicated the functions of the Senate;

5. the empress tried to develop new legislation;

6. there was a tightening of religious policy.

In general, Elizabeth’s reign did not become the “second edition” of Peter’s policies. Elizabeth's policy was distinguished by caution, and in some aspects, unusual gentleness. By refusing to sanction death sentences, she was actually the first in Europe to abolish the death penalty.

Peter III (December 25, 1761 - June 28, 1762). After the death of Elizabeth Petrovna in 1761, 33-year-old Peter III became Emperor of Russia.

Peter III announced to Frederick II the intention of Russia to make peace with Prussia separately, without allies France and Austria (1762). Russia returned to Prussia all the lands occupied during the Seven Years' War, refused indemnity to compensate for the losses incurred and entered into an alliance with the former enemy. In addition, Peter began to prepare for a completely unnecessary war with Denmark for Russia. In society this was perceived as a betrayal of Russian national interests.

During the six-month reign of Peter III, 192 decrees were adopted.

The secularization of church lands in favor of the state was announced, which strengthened the state treasury (the decree was finally implemented by Catherine II in 1764);

He stopped the persecution of Old Believers and wanted to equalize the rights of all religions.

Liquidation of the Secret Chancellery and the return from exile of people convicted under Elizaveta Petrovna;

Trade monopolies, which hampered the development of entrepreneurship, were abolished;

Freedom of foreign trade was proclaimed, etc.

Politically wise and economically expedient, these internal changes did not add to the emperor's popularity. His denial of everything Russian as “archaic,” the break with traditions, and the reshaping of many orders according to the Western model offended the national feelings of the Russian people. The fall of Emperor Peter III was a foregone conclusion, and it occurred as a result of a palace coup on June 28, 1762. Peter was forced to abdicate the throne, and a few days later he was killed.

Socio-economic development. A distinctive feature of Russia's social development was a significant expansion of the privileges of the nobility, the acquisition of which was facilitated by the relative instability of state power.

PERIOD OF PALACE COUPS

After the death of Peter I (January 28, 1725), who did not name a successor, the struggle for the throne became a characteristic feature of several decades, which the greatest Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevsky called “the era of palace coups.” In the 37 years from the death of Peter I to the accession of Catherine II, the throne was occupied by six monarchs who received the throne as a result of complex palace intrigues or coups. In fact, the country was ruled not by those who occupied the throne, but by those who were at its foot - nobles and favorites. It was during this period of Russian history that such orders were established in the life of the royal court in which it became possible to appoint favorites (favorites) to high positions, as well as the establishment of orders in which many phenomena in the country were determined by the influence of these favorites.

The guard, a selected, privileged part, became a major, almost decisive force in determining policy. Russian troops. The guard was used for the personal protection of the emperor, his family and for organizing control over the activities of various institutions, and was staffed mainly by nobles. The positions of the guard regiments largely determined who would occupy the throne in St. Petersburg. The Guard actively intervened in dynastic disputes and then the struggle for power took the form of palace coups. For the first time in this role, the guard acted immediately after the death of Peter. In 1722, Peter I issued the Decree “Charter on the Succession to the Throne,” according to which the emperor himself could appoint an heir, based on the interests of the state, but did not have time to name a successor. The question of Peter I's successor was to be decided by the Senate, the Synod and the generals, i.e. senior officials and officers. During negotiations about the heir to the throne between interested factions of the nobility, Guards officers were introduced into the Winter Palace, and two Guards regiments were lined up on Palace Square, summoned by Menshikov and expressing support for Catherine, the emperor's widow. So, with the help of the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky noble guard regiments, the first palace coup took place in 1725.

Catherine I was enthroned (1725-1727), and Menshikov became the de facto ruler of Russia. Representatives of the old nobility were dissatisfied with Catherine's accession and the strengthening of Menshikov's influence. In order to protect themselves from clashes with the Senate, the Menshikov group, by imperial decree in February 1726, established the Supreme Privy Council chaired by Catherine I. Three most important issues were removed from the jurisdiction of the Senate. public policy collegiums: foreign affairs, military, admiralty and transferred directly to the Supreme Privy Council. In the last days of her life, Catherine I signed a “testament” (will) (under pressure from the circles of the old Moscow nobility), according to which, on the basis of the “Charter on the Succession to the Throne” of 1722, power was transferred to the 12-year-old Tsarevich Peter Alekseevich (son of the executed Tsarevich Alexei, grandson Peter I). The new Emperor Peter II took the throne after the death of Catherine I in May 1727 (1727-1730). Until he came of age, Russia was to be governed by the Supreme Privy Council, the composition of which had changed. In September 1727, members of the council turned the young emperor against the all-powerful Menshikov - Menshikov was accused of high treason, deprived of all ranks, positions and awards, arrested and expelled from St. Petersburg. In February 1728, Peter II was crowned in Moscow. With the beginning of his reign, the clan aristocracy tried to restore the pre-reform system of state institutions. The royal court moved to Moscow, St. Petersburg fell into disrepair. Peter's fleet, created at the cost of enormous effort and material costs, was rotting in Kronstadt harbor. On January 19, 1730, Peter II died of smallpox and the question of the heir to the throne arose again.


The Supreme Privy Council, discussing candidates for the throne, denied the right to the throne to the daughter of Peter I, Elizabeth. The old boyar aristocracy decided to transfer the throne to the daughter of Tsar Ivan V - the widow of the Duke of Courland, the niece of Peter I - Anna Ioannovna, who signed the conditions (“conditions”) limiting her power: the empress did not have the right to start a war, make peace, introduce new taxes, dispose of state finances, distribute land, grant noble ranks to both Russians and foreigners without the permission of the Supreme Privy Council.

However, the policy of the “sovereigns” did not find the support of broad sections of the nobility. On February 25, 1730, Anna Ioannovna tore the “standards”. The Supreme Privy Council was abolished.

The reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna did not leave a good memory of itself among the Russian people. As V.O. Klyuchevsky argued, this was one of the darkest pages of our history, and the darkest thing about it was the Empress herself. The emperor’s favorite, Biron, had the greatest influence on state affairs, after whom the entire decade of her reign was called “Bironovism.” There was almost no noticeable progress in the development of the economy and trade. Financial position the country has deteriorated even further. The situation in the army and navy remained difficult. The Senate, restored to its rights in 1731, was pushed into the background by a new body - the Cabinet of Ministers. It has become the supreme body of state power, holding in its hands all the threads of governing the country. In October 1740, Anna Ioannovna died, the day before her death she signed the inheritance papers and regency(from Lat. - ruling - temporary exercise of the powers of the head of state collegiately or individually in the event of a minor, illness, or absence of the monarch). The heir to the throne was declared the son of her niece Anna Leopoldovna, two-month-old Ivan Antonovich, and the empress appointed her favorite Biron as regent (ruler) under him. A month later, Biron was arrested by the guards, exiled to the Tobolsk province, and then to Yaroslavl. His mother Anna Leopoldovna was proclaimed regent for the royal child.

palace coup imperial throne

The general prerequisites for palace coups include:

Contradictions between various noble factions in relation to Peter's legacy. It would be a simplification to consider that the split occurred along the lines of acceptance and non-acceptance of reforms.

Both the so-called “new nobility”, which emerged during the years of Peter thanks to their official zeal, and the aristocratic party tried to soften the course of reforms, hoping in one form or another to give a respite to society, and, first of all, to themselves.

But each of these groups defended their narrow-class interests and privileges, which created fertile ground for internal political struggle.

An intense struggle between various factions for power, which most often boiled down to the nomination and support of one or another candidate for the throne.

The active position of the guard, which Peter raised as a privileged “support” of the autocracy, which, moreover, took upon itself the right to control the compliance of the personality and policies of the monarch with the legacy that its “beloved emperor” left.

The passivity of the masses, absolutely far from the political life of the capital.

The aggravation of the problem of succession to the throne in connection with the adoption of the Decree of 1722, which broke the traditional mechanism of transfer of power.

The spiritual atmosphere that emerged as a result of the emancipation of the noble consciousness from traditional norms of behavior and morality pushed for active, often unprincipled political activity, instilled hope in luck and “omnipotent chance”, opening the way to power and wealth.

ZD 16 Favoritism in the 18th century. (message)

Favoritism in the 18th century

At all times, history was “made” by elders, princes, viziers, sultans, monarchs, emperors, kings, people in general, but then and now there are people who may be “blurred” in the general crowd of those in power, but who sometimes have a total influence on state policy. In any socio-political system, government, dictatorship, there are unspoken or visible personalities - favorites. There are different definitions of the term favoritism itself, but they are most accurately formulated in the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia: “Favoritism is a situation characteristic of the era of absolutism of the 17th – 18th centuries, in which favorites influence state affairs...”. In the dictionary of the Russian language S.I. Ozhegov there is a similar definition, but a decoding of the term favorite itself is added: “Favorite (Italian Favorito, from Latin Fovor - favor), a person who enjoys special favor and influences the views and behavior of his patrons.

Favoritism is characterized by the delegation of some (or even most) of the powers of the monarch to the favorite or his proteges. Favoritism became most widespread under an absolute monarchy. The reason for favoritism lies in the monarch's intention to concentrate supreme power in the hands of a very small group of people, often without outstanding qualities, but personally loyal.

In the 18th century, favoritism in connection with the rule of women acquired other features. The favorites were immensely endowed with titles and estates and had enormous political influence. Often incapable of state activities, empresses (with the exception of Catherine II, of course, relied entirely on the will of their favorites. Sometimes people from low classes became prominent political figures, rising thanks to the empress, who brought them closer to the court. Sometimes, thanks to their favorites, they became rich and advanced in their relatives in the service.

Already at the beginning of the Romanov dynasty, the first bricks were laid in the building of favoritism. The personal qualities of the monarchs undoubtedly contributed to the formation and development of favoritism in Russia. In Russia, favoritism flourishes under female empresses, who were distinguished by a special passion for love affairs. Moreover, not being distinguished by their desire for state affairs, in many cases they gave domestic and foreign policy into the hands of their favorites, thereby, at least indirectly, placing them above themselves in the state. In Western Europe, monarchs predominated - men who could not afford to place women at the helm of state policy, whose destiny, I exaggerate, was the kitchen and the bed.

After Peter's death, Menshikov could only do what he had done dozens of times before, when the Tsar was absent or indulged in entertainment. And the next day after death, just like the day before, the administrative bodies - the Senate, collegiums, various offices - turned out to be incapable of any initiative. Menshikov replaced her and continued to manage as before. He became a ruler, as a permanent substitute for royal authority, although such exercise of unlimited power was not stipulated by any law. This is an inherent feature of favoritism wherever it appears. The practical application of such a regime was not without difficulties. During the life of Peter, when the favorite performed the duties of the sovereign, the latter stood behind him, giving his consent to the temporary orders of his second self. Catherine wanted to imitate her husband; but she did not have the iron hand of a reformer, and among those around the empress Menshikov found rivals. From the first days, the Duke of Holstein showed his intention to compete with him and not to submit to the arrogance that was growing in this former cake maker. Bassevich tried further to stir up the ambition and suspicion of his duke. Menshikov had neither the flexibility nor the tact to eliminate the consequences of this. One day, when he introduced his eight-year-old son to the prince, the boy decided to stand up during the reception, and all the courtiers followed his example; and Menshikov did not even think of finding such an expression of respect unnecessary. This incident caused a scandal. He could unhinderedly enter Catherine I for a report. And the empress, in turn, did not forget to thank Menshikov. She granted him the city of Baturin - the same one that Alexander Danilovich literally begged from Peter I, but to no avail... Catherine I also forgot about all Menshikov’s debts.

When Anna Ioannovna comes to power, according to many historians, a dark streak begins in Russia. One of the contemporaries of that era described the thirties of the 18th century as follows: “A terrible word and deed was heard everywhere, dragging into the dungeons hundreds of victims of Biron’s gloomy suspicion or the personal enmity of his spies, scattered throughout the cities and villages, settling in almost every family. The executions were so common that they already aroused no one’s attention...” V. Pikul called Anna simply “a dirty, stupid woman, full of anger and vices, a wild lady on the Russian throne. Behind Anna stood the one they called Ernest Johann Biron. His real name is Johann Ernest Biren. As N. Kostomarov writes: “Out of vain ambition, he adopted the surname Biron, changing only one vowel in his real family nickname, and began to descend from the ancient aristocratic French family of Biron.” Active members of this family in France, having learned about such an impostor, laughed at him, but did not resist or protest, especially after with the accession of Anna Ioannovna to the Russian throne, he, under the name Biron, became the second person in a powerful European state. Around 1728, Johann Ernest came to Anna's court thanks to the patronage of Bestuzhev, who was then the duchess's favorite. An extremely ambitious man, Biron made the question of a career a matter of life. Vengeful, “without a concept of honor, without a sense of duty, he made his way in life with the self-interest of a petty egoist.” Having taken a strong position with Anna, Biren became close to her to such an extent that he became the most necessary person for her. At first he tried to be with her as often as possible and soon reached the point that she herself, even more than he, needed his company. According to contemporaries, Anna Ioannovna’s affection for Biren was unusual. The Empress thought and acted in accordance with how her favorite influenced her. Everything that Anna did essentially came from Biren.

If we talk about the personal qualities of the favorite, Count Manstein most clearly described them in his “Note”. “By the way, he owed the information and upbringing that he had to himself. He did not have the kind of intelligence that was liked in society and in the world, but he had a certain kind of genius. One could add to this the saying that work makes a man. Before arriving in Russia, he hardly even knew the name of politics, and after several years of staying in it he learned quite thoroughly the weight that concerns this state. Biron loved luxury and pomp to the point of excess and was a great lover of horses. This explains the words of the Austrian regent Ostein: “Biron speaks about horses like an intelligent person, but as soon as he talks about something other than horses, he lies like a horse.” “This man, who made an amazing career, had no education at all, spoke only German and the Courland dialect. I didn't read German well. He was not ashamed to publicly say during Anna’s life that he did not want to learn to read and write in Russian in order not to be obliged to present Her Majesty with petitions, reports and other documents sent to him daily.”

Arrogant, proud, cruel at heart, he covered up the dark sides of his character with the sophistication and sophistication of a secular man. Having come to power, the empress did not interfere with her favorite in any way. Due to natural laziness, she did not know the “tricks” of her favorite, and moreover, she sincerely believed that the people given to her by God were prospering. Anna saw the people through the prism of amusements, fireworks, balls and judged the situation in the state based on the official reports that she happened to read and sign. The Empress had no idea what was going on in the empire, and she did not want to know or think about it. She was satisfied with the way of life and affairs that she led. Taking advantage of the empress's abstraction from power, Biron takes it into his own hands. His power rested on three “pillars”: the Secret Chancellery (which was used by the favorite to fight enemies), the guard, and the minions of the ruler’s favorite. N. Kostomarov gives the following characterization to E. Biron “... had no state views, no program of activity and not the slightest acquaintance with Russian life and people. This did not prevent him from despising Russians and consciously persecuting everything Russian. His only goal was his own enrichment, his only concern - strengthening one’s position at court and in the state.” Manstein wrote: “Speaking about the Duke of Courland, I said that he was a great hunter of luxury and splendor; this was enough to inspire the empress with the desire to make her court the most brilliant in Europe. Large sums of money were spent on this, but still the empress’s wish was not soon fulfilled. Often, with the richest caftan, the wig was very carefully combed; an inexperienced tailor spoiled beautiful damask fabric with a bad cut; or if the toilet was impeccable, then the carriage was extremely bad: a gentleman in a rich suit rode in a crappy carriage, which was dragged by beds.”

Anna moves to St. Petersburg because, in her opinion, Moscow was not safe. He was pleased with the move and did not like Biron - the “barbarian capital”. In addition, an unprecedented embarrassment happened to him in Moscow: he, a brilliant rider, was thrown to the ground by a horse in front of the empress, courtiers and crowd. Anna, breaking the entire ceremony of the royal departure, jumped out of the carriage in order to lift the poor, bruised, but infinitely beloved chief chamberlain from the damned Moscow mud. This event reflects the true attitude of the empress towards her favorite. E. Biron was Anna's greatest object of passion. “Never in the world, I believe, was there a more friendly couple who would show such participation in the amusement or sorrow of a perfect person as the empress and the duke,” writes E. Minich and continues: “Both were almost never able to pretend in their outward appearance . If the Duke appeared with a gloomy face, then the Empress at the same moment took on an alarmed look. If he was cheerful, then the monarch’s face showed obvious pleasure. If someone did not please the Duke, then it was from the eyes and the meeting. The kindness the monarch gave him, he could immediately notice a sensitive change. All favors had to be asked from the duke, and through him alone the empress decided on it.”

Many historians attribute the licentiousness and cruelty of the court's morals to Biron's influence. It was believed that it was Biron who was able to give the empress’s amusements a character that served to humiliate the Russian noble families. For example, V. Andreev believes that the cruelty visible in such amusements as the ice house was not akin to Anna’s soul and was a consequence of Biron’s influence. His influence was reflected in Anna’s indecisive character and changeable opinions. Biron did not see a single independent person around him. He gradually destroyed all notable Russian people and was the complete manager of affairs. The so-called cabinet, established in 1731 from three persons: Osterman, Golovkin and Cherkassky, was supposed to replace the abolished Supreme Privy Council and become the head of government over the Senate and Synod. Deprived of any legal identity and independence, “...the cabinet confused the competence and office work of government agencies, reflecting the behind-the-scenes mind of its creator and the nature of the dark reign.” According to I.V. Kurukin: “Biron’s strength lay in the fact that he became the first “correct” leader in our political history, who turned the little-respected image of a night “temporary worker” into a real institution of power with unwritten, but clearly defined rules and boundaries.” From 1732, he began to take the initiative, meeting with foreign ambassadors on issues that interested them. The reports of the English consul K. Rondeau and I. Lefort clearly recorded this important change in the work of diplomats at the St. Petersburg court: in 1733 they already reported on the “custom” of visiting the chief chamberlain, which was strictly adhered to by members of the diplomatic corps.

After the rapprochement between Russia and England 1734-1741. Rondo becomes welcome guest Biron and Osterman, and therefore the awareness of his reports increases sharply. From the surviving reports of the English consul, we learn about Biron’s methods of diplomatic work. During informal meetings and conversations, he always made it clear that he was aware of the news coming from Russian ambassadors abroad; was the first to put forward initiatives, inform the interlocutor about decisions taken, but not yet officially announced; explained the point of view of the Russian government on certain issues. In some cases, Biron emphasized that he spoke on behalf of the empress, in others that he acted not as a minister, but solely as a friend. According to contemporaries, Biron played his role according to “European” rules, without abusing his power, and was kind and polite to everyone. However, if I.V. Kurukin is convinced that Biron, with all his information and influence, was still only a conductor of the will of the empress, and was more like the head of the office than an all-powerful temporary worker. Anisimov draws the opposite conclusion: “Biron’s influence was enormous in both foreign and domestic policy. In the system of power that developed under Anna without Biron, her confidant, a power-hungry man, not a single important decision was made at all. In his letters, the temporary worker constantly complains about his workload, but at the same time shows himself to be a very cautious person, trying not to emphasize his role in management, to remain in the shadows.”

Biron also secretly controlled the office. P.V. Dolgorukov especially singles out his confidant, the Jew Lipman, whom Biron made a court banker. Lipman openly sold positions, places and favors in favor of the favorite and engaged in usury on a half-basis with the Duke of Courland. Biron consulted him in all matters. Lipman often attended Biron’s classes with cabinet ministers, secretaries and presidents of the boards, expressing his opinions and giving advice, which everyone respectfully listened to. The most senior and influential people tried to please this favorite, who more than once sent people to Siberia on a whim. He traded his influence by selling official positions, and there was no baseness that he was not capable of.

Biron is credited with the development of denunciation and espionage in the country, explaining this by his fear for the safety and strength of his position. The Secret Chancellery, the successor to the Preobrazhensky Order of the Petrine era, was inundated with political denunciations and cases. Terror hung over society. And at the same time, physical disasters came one after another: pestilence, famine, wars with Poland and Turkey depleted the people's strength. It is clear that under such circumstances of life the people could not be calm. Hence another phenomenon of “Bironovism” - constant popular unrest.

In 1734-1738 impostors appeared in the southeast, calling themselves the sons of Peter. They were successful among the population and troops, but were soon caught. But even without them, the people's murmur did not cease. The people attributed all the country's disasters to foreigners who had seized power and were taking advantage of the fact that there was a weak woman on the throne.

Biron was married to Anna's maid of honor. Their children felt completely free at court. The Empress treated the young Birons very warmly. Awards and ranks rained down on them like from a cornucopia, it seems that Anna and the Birons formed a single family. They attended holidays together, attended theaters and concerts, rode sleighs, and played cards in the evenings. Anna's accession opened dizzying horizons for Biron. Already in June 1730, Anna obtained from the Austrian Emperor the title of count for him, and in the fall Biron became a Knight of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and Chief Chamberlain, so that this position would look more respectable, in the Table of Ranks - a document regulating the career advancement of military officers, officials and courtiers, changes were made, and the newly-minted chief chamberlain, together with the rank, “moved” from the fourth class directly to the second class.

The opinions of historians regarding the role of Biron and the scale of his influence are divided, but there is something on which modern researchers mostly agree: that Biron was an intelligent and strong-willed man, well acquainted with all the internal and foreign policy issues of the state. However, Biron should not be considered the only key figure involved in governing the country. As Rondeau noted, in the field of foreign policy, all matters passed through the hands of Osterman, who in many ways surpassed the chief chamberlain in experience and knew how to stun him with his analysis of the situation. As a result, the actual negotiation process with foreign diplomats was entirely in the hands of Osterman, as well as the current leadership and instructions to ambassadors. According to V. O. Klyuchevsky: “... over the pile of Bironov’s nonentities towered the real bosses of the state, Vice Chancellor A. I., Osterman and Field Marshal Minich. V. Pikul directly called Anna Ioannovna’s reign not Bironovism, but Ostermanism. This opinion can be confirmed by the notes of the Spanish Ambassador to Russia, a contemporary of those events, Duke of Lyria, in which he describes Biron and Osterman as follows: “Baron Osterman: He had all the necessary abilities to be a good minister, and an amazing figure, ... he was cunning in the highest degree, he was very stingy, but did not like bribes. He possessed the art of pretending to the greatest degree, with such dexterity he knew how to give a gloss of truth to the most obvious lies that he could deceive the most cunning people... Duke Biron - he had little to do and therefore allowed others to control him to the point that he could not distinguish bad advice from good... " Of course, the German party, based on this disposition, could overthrow Biron and replace him with Osterman or Minich. But, since Anna’s favorite did not bother himself with state affairs and did not pretend to be a commander, they only needed a person who would defend against the attacks of the Russian party, and at the same time would not interfere in political affairs. Based on the notes of Ya. P. Shakhovsky, a witness to the treaty of the German party, Biron could only conduct intrigues within the party and the court “... with his comrade, the Cabinet Minister Count Osterman, he had a secret enmity, and in each of them having their highest ranks at the court their party, constantly trying to make cunning nets for catching and ditches for falling...” Not without Osterman’s efforts, P. P. Shafirov, A. D. Menshikov, A. V. Makarov, D. M. Golitsyn, I. A. and P. L. Dolgoruky, A. P. Volynsky were destroyed. That is, we see his direct participation in the largest political processes of the second quarter of the 18th century. A master of political intrigue, he knew how to arrange the matter in such a way that the victims had no idea that it was Osterman who owed severe punishment and even turned to him for help.

In 1735, a seventeen-year-old princess (Anna Leopoldovna), who was already looking for a groom, fell romantically in love with the Saxon envoy Count Linar. Her governess, Aderkas, a Prussian relative of Mardefeld, helped in this intrigue. Having learned about this, the empress sent the guilty teacher to Germany, demanded that the too enterprising diplomat be recalled and, as it seemed, managed to return her niece to feelings more befitting of her rank. But as soon as Anna received unlimited power and freedom, Linar appeared in St. Petersburg. He came from an Italian family that had been settled in Germany since the sixteenth century; he was about forty years old; he was left a widower by his wife, née Fleming, to whom he owed his diplomatic career. Handsome, well-built, busy with his own person, he seemed much younger than his years. Catherine II, who saw him nine years later, half-jokingly draws him like this: “He was a man who, as they say, combined great knowledge with the same abilities. In appearance, he was in the full sense of a fop. He was tall, well built, reddish-blond, with a complexion as delicate as a woman's. They say that he took such care of his skin that every day before going to bed he covered his face and hands with lipstick and slept in gloves and a mask. He boasted that he had eighteen children and that everything their nurses could do this work by his grace. This, so white, Count Linar had a white ladies' order and wore dresses of the lightest colors, such as sky blue, apricot, lilac, flesh."

“Count Linar never misses an opportunity to prove to the Grand Duchess how madly in love he is with her. She takes this from signs to displeasure... He rented a house near the royal garden and from then on the Grand Duchess Regent, contrary to her custom, began to take walks very often.”

The evenings were spent behind closed doors in the apartment of the ruler's closest friend, her maid of honor Juliana (Julia) Mengden, or, as Elizaveta Petrovna contemptuously called her, Zhulia, Zhulki. Anna could not live even a day without this “beautiful dark-skinned woman.” Their relationship was extraordinary. Anna's love for Julia "was like the most ardent love of a man for a woman." It is only known that there was an intention to marry Linara and Julia, which was not carried out due to the coup, although in August 1741 they managed to get engaged, and Anna presented her friend with a countless number of jewelry and a fully furnished house. The purpose of this marriage was to disguise the ruler's relationship with Linar. Be that as it may, it was Julia Mengden, sitting by the fireplace with Anna doing needlework (on long evenings, her friends tore off the gold braid from the camisoles of the overthrown Biron), who gave the ruler advice on governing Russia. These pieces of advice from the provincial Livonian young lady, who had enormous influence on the ruler, made Osterman and other ministers' hair stand on end. When power changed again, the crown princess personally entered the ruler’s chambers and woke her up. Anna Leopoldovna did not resist the coup, but only asked not to harm either her children or Juliana Mengden. These were the people for whom Anna feared more than anything in the world. In this example, you can see the true attitude of the ruler towards her favorite.

On the night of November 25, 1741, power changed once again in the Russian Empire. The influence of the German party also finally fell, and it went into oblivion, trying to nominate a new favorite under Anna Leopoldovna, regent of Ivan VI, Moritz Linara. It didn't take much to overthrow the rulers. Firstly, a contender for the royal family: there already was one - Elizaveta Petrovna. The second favorable circumstance is the French ambassador of the famous de Chétardy: a clever, experienced intriguer, he did not spare gold in order to strengthen his influence in the Russian court and weaken the German one. The empress's lifestyle and character suggest that she was practically not involved in state affairs. The secrecy and suspicion that arose in Elizabeth during Anna's reign, a jealous attitude towards the actions, and more often imaginary encroachments on her power, are bizarrely combined with her almost complete failure to govern the country, which led to the dominance of favorites or “strong people” who begin become an integral part of the state. In 1750, Bestuzhev complained to the Austrian ambassador Gernes about the complete impossibility of any work under Elizabeth: “The whole empire is falling apart. My patience is running out. I am forced to demand my resignation."

Of these strong persons, during the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna, two warring noble parties stood out - the Shuvalovs and the Razumovskys. The Duke of Lyria described the situation that existed at the court of Elizabeth in this way. “In the present reign, the new favorite Razumovsky ruled the empire..., a simple Cossack reached the point of secret marriage with the empress...” It was actually the case that Alexey Grigorievich Razumovsky was Elizabeth’s marganastic husband, and they married her in the village of Perovo near Moscow in 1742. Razumovsky’s favor began in 1731, when Colonel Vishnevsky noticed a handsome singer from the family of the Cossack Reason in the village of Lemerr, Chernigov province. Contemporaries unanimously asserted that Razumovsky used for a long time enormous power, he behaved extremely modestly: he did not strive for high government positions and, if possible, avoided participation in court intrigues. Perhaps the only thing that the “modest” Razumovsky did actively and shamelessly was to enrich himself through the numerous gifts of the Empress with money, lands and serfs. Although Alexei Razumovsky himself removed himself from government affairs, his potential significance in their decision was enormous. Pezold, secretary of the Saxon embassy, ​​wrote in 1747 in Dresden: “The influence of the modest Razumovsky on the empress increased so much after their marriage that although he does not directly interfere in state affairs, for which he has no attraction or talent, everyone can be sure of achieving what he wants, as long as Razumovsky puts in a word.” Thus, such a situation in which power really “was lying under the feet of the favorites, but they simply did not deign to raise it, persists further in the reign of Catherine II.

Since the early 50s of the 18th century, the influence of A. G. Razumovsky has eclipsed the Shuvalov clan, led by Pyotr Ivanovich Shuvalov. The beginning of his nomination dates back to the mid-40s. This was helped a little by his marriage to Mavra Shepeleva, Elizabeth’s favorite mistress. His influence on the political life of that time is evidenced by examples worthy of a reformer: these are projects on wine and salt trade; gradual replacement of direct taxation with indirect taxation; projects to abolish internal customs in the empire; return to protectionist policies. His real power is also evidenced by his own strength - the Observation Corps, consisting of 30 thousand people. That is, both internal politics and military power were in his hands. Pyotr Ivanovich was the eldest and always remained, as it were, in the shadows, and the “chance” was “fulfilled” by the young and handsome, his cousin, Ivan Ivanovich Shuvalov. After the fall of Chancellor Bestuzhev, having achieved the appointment of his brothers to the Council of Ministers, the temporary worker always contributed to the triumph of the ideas and decisions of one of them. Elizabeth spoke through his lips, but he speaks only the words of Pyotr Shuvalov. The empress had no secrets from her favorite, and when Louis XV decided to enter into a secret relationship with the empress, he was warned that the third person between them would be the favorite. Officially, he does not hold any significant position, but he was simply called “Chamberlain,” and this word was respected at court. At the beginning of 1750, the Empress developed another serious hobby. Cadets of the Land Noble Corps (officer school) organized an amateur theater, which Elizaveta Petrovna wished to see at her court.

One of the cadets, Nikita Afanasyevich Beketov, attracted the empress's attention with his talented acting and beautiful appearance, and everyone started talking about him as a new favorite. In the spring of the same year, he left the corps with the rank of prime major and was taken to court as an adjutant to Razumovsky, who, due to his good nature, favored Elizabeth’s young favorite. At that time, she herself found herself in a very difficult situation. Catherine II recalled that on Easter, right in the church, “the empress scolded all her maids... the singers and even the priest all received a scolding. There was a lot of whispering later about the reasons for this anger; from vague hints it was revealed that this angry mood of the empress was caused by the difficult situation in which Her Majesty found herself between three or four of her favorites, namely, Count Razumovsky, Shuvalov, one choir named Kachenovsky and Beketov, whom she had just appointed as adjutant to Count Razumovsky. It must be admitted that anyone else in Her Majesty’s place would have been baffled even under less difficult conditions. Not everyone is given the ability to see and reconcile the pride of four favorites at the same time.” Kachenovsky turned out to be Elizabeth’s fleeting hobby, while Beketov’s favor lasted more than a year. The young officer was strongly supported by A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who, not without reason, feared the rise of Ivan Shuvalov and the strengthening of the influence of his brothers.

The time of Elizaveta Petrovna can be distinguished by the fact that favoritism is strengthened in an already constructed building, but, as in the subsequent period of history, it will only be an adornment of absolute power. This can be exemplified by the words of the French diplomat at the court of Elizabeth L. J. Favier: “The Empress is completely master of the art of implementation. The secret depths of her heart often remain inaccessible to even the oldest and most experienced courtiers. She under no circumstances allows herself to be controlled by any one person or favorite.”

Thus, the evolution of favoritism in Russia reaches a peak when this phenomenon is reborn into something special, unique, into a tradition on Russian soil. This, undoubtedly, is facilitated by the “greatest woman - the empress” on the Russian throne, under whom favoritism acquires the rank of a state institution and during whose reign the “golden age” of favoritism in Russia will come - Ekaterina Alekseevna. We can say that under all the previous empresses, favoritism was more of a whim, a royal whim, but under Catherine II it became a traditional state institution, supported by the empress herself. Thus, Russia of the 18th century is a society and court no more, no less depraved than all the court circles of Europe, and at the top of the hierarchical ladder, on the steps right next to the throne, there is favoritism. Almost all the favorites have one thing in common: they ended their lives poorly. K. Birkin expressed himself most clearly on this matter in his work on the topic of favoritism: “the fate of temporary workers and favorites reminds us of the fate of those three Turkish viziers, whom the Sultan paid from his own shoulders, and tomorrow sent the same viziers a silk cord for their own necks ... Another temporary worker, thinking of sitting on the throne, ended up impaled instead, putting his head on the block...”

Everyone knows and talks about the favorites, they slavishly obey them, but at the same time, they don’t seem to notice them, because this cannot happen in an absolute monarchy. Thus, the political history of the past shows that favoritism is an integral part of the governmental structure of society. And as absolutism develops, this phenomenon takes on the form of a permanent, important political institution having a great influence on the development, directions of government activities

ZD 17 Russian culture of the 19th century. (independent work)

Women's rule in Russia during the era of palace coups



Introduction

Section II. Women rulers and big politics

(40s - 50s of the 18th century)

Conclusion

Applications


Introduction


In modern historical science, there is a departure from traditional narrative (event) history, and new directions in research are emerging. One of the youngest and most rapidly developing disciplines in historical science is gender history. Word gender translated from English - gender .

Gender is a model of female and male roles, their relationships in a given society, sociopsychological and sociocultural characteristics. Gender is a reflection of life in a world where we are all women or men.

The gender hierarchy is the strongest and most durable of all hierarchical systems. It has been reproducing gender patterns and shaping gender identity for centuries. Historians strive return women into history, to restore the historical existence of women who have been forgotten male science, connect women's history with the history of society. For the first time in history, the gender approach found application in medieval studies. Medieval scholars tried to show that medieval women became invisible and silent thanks to their male contemporaries, who did not allow them to appear on the pages of chronicles and forgot about them when drawing up legal codes. The gender approach is fruitful in the study of such areas of life as family , labor in household, work in public production , religion , education , culture and others. Historians analyze the fates of women of the past, correlating them with social changes in economics, politics, ideology, and culture. A fertile area of ​​gender research is political history, where one can most clearly and vividly see the struggle of women for political, civil, and voting rights.

Another promising direction in gender history is personal, or new biographical history. Basically, women followed the model of behavior that was prescribed by traditional society. But even those rare women of the Middle Ages and early modern times who went beyond its boundaries did not question gender asymmetry , but used ordinary female instruments of influence to realize their power ambitions. Women had effective channels of informal influence: by arranging marriages, they established new family connections; by exchanging information and spreading rumors, they shaped public opinion; by providing patronage, they helped or hindered the political careers of men.

The experience of the 18th century in Russia is unique: for more than seventy years, women exercised the highest power in the state. An entire era took shape, a political tradition emerged. Such a long presence of women on the Russian throne was a natural result of Peter I’s transformations in the sphere of power. Peter I broke with traditional society, making power from a sacred instrument to satisfy the whims of the ruler. For his male heirs, those eternal boy emperors - Peter II, Peter III, Paul I - Peter I remained an unattainable ideal. Russia was facing a new Time of Troubles. And then a grandiose political revolution was carried out in Russia, using a gender alternative. Women empresses, despite their weaknesses and contradictions, were able to become worthy successors to the policies of Peter I. The gender culture of the empresses became the basis of their policies. At this time from trifles , elements of private life, fun and seemingly idle pastime, entire layers of culture grew, and the prerequisites and mechanisms for further modernization were formed.

The very fact of a woman’s accession to the throne - for the first time in Russian history - was very significant. He testified in the best possible way to the changes that took place in Russian society and radically changed the position of representatives of the “fairer sex” in it. Focusing on European norms of everyday behavior, Peter I gradually brought the Russian woman out of the mansion, first dressing her in European dress, then involving her in court ceremonies and participating in various kinds festivals, balls, masquerades, etc. Peter I broke the old wild traditions and customs. The age of the “terem imprisonment” of women ended: the new king ordered his subjects to bring their wives and daughters to the entertainment assemblies he organized, about which a decree was issued in 1718. Assemblies - meetings of people in private houses where males and females could meet and talk , exchange news, play cards, etc. The decree prescribed in detail the rules of conduct at assemblies and even fines for violating them. The need to be in public, to communicate, to have a conversation, including with foreigners, forced me to think about education. A woman at the head of state was a fairly common occurrence in the lives of others European countries that era, such as England, Austria, Denmark. But in Russia, Europeanization was very superficial, and therefore the emancipation of women sometimes took on ugly forms. Women set the tone for social life, intervened in the affairs of their husbands and gave them direction,” wrote O.V. Klyuchevsky knew the names of female empresses, the female president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, female writers, artists, and society ladies. And also women who amazed society with their high spirituality, morality and self-sacrifice.

Women's rule in this work is considered in the context of palace coups. There is no single scientific definition of a palace coup, and there are no clear time boundaries for this phenomenon. So, V.O. Klyuchevsky (the author of the term) dates the era of palace coups from 1725 to 1762. However, there is another point of view - 1725 - 1801. During this period, state policy was determined by individual groups of the palace nobility, who actively intervened in resolving the issue of the heir to the throne, fought among themselves for power, and carried out palace coups.

Of the 37 years of continuous leapfrog of power, 32 years were under the rule of women. In the history of the Russian state, a unique era of female empresses began. The accession of almost every female representative of the ruling dynasty (men - Peter II, Ivan Antonovich, Peter III - ascended the throne relatively calmly) was accompanied by a political coup with more or less active participation of the guard. The bright, catchy side of this period has always primarily attracted the attention of researchers; It was about her that historians mainly wrote.

The era of palace coups was unique and had its own face. And this face was female. The palace coups turned out to be the only era of female rule in the entire history of Russia: neither before nor after this did women come to power. However, despite the obvious significance of this period, it remains insufficiently studied. We can learn very little about women by turning to history textbooks. Even if their names are known, these are the names of wives and daughters, in relation to their husbands, and not independent individuals. Historians have often tried to downplay the importance of female rule; the successes and achievements of the era of empresses were attributed to favorites. The history with which we are familiar is military, economic and political history, not social history. There is no place for everyday life, the birth and upbringing of children, or the development of human emotional connections. All the thousand-year work of protecting and maintaining life, which was done primarily by women, disappears from this version of the development of civilization. There is no place in history for the private sphere, and therefore for women. As an exception, some prominent women are mentioned. But even in this case, their role is downplayed.

The main sources for the study of female rule in Russia during the era of palace coups are memoirs and eyewitness accounts of that era: Field Marshal B.Kh. Minich, K. G. Manstein, French Ambassador M. Shetardi, M.A. Fonvizin, Duke of Lyria, A.R. Vorontsova. Thus, “Manstein’s Notes on Russia” paints a diverse and diverse picture of the period of Anna Ioannovna’s reign. He gives brief but very accurate characteristics of the main political figures of that time, the favorites of the empress, but this information must be treated with caution, because each memoir source is a subjective interpretation of the author. The most important government documents of the time under review were used, where it can be seen that the autocratic-absolutist nature of power and the lack of constitutional and legal institutions required improvement of the administrative apparatus.

A distant study of Anna Ioannovna's reign was carried out in the noble historiography of Catherine's era. Although it was not free from ideological orders. Certain aspects of Anna's policy were considered by M.M. Shcherbatov, P.I. Panin, G.S. Malgin and others. The reign of Anna Ioannovna was given a significant place in general courses on Russian history by prominent representatives of Russian historical science of the 19th century: S.M. Solovyova, N.I. Kostomarova, O.V. Klyuchevsky and others. Scientific analysis is often combined with emotional assessments, first of all, at the expense of Bironovism.

A significant contribution to understanding the problem was made by S.M. Solovev. In his works, for the first time, sufficient archival material for scientific research was collected and summarized. V.O. makes a great contribution. Klyuchevsky. N. Kostomarov, K. Valishevsky also introduce new archival materials into scientific circulation. A Note on Ancient and New Russia” by N.M. Karamzin in his assessment of Annin’s reign is a continuation of the tradition of noble historiography of the previous era.

But among the studies we can highlight the works of V.S. Pikul, writer-historian. He worked in the genre of popular science works, which were aimed at studying the individual and his contribution to the historical process. In his works, he gives an ambiguous assessment of the reign of Anna Ioannovna and other Russian monarchs, puts forward a number of interesting versions and hypotheses regarding such a phenomenon as favoritism. In the last few years, the periodical press and historical publications have also raised the question of the identity of the favorites and the evolution of favoritism as a phenomenon. In this regard, the works of N.Ya. are interesting. Edelman, L. Vasilyeva, E. Eliseeva. L. Vasilyeva and E. Eliseeva give detailed information about all the favorites of Anna Ioannovna, Elizaveta Petrovna, Anna Leopoldovna and their attitude towards their favorites.

A significant intensification of research attention to the reign of Anna Ioannovna at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries was reflected in the appearance of specialized monographs by M. M. Bogoslovsky, V. N. Bondarenko, D. A. Korsakov, V. N. Stroev and others. In some of them An attempt is being made to revise existing stereotypes. The traditional view of the reign of Anna Ioannovna was adhered to by the authors of generalizing works on the history of Russia P.K. Shchebalsky and S.F. Platonov. Among the studies of the 1990-2000s. Monographs by E. V. Anisimov A. B. Kamensky, A. K. stand out. Medushevsky and others.

The main difficulty in studying the reign of Anna Leopoldovna is that a significant part of the documents relating to this period was deliberately destroyed by the new Empress Elizabeth Petrovna. Having come to power through a palace coup, the empress tried to quickly erase all memory of her predecessor and thereby eliminate any doubts about the legitimacy of her reign. It became possible to freely study the events of the reign of Ivan Antonovich only in the 19th century, when a series of palace coups ended and this topic lost its acute political relevance. The first book in Russian historiography about this historical period was the book by P.D., published in 1814. Yakovlev "The Life of Princess Anna, Ruler of Russia." It, in fact, was a short essay outlining the history of Anna Leopoldovna’s reign at a level corresponding to approximately a modern school textbook. Unfortunately, it is difficult to say what sources Yakovlev used when writing his book, since there is absolutely no indication in this regard. The work is done in a purely descriptive style, and there is practically no analysis of events and their author's assessment, with the exception of a not very flattering opinion about Anna as a German puppet.

The reign of Anna Leopoldovna was also covered in the book by Alexander Weidemeer, “Review of the most important incidents in Russia from the death of Peter the Great to the accession of Elizabeth Petrovna to the throne,” published in 1832. Perhaps the most detailed scientific work dedicated to the reign of Anna Leopoldovna in the entire 19th century was “History of Russia” by S. M. Solovyov. It is characteristic that the volume in which this period is described is called “History of Russia during the reign of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna,” and Anna’s reign occupies part of the first chapter.

Modern researcher E.V. Anisimov pays much more attention to the human qualities and personal life of Anna Leopoldovna, relegating her political activities to the background. In his book “Women on the Russian Throne,” written in good literary language, Anna Leopoldovna appears as a kind and harmless person, but, unfortunately, absolutely not ready and unable to bear the burden of state power.

The number of special studies devoted to the analysis of the historiographical situation in the study of Elizaveta Petrovna is increasing every year. Kostomarov also placed great emphasis on the description of personalities in his work “Russian history in the biographies of its main figures.” K. Waliszewski focused on studying events related to the accession and reign of Elizabeth. Here he uses archival material, mostly of foreign origin. In the 80s XX century this problem E.V. Anisimov, P. Ya. Edelman. E.V. Anisimov dwells in detail on the study of women's rule and especially Elizaveta Petrovna. In the last decade of the 20th century, N. I. Pavlenko was closely involved in research. In a series of publications in the Rodina magazine, he gives an overview of the entire era of palace coups. I.V. Kurkin studied the events of the coup of 1741 and the accession of Elizabeth. M.A. Boytsova made an attempt in her work “Palace Revolutions in Russia 1725 - 1825.” collect and systematize factual material, excerpts from the memoirs of contemporaries of that era.

Object of study - Political history of the Russian Empire 1725-1762.

Subject of study - Women's rule in the context of palace coups

The purpose of the study is to analyze the history of the development of Russian society during the era of palace coups through the prism of female rule.

Research objectives:

To characterize the main points of the design of the institution of female sovereignty using the example of the reign of Catherine I and Anna Ioannovna;

Reveal the personal role of Anna Leopoldovna and Elizaveta Petrovna through the sphere of power relations.

Show the main trends in the evolutionary process of turning favoritism into an integral part of the policy of Russian empresses;

Russian empress favoritism

Section I. The formation of the female model of government (1725-1740)


Peter died on January 28, 1725, without having time to use the Charter on the succession to the throne issued by him: he did not have time to appoint a successor. The dispute about the successor was resolved by the guards regiments, noble in composition, they turned into a weapon in the struggle for power. The new nobility that emerged under Peter, enlisting the support of the guards regiments, elevated Catherine to the throne. Elected by the ruling officials and the guard, Catherine uneasily accepted power, fearing the movement of the masses against the accession of a foreigner. However, there was no unrest: there were isolated cases of dissatisfaction with the dominance of women (there were people who did not want to swear allegiance to Catherine, saying: “If women are king, then let women kiss the cross.”

Catherine ruled with the help of the same people and the same institutions that operated under Peter the Great. According to S.F. Platonov, Ekaterina is an intelligent, energetic woman, but did not become a noticeable figure in the wider sphere state life. She lacked either education or business habits, and therefore she hid behind the personality of the talented Menshikov, who became the complete manager of affairs. S.G. Pushkarev also believed that Prince Menshikov Alexander Danilovich, whom Peter I called “min herts”, i.e., became the de facto ruler. "my heart" . Having come to power, Catherine sought to show that her reign would be “merciful” and humane. In confirmation of this, she signed decrees to forgive debtors, reduce the poll tax for peasants, and political criminals were released. The disgraced vice-chancellor Pyotr Shafirov, Matryona Balk and others returned to St. Petersburg. Many bribe-takers and embezzlers who were under investigation just yesterday could breathe easy - Peter’s noose suddenly loosened around their necks. But otherwise everything went as before. St. Petersburg lived in a measured and calm manner; in the spring, thousands of workers gathered to build the capital and its suburbs. Catherine did not cancel a single project, not a single important undertaking of her husband. All the holidays and customs that developed under him were preserved. “We wish to complete all the affairs begun by the labors of the emperor, with God’s help,” - this was said in one of the first decrees of the empress, and many understood this as a guarantee of continuing Peter’s course.

The first measures of the government of Catherine I: a reduction in the poll tax, this measure was necessary and justified, although demonstrative. A discussion and attempt to discuss and revise the tax reform of Peter I begins. However, until the spring of 1727, the matter was limited to only writing memos. Tax reforms were started, but did not achieve the expected results. Characteristics of Catherine's reign E.V. Anisimov coincides with the assessments of most historians. The “combat friend” of the great reformer was not a statesman, and she never tried to become one. For this, it is not enough to have a worldly mind and tact; this requires special talents, knowledge and the ability to think, act and foresee. Just as on the bridge of a ship it is useless to explain to someone who does not know arithmetic the essence of navigation under the starry sky, among the waves and reefs, so it was useless to teach this woman how to rule the country. And Peter never initiated his wife into the secrets of politics, into the complex calculations of plotting the course of a huge ship called Russia. It seemed to him that a different destiny awaited Catherine.”

Although Catherine tried to have her say in politics, it often came out inappropriately - under the influence of emotions and whim. The empress, of course, could not delve into state affairs and deal with them regularly. She needed help and she got it. In February 1726, a new highest government body was formed - the Supreme Privy Council. The imperial decree stated that the Council was being created “at our side for no other purpose, so that in this heavy burden of the government in all state affairs, with its faithful advice and impartial announcements of its opinions, it may help and relieve us.” In other words, the Council acted as a crutch, without which the Empress could not walk. But the Council also arose because the entire political situation required a single institution that would develop general directions of policy, both domestic and foreign. Previously, all this was done by Peter himself, in whose head a host of ideas, plans and destinies were stored and with whom they irretrievably perished. And now the team of wise advisers under the empress had to compensate for this loss to some extent. The Senate ceased to be “governing” and became just “high”. Remaining only a judicial body, equal in position to the collegiums.

In 1726, Senate Secretary Ivan Kirilov compiled an overview of the state of affairs in the Russian Empire and called it proudly and pompously: “The flourishing state of the All-Russian state.” But it was “blooming” only on paper. Catherine was an empty place, all responsibility fell on the shoulders of yesterday’s associates of the Tsar-Reformer, and they bent under her weight. It is known that the burden of power is not a laurel wreath. Knowledge of the real state of affairs in the country inexorably pushed them to change the previous - Petrine - policy. Yes, Peter was great, but he could not foresee all the consequences of the reforms; finally, he could be wrong! This is how the leaders explained to themselves and others the motives for the counter-reforms that had begun. This seemed incredible to many - almost immediately they began to overthrow the idols that had been worshiped for decades. But cruel necessity pushed Menshikov and his colleagues to cut taxes and the bloated state apparatus. This need forced them to think about reducing the army and easing the terms of trade. There were continuous discussions of policy problems in the Supreme Privy Council. The frantic rhythm of transformation slowed down, the huge ship of the empire entered a period of calm. But in canceling Peter’s reforms and suspending grandiose construction projects that were truly beyond the power of the people, the leaders were guided not only by state necessity and expediency. They deliberately based their policy on criticism of Peter's principles - after all, it is easiest to criticize their predecessors. They sought to earn political capital by pleasing everyone who was dissatisfied with Peter. They thought not so much about the country as about themselves, their power, their place in the sun. Throughout Catherine’s short reign, the government carefully “caressed” the guard. At the reviews in her tent, the Empress treated the guards officers with wine from her own hands and continued Peter’s policy. Special attention was devoted to supporting the combat effectiveness of the army and navy. Here is a brief assessment of her reign made by Klyuchevsky.

On December 23, 1726, after the meeting, in the absence of Her Majesty, the members of the Council went to the Empress’s apartment, and ... first listened to the chimes of the recently purchased clock play, and then the Empress deigned to accept the report, the reading of which lasted half an hour. After that, she went to dinner, inviting her advisers to the table. She gave the business all the attention she could muster. The following year, from January 1st to May 6th, the day of her death, she was never present at a meeting of the Council. Thus, the applied autocracy turned into a complete fiction. And soon the Council limited this fiction even in that which is longest preserved of all external manifestations of power, doomed to destruction: not in the formula of the oath taken by advisers; Neither in the decrees emanating from the Council - nowhere is Catherine called an autocrat. Catherine’s personal participation in this reign is not great, as has already been indicated. At first it was limited to the distribution of awards and a number of measures that rewarded numerous more or less important honorees of the past reign.

According to the Saxon Freksdorf, the empress’s morning began with a visit from Menshikov. The conversation was invariably preceded by the question: “What should we drink?” Several glasses of vodka were emptied at once. Then she went out to the reception room, where soldiers, sailors and artisans were constantly crowded, she gave alms to all of them, and if anyone asked the queen to be the adoptive mother of his child, she never refused and usually gave each of her godsons several ducats. Sometimes she was present at guards exercises and herself distributed vodka to the soldiers. The day ended with a party in the circle of constant company, and the queen spent the night with one of her lovers. Lefort wrote in one of his dispatches: “There is no way to determine the behavior of this court. Day turns into night, everything stands still, nothing is done... There is intrigue, search, disintegration everywhere...”. Holidays, drinking bouts, and walks took up all her time. On special days she appeared in all her splendor and beauty, in a golden carriage. It was so breathtakingly beautiful. Power, glory, delight of loyal subjects - what else could she dream of? But... sometimes the empress, having enjoyed the glory, went down to the kitchen and, as recorded in the court journal, “cooked it themselves in the kitchen.” She was having fun. And if she happened to interfere in the affairs of the government, it was not for their benefit. As we have seen, she was present at the parades, and also decided to attend naval exercises and herself leads the naval maneuvers. But this did not stop Admiral General Apraksin from noticing that his sailors had no clothes, sometimes even shirts. The ships grew old and were not renewed. During the entire reign, only two battleships were launched. Catherine's reign amounted to stagnation in the development that had begun.

Anna Ioannovna became empress unexpectedly for everyone. In January 1730, 14-year-old Emperor Peter II fell ill and died suddenly. With his death, the male line of the Romanov dynasty ended. They decided to take advantage of this circumstance as an opportunity to change the existing way of government. Part of the supreme leaders, led by Prince D.M. Golitsyn, attempted an oligarchic coup in the interests of a narrow circle of aristocratic families, represented by princes Dolgoruky and Golitsyn, who occupied almost all the seats in the Supreme Council. The Duchess of Courland, Anna Ioannovna, was recognized as the most suitable candidate for a monarch with limited rights. “The death of the last of the male line of the Romanovs took everyone by surprise and therefore many, not knowing who to settle on, wanted to quickly place on the throne a person who could not remain on it for long, but would give time to think and prepare. For these reasons, Anna’s candidacy was readily accepted ".

To consolidate the limitation of the empress's power, the leaders drew up the so-called conditions - points that regulated Anna's power. These clauses obliged the future empress to make all her decisions only with the consent of the Supreme Privy Council, namely: declaration of war, conclusion of peace, imposition of taxes on the population, promotion to ranks higher than colonel, and the guard and the army in general were placed under the supreme command of the Supreme Privy Council; deprivation of the nobility of life, estates and honor in court, distribution of estates and villages as grants, promotion of both Russians and foreigners to court ranks, use of state revenues for expenses. In addition, Anna was obliged not to marry, not to appoint an heir either for herself or for herself, and to maintain the Supreme Privy Council consisting of its permanent 8 people. In case of failure to comply with the points, the empress was deprived of her crown. Conditions were sent to Mitava, where Anna Ioannovna lived. The choice of the leaders came as a complete surprise to her. Having learned that the new empress would have almost no power, and all power would be concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Council, opponents of limiting autocracy organized an opposition. It included representatives of the nobility, dissatisfied with the unauthorized decision of the Supreme Council to take power into their own hands, as well as some members of the Supreme Council itself. These were people who came to the fore during the era of transformations of Peter I, they could not accept the new greatness of the leaders of noble families: the Golitsyns and Dolgorukys, unsure that the latter, who found themselves in the majority in the Supreme Council, would allow the hated upstarts to sit with them. The ferment intensified after on February 2, the “conditions” signed by the empress were read in the meeting of the Senate, generals and other high officials. Everyone signed their consent, but after that they began to submit projects and comments to the Supreme Privy Council. All projects converged in one desire to wrest rule from the hands of the supreme leaders and transfer it to elected representatives from the nobility. Having signed the “conditions,” Anna arrived in Moscow in February 1730. In the clash between supporters and opponents of limiting imperial power, Anna managed to find a very advantageous position, which allowed her to rely on supporters of the autocracy and then, with the help of the guard, carry out a palace coup, marked by the public and solemn destruction of the “conditions”. From this day on, the autocratic rule of Anna Ioannovna began. Anna could not forgive the leaders for their constitutional idea: she saw them as personal enemies. Golitsyn was imprisoned in the Schlisserburg fortress, where he died the following year. The fate of the Dolgorukys was even more sad: first they were sent to different places, everything was taken away from them, and then they were tortured and sentenced to death, the rest were sent into exile, not allowed to go anywhere except the church. Obliged to the nobility by her autocracy, Anna had to make some concessions in his favor. They found their expression in the following instructions: On March 4, 1730, the Supreme Privy Council was eliminated, the Senate was returned to its previous position as the primary government institution, and the number of its members was increased to 21. . The law on primogeniture has been repealed. The gentry corps was founded - the first military school for young nobles in Russia. Those who completed the training course there received the right to enter active service directly with the rank of officer, without undergoing military service. Military service was limited to 25 years; in a large family, one of the brothers was completely exempt from service. The nobility was not slow to widely use the granted benefit. Immediately after the end of the Turkish War, more than half of the officers resigned. Since nobles most often enlisted in regiments when they were still children, now many who were still vigorous and strong began to also bother about resigning. Flight from the army took on such enormous proportions that the new law had to be suspended. Not without savvy and not without energy, having shown this by her behavior in the first days of her accession, deftly deceiving the rulers and managing to hide her cards for the time being, Anna Ioannovna was not at all prepared to rule a large state. Especially in such a difficult moment as Russia was then experiencing, having not yet recovered from the terrible tension in which Peter the Great kept it during the last 25 years of his reign.

November 1731 Anna issued a decree establishing at the court of H.I.V. Cabinet. The situation in which Anna Ioannovna ascended the throne aroused in her distrust of the Russians; with the establishment of two new guards regiments, Izmailovsky and Cavalry, half recruited from Courlanders and Germans and under the command of foreign officers, she felt calmer. The Cabinet was placed above the Senate. By a special decree on December 17, 1731, the “Charter on Heritage” of 1722 was “returned” from oblivion, which was supposed to free the hands of the new empress when appointing an heir. Then the Russians heard a wondrous decree: they had to swear allegiance to the male child who was to be born to the Tsar’s niece Anna Leopoldovna, for whom they had not even found a husband yet. Many then, like Artemy Volynsky and his fellow “confederates,” were amazed.

At one time, Anna did not receive a proper education, she did not have any abilities or inclinations, and there was no desire for self-improvement. N. Kostomarov rightly points out such character traits as Anna’s laziness and slowness of mind. “Arrogant, arrogant, spiteful, not forgiving others for the slightest step that for some reason was disgusting to her. Anna Ioannovna did not develop either the habit or the ability to do business,” this is how the historian characterizes the empress. “Her disadvantage was that she loved peace and did not do business at all, leaving everything to the arbitrariness of her ministers.”

At first she passionately loved horse riding, then she became interested in target shooting. In all corners of the palace she had loaded guns at hand. She shot birds from the windows, filled the rooms with noise and smoke, demanding that her court ladies do the same. There were 379 horses in her stable. The love for horses was most likely borrowed from his favorite Biron. The proverb: “tell me who your friend is, and I will tell you who you are” is not very flattering for Anna. Her main lady of state and great favorite, Anna Feodorovna Yushkova, was a scullery maid who walked barefoot among the lower servants of the palace. Anna brought her closer to herself, married her, but did not civilize her. A cheerful, “entertainer” who loved indecent conversations, Yushkova entertained the queen on long winter evenings and cut the nails of Her Majesty, Biron and his family. She and another former scullery maid, Margarita Feodorovna Manakhina, together with the cheerful and enterprising princess Agrafena Alexandrovna Shcherbatova, formed the empress’s intimate circle. On the male side, the main role was played by jesters and buffoons, and Anna had a habit and even a system of introducing people from the highest aristocracy into their number.

The most negative assessment of Anna’s reign and herself as an empress was given by historians V.O. Klyuchevsky and S.F. Platonov, who unanimously stated that the empress did not show herself positively either in government activities or in her personal life. “The first, according to S.F. Platonov, boiled down to satisfying the egoistic aspirations of several individuals, the second was marked by oddities, a series of wasteful celebrations, rude morals at court, brilliant but cruel amusements like the ice house.” Anna had some masculinity, V.O. Klyuchevsky described her like this: “Tall and corpulent with a face more masculine than feminine.” The roughness of her appearance, excessive plumpness, and lack of grace were noted by many of Anna’s contemporaries. From the surviving letters of Anna Ioannovna, the empress’s superstition and her great penchant for gossip are striking. Anna especially loved to act as a matchmaker, bringing together couples of people according to her own understanding. Despite the considerable number of surviving letters from the empress, there are very few whose contents would relate to important subjects, so we have to admit the justice of the verdict of her contemporaries that Anna Ioannovna spent her time in empty amusements and did not do business at all. Supreme control of the state was given to the cabinet of ministers, which consisted of four main leaders: Chancellor Golovkin, Prince Alexei Cherkassky, Baron Andrei Ivanovich Osterman and Count Minich. By decree of June 9, 1735 the signature of the three ministers was equated to the signature of the empress.

The reign of Anna Ioannovna is connected with the “Bironovschina”. In the Soviet historical encyclopedia, "Bironovschina" is defined as an extremely reactionary regime in Russia in the 30s. XVIII century during the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna, named after her favorite E. Biron, the inspirer and creator of this regime. The characteristic features of Bironovism are the “dominance of foreigners,” mainly Germans, in all areas of state and public life, predatory exploitation of the people, plunder of the country’s wealth, brutal persecution of the dissatisfied, espionage, denunciations. In traditional assessments of Anna’s reign, the dominant point of view is that throughout this period the state was actually ruled by Biron, a greedy and cruel man with an exorbitant passion for luxury and the same amount of pride and pride. Other Germans, equally indifferent to the fate of Russia and thinking only about their own benefit, followed Biron to the Court. Biron did not rule the state, but exploited the country for his own personal gain, and from the very beginning of his power in Russia, he began to collect tax arrears from the people in the most ruthless way, ruining the people, establishing an impossible mutual guarantee in payment between the paying peasants and their landowners. and local administration. All classes of society were paid with both prosperity and personal freedom: peasants were deprived of property for arrears, landowners were in prison for the poverty of their peasants, the regional administration was subjected to shameful punishments for faulty receipt of taxes. “Biron was as greedy as he was cruel, having the Russian treasury uncontrollably, it was possible to satisfy any tastes. It seemed that this was not enough for him. With unprecedented cruelty and innate contempt for the human person, he resorted to brutal measures to satisfy his greed He literally robbed." V.O. gives a very vivid description of these events. Klyuchevsky: “A milking raid was organized on the people: extortion expeditions were organized; faulty regional rulers were shackled in chains, landowners and elders were starved to death in prisons, peasants were beaten on the right and everything that came to hand was sold from them. Tatar invasions were repeated, only from the domestic capital. A groan and a cry went across the country."

The opposition to Biron and his minions was led by Artemy Petrovich Volynsky. This man began his career under Peter I, married to his cousin L.K. Naryshkina. Volynsky distinguished himself as a diplomat and governor in Astrakhan and Kazan. In 1738, by the will of Anna Ioannovna, he became a cabinet minister. A very educated man, an outstanding statesman, he conceived projects of various reforms. At the same time, in accordance with the spirit of the times, he did not shy away from bribes and embezzlement, he was a clever intriguer at court, a despot in the provinces, which he ruled in his own estates. Volynsky and his supporters did not hide their disgust for Biron and everything that he personified. The head of the circle, in a number of notes, spoke out against the clique that ruled the court in Russia. Relations have become extremely strained. Biron and Osterman persuaded the empress, and she ordered in 1740. arrest Volynsky and his associates. The case ended with the execution of the cabinet minister and his two closest associates - P.M. Eropkin, court architect and A.F. Khrushchov, mining engineer. Others were sent to hard labor.

The opinion about the destructive influence of the German factor on Russian foreign policy, about the corruption of the Germans who occupied important government positions and their treacherous policy in conducting diplomatic negotiations became widespread. “The victorious war with Turkey, the successful campaign against the Crimea - the dream of so many generations! - the conquest of Azov, Ochakov, Khotin, Yassy, ​​the brilliant victory at Stavuchany gave the most insignificant results. Myopic and corrupt diplomacy reduced the heavy sacrifices made by the state to nothing: according to Belgrade to the world (1739), only Azov (lost in 1711) was left behind us, and even then with the obligation to demolish its fortifications; the nest of Crimean robbers and the lower reaches of the Dnieper still remained beyond the borders of Russian possessions: Russia still could not keep in The Black Sea, even the merchant fleet, not to mention the military."

Fiction played a special role in the idea of ​​“Bironovism” as the dominance of foreigners. In the works of K.P. Marsalsky "Biron's Regency" and I.I. Lazhechnikov "Ice House". Artemy Volynsky is presented as a patriot who died from the intrigues of the foreign temporary worker Biron. This was also facilitated by popular judgments about the dangers of Western influence on Russia. The campaign against cosmopolitanism in Soviet times left traces in historiography and public consciousness. V.E. Anisimov refutes this belief, drawing attention to the fact that the Germans were in Russia long before the reign of Anna and their number was never frightening for the Russian people. Since time immemorial, foreign specialists came to work in Russia, and Peter the Great opened the doors of the country especially wide for them." The historian lists famous people of science and art who, being foreigners, worked for the benefit of Russia: architects D. Trezzini and F.B. Rastrelli, scientists N. J. Delisle, D. Bernwalli, G. Z. Bayer, I. Gmelin, G. F. Miller, musicians and composers Ristoli, F. Araya, Lande, etc. In addition, he claims that it was under Anna on the initiative of the German Minich, the difference in the salaries of Russian and foreign officers was eliminated. Many government decrees were preserved on the prohibition of privileges for foreign specialists who entered the Russian service. “Reports on the composition of the officers on the eve of the “Bironovschina” and at its “height” have been preserved. According to the statements of 1728 71 generals served in the field army, of which 41, or 58%, were foreigners. By 1738 the proportion of foreign generals even decreased - out of 61 generals there were 31. If we count foreign generals along with staff officers (including majors), then in 1729 There were 371 generals and staff officers in the army, 125 of them were foreigners, or 34%. In 1738 There were 515 generals and staff officers, and 192 of them were foreigners, or 37.3%."

The opinion that the internal policy of the state under the “Bironovschina” was formed due to inconsistently implemented measures, dictated by the whims and arbitrariness of the empress’s associates should be considered erroneous. We find this issue studied in detail in the work of N.N. Petrukhintsev, dedicated to the formation of the internal political course under Anna Ioannovna. In it, he points out that by June 1, 1730, a series of six nominal decrees already existed: “On the establishment of a commission to review the state of the army, artillery and fortification and correct them”; “On the establishment of a Commission for the creation of staff for collegiums and offices”; “On the decision of cases by judges in good conscience, in accordance with the given oath, regardless of the faces of the powerful”; “On the immediate completion of the initiated Code...”; “On dividing the Senate into departments and assigning each a special type of business”; “On submitting two reports to the EIV every Saturday.” This series of decrees represented a relatively thoughtful and consistent program of domestic policy, the content of which can be reduced to five main points:

) possible reform of the army in order to reduce expenditures on it to reduce the tax burden of the peasantry and solve the most pressing military problems;

) rationalization and streamlining of the work of the bureaucratic apparatus in order to reduce costs;

) declaration in the decree of justice;

) continuation of work on the preparation of a new Code;

) Senate reform.

Subsequently, the program was supplemented by the issue of stabilizing the country's financial system, which resulted in the creation of the Coin Commission. Describing the directions of the commission’s work, the historian points to “an amazingly systematic approach to issues of monetary circulation,” the commission’s program “provided not only for a comprehensive solution to the issue of the monetary system as a whole... but also a whole range of measures to save foreign currency metal and develop the country’s trade and industry.” Despite the fact that basically this program was not implemented, quite active attempts were made to bring it to life, especially in the initial period of Anna’s reign. Although the reasons for failures in the implementation of the program N.N. Petrukhintsev attributes the subsequently increased role of favoritism in the internal life of the country, but he does not consider it to be the main one. He names the Russian-Polish and Russian-Turkish wars as the strongest factor that stalled work on problems of domestic policy. However, even the partial implementation of certain aspects of the planned internal political course obviously had a stabilizing effect on the development of the country. State monopolies on salt and rhubarb were restored; In 23 Russian cities, police teams appeared, subordinate to the Main Police Chief Office. But attempts to create a new “salary book” completely failed: in the absence of qualified personnel, the government was unable to cope with the difficult task of revising and recording all items of income. It was necessary to restore some old administrative forms, for example, the Siberian Order. The “Military Naval Commission” together with the Senate came to the conclusion that it was necessary to abandon Peter’s program for the construction of large warships in the “locked” Baltic Sea. The fleet was assigned a more realistic role of defending the coast from Sweden's most likely enemy.

There is also an opinion that during the Bironovschina there was persecution of the Orthodox Church. Here we can rather talk about the intrigues of the church leaders. The fact is that many clergy, dissatisfied with the reforms of Peter I, sought to remove the theorist of Peter’s church reforms, Bishop Feofan Prokopovich, from power, but he, as an experienced intriguer, skillfully defended himself, planting his opponents in distant monasteries and in the Secret Chancellery. Persecution and reprisals fell upon the Old Believers during the reign of Anna Ioannovna. Arrests, torture, and persecution of thousands of people led to the “burnings” of self-immolations of schismatics.

The circumstances of Empress Anna's accession to the throne seriously influenced the nature of her subsequent reign. Anna did not see the support of her power in the large noble class, which until recently had participated in drawing up projects to limit autocracy. Moreover, she could not trust the leaders of her former opponents, with their political ambitions and thirst for power. Therefore, the new empress sought support among those whom she personally knew and with whom she had been associated for a long time. Anna's circle included her relatives, the Saltykovs, an irreconcilable fighter with the leaders of P.I. Yaguzhinsky, A.M. Cherkassky, favorite Biron, Levenwolde brothers, who showed sincere devotion to Minich. It so happened that, thanks in part to the intelligence and talent, and in some places to the personal sympathy of the empress, Biron, Osterman and Minich came to the forefront among them. This German triumvirate - however, rarely acting as a united front, but quite often acting and weaving intrigues against each other - ruled Russia over the next ten years. It is also necessary to remember that Biron’s associates were not only Germans but also Russians: Pavel Yaguzhinsky, Artemy Volynsky, Alexey Cherkassky, Andrey Ushakov, Gavriil Golovkin. This confirms what has already been said - those close to Anna Ioannovna were divided not by nationality, but by the pursuit of personal gain and influence.

Of course, the fact that there were many foreigners at court surrounded by Anna could not help but be striking and caused dissatisfaction among the Russian nobility. But, it seems, the reason for this discontent was to a greater extent that the nobility were pushed away from the throne, deprived of the wealth and privileges that accompany proximity to the court of the autocrat.

S.F. Platonov sums up Anna’s reign as follows: “For ten years the Germans continued to dominate, for ten years the Russians were insulted in their best sympathies and feelings. The murmur did not stop. People who suffered from the Germans, regardless of their personal qualities, just because they were Russian , in the eyes of the people turned into heroic martyrs." Here S.F. Platonov expressed the opinion of more than one generation of Russian historians. The works of these scientists created a stable negative assessment of Anna Ioannovna’s reign, viewing it as a dark period Russian history, a time when power in the state belonged to poorly educated, dishonest people, guided only by personal selfish needs and desires to the detriment of the state. The time of Russia's movement backwards in its development.


Section II. Women rulers and big politics (40s - 50s of the 18th century)


There are periods in the history of any country that are very difficult to characterize. Little has been said about them and even less has been written. They most often represent such short periods of time that they are simply lost against the general background of the bright and large-scale events of their era. However, such neglect seems incorrect, because in in this case the principle of an integrated approach to the study of history is violated and the researcher risks losing sight of the connecting thread between the previous and subsequent historical periods and, possibly, what they tried to hide from him for one reason or another. Such periods, of course, exist in the history of Russia. One of them is the reign of Emperor John VI Antonovich, who, despite his high-profile title, was hardly aware of his high position and took any part in governing the state for the good reason that by the end of his short reign the royal person was a little over a year old from birth. Nevertheless, decrees and manifestos were issued in his name, allegiance was sworn to him, and the real ruler of the state was, of course, a person specially appointed for such an occasion - the regent. During the short reign of Ivan Antonovich, two such regents were replaced. The first was Duke Ernst Johann Biron, the favorite of Empress Anna Ioannovna, appointed to the regency by the late empress herself, then her mother, Anna Leopoldovna, “the blessed empress, Grand Duchess Anna of All Russia,” became the regent - this was her title.

Having proclaimed herself the Grand Duchess and ruler of the state on November 10, 1740 and essentially becoming an autocratic empress, Anna Leopoldovna continued to live as she had lived before. As a result, during the short reign of Anna Leopoldovna, “the position of Germans and foreigners in general strengthened even more than during the reign of Anna Ioannovna,” and the Germans occupied all the key positions in the state. Naturally, this could not but irritate the Russian nobility, especially since, according to Pavlenko, there was a threat of the emergence of a new Biron, who could become Anna Leopoldovna’s favorite Count Linar. These circumstances, the historian believes, ultimately led to another palace coup that elevated Elizabeth Petrovna to the throne. Briefly analyzing the internal political course of the Annin government, in particular its measures such as an attempt to speed up the consideration of petitions and streamline their submission, the adoption of a bankruptcy statute and a charter for cloth and karase factories, as well as a number of other measures, the historian confirms his initial conclusion. Kamensky is quite skeptical about the administrative abilities of Anna Leopoldovna and her husband. In his opinion, they “were even less capable of governing the country than their predecessor, but at the same time, apparently, they were quite ambitious and did not want to entrust management to their ministers.” “People like Anna, naive, simple-minded and gullible, have no place in the wolf pack of politicians, and sooner or later they die.” Weydemeyer portrays Anna as a ruler, gifted with an accurate mind and a kind heart, who was so outspoken that the pretense and servility of the courtiers around her caused her indignation. The courtiers considered the ruler arrogant and indispensable. “Having an exalted soul,” Weidemeyer writes, “she despised flatterers. She rewarded merit generously, did good to everyone and never caused harm to anyone in her life. She communicated with her servants so graciously that they adored her. Her appearance was pleasant, and even attractive, although her facial features were not correct.” Next, Minich writes what is confirmed by other sources - letters, memoirs and even portraits: “She was by nature sloppy, tied her head with a white scarf when going to mass, did not wear a bra, and in this form appeared publicly at the table and in the afternoon while playing cards with her chosen partners, who were the prince - her husband, Count Linar - the minister of the Polish king and the favorite of the Grand Duchess, the Marquis de Botta - the minister of the Viennese court, her confidant ... Mr. Finch. Only in such an environment, Ernst Minich adds, “was she free and cheerful in her manners.” “By nature she was lazy and never appeared in the Cabinet (of Ministers) when I came to her in the morning with papers drawn up in the office, or those who demanded some kind of resolution, she, feeling her inability, often told me: “I would like my son to be at an age when he could reign himself.” . Minich was declared “the first in the empire after Prince Anton and became the main leader of both the country’s domestic and foreign policy, but in March 1741, Anna Leopoldovna signed a manifesto on Minich’s resignation. The first time after Minikh’s resignation, A.I. dominated. Osterman, who survived five reigns and all the favorites. In the complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire, compiled already in the 30s of the 19th century, 185 legislative acts were recorded from November 1740 to November 1741, that is, approximately 15.4 acts per month, which is accordingly characteristic of the intensity of lawmaking in the 18th century. As for the content, it does not reveal any innovations.

“There was no creature less capable of being at the head of government administration than the kind Anna Leopoldovna.” Soloviev points out the reason for the fall of Anna’s government is that she “could not govern herself, she was bored with business; but at the same time, she did not know how and did not want to find a person more experienced, more capable than others, on whom she could place the entire burden of affairs,” and instead listened to the advice of those close to her, including Julia Mengden. There were many unsuccessful steps taken by Anna's government. These include, in particular, the election of Anton's brother Ulrich as Duke of Courland, which caused discontent in Courland, as well as insufficiently effective care of the navy, which led it to a deplorable state, which seriously hindered Russia in the war with Sweden.

Andreev believes that Anna was not such a bad ruler as many people imagine, and her readiness to conduct state affairs was no higher than that of Anna Ioannovna or Elizaveta Petrovna. And if circumstances had turned out differently, Anna Leopoldovna would have gone down in Russian history with no less reason than they did. The historian cites evidence from contemporaries about such positive qualities of the ruler as mercy, cheerful and kind disposition, intelligence and prudence, religiosity, freedom from superstition. He notes that at the first stage of her reign, Anna showed great interest in state affairs, and she “could be reproached for anything, but laziness.” However, Anna Leopoldovna’s trouble, Kurukin believes, was that she was not competent enough and did not have a strong will, easily falling under the influence of constantly competing confidants. This led to inconsistent personnel policies and inconsistency in government policy and weakness. “Anna,” writes the historian, “could well have been, for example, the Queen of England. In a different, more stable political system, nothing threatened her. But Russia’s conditions were beyond her.” Comparing the personal qualities of Anna Leopoldovna and both empresses who reigned before her and after - Anna Ivanovna and Elizaveta Petrovna, we must admit that she was better educated than them, and none of the three ladies had experience in solving state problems before the start of her reign. But at the same time, the historian notes that both empresses at the time of accession to the throne were significantly older than the twenty-two-year-old ruler and, having extensive life experience, knew how to better understand people. “Having no social support within the country, fearing the guard,” writes Augustine, “Anna Leopoldovna strengthened police surveillance and tried to maintain power by persecuting the opposition. The response was increased discontent among the nobles. And on November 25, 1741, as a result of a palace coup, Elizaveta Petrovna came to power.”

German sees the reason for the overthrow of Anna Leopoldovna in her own character and inability to govern. The danger for the ruler, the historian writes, was small at first, but then assumed threatening proportions and stemmed “from her (Anna Leopoldovna’s) own temperament, whimsical and indecisive: she could not inspire anyone to fully commit to herself.” It easily fell under the influence of others, especially under the influence of its favorite Julia Mengden, and could not clearly separate its own loyalties and the interests of the state.

Since the reign of Anna Leopoldovna was one of the shortest reigns in Russian history of the 18th century, using the example of this historical period we can find out what qualities were required from the Russian ruler in order for his power to be strong and unshakable.

On November 1741, another coup was carried out in favor of the daughter of Peter I, Elizabeth, and the representatives of the Brunswick family who reigned on the throne were arrested: the little emperor Ivan Antonovich, his mother and father. Elizabeth's accession to the throne was accompanied by two features: the pretender to the throne herself set off to obtain the crown, she herself led a detachment of guards who overthrew the Brunswick family; the second feature was the desire to attract the foreign states of Sweden and France. However, the coup was carried out without the participation of Swedish troops and French diplomats. The coup of 1741 was accompanied, in addition, by the arrest of Minich, Osterman and other influential Germans and their exile to Siberia.

By decree of December 12, 1741, Elizabeth restored “Petrine’s brainchild” - the Senate as the highest state body and eliminated the Cabinet of Ministers. Instead, it was ordered “to have a Cabinet at our court in such strength as it was under Peter the Great.” The personal imperial office was restored, headed by I.A. Cherkasov, which increased the importance of the autocrat. The Senate was under the control of the Empress. Elizaveta Petrovna restored Peter's "establishment" - emergency meetings of senior dignitaries to discuss the most difficult problems, especially in the field of foreign policy. These meetings were called “conferences,” but were not held regularly. Elizabeth sought to train personnel from Russian nobles to manage the affairs of state institutions. When appointing a foreigner to any position, she asked: “Don’t we have a Russian?” and ordered: “we must better look for capable Russian people, and invite foreigners as a last resort.”

At the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, Russia waged a war with Sweden (1741-1743), which ended in a peace favorable to Russia in the city of Abo. According to this peace, Sweden confirmed the results of the Northern War and ceded part of Finland to Russia. The main foreign policy event during the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna was Russia’s participation in Seven Years' War(1756-1763). Russia's eastern policy during this period was characterized by voluntary accession Kazakh lands of the Middle Zhuz into Russia.

Elizabeth’s contemporary, the Spanish politician Duke de Liria, wrote about the princess in 1728: “Princess Elizabeth is such a beauty as I have rarely seen. She is tall, extremely lively, dances well and rides without the slightest fear. She is not without intelligence, graceful and very flirtatious." There was also a fanatical passion for dress and hunting in her character; in addition, “such contradictions as piety and superstition and prejudice. Derzhavin very briefly and aptly noted the whole essence of the empress, comparing her with “calm spring”. Insane luxury and terrifying poverty; softness and cruelty; gross debauchery and piety, for twenty years Russia has shown these contradictions to the world. Possessing appearance a fashionista and the features of a European woman of the 18th century, Elizabeth still had much in common with the contemporary type of Russian woman. Chaotic, whimsical, with no time for sleep or food, she remained, like Anna Ioannovna, a landowner under strict regime, although less rude and more attractive. “Empress Elizabeth, distinguished by her benevolence and friendliness towards everyone around her, was even interested in the children of people belonging to her court. She largely preserved the ancient Russian morals, which were very similar to the ancient patriarchal morals.”

In old memoirs relating to this era one can almost always find ridicule of the reign of Elizabeth. N.I. Panin wrote about her reign: “This era deserves a special note: everything in it was sacrificed to the present time, the desires of decent people and all sorts of extraneous small adventures in business.” In the work of E.V. Eshevsky’s “Essay on the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna” contained, for example, the following words: “From then (from Peter the Great) until Catherine the Great herself, Russian history comes down to the history of private individuals, brave or cunning temporary workers, and the history of the struggle of famous parties, court intrigues and tragic disasters. T.N. Granovsky speaks of Elizabeth’s reign as follows: “Without exaggeration, Elizabeth’s reign can be called the administration of the most important dignitaries gathered in the Senate.” Being a man of character who adores entertainment, at the same time knowing her lack of qualities necessary for sovereign rule, she skillfully compensated for them by selecting associates. N.I. Pavlenko gives the following description of the ruler: “Most of all she was interested in caring about her appearance, masquerades and balls. The courtyard was surrounded by luxury, the costs of its maintenance were very high. In the last years of her reign, she hated any mention of business, and those close to her had to wait for several weeks for the right moment for her to sign the decree.” E.V. Anisimov speaking about Elizaveta Petrovna’s almost complete detachment from government administration. But there were still matters that could not be solved without her. These were matters of foreign policy, this was explained simply: foreign policy was interesting to the empress. But the authors of the book “History of Russia. All-Russian Emperors" and O.V. Klyuchevsky believe that the empress did not understand and was not interested in foreign policy. “Elizabeth with her 300,000-strong army could become the arbiter of European destinies; the map of Europe lay in front of her at her disposal, but she looked there so rarely that until the end of her life she was confident in the possibility of traveling to England by land.

She surrounded herself with Russian associates, and the death penalty was abolished. The Empress is involved in charity work. In Russia, under her rule, homes for the disabled, almshouses, and shelters were created.

Elizabeth waged a very fierce struggle with adherents of the Old Believers. She demolished Muslim mosques and Armenian churches. It would be an exaggeration to say that Elizaveta Petrovna was very concerned about the ideology of her reign and, in general, the difficult lot of a statesman. She did not dream of being known as a philosopher on the throne, nor did she long to become an Amazon warrior. She was more concerned about how she looked and whether others admired her.

Historians M.M. Shcherbatov, N.M. Karamzin rated her quite highly as a person (pious, kind, gentle, compassionate, etc.), but did not speak too enthusiastically about her as an empress. We especially note that monarchical traditions were very strong among historians, but still, Elizabeth’s ability to govern the state was initially assessed by historians of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. as lower than those of her father or Catherine II. Elizabeth is perceived as a historical figure by S.M. Soloviev, and V.O. Klyuchevsky and others. In their opinion, she continued the work of her father, although, according to the latter, she was not prepared for the throne, but managed to grasp the importance of the historical moment for some specific actions, which allow us to talk about her as a historical figure . CM. Soloviev “loved” this era and wrote about it with sympathy. Thus, S.M. Solovyov believed that the historical significance of Elizabeth’s time is determined by its preparatory role in relation to the next era, and its historical merit lies in the nationality of her reign. However, we see that under Elizabeth, as before, “fit people,” that is, favorites, played a big role. Solovyov characterizes Elizabeth’s government with the following words: “The restoration of Peter the Great’s institutions in the form in which he left them, the constant desire to give force to his decrees, to act in his spirit - imparted a certain firmness, systematicity to the actions of the government, and confidence and calmness to the subjects.”

Historians believed that she dealt with some issues personally, while others were resolved by her associates, but for modern researchers this does not seem important, because It is obvious that she was an autocratic empress, which means that it is important that she could intervene in government at any time.

There are different assessments of Elizaveta Petrovna’s activities. Some historians argue that her time was distinguished by humanity and religious tolerance, the strengthening of the role of the nobility in the state, the flourishing of manufacturing and trade, and the further development of education; others believe that no fundamental and significant changes have occurred in the state and society. Therefore, when speaking about the activities of the reigning person, it is necessary to take into account and take into account both points of view. For example, according to Klyuchevsky, she was an intelligent and kind, but disorderly and wayward Russian lady of the 18th century, whom, according to Russian custom, many scolded during her lifetime and, also according to Russian custom, everyone mourned after her death.

Section III. Favoritism is an integral part women's history era of palace coups


At all times, history was “made” by elders, princes, viziers, sultans, monarchs, emperors, kings, people in general, but then and now there are people who may be “blurred” in the general crowd of those in power, but who sometimes have a total influence on state policy. In any socio-political system, government, dictatorship, there are unspoken or visible personalities - favorites. There are different definitions of the term favoritism itself, but they are most accurately formulated in the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia: “Favoritism is a situation characteristic of the era of absolutism of the 17th - 18th centuries, in which favorites influence state affairs...”. In the Russian language dictionary S.I. Ozhegov there is a similar definition, but a decoding of the term favorite itself is added: “Favorite (Italian Favorito, from Latin Fovor - favor), a person enjoying special favor and influencing the views and behavior of his patrons.

Favoritism is characterized by the delegation of some (or even most) of the powers of the monarch to the favorite or his proteges. Favoritism became most widespread under an absolute monarchy. The reason for favoritism lies in the monarch's intention to concentrate supreme power in the hands of a very small group of people, often without outstanding qualities, but personally loyal.

In the 18th century, favoritism in connection with the rule of women acquired other features. The favorites were immensely endowed with titles and estates and had enormous political influence. Often incapable of state activities, empresses (with the exception of Catherine II, of course, relied entirely on the will of their favorites. Sometimes people from low classes became prominent political figures, rising thanks to the empress, who brought them closer to the court. Sometimes, thanks to their favorites, they became rich and advanced in their relatives in the service.

Already at the beginning of the Romanov dynasty, the first bricks were laid in the building of favoritism. The personal qualities of the monarchs undoubtedly contributed to the formation and development of favoritism in Russia. In Russia, favoritism flourishes under female empresses, who were distinguished by a special passion for love affairs. Moreover, not being distinguished by their desire for state affairs, in many cases they gave domestic and foreign policy into the hands of their favorites, thereby, at least indirectly, placing them above themselves in the state. In Western Europe, monarchs predominated - men who could not afford to put women at the helm of state policy, whose destiny, I exaggerate, is the kitchen and the bed.

After Peter's death, Menshikov could only do what he had done dozens of times before, when the Tsar was absent or indulged in entertainment. And the day after death, just like the day before, the administrative bodies - the Senate, collegiums, various offices - turned out to be incapable of any initiative. Menshikov replaced her and continued to manage as before. He became a ruler, as a permanent substitute for royal authority, although such exercise of unlimited power was not stipulated by any law. This is an inherent feature of favoritism wherever it appears. The practical application of such a regime was not without difficulties. During the life of Peter, when the favorite performed the duties of the sovereign, the latter stood behind him, giving his consent to the temporary orders of his second self. Catherine wanted to imitate her husband; but she did not have the iron hand of a reformer, and among those around the empress Menshikov found rivals. From the first days, the Duke of Holstein showed his intention to compete with him and not to submit to the arrogance that was growing in this former cake maker. Bassevich tried further to stir up the ambition and suspicion of his duke. Menshikov had neither the flexibility nor the tact to eliminate the consequences of this. One day, when he introduced his eight-year-old son to the prince, the boy decided to stand up during the reception, and all the courtiers followed his example; and Menshikov did not even think of finding such an expression of respect unnecessary. This incident caused a scandal. He could unhinderedly enter Catherine I for a report. And the empress, in turn, did not forget to thank Menshikov. She granted him the city of Baturin - the same one that Alexander Danilovich literally begged from Peter I, but to no avail... Catherine I also forgot about all Menshikov’s debts.

When Anna Ioannovna comes to power, according to many historians, a dark streak begins in Russia. One of the contemporaries of that era described the thirties of the 18th century as follows: “A terrible word and deed was heard everywhere, dragging into the dungeons hundreds of victims of Biron’s gloomy suspicion or the personal enmity of his spies, scattered throughout the cities and villages, settling in almost every family. The executions were so common that they already aroused no one’s attention...” V. Pikul called Anna simply “a dirty, stupid woman, full of anger and vices, a wild lady on the Russian throne. Behind Anna stood the one they called Ernest Johann Biron. His real name is Johann Ernest Biren. As N. Kostomarov writes: “Out of vain ambition, he adopted the surname Biron, changing only one vowel in his real family nickname, and began to descend from the ancient aristocratic French family of Biron.” Active members of this family in France, having learned about such an impostor, laughed at him, but did not resist or protest, especially after with the accession of Anna Ioannovna to the Russian throne, he, under the name Biron, became the second person in a powerful European state. Around 1728, Johann Ernest came to Anna's court thanks to the patronage of Bestuzhev, who was then the duchess's favorite. An extremely ambitious man, Biron made the question of a career a matter of life. Vengeful, “without a concept of honor, without a sense of duty, he made his way in life with the self-interest of a petty egoist.” Having taken a strong position with Anna, Biren became close to her to such an extent that he became the most necessary person for her. At first he tried to be with her as often as possible and soon reached the point that she herself, even more than he, needed his company. According to contemporaries, Anna Ioannovna’s affection for Biren was unusual. The Empress thought and acted in accordance with how her favorite influenced her. Everything that Anna did essentially came from Biren.

If we talk about the personal qualities of the favorite, Count Manstein most clearly described them in his “Note”. “By the way, he owed the information and upbringing that he had to himself. He did not have the kind of intelligence that was liked in society and in the world, but he had a certain kind of genius. One could add to this the saying that work makes a man. Before arriving in Russia, he hardly even knew the name of politics, and after several years of staying in it he learned quite thoroughly the weight that concerns this state. Biron loved luxury and pomp to the point of excess and was a great lover of horses. This explains the words of the Austrian regent Ostein: “Biron speaks about horses like an intelligent person, but as soon as he talks about something other than horses, he lies like a horse.” “This man, who made an amazing career, had no education at all, spoke only German and the Courland dialect. I didn't read German well. He was not ashamed to publicly say during Anna’s life that he did not want to learn to read and write in Russian in order not to be obliged to present Her Majesty with petitions, reports and other documents sent to him daily.”

Arrogant, proud, cruel at heart, he covered up the dark sides of his character with the sophistication and sophistication of a secular man. Having come to power, the empress did not interfere with her favorite in any way. Due to natural laziness, she did not know the “tricks” of her favorite, and moreover, she sincerely believed that the people given to her by God were prospering. Anna saw the people through the prism of amusements, fireworks, balls and judged the situation in the state based on the official reports that she happened to read and sign. The Empress had no idea what was going on in the empire, and she did not want to know or think about it. She was satisfied with the way of life and affairs that she led. Taking advantage of the empress's abstraction from power, Biron takes it into his own hands. His power rested on three “pillars”: the Secret Chancellery (which was used by the favorite to fight enemies), the guard, and the minions of the ruler’s favorite. N. Kostomarov gives the following characterization to E. Biron “... had no state views, no program of activity and not the slightest acquaintance with Russian life and people. This did not prevent him from despising Russians and consciously persecuting everything Russian. His only goal was his own enrichment, his only concern - strengthening one’s position at court and in the state." Manstein wrote: “Speaking about the Duke of Courland, I said that he was a great hunter of luxury and splendor; this was enough to inspire the empress with the desire to make her court the most brilliant in Europe. Large sums of money were spent on this, but still the empress’s wish was not soon fulfilled. Often, with the richest caftan, the wig was very carefully combed; an inexperienced tailor spoiled beautiful damask fabric with a bad cut; or if the toilet was impeccable, then the carriage was extremely bad: a gentleman in a rich suit rode in a crappy carriage, which was dragged by beds.”

Anna moves to St. Petersburg because, in her opinion, Moscow was not safe. He was pleased with the move and did not like Biron - the “barbarian capital”. In addition, an unprecedented embarrassment happened to him in Moscow: he, a brilliant rider, was thrown to the ground by a horse in front of the empress, courtiers and crowd. Anna, breaking the entire ceremony of the royal departure, jumped out of the carriage in order to lift the poor, bruised, but infinitely beloved chief chamberlain from the damned Moscow mud. This event reflects the true attitude of the empress towards her favorite. E. Biron was Anna's greatest object of passion. “Never in the world, I believe, was there a more friendly couple who would show such participation in the amusement or sorrow of a perfect person as the empress and the duke,” writes E. Minich and continues: “Both could almost never pretend in their outward appearance . If the Duke appeared with a gloomy face, then the Empress at the same moment took on an alarmed look. If he was cheerful, then the monarch’s face showed obvious pleasure. If someone did not please the Duke, then it was from the eyes and the meeting. The kindness the monarch gave him, he could immediately notice a sensitive change. All favors had to be asked from the duke, and through him alone the empress decided on it.”

Many historians attribute the licentiousness and cruelty of the court's morals to Biron's influence. It was believed that it was Biron who was able to give the empress’s amusements a character that served to humiliate the Russian noble families. For example, V. Andreev believes that the cruelty visible in such amusements as the ice house was not akin to Anna’s soul and was a consequence of the influence of Biron. His influence was reflected in Anna’s indecisive character and changeable opinions. Biron did not see a single independent person around him. He gradually destroyed all notable Russian people and was the complete manager of affairs. The so-called cabinet, established in 1731 from three persons: Osterman, Golovkin and Cherkassky, was supposed to replace the abolished Supreme Privy Council and become the head of government over the Senate and Synod. Deprived of any legal identity and independence, “...the cabinet confused the competence and office work of government agencies, reflecting the behind-the-scenes mind of its creator and the nature of the dark reign.” According to I.V. Kurukin: “Biron’s strength lay in the fact that he became the first “correct” leader in our political history, turning the little-revered image of a nighttime “temporary worker” into a real institution of power with unwritten, but clearly defined rules and boundaries.” From 1732, he began to take the initiative, meeting with foreign ambassadors on issues that interested them. The reports of the English consul K. Rondeau and I. Lefort clearly recorded this important change in the work of diplomats at the St. Petersburg court: in 1733 they already reported on the “custom” of visiting the chief chamberlain, which was strictly adhered to by members of the diplomatic corps.

After the rapprochement between Russia and England 1734-1741. Rondo becomes a welcome guest of Biron and Osterman, and therefore the awareness of his reports increases sharply. From the surviving reports of the English consul, we learn about Biron’s methods of diplomatic work. During informal meetings and conversations, he always made it clear that he was aware of the news coming from Russian ambassadors abroad; was the first to put forward initiatives, inform the interlocutor about decisions taken, but not yet officially announced; explained the point of view of the Russian government on certain issues. In some cases, Biron emphasized that he spoke on behalf of the empress, in others that he acted not as a minister, but solely as a friend. According to contemporaries, Biron played his role according to “European” rules, without abusing his power, and was kind and polite to everyone. However, if I.V. Kurukin is convinced that Biron, for all his information and influence, was still only a conductor of the will of the empress, and was more like the head of the office than an all-powerful temporary worker. Anisimov draws the opposite conclusion: “Biron’s influence was enormous in both foreign and domestic policy. In the system of power that developed under Anna without Biron, her confidant, a power-hungry man, not a single important decision was made at all. In his letters, the temporary worker constantly complains about his workload, but at the same time shows himself to be a very cautious person, trying not to emphasize his role in management, to remain in the shadows."

Biron also secretly controlled the office. P.V. Dolgorukov especially singles out his confidant, the Jew Lipman, whom Biron made a court banker. Lipman openly sold positions, places and favors in favor of the favorite and engaged in usury on a half-basis with the Duke of Courland. Biron consulted him in all matters. Lipman often attended Biron’s classes with cabinet ministers, secretaries and presidents of the boards, expressing his opinions and giving advice, which everyone respectfully listened to. The most senior and influential people tried to please this favorite, who more than once sent people to Siberia on a whim. He traded his influence by selling official positions, and there was no baseness that he was not capable of.

Biron is credited with the development of denunciation and espionage in the country, explaining this by his fear for the safety and strength of his position. The Secret Chancellery, the successor to the Preobrazhensky Order of the Petrine era, was inundated with political denunciations and cases. Terror hung over society. And at the same time, physical disasters came one after another: pestilence, famine, wars with Poland and Turkey depleted the people's strength. It is clear that under such circumstances of life the people could not be calm. Hence another phenomenon of “Bironovism” - constant popular unrest.

In 1734-1738 impostors appeared in the southeast, calling themselves the sons of Peter. They were successful among the population and troops, but were soon caught. But even without them, the people's murmur did not cease. The people attributed all the country's disasters to foreigners who had seized power and were taking advantage of the fact that there was a weak woman on the throne.

Biron was married to Anna's maid of honor. Their children felt completely free at court. The Empress treated the young Birons very warmly. Awards and ranks rained down on them like from a cornucopia, it seems that Anna and the Birons formed a single family. They attended holidays together, attended theaters and concerts, rode sleighs, and played cards in the evenings. Anna's accession opened dizzying horizons for Biron. Already in June 1730, Anna obtained from the Austrian Emperor the title of count for him, and in the fall Biron became a Knight of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and Chief Chamberlain, so that this position would look more respectable, in the Table of Ranks - a document regulating the career advancement of military officers, officials and courtiers, changes were made, and the newly-minted chief chamberlain, together with the rank, “moved” from the fourth class directly to the second class.

The opinions of historians regarding the role of Biron and the scale of his influence are divided, but there is something on which modern researchers mostly agree: that Biron was an intelligent and strong-willed man, well acquainted with all the internal and foreign policy issues of the state. However, Biron should not be considered the only key figure involved in governing the country. As Rondeau noted, in the field of foreign policy, all matters passed through the hands of Osterman, who in many ways surpassed the chief chamberlain in experience and knew how to stun him with his analysis of the situation. As a result, the actual negotiation process with foreign diplomats was entirely in the hands of Osterman, as well as the current leadership and instructions to ambassadors. According to V.O. Klyuchevsky: “... over the bunch of Bironov’s nonentities towered the real bosses of the state, Vice Chancellor A.I., Osterman and Field Marshal Minich. V. Pikul directly called Anna Ioannovna’s reign not Bironovism, but Ostermanism. This opinion can be confirmed by the notes of the Spanish Ambassador to Russia, a contemporary of those events, Duke of Lyria, in which he describes Biron and Osterman as follows: “Baron Osterman: He had all the necessary abilities to be a good minister, and an amazing figure, ... he was cunning in the highest degree, he was very stingy, but did not like bribes. He possessed the art of pretending to the greatest extent, with such dexterity he knew how to give a gloss of truth to the most obvious lies that he could deceive the most cunning people... Duke Biron - he had little to do and therefore allowed others to control him to the point that he could not distinguish bad advice from good... ". Of course, the German party, based on this disposition, could overthrow Biron and replace him with Osterman or Minich. But, since Anna’s favorite did not bother himself with state affairs and did not pretend to be a commander, they only needed a person who would defend against the attacks of the Russian party, and at the same time would not interfere in political affairs. Based on the notes of Ya.P. Shakhovsky, a witness to the treaty of the German party, Biron could only conduct intrigues within the party and the court “... with his comrade, the Cabinet Minister Count Osterman, he had a secret enmity, and in each of them, having his own party at the court of their highest ranks, continuously one network they tried to make cunning tricks for catching and ditches for falling...” Not without Osterman’s efforts, P.P. were destroyed. Shafirov, A.D. Menshikov, A.V. Makarov, D.M. Golitsyn, I.A. and P.L. Dolgoruky, A.P. Volynsky. That is, we see his direct participation in the largest political processes second quarter of the 18th century. A master of political intrigue, he knew how to arrange the matter in such a way that the victims had no idea that it was Osterman who owed severe punishment and even turned to him for help.

In 1735, a seventeen-year-old princess (Anna Leopoldovna), who was already looking for a groom, fell romantically in love with the Saxon envoy Count Linar. Her governess, Aderkas, a Prussian relative of Mardefeld, helped in this intrigue. Having learned about this, the empress sent the guilty teacher to Germany, demanded that the too enterprising diplomat be recalled and, as it seemed, managed to return her niece to feelings more befitting of her rank. But as soon as Anna received unlimited power and freedom, Linar appeared in St. Petersburg. He came from an Italian family that had been settled in Germany since the sixteenth century; he was about forty years old; he was left a widower by his wife, née Fleming, to whom he owed his diplomatic career. Handsome, well-built, busy with his own person, he seemed much younger than his years. Catherine II, who saw him nine years later, half-jokingly draws him like this: “He was a man who, as they say, combined great knowledge with the same abilities. In appearance, he was in the full sense of a fop. He was tall, well built, reddish-blond, with a complexion as delicate as a woman's. They say that he took such care of his skin that every day before going to bed he covered his face and hands with lipstick and slept in gloves and a mask. He boasted that he had eighteen children and that everything their nurses could do this work by his grace. This, so white, Count Linar had a white ladies' order and wore dresses of the lightest colors, such as sky blue, apricot, lilac, flesh."

“Count Linar never misses an opportunity to prove to the Grand Duchess how madly in love he is with her. She takes this from signs to displeasure... He rented a house near the royal garden and from then on the Grand Duchess Regent, contrary to her custom, began to take walks very often.”

The evenings were spent behind closed doors in the apartment of the ruler's closest friend, her maid of honor Juliana (Julia) Mengden, or, as Elizaveta Petrovna contemptuously called her, Zhulia, Zhulki. Anna could not live even a day without this “beautiful dark-skinned woman.” Their relationship was extraordinary. Anna's love for Julia "was like the most ardent love of a man for a woman." It is only known that there was an intention to marry Linara and Julia, which was not carried out due to the coup, although in August 1741 they managed to get engaged, and Anna presented her friend with a countless number of jewelry and a fully furnished house. The purpose of this marriage was to disguise the ruler's relationship with Linar. Be that as it may, it was Julia Mengden, sitting by the fireplace with Anna doing needlework (on long evenings, her friends tore off the gold braid from the camisoles of the overthrown Biron), who gave the ruler advice on governing Russia. These pieces of advice from the provincial Livonian young lady, who had enormous influence on the ruler, made Osterman and other ministers' hair stand on end. When power changed again, the crown princess personally entered the ruler’s chambers and woke her up. Anna Leopoldovna did not resist the coup, but only asked not to harm either her children or Juliana Mengden. These were the people for whom Anna feared more than anything in the world. In this example, you can see the true attitude of the ruler towards her favorite.

On the night of November 25, 1741, power changed once again in the Russian Empire. The influence of the German party also finally fell, and it went into oblivion, trying to nominate a new favorite under Anna Leopoldovna, regent of Ivan VI, Moritz Linara. It didn't take much to overthrow the rulers. Firstly, a contender for the royal family: there already was one - Elizaveta Petrovna. The second favorable circumstance was the French ambassador of the famous de Chétardy: a clever, experienced intriguer, he did not spare gold in order to strengthen his influence in the Russian court and weaken the German one. The empress's lifestyle and character suggest that she was practically not involved in state affairs. The secrecy and suspicion that arose in Elizabeth during Anna's reign, a jealous attitude towards the actions, and more often imaginary encroachments on her power, are bizarrely combined with her almost complete failure to govern the country, which led to the dominance of favorites or “strong people” who begin become an integral part of the state. In 1750, Bestuzhev complained to the Austrian ambassador Gernes about the complete impossibility of any work under Elizabeth: “The whole empire is falling apart. My patience is running out. I am forced to demand my resignation."

Of these strong persons, during the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna, two warring noble parties stood out - the Shuvalovs and the Razumovskys. The Duke of Lyria described the situation that existed at the court of Elizabeth in this way. “In the present reign, the new favorite Razumovsky ruled the empire..., a simple Cossack reached the point of secret marriage with the empress...”. It was actually the case that Alexey Grigorievich Razumovsky was Elizabeth’s marganastic husband, and they married her in the village of Perovo near Moscow in 1742. Razumovsky’s favor began in 1731, when Colonel Vishnevsky noticed a handsome singer from the family of the Cossack Razum in the village of Lemerre, Chernigov province. Contemporaries unanimously asserted that Razumovsky, who enjoyed enormous power for a long time, behaved extremely modestly: he did not strive for high government positions and, if possible, avoided participation in court intrigues. Perhaps the only thing that the “modest” Razumovsky did actively and shamelessly was to enrich himself through the numerous gifts of the Empress with money, lands and serfs. Although Alexei Razumovsky himself removed himself from government affairs, his potential significance in their decision was enormous. Pezold, secretary of the Saxon embassy, ​​wrote in 1747 in Dresden: “The influence of the modest Razumovsky on the empress increased so much after their marriage that although he does not directly interfere in state affairs, for which he has no attraction or talent, everyone can be sure of achieving what he wants, as long as Razumovsky puts in a word.” Thus, such a situation in which power really “was lying under the feet of the favorites, but they simply did not deign to raise it, persists further in the reign of Catherine II.

Since the beginning of the 50s of the 18th century, the influence of A.G. Razumovsky is overshadowed by the Shuvalov clan, led by Pyotr Ivanovich Shuvalov. The beginning of his nomination dates back to the mid-40s. This was helped a little by his marriage to Mavra Shepeleva, Elizabeth’s favorite mistress. His influence on the political life of that time is evidenced by examples worthy of a reformer: these are projects on wine and salt trade; gradual replacement of direct taxation with indirect taxation; projects to abolish internal customs in the empire; return to protectionist policies. His real power is also evidenced by his own strength - the Observation Corps, consisting of 30 thousand people. That is, both internal politics and military power were in his hands. Pyotr Ivanovich was the eldest and always remained, as it were, in the shadows, and the “chance” was “fulfilled” by a young and handsome man, his cousin, Ivan Ivanovich Shuvalov. After the fall of Chancellor Bestuzhev, having achieved the appointment of his brothers to the Council of Ministers, the temporary worker always contributed to the triumph of the ideas and decisions of one of them. Elizabeth spoke through his lips, but he speaks only the words of Pyotr Shuvalov. The empress had no secrets from her favorite, and when Louis XV decided to enter into a secret relationship with the empress, he was warned that the third person between them would be the favorite. Officially, he does not hold any significant position, but he was simply called “Chamberlain,” and this word was respected at court. At the beginning of 1750, the Empress developed another serious hobby. Cadets of the Land Noble Corps (officer school) organized an amateur theater, which Elizaveta Petrovna wished to see at her court. One of the cadets, Nikita Afanasyevich Beketov, attracted the empress's attention with his talented acting and beautiful appearance, and everyone started talking about him as a new favorite. In the spring of the same year, he left the corps with the rank of prime major and was taken to court as an adjutant to Razumovsky, who, due to his good nature, favored Elizabeth's young favorite. At that time, she herself found herself in a very difficult situation. Catherine II recalled that on Easter, right in the church, “the empress scolded all her maids... the singers and even the priest all received a scolding. There was a lot of whispering later about the reasons for this anger; from vague hints it was revealed that this angry mood of the empress was caused by the difficult situation in which Her Majesty found herself between three or four of her favorites, namely, Count Razumovsky, Shuvalov, one choir named Kachenovsky and Beketov, whom she had just appointed as adjutant to Count Razumovsky. It must be admitted that anyone else in Her Majesty’s place would have been baffled even under less difficult conditions. Not everyone is given the ability to see and reconcile the pride of four favorites at the same time.” Kachenovsky turned out to be Elizabeth’s fleeting hobby, while Beketov’s favor lasted more than a year. The young officer was strongly supported by A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who, not without reason, feared the rise of Ivan Shuvalov and the strengthening of the influence of his brothers.

The time of Elizaveta Petrovna can be distinguished by the fact that favoritism is strengthened in an already constructed building, but, as in the subsequent period of history, it will only be an adornment of absolute power. This can be exemplified by the words of the French diplomat at the court of Elizabeth L.Zh. Favier: “The Empress is completely master of the art of transformation. The secret depths of her heart often remain inaccessible to even the oldest and most experienced courtiers. She under no circumstances allows herself to be controlled by any one person or favorite.”

Thus, the evolution of favoritism in Russia reaches a peak when this phenomenon is reborn into something special, unique, into a tradition on Russian soil. This, undoubtedly, is facilitated by the “greatest woman - the empress” on the Russian throne, under whom favoritism acquires the rank of a state institution and during whose reign the “golden age” of favoritism in Russia will come - Ekaterina Alekseevna. We can say that under all the previous empresses, favoritism was more of a whim, a royal whim, but under Catherine II it became a traditional state institution, supported by the empress herself. Thus, Russia of the 18th century is a society and court no more, no less depraved than all the court circles of Europe, and at the top of the hierarchical ladder, on the steps right next to the throne, there is favoritism. Almost all the favorites have one thing in common: they ended their lives poorly. K. Birkin expressed himself most clearly on this matter in his work on the topic of favoritism: “the fate of temporary workers and favorites reminds us of the fate of those three Turkish viziers, whom the Sultan paid from his own shoulders, and tomorrow sent the same viziers a silk cord for their own necks ... Another temporary worker, thinking of sitting on the throne, ended up impaled instead, putting his head on the block...”

Everyone knows and talks about the favorites, they slavishly obey them, but at the same time, they don’t seem to notice them, because this cannot happen in an absolute monarchy. Thus, the political history of the past shows that favoritism is an integral part of the governmental structure of society. And as absolutism develops, this phenomenon takes on the form of a permanent, important political institution that has a great influence on the development and direction of state activity.


Conclusion


By the end of the 17th century. The Russian monarchy faced a dynastic crisis. Once established, the autocratic power was subjected to serious tests, with young monarchs or those incapable of ruling, in the form of an active struggle for the throne between rival factions of the nobility. Palace coups in Russia became one of the leading factors in political life precisely after Peter’s reforms, during which technical, economic and administrative forms borrowed from European experience were transplanted onto the soil of the feudal-serf system in order to modernize it. Such instability can be considered the “payment for reforms”, for breaking the traditional political culture- with the amendment that this breakdown began even before Peter. However, having arisen, each serious phenomenon further develops on the basis of its inherent internal tendencies.

At the beginning of the era, the political conflict manifested itself openly and was accompanied not only by the enthronement of a specific contender, but also by attempts to change the existing “form of government.” On the eve of the death of Peter I, a compromise was planned (the accession of Peter II with the appointment of Catherine as ruler “together with the Senate”), which was thwarted by supporters of unlimited autocracy. Such a conflict can be considered the first type of palace coup. In the interregnum of 1730, we can already talk about a complete coup d'état; however, the “sovereignty” provided the “gentry” with the opportunity to openly and legally draw up projects for a new state structure, and their opponents just as clearly defended their point of view. As a result, a new coup d'etat took place, restoring autocracy. But in both cases, the clashes took place in public, with the participation of representatives of the nobility and other “gentry” gathered in the palace.

The external stabilization of the regime under Anna Ioannovna stopped attempts to change the political system, but did not eliminate the contradictions inherent in it. In 1740, Field Marshal Minich first tried the tactics of a palace coup: under his command, the guards arrested the regent Biron and his inner circle. Subsequently, it was this type of palace coup (a conspiracy with the participation of the guards as a strike force) that became the main method of political struggle in the events of 1741 and 1762. - which also contributed to the increase in the “cost” of coups in the form of awards and payments to its participants.

In parallel, the formation of two more important elements of the post-Petrine monarchy took place - the supreme council under the sovereign and the institution of “random people”. The “revolutionary” elimination of political figures that emerged at the end of the 17th century with their exclusion not only from the circle of power, but also from all “normal” life - deprivation of ranks, “honor”, ​​property (the formulas “former Menshikov”, “former Biron” came into circulation ") - became the norm in post-Petrine Russia. The councils “at the side” of the sovereign showed a tendency towards a certain independence, the culmination of which was the attempt of the Supreme Privy Council in 1730 to formally limit the power of the emperor. Only by the middle of the century did the institution of favoritism finally “integrate” into the system of the Russian monarchy: “random people” took their place in it, their rises and “resignations” began to pass without causing coups with disgraces and exiles.

The role of the “Bironovism” was not the notorious “dominance of foreigners,” but that Anna’s reign “closed” the possibility of the emerging evolution of the Petrine system and thereby finally transferred the practice of political struggle into the mainstream of a revolution. Under Anna, a functioning Cabinet of Ministers was also formed and the appearance of a favorite was completed; this - and not repression at all - together with the satisfaction of a number of social demands of the nobility and the security measures taken provided the regime with a certain stability. The short period of Anna Leopoldovna's regency at some point provided an opportunity for elements of the legal regulation of the monarchy to manifest themselves (in the form of a charter on the regency and a law on the powers of the Cabinet of Ministers), but was interrupted by a new coup. However, the “restoration” of the Petrine system without a ruler figure similar to Peter (under Anna and, later, under Elizabeth) inevitably gave rise to the same problems: the struggle of court factions, the question of choosing an heir, the “personal principle” in governance, discontent of the guard and, finally, a coup as a means of conflict resolution. It seems possible to identify certain patterns in the development of “palace revolutions”. First of all, this is the emergence of opposing “parties” in the ruling environment (the principle of their formation is not always definable) and the formation of a circle of participants and performers of the future action. This circle became wider over time: many more people took part in the coup of 1762 than in 1741, which, by the way, made the coup in favor of Catherine the most “expensive”.

However, the role of the guard changed, both in the sense of the guards' conscious participation in the political struggle and in relation to its goals. In 1725, guard companies rather indicated her participation; in fact, its commanders - Ushakov, Buturlin and Menshikov - acted on behalf of the guard. In 1730, senior officers of both regiments participated in political discussions and signed projects for the future state structure. The fate of the monarchy was decided by the guards chief officers, who, together with other “gentry,” restored Anna Ioannovna’s “autocracy.” In 1741, the lower ranks of the guards came to the fore. As a result of the coup of 1741, the ruling elite experienced a shock when they realized that the guards “soldiers” had become the real power in the capital of the empire: the guard was on the verge of going out of control. The reaction to the increased role of the guard was (after the “coups” of 1730, 1740-1741, 1762) replacement of the command of regiments, and sometimes more serious “purges” of their personnel. The authorities sought to control movements and appointments in the regiments and even made attempts (under Anna Ioannovna) to change the order of their recruitment: recruit Courlanders, Holsteiners, and ordinary Ukrainian regiments. Key figures at court sought to find support in “personal” military units. At A.D. Menshikov had “his own” Ingria regiment; he also became the head of the personal guard of Catherine I - a cavalry guard company. Anna Ioannovna contrasted the “old” regiments with two new ones - Izmailovsky and Horse Guards. The grenadier company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment became Elizabeth's "life company".

Thus, the Russian “coup” began with an open clash of “parties” and went through the stage of active participation of guards soldiers in the preparation and conduct of the overthrow of the emperor in 1741. As a result, the “Praetorian” trend that emerged in 1741 was reversed. With a different development of events, the guard could turn into a privileged caste and an opponent of any reforms, as happened, for example, with the Turkish Janissary corps. In the second half of the 18th century. The Russian Guard ceased to perform the functions of a kind of emergency governing body and returned to its “direct” duties as an elite military unit, although until 1869 it was under the personal subordination of the Emperor.

Another characteristic feature of the “noble storms” was the transition of their participants from disputes about the rights of heirs and the competence of “testaments” to actions directed against the autocrats themselves, who were deprived of the sacred image of the “pious sovereign tsar” during Peter’s reforms. The dangerous idea gradually moved from the periphery of public life to its center, and then materialized in practice: in 1741, soldiers for the first time overthrew the legitimate emperor from the throne. Thus, the accessions of Catherine I, Anna Ioannovna and Elizabeth ultimately boomeranged at the supreme power itself. Palace coups had a demoralizing effect on both the conspirators and noble society as a whole, encouraging desires to denounce a colleague, betray an oath, or betray a patron.

The third feature of the “revolutions” of the 18th century. there was a desire to provide the appearance of legality and legally consolidate the result of the “revolution.” The most important element of this formalization of the coup was the oath to the new emperor, to which senior officials, guards and troops were immediately sworn, and then other subjects. The procedure that was supposed to take place after the death of the former sovereign often preceded it at the time described. Other forms of legal and ideological consolidation of the results of the coup also appeared. Each new coup was accompanied by more and more persistent attempts to influence public opinion. The first experiments of this kind turned out to be rather unsuccessful. The will of Catherine I was actually canceled by Menshikov. But Anna Ioannovna’s advisers managed to “consolidate” her very dubious “acquisition” of “autocracy” by expressing public opinion. In 1741, official acts and sermons created the ideological doctrine of the Elizabethan reign: the restoration of Peter’s “beginnings” with an extremely negative characterization of the period 1725-1741. as a time of domination by “foreigners”.

The desire to provide a legal, ideological and political basis for the accomplished seizure of power is not accidental. Every successful coup in the 18th century. was accompanied by a wave of unsuccessful attempts to “beat” him. The very ease of change stimulated the emergence of competitors among new rulers, especially in conditions of legal uncertainty, when even a legal change of sovereign often looked like a coup.


List of used literature


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Following the exploits of the Petrovs / G.I. Gerasimova // Collection of documents and memories. Comp. Gerasimova G.I. M., 1988. - 574 p.

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Manstein G.K. Notes about Russia. With a sword and a torch / G.K. Manstein//Palace coups in Russia 1725-1825. M., 1991.

Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire. T. 8. - M. - 552 p.

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Decree on the establishment at the court of E.I.V. Cabinet // Reader on the history of the USSR. T. 2. - M., 1953. - 964 p.

Charter on the succession to the throne of February 5, 1722 // Reader on the history of the USSR. T. 2. - M., 1953. - 964 p.

Abbubikova, N.I. What is “gender”?/ N.I. Abibukova // Social sciences and modernity. - M., 1996. No. 6. - 123 p.

Andreev, V.V. Representatives of the authorities in Russia after Peter./ V.V. Andreev. - Mn., 1990. - 448 p.

Anisimov, E.V. Anna Ivanovna / E.V. Anisimov // Questions of history. - M., 1993. No. 4 -28 p.

Anisimov, E.V. Aphrodite in power: The reign of Elizabeth Petrovna / E.V. Anisimov. - M.: AST: Atrel, 2010. - 605 p.

Anisimov, E.V. Women on the Russian throne / E.V. Anisimov. -SPb., 2002. - 171 p.

Anisimov, E.V. Russia in the middle of the 18th century / E.V. Anisimov. - M., 1986.- 238 p. (p. 183)

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Birkin, K. Temporary workers and favorites of the XVI, XVII, XVIII centuries / K. Birkin., T 2. - M., 1992.

Bogoslovsky, M.M. Russian XVIII century. / MM. Theological. Text. T. 1. - M., 2008. - 530 p.

Walishevsky, K. The Kingdom of Women. Reprint work./K. Valishevsky. - M., 1990. - 702 p.

Walishevsky, K. Daughter of Peter the Great. Reprint work / K. Waliszewski. - M., 1990. - 80 p.

Vasilivsky, I.M. The Romanovs from Mikhail to Nikolai / I.M. Vasilevsky. - Rostov-on-Don., 1993. -383 p.

Introduction to gender studies: Textbook. A manual for university students / Kostikova I.V. and etc.; Under general ed. I.V. Kostikova. 2nd ed., revised. and additional - M.: Aspect Press, 2005. - 255 p.

Weidemeyer, A. I. Review of the most important incidents in Russia from the death of Peter the Great to the accession of Elizabeth Petrovna to the throne / A. Weidemar. - St. Petersburg, 1968. Part 3 -172 p.

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30. Vyazimsky, B.L. Supreme Privy Council / B.L. Vyazimsky. - St. Petersburg, 1974., www.bibliard.ru<#"justify">ANNEX 1


About the establishment of the Supreme Secret Council. (Name)


Of blessed and highly glorious memory, the Sovereign Emperor, Our dear Sovereign Spouse, last year 1711, for His then frequent military campaigns and absences, deigned to determine the government of the Senate in several persons, and that meeting was at first, besides? Secret Real Advisors and Secret Advisors, from other noble and trusted persons who, except? the board of State Internal Affairs, they had no other business and always had their own business. inseparable; and the Secret Active Advisors were then on campaigns for His Majesty, and in the current Senate Assembly, honor everything? Secret Real Advisors. And although this was done according to the decree of His highly glorious memory of the Sovereign Emperor, however, with them to the Senate? decided to sit from other ranks, namely: in two? persons from General-Majors with variable weather conditions. And yet, have We seen that the Secret Real Advisers and the edge? The Senate Board has a lot of work in the following matters: 1) that they often have in their positions, like First Ministers, secret councils about political and other important State affairs. 2) Of these, some sit as Presidents in the first Collegiums, namely: in two Military, in the Land and in the Naval, and the third Political, which is why in the first and very necessary task? in Tainom Sov?t? They are causing a lot of insanity, and even in the Senate? there is a stop and continuation in business because they cannot do it soon due to their long periods of time? make resolutions on State internal affairs. We judged him for his good and led him from now on to the Court? It is ours, both for external and internal State important affairs, to establish a Supreme Secret Council, at which We ourselves will be present. In that Supreme Secret Council? to be with Us from the first Senators, and instead of them, others will be elected to the Senate, who will always be under one Senate government. To be with Us in the Secret Supreme Council? to the following persons: Field Marshal General and Secret Acting Advisor, Holy Prince Menshikov, Admiral General and Secret Acting Advisor Count Apraksin, State Chancellor and Secret Acting Advisor Count Golovkin, Secret Acting Adviser. Actual Adviser Count Tolstoy, Secret Actual Adviser Prince Golitsyn, Vice-Chancellor and Secret Actual Adviser Baron Osterman. And for the hearing, special days will be determined in each week? .

And according to the above decree of Her Imperial Majesty, the Supreme Council was appointed as follows: 1) To the Senate and to all? Collegiums and other places where decrees with this image will be sent: in the title?, the decree of Her Imperial Majesty, held in the Supreme Secret Council? (and name it, in what place, where.) 2) And from the Senate and from all other Collegiums to write about what is the most important thing? This will happen: a report to the Supreme Secret Council. 3) From the Senate to the Military, Land and Maritime and Foreign and from there to the Senate write promemories. 4) In the Supreme Secret Council, although in the presence of Her Imperial Majesty, although in the absence, it is clear that what will be determined about, protocols, resolutions, to all appointed persons of the Supreme Secret Council. And from that, where should the decrees be sent behind the seal in the Supreme Secret Council? incoming Member of the Foreign Board of the Acting State Councilor Vasily Stepanov. 5) And this determination for the first time is to serve them, but from now on how to do this, and what kind of servants will serve under this Supreme Secret Council? They need to compose a clear and detailed definition about this, and in time convey it to Her Imperial Majesty.


APPENDIX 2


About the destruction of the Supreme Secret Council and the High Senate, and about the restoration of the former Governing Senate. (Manifest.)


We command everyone to be informed about this, both spiritual and temporal, military and zemstvo administration, high and low ranks, that We, the Supreme Secret Council and the High Senate have set aside, and for the government we have determined the Government The Senate, on such a basis, and in such strength?, as under Uncle? To ours, blessed and worthy of memory Peter? Great, Emperor? and Autocrat? Was All-Russian. And in administration act according to the position given to the Senate under His Imperial Majesty? and according to the Code and decrees, to which the Governing Senate, all their decrees will be obedient, under severe punishment or death, for guilt? looking. And if this Senate through its present? the communion brought before God and the former loyalty to Us, the oath taken, it is unjust that they will act in any State or particular matter? Otherwise, it will be judged before Us, and the guilty will be severely punished.


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