The end of the regency of Tsarina Sofya Alekseevna, who ruled Russia from 1682 to 1689, was marked by two attempts to secure the southern borders of the state. They went down in history as Crimean campaigns Golitsyn 1687-1689 The portrait of the prince opens the article. Despite the fact that the main task assigned to the command could not be completed, both military campaigns played important role as during the Great Turkish war, and in the further development of the Russian state.
Creation of an anti-Turkish coalition
In 1684, at the initiative of Pope Innocent XI, an alliance of states was organized, called the "Holy League", and consisting of the Holy Roman Empire, the Republic of Venice and the Commonwealth - a federation of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. His task was to confront the aggressive policy, which had gained strength by that time, the Ottoman Empire, as well as its Crimean vassals.
Having concluded an alliance treaty with the Commonwealth in April 1686, Russia assumed the responsibility to carry out the military tasks assigned to it as part of the general strategic plan for fighting the alliance against Muslim aggressors. The beginning of these actions was the Crimean campaign of 1687, which was headed by Prince Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, who was the de facto head of government during the regency of Princess Sophia. Her portrait is below.
burning steppe
In May, the Russian army, numbering 100 thousand people and reinforced by detachments of Zaporozhye and Don Cossacks, set out from the left-bank Ukraine and began to advance towards the Crimea. When the warriors reached the borders of the Crimean Khanate and crossed the border river Konka, the Tatars resorted to the old and centuries-old method of protection against the advancing enemy - they set fire to the steppe on the entire territory lying in front of it. As a result, the Russian army, due to lack of food for horses, was forced to turn back.
First defeat
However, the First Crimean campaign did not end there. In July of the same year, the army of the Crimean Khan Selim Giray overtook the Russians in the area called Kara-Yylga. Despite the fact that in terms of numbers his army was inferior to the army of Prince Golitsyn, the khan was the first to attack. Dividing the forces at his disposal into three parts, he launched both frontal and flank attacks.
As the surviving historical documents testify, the battle, which lasted 2 days, ended with the victory of the Crimean Tatars, who captured more than a thousand prisoners and about 30 guns. Continuing the retreat, Golitsyn's army reached a place called Kuyash, and built defensive fortifications there, digging a moat in front of them.
The final defeat of the Russian-Cossack forces
Soon the Tatars approached them and camped on the opposite side of the ditch, preparing to give the Russian-Cossack army a new battle. However, the army of Prince Golitsyn, who had made a long journey through the waterless and scorched steppe by the enemy, was not able to fight, and its command suggested that Khan Selim-Girey begin negotiations on a peace treaty.
Having not received a positive response in time, and trying to avoid the complete destruction of his army, Golitsyn ordered a further retreat. As a result, having withdrawn at night, the Russians began to retreat, leaving the enemy an empty camp. Finding out in the morning that there was no one behind the defensive structures, the khan began the pursuit, and after a while overtook the Russians in the Donuzly-Oba area. In the ensuing battle, the army of Prince Golitsyn suffered heavy losses. According to historians, the reason for this military failure was the extreme exhaustion of the warriors, caused by the tan of the steppe.
Summary of the first trip
Nevertheless, the events of 1687, which became part of the military campaign that went down in history as the Crimean campaigns, played an important role in the struggle of the Holy League against Turkish expansion. Despite the failure that befell the Russian-Cossack army, he managed to divert forces Crimean Khanate from the European theater of operations, and thereby facilitate the task of the Allied forces.
The second campaign of Prince Golitsyn
The failure of the military campaign of 1687 did not plunge into despair either Princess Sophia or her closest boyar, Prince Golitsyn. As a result, it was decided not to stop the Crimean campaigns, and as soon as possible to strike again at the Horde, who had increased their robbery raids.
In January 1689, preparations began for a new military campaign, and in the first days of March, the army of Prince Golitsyn, this time increased to 150 thousand people, marched in the direction of the Crimea, which was the nest of the hated khanate. In addition to cavalry regiments and infantry, the warriors also had powerful artillery reinforcements, consisting of 400 guns.
Considering this period of the war of the European coalition with the Ottoman Empire and its vassals, one should note the very unworthy actions of the Commonwealth, which entered into negotiations with Istanbul and forced Russia to make the Crimean campaigns alone. What happened in subsequent years was repeated many times both in both World Wars and in many local conflicts - the main burdens fell on the shoulders of Russian soldiers who irrigated the battlefields with their blood.
Tatar attack repelled by artillery fire
After two and a half months of travel, in mid-May, the Russian army was attacked by the Tatars near the village of Zelenaya Dolina, which was three days from Perekop. This time, the Horde did not set fire to the steppe, saving food for their own horses, and, having waited for the approach of the Russian army, they tried to sweep it away with an unexpected blow from their cavalry.
However, thanks to the reports of the patrols sent ahead, the effect of surprise was not achieved by the enemy, and the gunners managed to deploy their guns in battle order. Their dense fire, as well as rifle volleys of infantry, stopped the Tatars, and then pushed them far into the steppe. A week later, the army of Prince Golitsyn reached Perekop - the isthmus connecting the Crimean peninsula with the mainland.
A close but unattainable goal
No matter how great was the desire of the prince’s warriors, having overcome the last kilometers, to break into the Crimea, from where from time immemorial the daring raids of the Horde were carried out on Russia, and where countless strings of captured Christians were then driven, but they failed to make this last throw. There were several reasons for this.
As it became known from the testimonies of the captured Tatars, throughout the territory of Perekop there were only three wells with fresh water, which were clearly not enough for the army of the prince of many thousands, and a waterless steppe stretched for many miles beyond the isthmus. In addition, the losses inevitable during the capture of Perekop could greatly weaken the army and call into question success in the battle with the main enemy forces concentrated on the peninsula.
In order to avoid unnecessary losses, it was decided to postpone further advance and, having built several fortresses, accumulate in them the necessary supply of food, equipment and, most importantly, water. However, these plans could not be realized, and soon the prince gave the order to retreat from their positions. Thus ended the Crimean campaigns of Golitsyn in 1687-1689.
The results of two military campaigns
Over the following centuries, discussions were repeatedly held about what role the Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689 played during the Great Turkish War, and what benefits they brought directly to Russia. Opinions differed, but most historians agreed that thanks to the military campaigns discussed above, Russia was able to greatly facilitate the task of the allied forces fighting the army of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Having deprived the Turkish Pasha of the support of the Crimean vassals, the Russian army significantly limited his actions.
In addition, the Crimean campaigns of Golitsyn contributed to the rise of Russia's prestige in the international arena. Their important result was the termination of the payment of tribute, which Moscow had previously been forced to pay to its longtime enemies. As for the internal political life of the Russian state, the failed Crimean campaigns played a very important role in it, becoming one of the reasons for the overthrow of Princess Sophia and the accession to the throne of Peter I.
At the end of 1686, preparations began for the Crimean campaign, which consisted in announcing the decree of the “great sovereigns” (Ivan and Peter, on whose behalf the government of Princess Sophia ruled the state from 1682) on the collection of military people, in drawing up their murals on the shelves in the categories , in determining collection points, in researching Money, in the preparation of outfit and ammunition, in the procurement of food, in the acquisition of the convoy.
Crimean campaign of 1687 In 1684, an anti-Turkish Holy League arose in Europe, consisting of Austria, Poland and Venice. In 1686 Russia entered into a military alliance against Turkey. According to the adopted plan, the Russian army was to launch offensive operations against the Crimean Tatars. This expressed new course foreign policy Russia, aimed at combating the Tatar-Turkish aggression.
At the end of 1686, preparations began for the Crimean campaign, which consisted in announcing the decree of the “great sovereigns” (Ivan and Peter, on whose behalf the government of Princess Sophia ruled the state from 1682) on the collection of military people, in drawing up their murals on the shelves in the categories , in determining collection points, in finding funds, in preparing a squad and ammunition, in procuring food, in completing a wagon train.
The points of concentration of troops (by March 1, 1687) were appointed: Akhtyrka (a large regiment of Prince Golitsyn), Sumy, Hotmyzhsk, Krasny Kut. On February 22, 1687, the appointed governors left Moscow for their regiments. The regiments gathered slowly, many military men ended up in "netchiks". The organizational period took more than two months.
General Gordon (one of the foreign commanders) warned the great governor Golitsyn about the main difficulty of the campaign - the need to overcome a large expanse of waterless steppe. However, no special measures have been taken in this regard.
By the beginning of May 1687, on the banks of the river. Merlo (common point of concentration) of the Russian marching army, according to the discharge list, numbered 112,902 people (without the army of the hetman of Ukraine and without serfs). The composition of this army was as follows:
Military men of the soldier, reytar and hussar service, as well as spearmen, that is, new regiments, accounted for 66.9% (75459 people). Consequently, the proportion of hundreds of service troops was continuously decreasing. The number of cavalry (46.3% - 52277 people) and the number of infantry (53.7% - 60625 people) (292) almost equalized, which indicates a structural change in the Russian army - an increase specific gravity infantry in connection with the increase in its role in combat.
The marching army consisted of a large regiment and four discharge regiments: Sevsky, Nizovy (Kazan), Novgorod and Ryazan. In early May, the regiments moved south past Poltava, crossed the Orel and Samara rivers and slowly moved towards Horse Waters.
Assuming that the Tatars would meet the Russians on the outskirts of the Crimea, the plan provided for a frontal offensive by the Russian army, combined with the actions of the Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks on the enemy's flanks.
The most characteristic is the organization of marching movement in the steppe conditions in the presence of a very mobile enemy (light Tatar cavalry).
In the vanguard, Golitsyn singled out two soldier and five archery regiments. Consequently, the marching guard consisted of infantry. The cavalry carried out observation in small detachments, not breaking away far from the infantry.
The marching order was a compact mass, the core of which was a wagon train, numbering 20 thousand wagons. Sources (for example, Gordon) report that the main forces moved in a marching column, which had more than 1 km along the front and up to 2 km in depth. If you make a calculation, it turns out that only wagons can be placed in such a rectangle, but there will be no room for infantry. Consequently, either there were half as many carts, or the marching column had a much greater depth (up to 5 km, if we assume that the carts were in two columns of 20 carts in a row in each column).
The deployment of troops in marching order was as follows: infantry marched inside a rectangle made up of two convoy columns; With outer side this rectangle is an outfit; the cavalry bordered the entire marching column, sending guards to reconnoiter the enemy.
Such a marching order corresponded to the situation - the conditions of the steppe terrain and the nature of the enemy's actions. Too compact construction of troops sharply reduced the pace of their movement. In five weeks, the marching army traveled about 300 km (i.e., on average, less than 10 km per day). However, Golitsyn reported to Moscow "that he was going to the Crimea with great haste."
Not far from the river Samara, up to 50 thousand Ukrainian Cossacks, led by Hetman Samoylovich, joined Golitsyn's army. Only now can we assume that total strength Russian-Ukrainian troops reached 100 thousand people (taking into account the inaccuracy of accounting for military people, "netchikov" and natural decline).
On June 13, the army crossed the river. Horse Waters and became a camp near the Dnieper. It soon became known that the steppe was on fire. It was set on fire by the Tatars in order to deprive the cavalry, convoy and artillery horses of pasture. The entire steppe “soiled from Horse Waters to the Crimea itself by fires” burned out, as a result of which it turned out to be a wide (200 km) defensive strip on the outskirts of Perekop.
Golitsyn gathered a military council, at which they decided to continue the campaign. In two days, only about 12 km were covered, but the horses and people were exhausted, as the lack of pasture, water and lack of food affected.
On the flanks of the main operational direction, tactical successes were indicated. By Sheep Waters Don Cossacks defeated a large detachment of Tatars. The Zaporozhye Cossacks sent to Kazykermen defeated the enemy in the area of the Karateben tract. But all this did not decide the outcome of the struggle, since the main forces of the Russian-Ukrainian army could not continue the campaign.
On June 17, a military council was again assembled, which spoke in favor of stopping the campaign. Golitsyn ordered a retreat, covered by a strong rearguard, consisting of Russian-Ukrainian cavalry, who received the task of besieging Kazykermen. On June 20, the marching army was again at Horse Waters, where they rested for about two weeks. On August 14, the regiments returned to their original area - the banks of the river. Merlot. Here Golitsyn sent the soldiers home.
The researcher Belov evaluates the Crimean campaign of 1687 as a reconnaissance activity of the Russian high command. Of course, one cannot agree with this, and there is no reason to justify the obvious unpreparedness and insecurity of the campaign of a large army in the steppe conditions. The possibility of steppe fires was not taken into account. The Zaporizhian Cossacks had rich experience in using fires for tactical purposes, but Golitsyn did not take all this into account.
The army suffered heavy losses from disease. The poor organization of the campaign and the failure to fulfill its goals, known to military people, undermined the confidence of the soldiers in the command and morale troops. Attention is drawn to the negative tactical content of the campaign, which also had a positive result - the first experience was gained in overcoming the large steppe.
The main thing was the strategic result of the campaign, given the coalition nature of the war. The offensive of a large Russian-Ukrainian army fettered the forces of the Crimean Khanate and thereby weakened Turkey, Russia provided assistance to its allies - Austria, Poland and Venice. Troops interacted successfully in theaters of operations remote from each other. However, with a tactical failure, an undoubted strategic success should be noted.
From the unsuccessful military operations of 1687, the Russian command drew a significant practical conclusion. In 1688, at the mouth of the river. Samara, the Novobogorodskaya fortress was built, which was a stronghold for the next campaign being prepared.
Crimean campaign of 1689 The second campaign in the Crimea was undertaken in the changed external and internal political situation. In Vienna, negotiations were underway to conclude peace with Turkey, the Polish government was not going to intensify the activities of its troops. A clearly unfavorable situation developed for the continuation of the war. However, the government of Sophia decided to organize a second Crimean campaign of the Russian army, hoping to strengthen its shaky position with military successes.
Prince Golitsyn was again appointed the great voivode. Now his plan was to carry out the campaign in early spring, avoiding steppe fires and having enough pasture and water.
Taking into account the experience of the first campaign, General Gordon recommended that the voivode Golitsyn conduct more thorough preparations for the campaign of 1689, in particular, take wall-beating machines with him, prepare assault ladders (there were no materials for their manufacture in the steppe), build seagulls on the Dnieper (for actions with sides of the river against Kazykermen). Gordon also proposed to arrange small earthen fortifications every four crossings to provide rear during an offensive. Most of these proposals were not taken into account.
Rylsk, Oboyan, Chuguev and Sumy (large regiment) were appointed as the points of concentration of the marching troops. At the turn of the river Samara was planned to join the Ukrainian Cossacks.
The number of Russian troops was determined at 117,446 people (without the forces of the hetman of Ukraine, who was obliged to field 30-40 thousand people). Significantly fewer forces participated in the campaign. The outfit consisted of up to 350 guns. The army had a two-month supply of food.
March 17, 1689 the army set out on a campaign. Based on the experience of 1687 (the movement of a huge clumsy square), the marching movement was now carried out in six independent squares (a large regiment, an avant-garde and four ranks). Each category consisted of infantry and cavalry regiments with outfits and was built according to the scheme of the square of the first campaign. Such a dispersal of troops on the march increased its mobility. Gordon's regiments were assigned to the vanguard.
On the river Samara, the new Hetman of Ukraine Mazepa and his Cossacks joined Golitsyn's army.
In the first days of the campaign, military people had to endure the cold, and then a thaw came. Regiments, convoys and outfits went through the mud and, not having enough materials to build crossings, they hardly crossed over the spilled steppe rivers. Under such conditions, the pace of the march could not be high.
Cavalry detachments were sent to provide troops on a campaign and conduct reconnaissance. When resting, each rank, vanguard and rearguard set up a camp, surrounded by slingshots, an outfit ready to open fire, and wagons, behind which infantry and cavalry were stationed. Horse guards with cannons were sent out for protection, and small guards were allocated from their composition, each of which also had a cannon. Paired posts were set up from the small watchman. Thus, the outpost consisted of three lines of support.
On May 15, during the movement of the Russian-Ukrainian army along the Kazykermen road to the Black Valley, significant forces of the Tatars appeared, attacking the vanguard. The attacks of the Tatars were repulsed, and the army continued to march.
On May 16, on the outskirts of Perekop, large forces of the Tatars launched an attack on the rear of the marching troops. The infantry and cavalry took refuge in the wagon train, while the detachment opened fire and repulsed the enemy attack. Following this, the Tatars attacked the left-flank discharge, inflicting significant losses on the Sumy and Akhtyrsky regiments of Ukrainian Cossacks. The outfit again did not allow the enemy to build on success and repelled enemy attacks.
Taking into account the experience of the battle, the governors regrouped the military branches. The cavalry was now placed inside the convoy, behind the infantry and outfit.
On May 17, the enemy tried to prevent the Russian-Ukrainian army from reaching Kalanchak. "The cruel attacks of the enemy" were successfully reflected by the fire of the detachment and infantry. On May 20, at the immediate approaches to Perekop, the Crimean Khan once again tried to defeat the Russian-Ukrainian army, surrounding him with his cavalry. However, this time the enemy attacks were not successful. In the end, the Tatars were forced to take refuge behind the fortifications of Perekop.
Perekop is a small isthmus - the gate to the Crimea. In the XV11 century. it was well fortified. The entire seven-kilometer isthmus is intercepted by a dry deep ditch (from 23 to 30 m) lined with stone. The earth rampart poured from the Crimean side was reinforced with seven stone towers. The only gate was defended by the citadel located behind them, behind which was the city. The citadel and towers were armed with artillery.
The Russian-Ukrainian army began to prepare for the assault on the fortifications of Perekop. Immediately affected by the absence necessary equipment to overcome the fortifications, about the timely preparation of which Gordon warned. The regiments successfully made a difficult march through the vast steppe, repulsed the attacks of the Tatars on the outskirts of Perekop, but now they did not have the appropriate means to break through powerful defensive structures. In addition to this, there was no fresh water and pasture for horses, as well as a lack of bread. Hot weather increased the suffering of people and horses. According to some reports, the enemy had a large numerical superiority (up to 150 thousand people).
To Golitsyn’s request about the method of further actions, the governors replied: “They are ready to serve and shed their blood, only they are exhausted from lack of water and lack of bread, it’s impossible to hunt near Perekop, and they would retreat away.” The Russian command decided to retreat, refusing to achieve the strategic goal set by the government, but thereby saving the army from possible defeat. This decision was facilitated by the negotiations on the peace of the Crimean Khan with Golitsyn, which is noted by the “Chronicle of the Seeker”: “Follow, going into tricks, when the troops began to approach Perekop with trenches, they (Tatars. - E. R.), some kind of peace, acted to the prince Atonement for Golitsyn ... "
In the end, the Russian-Ukrainian army "with pity and swearing at the hetman" began to retreat. The Tatars again set fire to the steppe, and the retreat took place in a difficult situation. The rear guard was commanded by Gordon, who noted in his diary that the difficulties could increase if the Khan organized the pursuit with all his might. However, for this purpose, he sent only part of his cavalry, which attacked the retreating for eight days.
On June 29, the Russian army reached the river. Merlot, where Golitsyn dismissed military men to their homes. One of the reasons for the failure of the Crimean campaigns was the indecision, hesitation and inaction of the commander-in-chief Golitsyn, which undermined the morale of the troops.
Not having reached the goal, the campaign still had a positive strategic result. The Russian army fettered the forces of the Crimean Khan and did not allow him to assist the Turkish sultan on the Dniester, Prut and Danube. The Russian regiments went against the Crimean Khan, and in Turkey they said: "The Russians are going to Istanbul." The Crimean campaigns contributed to the successful operations of the Venetian fleet. These campaigns were of great pan-European significance.
One of the consequences of the tactical failures of the Crimean campaigns was the fall of the government of Sophia. Thus, the political goal set by the government was not achieved. Crimean campaigns gave reverse result. In the events described, the influence of the course of hostilities on the internal political situation is clearly seen.
E.A. Razin. "History of military art"
Golitsin campaigns In 1683, the Turkish Sultan Mehmed IV undertook a major campaign against Austria. In July 1683, his troops laid siege to Vienna. The city was on the verge of destruction, but it was saved by the appearance of the army of the Polish king Jan Sobieski. On September 1, 1683, the Turks were utterly defeated near Vienna.
In 1684, Venice entered the war with Turkey. In the same year, Austrian troops occupied most of Croatia, which soon became an Austrian province. In 1686, after a century and a half of Turkish domination, the city of Buda was taken by the Austrians and again became a Hungarian city. The Venetians, with the help of the Knights of Malta, captured the island of Chios.
The Muscovite state could not miss such an opportunity to punish the Crimean Khan. By order of Princess Sophia (formally - on behalf of the young Peter and his brother, the feeble-minded Ivan), in the fall of 1686, preparations began for a campaign in the Crimea.
Back in 1682, the royal envoy Tarakanov let know from the Crimea that Khan Murad Giray, in order to receive gifts, ordered to seize him, bring him to his stable, “beat him with a butt, lead to fire and frighten with all sorts of torments.” Tarakanov said that he would not give anything extra in excess of the previous tribute. They let him go to the camp on the Alma River, having previously robbed him completely. Therefore, the ruler Sophia ordered to announce to the khan that he would no longer see the Moscow envoys in the Crimea, that negotiations were needed, and the gifts would now be accepted abroad.
In the autumn of 1686, the Moscow government addressed the troops with a letter stating that the campaign was being undertaken to rid the Russian land of unbearable insults and humiliation. From nowhere the Tatars do not take away so many prisoners as from it; they sell Christians like cattle; swear at the Orthodox faith. But even this is not enough. Russian kingdom pays an annual tribute to the Tatars, for which he suffers shame and reproach from neighboring states, but he still does not protect his borders with this tribute. Khan takes money and dishonors Russian messengers, ruins Russian cities. From Turkish Sultan there is no control over it.
At the head of the 100,000th army, the Governor of Novgorod, Prince Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, set out on a campaign of "a large regiment of the yard governor, the royal great press and the state's great embassy affairs."
Princess Sophia attached great importance to the Crimean campaign. Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn was her lover, and his success in the Crimea significantly increased Sophia's potential in the struggle for power with Peter's supporters. Together with the Russian troops, the Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of Hetman Ivan Samoylovich were to take part in the campaign.
Only at the beginning of 1687, the Golitsyn army moved south past Poltava, through Kolomak, the Orel and Samara rivers to Horse Waters. The army moved extremely slowly, with great precautions, although there was not even a rumor about the Tatars.
During the campaign, all the troops were concentrated in one huge mass, which had the shape of a quadrangle, more than a verst along the front and 2 versts in depth. In the middle was the infantry, on the sides - a wagon train (20 thousand wagons), next to the wagon train - artillery, covered by cavalry, which was responsible for reconnaissance and security. The vanguard of five streltsy and two soldier (Gordon and Shepelev) regiments was advanced forward.
On the Samara River, 50,000 Little Russian Cossacks of Hetman Samoylovich joined the army.
Only five weeks later, the army reached the Horse Waters River, having covered 300 versts during this time. But Golitsyn reported to Moscow that he was going "to the Crimea with great haste."
On June 13, the army crossed the Horse Waters, beyond which the steppe had already begun, and camped in the Bolshoy Lug tract, not far from the Dnieper. Here it suddenly became clear that the steppe was burning on a huge area - clouds of black smoke were rushing from the south, poisoning the air with an unbearable stench. Then Golitsyn gathered senior military leaders for advice. After much deliberation, the campaign was decided to continue.
On June 14, the army set out from Bolshoy Lug, but in two days they covered no more than 12 miles: the steppe was smoking, there was no grass and no water. People and horses barely moved. There were many sick people in the army. In this state, the troops reached the dry river Yanchokrak.
Fortunately, on June 16, heavy rain began, Yanchokrak filled with water and overflowed its banks. The governors, having ordered to build bridges, transferred the army to the other side in the hope that the downpour revived the steppe. But these expectations were not justified; instead of grass, the steppe was covered with heaps of ash.
Having made another transition, Golitsyn again, on June 17, gathered a council. There were at least 200 versts of the way to the Crimea. The army, however, has not yet met a single Tatar, but the horses, exhausted by starvation, could not drag cannons, and people risked dying of hunger. At the council, it was decided to return to the borders of Russia and wait there for the royal decree, and to cover the retreat from the attack of the Tatars, to detach 20 thousand Moscow troops and the same number of Little Russian Cossacks to the lower reaches of the Dnieper.
On June 18, the main forces hastily moved back along the same road, leaving the carts far behind them. On June 19, Golitsyn sent a report to Moscow, where he named the fire in the steppe and the lack of horse food as the main reason for the failure.
The Tatars had previously constantly set fire to the steppe at the approach of the enemy. But then the Little Russian enemies of Samoilovich filed a denunciation to Golitsyn that the arson of the steppe was committed by the Cossacks on the orders of Samoilovich. The prince and his governors also had to find someone to blame. The prince tipped off Sophia, and two weeks later Samoylovich was deprived of the hetman's mace.
On July 25, 1687, a Rada was held on the Kolomak River, at which hetman Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa was elected “with the free votes of the Little Russian Cossacks and the general foreman.” His election as hetman was greatly facilitated by Prince V.V. Golitsyn.
The second trip to the Crimea, Prince Golitsyn began in February 1689. Golitsyn planned to come to the Crimea in early spring in order to avoid steppe fires and summer heat. Troops gathered in Sumy, Rylsk, on Oboyan, in Mezherechy and in Chuguev. In total, 112 thousand people gathered, not counting the Little Russian Cossacks, who, as in the first campaign, were supposed to join on the Samara River. The army included 80 thousand troops of the "German system" (reiter and soldiers) and 32 thousand "Russian system", with 350 guns. Almost all regiments were commanded by foreigners, among them Gordon and Lefort.
In early March, V.V. arrived at the Big Regiment in Sumy. Golitsyn. Gordon suggested that the commander-in-chief move closer to the Dnieper and build small fortifications every 4 crossings, which was supposed to instill fear in the Tatars and provide rear. Gordon also recommended taking wall-beating guns and assault ladders with you, as well as building boats on the Dnieper to capture Kizikermen and other Tatar fortifications.
But Golitsyn ignored Gordon's proposals and hurried to go on a campaign in order to have time to avoid the steppe fires. The troops set out on 17 March. The first days there was a terrible cold, and then a thaw suddenly came. All this hampered the movement of the army. The rivers flooded, and the troops crossed the Vorskla, Merlo and Drel rivers with great difficulty.
On the Orel River, the rest of the army joined the Bolshoi Regiment, and on Samara, Mazepa and his Cossacks. On April 24, the army with a two-month supply of food stretched along the left bank of the Dnieper through Horse Waters, Yanchok-rak, Moskovka and Belozerka to Koirka.
The troops marched from Samara with great caution, sending cavalry detachments forward for reconnaissance. The order of movement, in general, was the same as in 1687, that is, extremely cumbersome and conducive to extreme slowness.
Having reached the Koirka River, Golitsyn sent a detachment of two thousand men to Aslan-Kirmen, and he himself moved east into the steppe, towards Perekop. On May 14, the detachment sent to Aslan-Kirmen returned without reaching the fortress.
On May 15, during the transition of the army to the Black Valley along the Ki-zikermen road, significant forces of the Tatars appeared. It was the army of Nureddin-Kalga, the son of the Khan. A skirmish ensued in the vanguard, during which both sides suffered minor losses. After that, the Tatars withdrew, and the Russian army entered the Black Valley.
The next day, the Tatars attacked again, rapidly attacking the rear of the army. The rear regiments hesitated, horsemen and footmen rushed into the Wagenburg, but the strong artillery fire stopped the Tatars. Having suffered heavy losses here, the Tatars rushed to the left flank and badly battered the Sumy and Akhtyrsky regiments of the Ukrainian Cossacks. But even here the artillery stopped the Tatars. Seeing the impotence of their cavalry against the Tatars, the governors placed it behind the infantry and artillery, inside the Wagenburg.
On the morning of May 17, the Tatars appeared again, but, seeing infantry regiments everywhere, they did not dare to attack them and disappeared. The total number of casualties in the Russian army during these days amounted to about 1220 people. Golitsyn's report on the three-day battle, on the brutal attacks of the enemy and on the brilliant victories was hastily sent to Moscow.
The army made two more crossings and on May 20 approached Perekop, a weakly fortified town. Ahead of Perekop stood the khan himself with a 50,000-strong army. Connecting with his son, he surrounded and attacked Golitsyn from all sides. Having driven off the Tatars with artillery fire, Golitsyn approached Perekop for a cannon shot and wanted to attack him at night.
But it was then that the indecision of the incapable Golitsyn was revealed. Had he decided at once, as he himself had planned, to attack, the victory might still have gone to him. The army had been without water for two days already, there was a lack of bread in the units, the horses were dead; a few more days, and the guns and the convoy would have to be abandoned. Preparing for the assault, all the governors, when asked what to do, answered: “We are ready to serve and shed our blood. Only from lack of water and lack of bread we were exhausted, it was impossible to trade near Perekop, and we would have to retreat away.
As a result, the weak-willed Golitsyn did not dare to storm the Perekop fortifications, but instead entered into negotiations with the Tatars. He flattered himself with the hope that the khan, fearing an invasion of the Crimea, would agree to favorable conditions for Russia: not to go to war with Ukrainian cities and Poland; do not take tribute and release all Russian captives without exchange. Khan deliberately dragged out the negotiations, knowing that the Russian army would not be able to stand near Perekop for a long time. Finally, on May 21, an answer came from the khan. He agreed to peace only on the same grounds and demanded 200,000 rubles of lost tribute. Golitsyn had no choice but to start a retreat. The Russian army retreated in very difficult conditions, fires raged throughout the steppe. Gordon, who commanded the rear guard, later wrote: “Our army was in great danger. Her position would have been even more difficult if the khan had taken it into his head to pursue with all his might. Fortunately, he had fewer troops than we imagined." However, this did not stop the Tatars from pursuing the Russians for 8 whole days, giving no rest day or night. On June 29, the devious Narbekov arrived at the bank of the Merlo River with the king’s gracious word and with the order to disband the people at home. “For such a glorious victory in the whole world, we favor you graciously and mercifully, and we graciously praise you again,” Sophia ended her handwritten letter to Golitsyn. Upon her return from the campaign, she showered rich awards on her favorite, governor, officers and lower ranks. Azov campaigns
1695 and 1696 - Russian military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire; were undertaken by Peter I at the beginning of his reign and ended with the capture of the Turkish fortress of Azov. They can be considered the first significant accomplishment of the young king. These military companies were the first step towards solving one of the main tasks facing Russia at that time - obtaining access to the sea.
The choice of the southern direction as the first goal is due to several main reasons:
the war with the Ottoman Empire seemed an easier task than the conflict with Sweden, which closed the exit to the Baltic Sea.
the capture of Azov would have made it possible to secure the southern regions of the country from the raids of the Crimean Tatars.
Russia's allies in the anti-Turkish coalition (the Commonwealth, Austria and Venice) demanded that Peter I begin military operations against Turkey.
The first Azov campaign of 1695
It was decided to strike not at the Crimean Tatars, as in the campaigns of Golitsyn, but at the Turkish fortress of Azov. The route has also been changed: not through the desert steppes, but along the Volga and Don regions.
In the winter and spring of 1695, transport ships were built on the Don: plows, sea boats and rafts to deliver troops, ammunition, artillery and food from the deployment to Azov. This can be considered the beginning, albeit imperfect for solving military problems at sea, but - the first Russian fleet.
In the spring of 1695, the 3rd army groups under the command of Golovin, Gordon and Lefort moved south. During the campaign, Peter combined the duties of the first scorer and the actual leader of the entire campaign.
The Russian army conquered two fortresses from the Turks, and at the end of June laid siege to Azov (a fortress at the mouth of the Don). Gordon stood against the south side, Lefort to his left, Golovin, with whose detachment the tsar was also located, to the right. On July 2, troops under the command of Gordon began siege work. On July 5, the corps of Golovin and Lefort joined them. On July 14 and 16, the Russians managed to occupy the towers - two stone towers on both banks of the Don, above Azov, with iron chains stretched between them, which blocked river boats out to sea. This was in fact the highest success of the campaign. Two attempts were made to storm (August 5 and September 25), but the fortress could not be taken. On October 20, the siege was lifted.
Second Azov campaign of 1696
Throughout the winter of 1696, the Russian army was preparing for the second campaign. In January, large-scale shipbuilding was launched at the shipyards of Voronezh and Preobrazhensky. The disassembled galleys built in Preobrazhensky were delivered to Voronezh, where they were assembled and launched into the water. In addition, engineering specialists were invited from Austria. Over 25 thousand peasants and townspeople were mobilized from the nearest district for the construction of the fleet. 2 large ships, 23 galleys and more than 1300 plows, barges and small ships were built.
The command of the troops was also reorganized. Lefort was placed at the head of the fleet, the ground forces were entrusted to the boyar Shein.
The highest decree was issued, according to which the serfs who joined the army received freedom. Land Army doubled to 70,000. It also included Ukrainian and Don Cossacks and Kalmyk cavalry.
On May 20, Cossacks in galleys at the mouth of the Don attacked a caravan of Turkish cargo ships. As a result, 2 galleys and 9 small ships were destroyed, and one small ship was captured. On May 27, the fleet entered the Sea of Azov and cut off the fortress from sources of supply by sea. The approaching Turkish military flotilla did not dare to join the battle.
On June 10 and June 24, attacks by the Turkish garrison were repulsed, reinforced by 60,000 Tatars camped south of Azov, across the Kagalnik River.
On July 16, the preparatory siege work was completed. On July 17, 1,500 Don Cossacks and part of the Ukrainian Cossacks broke into the fortress without permission and settled in two bastions. On July 19, after prolonged artillery shelling, the Azov garrison surrendered. On July 20, the Lyutikh fortress, located at the mouth of the northernmost branch of the Don, also surrendered.
Already by July 23, Peter approved a plan for new fortifications in the fortress, which by this time had been badly damaged as a result of artillery shelling. Azov did not have a convenient harbor for basing the navy. A better place was chosen for this purpose - Taganrog was founded on July 27, 1696. Voivode Shein for merit in the second Azov campaign became the first Russian generalissimo.
The value of the Azov campaigns
The Azov campaign demonstrated in practice the importance of artillery and navy for warfare. It is a notable example of the successful interaction of the fleet and ground forces during the siege of the coastal fortress, which stands out especially clearly against the background of the failures of the British in the storming of Quebec (1691) and St. Pierre (1693) close in time.
The preparation of campaigns clearly showed Peter's organizational and strategic abilities. For the first time, such important qualities as his ability to draw conclusions from failures and gather strength for a second strike appeared.
Despite the success, at the end of the campaign, the incompleteness of the results achieved became obvious: without the capture of the Crimea, or at least Kerch, access to the Black Sea was still impossible. To hold Azov, it was necessary to strengthen the fleet. It was necessary to continue the construction of the fleet and provide the country with specialists capable of building modern sea vessels.
On October 20, 1696, the Boyar Duma proclaims "Sea ships will be ..." This date can be considered the birthday of the Russian regular navy. An extensive shipbuilding program is approved - 52 (later 77) ships; new duties are introduced to finance it.
The war with Turkey is not over yet, and therefore, in order to better understand the balance of power, find allies in the war against Turkey and confirm the existing alliance - the Holy League, finally, to strengthen the position of Russia, the "Great Embassy" was organized.
Hetmanate22px Crimean Khanate
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Crimean campaigns- military campaigns of the Russian army against the Crimean Khanate, undertaken in and 1689. They were part of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686-1700 and part of the large-scale European Great Turkish War.
First Crimean campaign
Second Crimean campaign
Results
The Crimean campaigns allowed for some time to divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimeans and benefited Russia's European allies. Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international prestige increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved.
According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the government of Princess Sofya Alekseevna. Sophia herself wrote to Golitsyn in 1689:
My light, Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years! And hello again, God and Holy Mother of God by grace and with their mind and happiness, having defeated the Hagarites! God bless you and continue to defeat your enemies!
There is an opinion that the failure of the Crimean campaigns is greatly exaggerated after Peter I lost half of the entire army in the second Azov campaign, although he received only access to the inland Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov.
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Notes
Literature
- Bogdanov A.P."True and true legend about the Crimean campaign of 1687" - a monument to the journalism of the Ambassadorial order // Problems of studying narrative sources on the history of the Russian Middle Ages: Sat. articles / USSR Academy of Sciences. Institute of History of the USSR; Rep. ed. V. T. Pashuto. - M ., 1982. - S. 57–84. - 100 s.
An excerpt characterizing the Crimean campaigns
Young, pristine and pureI gave you all my love...
The star sang songs about you,
Day and night, she called me into the distance ...
And on a spring evening, in April,
Brought to your window.
I gently took you by the shoulders
And he said, without hiding a smile:
“So I didn’t wait for this meeting in vain,
My beloved star...
Mom was completely subdued by dad's poems ... And he wrote a lot of them to her and brought them to her work every day along with huge posters drawn by his own hand (dad drew superbly), which he unfolded right on her desktop, and on which , among all sorts of painted flowers, was capital letters written: "Annushka, my little star, I love you!". Naturally, what woman could endure this for a long time and not give up? .. They no longer parted ... Using every free minute to spend it together, as if someone could take it away from them. Together they went to the cinema, to dances (which they both loved very much), walked in the charming Alytus city park, until one fine day they decided that enough dates were enough and that it was time to take a look at life a little more seriously. They soon got married. But only dad's friend knew about it (mother's younger brother) Ionas, since this union did not cause much enthusiasm either from my mother’s side or from my father’s relatives ... Mom’s parents predicted for her a rich neighbor-teacher, who they really liked and, according to their concept, mother perfectly “suited” , and in my father's family at that time there was no time for marriage, since grandfather was put in prison at that time, as an "accomplice of the noble" (which, for sure, they tried to "break" the stubbornly resisting dad), and grandmother from nervous shock went to the hospital and was very sick. Dad was left with his little brother in his arms and now had to manage the entire household alone, which was very difficult, since the Seryogins at that time lived in a large two-story house(in which I later lived), with a huge old garden around. And, of course, such an economy required good care ...
So three long months passed, and my dad and mom, already married, were still going on dates, until mom accidentally went to dad’s house one day and found a very touching picture there ... Dad stood in the kitchen in front of the stove and looked unhappy “replenished” the hopelessly growing number of pots of semolina porridge, which at that moment was cooking for his little brother. But for some reason, the "harmful" porridge for some reason became more and more, and poor dad could not understand what was happening ... Mom, struggling to hide her smile so as not to offend the unlucky "cook", rolled up her sleeves right there began to put in order all this “stagnant domestic mess”, starting with completely occupied, “porridge stuffed” pots, an indignantly hissing stove ... helplessness, and decided to immediately move to this territory, which was still completely alien and unfamiliar to her ... And although it was not very easy for her at that time either - she worked at the post office (to support herself), and in the evenings she went to occupations for passing examinations in medical school.
She, without hesitation, gave all her remaining strength to her exhausted young husband and his family. The house immediately came to life. In the kitchen, there was a stupefying smell of delicious Lithuanian "cepelins", which my father's little brother adored and, just like his father, who had been sitting on dry food for a long time, ate them literally to the "unreasonable" limit. Everything became more or less normal, except for the absence of my grandparents, about whom my poor dad worried very much, and sincerely missed them all this time. But now he already had a young beautiful wife, who, as best she could, tried to brighten up his temporary loss in every possible way, and looking at dad's smiling face, it was clear that she was doing it quite well. Dad's little brother very soon got used to his new aunt and followed her tail, hoping to get something tasty or at least a beautiful "evening story" that his mother read to him in great abundance before going to bed.
So calmly in everyday worries the days passed, and then the weeks. Grandmother, by that time, had already returned from the hospital and, to her great surprise, found a newly-baked daughter-in-law at home ... And since it was too late to change anything, they simply tried to get to know each other better, avoiding unwanted conflicts (which inevitably appear with any new, too close acquaintance). More precisely, they simply “got used to each other”, trying to honestly bypass any possible “underwater reefs” ... I was always sincerely sorry that my mother and grandmother never fell in love with each other ... They both were (or rather, mother still are) beautiful people, and I loved them both very much. But if grandmother, all her life spent together, somehow tried to adapt to her mother, then mother, on the contrary, at the end of her grandmother’s life, sometimes showed her irritation too openly, which deeply hurt me, since I was very attached to both of them and very she did not like to fall, as they say, "between two fires" or forcefully take sides. I have never been able to figure out what caused this constant "silent" war between these two wonderful women, but apparently there were some very good reasons for this, or perhaps my poor mother and grandmother were just really "incompatible" , as happens quite often with strangers living together. One way or another, it was a pity, because, in general, it was a very friendly and faithful family, in which everyone stood up for each other like a mountain, and experienced every trouble or misfortune together.
But let's go back to the days when all this was just beginning, and when every member of this new family he honestly tried to “live in harmony”, without creating any trouble for the others ... Grandfather was also at home, but his health, to the great regret of everyone else, after the days spent in prison, deteriorated sharply. Apparently, including the hard days spent in Siberia, all the long ordeals of the Seryogins unfamiliar cities they did not spare the poor grandfather's heart, tormented by life - he began to have repeated microinfarctions ...
Mom made friends with him and tried her best to help him forget everything bad as soon as possible, although she herself had a very, very difficult time. Over the past months, she managed to pass the preparatory and entrance exams for medical school. But, to her great regret, her old dream was not destined to come true for the simple reason that at that time in Lithuania you still had to pay for the institute, and my mother's family (which had nine children) did not have enough finances for this .. In the same year, from a severe nervous shock that happened a few years ago, her still very young mother died - my grandmother from my mother's side, whom I also never saw. She fell ill during the war, on the day when she learned that there was a heavy bombardment in the pioneer camp, in the seaside town of Palanga, and all the children who survived were taken away to no one knows where ... And among these children was her son , the youngest and favorite of all nine children. A few years later he returned, but this, unfortunately, could not help my grandmother. And in the first year of mom and dad life together, she slowly faded away ... My mother's dad - my grandfather - remained in her arms big family, of which only one mother's sister - Domitsela - was married at that time.
Crimean campaigns of Prince Golitsyn
One year after the conclusion Eternal peace» Russia, in fulfillment of its obligations under the Holy League, started a war with the Crimean Khanate, a Turkish vassal and an old enemy of Russia. The 50,000th army was led by Prince V.V. Golitsyn. In May 1687, she approached the river. Horse Waters. Soon, at the river Samara, it was joined by the 50,000th army of Hetman I. Samoylovich. A detachment of G. Kasogov sailed along the Dnieper to the Kizi-Kermen fortress. The Don Cossacks of Ataman F. Minaev also participated in the campaign.
The situation seemed to be favorable - the Turks could not help the Crimea, as they fought with Austria, Poland and Venice. But Golitsyn's troops found themselves in a very difficult situation. It was a hot summer. There was not enough water, food, fodder. The Crimeans also burned the steppe from Horse Waters to Perekop. There were no battles, and the losses grew - both people and horses could not stand it. I had to retreat. A year and a half later, a new campaign began in the spring. Conducted training - the collection of money, warriors. On the river Novobogoroditskaya fortress was built in Samara to block the Crimean invasions of Ukraine.
By that time, the positions of the Ottoman Empire had greatly weakened. Russia's allies in the "Holy League" defeated the Turkish troops in Hungary, Dalmatia, Morea. Belgrade fell under the blows of the Austrian army. In Turkey itself, indignant troops overthrew Sultan Mohammed IV.
In February 1689, the Russian-Ukrainian army of V.V. Golitsyna (112 thousand people) again moved along the steppes to Perekop. Khan put up a 250,000th army. In mid-May, fierce battles began, the defeated Crimeans retreated. But the heat began again, the hardships of the first campaign resumed. After unsuccessful negotiations with the Khan, who proposed an agreement on the terms of the Bakhchisaray Peace of 1681 (Golitsyn did not agree with them), the Russian command began to withdraw troops.
Both campaigns did not bring visible success. Russian-Ukrainian military forces approached the Crimea, but could not enter the peninsula. The losses were considerable. Nevertheless, the significance of the campaigns, and no small one, is that for the first time in two centuries (after the overthrow of the Horde yoke), Russia undertook two major uprisings against the Crimean Khanate. The Crimeans experienced feelings of fear and the bitterness of defeat. Their military forces could not help the failed Turkey.
Austria and Venice received help from Russia and were able to make good use of it. Russia has demonstrated its increased military power. It is characteristic that in Istanbul, which received news of the approach of large Russian-Ukrainian armies to the Crimea and Turkish possessions in the Northern Black Sea region, more than once there was a panic: "The Russians are coming!"
In Moscow, they tried, especially the regent Sophia, to portray both campaigns as great victories, which they were not.
Tsar Peter Alekseevich did not even want to once accept Golitsyn, who returned from a campaign. But, despite his extreme dislike for his sister and her talent as a chancellor, after their overthrow he continued the same policy in the southern direction. True, he made some changes to it.