First Crimean campaign (1687). It took place in May 1687. Russian-Ukrainian troops took part in it under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn and Hetman Ivan Samoilovich. The Don Cossacks of Ataman F. Minaev also took part in the campaign. The meeting took place in the area of the Konskie Vody River. Total number The number of troops that set out on the campaign reached 100 thousand people. More than half of the Russian army consisted of regiments of the new system. However, the military power of the allies, sufficient to defeat the Khanate, turned out to be powerless in the face of nature. The troops had to walk tens of kilometers through deserted, sun-scorched steppe, malarial swamps and salt marshes, where there was not a drop of fresh water. In such conditions, the issues of supplying the army and a detailed study of the specifics of a given theater of military operations came to the fore. Golitsyn's insufficient study of these problems ultimately predetermined the failure of his campaigns.
As people and horses moved deeper into the steppe, they began to feel a lack of food and fodder. Having reached the Bolshoi Log tract on July 13, the Allied troops were faced with a new disaster - steppe fires. Unable to fight the heat and the soot that covered the sun, the weakened troops literally collapsed. Finally, Golitsyn, seeing that his army could die before meeting the enemy, ordered to go back. The result of the first campaign was a series of raids by Crimean troops on Ukraine, as well as the removal of Hetman Samoilovich. According to some participants in the campaign (for example, General P. Gordon), the hetman himself initiated the burning of the steppe, because he did not want the defeat of the Crimean Khan, who served as a counterweight to Moscow in the south. The Cossacks elected Mazepa as the new hetman. Second Crimean Campaign (1689).
The campaign began in February 1689. This time Golitsyn, taught by bitter experience, set out into the steppe on the eve of spring so as not to have a shortage of water and grass and not to be afraid of steppe fires. For a hike
an army of 112 thousand people was assembled. Such a huge mass of people slowed down their movement speed. As a result, the campaign to Perekop lasted almost three months, and the troops approached the Crimea on the eve of the hot summer. In mid-May, Golitsyn met with Crimean troops. After volleys of Russian artillery, the rapid attack of the Crimean cavalry choked and was never resumed. Having repelled the onslaught of the khan, Golitsyn approached the Perekop fortifications on May 20. But the governor did not dare to storm them. He was frightened not so much by the power of the fortifications as by the same sun-scorched steppe lying beyond Perekop. It turned out that, having passed along the narrow isthmus to the Crimea, a huge army could find itself in an even more terrible waterless trap.
Hoping to intimidate the khan, Golitsyn began negotiations. But the owner of Crimea began to delay them, waiting until hunger and thirst would force the Russians to go home. Having stood for several days at the Perekop walls to no avail and being left without fresh water, Golitsyn was forced to hastily turn back. Further standstill could have ended in disaster for his army. The Russian army was saved from a larger failure by the fact that the Crimean cavalry did not particularly pursue the retreating ones.
QUESTION No. 13 AZOV CAMPAIGNS OF PETER I Azov campaigns 1695 and 1696 - Russian military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire; were a continuation of the war started by the government of Princess Sophia with Ottoman Empire and Crimea; undertaken by Peter I at the beginning of his reign and ended with the capture of the Turkish fortress of Azov. They can be considered the first significant accomplishment of the young tsar. In 1694, it was decided to resume active hostilities and strike not at the Crimean Tatars, as in Golitsyn’s campaigns, but at the Turkish fortress of Azov. The route was also changed: not through the desert steppes, but along the Volga and Don regions. In the winter and spring of 1695, transport ships were built on the Don: plows, sea boats and rafts for the delivery of troops, ammunition, artillery and food for redeployment to Azov. In the spring In 1695, the army in 3 groups under the command of Gordon (9,500 people with 43 guns and 10 mortars), Golovin (7,000 people) and Lefort (13,000 people - with the last two: 44 squeaks, 104 mortars) moved south. During the campaign, Peter combined the duties of the first bombardier and the de facto leader of the entire campaign. From the Ukrainian side, Sheremetyev’s group and Mazepa’s Cossacks acted. On the Dnieper, the Russian army recaptured three fortresses from the Turks (July 30 - Kyzy-Kermen, August 1 - Eski-Tavan, August 3 - Aslan-Kermen), and at the end of June the main forces besieged Azov (fortress at the mouth of the Don). Gordon stood opposite the southern side, Lefort to his left, Golovin, with whose detachment the Tsar was also located, to the right. On July 2, troops under the command of Gordon began siege operations. On July 5, they were joined by the corps of Golovin and Lefort. On July 14 and 16, the Russians managed to occupy the towers - two stone towers on both banks of the Don, above Azov, with iron chains stretched between them, which blocked river boats from entering the sea. This was actually the highest success of the campaign. The fortress housed a 7,000-strong Turkish garrison under the command of Bey Hassan-Araslan. On August 5, Lefort's infantry regiments, supported by 2,500 Cossacks, made the first attempt to storm the fortress, which was unsuccessful. On the Russian side, losses in killed and wounded amounted to 1,500 people. On September 25, the second assault on the fortress took place. Apraksin with the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments and 1000 Don Cossacks managed to capture part of the fortifications and break into the city, but this was affected by inconsistency in the Russian army. The Turks managed to regroup, and Apraksin, not supported by other units, was forced to retreat. On October 2, the siege was lifted. 3,000 archers were left in the captured defensive towers, called the “Novosergievsky city”.
Second Azov campaign of 1696. Throughout the winter of 1696, the Russian army prepared for the second campaign. In January, large-scale construction of ships began at the shipyards of Voronezh and Preobrazhenskoye. The galleys built in Preobrazhenskoye were dismantled and transported to Voronezh, where they were reassembled and launched on the Don. On May 16, Russian troops again besieged Azov. On May 20, Cossacks in galleys at the mouth of the Don attacked a caravan of Turkish cargo ships. As a result, 2 galleys and 9 small ships were destroyed, and one small ship was captured. On May 27, the fleet entered the Sea of Azov and cut off the fortress from sources of supply by sea. The approaching Turkish military flotilla did not dare to engage in battle. On July 16, preparatory siege work was completed. On July 17, 1,500 Don and part of the Ukrainian Cossacks arbitrarily broke into the fortress and settled in two bastions. On July 19, after prolonged artillery shelling, the Azov garrison surrendered. On July 20, the Lyutikh fortress, located at the mouth of the northernmost branch of the Don, also surrendered. By July 23, Peter approved a plan for new fortifications in the fortress, which by that time had been badly damaged as a result of artillery shelling. Azov did not have a convenient harbor for basing the navy. For this purpose, on July 27, 1696, a more favorable location was chosen on Cape Tagany, where Taganrog was founded two years later. Voivode Shein became the first Russian generalissimo for his services in the second Azov campaign. the importance of artillery and navy for warfare. It is a notable example of successful interaction between the fleet and ground forces during the siege of a seaside fortress, which stands out especially clearly against the backdrop of the nearby failures of the British during the assault on Quebec (1691) and Saint-Pierre (1693). The preparation of the campaigns clearly demonstrated Peter’s organizational and strategic abilities. For the first time, such important qualities as his ability to draw conclusions from failures and gather forces for a second strike appeared. Despite the success, at the end of the campaign, the incompleteness of the results achieved became obvious: without capturing the Crimea, or at least Kerch, access to the Black Sea was still impossible. To hold Azov it was necessary to strengthen the fleet. It was necessary to continue building the fleet and provide the country with specialists capable of building modern sea vessels. On October 20, 1696, the Boyar Duma proclaimed “ Marine vessels be..." This date can be considered the birthday of the Russian regular navy. An extensive shipbuilding program is approved - 52 (later 77) ships; To finance it, new duties are introduced. On November 22, a decree was announced sending nobles to study abroad. The war with Turkey is not yet over and therefore, in order to better understand the balance of power, find allies in the war against Turkey and not confirm the already existing alliance - the Holy League, and finally strengthen the position of Russia, the “Great Embassy” was organized. The war with Turkey ended with the Peace of Constantinople agreement (1700)
QUESTION No. 14 Campaigns to Crimea by Minikha (1736) and Lassi (1737,1738) On April 20, 1736, Minich set out from Tsaritsynka with an army of about 54 thousand people. The troops were divided into five columns. Major General Spiegel commanded the first column, which formed the vanguard. The Prince of Hesse-Homburg led the second column, Lieutenant General Izmailov - the third, Lieutenant General Leontyev - the fourth and Major General Tarakanov - the fifth. In Minich's army there were both Zaporozhye and Ukrainian (Hetman) Cossacks. Minikh wrote to the empress about them: “In former times, the hetman’s Cossacks could field up to 100,000 people; in 1733 the number of employees was reduced to 30,000 and this year to 20,000, of which 16,000 people are now assigned to the Crimean campaign; they were ordered to be at Tsaritsynka in early April in full, but we have already walked 300 versts from Tsaritsynka, and the Hetman’s Cossacks in the army are only 12,730 people, and half of them ride on carts, and are partly poorly populated, partly skinny, we are forced to carry most of them with us, like mice who are in vain only for bread are eating. On the contrary, the Cossacks from the same people, fugitives from the same Ukraine, have 2 or 3 good horses for each person, the people themselves are kind and cheerful, well armed; with 3 or 4 thousand such people it would be possible to defeat the entire hetman’s corps.” Minich's army marched to Crimea along Leontyev's path, along the right bank of the Dnieper, at a distance of 5-50 km from the river. The first battle greatly raised the morale of the Russian army and, accordingly, aroused fear among the Tatars of the regular troops. A thousand soldiers were ordered to carry out a demonstrative attack on the Perekop positions on the right flank. The Turks succumbed to Minich's trick and concentrated significant forces in this area. There were up to 60 cannons in the fortress and towers, including several with the Russian coat of arms, captured by the Turks during the unsuccessful campaign of Prince Golitsyn.
Minikh ordered 800 soldiers of the Belozersky regiment to occupy the fortress, and appointed their colonel Devitsa as commandant of the fortress. In addition, 600 Cossacks were assigned to Devitsa. The Cossacks took from the enemy 30 thousand sheep and 4 to 5 hundred cattle, which they had hidden in the forest. On May 25, Minich convened a military council - what to do next. Minich thought in terms of a European war, where long-term supply of the army at the expense of the conquered country was normal. The capture of Kozlov further strengthened Minich in his opinion. Turkish troops concentrated in Kafa, and the main Tatar forces went into the mountains. Small cavalry detachments of the Tatars still surrounded the Russian army. On July 7, 1736, the Russian army reached Perekop. But the army had nothing to do at Perekop. Supplies of food and fodder were dwindling every day. The Tatar cavalry darted around, constantly attacking the foragers, stealing horses and cattle. Aporozhye and Ukrainian Cossacks were sent home immediately. On August 23, Lieutenant General Leontiev, who left the destroyed Kinburn, joined Minich.
Upon the arrival of the troops in Ukraine, Minich reviewed the troops. It turned out that half of the regular troops were lost during the campaign. Moreover, the majority of people died due to illness and physical fatigue. In total, the campaign of 1736 cost Russia about 30 thousand people. At this point the campaign of 1736 was over; at the end of the year Minich went to St. Petersburg to make excuses before the empress.
Campaign of 1737. On July 2, the Ochakov fortress was taken, and a Russian garrison was left in it under the command of Shtofeln. Another Russian army (about 40 thousand), led by Field Marshal Lassi, moved from the Don to the Sea of Azov; then, advancing along the Arabat Spit, crossed the Sivash against the mouth of the Salgir River and invaded the Crimea. At the same time, she received very important assistance from the head of the Azov flotilla, Vice Admiral Bredal, who delivered various supplies and food to the Arabat Spit. At the end of July, Lassi reached Karasubazar and took possession of it; but due to increased sickness in the troops and depletion of provisions, he had to leave the peninsula. Having ravaged Perekop on the way back, he returned at the beginning of October. Like the previous ones, the campaign of 1737, thanks to climatic conditions and the accumulation of all kinds of disorder (embezzlement, bribery and sloppiness) in the administration of the troops, cost the Russian army huge losses in people; and due to the death of the horses, on the way back it was necessary to leave part of the artillery in Ochakov and in the Andreevsky fortification built on the Bug River. The war resumed; but the 1738 campaign was unsuccessful for the allies. Minikh with his weakened army, the replenishment of which he was denied, reached the Dniester with great difficulty in early August; but having learned that on the other side of the river there is a strong Turkish army and that the plague had appeared in Bessarabia, Minich decided to retreat. The retreat through waterless and deserted terrain, with the constant threat of danger from the Tatars pursuing the army, again entailed very significant losses. Lassi’s campaign in the Crimea, through places devastated last year, was also disastrous because this time Turkish fleet prevented Vice Admiral Bredahl from delivering ground army necessary supplies. Russian troops were forced to leave Crimea at the end of August. For the Austrians, this year was especially unhappy: one defeat followed another. A number of all these failures did not lead, however, to the conclusion of peace. Only the plan of action for the future campaign was changed; Lassi had to limit himself to defense.
Eternal peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was concluded on April 26, 1686. It assumed the possibility of joint actions by Russia and the Holy League as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria, the Holy See and Venice against the Ottomans. Pope Innocent XI (pontificate 1676–1689) was considered the nominal head of the Holy League. Russia's accession to the struggle of the Holy League became a turning point in the history of Russian-Polish relations: from the centuries-long struggle between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until the partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century. moved to the union. Strategically, it turned out to be much more beneficial for Russia than for Poland. The Polish historian Zbigniew Wojczek, who studied the development of Russian-Polish relations in the second half of the 17th century, stated that the war of 1654–1667. and the Eternal Peace of 1686 ended with “that the Polish-Lithuanian state, Sweden, Turkey and eo ipso the Crimean Khanate lost their positions in relation to Russia,” which through its actions won “hegemony among Slavic peoples". And University of London professor Lindsay Hughes summed up her analysis of foreign policy during Sophia's regency with the conclusion: “From now on, Russia took a strong position in Europe, which it never lost.” It is fair to recognize the Perpetual Peace of 1686 as the most important contribution of the Sophia regency to the long-term strategy of turning Russia into the main pole of geopolitical power in Eastern Europe and a Great European Power.
Patrick Gordon, who was in Russian service, made efforts to actually join Russia to the Holy League. From 1685 to 1699 he became one of the leading Moscow military leaders. It was Gordon who persuaded the head of the government of Sophia, Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, to pursue an alliance with the Holy League. This alliance of Christian states against the Ottomans and Crimea arose in 1683-1684. Gordon was a supporter of pan-Christian unity in repelling Turkish expansion. (In life, a zealous Catholic, Gordon always communicated tolerantly with Orthodox and Protestants, unless it concerned a religious issue in Britain. There Gordon wanted to stop “Protestant aggression.”) The idea of a union between Russia and the Holy League permeates Gordon’s memorandum submitted to V.V. Golitsyn in January 1684
N.G. Ustryalov, citing Gordon’s memorandum of 1684 in its entirety, noted that V.V. Golitsyn treated him “indifferently.” This is an obvious misunderstanding, dictated and inspired by apologetics for Peter I, which demanded that all recent predecessors or opponents of Peter I be perceived as narrow-minded and useless for Russia. Another explanation for Ustryalov’s conclusion may be his understanding of the fact of unsuccessful Russian-Austrian negotiations in 1684. Imperial ambassadors Johann Christoph Zhirovsky and Sebastian Blumberg failed to conclude an alliance between the Habsburgs and Russia in Moscow in May 1684. Golitsyn's actions in 1685–1689, especially the conclusion of the Eternal Peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on April 26 (May 6, Gregorian style) 1686 and the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689. fully agree with the proposals of the Scottish general of 1684.
In a memorandum of 1684, the major general analyzed all the arguments for peace with the Ottoman Empire and in favor of war with it in alliance with the Holy League. Gordon, who served at one time in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, always paid tribute to Polish love of freedom, courage and cordiality, but he warned the Russian government that only the joint struggle of Christians with the Turks would make the fears of the Russian authorities about the anti-Russian plans of the Poles “unreasonable misunderstandings.” “Suspicion and distrust between neighboring states were, are and will continue to be,” noted Gordon. “Even the sacredness of so close a League cannot remove it, and I have no doubt that the Poles will retain such thoughts and grievances, for discord is weeds, nourished by the memory of past rivalries, unfriendliness and insults.” However, keep in mind that by doing a favor and helping them now, you will be able to erase, at least to a greater extent, soften the anger from past enmity, and if they turn out to be ungrateful, then you will have the advantage of a just cause, which is the main thing for waging war.
Patrick Gordon insisted on instilling in the Russian people the idea of the need for victory over the Crimea, as well as on continuing to improve Russian military affairs. “...It is a very mistaken idea to think that you can always or for a long time live in peace among so many warlike and restless peoples who are your neighbors,” warns Gordon. He ends his message to V.V. Golitsyn in the words: “I will add that it is very dangerous to allow soldiers and people to get out of the habit of owning weapons when all your neighbors use them so diligently.” Gordon's memorandum also proposed a plan for the defeat of Crimea, which in 1687–1689. unsuccessfully tried to implement V.V. Golitsyn.
Gordon believed that the flat steppe surface would facilitate the movement of the Russian army to Perekop. “...With 40,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry, you can easily accomplish this in one or at most two years. And the way there is not so difficult, only a two-day march without water, even so comfortable that you can walk the whole way in combat formation, except for very few places, and even there there are no forests, hills, crossings or swamps.” The international situation should also have made the campaign “easier.” Ottoman expansion into Central and Eastern Europe a limit was set. In the fall of 1683, the troops of the Holy Roman Empire and the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, led by King John Sobieski, defeated huge Turkish forces near Vienna. As subsequent history showed, the growth of Turkish possessions in European space stopped. The Ottoman Empire moved to maintain its conquests, but its military and economic backwardness, progressing against the backdrop of the rapid development of the European powers, doomed Turkey to a gradual but continuous weakening of its position as an empire and a great power.
This opened up brilliant strategic prospects for Russia to recapture Ottoman possessions in the Black Sea region. The Scottish commander felt them. But with “ease” he was clearly mistaken. The Russians were able to implement his plan to defeat the Crimean army and occupy Crimea for the first time only during the next (5th) Russian-Turkish War of 1735–1739. during the reign of Peter I's niece, Anna Ivanovna (1730–1740). The campaign of 1735 under the leadership of General Leontyev almost completely repeated the campaign of V.V. Golitsyn 1687 Russian troops reached Perekop and returned. In 1736, Field Marshal Minikh, president of the Military Collegium, who himself led the troops, defeated the Tatars, entered Crimea, took and burned Bakhchisarai, but was forced to leave the Crimean peninsula. Having no fleet in either the Black or Azov Seas, Russian forces in Crimea could have been blocked from Perekop by the Crimean cavalry hastily returning from the Persian campaign.
The annexation of Crimea to Russia in 1783 was still a long way off. But this goal, proposed by Gordon as the immediate tactical task in 1684, has been around since the end of the 17th century. became strategic for the southern direction of Russian foreign policy.
Campaigns of V.V. Golitsyn to the Crimea in 1687 and 1689 became a real confirmation of Russia’s alliance with the anti-Turkish coalition. Golitsyn's offensive Crimean campaigns opened a new era in Russian foreign policy, which lasted until the First World War inclusive. The international meaning of the tactics of the Crimean campaigns as part of the international actions of the Holy League was to prevent the Tatar cavalry from helping the Turks in their actions in Central Europe. Internal tasks were reduced to the defeat of the Crimean cavalry and the occupation of Crimea. If the first international part of the Crimean campaigns was a success, then the second part was much worse.
Russian army after military reforms of the 17th century. was stronger than the Crimean one. Crimea had neither infantry nor modern artillery. All its power consisted of maneuverable medieval cavalry, which, having no convoys, moved quickly. The surprise of the attack was its main trump card, and the capture of people, livestock and some other booty was the main goal of the military campaigns of the Crimea. Creation by Russia in the 17th century. Four serrated defensive lines on the southern borders made it impossible for the Crimean cavalry to make an unexpected deep breakthrough into Russia. Only border raids by small Crimean detachments were carried out, and the scale of their production was incomparable with the 16th century, when the Crimeans reached Moscow. The reliability of Russian defense to a large extent provoked Crimean and Turkish aggression against the more accessible Little Russia. The Crimean campaigns were the first attempt at large offensive operations involving more than 100 thousand people on foreign territory.
The backbone of Golitsyn's army in both 1687 and 1689 were regiments of the new system. The army moved all the way to Perekop under the cover of the Wagenburg, a mobile fortification of 20 thousand carts. It is significant that the Tatars did not dare to give battle. In the 17th century In general, without European allies (for example, the Zaporozhye Cossacks) or their Turkish patrons, they did not dare to engage in general battles. It is no coincidence that General Gordon noted about the Crimeans: “Their former courage has been lost and the sudden invasions to which they previously subjected the Great Russians have been forgotten...”. The real enemies of the Russian army in the campaigns of 1687 and 1689. the heat and scorched steppe became. Lack of food for horses turned out to be a big problem for the Russian army. Food and water spoiled by the heat, as well as the hardships of marching high temperature and under the scorching sun were the second major problem. The Second Moscow Butyrsky Elected Soldiers' Regiment, distinguished by impeccable discipline and training, lost more than 100 out of 900 people on the march to the Russian border in April 1687. (By the way, losses on the march, even during the Napoleonic Wars, accounted for the majority of losses of all European armies, often exceeding combat losses.) The third group of problems was a consequence of the preservation of many medieval relics in the Russian army. “Noness” immediately surfaced, i.e. absenteeism or desertion of many service people. The withdrawal by nobles, especially noble ones, of a large number of armed, but in fact absolutely useless, servants accompanying them only delayed the movement of an already huge and slow army. But these were already minor costs. In essence, Golitsyn’s army fought not with the enemy, but with the climate and terrain. It turned out that in the conditions of the Wild Field these are much more powerful opponents than the Crimean Tatars.
Exactly natural factor Patrick Gordon did not appreciate the Crimean campaign in his project in 1684, and in 1687 the main organizer of the Russian offensive, V.V., did not take it into account. Golitsyn. And no wonder. After all, this was the first large-scale rush of the Russians across the Wild Field to Perekop.
The scorched Wild Field met the Russian soldiers with completely unbearable conditions for a campaign. This is clearly reflected in the letters to the homeland of Franz Lefort, a lieutenant colonel and participant in the events. Lefort points out that the border river Samara met the Russian army with “not quite... healthy water. Having passed several more rivers, we reached the Konskaya Voda River, which concealed a strong poison in itself, which was discovered immediately when they began to drink from it... Nothing could be more terrible than what I saw here. Entire crowds of unfortunate warriors, exhausted by marching in the scorching heat, could not resist swallowing this poison, for death was only a consolation for them. Some drank from stinking puddles or swamps; others took off their hats filled with breadcrumbs and said goodbye to their comrades; they remained where they lay, not having the strength to walk due to the excessive excitement of the blood... We reached the Olba River, but its water also turned out to be poisonous, and everything around was destroyed: we saw only black earth and dust and could barely see each other. In addition, the whirlwinds raged constantly. All the horses were exhausted and fell in large numbers. We lost our heads. They looked everywhere for the enemy or the khan himself to give battle. Several Tatars were captured and one hundred and twenty of them were exterminated. The prisoners showed that the khan was coming at us with 80,000 thousand Tatars. However, his horde also suffered severely, because everything up to Perekop was burned out.”
Lefort reports huge losses of the Russian army, but not from battles that did not occur on the way to Perekop, and even greater losses when returning from there. Many German officers also fell. Death “kidnapped our best officers,” states Lefort, “among other things, three colonels: Vaugh, Flivers, Balzer and up to twenty German lieutenant colonels, majors and captains.”
The question of who set the steppe on fire is still controversial. A number of researchers believe that the Tatars did this, seeing no other opportunity to stop the Russians. But the fire doomed the Crimeans themselves to inaction. They also had nothing to feed their horses, and they found themselves locked on the Crimean peninsula. The second version comes from the assessment of what happened by the Russian authorities and now has more and more supporters. The fire was organized by the Cossacks, who were not interested in this war, since it led to the strengthening of Moscow’s position, its dictatorship over the Cossack elders, and the distraction of the Cossacks from the defense of Ukrainian territories proper.
In addition, many Ukrainians still saw the Poles as their main enemy, and the Crimean Campaign of 1687 also involved actions to protect Poland and Hungary, where the troops of the Holy League fought the Ottomans. Gordon constantly reports on Russia's allied obligations. For example, describing the retreat of the Russian army in 1687, he stated: “So, we slowly went back to the Samara River, from where we sent 20 thousand Cossacks beyond Borysthenes to monitor the actions of the Tatars and guard so that they did not invade Poland or Hungary , and in order to firmly block all crossings.” The anti-Polish sentiments of the “Russian Cossacks” were generated not only by old grievances and religious enmity. The “Russian Cossacks” saw in the robbery of Polish possessions their “legitimate booty,” which they were clearly deprived of by the alliance of Russia and the Holy League.
Patrick Gordon, in one of his letters to Earl Middleton, a high-ranking nobleman at the court of the English king James II, wrote on July 26, 1687: “The Ukrainian hetman Ivan Samoilovich (a man with great power and influence) was very opposed to peace with the Poles and this campaign, everyone measures hindered and slowed down our progress.” This message from Gordon, a direct participant in the events, whose “Diary” is usually confirmed by information from other sources, is a serious indirect confirmation of Samoilovich’s guilt. True, it was in relation to Hetman Samoilovich that Patrick Gordon could have a biased opinion. At one time, the hetman offended his son-in-law, the Kyiv governor F.P. Sheremetev, with whom Gordon was friends. After the death of Sheremetev’s wife, the hetman’s daughter, Samoilovich demanded that his daughter’s dowry be returned to him and his grandson be raised.
However, rumors that it was the Ukrainian Cossacks, with the connivance, if not the direct command of Hetman Samoilovich, who burned the steppe, besides Gordon, are also reported by the “neutral” Lefort: “They could not understand how the Tatars managed to burn out all the grass. The Cossack hetman was suspected of complicity with the Tatar Khan.” For example, after the Cossacks crossed the bridges over the Samara River, for some reason the bridges burned down, and the Russians had to build a new crossing in order to move on.
One way or another, Hetman I.S. had to answer for the return of Russian troops without victories over the Tatars. Samoilovich. He was unpopular among Ukrainians. The hetman's son Semyon (died in 1685) carried out in February-March 1679 the population of the “Turkish” Right Bank Ukraine behind the left bank of the Dnieper. Moscow did not leave the settlers under the rule of the hetman. They wandered around the “Russian” Sloboda Ukraine until 1682, until, finally, in 1682, a decree came about the places of settlement allocated to them there. The foreman was strained by Samoilovich’s despotic temper. Having lost the support of Moscow, Ivan Samoilovich could not stay in power. V.V. Golitsyn gave rise to the denunciation of the Zaporozhye general foremen and a number of colonels about the alleged betrayal of the hetman of Russia. As a result, Ivan Samoilovich lost his mace, his son Gregory was executed in Sevsk for “thieves’, fanciful” speeches about Russian sovereigns. Considerable wealth of the Samoilovichs was confiscated - half went to the royal treasury, half to the treasury of the Zaporozhye army. The hetman himself (without investigation into his case) and his son Yakov were sent into Siberian exile, where he died in 1690.
Mazepa became the new hetman of “Russian Ukraine”. Gordon characterizes him as a great supporter of the union of Russia and the Holy League. “Yesterday, someone named Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa,” Gordon informed Middleton, “a former adjutant general, was elected to his (Samoilovich’s) place. This person is more committed to the Christian cause and, we hope, will be more active and diligent in stopping the Tatar raids on Poland and Hungary...” This refers to the participation of the Cossacks in operations directed against the participation of the Crimean Tatars in the actions of the Ottomans in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or in Hungary. The government of Sophia had some doubts about Ivan Mazepa’s loyalty to Russia. The princess's trusted associate, Duma nobleman Fyodor Leontyevich Shaklovity, went to Ukraine to investigate this matter. “Having returned,” Gordon reports, “he gave a favorable report about the hetman, but with an admixture of some guesses and suspicions about him because of his origin (he is a Pole), and therefore about his possible goodwill, if not secret relations with this people "
The campaign of 1687 made a due impression on the Tatars. They did not risk organizing a large-scale counter-offensive in 1688, limiting themselves to the traditional raids of individual detachments on the Russian border. The serif lines did not allow the Tatars to break through into Russian territory. In view of a possible new Russian offensive, the khan did not dare to go far from his own borders.
This certainly contributed to the victories of other members of the Holy League in 1687–1688. Gordon defined the Ottoman army without the Crimean cavalry as “a bird without wings.” After the capture of Buda (1686), Prince Ludwig of Baden with 3-4 thousand of his people defeated 15 thousand Turks in Bosnia near the village of Trivenic in 1688. In the same year, General von Scherfen captured Belgrade from the Ottomans after a 27-day siege. The losses of the imperial troops were several times less than the Turkish ones. Things were worse for the Poles. They were defeated at Kamenets, where the Ottomans acted with the Crimean Tatars. It is noteworthy that the Poles explained their defeat precisely by the fact that the Muscovites did not distract the Tatars this time. Gordon shared the same opinion. However, the Ottoman victory at Kamenets did not radically change the picture of the failures of the Turkish Empire in 1687–1688. Back in November 1687, the Janissaries overthrew Sultan Mehmed IV and elevated his brother Suleiman II to the throne. Turkish ambassadors arrived in Bratislava in 1688. Formally, they wanted to notify the emperor about their new ruler. The main goal was to probe the question of peace.
Rumors about a possible truce between the Holy League and Turkey alarmed Russia. She was preparing for the second Crimean campaign. The Sophia government hoped that the Holy League would also continue fighting. In 1688, the Holy Roman Emperor assured the Russian Tsars that this would be the case. The imperial message was transmitted to the Russian resident in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Prokofy Bogdanovich Voznitsyn (future one of the three “great ambassadors” of 1697–1698). Austrian victories over the Turks were halted not because of their collusion with the Ottomans, but because the French, longtime European allies of the Turks and opponents of the Empire, invaded its possessions. The French king Louis XIV began the War of the Palatinate Succession (1688–1698). He soon captured Philipsburg, a city in Baden.
The ambassadorial order obliged P.B. Voznitsyn, as well as the Greek Orthodox scholar monk I. Likhud, sent by the tsarist government to Venice in 1688, to convince the imperial government to take into account Russian interests in the event of peace. Looking ahead, we note that Peter’s diplomacy will do exactly the same, having discovered in 1697–1698. the impossibility for their Western allies to continue the war with Turkey due to the expectation in Europe of the war “for the Spanish succession”. The Truce of Karlowitz of 1699 will be represented by a number of separate treaties between the League participants and Turkey. Russia will be able to secure Azov, captured in 1696, and the Peace of Constantinople in 1700, in addition to Azov, will bring Russia the official cessation of payments for “commemorations” to Crimea and the liquidation of Turkish fortresses near the Dnieper. Peter's policy on the southern borders was not some new turn, but a logical continuation of the course begun by the government of Sophia and Golitsyn.
Another indicator of this continuity can be Russian diplomatic activity on the eve of the First Crimean Campaign. Russian Ambassador V.T. Postnikov negotiated the expansion of the anti-Turkish alliance in England, Holland, Bradenburg (Prussia) and Florence. B. Mikhailov went to Sweden and Denmark for the same purpose; to Venice - I. Volkov, to France and Spain - Ya.F. Dolgorukov and Y. Myshetsky, to Austria - B.P. Sheremetev and I.I. Chaadaev. All these embassies had the same official tasks as the Grand Embassy of Peter I - they tried to expand the circle of their Western allies in the war with Turkey.
In the spring of 1688, Hetman Ivan Mazepa and okolnichy Leonty Romanovich Neplyuev insisted on attacking the Belgorod regiments of Kazy-Kermen. They proposed appointing Patrick Gordon as one of the main military leaders. His authority increased after the campaign of 1687 V.V. Golitsyn rejected this proposal, focusing on the construction of the large Novobogoroditsk fortress on the Samara River, which strengthened Russia's border defense system. Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, an undeniably talented diplomat and administrator, did not have the abilities of a major military leader, although he spent most of his life on military service. The Old Moscow unification of military and civil service demanded that such a large-scale expedition of Russian troops into foreign lands be led by the head of government. As an experienced politician, Golitsyn could not ignore this. A number of historians, in particular Ustryalov, suggested that exorbitant ambition forced Golitsyn to aspire to the post of commander-in-chief. Meanwhile, the Frenchman Neville, ambassador of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, who was admitted to the house of V.V. Golitsyn, completely refutes this version. “Golitsyn did everything,” recalls Neville, “to reject this position, because... he rightly assumed that he would have a lot of difficulties, and that all responsibility for failure would fall on him, no matter what measures of foresight and precautions he took, and that it would be difficult for him to maintain his glory if the campaign was unsuccessful... Having been a greater statesman rather than a commander, he foresaw that his absence from Moscow would cause him more harm than the conquest of Crimea itself would have brought glory, since it would not have placed him higher, and the title of commander of the troops did not add anything to his power.”
V.V. Golitsyn decided to take the same route a second time. Gordon in 1688 no longer found the previous path, which he himself had proposed in 1684, successful. The Scotsman describes the reasons for choosing the old route: “Antony, an experienced Cossack, sent on reconnaissance towards the Crimea, returned and reported that all the way to Perekop he discovered places where you can get water either from springs or by digging the ground an elbow deep. This became a strong incentive for our gullible and crazy people to undertake another campaign along the same path that we went through before.” It was decided to increase the number of participants in the campaign to 117.5 thousand people. Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of Mazepa fielded up to 50 thousand more. Troops began gathering in Sumy in February 1689. A decree was sent out, “... that from those who do not appear... lands will be taken away in the name of Their Majesties.” Gordon commanded three regiments of soldiers on the left flank. He has already said goodbye, as can be seen from his “Diary,” with the version about the ease of conquering Crimea. In March 1689, Gordon advised “Generalissimo” Golitsyn to go not through the steppe, as last time, but along the Dnieper, having previously organized outposts there with reliable garrisons, “every four days of marching.” Gordon advised to reinforce the regiments of the new formation with grenadier companies. But V.V. Golitsyn did not follow these ideas from Gordon.
When the Russian army, having made a difficult march in the heat across the steppe, successfully reached Perekop (May 20, 1689), Golitsyn did not dare to storm its outdated fortifications, although the skirmishes with the Tatars that took place this time testified to the superiority of Russian weapons. On May 15, the Tatar cavalry tried to attack the Russian right flank, but was repulsed with heavy losses by Russian marching artillery fire. The regiments of the new system performed well, which indicated the correctness of the course towards the gradual professionalization of the Russian army. The Russians had a chance for a successful breakthrough to the Crimean Peninsula, but V.V. Golitsyn preferred negotiations. He demanded surrender from the khan, and having received a refusal, he gave the order to retreat due to the large losses of people from the heat, disease and hardships of the campaign.
This was a fatal mistake by the commander-in-chief. There were even rumors about his khan bribing him. During the retreat, the regiments of the new formation again distinguished themselves. “...There was great danger and even greater fear, lest the khan pursue us with all his might,” wrote Patrick Gordon later (January 28, 1690) in his message to Earl Erroll, “so I was detached from the left wing with 7 registrants infantry and several cavalry (although all were dismounted) in order to guard the rearguard. They pursued us very zealously for 8 days in a row, but achieved little..."
Princess Sophia, as in 1687, ordered that the troops be met as victors, which, in essence, they were. For the second time in Russian history, it was not the Crimeans who attacked Russian soil, but the Russians who fought within the Crimean borders, making their contribution to the common cause of the Holy League. This is exactly how A.S. assessed the Crimean campaign of 1689. Pushkin, collecting material for his “History of Peter the Great.” “This campaign brought great benefit to Austria, for it destroyed the alliance concluded in Adrianople between the Crimean Khan, the French ambassador and the glorious Transylvanian prince Tekeli. According to this alliance, the khan was supposed to give 30,000 troops to help the high vizier enter Hungary; The khan himself, with the same number, was to attack Transylvania together with Tekeli. France pledged to help Tekeli with money and give him skilled officers.”
But all these international multi-way combinations were little understood by the population Russia XVII century, especially against the backdrop of the entry into the final stage of the conflict between the two court “parties” - the Miloslavskys and the Naryshkins. Without the occupation of Crimea by the “Naryshchkin party,” it was easy to imagine V.V.’s campaign. Golitsyn failure. It is no coincidence that young Peter, as Gordon’s Diary reports, did not even allow V.V. Golitsyn upon his return from Crimea to his hand. True, such a recognized expert on the history of Peter I as N.I. Pavlenko, based on other sources, claims that Peter only “intended to refuse Golitsyn and his retinue an audience, but he was hardly dissuaded from this step, which meant a break with Sophia. Reluctantly, Peter accepted Golitsyn and those accompanying him. Among the latter was Colonel Franz Lefort.” A participant in the Crimean campaign, Lefort, along with Patrick Gordon, in a few months would turn into the closest friend and mentor of Peter I. The colossal losses of Golitsyn’s army from heat, bad water, food and disease made a grave impression on ordinary Muscovites. The “Naryshkin party,” whose leadership included cousin V.V. Golitsyna B.A. Golitsyn, a good chance arose for the overthrow of Sophia, which was realized during the August coup of 1689.
It was in the interests of the victors to “denigrate” the history of the Crimean campaigns in every possible way, which did not prevent Peter I, 6 years later, from continuing the offensive launched by his sister’s government on the southern borders of Russia, as well as on other borders, for during the entire second half of the 17th century. Russia has not known a single strategic defeat. She won the war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, taking away half of Ukraine and Kyiv from it. It reduced the war with Sweden to a draw, without winning or losing any of the territories it had after the Time of Troubles. Forced Turkey to recognize Russian citizenship of Left-Bank Ukraine, Zaporozhye and Kyiv and, finally, attacked Crimea twice, forcing it to permanently switch from attack to defense. Peter would take into account the difficulties of a foot march across the Wild Field discovered during the Crimean campaigns and shift the direction of the main attack in the south directly to the Turkish outpost of Azov, where troops could be transported along the Don. Among the main leaders of the Azov campaigns of 1695 and 1696. we will see V.V.’s closest associates. Golitsyn on the Crimean campaigns - “service Germans” Pyotr Ivanovich Gordon and Franz Yakovlevich Lefort.
(map from the article ""
"Sytin's Military Encyclopedia")
Crimean campaigns- military campaigns of the Russian army against the Crimean Khanate, undertaken in 1689. They were part of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686-1700 and part of the larger European Great Turkish War.
First Crimean campaign[ | ]
The troops advanced from different regions were supposed to gather on the southern borders of the country by March 11, 1687, but due to delays, the gathering ended later than this date, in mid-May. The main part of the army gathered on the Merle River and set out on the campaign on May 18. On May 23, she turned towards Poltava, moving to join Samoilovich's Cossacks. By May 24, the hetman's army arrived at Poltava. As planned, it consisted of about 50 thousand people, of which approximately 10 thousand were specially recruited burghers and villagers. It was decided to send the Cossacks to the vanguard of the army. After waiting for all the troops to arrive, on May 26, Prince Golitsyn conducted a general review of his army, which showed that there were 90,610 people under his command, which is not much lower payroll troops. On June 2, the troops of Golitsyn and Samoilovich met at the intersection of the Hotel and Orchik rivers and, having united, continued to advance, making small transitions from one river to another. By June 22, the troops reached the Konskie Vody River. After crossing the Samarka River, it became difficult to supply the huge army - the temperature rose, wide rivers were replaced by low-water streams, forests - by small groves, but the troops continued to move. The Crimean Khan Selim I Giray was at that time on Molochny Vody; no Tatar troops were encountered on the way. Realizing that his troops were inferior to the Russian army in numbers, weapons and training, he ordered all uluses to retreat deep into the Khanate, poison or fill up water sources and burn out the steppe south of Konskie Vody. Having learned about the fire in the steppe and the devastation of lands right up to Perekop, Prince Golitsyn decided not to change the plan and continued the campaign, by June 27 reaching the Karachekrak River, where a military council was held. Despite sufficient supplies of provisions, the advance through the scorched and devastated territory had a negative impact on the condition of the army, the horses became weak, providing the troops with water, firewood and horse feed turned out to be extremely difficult, as a result of which the council decided to return the army to the Russian borders. The retreat began on June 28, the troops went northwest to the Dnieper, where the Russian command expected to find surviving sources of water and grass for horses.
To fight the Tatars, approx. 20 thousand Samoilovich Cossacks and approx. 8 thousand people governor L.R. Neplyuev, who were supposed to be united with almost 6 thousand people. General G.I. Kosagov. Messengers were sent to Moscow with the news of the end of the campaign. However, when the army retreated, it turned out that the supplies of water and grass along the retreat route were insufficient, the loss of livestock increased, and cases of illness and heat strokes became more frequent in the army. The army was able to replenish supplies and rest only on the banks of Samarka. During the retreat, rumors arose in the Russian camp about Hetman Samoilovich's involvement in the arson of the steppe, and a denunciation was sent to Moscow against him.
When the army reached Aurelie, the head of the Streletsky Prikaz, F.L. Shaklovity, arrived from Moscow and expressed support for Golitsyn’s decision to retreat. The Russian government, realizing the extreme danger of continuing the campaign in such conditions and wishing to preserve the reputation of the command of the retreating army, chose to declare the Crimean campaign a success. The Tsar's letters stated that the Crimean Khanate had been sufficiently demonstrated to have enormous military strength, which should have warned it against future attacks on Russian lands. Subsequently, in order to avoid discontent on the part of the military people, they were given cash benefits and other awards.
While Golitsyn's army was crossing to the right bank of the Dnieper, the Crimean Khan decided to take advantage of the division of the Russian army and at night attacked Kosagov's troops left on the left bank of the river. The Tatars captured part of the convoy and stole herds of horses, but their attack on the army camp was repulsed. Moreover, Neplyuev’s horse and foot soldiers arrived to help Kosagov, quickly putting the Tatars to flight and recapturing some of the captured property from them. The Tatar cavalry appeared again the next day, but did not dare to attack the Russian camp again, limiting themselves to attacks on foragers and the theft of several small herds of horses.
In response to the denunciation of Hetman Samoilovich, on August 1, a messenger arrived from Moscow with a royal decree, which ordered the election of a new hetman who would be more suitable for the Little Russian army. Instead of Samoilovich, I. S. Mazepa became hetman, but units loyal to Samoilovich opposed this and started a riot, which stopped after Neplyuev’s units arrived in the Cossack camp.
On August 13, Golitsyn’s army reached the bank of the Merla River, and on August 24 received a royal decree to stop the campaign and disband the army participating in it. At the end of the campaign, troops of 5 and 7 thousand people were left on the southern borders of the state “to protect the Great Russian and Little Russian cities.” For the next campaign in Crimea, it was decided to build fortifications on the Samarka River, for which several regiments were left there.
In the Crimean Tatar version of events as presented by historian Halim Geray, a representative of the ruling Geray dynasty, Selim Geray gave the order to burn all the grass, straw and grain that was in the way of the Russians. On July 17, the Khan’s army met the Russians near the Kara-Yylga area. The exact number of his army is unknown, but it was smaller than Golitsyn’s army. The Khan divided his army into three parts: one he led himself, and the other two were led by his sons - Kalgai Devlet Giray and Nureddin Azamat Giray. A battle began that lasted 2 days and ended with the victory of the Crimeans. 30 guns and about a thousand prisoners were captured. The Russian-Cossack army retreated and built fortifications near the town of Kuyash behind the Or fortress. The Khan's army also built fortifications along the ditch facing the Russians, preparing for the decisive battle. The Russian-Cossack army, suffering from thirst, was unable to continue the battle, and peace negotiations began. By morning, the Crimeans discovered that the army of Russians and Cossacks had fled and they began pursuit. Near the Donuzly-Oba area, the Russian-Cossack troops were overtaken by the Crimeans and suffered losses. The main reason The defeat was the exhaustion of the Russian troops due to the fall of the steppe, but despite this, the goal of the campaign was fulfilled, namely: to distract the Crimean Khanate from the war with the Holy League. The retreat of the Russian army, which began in June, before the clashes he described, is not reported in Geray’s work; attention is focused on the actions of Khan Selim Geray, other Gerays and their troops, but it is noted that the Russians did not have “provisions, fodder and water.”
Contrary to this version, as noted by both pre-revolutionary and modern researchers, before the decision to retreat, Russian troops did not meet a single Tatar on their way; Advance across the scorched steppe stopped only due to fires spreading across it and a lack of provisions, long before any clashes with the enemy. The clashes themselves were in the nature of minor skirmishes, and the Khan’s attack on Russian troops in mid-July was quickly repulsed by them and led the Tatars to flee, although they managed to capture part of the convoy.
In the report of the book. V.V. Golitsyn’s campaign is presented as successful, the absence of any significant battles and the Tatars’ avoidance of battle, characteristic of both Crimean campaigns, is noted: “... the khan and the Tatars attacked... the military people of the offensive came into fear and horror, and put aside their usual insolence , he himself did not appear anywhere and his Tatar yurts... did not appear anywhere and did not give battle.” According to Golitsyn, the Khan’s army, avoiding a collision, went beyond Perekop, the Russian troops vainly hoped to meet the enemy, after which, exhausted by the heat, dust, fires, depletion of supplies and feed for horses, they decided to leave the steppe.
The unsuccessful campaign of V.V. Golitsyn against the Crimean Khanate. The artist depicts the return of the army along the bank of the Samara River. Miniature from the 1st half manuscript. 18th century "History of Peter I", op. P. Krekshina. Collection of A. Baryatinsky. State Historical Museum.
On the right flank, the Turkish vassal, the Budjak Horde, was defeated. General Grigory Kosagov took the Ochakov fortress and some other fortresses and went to the Black Sea, where he began building fortresses. Western European newspapers wrote enthusiastically about Kosagov's successes, and the Turks, fearing an attack by Constantinople, gathered armies and navies towards him.
Second Crimean Campaign[ | ]
Results [ | ]
The Crimean campaigns were of great international importance, were able to temporarily divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimean Tatars and greatly contributed to the military successes of Russia's European allies in the fight against the Ottoman Empire, the end of Turkish expansion in Europe, as well as the collapse of the alliance between the Crimean Khanate concluded in 1683 in Adrianople , France and Imre Tekeli, who became a Turkish citizen. Russia's entry into the Holy League confused the plans of the Turkish command, forcing it to abandon the offensive on Poland and Hungary and transfer significant forces to the east, which facilitated the League's fight against the Turks. However, despite the significant superiority in strength, the campaign of the huge army ended in its exodus; no significant clashes occurred between the warring parties, and the Crimean Khanate was not defeated. As a result, the actions of the Russian army were criticized by historians and some contemporaries. So, in 1701, the famous Russian publicist I. T. Pososhkov, who had no personal connection to both campaigns and relied on what he heard about them, accused the troops of being “fearful,” considering it dishonorable that a huge army did not provide assistance to those defeated by the Tatar cavalry regiment of Duma clerk E.I. Ukraintsev.
Discussing the reasons for the failure of the campaign, historian A. G. Brickner, noted that during the campaign, clashes between both sides were in the nature of only minor skirmishes, without reaching a real battle, and the main opponents of the Russian army were not so much the Tatars themselves, whose number was small , how hot the steppe climate is and the problems of providing for a huge army in the steppe, aggravated by diseases that engulfed the army, a steppe fire that left horses without food, and the indecisiveness of the command.
Prince Golitsyn himself reported on the catastrophic “lack of water and lack of food” during the campaign across the hot steppe, saying that “the horses died under the outfit, the people became weak,” there were no sources of food for the horses, and the water sources were poisoned, while the khan’s troops They set Perekop Posads and the settlements surrounding them on fire and never showed up for the decisive battle. In this situation, although the army was ready to “serve and shed their blood,” they considered it wise to retreat rather than continue their actions. The Tatar Murza, who came to the Russian camp several times with an offer of peace, was refused on the grounds “that that peace would be disgusting to the Polish Union.”
As a result, Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international authority increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved. According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the princess’s government
During the 16th-17th centuries Russian state increased greatly in size. But this territorial growth had a significant drawback: Russia remained practically landlocked. The northern route was inconvenient and was almost entirely controlled by the British. Sea routes were the only convenient ones for conducting large-scale trade, because on land there were too many problems with roads.
Moscow was also concerned about the Crimean issue. Tribute to the Crimean Khan continued to exist, and Tatar raids threatened the southwestern lands. Victory over Crimea could raise the prestige of any ruler. Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns were an attempt to resolve this issue.
The regime of Princess Sophia, who ruled the kingdom on behalf of her young brothers, was not strong from the very beginning. In addition, the younger prince, the energetic and intelligent Peter, was growing up, and the time was approaching when full power should be transferred to him. Sophia could not allow this, it would mean forcible tonsure as a nun. A major military victory could strengthen the princess's position and allow her to compete for power.
The eternal peace concluded between Russia and Poland in 1686 implied Russia's entry into the anti-Turkish alliance created by King John Sobieski. In accordance with the agreement, in the summer of 1687, Russian troops set out on the first Crimean campaign. The decision was not made very easily; many representatives of the Boyar Duma considered the war unnecessary, considering even a tribute to the khan “not offensive.”
The command was entrusted to Prince Vasily Golitsyn, the actual husband of the princess. The choice was unfortunate. Prince Golitsyn was an intelligent, educated man, but he was poorly versed in military affairs. In addition, many did not treat him very well precisely because of his closeness to the princess. The hetman of Left Bank Ukraine I. Samoilovich and his Cossacks acted in alliance with the prince. But Samoilovich was cool about the idea of the campaign, and many representatives of the elders and ordinary Cossacks did not approve of the alliance with Poland.
The army did not even reach Perekop. The summer turned out to be hot, the steppe was dry, the wells dried up. The Crimean Tatars deliberately covered them and burned the grass, creating fields of ash that horses refused to walk through. Superstitious inhabitants of the forest zone were afraid of mirages that sometimes appeared in open spaces. Moscow commanders and Golitsyn himself did not know how to navigate the steppe. The Moscow army did not know how to quickly fight off raids by Tatar detachments, as the Ukrainians were able to do. There was no vinegar stored to cool the guns during possible firing. Discontent was brewing among the Cossacks. The army lacked the basic necessities, and epidemics began. The grain taken to feed the soldiers was discovered to be damaged (some bags contained garbage or moldy bread), and “theft” began to be suspected.
Golitsyn understood that the campaign would have to be interrupted, but he needed a “scapegoat” who could be blamed for the failure. A suitable candidate was proposed to him by a group of representatives of the Ukrainian Cossack elders, led by General Captain I. Mazepa and General Clerk V. Kochubey. The prince was informed that the steppe was allegedly set on fire not by Tatar troops at all, but by people specially sent for this by Hetman Samoilovich. The hetman was accused of treason, arrested and exiled to Siberia, his eldest son's head was cut off. I. Mazepa was elected the new hetman. It is significant that Mazepa was in great favor with Samoilovich, and was even at one time the teacher of his executed son.
There is a very enduring legend in history that Mazepa paid Golitsyn 20,000 gold chervonets for his election as hetman. Evidence of this is unlikely to ever be found; such cases were carried out without witnesses in the 17th century. But it is known that the prince was constantly in need of money, and that Mazepa considered a bribe a very reasonable way to achieve his goal.
But the obligations to Poland regarding the Eternal Peace remained, and in the spring of 1689 the second Crimean campaign began. This time the troops reached Perekop, but no further. All the mistakes of the previous campaign were repeated. There was not enough food and fodder, the Streltsy army did not want to fight. The Crimean Tatars attacked in small but very mobile detachments, exterminating the Russian army “at retail.” Mazepa, like Samoilovich, did not express open dissatisfaction, but gave very cautious advice and referred to the discontent of his Cossacks. Golitsyn was again forced to turn back. The failure of the second Crimean campaign became a direct impetus for the fall of Princess Sophia and the transfer of real power to the grown-up Peter I. Frustrated Streltsy commanders and boyars declared that “no great deeds were to be seen” from the princess and left for the court of the young Tsar. Prince Vasily Golitsyn ended his days in exile, and the princess in a monastery.
Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns are interesting not for their results (there were none), but because they clearly showed the shortcomings of the Russian army of the late 17th century. The Streltsy army was becoming unreliable; the Streltsy were more interested in their profitable trades in Moscow. The noble militia gathered slowly and reluctantly; many nobles were in no hurry to spend time on military training. The warriors that the nobles brought with them did not know how to do anything. There was nothing resembling a quartermaster service. There were not enough cannons, and those that were available were often of very poor quality. The archers' weapons were also technically outdated. Commanders were selected according to their nobility, and not according to their knowledge and abilities. Military discipline was very weak.
Neither Sophia nor Golitsyn were able or had time to draw conclusions from their failures. But Peter I managed to do them. Recognizing the right idea consolidating Russia in the Black Sea and getting rid of the Turkish and Tatar danger, he understood the need for a different organization of the Black Sea campaign. Peter's Azov campaigns were similar in purpose to Golitsyn's Crimean campaigns, but gave completely different results. All shortcomings in the organization of the army were taken into account by the new king and corrected during military reforms.
In 1684, under the patronage of Pope Innocent XI, the Holy Roman Empire, the Venetian Republic and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth united into a single Holy League against the Ottoman Empire. The pretext for the anti-Ottoman coalition was the Balkan peoples who were under the protectorate of the Ottomans.
The idea of liberating Christian peoples was only a pretext for an armed conflict, as a result of which the European powers hoped to divide the lands of the Danube principalities among themselves. But first it was necessary to divert the main forces of the Crimean state, which was on the side of the Porte. To do this, it was necessary to look for an ally in the north. And very soon he discovered himself in the person of the Moscow principality.
First Crimean campaign
By that time, Muscovy was inflamed with its own passions. The Sagittarius brought to power Sofya Alekseevna, an intelligent, powerful and ambitious princess, and with her her favorite, Prince Vasily Golitsyn, one of the most educated people of his time. In contrast to the boyar opposition, his views were too progressive for the Moscow principality. The prince strove for Europe. Therefore, as soon as the Kremlin heard about the creation of the Holy League, a Moscow embassy was immediately sent to the Pope, the fact of its creation testified to the desire of the ruler Sophia to join a new coalition against the Ottomans. However, the European states initially doubted the decision to accept Orthodox Muscovy into their Catholic union, and only two years later, when the need had matured to distract the main forces of the Crimean Khanate, did they deign to give it such a right.
On May 6, 1686, Muscovy signed the “Treatise on Eternal Peace” with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This document obligated Moscow to involve the Cossacks of Left Bank Ukraine under the command of Hetman Ivan Samoilovich in military operations.
The hetman himself was against these actions, believing that a new war was actually breaking out “for no reason”, that peace with the Crimean Tatars was beneficial, and the Khanate “cannot be won or retained by any measures” and that an attack on Crimea would bring more harm than benefits. But the supporters of the war were determined, and no one listened to Samoilovich. He was ordered to prepare 50,000 Cossacks for war.
As historian Lev Gumilyov writes, “The West sought to attract the Russians to the war not so much with the Ottoman Empire, but with its ally the Crimean state, since the Austrians and Poles were more afraid not of the regular Ottoman army, but of the swift Crimean Tatar cavalry.”
Consequently, the Russians were assigned the role of distracting the Crimeans from the main theater of military operations. Of course, this was not what Prince Golitsyn wanted, but in order to maintain prestige, one had to agree to such conditions.
They began to prepare thoroughly for war. After all, this was the first campaign against the Crimean Khanate. For this occasion, an army of one hundred thousand was assembled, headed by the prince himself. He was not distinguished by his talents as a commander, and he did not have any special desires to fight, but ruler Sophia demanded this from him.
They set out on the campaign in May 1687. In the Poltava region, Hetman Samoilovich joined the prince.
By this time, Selim Giray Khan was on the Crimean throne. It was one of the outstanding Crimean rulers. Historians evaluate him as an intelligent, reasonable, democratic and humane person. Selim Giray was not power-hungry and more than once voluntarily tried to resign as khan. However Ottoman sultans, the Crimean nobility and people called him to the Crimean throne four times.
This time, a war was being prepared with the Holy League and Selim Giray was to march at the head of his army against Austria. But as soon as the khan approached the Austrian lands, news came that an army of 100 thousand Russians and 50 thousand Cossacks under the command of boyar Vasily Golitsyn had approached the borders of the Crimean state with the goal of invading its borders.
Having hastily left Europe, Selim Giray arrived in Crimea and already on July 17, 1687, in the town of Kara-Yylga, he met with the Russian army.
Compared to the Russian army, the Crimean cavalry was small in number. But this circumstance did not bother the khan. He divided his army into three parts, led one himself, and entrusted the other two to his sons - Kalga Devlet Giray and nur-ed-din Azamat Giray.
The first and only battle lasted with intervals of several days. Thanks to the courage of Nur-ed-din, who threw his main forces into the center of the Russian army, the enemy’s ranks were upset. Crimean askers captured 30 cannons and captured about a thousand people. At the same time, the askers under the leadership of the khan blocked the Russians’ path to retreat. Two days later, Golitsyn decided to make peace with the Crimean Khan. Russian envoys were sent to the headquarters of the Crimean Khan. But the peace agreement was never concluded due to the fact that the prince ordered his troops to hastily leave the camp the night before the conclusion of a possible peace. The Russians broke out of encirclement with heavy losses. They retreated, pursued by the Crimean Tatar cavalry right up to the borders of the Hetmanate.
Prince Vasily Golitsyn placed all the blame for the failure of the unsuccessful campaign on Ivan Samoilovich. The prince openly accused the hetman of disrupting the campaign and that the steppe along which the Russian army was advancing was allegedly burned out by the Cossacks themselves on the orders of the hetman, who did not want war with the Crimean Tatars. Without any special proceedings, Samoilovich was deprived of the hetman's mace. Golitsyn, for “betraying” the Cossacks, was kindly treated by Princess Sophia, who encouraged him that on his next campaign he would be accompanied by the new hetman, “loyal” to the royal crown, Ivan Mazepa.
Prince Golitsyn tried to do everything to entrust the command of the second campaign to the Crimean Khanate to someone else. But he fails. Sophia wanted her favorite to take revenge in a new campaign, which should bring him victory. There was only one thing left - to take all possible measures to prevent a repeat defeat.
Second Crimean Campaign
On April 6, 1689, the prince, having waited out the thaw, headed to Ukraine with a new army. Here, on the Samara River, he was joined by the Cossacks, led by the new hetman Ivan Mazepa. A few days later, the Russian army invaded the Crimean state.
The first clash with the Crimean cavalry took place on May 14 on the approaches to Or-Kapy. Golitsyn gave the order to prepare for battle. The Crimeans attacked Sheremetev's regiment, which almost immediately fled. But after a short battle the Crimeans retreated. The Russians also retreated. They moved away from Or-Kapa and set up camp in the town of Black Valley.
And already on May 16, Selim Giray and his army went out to meet the enemy. The maneuverable Crimean cavalry surrounded the Russian army. Golitsyn was in no hurry to give the order to go on the offensive, despite the fact that the governors demanded this of him. He ordered not to budge and set up defense. The infantry and all the artillery armed with firearms formed a reliable defense in the field. However, when the order was given to fire muskets and cannons, it turned out that the Russian people, who were not trained in such weapons, put more of their own on the battlefield than the Crimean askers who were watching this fuss from the sidelines. Nur-ed-din Azamat Giray was the first to enter the battle. He attacked the Cossacks, led by Emelyan Ukraintsev, Moscow Secretary of State. The Muscovite, inexperienced in military affairs, was so shy that he could not withstand the onslaught of the Crimeans. As a result, the camp’s defenses were broken through and the Crimean Tatars took 30 cannons with them as a trophy. Voivode Sheremetev was also unlucky; he was attacked by another Crimean detachment, which managed to break through and capture a convoy with firearms. Having sowed panic in the ranks of the Russian army, the Crimean cavalry ended the battle and retreated along with the captured trophies.
The next day, Prince Golitsyn ordered to remove the camp, unite the regiments into one army and then go to the Or fortress. Before they had time to move, the Crimeans unexpectedly appeared again and walked around the entire army in a circle, struck fear into the Muscovites and disappeared again. The entire next day, the Russians did not meet a single Crimean Tatar on their way. This gave them a little courage. And on May 19th with varying success approached Or-Kapy directly and camped within a cannon shot of the city.
Hetman Ivan Mazepa wrote to Moscow about these same events a little later: “...On the 15th day of May, in those wild fields close to the Green Valley tract, the enemies of the Basurmans Khan of Crimea and Kalga and Nur-ed-Din Sultans also Shirin Bey with his Crimean and Belogortsky hordes , with the Circassian and Yaman-Sagaidak hordes with them, they crossed our path, from the second hour of the day the battle began and strongly attacked the troops of their royal majesty [Russian troops] and pressed until the evening, and the troops of their royal majesty ... bravely and courageously With them, in a strong fight and beating many of them and wounding them, they came to the Black Valley and spent the night here.” According to Mazepa's letter the next day, May 16, the Crimeans forced the Russian army into battle. Moreover, the Crimeans, according to the eyewitness hetman, made continuous attacks on the Muscovite camp and broke through carts in different places. By evening, the Crimean askers stopped the attack. On May 17, the Russians approached Kalanchak: “... and there the enemies, the Khan, the sultans, and all the hordes, stepped in front of and surrounded the carts, harrowed the distant troops of the great sovereigns in the campaign and throughout the whole day they carried out raids and attacks...”.
Golitsyn had long ago decided that at the slightest opportunity he would retreat. He absolutely did not want to engage in battle with the Crimeans. And he saw some kind of catch in the fact that they were so easily allowed to approach the fortress. However, in order not to lose face in front of his compatriots, he hastened to send envoys to the fortress with an ultimatum, knowing in advance that the khan would never agree to his conditions.
The ultimatum amused the Khan. In response, he said that he did not want other terms of peace besides those on which he had previously made peace with the Russian tsars. Prince Golitsyn did not like this answer, and, not considering it more possible to camp in the steppe, he thought about retreating, since the army would not have lasted long without food and water.
Meanwhile, the Russian commanders hoped to attack Or-Kapy at night. But in the evening, when everyone came to the prince’s camp tent for orders, they were very surprised to learn that they would have to return tomorrow. Golitsyn did not want to explain the reasons for such a strange decision. He again sent an ultimatum to the Khan, but this time only to stall for time. And the next morning, when the khan prepared an answer, he discovered that the Russian army, without waiting for the khan’s people, began to retreat.
Meanwhile, Golitsyn sent messengers to Moscow and to the Polish king with the message that he had defeated the Crimeans and pursued them to their borders. But in Moscow, thanks to Hetman Mazepa, they learned about the true state of affairs, and Vasily Golitsyn very soon went to Siberia. And the princess is in the Novodevichy Convent.
Gulnara Abdulaeva