This article was originally written by L.V. Sapogovskaya was published under the title “Gold mining of the Republic of Soviets - USSR - Russian Federation: evolution of the industry in alternative management systems” in the collection “Economic History. Yearbook. 2003” (M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. P. 266-308).
The status of the gold mining industry of the Russian economy in various economic systems that succeeded each other throughout the 20th century was determined by a set of conditions for its development, formed by state policy in the relevant area. At each specific stage of Russian history, the status of the industry reflected the institutionalization of ideas about the economic role of gold and the nature of its inclusion in modernization processes. The range of functions of gold in demand during the period under review was wide - from ensuring monetary circulation, emergency and planned international payments, economic and mobilization reserves, guaranteeing loans and servicing external debt, to political-ideological and proclamative. Let us emphasize: the author sees the deep problematic context of the topic stated in the article in the fact that the special role of gold in the economic history of the 20th century. 1 allows us to consider the presence of our own gold mining as one of the important factors in the formation of national economic models.
The development of the gold industry in Russia, one of the leading gold-mining countries, has not received proper historiographical coverage 2 . This especially applies to the Soviet period in the history of the industry, which developed in an atmosphere of secrecy. It is possible to clearly define the chronological period of maximum official “closedness” of the topic - from 1929 to 1991. This period of time is characterized by a largely irreparable loss of information, since, firstly, the process of historiographic analysis, based on the introduction of source materials into scientific circulation, was interrupted complexes, and, secondly, the problem itself was artificially isolated during the formation of conceptual ideas about the features of national economic development. But even the milestone year of 1991 did not give impetus for large-scale adoption of information (for example, on time series of production, the state of gold reserves, the nature of the use of gold resources and reserves, relevant directives of authorized government structures). The hierarchy of accessibility for researchers of archival collections is also preserved.
These conditions determined the nature of the information and analytics discussed in this article. The author qualifies the work as, in a certain sense, staged. The objective limitation of the source base did not entail a narrowing of research tasks. The author followed the path of accumulation and systematization of information from available archival sources (mainly office documentation of various subjects of the gold economy), consistent analysis of sets of legislative acts, periodicals, as well as development of historiographic materials and Internet resources. In relation to the modern period in the history of the development of the industry, which, in accordance with the current rules of archival affairs (time limit), generally cannot yet be fully documented, the author used “oral history” methods as an auxiliary research tool 3 .
The new government that established itself in Russia after the October Revolution paid considerable attention to gold from its first steps. The first government decree “On Gold and Platinum” was published in January 1918 and established state control over the circulation of precious metals. There has not yet been any talk of nationalizing gold mining enterprises. Within the framework of the All-Russian Council of National Economy (VSNKh), in February 1918, the Committee on Precious Metals was created, which was supposed to provide “general conditions” for the development of the industry 4 . The initial staff of the Supreme Economic Council Committee (“Glavzoloto”) consisted of only three people. The first organizational act of the new central local body was the convening of the “Conference of gold-platinum mines of the entire Urals.” Control over the implementation of government regulations was assigned to the system of local councils, which were especially responsible for preventing the “leakage” of gold from the mines. Almost the only lever for maintaining a minimum level of gold mining was the system of punishments for violations of the metal accounting procedure, supported by actively operating revolutionary military tribunals.
A number of government regulations were designed to ensure savings in gold circulating in the country. By special resolution of the Council people's commissars(SNK) on February 14, 1918, regulation of the standard and weight of gold products was introduced, their maximum permissible standards were determined (36th standard; the weight of wedding rings is no more than 1 spool (4.266 g), baptismal crosses are no more than 0.5 spool Owners of shops selling products made of precious metals, jewelry and watch workshops had to remake all existing products within a three-month period to the established standard, and sell or hand over those not converted at a fixed price to the State Bank. Special committees at local finance commissariats were responsible for the accumulation and immediate sending all the precious metal received as a result of this operation to the capital.
In June 1918, a Decree was issued on the nationalization of gold mining enterprises, but the Civil War that broke out in the country prevented the establishment of work. As the Red Army moved east, the Committee on Precious Metals of the Supreme Economic Council tried to expand the scope of its activities. In December 1918, a representative of the Committee was sent to Siberia with the goal of “expanding a gold mining operation.” The establishment of Glavzoloto’s work at that time was hampered by the lack of connections with the most important gold mining areas. The development of separatist tendencies played a certain role in this: the Siberian Economic Council, for example, prohibited “all dealings in gold with Moscow” 5 . During the existence of the Far Eastern Republic, the Aldan mines were under the jurisdiction of the Department of Gold Mining Enterprises of the Supply Directorate of the Fifth Siberian Army.
During the Civil War, gold mining was in a state of unprecedented devastation. At the mines and mines, which passed either to the “whites” or to the “reds,” extraction was hastily organized 6 , however, retreating, both of them hid or blew up equipment, flooded mines, and hid promising development areas. Gold production, which had declined during the First World War (from 63.6 tons in 1913 to 30.4 tons in 1916), fell to an all-time low during the Civil War. In 1919 it was 482 poods. (8 tons), in 1920 - 169 poods. (2.8 tons), in 1921 - only 150 poods. (2.5 t) 7 .
There was no hope for massive supplies of the precious metal the country needed from the poorly managed, destroyed industry. Officially, in terms of supply level, the gold industry was placed in fifth place, but in fact it was supplied on a residual basis. The acceptable price for gold was slightly higher than the cost of its production. The bet was placed on the forcible seizure of the precious metal - expropriation. The party members who zealously acted in this field were inspired by the lofty revolutionary goals of restoring industry destroyed by bourgeois sabotage at the expense of gold, and by the slogans of the class “struggle against luxury.”
A campaign was carried out on a large scale to confiscate valuables from safes and gold-alloying laboratories of commercial banks 8 and state gold-alloying laboratories in the provincial centers of Siberia 9 . On April 16, 1920, the “Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars on requisitions and confiscations” 10 was published, which, as is known, defined the scope of the requisitioned extremely broadly, not only food and items for economic and production purposes, but also, “in case of particularly acute public need” , household items. And on July 13, 1920, a specialized resolution of the Council of People's Commissars “On the confiscation of precious metals, money and various valuables” 11 followed, according to which not only old gold coins and gold bars were subject to confiscation, but also “gold products weighing over 16 spools per per person” (the compensation provided was disproportionate to the real value of the metal). Seizure campaigns gained momentum. The proletarian government demonstrated a very characteristic shift in policy priorities in the sphere of obtaining gold - not to extract it from its own depths, but to requisition it.
In the battles of the Civil War, gold was also “mined” in a very specific way. The leadership adopted a special resolution “On the confiscation and requisition of the property of private individuals in areas liberated from the enemy” (where the population still had relatively a lot of gold in their hands), as well as a Decree “On the confiscation of all movable property of emigrants and persons equated to them " 12 . In a special secret telegram to “all revolutionary committees of Crimea,” the government drew attention to goods and valuables that were important for export abroad, and the first on the proposed list was “gold and products made from it.”
According to official data, in 1918-1922. V Soviet Russia 15.4 tons of gold were extracted from the subsoil, and 15.7 tons were “additionally received from the population” 13. The real volume “received from the population” - confiscated and “voluntarily” surrendered - was much greater. According to rough estimates, only across the borders of the Baltic states in 1920-1922. At least 500 tons of gold were exported 14. The same is evidenced by the “shock” activity of Gokhran, created in February 1920 15 . The first task that the government set for him was to accept from Soviet institutions within three months all the valuables they had “in storage, in management.” Despite the declaration of the strictest accounting of every gram of precious metals, order in Gokhran was restored with great difficulty. IN AND. Lenin, in his famous notes to Narkomfin, demanded “acceleration of the analysis of valuables,” asked “how many boxes have been opened out of how many,” and tried to prevent theft 16 . Receipts to Gokhran were practically continuous in the first years of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was due to the implementation of a series of requisition decrees.
Gokhran, in accordance with the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars, had to be guided by the instructions of the People's Commissariat of Finance, which dealt with the use of valuables to pay for imports 17 . On June 23, 1921, the Council of People's Commissars issued the Decree “On the distribution of gold and platinum,” which imposed a ban on transactions with precious metals “in any form.” They could not be objects of purchase, processing, distribution and exchange on the part of cooperative organizations and individuals; “the speedy accumulation of gold reserves”; the decree established a strict system for recording production (similar to the “old regime” corded gold record books were used) and the delivery of metals to Gokhran.
The mobilized gold, as well as the gold “inherited” from the Russian Empire, was of significant importance to reinforce the first, vital (aimed at concluding peace) diplomatic victories of Soviet Russia. According to the additional financial agreement of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, Soviet Russia had to pay Germany 6 billion marks, and a significant part of the payments was made in gold (the total volume of its transfer was supposed to be 694 tons 18). Peace with Estonia, which V.I. Lenin qualified it as “the window broken through by Russian workers into Western Europe,” and was paid for not only with territorial concessions, but also with 10 tons of gold worth 14 million rubles. Latvia and Lithuania received gold worth 4 and 3 million rubles at the conclusion of peace treaties. 19 In conditions when the West declared a blockade on “stolen” Russian gold, it ended up on world exchanges through a chain of intermediaries. To depersonalize and conceal its origin, it was melted down into gold bars, usually of non-standard shapes (the so-called “gilts”) 20 . There were sales channels for currency metal through Iran and Turkey, but the Baltic states became the main “sales window” starting in February 1920.
Precious metals were needed by the new government to overcome the devastation and restore the national economy. The demand for gold to pay for trade flows from the West increased after the economic blockade was lifted from the Soviet Republic and a number of trade agreements were signed. During this period, gold was considered by foreign partners as the optimal, preferred form of payment. This was largely due to the fact that significant decisions were made at the Brussels and Genoa conferences to restore pre-war currency parities based on the gold standard 21 . Fearing economic shocks, European governments actively accumulated gold reserves and consistently removed the metal from domestic monetary circulation; gold became “coveted as never before” 22.
For Soviet Russia, the “question of questions,” in the formulation of the Commissariat of Finance, was “the distribution of goods and their value” (i.e., providing the necessary purchases with currency) 23 . Back in 1918, the representative of the Soviet government in London, M. Litvinov, managed to arrange the purchase of large quantities of agricultural machinery, metal products, coal and cotton. In March 1920, it was decided to pay 300 million rubles for the first 1000 steam locomotives and spare parts for the repair of railway transport. “gold in bullion”, during the famine of 1921 in London, grain was purchased with gold (in the amount of 2 million gold rubles), within the framework of the GOELRO plan 10 million rubles. gold was allocated for the purchase of “everything necessary” for the oil industry, for the equipment of the legendary Kashirskaya and Volkhov power plants, and financed the Hydrotorf program. By special order of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) at the end of 1921, 10 million rubles were allocated for the “purchase abroad of products and basic necessities.” gold 24. In 1922, 33 million rubles were spent on the purchase of aircraft in Germany. gold. In England, the construction of ships for the Black Sea Fleet was ordered on terms of payment mainly in “timber and gold” (in the amount of up to 60 million rubles in gold) 25 .
In one of his speeches at the 10th Congress of the RCP(b), member of the Narkomfin board E. Preobrazhensky categorically stated: “We cannot give a single spool for circulation within the country” 26 . He defined the place of “despicable metal” in “building a new life” in his famous work“On the significance of gold now and after the complete victory of socialism” V.I. Lenin. Party leaders sought to fulfill the sonorous order of the head of state - “to sell gold at a higher price, buy goods with it at a lower price,” but in the regime of the need for “anything and everything” and strict deadlines, consistent fulfillment of this requirement was hardly possible. Since September 1921 it operated Emergency Commission for export under the chairmanship of M.V. Rykunov. The consumption of gold and jewelry is taken under special control, V.I. Lenin consults in detail the head of the new department about what the “table” of its accounting should be 27. A Commission on the Gold Fund was created under the Labor and Defense Council (STO), whose task was to consider “applications from institutions for the release of funds in gold.”
In those same years, the issue of resuscitating the monetary system came up on the agenda: Soviet economic policy was moving away from “military-communist” principles 28 . Since the existing banknotes could not perform the functions of a measure of value, an instrument of circulation and credit, gold calculation, first spontaneously and then purposefully (by resolution of the People's Commissariat of Finance) began to be used for analysis and calculation of costs, inter-farm calculations, in planning the state budget and drawing up estimates of large expenses 29 . In December 1921, party decisions stated: “The restoration of monetary circulation on a metal basis (gold) should become the guiding principle of Soviet power” 30 . The formulation of the 11th Congress was more cautious: “...without setting the task of an immediate return to gold circulation, it is firmly established that our financial and economic policy is decisively oriented towards the restoration of the gold backing of money” 31. The monetary reform was initially conceived as based on backing money with gold, then reoriented to 50% backing it with gold, currency and goods. In fact, they were provided with gold by 25-30% 32 .
The State Bank switched to a policy of systematic accumulation of gold and currency. This process, however, was difficult 33 . After significant expenses on grain purchases abroad, the Politburo, having considered the issue “On the Gold Fund,” decided to introduce the strictest, most accurate and rapid registration of all its expenses, and systematic (twice a month) reports from the fund’s management to the Politburo were introduced. From now on, neither the Council of People's Commissars nor the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee had the right to spend gold from the fund without the consent of the Politburo.
As the flow of expropriations dried up (there was nothing left to confiscate), and tightening control over the circulation of gold ceased to produce tangible results, the state began to pay increasing attention to the problems of gold mining. In October 1921, the new Decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the Gold and Platinum Industry" 34 confirmed that gold-platinum deposits are the "exclusive property of the state", but granted all citizens of the RSFSR, cooperatives, artels the right to search and explore precious metals, as well as to receive enterprises and mines for operation on a contractual rental basis. To stimulate production, settlement prices for gold were increased; payment was made not only in Sovznak, but also, which was essential in a starving country, in food and consumer goods (at the request of the deliverer, in the amount of no more than 50% of the amount due to him).
Liberalization in the spirit of the NEP was intended to revive the industry and increase production volumes. “Freedoms” were combined in the industry with increased government control. The goal of accumulating precious metals “at any cost” determined the nature of the government’s regulatory influence on the industry, which used the entire range of economic and administrative means. To boost the gold-platinum industry, all mining enterprises in the industry, smelting laboratories and refineries, as well as the Petrograd Mint, were transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Committee for the Gold-Platinum and Silver Industry of the Supreme Economic Council. The duties of the Committee included ensuring the implementation of the production plan, calculating the cost and prices for the mined metal 35. Authorized inspectors of the Committee were sent to the fishing areas to improve the manageability of the industry 36 .
In the early 20s. comparatively more attention within the precious metals industry was paid to platinum, a particularly profitable metal that was in great demand abroad 37 . Gold, as one of the statesmen of that time put it, remained “as a stepdaughter”: no serious measures were taken to revive gold mining enterprises. In the Urals, for example, until 1929, 90% of capital investments were directed to the platinum industry 38 . In gold mining areas, the purchase of so-called free-bearing and lifting gold was launched. The Soviet government could not afford to neglect clearly illegally mined metal, turning a blind eye to its origin and paying on the same basis as that mined at officially registered enterprises. In relation to the latter, during this period the state acted more in the role of a “granary industrialist” - that is, it was not directly involved in the production of gold, but, providing food for enterprises, bought it 39.
This direction of the gold mining policy was determined, first of all, by the fact that it was impossible to speed up production volumes in conditions when the equipment was extremely worn out and explored reserves were depleted (before 1922, geological exploration was not carried out at all). The necessary investments in the industry, due to the permanently tense state of finances, were beyond the power of Soviet Russia. The official directives of those years are very typical: technical modernization “to be done at the expense of the concessionaires”, at the expense of the state - “in certain exceptional cases” 40. The increase in production volumes was slow. The acceptable price for gold was still slightly higher than the cost of its production 41 . The resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars “On measures for the development of the gold and platinum industry” (March 6, 1923), “On measures to boost the state and private gold industry” (September 23, 1924) were aimed at solving mainly organizational problems. The annual report of Glavzoloto for 1924 noted: “...until now the State has paid little attention to the gold industry,” as evidenced by the lack of preferential lending and the limited system of material incentives 42 .
A certain turn in the gold mining policy was marked by the expansion in 1924-1925. powers of Glavzoloto. This organization was conceived as a kind of “state within a state”, which was supposed to provide itself with everything necessary. To improve the “supply of working capital and material assets to enterprises,” he was given the right to have his own factories 43 and agricultural enterprises; purchase products handicraft(and at “free” prices) and factory-produced items “according to a special nomenclature”; have their own horse-drawn and water transport (“Glavzoloto” was given the shipping company of the Lena Gold Mining Company; the first ten trucks sent to the Ural mines formed the basis of the vehicle fleet being formed 44). The People's Commissariat of Railways was henceforth obliged to transport cargo for the industry out of turn, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was to “actively cooperate” with Glavzoloto in terms of purchasing equipment, the People's Commissariat of Food was to facilitate “purchase and exchange” through credit funds. It was planned to urgently open a preliminary loan of 6 million rubles to Glavzoloto. and provide 3 million rubles. in foreign currency for foreign orders, as well as a “natural fund” - to pay for artisanal gold in “consumer goods”. In the name of the efficiency of Glavzoloto’s work, he was given exclusive right“transfer your loans within a year from one item to another, without asking permission” (!), all operations of Glavzoloto and its local bodies were freed from the control of the famous Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (RKI). A significant addition in the spirit of the times stated that all its cargo, property, supplies, premises and warehouses “are not subject to requisition, confiscation, or redistribution.” It is obvious that this set of rights and privileges did not simply symbolize the transfer of the industry to “Bolshevik self-financing”, but became the initial milestone on the path to its acquisition of a special status 45 .
In 1925, Glavzoloto specialists prepared a draft plan for the development of the gold industry for 1925/26-1929/30. This first plan has already defined the most important principles of the Soviet gold mining policy: vesting industry management bodies with special powers, rights and privileges, finding means of encouraging workers, focusing on “quick” and “easy” gold, as well as the priority of state mining in comparison with concession and especially private rental. The state needed stability and controllability of the industry, and private-leased gold mining, as one of the leaders of that time put it, “often capricious,” so production volumes depended not so much on the state, but on “a number of reasons, partly political, partly psychological, independent of the good will of the government" 46 .
In 1927, a new reorganization of industry management followed - the All-Union Joint Stock Company "Soyuzzoloto" 47 was formed. In the same year, the First All-Union Gold Mining Congress of the USSR 48 took place. The shareholders of Soyuzzoloto, in addition to the gold mining trusts (20 in 1927, 49), were the Supreme Economic Council, Narkomfin and the State Bank. Not limited to solving supply problems, this new structure was supposed to “turn around to face production.” The head of the “golden front headquarters” was soon personally headed by I.V. Stalin appointed A.P. Sersbrovsky 50 . He began his activities by familiarizing himself with the advanced technical experience of the United States, “searching” and inviting old specialists, establishing connections with existing educational institutions to train the necessary personnel, as well as setting up a geological exploration system (in 1928, 930 thousand rubles were allocated for these purposes ., and in 1929 - already 2.9 million rubles, in 1930 - 4.6 million rubles). It was considered expedient to attract unemployed people into the gold mining industry from the labor exchanges of cities adjacent to the mining areas (the option of using the unemployed of European Russia was also discussed) 51 . From the very first steps of its activities, Soyuzzoloto began developing “measures to attract artisanal mining.” In March 1928, a special resolution was adopted “On the financing of private gold mining enterprises”, which were offered interest-free loans for up to 10 years in the amount of 70% of the amount of costs required to carry out the work 52.
In parallel with measures to develop gold mining, serious attention was paid to improving the system of its purchase, which retained its importance as a source of foreign currency metal. The bureau was created at Soyuzzolot and entered into an agreement with the State Bank on delimiting the scope of its activities. The State Bank could henceforth engage in purchases in all regions, but only through its branches, and Soyuzzoloto could work not only through its apparatus, but also through the banking “counterparty network” transferred to its disposal, as well as state cooperative organizations and even private proxies . The use of monetary payment was encouraged, but in order to speed up the “squeezing out of the remaining household gold” (the official wording), trade transactions were allowed (the People's Commissariat of Trade allocated special funds for this) 53 .
During this period, Soviet Russia began to increase gold production. A noticeable role was played by the development of the richest region of Aldan (Yakutia), which began in 1923, where gold was literally collected by hand. Free prospecting in the region was quickly supplanted by the labor collectives of the Aldanzoloto trust 54 . In the 1927/28 business year, the state received 61% more gold than in the previous year. In 1929, the country produced 25.2 tons of chemically pure gold, with the share of “free-supply” and purchased gold for the period 1926-1929. decreased from 16.9% to 2.8% 55 .
The country was on the verge of industrialization, which had to be financed relying on internal resources. The foreign trade index - the share of merchandise exports in the gross national product - by the end of the NEP was 6%, by the end of the 30s. - only 1% 56. The government declared a course to increase the gold reserves necessary to ensure it. The resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars "On benefits for state enterprises mining gold along with other minerals" (dated May 16, 1927), "On the gold and platinum industry and on the storage and circulation of gold and platinum" (dated May 8, 1929) were adopted. d.) 57 . A number of laws concerned benefits for those working in the industry, primarily for miners. The Party Central Committee launched a vigorous activity, which found expression in a whole series of party and production-technical meetings, and the “bombardment” of party committees of enterprises with loud calls.
Adopted for 1925/26-1928/29. directives for the preferential development of state-owned production were not implemented, despite the allocation of significant additional allocations to the industry (due to which the total allocations exceeded the Promfinplan indicators by 80%). A special commission of Soyuzzoloto revealed an 18% excess of the planned production cost. From the reports of Glavzoloto it followed that more than 50% of the funds received for geological exploration work were “written off as losses due to ineffectiveness” 58 . The state could not afford such irrational spending of scarce funds. The theses of the Central Committee (marked “Only for members of the CPSU(b)”) “On the main tasks of developing the gold industry and organizing the purchase of gold in the country” explained that since the accumulation of gold reserves is “the most important task in strengthening the international and internal position of the USSR,” and “the state has no funds for mechanization”, over the next few years gold mining should develop through manual labor. This attitude became decisive in gold mining policy for a long time. Very typical in this sense is the statement tastefully quoted at the 17th Party Congress (this was already January 1934) by the head of Glavzoloto, I.V. Stalin: “You don’t need to get carried away with various far-fetched things, but simply approach the matter - where you need a shovel, let there be a shovel, where you need a kayla-kayla” 59.
The goals of industrialization were to be served by “light” gold, mined without large-scale capital expenditures. The gold component fit organically into the chosen concept of autarky and a “closed economy.” The “Stalinist golden program” came into effect. Its adoption was largely due to the most important development trends financial systems capitalist countries. In 1929, the gold bullion standard was restored in the world, marking the increasing economic role of gold 60 . It was in 1929 that a regime of secrecy began to take hold in the industry, limiting access for specialists to conduct an objective analysis of its problems.
The completion of the first five-year plan allowed the government to somewhat adjust its policy regarding gold mining - it became possible to replenish the equipment fleet and improve its structure, which was very important given the diversity of natural conditions of gold mining areas. In the mid-20s, due to the scarcity of funds and the weakness of the domestic mechanical engineering industry, Soyuzzoloto recommended “selecting and steadily adhering to a limited number of types of equipment” 61 . The need for technical improvement of work was also dictated by the unsatisfactory results of gold mining throughout the country. “From year to year, production programs are fulfilled by 40-50%. This must end!” - called the editorial of the first issue of the new magazine “Soviet Gold Industry” 62. As industrialization progressed, technical means began to be sent to the industry; Refineries and amalgamation factories were being restored; construction began (at the Motovilikha and Nevyansk plants) and the introduction of dredges. Relatively more attention began to be paid to the qualitative characteristics of production, primarily the cost of mined gold, which was now established in the system of planned indicators. But there was still a lack of experience, knowledge and technology (typical, for example, is the experience of awarding bonuses with imported equipment 63). At the turn of the 20-30s. The practice of “technical assistance” agreements with foreign companies has become more widespread in the industry 64 .
But the dominant gold mining policy during this period remained the creation of special conditions in the industry. The sphere of benefits and privileges expanded steadily, the peak of this phenomenon occurring in the period 1932-1934. 65 The list of legislative guarantees for the special position of the industry was, indeed, impressive 66 . Firstly, cutting, reduction, or underutilization of funds allocated “for any gold mining purposes” was strictly prohibited. The funds were considered armored; changes in delivery times could only take place with the permission of the service station. The gold industry's need for hard-to-find metals, materials and equipment was met in an equal share with special orders and orders from the ferrous metallurgy industry. Suppliers of goods for the gold mining funds were obliged to make shipments “primarily before other urgent ones”; industry enterprises were provided with all types of transport in the first place (the supply of “gold” vehicles and the Lena Shipping Company was provided by trust funds). The Transportation Committee at the Service Station and the People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS) was obliged to satisfy requests for rolling stock for gold mining cargo on a par with military ones. An “unconditional” ban on the mobilization of automobile and horse-drawn transport by industry enterprises was introduced, and village councils were charged with the duty of uninterrupted provision of “gold paths.” The bodies of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture urgently assigned hayfields to mines and mines for the needs of servicing horse-drawn transport.
Benefits also covered food supplies. The industry's funds were equal to the funds of the Reserve Committee, the country's fruit and vegetable organizations were obliged to meet the needs of enterprises for vegetables and fruits, and Glavzolota's own agricultural enterprises were exempt from paying tax in kind. As before, much attention in the “Stalinist program” was paid to the conditions for purchasing gold. Special funds of goods were allocated for appropriate purposes best quality; When purchasing all types of gold, Torgsin authorities had to uninterruptedly stock it with food and industrial goods at the same prices as Glavzoloto.
In 1932, gold mining came under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry 67 . By that time, all territorial trusts, two machine-building plants (Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk), the Moscow Refinery, the institutes Giprozoloto, Ginzoloto, and Niszolotolaboratory 68 were functioning in the Glavzoloto system. The specialized departments within its framework were Zolotoprodsnab, Zolototechsnab, Zolototrans and Zolotorazvedka. Strict unity of command, strict discipline and personnel policies were introduced in the industry under the slogan “mercilessly part with those who are not able to fight in the Stalinist way for the implementation of the golden program” 69 .
The introduction in 1932-1934 played an important role in the development of gold mining. in settlements with prospectors and freemen of the so-called golden calculus, which became a serious material incentive. Mining artels in the 30s. consistently provided more than half of gold production (56-62%). This “source” did not require special capital expenditures from the state, which was important in conditions when the country needed gold “today and cheaply.” In the year of the end of the first five-year plan, a special order from Glavzoloto (dated July 7, 1933) charged the trusts with the duty of “expanding mining operations everywhere and widely informing the population of gold-mining regions about benefits for miners and gold miners.” It was still important in a half-starved country to maintain a network of special stores for miners with an improved assortment and price lists in gold terms. By a special joint decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, prospectors were equated in status to industrial workers. Representatives of all categories of gold miners in the 30s. became heroes of the country 70.
The industry was under the special control of the STO. Most government directives in the field of gold mining were of the highest category of significance and had the title of “Stalin's task.” In 1934, the government declared the goal of “transforming gold mining and gold purchasing into the business of the entire working population.” To develop the success of Glavzoloto’s activities and to make decisions more quickly, by order of the Council of People’s Commissars of July 15, 1936, this body was granted special self-supporting rights to conclude a wide range of contracts and open bank accounts 71 . In the strictly hierarchical system of the Soviet economy, not only the special or primary, but the military-strategic importance of the industry was determined, which received the official status of the “currency workshop of the national economy.” Export sales of gold provided scarce financial resources, while using it as collateral provided operational and image advantages. The state bought gold at fixed prices significantly (almost 40%) below world market prices, which served as an additional source of funds. In the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a kind of dictatorship of “despicable” metal was established in the economy. At the same time, the propaganda literature of those years invariably emphasized the instrumental role of such “socialization” of gold: “The October Socialist Revolution put an end to the dominance of gold on one sixth of the globe... the golden calf, this engine of capitalism, has been debunked, it has lost its power in the Soviet Union » 72.
The system of benefits and economic incentives (“equalization” in the system of management decisions of Glavzoloto was deliberately eradicated), on the one hand, and the strict production accounting system, the discipline of high production standards, on the other, had a positive effect on increasing production volumes and minimized theft. In 1936-1937 The level of domestic gold mining exceeded 130 tons, the USSR took second place in the world in terms of its volume 73 . The plans were even more impressive. The fact is that “Stalin’s tasks” within the framework of the second five-year plan turned out to be “thwarted.” The overall scale of underfulfillment was 17%; in the public sector this figure was even higher - 24% 74 . The preservation of more than half the share of artisanal production was qualified as a violation of the party's guidelines (note that its planned level was a hypocritically indicative 49% - at least one percentage point, but less than the state level).
1937-1938 were marked by a campaign to eradicate “enemies of the people,” during which the industry’s personnel suffered significantly. Subsequently, officials had no choice but to assure new managers that “there is nothing insurmountable for specialists and non-specialists (!) in the gold mining business”; The widespread ridicule of the “subtleties” of the gold business remained very characteristic of that time. L.M., who became the head of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Kaganovich began his activities with a trip to gold mining sites. “The fact that the gold industry has found itself in such a difficult situation has been the work of pests,” he summed up at a meeting of the Glavzoloto activists in February 1938. The real reason for the insufficient rate of increase in production was the low technical level of production, including difficulties with development and rational use of incoming new technology. Plans for the second half of the 30s. the creation of factories with a complete cycle, amalgamation factories, the production of hydraulic equipment and even dredges were invariably not completed (by more than 20%).
The amount of losses in the gold mining industry by 1937 amounted to 150 million rubles. The authorities were justifiably concerned about the high cost of gold. Under these conditions, the most important principles of the gold mining policy were adjusted; the main goal was proclaimed to reduce the cost of production (“Work in a new way, produce gold not at any price, but cheap”). At the end of the 30s. Attempts were made to eradicate artisanal mining that does not fit into ideological standards. “Bandit” by A.P. Serebrovsky was accused of “corrupting miners” with benefits and the provision of the best sites; a “commercial approach” to the matter was condemned and used as an accusation. “Move from the saddle of artisanal mining to the steering wheel of a mechanized state one!” - this is how the main task of the development of the industry for 1938 was formulated. On July 25, 1938, the Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars ordered “to transform this sector into state status” with the simultaneous elimination of previously established benefits. In 1939, the number of miners immediately decreased by almost 40%, and production volumes fell significantly. This resulted in the anger of I.V. Stalin, benefits for miners were restored with appropriate comments about the “gross perversions” of party decisions.
The need to provide stability to gold mining turned the government to the problem of developing not only alluvial, but also ore deposits. In the 30s The practice of working with gold ores at the Glavtsvetmet plants began to yield good results. Copper smelters provided almost complete (96%) extraction of the precious metal and received ready-made fluxes and additional copper, and the development of poorer ores became economically profitable for the gold industry. It was planned to develop similar inter-industry cooperation in relation not only to quartz ores, but also concentrates and ephels 75. On this basis, in January 1939, the Main Directorate of Gold Mining was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Non-ferrous Metallurgy. Within its framework, management of the industry was briefly (until May 1940) divided according to territorial principles, and the Main Directorates of the Gold and Platinum Industry of the Urals, Kazakhstan, and Western Siberia(“Glavzapadzoloto”) and Eastern Siberia and the Far East (“Glavvostokzoloto”).
In the 30s The volume of Soviet gold mining was maintained at about 130 tons per year, the next two years increased by an average of 20 tons, in 1941 the production volume was about 174 tons 76 . During the pre-war five-year plans, about 2.7 thousand tons of gold were spent on industrial needs, 77 which undoubtedly played an important role in ensuring the industrialization and technical and economic independence of Soviet Russia. At the same time, it should be noted that in modern economic literature, the qualitative structure of equipment and technologies imported during the period under review (and, accordingly, the adequacy of the use of gold and foreign exchange resources of the USSR) is far from being assessed positively 78 .
During the Great Patriotic War, the industry “went on a golden watch at the front.” Much has been written about the selfless labor of those who worked at gold mining enterprises of that time 79 . A military regime was established at state enterprises, and mining cooperatives were supported. The government was seeking funds to supply the industry with food. The industry that replenished the country's military budget was given paramount importance in the gold-mining regions; in particular, feasible capital construction and technical re-equipment took place. On the other hand, production was restored using almost artisanal means at mines and mines that were considered unpromising in the pre-war period, and the cheapest methods of extraction were cultivated.
The gold reserves were consumed during the war years faster than they grew due to the all-out acceleration of production. Under lend-lease, the USSR paid for supplies, primarily weapons, about 1.5 thousand tons of gold 80 . According to the First Department of the State Planning Committee, within the framework of this agreement our country received finished products an amount equivalent to 19% of national income 81. The gold reserves, which had been significantly depleted during the war years, had to be quickly replenished.
The first post-war years were characterized by a system of special committees for organizing work in particularly important areas of production 83 . But even against this background, the transfer of gold mining to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of September 2, 1946) was the most radical step. This decision secured the special status of the industry, but by completely different means: if in the 30s. It was associated, first of all, with a system of benefits and privileges, economic and moral incentives, the new system was based on the use of forced labor of a contingent of prisoners.
During the war years, the share of consumption in the national income was reduced to a minimum, the extreme resource was exhausted to the bottom, and expectations of positive changes grew in society. Gulag gold was intended, among other things, to create a basis for the guaranteed abolition of the card system. The decision on gold mining was also prompted by the inexorably approaching famine due to the drought of 1946 84 . The most important reason was due to the fact that the country needed to be raised from devastation in the context of the rapidly unfolding Cold War. Extraordinary measures were aimed at releasing and redistributing available financial resources to solve the problems of developing the military-industrial complex (MIC) and implementing the nuclear program. The increase in the importance of gold itself was due to the fact that the gold-dollar standard 85 was established in the world and the confrontation between the USSR and the “capitalist camp” again began on the “gold and foreign exchange front” 86. The USSR did not ratify the Bretton Woods Agreement, and the country's gold reserves were intended to serve as, on the one hand, a guarantor of the country's financial autarky, and on the other hand, a mobilization reserve.
On the basis of the former Glavzoloto, the notorious Glavspetsvetmet (SGU Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR) was established, which quickly organized forced labor camps (ITL) and camp departments (LC) in the mines and mines. The practice of using prison labor in particularly important and difficult mining operations began in the pre-war period. Since 1937, the Main Directorate for the Construction of the Far North, Dalstroy, 87 operated, where in 1939 66.7 tons of gold were mined at 42 mines 88. According to recently published reference data 89, in the system of GULAG facilities in the post-war period there were more than 30 large and “gold-specialized” institutions 90. Using special powers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs energetically began to technically re-equip enterprises, identify and commission new ones; A fairly powerful and mobile, well-equipped geological department was created at the State Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR 91. Within the framework of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, prospecting, already deprived of the benefits of the “golden calculation”, developed: in 1947, the Model Charter of the prospecting artel in the Glavspetsvetmet system 92 was approved, followed by the resolution “On measures to increase artisanal mining of gold and platinum” 93.
The transfer of the industry to the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the work regime on the edge of human capabilities, the negligible cost of prison labor, which truly produced the “cheapest” gold in the world, had a quick and impressive effect. Already in 1950, domestic gold mining exceeded the 100-ton mark. By 1953, the USSR's gold reserves had reached its record height to date, amounting to 2049 tons 94 . Since in 1928-1953. Only about 2,400 tons of gold were extracted from the depths 95; it is obvious that all of it was sent to state reserves.
The successful accumulation of the Soviet Union's gold reserves was expressed in the monetary reform of 1950. Although the USSR did not ratify the Bretton Woods agreement, on March 1, 1950, the country “established the gold content of the ruble” (resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On the transfer of the ruble exchange rate to gold base and on the increase in the exchange rate of the ruble in relation to foreign currencies" dated February 28, 1950). The widely publicized reform was touted as a result of the country's implementation of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. There was, of course, no talk about increasing the volume of gold mining in the system of special camps of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In parallel with the acceleration of gold mining, in the post-war period the state paid significant attention to the problems of internal circulation of gold, which was placed under strict control. In 1952-1953 A campaign aimed at “rational and economical use of precious metals” 96 was carried out on a grand scale.
After the death of I.V. Stalin's gold mining enterprises were removed from the system of militarized management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but this department retained the functions of dispensing precious metals “on instructions” from the Ministry of Finance. The July 1953 resolution of the Council of Ministers confirmed state control over the system of internal circulation of gold 97, but the emphasis of gold mining policy at this stage changed. The industry was spontaneously “downgraded.” So, in his desire for “savings” N.S. Khrushchev overnight canceled the bonuses to wages, which were received by residents of Siberia and the Far East, where the main gold mining potential was concentrated. The attitude of the new head of state towards the industry is indirectly evidenced by the famous decree of 1955 on the expansion of sown areas, which “hit” the interests of gold mining enterprises (collective and state farms were given the lands on their balance sheets). With the creation of economic councils, the prospects for the development of the industry began to be associated, first of all, with the intensification of the use of local resources - material and power. Subdivisions of geological services were removed from the jurisdiction of the trusts and transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Geology, and the specialized head institute of the industry, Ginzoloto, ceased to exist 98 .
Decentralization of management, fragmentation of the industry into territorially isolated and “specifically managed” production by economic councils had a negative impact on overall indicators. Period 1953-1964 was marked by a noticeable decline in production volumes since 1957. annual plans were underfulfilled by an average of 5-10%. In the industry, there was a procedure for approval by the Council of Ministers of the USSR of the planned cost of gold, which was based on the gross cost principle (the planned cost was determined after approval of the total cost of producing all marketable products, without taking into account the specifics of enterprises) 99 . In this way, the state tried to guarantee the required production volumes. Attention to the industry intensified during the preparation of the monetary reform of 1961. The Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of February 24, 1960, on the one hand, in the spirit of the times, proclaimed the need to “strengthen the party leadership” of the industry, but, on the other hand, introduced wage increases and new systems of material incentives for productive labor.
Successes in progress towards the “bright future of communism” during the period under review were widely associated with an increase in the gold content of the ruble 100 . The 1961 reform denominated the currency and changed the price scale; in parallel, the gold content of the ruble was increased by 4.4 times - to 0.987. The last measure had virtually no positive impact on the living standards of the population: the real purchasing power of the Soviet ruble remained extremely low, and the dollar exchange rate on the black market remained an invariable reproach to it 101 . The economy was gradually drawn into deficit, and the place of money was increasingly taken by the direct distribution of material resources 102 .
The international and domestic aspects of the reform were formally connected, but the gold content of the Soviet ruble had real significance only in relation to the foreign economic sphere. This was completely justified, since the gold standard existed in a “reduced” form until the Jamaica Agreement of 1976. Gold was one of the guarantors of foreign economic relations of the USSR with the capitalist world. Taking into account the new content of the ruble, supply agreements with the countries of the socialist camp were adjusted; in the 60s The Gold and Foreign Exchange Department of the Ministry of Finance recalculated arrears on loans and payments with “friendly” developing countries 103 . A unique response to the monetary reform (“Russia is now fabulously rich,” wrote L’Humanité) was a new round of the campaign initiated by France to return the tsarist debts 104.
In post Stalin times The Soviet Union began to actively sell precious metals on world markets 105. Behind this was the fundamental principle of “not to deaden the gold resource in state storehouses,” an attempt to make it “working.” These innovations were interpreted in the spirit of criticism of the “Stalinist economy” 106. A significant role in changing the guidelines of export policy was played by the fact that the 20th Congress of the CPSU dealt the “first blow” to the political and economic isolation imposed by Stalinism, according to the theory of a “besieged fortress” 107.
Sales of gold under N.S. Khrushchev (he warmly supported this practice) were also done “in order to undermine the financial stability of capitalism.” With large releases of gold onto the world market, socialist dealers tried to crush the financial power of Western countries based on the gold-dollar standard (the Ministry of Finance in 1955 received triumphant reports that sales of gold to the USSR caused a fall in prices on the world market 108). But these actions were clearly adventurous in nature and were extremely inept; they earned from Western market operators and analysts the characterization of “remarkably uncomplicated”, which ignored market conditions and, as a result, were produced “at a loss” 109 . The flip side of the “undermining of capitalism” was the traditional USSR policy of “international assistance,” which also cost a lot.
For the West, the USSR's sales of gold came as a “stunning surprise” and were interpreted as “Russia’s peaceful aggression, ... a psychological and actual initiative” aimed at obtaining necessary goods in return 110 . About a third (30.1%) of the total gold exports of the USSR in the post-war period until 1991 occurred in 1953-1964, when N.S. was at the head of the Soviet state. Khrushchev 111. By the end of 1953, 250-300 tons of gold were spent on food purchases 112. One of the largest gold sales campaigns was held in 1963, when 800 tons of the precious metal were spent on the purchase of grain. During this period, sold gold primarily served as an economic resource for servicing emergency expenses.
The emerging trend towards expanding the functions of gold required the implementation of measures to maintain and develop the gold mining industry. Gold is firmly entrenched in the category of “planned unprofitable products.” Its production suffered from a low level of energy supply 113, business executives constantly complained about delays in material and technical supplies, and housing and communal conditions remained truly disastrous in most areas 114. At the turn of the 50-60s. The Council of Ministers has repeatedly approved unplanned investments in the gold industry; about 600 million rubles were allocated annually for capital construction. 115 The policy for the development of geological exploration was less consistent: the campaign, which had barely begun, was curtailed “in order to raise additional funds for other urgent needs of the national economy” 116.
In parallel with the production component of the gold mining policy, it is necessary to mention the campaign to save this metal, which began in Stalin's times 117. The Ministry of Finance, for example, even dealt with the issues of its use in the production of rings (“production of heavy products”), supply standards for watch factories, and the methodology for accounting for “carry-over stocks” at enterprises of various profiles dealing with precious metals. Every gram of gold sold for domestic consumption was taken into account; the official correspondence of those years is filled with 118 “refusing” resolutions on such requests. For example, the USSR Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Local Industry of the RSFSR were denied an increase in the volume of gold supply for the jewelry industry; To the Ministry of Health - to reduce selling prices for semi-finished dental products 119. Each “book” of gold leaf was dosed 120 for restoration work 121 . “Calculations of needs” were subjected to a thorough examination even for the production of representative and other products from precious metals (for example, deputy badges, gift pens with a gold nib) 122 .
With the liquidation of the economic councils and the restoration at the end of 1965 of the Union-Republican Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (and within its structure, the specialized Directorate of the Gold-Platinum and Diamond Industry "Glavzoloto"), the possibility of pursuing a unified industry policy once again arose. Some steps were taken to restore the special status of the gold industry, which followed from a separate (outside the general national economic plan) approval of its planned indicators and the identification of the main items of material and technical supply. The first decade of Glavzoloto’s economic activity was characterized by an increase in production capacity. The reform of 1965 and the introduction of a cost accounting system at enterprises played a prominent role in this. The volume of gold mining in the turnaround decade of the 60-70s. (1966-1975) gradually increased, reaching a record level of 281 tons in 1975. As part of the policy of economic stimulation and expansion of the sphere of economic independence of enterprises, the system of financing the industry changed: part of the funds remained under the control of gold mining enterprises and was used to replenish equipment. The government sought funds for additional financing of public utility construction, but their allocation was not stable. Thus, already in 1967, “due to the impossibility of securing” the initial funding standards were reduced: for housing construction - by 4.4%, utilities - by 78.9%, construction of educational, cultural, and healthcare facilities - by 66.4 % 123. Gold mining companies and local authorities were once again required to mobilize domestic resources.
A particular problem has become the shortage of explored, exploitable resources. The campaign to identify them became the beginning of the development of a special secret plan of the CPSU Central Committee for the development of ore deposits and the establishment large productions this profile as an alternative to unstable and dispersed placer mining 124 .
Economic reform of the second half of the 60s - 70s. was inconsistent and contradictory, since in parallel with the expansion of the rights of economic entities, the centralized principles of production management were strengthened. The next reorganization, which transformed the trusts into combines and then into production associations, was unsuccessful, since it again significantly limited the economic efficiency of the primary production units. Glavzoloto was transformed into the All-Union Production Association Soyuzzoloto, but this new body remained within the framework of the complexly organized diversified Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy. Administrative confusion led to the fact that since 1976, a trend detrimental to state interests became apparent - the volume of domestic gold mining began to decline 125 .
The bulk of the decline in gold mining occurred in the public sector. Mining artels, despite the restrictive policies, worked quite successfully (this sector from the 70s until the early 90s provided about a third of domestic gold production 126). The prospectors showed “extraordinary tenacity” in resisting the pressure of power structures that were prejudiced against “non-socialist” forms of production 127 . Since the mid-70s. artels began to operate under contracts with state gold mining enterprises and under their control. In this way, the authorities tried to level the conditions for the activities of state-owned enterprises and artels in the use of state equipment and various forms of subsidies (Model Charter 1975 128).
Of the large, truly innovative programs of the 70-80s. should be called the setting up of ore production. It was slowly, not without glitches, but implemented - however, mainly in the territories of present-day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan 129. The deadlines for the construction of the most promising Olimpiadinsky mine were disrupted (completion was planned for 1985), and the construction of the Sukhoi Log gold mining plant was delayed (about 600 million rubles were invested in its development before the collapse of the USSR) 130 . Significant funds were allocated to the development that unfolded in the late 70s. reconstruction of Lenzoloto's facilities, which significantly reduced the cost of developing the richest placers and significantly increased the annual reclamation of metal. The low pace of creation of new powerful plants again put on the agenda the issue of “accelerating the industrial development of small deposits” 131 .
The importance of gold for the USSR economy was generally recognized. The head of the Council of Ministers, A.N., was actively involved in the affairs of the industry. Kosygin. Since 1971, he personally received monthly reports on the state of affairs in the industry 132. Under him, there was a practice of targeted allocation of scarce resources and additional allocations for equipment. Funds allocated for capital construction were systematically redistributed in favor of the industry. An indispensable attribute of the gold mining policy remained providing employees with bonuses and wage ratios 133 . When the USSR Ministry of Finance reduced allocations for geological exploration in 1982, this did not affect gold, which was included in the “special list” of minerals established by the Central Committee 134. For the period 1981-1985. The State Planning Committee developed a targeted comprehensive program of geological exploration and research work on gold 135 .
Periodic financial injections into the industry gave low returns, in general conditions Due to an inefficient economy, the state was unable to adequately and systematically support the necessary modernization processes in the industry. Periods of generous investment were followed by a series of “cuts” and “redistributions”. The gold industry of “developed socialism” continued to represent “oases” of advanced enterprises in the desert of undeveloped industrial and social infrastructure. It is significant that innovative prospects were laid out on an inadequate information basis. Thus, in 1979, when petitioning for an increase in investment in gold mining, the State Planning Committee drew attention to the most serious problems of the planning system, which “do not exist in any other sub-sector of non-ferrous metallurgy.” “Not being able to carry out an analysis for each plant and type of work,” the State Planning Committee admitted that it considered gold mining “often intuitively” 136 . Planning deficiencies were exacerbated by the culture of secrecy. It gave rise to a fear not only of the public, but also of specialists directly, to express in any form their opinion about the problems and shortcomings of the development of the industry.
At the end of the 70s, in the context of a reduction in gold production, which coincided with the depletion of the influx of “petrodollars” into the country, the leaders of Glavzoloto K.V. Vorobiev and V.P. Berezin, supported by the head of the Council of Ministers, again raised the issue of the need to give the gold mining industry a special status. Ensuring such a turn in the gold mining policy at the initial stage should have been the removal of the industry from the competence of the complexly organized diversified Ministry of Non-ferrous Metals, whose activities caused a lot of criticism. However, this initiative was not supported.
During the Brezhnev period, they repeatedly tried to “patch the holes” of the economy of “developed socialism” through gold sales. In the 70-80s. At least 200 tons of gold were sold abroad annually 137. In some years, sales volume exceeded production volume. Target sales volumes were approved by the Council of Ministers. Gold was used to pay for imported equipment, the needs of medicine and the domestic pharmaceutical industry, and grain purchases were periodically practiced. The main share of domestic gold consumption in the USSR went to industrial needs (primarily military-industrial complex enterprises) and the production of precision alloys (alloys with specified properties). In Soviet times, military-industrial complex enterprises received gold from the State Fund at a cost of 1 ruble. for 1 g of metal - despite the fact that the industry average price for manufacturing enterprises was 12 rubles. for 1 year. Total in the USSR for internal needs for the period 1953-1990. 582 tons of gold were consumed, i.e. on average 15.7 tons per year 138.
The most important area of using gold in the economy remained its export sales. Gold was sold in small quantities, but operations were practically put on stream. It should be noted that at this stage sales of the USSR were carried out at a high professional level. Vneshtorgbank began to “play” on the London market, a recognized global center for gold transactions; The Moscow People's Bank also dealt with similar issues and became a recognized market participant, enjoying “credit” (trust) in the City 139 . At the same time, part of the Soviet gold sales were “actually speculative in nature and were carried out ... under a secret agreement with the Anglo-American Corporation - Moscow received significant profits, but for the corporation these transactions were harmless and even had a positive impact on long-term trends” 140.
In the second half of the 1970s, after the US dollar was delinked from gold, the price of the latter, as we know, increased sharply. In terms of taking advantage of global market conditions, the Soviet Union's sales of gold during this period cannot be considered inadequate. The crux of the problem, however, is what the proceeds were used for. The influx of “gold dollars” actually supported ineffective management mechanisms. In addition, a tenfold or more increase in the price of gold should have contributed to the development of technical and technological renewal of the industry, but this chance was practically not used in the USSR. While rising prices around the world led to the development of deposits with low metal content, the USSR continued to rely on the potential of the most accessible and rich deposits.
In the short period when Yu. V. Andropov was the head of state, the gold mining policy of the previous period was subjected to a serious revision. In 1983, the Ministry of Tsvetmet and the State Planning Committee prepared a long-term plan for the development of the gold mining industry for the period until 1995, and a resolution of the same name was issued by the CPSU Central Committee 141. In the plans for “accelerated development” in the XII Five-Year Plan of the gold and diamond mining industries, 2 billion rubles were allocated for corresponding purposes. (2.3 times more than in the XI Five-Year Plan) 142. Already in 1986, the “acceleration” strategy, aimed at increasing the rate of economic growth and comprehensive intensification of production, began to fail. The program for the development of mechanical engineering as the “locomotive of modernization” of the economy is failing, and the budget deficit is sharply increasing. Under these conditions, the transfer of all sectors of the economy to new management methods is declared a priority 143.
In 1988, the long-standing problems of reforming the gold mining management system were finally resolved. By a joint resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers “On improving the management of the industry for the extraction of precious metals and natural diamonds,” Glavzoloto was renamed to Glavalmazzoloto and transferred from the Ministry of Tsvetmet to the direct jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. It was planned to use the mobilization resource of the Soviet economy to improve scientific and technical support and accelerate the development of the industry, which was designed to occupy a special place in the new socio-economic model. “Glavalmazzoloto” paid special attention to the financial and material condition of its subordinate enterprises, staffing them with engineers, strengthening production discipline, and normalizing the operating conditions of the mining sector. Particular importance was attached to the development of a system of economic independence of lower-level production structures and the delegation of the main part of operational management functions to them.
Since the late 1980s. There was an increase in gold production, which was partly also due to the positive initiatives of the perestroika era and its inherent enthusiasm for renewal. In 1990, the annual volume of domestic production exceeded the record level of 300 tons in recent decades. But the gold mining industry was still characterized by imbalances, and the tasks of transferring it into a system of large, stable production and reducing the cost of production remained urgent.
During the years of “perestroika,” the rate of consumption of gold reserves significantly exceeded the rate of its replenishment. Already its first months “cost” the state gold reserves about 130 tons, and according to January registrations of 1985 and 1986. it decreased by 197 tons (from 784 to 587). When in the second half of the 80s. The country's economy began to decline sharply, and the government turned to external loans, in which gold played a prominent role 145. It is significant that the consideration and resolution of issues related to gold during this period increasingly moved from the Council of Ministers to the Central Committee of the CPSU, and was clothed with ever new veils of secrecy.
During the years of perestroika, the goals of gold sales abroad became different. On the one hand, a significant emphasis was placed on the import of Western technologies, on the other hand, a large number of scarce consumer goods (primarily clothing and shoes) were purchased with gold, designed to demonstrate the “humanization of party and state priorities”, as well as to replenish the quickly exhausted “ credit of confidence" of the new government 146. A constant item in the gold and foreign exchange balance during this period remained the Soviet Union's support for the socialist camp and the “progressive forces of the third world” 147.
In specific instructions to Vnesheconombank, through which transactions with gold were mainly carried out, there was an indispensable parting word about the sale of the metal “taking into account market conditions in order to obtain maximum profit. In these reproductions, Switzerland is named as a permanent partner of the USSR during this period 148 (in this case we are not talking about the Swiss government, but about the second largest gold market in the world, the Zurich gold market, the features of which are maximum freedom of operations, the absence of taxes and exchange controls, and also carefully maintained secrecy of transactions). For obvious reasons, nothing is reliably known about the USSR's operations in peripheral gold markets.
The Russian Federation became the “successor” of the USSR gold economy. It was a sphere of strict monopoly control and governing influence of the state; The state and prospects of the industry were determined by the practice of fixing the price of gold, limited domestic demand, the insufficient level of preparedness of the mineral resource base, and the low “margin of profitability” of mining 149 . An extremely sharp reduction in the total volume of gold production followed already in 1991 - from 302 (1990 level) to 168 tons. In 1992-1994. production remained at the level of 140 tons per year, to which, after a series of declines (critical - up to 115 tons in 1998), it returned in 2000, with subsequent growth in 2001 and 2002 (150 tons and 163 t respectively) 150 . These trends justify the opinion that during the 90s. the industry's situation could be described as “balancing on the brink of a complete crisis” 151. This state of affairs was due both to the nature of the processes of economic transformation, which set the general context for the development of the industry, and to the guidelines and mechanisms for implementing the gold mining policy itself.
The development of negative processes was greatly facilitated by the chronic institutional uncertainty of the gold-industrial policy throughout the 1990s. For some time, the industry found itself simply outside the management system, and the enterprises were virtually “ownerless”, since the Russian Republican Main Directorate of the Gold-Platinum and Diamond Industry was not created during the Soviet period. The Committee of Precious Metals and Precious Stones, formed under the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, became the legal successor of Glavalmazzoloto of the USSR Council of Ministers, but it acted primarily within the limited functions of the former Gokhran: “accepted - paid, released - received.” In 1993, there was a government decree on the transfer of industry enterprises to the jurisdiction of the specially created Committee of the Russian Federation on Precious Metals and Precious Stones (Roskomdragmet), which was entrusted with the implementation of a unified federal policy in the field of extraction, production, use and export of precious metals 152. But, firstly, the development of Roskomdragmet’s activities was negatively affected by the fact that the basic law, designed to serve as the foundation for regulating relations in the relevant area, could not be adopted for a long time; secondly, this theoretically highly empowered body did not last long. Already at the end of 1996, Roskomdragmet was abolished, and its functions were dispersed. They were partially transferred to the Department of Precious Metals and Precious Stones of the newly formed Ministry of Industry of the Russian Federation 153, partially to the Gokhran of the Ministry of Finance 154. But this was not the end of the leapfrog in government bodies: after the very short (March 1997) abolition of the Ministry of Industry, its functions in the area in question were transferred to the Ministry of Economy. In August 2000, the corresponding functions were transferred from the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade to the Ministry of Finance 155.
The key principle of the Russian Federation's gold policy at the first stage of its renewal was the denationalization of the gold mining industry 156. Its new status was determined by granting the right to gold mining to everyone legal entities of the Russian Federation while maintaining a state monopoly on the foreign market. In essence, a spontaneous (as opposed to the previously existing permitting) system for organizing gold mining enterprises was established for the development of all placer deposits and part of ore deposits (the reserves of which did not exceed 100 tons). Privatization took place rapidly, no less rapidly in the first half of the 90s. The number of enterprises also grew: instead of 12-14 large regional associations, in 1994 there were more than 600, and in 1998 - 450 independent firms 157.
The process of liberalizing gold prices has also begun. Since the spring of 1918, the so-called protocol system came into effect, in which the price was fixed monthly (based on the prices of the London Gold Exchange and the average exchange rate of the ruble to the dollar) and put into effect by a special decision of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. In conditions when everything necessary for gold mining was purchased at “free” prices, to encourage the industry, the government temporarily established partial payment for gold in freely convertible currency (the limit was first set at 25%, and from December 1918 - 40%) 158. It was this measure that ultimately saved the gold mining industry from collapse.
The adoption of extraordinary measures to support gold mining was greatly facilitated by the increasingly depressing state of the state fund of precious metals. Proclaimed " the most important condition» sovereignty of the newly formed state 159, it melted catastrophically. From 850 tons in 1989, by 1995 its volume dropped to less than 300 tons 160 . Avoiding the extremes of fetishizing the role of “state storehouses,” we note that the history of Russia at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries. demonstrated the importance of gold's reserve functions: in extreme conditions of a permanent political and socio-economic crisis, it was always in demand. The circulation of gold from state reserves was non-stop at that time. For example, the head of the Central Bank V. Gerashchenko, having determined their “approximate” volume at 100-150 tons in May 1993, stated that “it is impossible to name an exact figure, since the state is stratifying gold for Western loans, the most valuable goods” 161 . At the beginning of the 90s. accounted for the largest volume of external sales of gold. The so-called “gold exchanges” 162 and the commercial operations themselves were so large-scale that significant price fluctuations are traditionally associated with the supply of large quantities of Russian gold to the world market 163 . It is unlikely that in our time, when, according to the law on state secrets, information about the size of the gold reserve “is not subject to classification” 164, it is possible to trace the fate of 165 more than five hundred tons of gold reserves and about another 1,400 tons of gold mined during the period 1990-1998 . 166
The decline in gold production (from 302 tons in 1990 to 115 tons in 1998) caused significant damage to the interests of the country. The state was looking for means to support gold mining along the path of market transformation of the industry. Government directives gradually removed the taboo from the concept of “precious metals market.” By decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 16, 1993, the Central Bank, in agreement with the Ministry of Finance, received the right to issue licenses to commercial banks for the right to conduct operations with gold. The admission of “external” entities to the sale of gold was due to the crisis financial situation of the authorities. In 1994, during the development by Roskomdragmet, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Russia of the draft Federal Program for Precious Metals for 1995-2000, it became clear that the federal budget “is not able to provide advance payments for gold mining in full” 167 . The Association of Russian Banks (ARB), where the Section on Precious Metals was created in October 1995, began developing a program for the transition from state financing of the industry to bank lending. The motivation for the need for such a transition came down to three points - preserving the industry, freeing the state from the budgetary burden, and obtaining a new niche for banks to operate.
The established order was, of course, more adapted to the new conditions, but its quasi-market nature became a kind of “golden cage” for all agents. Once they bought gold from mining enterprises or government institutions, commercial banks could only sell it to each other or, again, to government institutions, and fixed gold prices made it impractical and economically unprofitable for them to finance mining. The Central Bank (CB) was limited in funds and could provide support to producers within very narrow limits. The government, having a monopoly on all the gold mined in the country, was unable to fully and properly pay the mining companies for it 168 . In fact, it was a vicious circle that made gold less liquid. Sales abroad remained the main form of gold sales. But the “gold marketing policy” during this period was ineffective; the new dealers, acting on behalf of the “pro-capitalist” government, turned out to be “less capable players in the gold market than their communist predecessors,” which is recognized by both domestic and Western analysts 169 .
The position of the authorities was internally contradictory - economic liberalization of the gold market was carried out in conditions where gold itself remained in the category of currency values. As a result, on the one hand, non-state structures became more active, on the other, the state sought to carefully control all operations in this area 170. There was an intense dialogue between financial and industrial circles and government agencies, but the subjects of state policy (the Central Bank, Gokhran of the Russian Federation, the Department of Finance, Budget and Monetary Circulation of the Government Apparatus) put forward contradictory and often polar programs. The government's failure to consolidate the entities of the emerging gold market was fully demonstrated in the fate of the basic law on precious metals. Its painful, almost six-year approval process ended in 1998 with the adoption of a deliberately compromise option.
At this time, in order to be sold on the market, gold first had to be used to “sell itself” (the notorious “gold for gold” scheme was in effect: to ensure the purchase of newly mined gold, Gokhran sold part of its reserves in order to pay off gold mining companies ). All program-theoretical constructions of government departments were shattered by the immutable fact of the lack of necessary financial resources. The budget still did not provide for the appearance of “real money” even to advance potential production.
Russian commercial banks were called upon to reduce the negative impact of state insolvency on the real sector. First, by government decree (“On amendments to the procedure for regulating prices (tariffs) for precious metals” dated June 30, 1997) with the aim of “attracting resources into the production sector on the domestic market” it was abolished government regulation prices for precious metals. The new system was based on the London fixing price (in US dollars, converted into rubles at the Central Bank exchange rate on the day preceding payment). Obviously, in the absence of freedom of export operations, binding internal price for gold to the global one was economic nonsense. The next presidential decree (dated July 23, 1997 171) extended the liberalization of gold transactions from the domestic market to the external market: banks received the right to export precious metals 172. These decisions formalized the “alignment of forces” that had developed in the gold sector.
The state potentially retained the role of a privileged market participant. The Department of Precious Metals and Precious Stones of the Ministry of Finance was responsible for implementing a unified state industrial policy in the field of gold. The participation of the Gokhran of the Russian Federation in the market is still ensured by the preemptive right to purchase gold for the needs of the government (in the 90s, it annually acquired about a fifth of gold production). In its modern form, 173 this body is a kind of “pocket” of the current government, funds from which are used for current needs. The gold reserve maintained by Gokhran provides the state's mobilization resource necessary to meet the needs of the defense industry. Gokhran also keeps records of all purchase and sale transactions of gold from producers. Gokhran's policy in the near future appears to lack consistency, reflecting the vicissitudes of government policy: in the period 1998-1999. he pursued a policy of minimizing purchases, while in 1998 and 2000. were marked by the heads of the department putting forward plans to expand its functions with a corresponding intensification of work to replenish state funds 174. Modern Gokhran, according to its head V.V. Rudakov, is guided by the principle of maintaining a minimum “defined as an adequate level of state reserves” 175.
The position of the Russian Central Bank in the gold market is determined by the fact that, according to current legislation, it does not have the right to work with producers, but can buy gold from commercial banks. Until 1998, it was the Central Bank that sold all the gold purchased from manufacturers. With the permission of commercial exports of gold, the volume of foreign currency metal purchased by the Central Bank sharply declined: from 100 tons in 1997 to 54.7 and 26.7 tons in 1999 and 2000, respectively, and 12.5 tons in 2001 176 With the instability of world prices for gold, the share of the latter in the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation during the 90s. decreased from 33.1% to 12.4%. The essentially “residual” principle of purchasing policy, characteristic of the activities of the Central Bank in today’s conditions, was formulated by the head of the Department of Methodology for Managing Operations with Precious Metals L. Selyunina: “The Central Bank purchases all the gold that commercial banks offer it” 177 .
The state practically stopped financing gold mining and began purchasing it only to replenish the minimum reserves of Gokhran, as well as - in small quantities - to increase the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank. The “core” of the modern domestic gold market, therefore, is commercial banks. Since the last third of the 1990s. they purchased about 80% (about 100 tons) of gold mined from Russian subsoil. In 2000, they purchased in advance the entire estimated production volume for the year, and invested more than $200 million in the form of credit resources (for comparison, the federal target program “Production of Gold and Silver in Russia for the Period until 2000” provided for investments in total amount 5.73 million dollars) 178. If in 1998 the volume of the commercial market was about 50 tons of gold, and 60 tons were purchased by the state, then in 2000, with a production volume of 144 tons, 112 tons were purchased by commercial banks (they actually concluded contracts for 140 tons), 25 - Gokhran 179, 7 - refineries 180.
As of 2001, 161 domestic banks had licenses to operate with gold, 48 banks 181 entered into agreements with subsoil users, of which about 20 declared their particularly active position in this area of activity. The lion's share of gold purchased by commercial banks is sold abroad by them 182 . According to the Union of Gold Miners, 76 tons of gold were exported from Russia in 2000, and 100 tons in 2001. The decision to liberalize exports was aimed at supporting domestic gold producers with funds from commercial banks. However, compliance with state interests in this scheme for the sale of gold can be questioned, since gold “leaves” the country, and the state loses profits from operations with this type of resource 183 .
It seems fundamental to have a negative assessment of the established seasonal, “one-time” nature of financial relations between producers and banks, when the latter finance the industry, as a rule, only by advancing next year’s production. The current economic and legal conditions contribute to the development of a system of long-term loans in the industry to a minimal extent 184. As a result, banks contribute minimally to improving the technical and technological appearance of the industry, where outdated equipment and technologies predominate, and labor productivity is 10-20 times less than in similar industries in industrialized countries. The emerging positive trend towards changes in the qualitative structure of production at alluvial and ore deposits is constrained by the lack of guaranteed economic and legal mechanisms for providing the most promising ore objects with long-term financial resources.
The fact that the course proclaimed by the Government of the Russian Federation towards the innovative nature of industrial policy in the gold industry has no real financial basis is evidenced by the actual failure of plans to attract foreign investment into the industry. Federal program “Production of gold and silver for the period until 2000” it was planned to attract 1246 million dollars for the commissioning and reconstruction of gold mining enterprises. In reality, according to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, out of those planned for 1996-1998. foreign investments in the amount of 842 million dollars received only 232 million, or 27.5% 185 . Only two projects with Western investments are being successfully implemented (Omolon Gold Mining Company OJSC and Buryatzoloto OJSC), which are united by the highest quality of deposit reserves. Apart from the Sukhoi Log deposit, around which political games are actively being waged, there are currently no other gold ore deposits in Russia that can ensure high profitability of their development. Large national companies capable of implementing large-scale projects in the field of gold mining are still extremely few in the country (today there are no more than 20 of them).
It is obvious that the most dependent and suffering element of the gold market that has formed over the past years is the subsoil user. The current one is recognized as particularly destructive price policy: if in the first half of 1999, contracts for the purchase of gold were concluded at a price of 99.5-98.5% of the current fixing price on the London Stock Exchange, then with the introduction of a customs duty on the export of precious metals, gold actually began to be sold at a price of 6.5 % below the world level (duties have been abolished since January 2002, but over three years the losses of Russian producers amounted to at least 30 million US dollars 186). In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 21, 2001 “On the procedure for the import into and export from the Russian Federation of precious metals and precious stones,” manufacturers received the right to independently enter the foreign market with their products, but the corresponding practice has not yet been developed. The position of producers is negatively affected by the existing taxation system. According to analysts, until 1996, the share of taxes in the cost of gold tended to increase, and since 1996 it has remained virtually unchanged, ranging from 21 to 29.5%, which is 2-3 times higher than in similar industries abroad 187.
In 1991-1999 gold production in Russia decreased by 25.6% 188. The main share of the increase in production in the turning years of the XX-XXI centuries. are given by 2-3 largest companies 189, with the exception of whose contribution there is a predominantly downward trend. The emerging positive trends do not have the necessary “margin of safety” due to the insufficient renewal of fixed assets of enterprises and the peculiarities of economic and legal conditions. A number of competent persons testify to the “hidden tense state” of the industry, also emphasizing that its extremely ineffective inclusion in general economic modernization processes is evidenced by the fact that “the gold industry is expecting a fall in the ruble” 190 .
Assessing the prospects for the development of the domestic gold industry, the Third International Business Conference “Russian Market of Precious Metals and Precious Stones” (RDMK) 191 noted that the main obstacle to the development of the “gold business” is the “lack of a unified state policy” 192. It is no coincidence that this issue was given priority importance. Firstly, the corresponding federal program expired at the end of 2000, and the new one did not come into effect. It seems quite typical that a number of experts admitted that the program was “buried” because government agencies simply did not have adequate information about the development of this area. Secondly, the basic Federal Law “On Precious Metals and Precious Stones” 193 adopted in 1998, at the time of its adoption, did not correspond to objective realities and was not oriented towards the future, and therefore never really came into effect 194 .
Speaking about the goals and means of modern economic policy in Russia, it should be noted that today gold is not considered as a critically important economic resource 195 . Its production and consumption are included in economic mechanisms from the standpoint, first of all, of “budget income” - tax and customs revenues, as well as the development of geopolitically important north-eastern territories for Russia, where gold mining forms the basis of regional economies. The role of gold is limited by its less than 0.5% share in the gross domestic product (GDP) 196 , the incomparability of potential income with the scale of Russia's catastrophically increased external debts 197 , and its reduced importance in the structure of state gold and foreign exchange funds. Gold mining policy today officially distances itself from the policy of forming state reserves 198 .
At the same time, gold potentially remains an important factor in the economic system, capable, in particular, of amortizing the increase in the balance of payments deficit and inflationary processes during critical periods. International statistical standards widely use the GDP “gold intensity” index; One of the important aspects of the activities of the International Monetary Fund on the “Russian field” was the accounting of indicators related to gold 199 . World statistics show that economically developed countries that are able to satisfy their foreign exchange needs through income from foreign trade do not neglect gold 200.
Declining economic importance of gold theorists of the 70-80s. XX century associated with a reduction in international confrontation, a reduction in the risk of currency shocks, an expansion of the free movement of capital, as well as a stabilization of the situation on the world oil market. And if recently the question was only raised about how long-term these trends are, today none of the listed factors no longer represents a “stable given”. The state and current evolution of the international monetary system have updated today the consideration of the problems of future prospects for the economic status of gold 201, including for Russia - in terms of banking and monetary reforms 202. Without invading the sphere of economic analysis, we note that this issue remains hotly debated, but the content of the discussions confirms the opinion that Russia has clearly insufficiently realized the potential of its own gold mining 203 .
Urgent problems remain in raising gold mining to the level of efficient resource use and using the income it generates as a source of investment funds in the economy. Gold is still a particularly liquid mineral, a privileged currency commodity, “a reserve of last resort, which formed the basis for the development of materials of the future and high-tech technologies, i.e. one of the “special components of national wealth” 204. As a consequence, Russia needs a truly national policy in the field of gold, self-determination in terms of state priorities and national interests. And in this case we are not talking about mirages of economic respectability: neglecting this problem, given the current state of affairs in the gold industry, can lead to irreversible damage to the fundamental strategic interests of the country.
The research on the topic “National gold mining policy of the 18th-20th centuries, or Does Russia need gold” is carried out by the author with the support of the Grant Council of the President of the Russian Federation “Young Doctors of Science” and state support from leading scientific schools (grant No. 01-15-99509).
1 See, for example: Weston R. Gold: A World Survey. L., 1983; Bordo M.D. The Gold Standard: Myth and Realities. San Francisco: Pacific Institute, 1984; Anikin A.B. Gold: International economic aspect. 2nd ed. M., 1988; Flanders M.J. International Monetary Economics: 1870-1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Benevolsky B., Krivtsov V., Migachev I. Gold mining and gold consumption: economic aspects // RDMK-2000: Third international business conference “Russian market of precious metals and precious stones: state and prospects”: Documents and materials. M., 2001. pp. 380-396.
2 On the historiography of the domestic gold industry, see, for example: Sapogovskaya L.B. Private gold mining in Russia at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries: the Urals and Siberia - development models. Ekaterinburg, 1998. pp. 6-14.
3 Interviews were conducted with the heads of a number of gold mining and gold processing enterprises, the director of the Gokhran of the Russian Federation V.V. Rudakov, Head of the Department of Supply, Calculation and Pricing of the Gokhran of the Russian Federation V.G. Goncharov, Chairman of the Committee on Precious Metals of the Association of Russian Banks S.G. Kashuba, Chairman of the Union of Gold Miners of Russia V.N. Braiko, Chairman of the Union of Prospectors of Russia V.I. Tarakanovsky.
4 For explanations of the activities of the Committee on Precious Metals, see: Russian State Archive of Economics (hereinafter referred to as RSAE). F. 325. Op. 1. D. 163. L. 1-9. In the period from October 1917 to February 1918, within the framework of the Supreme Economic Council there was a Section on Precious Metals, focused primarily on the gold processing industry (assay supervision, gold-alloying laboratories, jewelry making). See: Krylov A.I. Forms of organization of the gold industry // Gold industry of the USSR (1st All-Union Gold Industry Congress). M.; L., 1927. P. 17.
5 RGAE. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 151-154, 157-159.
6 It is known that A.V. Kolchak planned to launch gold mining in the occupied territories, a loan was allocated to the Ural Mining Administration, and assistance was provided to the owners of the mines in the purchase of food. There is information that the Kolchakites paid in gold for one of the arms shipments. Later, the “supreme ruler” decided to leave gold in free circulation, but introduced a monopoly on platinum, which was in unlimited demand among the Entente.
7 Soddatov L.K. Gold mining in the national and world economy. M., 1925. P. 99. Data on the development of gold mining in the first op. 1. D. 4. L. 94. The volume of production in 1920 is determined at 109 poods. (1.8 t).
8 See, for example: Murtuzalieva L.F. Activities of the Precious Metals Department of the Ural Regional Council for the seizure and remelting of products made of precious metals in the spring of 1918 // From the history of Ural gold. Ekaterinburg, 1995. pp. 102-104.
9 See, for example: State Archive of the Irkutsk Region (hereinafter - GA IO). F. r-1344. D. 2, 3, 7.
10 Decrees of the Soviet government. T. VIII. M., 1976. S. 42-48.
11 Ibid. T. IX. M., 1978. S. 213-214.
12 Collection of laws and orders of the Workers' and Peasants' Government (hereinafter - SU). 1921. No. 18. Art. III. P. 106.
13 Leshkov V.G., Belchenko E.L., Guzman B.V. Gold of Russian subsoil. M., 2000. P. 108.
14 Interesting data about “golden parcels” passing through the ports of the Baltic states, based on information from the Western press in 1920-1922, as well as on the memoirs of the Soviet trade representative in Reval G. Solomin, are given in: Mosyakin A. Baltic offshore // Istorija . No. 13. 2001 (www.baltkurs.com).
15 See, for example: Gokhran of Russia. M., 1999. P. 2-5.
16 See: Lenin V.I. Full collection Op. T. 54. pp. 153-154, 412; T. 51. P. 299-300; T. 52. pp. 407-408.
17 Decrees of the Soviet government. T. VII. M., 1974. S. 193-194.
18 History of diplomacy. T. II. M., 1945. P. 363.
19 See: Collection of current treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the RSFSR with foreign states. Vol. I. Current treaties, agreements and conventions that entered into force on January 1, 1921. P., 1921, pp. 239-247.
20 During this period, not only gold, but also artistic values were exported abroad. See, for example: Sold treasures of Russia. 1918-1937. M., 1999.
21 See: Almazova O.L., Dubonosov L.A. Gold and currency: past and present. M., 1988. pp. 33-34.
22 In the Western press, L. Krasin was portrayed as Mephistopheles, “alluring with gold cash” (“Riga Day” of July 1, 1920).
23 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 1. D. 187. L. 406-407.
24 News of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. 1921. No. 45; Collection of laws and orders of the Workers' and Peasants' Government. 1921. No. 16. Art. 101.
25 See, for example: Nove A. An Economic History of the USSR. London, 1986. P. 147-153; Belousov P. Economic history of Russia: XX century. Book 2. M., 2000. pp. 371-377.
26 Protocols of the X Congress of the RCP(b). M., 1933. P. 430.
27 Lenin V.I. Full collection Op. T. 53. P. 93.
28 See: Sokolnikov G.Ya. New financial policy, on the way to hard currency. M., 1995.
29 Belousov R. Economic history of Russia: XX century. Book 2. P. 254.
30 CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. M., 1954. Part I. P. 589.
31 XI Congress of the RCP(b). M., 1922. P. 557.
32 Bokarev Yu.P. Russian economy in the world economic system(end of the 19th century - 30s of the 20th century) // Economic history of Russia in the 19th-20th centuries: Modern view. M., 2000. P. 449. The maximum share of provision of new banknotes with precious metals was 53.4% at the beginning of April 1923 (see: Yurovsky L. On the path to monetary reform. M., 1924. P. 72- 74).
33 See: Bogolepov D. Money of Soviet Russia. L., 1924. S. 27-29; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Banking and Monetary Statistics: 1914-1941. Washington, 1976. P. 550-551.
34 SU. 1921. No. 74. Art. 604.
35 RGAE. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 172. L. 2-7.
36 See: RGAE. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 11-12; D. 10. L. 1-4; D. 19. L. 17-20.
37 In 1918, the cost of a platinum spool was 72 rubles, while the British, “without haggling,” gave 300 rubles. (see, for example: Filatov V.V. Birth of the plant // Ekaterinburg Non-Ferrous Metals Processing Plant: Special issue, "Gold of Russia" magazine, 1996). Of the areas classified by the government in 1924 as “super-impact” in terms of supply, only one (Lensky) was gold mining, the rest (Neyvinsky, N.-Tagilsky, Isovsky, N.-Turinsky) specialized in platinum mining.
38 See, for example: Gulin V.S. The Ural mining industry in figures for 50 years and further ways of its development. M., 1930. P. 41.
39 See: Kochegarova E.D. Gold mining industry of the Far East (1922-1940): Historical experience: Author's abstract. diss... cand. ist. Sci. Vladivostok, 2002.
40 RGAE. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 58. L. 27.
41 According to the author’s estimates, by only 3-4.3%.
42 RGAE. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 25. L. 6.
43 The first was the Nizhne-Turinsky plant in the Urals.
44 RGAE. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 72. L. 1-8.
45 Ibid. F. 8153. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 14 vol.
46 See: ibid. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 58. L. 29-30.
47 Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of June 4, 1927 “On the procedure and timing for the liquidation of state gold mining enterprises that are part of the Soyuzzoloto JSC” (RGAE. F. 8152. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 1, 6; D. 6. L. 1-9).
48 Gold mining of the USSR. I All-Union Gold Mining Congress. M., 1927.
49 All trusts have the status of all-Union subordination.
50 About his work and the state of affairs in gold mining A.P. Serebrovsky later wrote in the book “On the Golden Front” (M., 1936).
51 RGAE. F. 8152. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 23ob., 28, 48, 76, 223.
52 Ibid. D. 216. L. 54. “Soyuzzoloto” was supposed to promote the development of private enterprises, but “all abnormalities” were immediately reported to the NKF and NKT of the OGPU.
53 See: RGAE. F. 8152. Op. 1. D. 216. L. 39-40, 56-59.
54 The Soviet government tried to fight the “taiga law”; Punitive measures to protect state property were actively introduced in the region. A 700-kilometer path was laid from the Trans-Siberian Railway to the field area, and steam dredges were delivered almost on the shoulders from the Bodaibo mines.
55 RGAE. F. 8152. Op. 1. D. 326. L. 1v.
56 Gregory P. Economic history of Russia: what we know about it and what we don’t know: an economist’s assessment // Economic history: Yearbook, 2000. M., 2001. P. 55
57 From July 22, 1928 “On the conditions of employment of miners engaged in the extraction of precious metals and precious stones”; dated September 12, 1928 “On benefits for specialists of state enterprises for the extraction of gold and platinum.”
58 RGAE. F. 8152. Op. 1. D. 326. L. 46, 52, 74.
59 Ibid. F. 8153. Op. 1. D. 62. L. 57 rev.
60 See, for example: Borisov S.M. Gold in the economy of modern capitalism. M., 1968. S. 131-139; Almazova O.L., Dubonosov L.A. Gold and currency: past and present. M., 1988. pp. 35-46.
61 From a note by Soyuzzoloto technical expert I.M. Charkviani (RGAE. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 220. L. 9 rev.).
62 Soviet gold mining. 1932. No. 1. P. 1.
63 RGAE. F. 8153. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 31.
64 See, for example: RGAE. F. 7620. Op. 1. D. 776. L. 33 (with the Southwestern engineering corporation); F. 8152. Op. 1. D. 326. L. 2 (Amtorg Trading Corporation); L. 42-43 (with the companies Krupp, Siemens and Halske, well-known in Russia since pre-revolutionary times); F. 325. Op. 1. D. 46. L. 1-5 (correspondence with foreign joint-stock companies of the Mining Department and the Bureau of Foreign Science and Technology (BINT) of the Supreme Economic Council).
65 Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of June 20, 1932 (No. 987/215); March 20, 1934 (No. 589/99); July 7, 1934 (No. 1581/276); Council of Labor and Defense of December 15, 1932 (No. 1576/975).
66 RGAE. F. 8153. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 29-35.
67 Head of the industry A.P. Serebrovsky became deputy people's commissar.
68 See, for example: RGAE. F. 8153. Op. 1. D. 41. L. 11-12.
69 Ibid. D. 62. L. 5.
70 See, for example: The best people of the gold industry. M., 1935.
71 RGAE. F. 8153. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 2-3.
72 Tales of Gold. Sverdlovsk, 1937. Preface. P. 7.
73 See, for example: Vekhov S.M. Gold industry during the years of Stalin’s five-year plans // Gold industry. 1939. No. 10, 11.
74 RGAE. F. 8153. Op. 1. D. 121. L. 1-2.
75 Spikes are the remains of mineral particles obtained by washing sands and other rocks. Ephel - small particles carried away by water during the washing of placer gold or processing of ore gold. (See, for example: Borchwaldt O.V. Dictionary of gold mining of the Russian Empire. M., 1998. P. 184-185, 190-191.)
76 Author’s calculations based on data from annual indices of gold mining dynamics at Glavzoloto (RGAE. F. 325).
77 See, for example: Kempton D.R., Levine R.M. Soviet and Russian Relation with Foreign Corporation: The Case of Gold and Diamonds // www.goldsheetlinks.com.
78 For the most categorical opinions in this range of problems, see the work: Glazyev S.Yu., Lvov D.S., Fetisov G.G. Evolution of technical and economic systems: possibilities and limits of centralized regulation. M., 1992. pp. 89-117. The authors, in particular, argue that the massive involvement of foreign experience was ill-considered and limited in nature, and after the Great Depression period it was associated mainly with copying outdated technological structures.
79 See, for example: Gold-platinum and diamond industry during the years of Soviet power // Non-ferrous metals. 1967. No. 10.
80 In 1944, American experts visited the golden Kolyma to verify the “gold-worthiness” of the USSR.
81 See, for example: Danilov A.A., Pyzhikov A.V. The birth of a superpower: the USSR in the first post-war years. M., 2001. P. 123.
82 The size of the USSR's gold reserves was a strict state secret (there is still no data on it), known almost only to the head of state. Since part of the reserves in Stalin's times was kept in the Ministry of Finance, and the other in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, even the head of the financial department did not have adequate information
83 See, for example: Simonov N. Military-industrial complex in the USSR in the 1920-50s. M., 1996. pp. 203-207.
84 Winter V.F. Famine in the USSR 1946-1947: origin and consequences. M., 1996. P. 190.
85 Gold content the dollar was set at 0.888 grams of pure gold; thus, the fixed price of gold was $35 per troy ounce. The gold dollar standard was based on the unilateral commitment of the US government to convert gold into the dollar. It was an “additionally reduced form of the gold standard” compared to the classic one: the terms of the interstate gold bullion standard were applied to the dollar, and the interstate gold and exchange standard was applied to all other currencies (see: Apmazova O.L., Dubonosov L.A. Gold and currency: the past and the present. M., 1988. P. 105).
86 See, for example: Elin G.M. Foreign currencies and the mechanism of international payments. M., 1946; Matyukhin G.G. Hot money. M., 1979; Bogdanov S.M. Monetary system of modern capitalism. M., 1968.
87 Formed on the basis of the State Trust for Industrial and Road Construction in the Upper Kolyma Region.
88 GULAG. 1918-1960: Documents. M., 2000. pp. 752-759.
89 The system of forced labor camps in the USSR. 1923-1960: Directory. M., 1998; GULAG. 1918-1960: Documents.
90 The following institutions operated in the GULAG system: Beregovoy ITL, which was engaged in servicing the Utim gold mining plant; Western ITL, specializing in work in gold mines; Indigirsky ITL developed 9 mines; Berelekhsky ITL conducted geological exploration work in the Magadan region; development of the Tuim group of fields and design and survey work was carried out by ITL Taezhny Yeniseiskstroya; a geological exploration department operated in the system of the Nizhneindigirsky Leningrad Region; Minusinsk LO carried out work for the Minusazoloto plant; Primorsky ITL served the Primorzoloto trust; The Northern ITL provided labor for 11 gold mines; The North-Eastern ITL, in addition to the extraction of tungsten and tin, developed several dozen mines and mines, served an enrichment and gold recovery plant; Tenkinsky ITL developed production at a dozen mines with a processing plant; The Far Eastern was in charge of gold mining on Askold Island. In Siberia, the following were associated with the gold industry: Khakass Regional District, serving the Khakasszoloto trust; Baleysky ITL, serving the Darasun, Baleyzoloto plant and a branch of the Giprozoloto Institute; The Bodaibo ITL carried out the production of Lenzoloto’s work, and certain areas of Lengiprozoloto’s design work were also carried out here; Darasun ITL was engaged in the construction of a concentrate cyanidation workshop; Dzhugzhursky and Etsiseisky ITL - underground mining operations for gold extraction; ITL Affinazhstroy, opened back in 1942, built a refinery in Krasnoyarsk; Aldansky - carried out geological exploration work on placer deposits and operated a slurry factory; "Zalotoprodsnab" was subordinated to the Ust-Kutsk and Balagansk LR. Operating in the Urals were: Berezovlag, which was engaged in the reconstruction of the Berezovzoloto plant and carried out production tasks for gold mining; Kochkarsky LO, which served the Kochkarzoloto plant; Verkhne-Neyvinsky ITL carried out the construction of facilities at the Berezovzoloto plant; Bazhenovsky ITL specialized in geological exploration of the northern regions of the Urals; several mines worked in the Ivdellag system; Urallag was largely focused on the work of the Uralzoloto trust.
91 According to a number of practitioners, “the transfer of gold mining to the management system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had not only negative consequences” (see, for example: Leshkov V.G., Belchenko E.L., Guzman B.V. Gold of Russian subsoil. M ., 2000. P. 118).
92 From July 1, 1947 No. 2283 “On approval of the Model Charter of the Artel of Miners in the Glavspetstsvetmet system of the USSR.”
93 From May 2, 1948 No. 1457.
94 See, for example: Chernyak A. Gold of Russia: (Based on materials from a hearing in the State Duma) // Russian Federation. No. 1. 1996. P. 10.
95 Author's calculations.
96 RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 72. D. 1733. L. 1-2, 55.
97 Ibid. Op. 42. D. 170. L. 78-83.
98 Its divisions became part of the Central Research Geological Prospecting Institute of Non-Ferrous and Precious Metals.
99 RGAE. F. 4372. Op. 57. D. 412. L. 52-53.
100 The “supplier of ideas” was the State Economic Council, working in parallel with the State Planning Committee, headed by A.F. Zasyadko, which also prepared the economic part of the CPSU Program of 1961 (see, for example: Bystroe F.P. Ruble and dollar. M., 1961) .
101 During the preparation of the reform, a fight was carried out with particular severity (up to the introduction of the death penalty) against the black gold and foreign exchange market, which “undermined the authority of the Soviet “gold” ruble.”
102 See, for example: Bessonova O.E. Institutions of the distribution economy of Russia: Retrospective analysis. Novosibirsk, 1997. pp. 37-38, 46-47, 51.
103 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 55. D. 539. L. 12; Op. 49. D. 807. L. 33-34, 46, 68, 92-100, 114, 170; D. 816. L. 4-9.
104 Ibid. Op. 49. D. 823. L. 1, 3-7, 10; Op. 55. D. 550. L. 7-8.
105 I.V. Stalin pursued a policy of steady accumulation of gold funds. According to some recollections, he refused to make payments on the foreign market in precious metals because this could lead to a fall in world prices for gold and, accordingly, to the loss of the USSR achieved positions in this area (see, for example: Stalin’s gold reserves // Pravda Rossii. 2001. No. 23).
106 This thesis was very important for N.S. Khrushchev. See, for example: Khrushchev N.S. Forty years of the Great October Socialist Revolution. M., 1957.
107 Russia: state priorities and national interests. M., 2000. P. 272.
108 RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 45. D. 1197. L. 4.
109 See: Allian. K. Gold and Political Market. New York, 1988, pp. 111-114.
110 New York Post. 07.07.1953 (RGAE. F. 7733. On. 45. D. 1197. L. 27-28).
111 Data from National Trade Data Bank Market Reports and Bank of America World Information Service // www.databank.neu.edu. Author's calculations.
112 Pyzhikov A. Amplitude of economic development of the USSR in 1953-1964. // Economic Issues. 2002. No. 1. (The author refers to data from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (hereinafter - AP RF). F. 3. Op. 52. D. 292. L. 73.)
113 RGAE. F. 4372. Op. 67. D. 5083. L. 223-224.
114 Ibid. Op. 66. D. 1762. L. 4; Op. 67. D. 392. L. 104.
115 See: ibid. Op. 57. D. 424. L. 30; D. 411. L. 144-145.
116 See: ibid. Op. 66. D. 1760. L. 5; D. 1777. L. 41.
117 Directed by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of October 27, 1952 and was expressed, in particular, in a campaign to conduct an audit of jewelry factories and trading bases of the Glavyuvelirtorg of the Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade (see, for example: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 42 D. 170. L. 52-56).
118 See, for example: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 44. D. 1318. L. 1, 10; Op. 43. D. 266. L. 18-19; Op. 43. D. 266. L. 14.
119 Ibid. Op. 45. D. 115. L. 27-28. Op. 41. D. 221. L. 35; Op. 43. D. 266. L. 3.
120 The thinnest (usually fractions of a micron) films of gold, folded into so-called books weighing 1.5-2 g.
121 If the directorates of national museums and regional executive committees, having completed all the formalities, after the inevitable “cuts” were still able to satisfy their needs, then the approval of requests from church institutions, as a rule, required special conditions, for example, paying for gold leaf “offerings” when the State Fund “coins received from believers were surrendered” (see, for example: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 42. D. 170. L. 14, 74; Op. 45. D. 116. L. 14; Op. 41. D. 221. L. 15; Op. 43. D. 266. L. 10).
122 RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 45. D. 115. L. 10, 25; D. 170. L. 47.
123 Ibid. F. 4372. Op. 66. D. 943. L. 39-40; D. 1760. L. 90; D. 1761. L. 87-88; D. 1762. L. 4.
124 See: ibid. D. 1026. L. 1-2; D. 3319. L. 17-18.
125 See, for example: Figures on Soviet gold production // Eurasian Geography and Economic. 1997. No. 6 (www.bellpub.com).
126 Kamanina A.L. Russia's position on the world gold market // Corinth. 1993. No. 17.
127 Resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee 1983, 1987 on gold mining concerned mainly restriction measures, and in the future - a complete curtailment of mining operations in the country.
128 Decree of the USSR Government of March 10, 1975 No. 198 // Collection of Decrees of the USSR Government. 1975. No. 9. P. 47.
129 RGAE. F. 4372. Op. 67. D. 2373. L. 173; D. 1106. L. 17-19; D. 461. L. 67-69; D. 5085. L. 676-680.
130 Ibid. D. 2373. L. 25-33, 35; D. 4374. L. 193-195; D. 5086. L. 7; D. 5900. L. 121-124; D. 5903. L. 160-161.
131 Ibid. D. 3706. L. 203-205.
132 The tradition of monthly “golden reports” was supported by the next chairman of the Council of Ministers, N.A. Tikhonov.
133 See: RGAE. F. 4372. Op. 67. D. 4370. L. 215-218.
134 Ibid. D. 3685. L. 216.
135 Ibid. D. 2688. L. 27-30.
136 Ibid. D. 2374. L. 122-123.
137 Platonov O.A. Russia's crown of thorns: History of the Russian people in the 20th century. M., 1998. T. II. P. 394. In the period 1934-1998. The USSR sold gold for 150 billion US dollars, which corresponds, taking into account price dynamics, to the sale of an average of approximately 100 tons of gold per year (Lamin V.A. The Golden Trace of Siberia. Ekaterinburg, 1997. P. 135).
138 Leshkov V.G., Belchenko E.L., Guzman B.V. Decree. Op. P. 154.
139 See, for example: Osipov V. Britain through the eyes of a Russian. M., 1976. P. 52.
140 Kempton D.R., Levine R.M. Soviet and Russian Relation with Foreign Corporation: The Case of Gold and Diamonds // www.goldsheeetlinks.com.
141 RGAE. F. 4372. On. 67. D. 5085. L. 64-65.
142 Ibid. D. 5900. L. 121-122.
143 Gorbachev M.S. Life and reforms. Book 1. M., 1995. P. 304.
144 See, for example: Egorov E.G., Alekseev P.S. Economics of the gold and diamond mining industry in the transition period. Novosibirsk, 1997.
145 See: Gold: past and present. M., 1998. pp. 119-120.
146 See, for example: Zhukov V.I. Reforms in Russia. 1985-1995. M., 1996.
147 See, for example: Bunich I. Gold of the Party // Gold of Russia. T. II. M, 1994. S. 453-487.
148 Ryzhkov N.I. I'm from a party called Russia. M., 1995. P. 237.
149 For comparative data on the margin of profitability of gold for leading gold-mining countries, see the work: Borisov S.M. World gold market: trends and statistics // Finance and credit. 1997. No. 6. P. 47.
150 According to the Union of Gold Miners of Russia.
151 RDMK-2000: Third international business conference.... P. 54.
152 Resolutions of February 12, 1993 No. 114 and May 24, 1993 No. 485.
153 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of December 18, 1996 No. 1511 “On approval of the Regulations on the Ministry of Industry of the Russian Federation.”
154 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 21, 1996 No. 1378 “On the creation, under the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, of a State Institution for the formation of the State Fund of Precious Metals and Precious Stones of the Russian Federation, storage, release and use of precious metals and precious stones (Gokhrana of Russia).”
155 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of August 23, 2000 No. 624 “Issues of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.”
156 Presidential Decree “On the extraction and use of precious metals and diamonds on the territory of the RSFSR” (November 1991); Government Decree “On the extraction and use of precious metals and diamonds on the territory of the Russian Federation and strengthening state control over their production and consumption” (January 1992).
157 See, for example: Kolmogorov N.K. Gold mining industry in Russia: Problems and prospects // Mineral resources of Russia. 2000. No. 2.
158 Business. 1994. No. 2. P. 11.
159 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On the extraction and use of precious metals and diamonds on the territory of the RSFSR” dated November 15, 1991
160 See: Gusseynov E. How Russia’s gold reserves were eroded // Financial news. 1996. No. 51. According to other data, the Control Directorate of the Presidential Administration revealed that in January 1995 there were only 78.4 tons of gold in the State Fund vaults (Kommersant-Daily. 1997. September 20. No. 159. P. 1).
161 Arguments and facts. 1993. No. 19.
162 Gold was placed under Western control and management, and the government, in dire need of funds, received compensation based on a price below the market price. At the same time, the Government of the Russian Federation retained the right to “buy back” gold within the specified time, but the terms of the agreement were violated, and at least 200 tons of gold were irretrievably lost.
163 See, for example: Gold bulletin // World Gold Council. L., 1996.
164 Law of the Russian Federation of July 21, 1993 No. 5485-18.
165 High-profile Duma investigation into the “movement of state fund values in the period 1989-1995.” discovered inconsistency of data on the directions of “gold flows”, gaping information gaps, diverging (and very significantly) basic indicators (see, for example: Commission materials State Duma: Gold of Russia // Russian Federation. 1996. No. 1).
166 1406.6 tons, according to the Union of Gold Miners of Russia.
167 Rodyushkin V.T. Banks’ work with precious metals: how it was // Association of Russian Banks: 10 years. M., 2001. P. 45.
168 See: Business world. 1994. April 23; Kommersant-Weekly (Power). 1997. March 11.
169 Kempton D.R., Levine R.M. Op. cit.
170 See, for example: Gold Exchange: yesterday, today, tomorrow // www.rdmk.ru.
171 “On some measures to liberalize the export of refined gold and silver from the Russian Federation.”
172 This decision was developed in the decree “On the export of refined gold and silver from the Russian Federation by credit institutions” (February 1998).
173 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 21, 1996
174 See: Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 1998. February 27; Kommersant-Daily. 2001. September 21; Financial news. 2000. October 13; Non-ferrous metallurgy. 2000. September; Interfax. 2000. September 21.
175 Interview materials.
176 ABCentre-Nonferous Metals Review, July 6, 2001.
177 Non-ferrous metallurgy. 2000. October 13.
Some “interesting” facts about the activities of the CPSU have become known. One of the high-profile incidents was the disappearance of the party's gold reserves. In the early nineties, a variety of versions appeared in the media. The more publications there were, the more rumors spread about the mysterious disappearance of CPSU values.
Gold in Tsarist Russia
One of the main factors determining stability in the country is the availability and size of the state gold reserve. By 1923, the USSR had 400 tons of state gold, and by 1928 - 150 tons. For comparison: when Nicholas II ascended the throne, the gold reserves were estimated at 800 million rubles, and by 1987 - at 1095 million. Then a monetary reform was carried out, filling the ruble with gold content.
From the beginning of the twentieth century, supplies began to deplete: Russia prepared for the Russo-Japanese War, was defeated in it, and then the revolution occurred. By 1914, gold reserves had been restored. During the First World War and after it, gold was sold (and at dumping prices), pledged to creditors, moving to their territory.
Stock restoration
The Soyuzzoloto trust was created in 1927. Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin personally led gold mining in the USSR. Industry rose, but the young state did not become a leader in the extraction of valuable metals. True, by 1941 the USSR's gold reserves amounted to 2,800 tons, twice as much as the Tsar's. The government stockpile has reached an all-time high. It was this gold that made it possible to win the Great Patriotic War and restore the destroyed economy.
USSR gold reserves
Joseph Stalin left his successor about 2,500 tons of state gold. After Nikita Khrushchev, 1,600 tons remained, after Leonid Brezhnev - 437 tons. Yuri Andropov and slightly increased the gold reserves, the “stash” amounted to 719 tons. In October 1991, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation announced that 290 tons of valuable metal remained. This gold (along with debts) passed to the Russian Federation. Vladimir Putin accepted it in the amount of 384 tons.
Gold cost
Until 1970, the price of gold was one of the most stable parameters in the world. The US leadership regulated the price at $35 per troy ounce. From 1935 to 1970, America's gold reserves were rapidly declining, so it was decided that the nation's currency would no longer be backed by gold. After this (that is, since 1971), the price of gold began to rise rapidly. After the price surge, the value fell slightly, reaching $330 per ounce in 1985.
The price of gold in the Land of the Soviets was not determined by the world market. How much did a gram of gold cost in the USSR? The price was approximately 50-56 rubles per gram for 583 standard metal. Pure gold was bought at a price of up to 90 rubles per gram. On the black market, a dollar could be bought for 5-6 rubles, so the cost of one gram did not exceed $1.28 until the seventies. Thus, the cost of an ounce of gold in the USSR was a little more than 36 dollars.
The myth of party gold
Party gold refers to the hypothetical gold and currency funds of the CPSU, which allegedly disappeared after the collapse of the USSR and have not yet been found. The myth about the existence of the untold wealth of the leaders of the Union became popular in the media in the early nineties. The reasons for the increased interest in this issue was the participation of Communist Party leaders in privatization, while the majority of the country's population was below the poverty line.
The first publication devoted to this issue is the book “Corrupt Russia” by Andrei Konstantinov. The author gives the following possible scheme for the receipt of funds into the party’s “black treasury” using the example of a scheme that was revealed during an inspection of the Lenrybkholodflot party organization.
Thus, prosecutors established that high earnings resulted in significant contributions to the party treasury. In this case, double statements were used, and most of the funds were sent to higher authorities, that is, first to the regional committee, and then to Moscow. The incident was resolved with the participation of senior party officials.
Where did the USSR gold go? Many public and political figures dealt with this issue: Russian writer Alexander Bushkov, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Gennady Osipov, international observer Leonid Mlechin, chairman of the KGB of the USSR and close associate of Yuri Andropov Vladimir Kryuchkov, dissident historian Mikhail Geller and others. Experts have not come to a clear conclusion about the existence of party money and its location.
Three suicides in a row
At the end of August 1991, Nikolai Kruchina, the manager of the CPSU, fell out of a window. The party's chief treasurer was considered close to Mikhail Gorbachev. More than a month later, Georgy Pavlov, Brezhnev’s comrade-in-arms and Nikolai Kruchina’s predecessor in office, died in a similar manner. He held this position for eighteen years. Of course, these two people were aware of the party's affairs.
A few days later from the window own apartment Dmitry Lisovolik, the head of the department of the Central Committee who dealt with the American sector, fell out. This department carried out communications with foreign parties. The death of three officials at once, who were well aware of the financial activities of the Communist Party, gave rise to the legend of the existence of USSR gold, which disappeared in the last year of the existence of the state of peasants and workers.
Was there gold?
The Communist Party ruled the state for 74 years. At first it was an elite organization consisting of a few thousand chosen ones, but towards the end of its existence the Communist Party grew thousands of times. In 1990, the number of officials was almost 20 million people. All of them regularly paid party dues, which made up the treasury of the CPSU.
Some of the funds went into the salary fund for nomenklatura workers, but how much money was actually in the treasury and how was it spent? This was known only to a select few, among whom were Dmitry Lisovolik, Nikolai Kruchina and Georgy Pavlov who died mysteriously. This important information was carefully hidden from the eyes of outsiders.
The Communist Party received considerable income from publishing. Literature was published in huge editions. The most minimal estimates indicate that monthly amounts amounting to hundreds of millions of rubles were received into the party treasury.
No less large sums of money were accumulated in the Peace Defense Fund. Ordinary citizens and the church made voluntary and forced contributions there. The fund was a non-profit organization, but was actually under the control of the same communist party. The Peace Fund did not publish any financial statements, but (according to rough estimates) its budget was 4.5 billion rubles.
The problem of transition to state ownership
It was from the funds listed above that the party’s gold was made up. How much gold did the USSR have? It is impossible to even approximately estimate the assets of the USSR. When Yeltsin, after the putsch, issued a decree on the transfer of party property to the state, it turned out that this was impossible. The court ruled that the uncertainty of ownership of property managed by the party does not allow the CPSU to be recognized as its owners.
Where did the gold go?
Where is the gold of the USSR? The search for the party fund was taken quite seriously. The existence of the Party's gold was more than just an urban legend or newspaper sensation. In the difficult conditions in which Russia found itself in 1991-1992 and beyond, there was an urgent need for party money.
The State Bank first published information on the amount of gold in 1991. It turned out that only 240 tons remained. This shocked Western experts, who estimated gold reserves from Soviet times at 1-3 thousand tons. But it turned out that even Venezuela has more valuable metal than the Land of the Soviets.
Simple explanation
Immediately after the official publication of data on the size of gold reserves, rumors spread that the party treasury had been secretly taken to Switzerland. This process was, of course, led by the top leaders of the Communist Party. Subsequently, a very simple explanation was found for the depletion of the supply of valuable metal.
The fact is that in the last years of the USSR the government actively received loans secured by gold. The state was in dire need of currency, the flow of which was cut off due to a sharp drop in the cost of oil and the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
Party - not state
In addition, the gold, of which 240 tons remained, was state-owned, not party-owned. Here we need to remember that at one time it borrowed funds from the state treasury, but the state treasury did not from the budget of the Communist Party. Both Western detectives and the Russian prosecutor's office were looking for the party stock. Small amounts were found in official accounts, but they were significantly less than expected. We had to be content only with real estate that was privatized.
Versions of Western experts
The search for mysterious party gold was also carried out in the West. The government used the services of the world-famous Kroll agency. The organization's staff included former employees intelligence agencies, accountants who worked in well-known companies, and other experts. The company was looking for money from Saddam Hussein, dictator Duvalier (Haiti) and Marcos (Philippines).
Soon after the conclusion of the agreement, the Americans sent the Russian government materials that included high-ranking government officials from the Soviet era, but there were no specifics. Russian leaders decided to refuse Kroll's services. This was motivated by the significant monetary costs of paying for the agency's services. The Russian treasury would not have been able to withstand such spending in difficult years.
So where is the money
It is obvious that the Communist Party had an impressive treasury and managed the money of some organizations. But where? It is unlikely that billions of rubles could have been transferred abroad, although part of the money could indeed have gone there.
The USSR had a sufficient number of banks abroad. Some were engaged in servicing foreign trade transactions, others operated as ordinary private banks. Branches were located in London, Paris, Singapore, Zurich and several other cities.
It was possible to withdraw money through these banks, but their employees were foreigners, so carrying out such operations was extremely risky. Yes, and these are the ones financial institutions They would start checking first if they were seriously looking for the party’s money.
Plausible version
Most likely, the gold of the USSR remained in the USSR itself, that is, in circulation. The 1988 Cooperation Law allowed citizens to conduct commercial activities, but people did not have the initial capital for this. The Party paved the way by its example. The following year, the first private banks began to open. But where did the Soviet people get that kind of money? This is despite the fact that the authorized capital of the Soviet bank fund must have been at least 5 million rubles. Here, too, it could not have happened without the help of the Communist Party.
The main bonanza was, of course, international activity, which for a long time remained the monopoly of the CPSU. In the late eighties, private organizations entered this area. But foreign trade relations were supervised by the party and security forces. Rubles were exchanged at a reduced rate for foreign currency, and then inexpensive equipment was purchased with this money. Most often they imported computers, for which there was simply a huge demand.
So, the party's gold really existed. But these are underground gold vaults or planes loaded to the brim with banknotes. Some of the money could have been pocketed by government and public figures, but it is unlikely that these were truly significant amounts. Most of the money simply turned into paper in 1992. But the real gold was the leverage that allowed leaders to form capital for themselves in the last years of the USSR.
In the late 1920s, the Soviet Union was close to bankruptcy. Where were the funds for industrialization found?
By the end of the 1920s - the time of the establishment of Stalin's sole power - the country of the Soviets was on the verge of financial bankruptcy. The gold and foreign exchange reserves of the USSR did not exceed 200 million gold rubles, which was the equivalent of 150 tons of pure gold. Insignificant compared to the pre-war gold reserves of the Russian Empire, which reached almost 1.8 billion gold rubles in value (the equivalent of more than 1,400 tons of pure gold). In addition, the USSR accumulated an impressive foreign debt, and the country had to spend astronomical funds on an industrial breakthrough.
By the time of the dictator's death in March 1953, the USSR's gold reserves had increased at least 14 times. According to various estimates, Stalin left as a legacy to subsequent Soviet leaders, from 2051 to 2804 tons of gold. Stalin's gold box turned out to be larger than the golden treasury of Tsarist Russia. His main rival, Hitler, was far from Stalin. At the beginning of World War II, Germany's gold resources were estimated at $192 million - the equivalent of 170 tons of pure gold, to which must be added about 500 tons of gold looted by the Nazis in Europe.
What price was paid for the creation of Stalin’s “stabilization fund”?
The royal gold treasury was wasted in just a few years. Even before the Bolsheviks came to power, more than 640 million gold rubles were exported abroad by the Tsarist and Provisional governments to pay for war loans. In the ups and downs of the Civil War, with the participation of both whites and reds, they spent, stole and lost gold worth about 240 million gold rubles.
But the “tsarist” gold reserves melted especially quickly in the first years of Soviet power. The gold was used to pay indemnities for the separate Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with Germany, which allowed Soviet Russia to withdraw from the First World War, and for “gifts” under the peace treaties of the 1920s to its neighbors - the Baltic states, Poland, and Turkey. Huge amounts of money were spent in the 1920s to foment world revolution and create a Soviet spy network in the West. In addition, tons of gold and jewelry expropriated from the “property classes” were used to cover the Soviet foreign trade deficit. With the complete collapse of the economy, the lack of exports and income from them, as well as difficulties in obtaining loans in the capitalist West, Soviet Russia had to pay for the import of vital goods with national gold reserves.
In 1925, a US Senate commission investigated the issue of Soviet exports of precious metals to the West. According to her data, in 1920-1922 the Bolsheviks sold more than 500 tons of pure gold abroad! The realism of this assessment was confirmed both by secret documents of the Soviet government and by the meager cash in the vaults of the State Bank of the USSR. According to the “Report on the Gold Fund”, compiled by a government commission, which, on Lenin’s instructions, examined financial position country, on February 1, 1922, the Soviet state had gold worth only 217.9 million gold rubles, and of these funds it was necessary to use 103 million gold rubles to pay off the state debt.
By the end of the 1920s the situation had not improved. Russia's gold reserves had to be created anew.
In 1927, forced industrialization began in the USSR. Stalin's calculation that foreign exchange earnings from the export of agricultural products, food and raw materials would finance the country's industrial development did not come true: in the context of the global crisis that broke out in 1929 and the protracted depression in the West, prices for agricultural products fell hopelessly. In 1931-1933 - the decisive stage of Soviet industrialization - real export earnings annually were 600-700 million gold rubles less than expected before the crisis. The USSR sold grain at half or even a third of the pre-crisis world price, while millions of its own peasants who grew this grain were dying of hunger.
Stalin did not think about retreat. Having started industrialization with an empty wallet, the USSR took money from the West, Germany being the main creditor. The country's external debt since the fall of 1926 increased by the end of 1931 from 420.3 million to 1.4 billion gold rubles. To pay off this debt, it was necessary to sell to the West not only grain, timber and oil, but also tons of gold! The country's meager gold and foreign exchange reserves were melting before our eyes. According to the State Bank of the USSR, from October 1, 1927 to November 1, 1928, more than 120 tons of pure gold were exported abroad. In fact, this meant that all the free gold and foreign exchange reserves of the country were used, plus all the gold industrially mined in that financial year. It was in 1928 that Stalin began selling off the country's museum collections. Artistic exports resulted in the loss for Russia of masterpieces from the Hermitage, the palaces of the Russian aristocracy and private collections. But the costs of the industrial breakthrough were astronomical, and the export of works of art could provide only a very small part of them. The largest “deal of the century” with US Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, as a result of which the Hermitage lost 21 masterpieces of painting, brought Stalin’s leadership only about 13 million gold rubles (the equivalent of less than 10 tons of gold).
Gold from the State Bank was delivered by steamship to Riga, and from there by land to Berlin, to the Reichsbank. In the early 1930s, gold cargo from the USSR arrived in Riga every two weeks. According to the American Embassy in Latvia, which closely monitored Soviet gold exports, from 1931 to the end of April 1934, gold worth more than 360 million gold rubles (more than 260 tons) was exported from the USSR through Riga. However, it was impossible to solve the problem of external debt and financing of industrialization using the gold and foreign exchange reserves available in the State Bank.
What to do? At the turn of the 1920s-1930s, the country's leadership was gripped by a gold rush.
Stalin respected America's economic achievements. According to eyewitness accounts, he read Bret Harte and was inspired by the gold rush in California in the mid-19th century. But the Soviet gold rush was strikingly different from free Californian entrepreneurship.
There it was the business and risk of free people who wanted to get rich. The discovery of gold in California breathed life into the region, giving impetus to the development of agriculture and industry in the Western United States. California's gold contributed to the victory of the industrial North over the slave-owning South.
In the Soviet Union, the gold rush of the turn of the 1920s and 1930s was a state-owned enterprise whose purpose was to finance industrialization and create a national gold reserve. The methods by which it was carried out gave rise to mass famine, the prisoners' Gulag, the plunder of church property, national museums and libraries, as well as personal savings and family heirlooms of their own citizens.
When extracting gold and currency, Stalin did not disdain anything. At the end of the 1920s, the criminal investigation department and the police transferred all cases of “currency traders” and “value holders” to the Economic Directorate of the OGPU. Under the slogan of fighting currency speculation, “scrofulous campaigns” followed one after another—the confiscation of currency and valuables from the population, including household items. Persuasion, deception and terror were used. Nikanor Ivanovich’s dream from Bulgakov’s “The Master and Margarita” about the theatrical forced surrender of currency is one of the echoes of the “scrofula” of those years. The torture concert for currency traders was not the writer’s idle fantasy. In the 1920s, the OGPU convinced Jewish Nepmen to hand over their valuables using native melodies performed by a guest musician.
But jokes aside, the OGPU also had frankly bloody methods. For example, the “dollar steam room” or “golden cells”: “currency traders” were kept in prison until they told where the valuables were hidden, or relatives from abroad sent a ransom - “salvation money”. Demonstration executions of “currency and gold concealers”, sanctioned by the Politburo, were also in the arsenal of OGPU methods.
In 1930 alone, the OGPU handed over to the State Bank valuables worth more than 10 million gold rubles (the equivalent of almost 8 tons of pure gold). In May 1932, the deputy chairman of the OGPU, Yagoda, reported to Stalin that the OGPU cash desk contained valuables worth 2.4 million gold rubles and that, together with the valuables that “were previously handed over to the State Bank,” the OGPU had extracted 15.1 million gold rubles (almost 12 tons purity in gold equivalent).
The methods of the OGPU at the very least made it possible to obtain large treasures and savings, but there were values of a different kind in the country. They were not hidden in hiding places or underground, ventilation pipes or mattresses. For everyone to see, they glittered with a wedding ring on their finger, an earring in their earlobe, a gold cross on their body, a silver spoon in the chest of drawers. Multiplied by the country's 160 million population, these simple things, scattered among boxes and sideboards, could turn into enormous wealth. As the gold reserves of the State Bank depleted and the foreign exchange appetites of industrialization grew, the leadership of the USSR grew stronger in its desire to take these savings from the population. There was also a way. During the hungry years of the first five-year plans, the population’s valuables were bought up by the stores of Torgsin, the “All-Union Association for Trade with Foreigners on the Territory of the USSR.”
Torgsin opened in July 1930, but at first it served only foreign tourists and sailors in Soviet ports. The depletion of gold and foreign exchange reserves and the needs of industrialization forced the Stalinist leadership in 1931 - the apogee of the madness of industrial imports - to open the doors of torgsin to Soviet citizens. In exchange for cash currency, royal gold coinage, and then household gold, silver and precious stones, Soviet people received Torgsin's money, which they used to pay in his stores. With the admission of the hungry Soviet consumer to Torgsin, the sleepy life of elite stores ended. Torgsin stores shining with mirrors in large cities and unsightly little shops in godforsaken villages—Torgsin’s network has covered the entire country.
The terrible year 1933 was the sad triumph of Torgsin. Happy was the one who had something to hand over to Torgsin. In 1933, people brought 45 tons of pure gold and almost 2 tons of silver to Torgsin. With these funds they purchased, according to incomplete data, 235,000 tons of flour, 65,000 tons of cereals and rice, 25,000 tons of sugar. In 1933, food products accounted for 80% of all goods sold in Torgsin, with cheap rye flour accounting for almost half of all sales. Those dying of hunger exchanged their meager savings for bread. Mirrored delicatessen stores were lost among Torgsinov's flour warehouses and sackcloth bags of flour. Torgsin's price analysis shows that during the famine, the Soviet state sold food to its citizens on average three times more expensive than abroad.
During its short existence (1931 - February 1936), Torgsin produced 287.3 million gold rubles for the needs of industrialization - the equivalent of 222 tons of pure gold. This was enough to pay for the import of industrial equipment for ten giants of Soviet industry - Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, DneproGES, Stalingrad Tractor Plant and other enterprises. The savings of Soviet citizens amounted to more than 70% of Torgsinov's purchases. The name Torgsin - trade with foreigners - is false. It would be more honest to call this enterprise “Torgsovlyud”, i.e. trade with Soviet people.
The savings of Soviet citizens are a finite value. The OGPU, with the help of violence, and Torgsin, with the help of famine, almost completely emptied the people's money-boxes. But there was gold in the depths of the earth.
On the eve of the First World War, in 1913, 60.8 tons of gold were mined in Russia. The industry was in the hands of foreigners, and manual labor predominated in it. In the Civil War, the Bolsheviks defended all the known gold-bearing lands of the Russian Empire, but wars and revolutions destroyed the gold mining industry. Under the NEP, gold mining began to revive through private miners and foreign concessionaires. It is paradoxical that, given the state’s dire need for gold, Soviet leaders treated the gold mining industry as a tertiary industry. They spent a lot of gold, but cared little about its extraction, living like temporary workers through confiscations and buying up valuables.
Stalin paid attention to gold mining only with the beginning of the industrial breakthrough. At the end of 1927, he summoned the old Bolshevik Alexander Pavlovich Serebrovsky, who by that time had already distinguished himself in the restoration of the oil industry, and appointed him chairman of the newly created Soyuzzoloto. In Soviet Russia that year, only about 20 tons of pure gold were mined, but Stalin set the task boldly in a Bolshevik way: to catch up and overtake Transvaal, the world leader, which produced more than 300 tons of pure gold per year!
As a professor at the Moscow Mining Academy, Serebrovsky twice traveled to the United States to learn from American experience. He studied technologies and equipment in the mines of Alaska, Colorado, California, Nevada, South Dakota, Arizona, Utah, bank financing of gold mining in Boston and Washington, and the operation of factories in Detroit, Baltimore, Philadelphia and St. Louis. He recruited American engineers to work in the USSR. Due to health problems, the second trip ended in the hospital. But the selfless work of Serebrovsky and his associates brought results. The flow of gold into the State Bank vaults began to increase. Since 1932, the “civilian” gold mining, which was under the authority of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry, was supplemented by Dalstroy, the gold mining of Kolyma prisoners.
The astronomical figures of the plans were not fulfilled, but gold production in the USSR grew steadily from year to year. The fate of Serebrovsky was sad. He was appointed to the post of People's Commissar, and the next day he was arrested. They carried him out on a stretcher straight from the hospital, where Serebrovsky was treating his health, which had been undermined in the service of the Soviet state. In February 1938 he was shot. But the job was done - the gold mining industry was created in the USSR.
In the second half of the 1930s, the USSR took second place in the world in gold mining, overtaking the United States and Canada and second, albeit by a huge margin, only to South Africa, whose annual production approached the 400-ton mark by the end of the decade. The West was frightened by the loud statements of the Soviet leaders and seriously feared that the USSR would flood the world market with cheap gold.
In the pre-war period (1932-1941), prisoners' Dalstroy brought Stalin's leadership almost 400 tons of pure gold. Non-GULAG “civilian” gold mining for the period 1927/28-1935 produced another 300 tons. There is no data on the work of “civilian” free gold mining in the second half of the 1930s, but if we assume that development proceeded at least at the same pace as and in the mid-1930s (an annual increase of 15 tons on average), then its pre-war contribution to the achievement of monetary independence of the USSR will increase by another 800 tons. Gold in the USSR continued to be mined both during the war and after it. In the last years of Stalin's life, annual gold production in the USSR exceeded the 100-ton mark.
Having created a gold mining industry, the country overcame the gold and foreign exchange crisis. As a result of victory in World War II, the USSR's gold reserves were replenished through confiscations and reparations. After the war, Stalin stopped selling gold abroad. Stalin's moneybox was opened by Khrushchev, who spent gold mainly on the purchase of grain. Brezhnev also actively spent “Stalin’s gold”, mainly to support third world countries. By the end of Brezhnev's reign, Stalin's gold reserves had dwindled by more than a thousand tons. Under Gorbachev, the process of liquidating Stalin's treasury was completed. In October 1991, Grigory Yavlinsky, who was responsible for negotiating economic assistance with the G7, announced that the country's gold reserves had dropped to approximately 240 tons. The USSR's main adversary in the Cold War, the United States, had by that time accumulated more than 8,000 tons.
By stockpiling gold in every possible, and often criminal and reckless way, Stalin accumulated funds that ensured the influence of the USSR in the world for several decades to come. However, this was a disservice to Russia. Stalin's gold reserves extended the life of the inefficient planned economy. The Soviet era ended along with Stalin's golden treasury. The leaders of the new post-Soviet Russia had to create the national gold and foreign exchange reserves anew.
It seems that the Russian Central Bank’s “emergency dump” of American treasury bonds is slowly beginning to make sense. Although the Central Bank itself does not give any comments on this matter, and sometimes it takes almost anecdotal forms.
Thus, Deputy Minister of Finance of Russia Sergei Storchak, answering questions from journalists, said that he himself does not know the motives that guided the Central Bank in selling off American assets. According to him, he addressed this question to the deputy head of the Central Bank, Ksenia Yudaeva, but did not receive an answer from her. After which Mr. Storchak could only thoughtfully declare that this was “the area of responsibility of the Central Bank” and close the topic.
We note, not without some satisfaction, that this is another symptom of the imminent change of our “hired personnel” in the government. If the Central Bank is no longer informing these guys on such important issues, then it looks like it’s really time for them to think about looking for a new job.
Although everything will be fine for them, of course. Vladimir Vladimirovich “doesn’t abandon his own”...
Now a little about more important things.
In parallel with the sale of American debt obligations, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation continued to increase its gold reserves. Now it is close to 2000 tons, and it is very likely that it will soon cross this mark. The share of gold in the country's total gold and foreign exchange reserves has grown tenfold in recent years, and the volume of American treasuries has fallen from a peak of $176 billion to the current $15.
Purely economic reasons for such a decision may seem too distant, but still we must remember that the world economy has accumulated a huge debt amounting to $247 trillion, or 318% of total global GDP. The fact that this bubble may burst has long been a commonplace in discussions. But it is also obvious that now, in the context of the unleashed economic wars, the risk of puncturing the bubble is becoming too great. Against this background, going into precious metals as the most reliable asset looks like the most adequate long-term strategy, even regardless of our own vector of further development.
It is a little confusing that the other largest holders of US valuable papers, such as China and Japan, are in no hurry to abandon them. But this may be due both to the significantly greater dependence of these countries on the American market (and on the location of American authorities, accordingly), and to the fact that Putin knows something that others are not yet aware of.
And Putin really knows something. At a minimum, his future steps in the geopolitical party that was imposed on him. And where, where, and in calculating risks, he was always a real grandmaster...
The tactics of the Russian Central Bank are becoming partly clear. Instead of a one-time or some kind of forced purchase of gold on the stock exchange or from other holders of large gold reserves, he is in no hurry to immediately invest all the money received from the sale of American securities into gold. This is counterproductive, if only because when such a buyer appears on the market, prices will immediately skyrocket, and the total volume of purchases will decrease by tons or even tens of tons.
It is much more rational to purchase gold from mining companies, purchasing both its available volume and contracts for future supply. In the future, of course, this will also lead to an increase in metal prices, but it will be much less rapid and at some point will even become profitable for large holders of gold assets.
It is very likely that the Central Bank is acting exactly this way, although these are only guesses - such a sensitive issue as gold trading is not discussed by officials and authorized persons in open sources, and we can only learn something about this after the fact, looking at the changed size of the gold reserve and assessing the dynamics of its growth.
In general, we continue to follow the topic. For now, we just state: in February, Russia entered the top five states with the largest gold reserves. To do this, she had to bypass China in this matter. If current growth rates are maintained, in about three years Russia may enter the top three.
And in ten years, if everything goes well, Moscow can update the USSR record of 2,800 tons of gold.
The collapse of Tsarist Russia left the country virtually without gold and foreign exchange reserves. It took significant efforts and decades to not only make up for the losses, but to create a margin of safety, thanks to which the country carried out large-scale industrialization.
Wasted
After the Bolsheviks came to power, the country's gold reserves slightly exceeded 1,000 tons. The Provisional Government did its best, transporting about 500 tons of precious metal abroad. The Bolsheviks also began to squander the funds they had inherited from the former owners of the country. After all, the rednecks need something to restore the country?
Due to difficulties in obtaining Western loans, the new government was forced to pay for the import of essential goods with national gold reserves. Only 60 locomotives purchased in England and Sweden cost the treasury 200 tons of gold. 100 tons were given to Germany as reparations. As a result, by 1922 the treasury was reduced by another 500 tons.
The Bolsheviks, of course, tried to plug holes in the budget by expropriating valuables from the “owning classes,” but the purchase of food, manufactured goods, military equipment and equipment also absorbed these funds. Of course, the coveted bullion could not be avoided. As a result, by 1928 the country's gold reserves were practically exhausted - there were some 150 tons left.
Top up at any cost
In the first years of Soviet power, there was no real opportunity to replenish the country's gold reserves. The main reason is that the Bolsheviks were not able to fully control gold mining. Only a small fraction of the precious metal extracted from the Russian depths ended up in the treasury. In 1928, it was decided to sell off part of the country's museum collections. This resulted in the loss of 21 masterpieces from the Hermitage, for which they received a measly 10 tons of gold.
The looting of the palaces abandoned by the aristocracy also did not add much weight to the treasury.
In 1930, the authorities began to confiscate gold from the wealthy part of the population - during this year the State Bank enriched itself by 8 tons of the despicable metal. And in 1932, they collected 12 tons of “surplus”. But this was not enough. In January 1931, the government opened Torgsin - the All-Union Association for Trade with Foreigners on the Territory of the USSR. In Torgsin stores, guests from abroad, as well as wealthy Soviet citizens, could exchange gold, silver, precious stones and antiques for food and other consumer goods.
And things went well. In 1932, 22 tons of gold were brought to Torgsin, and a year later - 45 tons. Thanks to Torgsin's gold injections, imported equipment was purchased for 10 industrial giants. In 1936, Torgsin ceased to exist, giving a total of 222 tons of pure gold to the state.
Everything for industrialization
Despite the fact that individual mining was an alien element for the Soviet consciousness, the need for gold turned out to be above all. The practical Stalin understood this very well, giving enthusiastic gold miners all kinds of benefits.
The country desperately needed funds for industrialization. Any obstacles to the free pursuit of gold mining were removed. Almost any category of the population was allowed to engage in gold mining, with the exception of former criminals. In a short time, the number of miners in the USSR reached 120 thousand people.
In 1927, Stalin set the Soyuz Gold trust the task of becoming the world's leading gold producer, ahead of even the richest South African mines. Things, however, were going neither shaky nor slow. The plan for the extraction of currency metal - 258.9 tons - during the first five-year plan (1929–1933) was not fulfilled. However, the errors have been corrected. By 1936, compared to 1932, gold production increased 4.4 times - from 31.9 to 138.8 tons.
Subsequently, the pace of gold production reached a record 320 tons per year. Unfortunately, it was not possible to overtake the gold mines of South Africa, since the leader - Transvaal - increased gold production to 400 tons per annum. However, it helped bring industrialization to life. The authorities managed not only to invest in industry, but also to save for a rainy day. By the beginning of World War II, the state treasury contained about 2,800 tons of gold. It was this gold reserve, multiplied by human resources, that laid the foundation for industrial success during the war and contributed to the rapid restoration of the country from ruins.
Melted before our eyes
After the war, the USSR government stopped selling gold abroad; moreover, due to confiscations and reparations, gold reserves began to grow again. By the end of the Stalin era, the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves amounted to 2,500 tons.
However, over the next few decades, the USSR's gold reserves began to decrease before our eyes. After Khrushchev's removal they amounted to 1,600 tons, and at the end of Brezhnev's reign there were only 437 tons in the treasury. The Soviet leaders of the early 80s - Andropov and Chernenko - despite the short duration of their stay at the top of power, were able to increase their gold reserves by 300 tons. But with the arrival of Gorbachev, gold reserves began to rapidly disappear again. As an investigation by Yegor Gaidar’s group showed, the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the USSR, including the savings of enterprises and ordinary citizens, located in the accounts of Vnesheconombank, were “squandered” by Prime Ministers Valentin Pavlov and his predecessor Nikolai Ryzhkov.
The problem was aggravated by the fact that the supply of large cities with food, consumer goods, and medicine was largely dependent on imports. Now there was nothing to pay for them: the country was threatened by a collapse of supplies, the shutdown of a significant part of enterprises, and even famine.
End of an era
The situation with the country's budget at the time of the collapse of the USSR was truly catastrophic. Gold reserves have decreased by approximately 5.5 times compared to the mid-80s. In 1991, a period arose when the gold and foreign exchange funds available to the government amounted to no more than $26 million. The Russian Federation inherited only 290 tons of gold and numerous foreign debts, reaching a fantastic amount of 63 billion dollars. In the fall of 1991, the new authorities tried to clarify the situation with the so-called “party gold.” The names of major Soviet officials were revealed who transferred millions of dollars to their foreign accounts, but nothing more. No one knows where the billions went.
Petr Aven, who headed the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in Gaidar’s government, is sure that the money of the CPSU is a myth. During Soviet times, he oversaw Vneshtorgbank and understood the schemes for getting money into party accounts. According to him, amounts of more than 1 or 2 million dollars did not appear there. It was absolutely impossible to carry out a larger-scale operation in that system of power, Aven assured. It is interesting that by the 2000s, the government of the Russian Federation planned to increase the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves to 900 tons, but it turned out to be impossible to realize the intention then. When Vladimir Putin took the presidency for the first time, the treasury contained only 384 tons of gold. But a little time will pass and the weight of the noble metal will increase to 850 tons.