A video recording of a lecture and a transcript of a fragment where the historian talks about how the revolution touched the Kuban and why conflicts between Cossacks and nonresidents over the land issue became the main cause of the Civil War.
What did the February Revolution in the Kuban lead to?
The Kuban region - everything to the north of the Caucasus Mountains - it was a military region, a Cossack region, it had its own agenda. Everything to the south of the ridge - Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Sochi and Gagra - was part of the Black Sea province. It was a completely different administrative unit, all-Russian.
For the Kuban, the main problem was land. The Cossacks at that time were approximately 43%, the rest of the population was mostly Russian peasants from other cities. The main conflict sparked between the Cossacks and non-residents. Some wanted to defend estate privileges, others wanted equal land use. Auxiliary was the conflict between the Russian population as a whole and the "highlanders" (as they were then called): Circassians, Karachays (Karachay was also part of the Kuban region then), Abazins. Here, too, there was a land issue, because 85% of the population of the “highlanders” was rural.
The main conflict sparked between the Cossacks and nonresident
The former head of the Kuban region, Ataman Major General Babych, resigned after the February Revolution. He declared that he recognized the Provisional Government and transferred power to new bodies. Such bodies were the Kuban Regional Council, which was elected at the regional congress on April 16, 1917, and its executive committee. It included two representatives from the Cossacks and non-residents, from each of the seven departments, and four representatives from all the highlanders. It was not difficult to imagine that the representation of Cossacks and non-residents in the council was approximately equal. It was democratic and corresponded to the composition of the population. Commissar of the Provisional Government Bardish was sent from Petrograd. There were municipalities and city dumas.
On April 17, the Cossack Congress created the Kuban Regional Military Rada, a representative body, and the Military Government, an executive body. The government was headed by Filimonov, a representative of the linear Cossacks from the Abinsk department. Ryabovol from Chernomorsk became the chairman of the Rada - the same one whom Denikin's forces would later shoot in Rostov during the Civil War.
The crisis situation began to develop from the end of April 1917. The Cossack and nonresident parts of the Kuban population did not recognize each other, each considered only itself as the monopoly holders of power. In the future, this conflict begins to radicalize and grow, involving those who fled from the front and were demobilized. Highlanders and the urban working population are gradually being drawn into it.
Events developed differently in the Black Sea province, the administrative center of which was the city of Novorossiysk, a large port with railway workshops and cement plants. The Bolsheviks and Mensheviks dominated there, there was no Cossack factor. But in the Black Sea province there was another problem - its protractedness, and as a result, in Anapa, Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Gelendzhik and Sochi, events developed in completely different ways.
All these revolutionaries sat in the same cafe and talked peacefully. When the directive came from Petrograd to split into Mensheviks, Bolsheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, they quarreled
Alexander Cherkasov
Alexander Cherkasov, a Sochi historian, described the features of the revolutionary events in the Black Sea province like this: “All these revolutionaries were sitting in the same cafe and talking peacefully. When the directive came from Petrograd to split into Mensheviks, Bolsheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, they quarreled - people who sat at the same table, drank, knew each other and were in personal relationships. And then the contradictions began to escalate - but one must understand that in such small provincial territories, conflicts were often imposed from outside, from the capitals. The internal reasons and lines of demarcation were quite different.
The main reason for the Civil War in the Kuban, which will flare up by the end of 1917, is the conflict between the Cossacks and nonresidents, the land conflict. And also the issue of hostility and identity conflict, which by that time had already been developing for a very long time. If we talk about the Kuban, this led to the fact that in early October 1917 the Second Regional Rada proclaimed itself the monopoly owner of power. Out-of-town structures found themselves, as it were, in a semi-legal position, they began to collect weapons, mobilize and prepare a speech against the Cossack Rada. The events to which this will lead to the beginning of 1918 remain outside the scope of our analysis.
Socio-economic relations on the eve of the Civil War. The main events of the Civil War in the Kuban. The process of creating the first rebel groups. Reasons for the end of the white-green rebellion. Consequences of the Civil War in the Kuban.
Brief summary of the material:
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Introduction
The relevance of the topic is revealed in the uniqueness of the history of the Civil War in the Kuban. The participation of peasants in the events of civil confrontation played a significant role in the struggle of various opposing forces, significantly weakening political rivals.
The chosen topic is relevant due to the specifics of the place: the Kuban is a border area, multi-ethnic, and therefore potentially explosive. The history of the Civil War in the region is very instructive for modern politicians, both Russian and regional.
The object of the study is the specifics of the history of the Civil War in the territory of the Kuban in 1917-1922.
The subject is the prerequisites and the process of development of social contradictions in the Kuban; the activities of the opposing state structures formed during the years of the Civil War; regional specificity, influencing the course of the Civil War and the main directions of the policy of opposing forces; features of the military operations of the Civil War in the region from October 1917 to December 1922
The chronological framework covers the period from the autumn of 1917 to December 1922, that is, the stage when the Civil War took place in the Kuban.
The boundaries are determined by the territories of the Kuban in the designated chronological period.
The degree of knowledge of the problem. Only in the first 50 years after the establishment of Soviet power on the history of the Civil War, more than 12 thousand books and articles were published, with some probability it can be argued that now the historiography of the Civil War includes at least 20 thousand works.
Several periods can be distinguished in the development of the historiography of the problem: 1920s, 1930s - early 1950s, mid-1950s - mid-1980s, 1985 - up to the present.
The first period includes the 1920s, when there was an accumulation of material on the problem, and the sequence of events of the Civil War in the territory of the Kuban was relatively reliably stated, since most of the authors were direct participants in these historical events.
Some authors (Y. Shafir, V. Vasilenko, N. Baturin, Golubev, M.S. Svechnikov, V.A. Antonova-Ovseenko and others) reflected only individual events and facts of the revolutionary history of the Civil War in the Kuban; others (G. Ladokha, N. Yanchevsky, B. Gorodetsky, A. Platonov and others) covered them as a whole. The most significant works of this period are the works of G. Ladokha and N. Yanchevsky.
The works of the leaders of the white movement A. Denikin, A. Lukomsky, G. Pokrovsky, P. Wrangel, published in exile, are not only memoir sources for the present study, but also an integral part of the historiography of the Civil War. Among them, especially significant, in addition to the memoirs of A.I. Denikin “Essays on Russian Troubles”, memoirs of the former Commander-in-Chief of the Peasant Militia of the Committee for the Liberation of the Black Sea Governorate N.V. Voronovich, highlighting the causes of the emergence and activities of the peasant movement in the Kuban region.
The second period - 1930 - early 1950s. - was marked by a strictly limited ideological framework prescribed for historical science by the Stalinist totalitarian-bureaucratic regime, when the “History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)” became the methodological basis for all research on national history. Short Course.
At this time, new works by I.M. Razgona and Ya.N. Raenko. The purpose of their study was the region of the North Caucasus, and not a special study of the revolution and the Civil War in the Kuban and the Black Sea.
The third period (1955 - early 1980s) is characterized by a wide scope of research in various directions with the involvement of new sources from local archives declassified during the years of the "thaw". Of considerable interest is the work of I.P. Osadchy, in which the author examined the events and driving forces of the Civil War on the territory of the Kuban region from the traditional Soviet period positions. Since the second half of the 1960s. Until the mid-1980s, in historical research, a return to the dominance of official ideology can be traced, but at the same time, the problems of research on the Civil War in the Kuban continue to expand.
The fourth period of historiography continues from 1985 to the present. Previously unknown archival materials, as well as diaries, letters, memoirs and other personal sources of participants in the warring parties are widely introduced into scientific circulation. Early 90s. there was a separation of the history of the white movement into an independent subject of study. At the same time, an active study of the theme of the peasant movement in various regions of Russia began.
Summing up, it should be noted that throughout the Soviet period, the selection of historical topics was determined by the pressure of state ideology. At the same time, regional history was inevitably subjected to this influence. The conducted historiographic review allows us to conclude that the formulation and study of the topic this study allows you to give a more complete and objective picture Civil War in the Kuban.
The purpose of the work is to study the regional features of the Civil War on the territory of the Kuban in 1917-1922.
The research objectives are as follows:
1. show the origins and prerequisites of civil confrontation in the Kuban;
2. explore the nature of the dynamics and forms of civil confrontation at each stage;
3. to study the evolution of the socio-ideological essence of insurgent activity, the forms of the population's reactions to its manifestations, the results of its influence;
4. present a comprehensive and holistic picture of the results of the civil confrontation in the Kuban.
Source base. The topic under study is provided by a variety of sources. Among them are party and state documents, materials of Soviet bodies, statistical data, periodicals, eyewitness memories.
Methodological basis of the course work. The work uses traditional scientific principles of historicism. The methodological principle of historicism makes it possible to study the Civil War taking into account the specific historical conditions of that time. The principles of scientific reliability and objectivity make it possible to comprehensively study the material used. Of great methodological importance is a systematic approach, which makes it possible to most fully study the nature, alignment, and correlation of the contending forces.
Work structure. The course work consists of an introduction, three sections, a conclusion, a list of sources and literature used.
Section I. Socio-economic relations on the eve of the Civil War
Russia in the twentieth century experienced several terrible wars. The two world wars were the longest and bloodiest. But along with the world wars, the most difficult for the fate of the country was the Civil War, which grew out of the First World War and two revolutions. In Russian history, internal confrontation has always caused the weakening of the state and brought suffering to millions of people. Ermolin A.P. Revolution and the Cossacks (1917-1920). - Moscow, 1982. - S. 180.
Any war is terrible, but the Civil War is a particularly terrible phenomenon. The search for an enemy from outside is moving inward. The concepts of “friend or foe” lose their former definition, and then everyone can turn out to be an “enemy”, and the criteria for “friend or foe” are constantly changing and expanding. Disregard for human life firmly established in the public mind. Kozlov A.I. At the historical turn / A.I. Kozlov. - Rostov-on-Don, 1977. - S. 428.
The civil war, in which the solution of all problems by "tough measures" logically fit into the prevailing war time a special mentality, the bearers of which were primarily those who themselves participated in the hostilities, had an impact on the economic, political, cultural post-war life.
In the region under study, the social composition of the belligerents had its own specifics. The Kuban Cossacks, non-residents and peasants, as well as representatives of the mountain peoples inhabiting the North Caucasus, turned out to be direct participants in the internecine confrontation, the specificity of which was manifested both in the multi-ethnic composition of the population and in the multi-caste nature of the participants in the intrastate armed confrontation. National diversity and the entire socio-economic way of life in the region gave rise to great differences in everyday life, culture and traditions. Yanchevsky N.L. Civil struggle in the North Caucasus. T.1. / N.L. Yanchevsky. - Rostov-on-Don, 1927
The Cossacks, which was once a symbol of freedom and freedom, eventually became one of the estates Russian Empire. The revolutionary events of 1917 did not bypass the Cossack regions. Like Russia as a whole, the Cossacks found themselves at a crossroads. Main question political life it became a question of choosing a further path of development, which, ultimately, led to a fratricidal slaughter. At the same time, the revolution and the Civil War did not so much split the country as they emphasized and revealed the contradictions that existed within Russian society as a whole and the Cossack regions as its component. Gordeev A.A. History of the Cossacks. - Moscow, 1993. - S. 225.
The factors that had an important impact on the course and outcome of the Civil War include, in particular, the stratification within the Cossacks and their relationship with the nonresident population of the Cossack regions. One of the main reasons for the participation of the majority of the Cossacks in the war on the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces was...
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The news of the overthrow of the Provisional Government in Petrograd and the proclamation of Soviet power was received in the Kuban on 26 October. At an emergency meeting, the Yekaterinodar and Novorossiysk Soviets decided to take power into their own hands, although this was not easy to do. The Kuban military government decided not to recognize the power of the Bolsheviks and to assume full power. Martial law was introduced in the Kuban region on October 26, members of the executive committee of the Yekaterinodar Soviet were arrested, and revolutionary-minded units were subject to disarmament. In response, protest rallies and strikes began in the city.
On November 1, 1917, the 1st session of the Legislative Rada began its work in Yekaterinodar, which elected the Kuban Regional Government instead of the Provisional Military Government, with L. L. Bych as its chairman. The Rada was looking for support among the population of the region. On December 12, the II regional congress of representatives of the Cossacks, non-residents and highlanders, consisting of supporters of the Rada, opened. The congress elected a united Legislative Rada consisting of 45 Cossacks, 45 from other cities and 8 mountaineers, as well as a new regional government. At the same time, a congress of labor Cossacks and non-residents (or the II Kuban regional congress of non-residents) was held in Yekaterinodar, which refused to recognize the decisions of the regional Rada and the government and demanded the transfer of all power to the Soviets. The congress recognized the power of the Soviets of People's Commissars (SNK) and elected the regional Soviet of People's Deputies. On January 8, 1918, the 1st session of the united (Legislative Rada) proclaimed the Kuban an independent republic, which is part of Russia on a federal basis.
In the Black Sea province, events developed according to a different scenario. On October 27, in Novorossiysk, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, the Military Revolutionary Committee (VRC) was created. The City Duma of Novorossiysk, which was dominated by Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, formed the VRK under its control. On November 23, Soviet power was established in Tuapse.
On November 23, the Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Black Sea Governorate elected the Central Executive Committee (CEC), by the decision of which the provincial commissar S. Dolgopolov was removed from power and the Military Revolutionary Committee, created by the city duma, was dissolved. On December 1, power in Novorossiysk passed to the provincial Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.
In Sochi, from October 29, power was concentrated in the hands of the Revolutionary Committee, which relied on Red Guard detachments. On January 9, 1918, the Revolutionary Committee removed the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks from leadership of the executive committee of the Sochi Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and all power passed into the hands of the Bolsheviks. The process of formation of Soviet power in the Sochi District ended with the convocation of the First District Congress of Soviets on January 28-30, at which the District Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies was elected, which formed the district executive committee.
In the Gagra district of the Black Sea province, the power of the Transcaucasian Commissariat was established, formed on November 15, 1917 in Tiflis by the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Dashnaks and Musavatists, who launched a struggle for the separation of Transcaucasia from Soviet Russia.
During January 1918, Soviet power was established in Armavir, Maykop, Temryuk, Tikhoretskaya and a number of villages, where the formation of Red Guard detachments began.
On January 17, representatives of the revolutionary committees and Soviets of the Kuban region gathered in the village of Krymskaya and formed the Kuban Regional Military Revolutionary Committee with the aim of capturing Yekaterinodar and establishing Soviet power.
On February 1, the First Congress of Soviets of the Kuban Region opened in Armavir, proclaiming Soviet power throughout the region. The congress elected the Regional Council and the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee decided to organize organs of Soviet power and abolish the old organs of power.
On March 14, the armed forces of the Reds occupied Yekaterinodar, forcing the Rada and the government with its detachment to leave the Kuban River to join General Kornilov's Volunteer Army. A semi-annual Soviet period began in the Kuban and the Black Sea region.
On March 10-13, the III Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of the Black Sea Governorate took place in Tuapse. It decided to transform the province into the Black Sea Soviet Republic as constituent part RSFSR.
On April 14, the II Regional Congress of Soviets, held in Yekaterinodar, proclaimed the formation of the Kuban Soviet Republic. The congress approved a short constitution, elected the Central Executive Committee and formed the Council of People's Commissars, consisting of 16 commissariats. Ya. V. Poluyan became the chairman of the CEC. In each locality, the congress decided to elect Soviets from among the supporters of the new government to replace the former municipal and Cossack bodies.
The country was already in the midst of a civil war.
On May 28, the III Extraordinary United Congress of Soviets of the Kuban and the Black Sea Region opened in Yekaterinodar, which on May 30 adopted a decision to unite the Kuban and Black Sea Soviet Republics into the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic. However, the old divisions persisted and separatist sentiments were strong.
In June 1918, when the issue of sinking the Black Sea Fleet was being decided, the majority in the leadership of the Kuban-Black Sea Republic spoke out in favor of its formal separation from Russia, hoping to declare the fleet the property of their republic. This caused strong opposition from the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.
The deterioration of the situation at the front, the complication of the situation as a whole for the Soviet government made it necessary to overcome separatist sentiments, and at the First North Caucasian Congress of Soviets on July 7, a decision was made to unite the Kuban-Black Sea, Stavropol and Terek republics into one North Caucasian Soviet republic with a center in Ekaterinodar. It should be noted that the central bodies of Soviet power used old administrative names in documents.
On May 31, 1918, V. I. Lenin signed the decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the organization of the management of the Cossack regions." The labor Cossacks, jointly and on an equal footing with peasants and workers, were given the right to organize Soviets of Cossack, peasant and workers' deputies: in the form of military or regional - like provincial, and district or district - like county, stanitsa or village. These Soviets received representation in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. It was also indicated here that the formation of the Cossack units of the Red Army should immediately begin.
In an atmosphere of acute class struggle, the new state structures carried out complex socio-economic transformations in order to establish
economic life and the seizure of economic power from the bourgeoisie with the overcoming of its resistance.
On the industrial enterprises established workers' control. All social privileges and restrictions were abolished. Priority social measures were carried out: an 8-hour working day, restrictions on overtime work, unemployment and sickness insurance, free public education, free medical care. Having abolished private ownership of urban real estate in large cities, the Soviet government transferred the housing stock into the hands of local authorities, which immediately began the mass resettlement of working families from basements, attics, barracks and dilapidated buildings to comfortable "bourgeois" houses of the former owners.
The land was socialized in rural areas. Equalized land tenure increased the stratum of the middle peasants. Land was partially confiscated from the kulaks. On the landlords' lands, various collective farms were created - communes, state farms, tozes.
The years 1918-1920 constitute one of the most tragic and at the same time heroic pages in the history of Russian society. The events of this period express several social processes. The heroic struggle of the working people of Russia for the preservation of the gains of the revolution, for new life against the attempt of the overthrown classes to restore their dominance became the apogee of the centuries-old social and cultural split of Russian society. At the same time, the war for the independence of Russia against the interventionists and the national liberation struggle in the national regions against the old imperial domination of the overthrown classes were waged. But it was at the same time a fratricidal war, it became a tragedy of Russian society, a national catastrophe that brought enormous sacrifices and suffering. The scale of the armed struggle and mutual terror, the destruction of the economy and cultural heritage, social hatred and general bitterness have seriously affected the public and personal relations of people of more than one generation.
Western states they switched from covert intervention (supporting the counter-revolution within the country) to a direct invasion of the territory of Russia, dividing it into spheres of influence, uniting, rallying, arming all anti-Soviet forces. General M. V. Alekseev was allocated 100 million rubles for the organization of the Entente Volunteer Army in Novocherkassk. This plan was supported by the US government. The dismemberment of Russia was to be carried out, in the opinion of the American leadership, by recognizing provisional governments in various regions of Russia, by providing assistance to these governments and through these governments.
Ataman Krasnov, with the support of the German command, creates the Don Army. Generals A. I. Denikin and M. V. Alekseev in the Kuban form formations of the Volunteer Army with the help of the Entente.
From February 9 to February 10, 1918, the first campaign of the Volunteer Army under the command of General L. G. Kornilov to the Kuban began from Rostov-on-Don. The Kuban Rada went to meet the "liberators". In its statement, the Rada reported that the Kuban Cossacks "could not protect their chosen ones." An attempt by the Whites to storm Yekaterinodar in April 1918 ended in failure and the death of the commander in chief. The campaign to the Kuban, later called the 1st Kuban, or "Ice", lasted 80 days.
Under the conditions of the Civil War, international intervention and the most difficult economic situation in the country, according to the decision of the III Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of the Kuban-Black Sea Republic, an increased export of food to the revolutionary center began. The use of coercive measures, requisitions led to the fact that at the end of the spring of 1918, armed rebellions broke out on the territory of the Kuban region.
In August 1918, the Volunteer Army under the command of General A.I. Denikin, who led the army after the death of Kornilov, launched a large-scale offensive against the Kuban. On August 4, the Whites took Yekaterinodar. But the Reds were not broken. The Red Army of the North Caucasus under the command of I. L. Sorokin concentrated in the eastern part of the Kuban region. It numbered up to 150 thousand fighters, 200 guns. The army was replenished mainly by nonresident peasants. The Reds managed to recapture Stavropol and Armavir from the Whites. But it was not possible to keep these cities.
While military units loyal to the Bolsheviks were retreating, and the Volunteer Army was advancing, Georgian military units crossed the border in the Adler region. As newspapers in Tbilisi wrote, the purpose of the military action was the decision of the Georgian government to "restore" the borders of their state of the XIV century.
On July 5, units of the Georgian National Guard occupied Sochi, on July 13 - Tuapse, then advanced along the railway line to the Khadyzhensk station, along the coast - to Arkhipo-Osipovka, Pshada and Mikhailovsky Pass. The government of N. Zhordanya announced the "temporary" accession of the Sochi and Tuapse districts to the Georgian Democratic Republic. The Georgian units were stopped near Tuapse by the retreating Taman army, and then driven out of the territory of the Black Sea province by the Volunteer Army.
The events of the Civil War are full of examples that testified that the social origin and line of behavior of the participants in revolutionary cataclysms did not always coincide. This was clearly manifested in the example of the Taman army.
The units of the Tamanians were led by two former officers tsarist army E. I. Kovtyukh and G. N. Baturin, who fought against the Whites along with the Kuban, Black Sea sailors who remained in Novorossiysk after the sinking of the Black Sea squadron by Ukrainian units retreating from the Crimea.
In November 1918, the last units loyal to the Bolsheviks left the territory of the region. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (VSYUR), General A. I. Denikin, restored the former Cossack administration, considering the Cossacks to be the most important part of the anti-Bolshevik movement. The former structure of the administrative-territorial division was also recreated. In the Black Sea province, the functions of the governor were performed by General A.P. Kutepov. Town governors, gendarmerie, police appeared in the cities, and the volost and rural administration was revived in the villages and villages.
On December 5, 1918, the Kuban Rada, in accordance with the "Temporary Regulations on the Administration of the Kuban Territory", transformed the Kuban Region into the Kuban Territory. From that time until the end of March 1920, Yekaterinodar was considered a regional center. Similar formations arose on the Don, Terek and other Cossack territories. However, everyone's approach was different. The Kuban and the Don strove for broad autonomy, the highlanders - for separation from Russia, and the command of the All-Union Socialist League - for a united and indivisible Russia.
The Cossack leaders were looking for their own way of developing the Kuban, but this was hampered by old disagreements. After the resignation of M.P. Babych, three military chieftains, five chairmen of the government were replaced, and the composition of the government changed nine times.
The Kuban Rada sought to pursue its own independent policy. Back in August 1918, she launched an active foreign policy activity. Government representatives from Astrakhan, Minsk, Kiev, the Great Don Army, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Persia were accredited to the Kuban Rada. At the beginning of 1919, the Kuban Rada sent a delegation to the Paris (Versailles) peace conference, trying to get the Kuban included in the League of Nations as a full member of the world community.
In autumn, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) instructed People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin to begin negotiations with the Parisian representatives of the Don and Kuban White Cossack governments, who turned to the Council of People's Commissars with a peace proposal.
The command of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia also became aware that the delegation of the Kuban Rada signed a Friendship Treaty with the mountain majlis in Tiflis, in which they promised support to the mountaineers fighting against Denikin. The Commander-in-Chief of the VSYUR declared this treaty illegal. In response, the Kuban Rada began to pull up its troops to Yekaterinodar. The case ended with the arrest and execution of some leaders of the Kuban "independence".
By order of A. I. Denikin, some members of the Parisian delegation were arrested and brought to court-martial. As for the Kuban Rada itself, this was the end of its search for a “third way”.
Conclusion
So, February 1917 drew a line under the history of the Romanov monarchy, it briefly survived its 300th anniversary. Based on the sources I studied, describing the events in Russia in 1915-1917, one main conclusion can be drawn: due to the inept actions of the tsarist government and Nicholas II in particular, due to its inability to competently manage the state, the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 became forced necessary measure. Too great was the dissatisfaction with the tsarist regime of many influential political forces and community groups. The February revolution took place in a different environment than the revolution of 1905-1907. Russia's participation in the exhausting World War I sharply exacerbated all socio-economic and political contradictions. The needs and calamities of the masses, generated by economic ruin, caused acute social tension in the country, the growth of anti-war sentiment and extreme dissatisfaction with the policy of tsarism, not only left and opposition forces, but also a significant part of the right. The authority of autocratic power and its bearer, the emperor, fell sharply. But not everywhere the revolution took place with such success, in many regions there was great resistance.
Considering all the ongoing political events, we can conclude that in the process of establishing Soviet power in the Kuban in the period from 1917 to 1918. there were repeated clashes between the Bolsheviks and local self-government. The population was pulled to one side or the other. In addition, interethnic conflicts constantly occurred. It should be noted that the formation of Soviet power on the territory of the Kuban was not completely completed even after the end of the Civil War. And after that, the confrontation continued. The Soviet people played an important role in improving the basis of agricultural production in the region and organizing it as a whole, which included "the active involvement of the masses of the peasantry in agricultural work, the involvement of teachers, the advanced peasantry to carry out propaganda on the introduction of better farming methods, the organization of peasant demonstration fields, the training of land surveyors It became obvious that without the help of the Center, other peoples, and primarily Russian, it would be difficult to overcome the difficulties that had arisen both in organizing agricultural production and in providing the population with food - the Soviet government provided assistance to the population of the North Caucasus. together with representatives of autonomous entities, the Soviet people passed on their experience to them, while getting acquainted with the customs and traditions of the local population.The population of the North Caucasus could not cope with the pressure of the Soviet authorities, it turned out to be much more profitable on walks under her protection, and not to resist. A major role in the fact that it was Soviet power that was established in the North Caucasus was played by the fact that initially there was a huge preponderance of forces on its side. Undoubtedly, the 1st World War, which did not allow military assistance to be provided to the Russian counter-revolution.
He was the chief of staff of the "Steel" division just in October 1918. at the moment we are interested in.
But I didn’t find anything about Chistov (probably because Chistovs are like uncut dogs). Sorokin after the February Revolution was seen in the ranks of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
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(Saygo @ Yesterday, 23:31)
At the moment we are interested in
From Redneck's report to Stalin:
The task given by you to me was not possible to fulfill for the following reasons: Your order addressed to Kalnin, Chistov and Belenkovich did not find anyone in the designated positions.
This, judging by the context, is somewhere around September 1918.
At this time, the commander-in-chief was Sorokin. Kalnin was taken back in August 1918.
(Saygo @ Yesterday, 23:31)
But I didn’t find anything about Chistov (probably because Chistovs are like uncut dogs).
Chistov's initials, according to unconfirmed reports - "P.G." (Peter Grigorievich?), and according to the press on famous photo body Kornilov post - "Commander of the revolutionary troops of the Caucasian army."
What kind of formation this is and who Chistov is is not clear from this. It is known that when Antonov in Tsaritsyn disbanded the units that left the WWI fronts, the number of armies often reached only 300-400 people! (according to Snesarev - a participant in the events).
(Saygo @ Yesterday, 23:31)
Sorokin after the February Revolution was seen in the ranks of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
Not everything is clear either.
One of the leaders of the SR party (left wing) in the Kuban, Yevgeny Davidovich Lekhno (chairman of the executive committee of the Sochi Soviet), said this:
Sorokin called himself a Left Socialist-Revolutionary... I did not know this, although I was one of the leaders of the S.-R. in the North Caucasus. Yes, I don't think he was.
Former adjutant Sorokin S.F. Hardhead reported about his commander:
He was always present at the party meetings of the primary party organization at the army headquarters, actively speaking on all the issues discussed ... In May 1918, the party organization at the headquarters of the Rostov-Bataysk Front registered Sorokin as a sympathizer of the RCP (b). I know this well, because I was also registered as a sympathizer of our party.
Those. semi-legendary times.
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RED ARMY OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS
(KASK), formed in Feb. 1918 in the Kuban as the South-East. revolutionary army, from Apr. - troops of the Kuban (Kuban-Chernomor.) Sov. Rep., since July - CASK. Counted approx. 98 thousand bayonets and sabers. In the summer of 1918, she suffered a series of defeats and in October. converted to 11 A. Team: A.I. Avtonomov, K.I. Kalnin, I.L. Sorokin.
True, it remains unclear what kind of "commander of the revolutionary troops of the Caucasian army" is. especially in April 1918.
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From the memoirs of Adjutant Sorokin F.F. Krutogolova (published in full in 2010):
Sorokin put military affairs higher and more important than anything during the war, strove to be unlimited in the sphere of military activity, not in civil affairs.
intervened, leaving it to the political agencies of the army. He represented a man who had to fight not only with obvious enemies, but also with some mysterious betrayal,
which surrounded him. He felt all the insincerity of the attitude towards him from the members of the Central Executive Committee of the North Caucasian Republic - Rubin, Krainy (Schneiderman), Rozhansky, Dunaevsky and members of the Emergency Defense Headquarters - Kazbek and Ivanov. They did not know the army, and the army did not know them and did not see them. At the same time, they sent to the main headquarters of the North Caucasian army and to the operational headquarters of the White Guard officers, Denikin's agents, who, hiding, did their dark deeds: they distorted the meaning of orders and orders in favor of the Denikin army, in July 1918 they summoned to an urgent meeting in the main headquarters at st. Tikhoretskaya commissar of the republic A.S. Silichev, military instructor Sosnitsky and at that time raised an uprising in the main headquarters. Silichev and Sosnitsky were killed, Kalnin was wounded, but he managed to escape, the chief of staff Balabin fought to the last bullet and shot himself.
Sorokin, Gaychenets, Shcherbina, Trotsevsky, according to the documents left by the former commander-in-chief of Avtonoms - Rubin, Krainy, Dunaevsky, Rozhansky, Kazbek - were strangers, newcomers, Bundists who took advantage of the fact that the Kuban Bolsheviks, who were in exile, who were arrested by Pokrovsky18, and who were destroyed altogether - seized state, political power in the newly born Kuban-Black Sea, and later the North Caucasian Republic, and tried to seize military power as well. This is what caused all our troubles.
What is this strange intrigue? Who sent whom and where?
He is talking about Goon:
The Ukrainian units of Zhloba25, Mokrousov26, Rodionov and Nikiforova27 (anarchist Marusya) retreated to the Kuban not to defend it, but to preserve their forces. They did not show themselves as heroic deeds.
...
Goon D.P., in violation of Sorokin's order, true to his partisan habit, essentially fled with his units from the front near Tsaritsyn and took advantage of this
whites. They dismembered our front, pinned us to the banks of the Kuban River, and we had to lose thousands of dead and wounded. Redneck helped the defense of Tsaritsyn, but committed a crime against the troops of the 11th army. An impartial history will still weigh his merits and guilt, and will say what is more, which scale is heavier.
This information is fully confirmed by documents from TsGASA:
Head of the main commissariat Sev. Cav. Republic Mamsurov29 until the end of 1918, no one knew what he was doing, his warehouses were always empty, and in the Mineralnye Vody, wagons with ammunition and uniforms stood at a dead end. How could he not know this? The army fought undressed, undressed, without a supply of food and ammunition, it was mowed down by typhoid. In January 1919 there were over 40,000 patients. In the wild sands of Astrakhan, on the way from Kizlyar to Astrakhan, 30 thousand soldiers and commanders of the 11th long-suffering North Caucasian army died.
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Kochubey, thanking the fighters for the attack, called the commander of the Yeysk regiment temporarily assigned to him, Derevyannikov, a lethargic, timid man and ordered him:
Take everything out of the village overnight. Hai Cadets gasp for air. If you take it out - I will reward you, if you don’t take it out - I personally kill it in front of the brigade.
But who really commanded this regiment - Khizhnyak Ivan Lukich (namesake Sorokin) was born on April 2, 1893 in the city of Yeysk, Kuban Region (now Krasnodar Territory) in a large fishing family. In 1914-1917 he served in the tsarist army as part of the 3rd, 222nd, 153rd, 286th and 208th regiments in the following positions: private, platoon commander, company sergeant major, company commander, elective regiment commander in the Caucasus front. He graduated from the regimental school of the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the Western Front (1915), the ensign school in the city of Tiflis (1917).
He was an active participant in the February Revolution. After the dissolution of the old army in December 1917, he volunteered for the ranks of the Red Army. In December 1917, he joined the Bolshevik Party in Kharkov. During the Civil War, from December 1917, I. L. Khizhnyak commanded a company in the Red Guard detachment of R. F. Sievers in the Don region, participated in battles against the troops of General A. M. Kaledin in the Taganrog direction. Since February 1918 - the commander of the battalion of the 1st Yeysk revolutionary regiment of the troops of the North Caucasus, since April - the commander of this regiment. Since February 1919 - the commander of a separate Rostov-Nakhichevan battalion (possibly from ethnic Armenians - New Nakhichevan is now within the boundaries of Rostov, but in those years it was a separate settlement and was inhabited mainly by Armenians, immigrants from the Crimea).
Those. from April 1918 to February 1919 he commanded the Yeisk Infantry Regiment I.L. Khizhnyak (1893-1980). And the battles for Vorovskolesskaya went on between 17.08.1918 and 15.09. 1918.
But I can’t find the exact date of the battles for Vorovskolesskaya anywhere - it is mentioned, but no one gives the date.
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Here is what the whites wrote about the state of the red troops during the Armavir operation 09/08-19/1818:
According to the headquarters of the division, the forces of the enemy who were against us were estimated at 12-15 thousand people, mainly infantry, with 20-30 guns. There were only a few hundred cavalry. The enemy was richly supplied with ammunition and technical means . With the Red troops there were several armored vehicles, sufficient means of communication ... The Reds fought stubbornly, but the general management was very bad.
- Wrangel P. N. Notes
And here is what Snesarev, who inspected the Red troops in the North Caucasus, writes.
29.05.1918:
VII. Supply:
a) unsatisfactory cartridges: some detachments had only 120 cartridges in men and 20 cartridges in reserve, there were detachments almost completely not supplied with cartridges, stocks of cartridges in Tsaritsyn have not yet been clarified;
b) entrenching tools, telephone equipment is not enough, some detachments do not have them at all;
c) there are few artillery pieces, there are not enough shells;
d) convoys in a chaotic state;
e) food - in general, enough: people are given 2 pounds of bread and up to ¾ pound of meat. In some detachments, a lack of bread is beginning to be felt, apparently due to insufficient organization.
VIII. The sanitary service is completely unorganized and is in the most chaotic state, there is not always even a first aid assistant with his bag and the most necessary medicines .., which, of course, will also not contribute to the moral stability of the troops in battles.
7. Supply.
Artillery supply is unsatisfactory.
Armed with rifles Gra, Italian, Winchester, Russian 3-line.
There are 100 shells* per gun, 60-65 [cartridges] per rifle (in the Kuberle area - 30)**.
Quartermaster's clothing allowance has not been established. According to the speakers, there are a lot of barefoot and naked, but at the same time, there are cases of issuing uniforms and salaries several times due to poor organization of the case. There is not enough money (in the Velikoknyazhesky district there are 2,000 rubles at the box office, while up to one million is required per month). The supply is in disarray. In one of the detachments of the Velikoknyazhesky section there is a commissar who is charged with all the supplies. Being eternally under the weight of a continuous flow of demands, partly under the threat of lynching, this exhausted man, but, undoubtedly, good worker, several times began to cry in my presence.
8. There is no sanitary service. She is in the same unacceptable state as on the other fronts of the district.
* In the document it is erroneous - cartridges.
** On the day of my departure, 10 million rifle cartridges and several tens of thousands of shells were received from Tikhoretskaya, which somewhat strengthens the situation (note of the document).
The social and national structure of the population in the Terek region adjacent to the Kuban region on 06/12/1918 according to the report of the head of the Vladikavkaz detachment of the Red Army M.D. Tomashevsky:
The situation in the Terek region
In the Terek region there are up to 300 thousand Chechens, about 80 thousand Ingush, 130 thousand Ossetians, 250 thousand Cossacks, 250 thousand peasants ... Our supporters are about 600 thousand people, against us about 410 thousand people. The Bolsheviks are defenders of statehood and opponents of separatist sentiments.
There are troops: in Vladikavkaz, three battalions (about 1,500 people) with 8 machine guns, one squadron, two field batteries, 4-48 [lin.] howitzers; in Georgievsk, two battalions (about 1,000 men) with four machine guns and one field battery; in Mozdok, half a company of infantry and a howitzer battery (4 howitzers); in Pyatigorsk two battalions of infantry and 6 guns; in Grozny two battalions (1000 people) and 6 guns; flying railway detachment - one company; one armored train and one more is being equipped. There are about 5,000 troops in total.
That. 500 thousand Russians (Cossacks and non-residents 50% each) account for 510 thousand foreigners of 3 nationalities. About 60% of the population supports Soviet power, but there are only about 5,000 organized forces, their discipline and steadfastness in battle are unsatisfactory. Chechens are opposed to Russians (both Cossacks and nonresidents).
But even these 5,000 soldiers are poorly provided for:
There is a cartridge factory in Georgievsk, but there are few stocks; 200 rounds per rifle, 100 rounds in hand, 200 rounds per gun. Great need for weapons, ammunition and shells; equipment must be released for at least 1000 people of an exemplary battalion. A second armored train is urgently needed, otherwise oil cannot be brought in. We also need an armored car for the Georgian Military Highway. There is a strong shortage of banknotes, as a result of which the region has resorted to printing its own money.
In general, the difficulty of communication with the central government was the reason for the independent actions of the regional government, regardless of the center. It is desirable to have a strong connection with the center and help with weapons, ammunition, equipment, money, as well as an emergency order of an armored train, otherwise it is impossible to supply oil and an armored car for the Georgian Military Highway.
07/01/1918 Commander of the Kuban Front Kalnin (Sorokin's predecessor):
Sukhumi front. The position of the front is unimportant, there are no shells and cartridges.
Inner front. In the area of Zimovniki-Velikoknyazheskaya, the Cadets occupied Torgovaya and Velikoknyazheskaya**. The railroad line in the designated area is in the hands of counter-revolutionary gangs and is thus cut off from Tsaritsyn. I am taking all measures, concentrating troops in order to take possession of the railway line.
There are no shells and cartridges at the fronts, as well as money for issuing salaries to the regiments for the month of June of this year. Those I sent for shells, cartridges and money did not return.
** On June 25, 1918, Art. Trading (TsGASA, f. 100, op. 12, d. 39, l. 24), June 28, 1918, - Velikoknyazheskaya (TsGASA, f. 100, op. 12, D. 36, l. 88).
07/3/1918 military instructor Snesarev and military commissar Anisimov:
5. Kalmyks adjoin the rebellious Cossacks. At the Krachkovsky front, there is an acute shortage of rifle cartridges (at least 1 million rifle cartridges, 200 thousand artillery cartridges are urgently needed).
...
5. Absolutely urgently, out of any queue, it is necessary to release 20 million rifle cartridges and one million 3-inch artillery shells to the North Caucasian District. The Tsaritsyno base has essentially been completely exhausted.
6. The situation of the North Caucasian District is not only critical, which makes it necessary for the state to pay the most serious attention of the center to it, since otherwise it may soon turn from critical into catastrophic.
This refers to the entry into the civil war of the Don Kalmyk Cossacks on the side of the Whites. Shortage of cartridges for the first time - at least 1 million pieces! With the number of Soviet units of about 40 thousand, this is only 25 rounds per rifle!
07/29/1918 from the report of the military council of the North Caucasian military district of the Red Army:
4. In the Kuban region, Kalnin's troops endure big disadvantage cartridges, shells, but it is impossible to give them, why they were already forced to clear Tikhoretskaya, and on July 23 also Kavkazskaya, there is no exact information about the situation of the Kalnin group, we are doing everything possible to clarify it. The troops of Colonel Shkuro, who have occupied Stavropol, threaten to seize Armavir.
And again on the flank of the Kuban - Sergo Ordzhonikidze reports:
On August 6, at 5 o'clock in the morning, counter-revolutionary gangs of Cossack and Ossetian officers attacked the city, supported by the self-defense of the city center *, starting an uprising against Soviet power. After 11 days of stubborn fighting, the rebels were defeated (they fled the city). For all the time of the fighting, the Red Army behaved beyond all praise, defending Soviet power with its chest. The Molokan and Kursk settlements and the whole of Ingushetia and Chechnya rose as one man against the counter-revolution in defense of Soviet power.
* So in the document.
Those. From August 6 to August 17, 1918, serious battles were going on in the rear near Sorokin, supply lines were already unimportant, and then Vladikavkaz practically fell out of the railway transport scheme.
At this time, the real situation in the center is such that after 09/11/1918 they not only do not supply Sorokin with ammunition, but they don’t even know what’s wrong with him, they try to reorganize the troops, but there is no real opportunity to do this - from the report of the military inspection on the Southern Front:
There is no information about the situation of the North Caucasian army, almost the same can be said about the Astrakhan group. Details of these two groups are attached *.
...
All the troops of Soviet power operating in the North Caucasus must be united under one common command, although this will not be easy to do all at once. At the moment, the North Caucasus, in my opinion, is a series of oases in which Soviet troops operate without any connection with each other, without a common task, and therefore cannot be strong, because they are not inspired, not united by one command will.
I put as the basis the complete unification of all Soviet troops operating within the North Caucasus, in a single command and the restoration of any kind of connection with this army. The North Caucasian army will receive the number 11 of the army. The post of army commander is vacant.
* Applications in the case were not found.
Sorokin's position is already very precarious - he eats only from local resources, he is not seen as a future army commander 11 in the center ...
Meanwhile, People's Commissar of Labor A.G. Shlyapnikov reports on September 20, 1918 about the beginning of ethnic clashes that paralyze the supply of Sorokin's troops:
By the time I arrived from the village of Goity, on the night of August 18, in Grozny, the battle with the Cossacks had already been going on for the 8th day. Neighboring villages provided assistance to the Grozny village. Chechen forces mobilized against these villages. As a result, according to the latest news, Grozny workers destroyed the station. Grozny, and the Chechens burned and massacred the inhabitants of the sts. Yermolovskaya and besieged sts. Petropavlovskaya. Communication with Vladikavkaz by rail was interrupted and carried out by messengers through the mountains. In Vladikavkaz itself, in the first half of August, there was a multi-day battle. The victory remained with our troops, among which the Ingush occupied a prominent place. There was also a battle in Kizlyar, but due to the lack of equipment, the Kizlyar garrison wages an exclusively defensive war, being surrounded on all sides by the Cossacks. The coast of the Caspian Sea to the Bryanskaya pier is in the hands of the Cossacks.
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The full text of the order on the reorganization of the Red troops in the North Caucasus and the appointment of commander-in-chief I. Sorokin:
ORDER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY VOICE COUNCIL OF THE FRONT ON THE APPROVAL OF I.L.
No. 118 September 24, 1918,
§ one
The Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front decided: to approve the commander of the troops operating in the North Caucasus, comrade Sorokin.
§ 2
All Soviet troops operating within the Stavropol province are included in unconditional subordination to the commander of the troops of the North Caucasus, Comrade Sorokin,
§ 3
All Soviet troops of the North Caucasus, acting under the command of Comrade Sorokin, are declared mobilized on a common basis.
§ four
Tov. Sorokin is ordered to immediately take all measures and urgently establish both telephone and telegraph communications between his units, as well as with the troops of the Tsaritsyno Front and the Military Revolutionary Council through the following points: Divnoye, Crosses of the Astrakhan province, Zavetnoye and Tsaritsyn,
§ 5
For the speediest possible cleansing of the cadet gangs and for the elimination of counter-revolutionary actions in the North Caucasus, it is necessary to cut off all the gangs of Alekseev and Denikin from the cities of Rostov and Novocherkassk, which are their strategic centers and supply bases. The problem can be solved if our troops, passing along the left bank of the river. Manych, they will go to the Bataysk-Key of Rostov.Based on such considerations, the Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front ordered: Comrade Sorokin, commander of the troops of the North Caucasus, entrenched in convenient positions along the front Apsheronskaya-Bzhedukhovskaya-Mikhailovskaya - Gulkevichi - Armavir - Nevinnomysskaya, to allocate up to 15,000 bayonets from there with sufficient cavalry and artillery, transfer them to the Stavropol district to the village. Vinodelny, where, pouring into the Stavropol troops, separate the strike group, which, dividing into three sections (right-flank, central and left-flank), prepare for the following operations.
Right-flank section of the shock Stavropol group.
Having built a front from the lake. Manych to the south and having closely connected with its left flank with parts of the central sector, immediately open an energetic offensive along the left bank of the Manych, keeping the direction to Bataysk and not losing all the time communication with the central sector,The central section of the shock Stavropol group.
Having closely connected with the units of the right-flank section and deployed with the front to the west to the south of its ledge, at the same time go on the offensive, moving towards the villages of Dmitrievskoye, Medvezhye, White clay, Yegorlykskaya, Kagalnitskaya, Bataysk, all the while keeping a close connection both to the left and to the right.Left-flank section of the shock Stavropol group.
Having established a close connection with the central section to the right and left with the units located in the Aleksandrovsky district, simultaneously with the advancement of the right-flank [and] Central sections, move with a swift blow in the direction of Safe, Uspenskaya, Novopokrovskaya, Nezamaevskaya, Tikhoretskaya, Sosyka, Kushevskaya and Bataysk.Parts located in Aleksandrovsky Uyezd and to the north of it, east of Stavropol.
With a swift blow, level the front and surround Stavropol, cut the line of the railway (Stavropol-Kavkazskaya ") near the Pelagiada station, take Stavropol, pulling together all the units located in the Aleksandrovsky district and the Labinsk department. All the time of operations, keep close contact with the neighbors to the right, left and rear.Parts located in the Batalpashinsky, Labinsk and Maikop departments, having contacted each other and with the headquarters of the commander of the North Caucasian Front, firmly gain a foothold in their positions, demonstrating an offensive in various places on the instructions of Comrade Sorokin.
§ 6
Comrade Sorokin, commander of the troops of the North Caucasus, is ordered to take all measures to protect the city of Grozny from attacks by cadet bands and to protect all industries from damage.
§ 7
The entire operation in the northern districts of the Stavropol province is ordered by the Military Revolutionary Council to be carried out by Comrade Sorokin himself.
§ eight
The Military Revolutionary Council instructs Comrade Sorokin to select and appoint commanders, as well as the boundaries of their sectors, who is obliged to immediately inform the Military Revolutionary Council about this with a secret package.
§ 9
Tov. The Military Revolutionary Council orders Sorokin to report on the progress of operations until telegraph communication is restored once a day, and with the restoration of telegraph communication, twice a day, in the morning and in the evening.
§ ten
The execution of this order must be started in the near future, and therefore all regroupings are ordered by Comrade Sorokin to be carried out urgently.Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front Stalin
Members: Minin, Voroshilov
And, most interestingly, Sorokin, without cartridges and normal communications, nevertheless took Stavropol on 10/15/1918. Here is what he said at the front-line congress in Pyatigorsk to representatives of the Central Executive Committee of the North Caucasian Republic - a word from the adjutant of the commander-in-chief Krutogolov:
If you have released enough money for the army, then present bank documents. Then. I am the commander-in-chief, I am in charge of the army, and not its supply. I am not the head of the main commissariat. Head of the main commissariat Mamsurov, so ask him: why does he have empty warehouses? What does he do? Why did the wagons with cartridges, shells and uniforms end up in the Minvody, in the dead end of the railway station, between burnt and broken wagons and steam locomotives? Who drove them there? Where are the documents for them?
Those. while the Red Army fought without ammunition, a mess was created in the rear. Subsequently, Sorokin will be remembered for this - says Chekist V. Vikulov:
On October 15, 1918, at the insistence of the regional committee of the party and the Central Executive Committee, a congress of commanders and delegates of military units opened in Pyatigorsk. All the members of the Revolutionary Military Council, leading officials of the regional committee and the Central Executive Committee, Sorokin with his headquarters were present ...
The commander-in-chief went up to the podium in a brand new Circassian coat with a patterned belt, in a kubanka made of black kurpei. Casting a piercing glance over the delegates, drawing out his words, he began a report on the state of the army and its tasks. Sorokin blamed all the blame for the difficult situation in the units and formations on the government and the regional committee, accusing them of hindering him. In conclusion, regardless of the extremely difficult financial position republic, he impudently demanded two million rubles from the government...
As you can see, there was a sharp struggle within the leadership of the North Caucasian Republic, and the dividing line lay between the military and civilian authorities, who were supported by the Cheka under the leadership of M. Vlasov.
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(Zhang Geda @ Today, 18:54)
The Taman army of Matveev was created on August 27, 1918 in Gelendzhik. At this time, the Red troops lost contact with each other due to the loss of Yekaterinodar on 08/16/1918.
(Zhang Geda @ Today, 18:54)
Adjutant Sorokina wrote that if Matveev had begun a retreat not to Gelendzhik and Tuapse, but to Timashevka and further east, then the strategic position of the Red troops in the Kuban would have improved and, perhaps, there would have been no retreat to Astrakhan at all.
(Zhang Geda @ Today, 19:34)
So, as we can see, Wrangel, to put it mildly, exaggerates the equipment of the Red troops and the provision of their ammunition. For what purpose? Embellish your victory?
Wrangel wrote:
Behind Wrangel's "Notes" there is something more than a desire to embellish one's successes. And the history of their publication is quite interesting. I'm posting it as a separate post, just in case it develops into a separate topic.
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(Saygo @ Today, 19:16)
If the army was created in Gelendzhik, then how could it bypass Gelendzhik?
The formation of the Taman army was a forced measure, which was taken in the conditions of retreat from Timashevskaya to the west. They say that Matveev, as the commander of one of the columns (originally the Taman army - a mechanical association of 3 columns of red troops), did not comply with Sorokin's order to join forces by retreating east from Timashevka, but went west to Gelendzhik.
They went to Gelendzhik in separate columns, with refugees, they were badly battered by the Whites and the invaders. An army was formed in Gelendzhik and marched on Tuapse.
But if Matveev would not go to Gelendzhik?
(Saygo @ Today, 19:16)
Wrangel wrote:
Revere the whites - so everyone robbed the Reds, and the whites were saints. Only now they lost the war - no one wanted to fight for them. The same Kubans, when Denikin hanged Kulabukhov (this is the question - did white priests hang), began to desert en masse from his army (as a result, only about 15% of the Kuban contingent remained at the time Denikin surrendered command to Wrangel).
Incl. no faith in it
The enemy forces were estimated at 80,000 bayonets and checkers with 100 guns. With the huge reserves of our former armies, the enemy was incomparably stronger and technically, however, inept leadership and lack of discipline nullified this superiority.
...
Almost all the soldiers of the Red Army had significant amounts of money with them, in the convoys of the Red troops one could find everything from soap, tobacco, matches and ending with sable coats, crystal dishes, pianos and gramophones.
The DOCUMENTS I cited (unlike the notes, to put it mildly, made after the fact for a specific purpose and, as usual, by eye, without documents) and evidence of a memoir character show all the "conscientiousness" of his information.
Although the image of Sorokin was regularly drawn as a kind of adventurer who drank expensive cognac and surrounded himself with all possible luxury. In this, by the way, it could be true. Only now Sorokin was one for 40-80 thousand fighters (and not 100 thousand, as Wrangel writes - the whites always mercilessly exaggerated, while in the documents of the reds there were such things:
According to these detachments, there are up to 6,000 enemy troops. Military commissar Zedin is inclined to consider this number highly exaggerated and it is more likely to consider their detachment the result of their own fear, especially since already once some of them had to be disarmed in Tsaritsyn, due to their moral unreliability.
TsGASA, f. 40435, op. 1, d. 82, l. 338. Copy.).
Incl. the question of what made Wrangel lie (good pun) remains open!
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Monetary allowance of the Red Army in the North Caucasus and the Southern Front in 1918:
Quartermaster's clothing allowance has not been established. According to the speakers, there are a lot of barefoot and naked, but at the same time, there are cases of issuing uniforms and salaries several times due to poor organization of the case. There is not enough money (in the Velikoknyazhesky district there are 2,000 rubles at the box office, while up to one million is required per month).
...
3) In view of the fact that no records of people exist, lists, apparently, are not kept, a person is not listed in a certain part and, strictly speaking, is not connected with it by anything binding on him, then there is an almost continuous change in the number of each of the detachments, than the most elementary tactical assumptions are violated, there is an unjustified waste of people's money for the issuance of salaries, for uniforms, etc., and most importantly, each commander of the detachment is deprived of the actual opportunity to answer the question: what combat strength does he have at his disposal and what can he do? The only way out of such a situation would be to determine at least some norms for military units, and then tie people, perhaps in the way recommended above, to a certain part, then keep a strict account of people and materiel, categorically prohibit the issuance of salaries for unserved time.
TsGASA, f. 3, he. 1, d. 90, ll. 79-81. Script.
The salary of the Red Army soldiers is 300 rubles per month with their own maintenance and clothing.
...
There is a strong shortage of banknotes, as a result of which the region has resorted to printing its own money.
[Podvoisky]: How much money do you need? How many are expected to be mobilized?
[Zinoviev]: - I propose to the chairman of the executive committee to release a credit for each mobilized strictly accounted soldier, not a runner, 600 rubles, presumably; in fact, of course, the costs will be much lower, based on this norm and on the lists presented in the report, certified by the Orenburg executive committee.
[Podvoisky]: - The loan was released, 1600 rubles were approved. All expenses on assignment, maintenance of soldiers and horses in a combat situation, and absolutely all expenses associated with barracks and field life and for the maintenance of command staff, headquarters and office are considered.
...
[Zinoviev]: - With the mobilization of workers and peasants, up to 15 million banknotes are needed, how can we get them now? Come to Ufa. At the front, no change. Goodbye. Zinoviev.
TsGASA, f. 10, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 62-63. Copy.
There are no shells and cartridges at the fronts, as well as money for issuing salaries to the regiments for the month of June of this year.
TsGASA, f. 100, op. ;2, d. 49, l. 19. Original.
The last message of Commander-in-Chief Kalnin is very interesting - if Snesarev indicated that 2 million rubles were needed. for a month, and the salary of a Red Army soldier is 300 rubles, then in the lists (for all their inferiority) there were only less than 70 thousand people! Combatants and non-combatants!
So what are we going to do folks? Documents - they are documents. And it was not for nothing that Sorokin ran into the Central Executive Committee - where are the 2 million who were supposedly released to the army?
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It was no better in the neighboring regions - here is the information from Baku for 07/18/1918:
Communication with the local Council of People's Commissars is complete, contact too, in view of the ambulance with new forces, three million money, and most importantly, at least two or three fighters (vessels) and four motor pontoons for the river. Hens. Its significance for my right flank is important, for this river covers my left flank. Forces here, as it turns out, 5-6 thousand, no more, and then oh ... *** these thousands! .. *** I will wait and hold on!
P.S. Place machine guns and Hotchkiss guns on the pontoons. Desperately need 6-inch. shells and shells.
TsGASA, f. 40435, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 175-176. Autograph.
1.06.1918, Ural:
[Goloshchekin]: - ... Mobilization in the Middle Urals is going well. We gave the order to start intensive military exercises. So far, no reinforcements have been received from Kazan, in general, about the forces operating with Southern Urals, except for those sent by us from the Yekaterinburg district, * - it is not known, because Ufa and Kazan do not provide information, despite our requests.
It is strange that the center does not help with armaments, although we have repeatedly demanded this. The attitude of Sklyansky, who does not send money, despite the promise, is also unacceptable. Further ignoring us may reflect badly on the course of affairs. We know nothing about Berzin and have not heard anything. District military commissar Goloshchekin.
TsGASA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 29, ll. 21-24. Telegraph form.
Moreover, the situation with the lack of money and ammunition in the Caucasus was permanent - even Avtonomov reported on 04/18/1918, after the Red troops defended Yekaterinodar:
In conversations, the commander-in-chief Avtonomov complains about the lack of equipment and the lack of a sufficient number of rifles, cars and airplanes, as well as the lack of money. There are forces - over 75 thousand, there is nothing to support.
Upon receipt, please investigate immediately and send money for the upkeep of the army urgently, delaying the deportation will delay the fight against counter-revolutionaries.
TsGASA, f. 3, op. 1, d. 21, l. 335. Copy.
These are documents. Do not dispute.
That the robbers, who temporarily adjoined the Red Army, had stolen money - I do not argue. But this got out of hand - in the documents there are a lot of examples of how parts are reorganized, dubious elements are removed, criminals are put on trial.
And so - how could Wrangel lie?
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More about the delights of supply in the North Caucasus in 1918:
General position. The military-strategic position of the Soviet troops in the Caucasus is presented as follows: the Transcaucasian railway from Batum and Poti to Yevlakh, the Kara railway from Tiflis to Alagez are in the hands of the German-Turks and Georgians, The Vladikavkaz railway from Gudermes to Chir-Yurt is in the hands of the Chechens. The further advance of the German-Turks to the Caspian Sea is hindered by Soviet troops, and on the Kara road, Nazarbekov's corps, which includes Armenian regiments.
Information about the enemy. There is no exact information about the numerical strength of the regular Turkish troops operating against the Baku Corps, but it includes German instructors who form and organize the local Muslim population, the numerical strength of which is very solid, they were also joined by Persian robber tribes, the Shahsevans, who crossed the Araks to Mugan.
As we remember, at this moment the main supply base of the North Caucasus is Tsaritsyn. The road goes through Astrakhan and Vladikavkaz. The Chechens are "cutting out" a piece of about 60 km., on which, during the critical days of the White offensive on Yekaterinodar, traffic is practically paralyzed.
Where did the Reds get a lot of shells and cartridges from? The whites, let's not forget, have the support of the allies and the German-Turkish forces (different groups have different masters).
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On the importance of the railway junction in the Gudermes region, which controlled the Chechens in August 1918:
it was the creation in 1893 of the railway junction of the then Vladikavkaz railway. near the village of Gyumse (locomotive depot, railway turntable, workshops, station) became a city-forming impetus for the transformation of the (mentioned above) aul, village / worker's settlement and village into the city of Gudermes. Both before and now, Gudermes is an important transport hub of the North Caucasus: the railway junction of the North Caucasian Railway Russian Federation(lines to Astrakhan, Rostov-on-Don, Mozdok, Baku), highway M29 Rostov-on-Don - Baku.
From Chiri-Yurt the railway goes to Argun, and from there to Vladikavkaz. Relying on Gudermes, the Chechens paralyzed the supply of the North Caucasian Red Army in the most crucial days, when the fate of Yekaterinodar was being decided.
As of 07/12/1918, the message in the North Caucasus by rail is only fragmentary:
Railway communication free from art. Cool on Mozdok to the station. Chervlennaya and further to Kizlyar; from Chervlennaya to Petrovsk, the path was dismantled and Petrovsk was isolated from the region, having communication only with Baku, and with Astrakhan and the region only by sea. From Art. Cool to the south to Beslan, trains are robbed by Ossetians and Ingush in the area of st. Dargkokh and Elkhotovo. From Beslan to the Terrible Way restored by political negotiations with the Ingush; oil is transported, but in general, traffic is safe only with armored trains. There may be a break in the railway traffic from the Batalpashinsky district in the direction of Pyatigorsk and Mineralnye Vody.
TsGASA, f. 40435, op. 1, d. 82, ll. 209-210. Copy.
After 08/22/1918 - the supply of counter-revolutionary forces in the Eastern Caucasus by the British and Turks:
According to the latest reports, the Cossacks entered into an agreement with the British, receiving military equipment from them in exchange for bread. It is also reported that the British landed at the Novo-Terechnaya pier in the amount of two companies. In addition, Colonel Bicherakhov moved to Petrovsk-Port along the line of the Baku-Derbent railway. Until August 22, the day I was in Petrovsk-Port, Bicherakhov with up to a thousand Cossacks and local bands of Lezgins was in Derbent. Our forces were sent from Temir-Khan-Shura and Petrovsky Port near Derbent. Near Chir-Yurt, along the line of the river. Sulak, our troops stood defending the path from Chir-Yurt to Petrovsk from Kalmyk-Chechen counter-revolutionary gangs led by sheikhs and Imam Nazhmutdin Gotsinsky, people of Turkish orientation, acting at the expense of the Turkish government. Railway from Chir-Yurt to Grozny was destroyed. An oil pipeline was also destroyed, connecting the Grozny oil tanks with the tanks of the Petrovsky Port, through which, under normal conditions, up to 300 thousand poods of oil were pumped daily.
TsGASA, f. 1, op. 2, d. 45, ll. 171-174. Certified copy.
In Tuapse, the Taman army led by Matveev and Kovtyukh had to face the Georgians who occupied the city. How did they get there?
A detachment of troops of Menshevik Georgia, fortified in Tuapse, was led by Major General Giorgi Mazniashvili (1870 or 1872-1937).
Giorgi Mazniashvili (portrait in the appendix) was born in 1870 in the village of Sasireti in the Kaspi region. He distinguished himself in the Russo-Japanese War, was wounded. In the infirmary, Nicholas II himself visited him, awarding him the Order of St. George.
After the February Revolution, Mazniashvili returned to Georgia and founded the Georgian 2nd Division. In 1918, the Transcaucasian Commissariat instructed him to defend Tbilisi from the threat from the Russian armies chaotically retreating from the Turkish front. The Bolsheviks sought to use these military forces to seize power. Mazniashvili averted the threat from the capital with the help of an armored train and a cavalry regiment of Georgian Muslims.
In April 1918, on the basis of the Brest peace, the Turks occupied Batumi, crossed into Guria and reached Ozurgeti. Having mobilized the people's militia, partisans and parts of the regular troops, Mazniashvili liberated Guria and Batumi. 06/18/1918 Mazniashvili was appointed governor-general of Abkhazia and commander of the troops. With the help of Georgian troops, which included the Abkhazian cavalry of 300 fighters, he occupied the cities of Gagra, Sochi, Tuapse. In October he was appointed governor-general of the Tbilisi district, in December commander-in-chief during the war with Armenia, at which time he became close friends with General Kvintinadze. Their military alliance largely determined the coherence of the actions of the Georgian troops and, ultimately, the success of military operations on the part of Georgia.
In 1919, he was appointed governor-general of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki, and in 1920, commander of the Tbilisi garrison. In February 1921, Mazniashvili was the commander of the Soganlug troops, who defended Tbilisi from the Krtsanisi field.
In March 1921, the Turks again occupied the southern regions of Georgia and Batumi. The Georgian Bolsheviks turned to Mazniashvili for help. Sergo Ordzhonikidze told him: "As a Menshevik general, you are outlawed and anyone can shoot you, so go over to the side of the Bolsheviks." Mazniashvili answered him: “I am not a Menshevik or Bolshevik general. I am a Georgian general." Then Mazniashvili drove the Turks out of Batumi in two days.
After the annexation of Georgia to the USSR, in 1923 the general was arrested. In 1925 he was exiled to Iran, from where he moved to France. There he became the victim of slander and gossip, claiming that it was he who allegedly gave the Bolsheviks the plan for the 1924 uprising. “Giorgi Mazniashvili would rather die than betray his homeland,” he wrote to Noah Zhordania.
Mazniashvili could not live long in a foreign land and, after lengthy negotiations with the Soviet government, returned to his homeland, where many troubles and injustice awaited him. They didn't give him a job, they didn't give him a pension. Left without funds, the general returned to his native village, where he supported his family by housekeeping. In 1937, his son was first arrested, and then the general himself was arrested and shot. The location of his grave is unknown.
By order of the Government of Georgia, G. Mazniashvili had to take the railway. the Tuapse-Maikop line in order to withdraw from there the grain and oil promised by the Kuban government:
This report of mine would have been approved by the government, if at that time there was no shortage of grain and oil in Georgia. Just then, a certain Lapin, a member of the Kuban Rada, arrived in Sochi and told me and Gizo Anjaparidze that the Kuban Rada thanks us for the patronage of the Cossack refugees, that the Kuban government is ready to sell us grain in sufficient quantities if Georgia helps in occupying Tuapse and Maykop. Lapin assured that a large stock of wheat had been accumulated at the Maikop railway station and that it was necessary to take the Tuapse-Maikop line for its export, that so much oil and oil products had been accumulated at the stations of Azerbaijan and Dagestan that the whole of Georgia would last for a long time.
"This report of mine", mentioned by General Mazniashvili, is summarized in one line in his memoirs:
A trip to Tuapse considered unnecessary
Mazniashvili understood that the invasion of the Black Sea province of Russia is a war with the Russians. But then the Abkhazian National Council (ANC) intervened in the matter, which called the Georgians and Germans for help, and also gathered 300 horsemen to assist the Georgian troops. The shortage of bread and oil, as well as the assurances of the Kuban Rada in assistance, led to the fact that the war with Georgia began.
Decree of the Abkhazian National Council on the need to occupy the Sochi and Tuapse districts
The Abkhazian National Council, having discussed the political moment and taking into account, firstly, the fact that the Bolshevik anarchy, which has been tearing apart Abkhazia for three months already, feeds mainly on the Sochi and Tuapse districts and, secondly, also taking into account the fact that the Bolshevik mood was created and maintained on the basis of food difficulties arising from the moment the port of Tuapse was occupied by the Bolsheviks, who stopped communication with the North Caucasus and delayed food shipments coming from the North Caucasus to the Black Sea coast of Abkhazia and Georgia, decided: to establish a lasting order in Abkhazia and resolve the food crisis as in Abkhazia, and in Georgia, it is necessary to recognize the occupation of the Sochi and Tuapse districts with the port of Tuapse. Bring this resolution to the attention of the Government of the Georgian Democratic Republic and the commander of the detachment, Major General Mazniev.
Genuine signed by the Chairman of the Abkhazian National Council
V.A. Shervashidze
TsGAA, f.I-39, op.1, d.6, l.13.
07/06/1918 Georgian troops captured Sochi. The testimonies of contemporaries report that many in Sochi welcomed the arrival of the Georgian Mensheviks as a guarantee against the return of the Bolsheviks. At the same time, Mazniashvili's troops brutally suppressed the actions of the Abkhaz, who did not want to live in the same state with the Georgians, and imposed huge indemnities on their settlements. The soldiers of the Georgian troops were outrageous, robbing the population. Serafimovich in "Iron Stream" harshly went over the Georgian officers who raped women.
07/27/1918, General G. Mazniashvili reports to Tbilisi:
I inform you that on July 26 at 20 o'clock my troops, after a 12-hour stubborn battle, took Tuapse. The enemy fought back fiercely. The capture of each hill had to be fought. They took many prisoners, took away 4 cannons, 12 machine guns, a huge amount of ammunition, various ships, cars, 5 locomotives with wagons and a large quartermaster's property
Wishing to forestall the attack of the enemy concentrated at the Belorechenskaya station, the troops entrusted to me on August 4 at 1 pm went over to the offensive and dispersed the enemy advance detachments, which had fortified six kilometers from Tuapse. Continuing the offensive, our troops met with the main enemy forces - with the regiments of Mikhail and Maikop with total strength about 4 thousand people led by Antonov. This army had three guns, an armored train called "Freedom Fighter No. 2" and many machine guns. The battle began four versts from the village. Greshesko; after a six-hour stubborn battle, Antonov's army was defeated and dispersed. The number of wounded and killed Bolsheviks is estimated in the hundreds. An armored train was smashed, a steam locomotive was burned and the entire train was caught, two cannons, 30 machine guns, a huge number of bullets for machine guns, grenades and rifles were captured. They also seized a serviceable field kitchen, a whole train with machines for digging a ditch, flour, canned food in boxes, a whole communication property, a herd of sheep, four train sets. Pursuing the finally defeated enemy, on August 4 at the twentieth hour they took the Krivenkovskaya station, advanced 5 km forward and are currently fortified there.
However, the valor of the Georgian troops turned out to be very short - 08/16/1918 Denikin took Krasnodar. The western grouping of Soviet troops was cut off from the main forces. Under these conditions, the red units began to retreat to Novorossiysk. With the approach of troops numbering up to 30 thousand fighters (but weighed down by 25 thousand refugees fleeing the atrocities of the whites), a few German and Turkish troops left the city. The Reds did not linger in it and moved to Gelendzhik, where on 08/27/1918 the Taman army was formed under the command of Matveev.
On August 28, 1918, the 1st column of the Taman army occupied Arkhipo-Osipovka, and on September 1, 1918, captured Tuapse, defeating Mazniashvili's troops and capturing 16 guns, 10 machine guns, 6,000 shells and 800 thousand rounds of ammunition. According to some reports, the positions in Tuapse were occupied by only 500 Georgian soldiers, but the position was very advantageously located, being shot from guns, for which the Georgians had no shortage of ammunition. The Tamanians, on the other hand, had no more than 5 rounds of ammunition per person. 09/2/1918 The 1st column set out from Tuapse through the spurs of the Main Caucasian ridge to the village of Khadyzhenskaya, followed by parts of the 2nd column. The 3rd column was in Tuapse until 09/07/1918. So the Tamanians broke through the Georgian barrier, which Denikin and the Kuban Rada had hoped for, but Soviet power in Tuapse was established only 2 years later.
In the last quarter of a century, historians such as Pivovarov, Mlechin, Svanidze and the like, when mentioning cruelties civil war they definitely focus on the so-called "Red Terror" and do not say a word that there was a "White Terror" no less cruel and bloody.
Let's fill in the gaps in our history and turn to the book of the White emigrant Georgy Pokrovsky “Denikin. The Year of Politics and Economics in the Kuban 1918-1919, published in Berlin in 1923.
I must say that the book caused a great resonance among the emigrant public. Reputable magazines published reviews of it, giving a conflicting assessment. But they agreed on one thing: the book is written on rich factual material. Scientific weight is given to it by the use of rich documentary material by the author: transcripts of meetings of the Kuban Rada, publications of official government documents and materials in official Kuban, as well as memoirs, various periodicals.
Pokrovsky in his work explores the theme of the morale of the white troops, the moral and psychological state of officers and soldiers, the source of the study is mainly documents.
He writes that Denikin's Volunteer Army repeatedly and everywhere subjected peasants and working people to violence and abuse during their stay in the Kuban.
In support of his words, Pokrovsky quotes the report of the cornet of the 1st plastun battalion V. F. Bliznyuk dated November 6, 1918 to the chairman of the legal commission of the emergency council. It said that with the occupation of the village of Abinskaya by a detachment of the Volunteer Army “... they no longer distinguished either non-residents or Cossacks. Usually the victims of the execution were forced to strip naked, sometimes in the middle of the square, in the presence of adults and children, they were ordered to lie down, put boots on their heads or necks and flogged with ramrods or whips until blood spatters and pieces of torn meat flew in all directions ...
Mass of raped girls and even children. On one farm, eight Cossacks raped a woman who had been relieved of her burden three days ago. There were cases when the restorers of "law and order" gave life to women after obliging the latter to spend several nights with them ...
...Waves of Jewish pogroms swept through the territory of the rear of the Volunteer Army. The Jewish population was beaten almost without exception. Neither old nor young were spared. Enough of a Jewish surname, a Jewish physiognomy, how you are doomed to death ... "
This is one of the numerous testimonies of the "White Terror". It reveals the true face of the counter-revolution, which is hidden under the mask of saving the motherland.