The Soviet-Finnish War briefly. The myth of “peaceful” Finland

Subject Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 has now become a fairly popular topic of discussion in Russia. Many call it a disgrace to the Soviet army - in 105 days, from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, the sides lost more than 150 thousand people in killed alone. The Russians won the war, and 430 thousand Finns were forced to leave their homes and return to their historical homeland.

In Soviet textbooks we were assured: armed conflict the “Finnish military” began. On November 26, near the town of Mainila, there was an artillery attack on Soviet troops stationed near the Finnish border, as a result of which 4 soldiers were killed and 10 were wounded.

The Finns proposed creating a joint commission to investigate the incident, which the Soviet side refused and stated that it no longer considered itself bound by the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact. Was the shooting staged?

“I got acquainted with documents that had recently been classified,” says military historian Miroslav Morozov. — In the divisional combat log, the pages with entries about artillery shelling have a noticeably later origin.

There are no reports to the division headquarters, the names of the victims are not indicated, it is unknown to which hospital the wounded were sent... Apparently, at that time the Soviet leadership did not really care about the credibility of the reason for starting the war.”

Since Finland declared independence in December 1917, territorial claims have constantly arisen between it and the USSR. But they more often became the subject of negotiations. The situation changed at the end of the 30s, when it became clear that the Second World War would soon begin. The USSR demanded that Finland not participate in the war against the USSR and allow the construction of Soviet military bases on Finnish territory. Finland hesitated and played for time.

The situation worsened with the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, according to which Finland belonged to the sphere of interests of the USSR. The Soviet Union began to insist on its terms, although it offered certain territorial concessions in Karelia. But the Finnish government rejected all proposals. Then, on November 30, 1939, the invasion of Soviet troops into Finnish territory began.

In January frosts hit -30 degrees. Soldiers surrounded by Finns were forbidden to leave heavy weapons and equipment to the enemy. However, seeing the inevitability of the death of the division, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement.

Of almost 7,500 people, 1,500 returned to their own. The division commander, regimental commissar and chief of staff were shot. And the 18th Infantry Division, which found itself in the same conditions, remained in place and was completely destroyed to the north Lake Ladoga.

But the Soviet troops suffered the heaviest losses in battles on the main direction - the Karelian Isthmus. The 140-kilometer Mannerheim defensive line covering it on the main defensive line consisted of 210 long-term and 546 wood-earth firing points. It was possible to break through it and capture the city of Vyborg only during the third assault, which began on February 11, 1940.

The Finnish government, seeing that there was no hope left, entered into negotiations and on March 12 a peace treaty was concluded. The fighting is over. Having won a dubious victory over Finland, the Red Army began to prepare for war with a much larger predator - Nazi Germany. The story allowed 1 year, 3 months and 10 days to prepare.

According to the results of the war: 26 thousand military personnel died on the Finnish side, 126 thousand on the Soviet side. The USSR received new territories and moved the border away from Leningrad. Finland subsequently sided with Germany. And the USSR was excluded from the League of Nations.

A few facts from the history of the Soviet-Finnish war

1. The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939/1940 was not the first armed conflict between the two states. In 1918-1920, and then in 1921-1922, the so-called first and second Soviet-Finnish wars were fought, during which the Finnish authorities, dreaming of a “Great Finland,” tried to seize the territory of Eastern Karelia.

The wars themselves became a continuation of the bloody Civil War that raged in Finland in 1918-1919, which ended with the victory of the Finnish “whites” over the Finnish “reds”. As a result of the wars, the RSFSR retained control over Eastern Karelia, but transferred to Finland the polar Pechenga region, as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula.

2. At the end of the wars of the 1920s, relations between the USSR and Finland were not friendly, but did not reach the point of outright confrontation. In 1932, the Soviet Union and Finland entered into a non-aggression pact, which was later extended until 1945, but was unilaterally broken by the USSR in the fall of 1939.

3. In 1938-1939, the Soviet government conducted secret negotiations with the Finnish side on the exchange of territories. In the context of the impending world war, the Soviet Union intended to move the state border away from Leningrad, since it was only 18 kilometers from the city. In exchange, Finland was offered territories in Eastern Karelia, significantly larger in area. The negotiations, however, were unsuccessful.

4. The immediate cause of the war was the so-called “Maynila Incident”: on November 26, 1939, on a section of the border near the village of Maynila, a group of Soviet military personnel was fired upon by artillery. Seven gun shots were fired, as a result of which three privates and one junior commander were killed, seven privates and two command personnel were wounded.

Modern historians still debate whether the Maynila shooting was a provocation Soviet Union or not. One way or another, two days later the USSR denounced the non-aggression pact, and on November 30 began military operations against Finland.

5. On December 1, 1939, the Soviet Union announced the creation of an alternative “People's Government” of Finland in the village of Terijoki, led by communist Otto Kuusinen. The next day, the USSR concluded a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship with the Kuusinen government, which was recognized as the only legitimate government in Finland.

At the same time, the process of forming the Finnish People's Army from Finns and Karelians was underway. However, by the end of January 1940, the position of the USSR was revised - the Kuusinen government was no longer mentioned, and all negotiations were conducted with the official authorities in Helsinki.

6. The main obstacle to the offensive of the Soviet troops was the “Mannerheim Line” - named after the Finnish military leader and politician, the defense line between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, consisting of multi-level concrete fortifications equipped with heavy weapons.

Initially, the Soviet troops, who did not have the means to destroy such a line of defense, suffered heavy losses during numerous frontal attacks on the fortifications.

7. Finland was simultaneously provided with military assistance by both Nazi Germany and its opponents - England and France. But while Germany was limited to unofficial military supplies, the Anglo-French forces were considering plans for military intervention against the Soviet Union. However, these plans were never implemented due to fears that the USSR in such a case might take part in the Second World War on the side of Nazi Germany.

8. By the beginning of March 1940, Soviet troops managed to break through the Mannerheim Line, which created a threat complete defeat Finland. Under these conditions, without waiting for the Anglo-French intervention against the USSR, the Finnish government entered into peace negotiations with the Soviet Union. A peace treaty was concluded in Moscow on March 12, 1940, and the fighting ended on March 13 with the capture of Vyborg by the Red Army.

9. In accordance with the Moscow Treaty, the Soviet-Finnish border was moved away from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km. According to many historians, it was this fact that largely helped to avoid the capture of the city by the Nazis during the Great Patriotic War.

In total, the territorial acquisitions of the USSR following the results of the Soviet-Finnish war amounted to 40 thousand sq. km. Data on the human losses of the parties to the conflict to this day remain contradictory: the Red Army lost from 125 to 170 thousand people killed and missing, the Finnish army - from 26 to 95 thousand people.

10. The famous Soviet poet Alexander Tvardovsky wrote the poem “Two Lines” in 1943, which became perhaps the most vivid artistic reminder of the Soviet-Finnish war:

From a shabby notebook

Two lines about a boy fighter,

What happened in the forties

Killed on ice in Finland.

It lay somehow awkwardly

Childishly small body.

The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,

The hat flew far away.

It seemed that the boy was not lying down,

And he was still running

Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...

Among great war cruel,

I can’t imagine why,

I feel sorry for that distant fate

Like dead, alone,

It's like I'm lying there

Frozen, small, killed

In that unknown war,

Forgotten, small, lying.

Photos of the “unfamous” war

Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant M.I. Sipovich and captain Korovin at a captured Finnish bunker.

Soviet soldiers inspect the observation cap of a captured Finnish bunker.

Soviet soldiers are preparing a Maxim machine gun for anti-aircraft fire.

A house burning after a bombing in the Finnish city of Turku.

A Soviet sentry next to a Soviet quad anti-aircraft machine gun mount based on the Maxim machine gun.

Soviet soldiers dig up a Finnish border post near the Mainila border post.

Soviet military dog breeders of a separate communications battalion with communication dogs.

Soviet border guards inspect captured Finnish weapons.

A Finnish soldier next to a downed Soviet fighter I-15 bis.

Formation of soldiers and commanders of the 123rd Infantry Division on the march after the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus.

Finnish soldiers in the trenches near Suomussalmi during the Winter War.

Prisoners of the Red Army captured by the Finns in the winter of 1940.

Finnish soldiers in the forest try to disperse after noticing the approach of Soviet aircraft.

A frozen Red Army soldier of the 44th Infantry Division.

Red Army soldiers of the 44th Infantry Division frozen in a trench.

A Soviet wounded man lies on a plastering table made from improvised materials.

Three Corners Park in Helsinki with open gaps dug to provide shelter for the population in the event of an air raid.

Blood transfusion before surgery in a Soviet military hospital.

Finnish women sew winter camouflage coats at a factory/

A Finnish soldier walks past a broken Soviet tank column/

A Finnish soldier fires from a Lahti-Saloranta M-26 light machine gun/

Residents of Leningrad welcome tankers of the 20th Tank Brigade on T-28 tanks returning from the Karelian Isthmus/

Finnish soldier with a Lahti-Saloranta M-26 machine gun/

Finnish soldiers with a Maxim M/32-33 machine gun in the forest.

Finnish crew of the Maxim anti-aircraft machine gun.

Finnish Vickers tanks knocked out near Pero station.

Finnish soldiers at the 152-mm Kane gun.

Finnish civilians who fled their homes during the Winter War.

A broken column of the Soviet 44th Division.

Soviet SB-2 bombers over Helsinki.

Three Finnish skiers on the march.

Two soviet soldier with a Maxim machine gun in the forest on the Mannerheim Line.

A burning house in the Finnish city of Vaasa after a Soviet air raid.

View of a Helsinki street after a Soviet air raid.

A house in the center of Helsinki, damaged after a Soviet air raid.

Finnish soldiers raise the frozen body of a Soviet officer.

A Finnish soldier looks at the captured Red Army soldiers changing clothes.

A Soviet prisoner captured by the Finns sits on a box.

Captured Red Army soldiers enter the house under the escort of Finnish soldiers.

Finnish soldiers carry a wounded comrade on a dog sled.

Finnish orderlies carry a stretcher with a wounded man near a field hospital tent.

Finnish doctors load a stretcher with a wounded person into an ambulance bus manufactured by AUTOKORI OY.

Finnish skiers with reindeer and drags at a rest during the retreat.

Finnish soldiers dismantle captured Soviet military equipment.

Sandbags cover the windows of a house on Sofiankatu Street in Helsinki.

T-28 tanks of the 20th heavy tank brigade before going on a combat operation.

Soviet T-28 tank, destroyed on the Karelian Isthmus near height 65.5.

Finnish tankman next to a captured Soviet T-28 tank.

Residents of Leningrad greet the tankers of the 20th heavy tank brigade.

Soviet officers against the backdrop of Vyborg Castle.

A Finnish air defense soldier looks at the sky through a rangefinder.

Finnish ski battalion with reindeer and drags.

A Swedish volunteer in position during the Soviet-Finnish War.

Crew of a Soviet 122 mm howitzer in position during the Winter War.

A messenger on a motorcycle conveys a message to the crew of a Soviet armored car BA-10.

Pilots Heroes of the Soviet Union - Ivan Pyatykhin, Alexander Letuchy and Alexander Kostylev.

Finnish propaganda from the Soviet-Finnish War

Finnish propaganda promised a carefree life to the surrendered Red Army soldiers: bread and butter, cigars, vodka and dancing to the accordion. They paid generously for the weapons they brought with them, they made a reservation, they promised to pay: for a revolver - 100 rubles, for a machine gun - 1,500 rubles, and for a cannon - as much as 10,000 rubles.

The Finnish War lasted 105 days. During this time, over one hundred thousand Red Army soldiers died, about a quarter of a million were wounded or dangerously frostbitten. Historians are still arguing whether the USSR was an aggressor and whether the losses were unjustified.

A look back

It is impossible to understand the reasons for that war without an excursion into the history of Russian-Finnish relations. Before gaining independence, the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” never had statehood. In 1808 - an insignificant episode of the twentieth anniversary of the Napoleonic Wars - the land of Suomi was conquered by Russia from Sweden.

The new territorial acquisition enjoys unprecedented autonomy within the Empire: the Grand Duchy of Finland has its own parliament, legislation, and since 1860 - its own monetary unit. For a century, this blessed corner of Europe has not known war - until 1901, Finns were not drafted into the Russian army. The population of the principality increases from 860 thousand inhabitants in 1810 to almost three million in 1910.

After the October Revolution, Suomi gained independence. During the local civil war he won local option"white"; chasing the “reds”, the hot guys crossed the old border, and the First Soviet-Finnish War began (1918-1920). Bleeded Russia, having still formidable white armies in the South and Siberia, chose to make territorial concessions to its northern neighbor: as a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Helsinki received Western Karelia, and the state border passed forty kilometers northwest of Petrograd.

It is difficult to say how historically fair this verdict turned out to be; The Vyborg province inherited by Finland belonged to Russia for more than a hundred years, from the time of Peter the Great until 1811, when it was included in the Grand Duchy of Finland, perhaps also as a sign of gratitude for the voluntary consent of the Finnish Seimas to pass under the hand of the Russian Tsar.

The knots that later led to new bloody clashes were successfully tied.

Geography is a sentence

Look at the map. It's 1939, and Europe smells of a new war. At the same time, your imports and exports mainly go through seaports. But the Baltic and the Black Sea are two big puddles, all the exits from which Germany and its satellites can clog in no time. The Pacific sea routes will be blocked by another Axis member, Japan.

Thus, the only potentially protected channel for export, for which the Soviet Union receives the gold it desperately needs to complete industrialization, and the import of strategic military materials, remains only the port on the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, one of the few year-round ice-free harbors in the USSR. The only railway to which, suddenly, in some places passes through rugged deserted terrain just a few tens of kilometers from the border (when this railway was laid, back under the Tsar, no one could have imagined that the Finns and Russians would fight on opposite sides barricades). Moreover, at a distance of a three-day journey from this border there is another strategic transport artery, the White Sea-Baltic Canal.

But that’s another half of the geographic troubles. Leningrad, the cradle of the revolution, which concentrated a third of the country's military-industrial potential, is within the radius of one forced march of a potential enemy. A metropolis, whose streets have never been hit by an enemy shell before, can be shelled from heavy guns from the very first day of a possible war. Baltic Fleet ships are losing their only base. And there are no natural defensive lines, right up to the Neva.

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.

In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was in intense debate about the form government structure, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the Kaiser sent expeditionary force(numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that the total number of local “reds” and “whites”, who were significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.

Yes, at that time the idea of attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during Western campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.

Negotiation

Stalin was anything but a fool. If to improve the strategic situation it is necessary to move the border away from Leningrad, so it should be. Another question is that the goal cannot necessarily be achieved only by military means. Although, honestly, right now, in the fall of ’39, when the Germans are ready to grapple with the hated Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, I want to quietly solve my little problem with the “Finnish White Guard” - not out of revenge for an old defeat, no, in politics following emotions leads to imminent death - and to test what the Red Army is capable of in a battle with a real enemy, small in number, but trained by the European military school; in the end, if the Laplanders can be defeated, as our General Staff plans, in two weeks, Hitler will think a hundred times before attacking us...

But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not tried to settle the issue amicably, if such a word is appropriate for a person of his character. Since 1938, the negotiations in Helsinki had been neither shaky nor slow; in the fall of 1939 they were moved to Moscow. In exchange for the Leningrad underbelly, the Soviets offered twice the area north of Ladoga. Germany, through diplomatic channels, recommended that the Finnish delegation agree. But they did not make any concessions (perhaps, as the Soviet press transparently hinted, at the suggestion of “Western partners”) and on November 13 they left for home. There are two weeks left until the Winter War.

On November 26, 1939, near the village of Mainila on the Soviet-Finnish border, the positions of the Red Army came under artillery fire. The diplomats exchanged notes of protest; According to the Soviet side, about a dozen soldiers and commanders were killed and wounded. Whether the Maynila incident was a deliberate provocation (as evidenced, for example, by the absence of a named list of victims), or whether one of the thousands of armed men, tensely standing for long days opposite the same armed enemy, finally lost their nerve - in any case , this incident was the reason for the outbreak of hostilities.

The Winter Campaign began, where there was a heroic breakthrough of the seemingly indestructible “Mannerheim Line”, and a belated understanding of the role of snipers in modern warfare, and the first use of the KV-1 tank - but for a long time they did not like to remember all this. The losses turned out to be too disproportionate, and the damage to the international reputation of the USSR was severe.

A look back

After the October Revolution, Suomi gained independence. During the local civil war, the local version of the “whites” won; chasing the “reds”, the hot guys crossed the old border, and the First Soviet-Finnish War began (1918-1920). Bleeded Russia, having still formidable white armies in the South and Siberia, chose to make territorial concessions to its northern neighbor: as a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Helsinki received Western Karelia, and the state border passed forty kilometers northwest of Petrograd.

The knots that later led to new bloody clashes were successfully tied.

Geography is a sentence

friend of your enemy

Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was undergoing intense discussions about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that the total number of local “reds” and “whites”, who were significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Yes, at that time the idea of attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.

Negotiation

(see the beginning in the previous 3 publications)

73 years ago, one of the most unpublicized wars in which our state took part ended. The Soviet-Finnish War of 1940, also called the “Winter”, cost our state very dearly. According to the lists of names compiled by the personnel apparatus of the Red Army already in 1949-1951, the total number of irretrievable losses amounted to 126,875 people. The Finnish side in this conflict lost 26,662 people. Thus, the loss ratio is 1 to 5, which clearly indicates the low quality of management, weapons and skills of the Red Army. However, despite this high level losses, the Red Army completed all its tasks, albeit with certain adjustments.

So on initial stage During this war, the Soviet government was confident of an early victory and the complete capture of Finland. It was based on such prospects that the Soviet authorities formed the “government of the Finnish Democratic Republic” headed by Otto Kuusinen, a former deputy of the Finnish Sejm, a delegate of the Second International. However, as military operations progressed, appetites had to be reduced, and instead of the premiership of Finland, Kuusinen received the post of chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Council of the newly formed Karelian-Finnish SSR, which existed until 1956, and remained the head of the Supreme Council of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Despite the fact that the entire territory of Finland was never conquered by Soviet troops, the USSR received significant territorial gains. From the new territories and the already existing Karelian Autonomous Republic, the sixteenth republic within the USSR was formed - the Karelo-Finnish SSR.

The stumbling block and the reason for the start of the war - the Soviet-Finnish border in the Leningrad region was moved back 150 kilometers. The entire northern coast of Lake Ladoga became part of the Soviet Union, and this body of water became internal for the USSR. In addition, part of Lapland and islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland went to the USSR. The Hanko Peninsula, which was a kind of key to the Gulf of Finland, was leased to the USSR for 30 years. Soviet naval base existed on this peninsula at the beginning of December 1941. On June 25, 1941, three days after the attack by Nazi Germany, Finland declared war on the USSR and on the same day Finnish troops began military operations against the Soviet garrison of Hanko. The defense of this territory continued until December 2, 1941. Currently, the Hanko Peninsula belongs to Finland. During the Winter War, Soviet troops occupied the Pechenga region, which before the 1917 revolution was part of the Arkhangelsk region. After the area was transferred to Finland in 1920, large reserves of nickel were discovered there. The development of the deposits was carried out by French, Canadian and British companies. Largely due to the fact that the nickel mines were controlled by Western capital, in order to maintain good relations with France and Great Britain following the Finnish War, this site was transferred back to Finland. In 1944, after the completion of the Petsamo-Kirkines operation, Pechenga was occupied by Soviet troops and subsequently became part of the Murmansk region.

The Finns fought selflessly and the result of their resistance was not only large losses of Red Army personnel, but also significant losses military equipment. The Red Army lost 640 aircraft, the Finns knocked out 1,800 tanks - and all this despite the complete dominance of Soviet aviation in the air and the virtual absence of anti-tank artillery among the Finns. However, no matter what exotic methods of fighting Soviet tanks the Finnish troops came up with, luck was on the side of the “large battalions”.

The whole hope of the Finnish leadership lay in the formula “The West will help us.” However, even the closest neighbors provided Finland with rather symbolic assistance. 8 thousand untrained volunteers arrived from Sweden, but at the same time Sweden refused to allow 20 thousand interned Polish soldiers through its territory, ready to fight on the side of Finland. Norway was represented by 725 volunteers, and 800 Danes also intended to fight against the USSR. Hitler also tripped up Mannerheim again: the Nazi leader banned the transit of equipment and people through the territory of the Reich. A couple of thousand volunteers (though of advanced age) arrived from Great Britain. A total of 11.5 thousand volunteers arrived in Finland, which could not seriously affect the balance of power.

In addition, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations should have brought moral satisfaction to the Finnish side. However, this international organization was only a pathetic forerunner of the modern UN. In total, it included 58 states, and in different years, for various reasons, countries such as Argentina (withdrew in the period 1921-1933), Brazil (withdrew in 1926), Romania (withdrew in 1940), Czechoslovakia (membership terminated March 15, 1939), and so on. In general, one gets the impression that the countries participating in the League of Nations did nothing but enter or leave it. The exclusion of the Soviet Union as an aggressor was especially actively advocated by such countries “close” to Europe as Argentina, Uruguay and Colombia, but Finland’s closest neighbors: Denmark, Sweden and Norway, on the contrary, stated that they would not support any sanctions against the USSR. Not being any serious international institution, the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946 and, ironically, the chairman of the Swedish Storing (parliament) Hambro, the same one who had to read out the decision to exclude the USSR, at the final assembly of the League of Nations announced a greeting to the founding countries of the UN , among which were the Soviet Union, still headed by Joseph Stalin.

Supplies of weapons and ammunition to Filand from European countries were paid in specie, and at inflated prices, which Mannerheim himself admitted. In the Soviet-Finnish war, profits were made by the concerns of France (which at the same time managed to sell weapons to Hitler’s promising ally Romania), and Great Britain, which sold frankly outdated weapons to the Finns. An obvious opponent of the Anglo-French allies, Italy sold Finland 30 aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. Hungary, which then fought on the side of the Axis, sold anti-aircraft guns, mortars and grenades, and Belgium, which a short time later fell under German attack, sold ammunition. Its closest neighbor, Sweden, sold Finland 85 anti-tank guns, half a million rounds of ammunition, gasoline, and 104 anti-aircraft weapons. Finnish soldiers fought in overcoats made from cloth purchased in Sweden. Some of these purchases were paid for with a $30 million loan provided by the United States. What is most interesting is that most of the equipment arrived “at the end” and did not have time to take part in hostilities during the Winter War, but, apparently, it was successfully used by Finland already during the Great Patriotic War in alliance with Nazi Germany.

In general, one gets the impression that at that time (winter of 1939-1940) the leading European powers: neither France nor Great Britain had yet decided with whom they would have to fight in the next few years. In any case, the head of the British Department of the North, Laurencollier, believed that the goals of Germany and Great Britain in this war could be common, and according to eyewitnesses - judging by the French newspapers of that winter, it seemed that France was at war with the Soviet Union, and not with Germany. The joint British-French War Council decided on February 5, 1940 to appeal to the governments of Norway and Sweden with a request to provide Norwegian territory for the landing of the British Expeditionary Force. But even the British were surprised by the statement of French Prime Minister Daladier, who unilaterally announced that his country was ready to send 50 thousand soldiers and a hundred bombers to help Finland. By the way, plans for waging war against the USSR, which at that time was assessed by the British and French as a significant supplier of strategic raw materials to Germany, developed even after the signing of peace between Finland and the USSR. Back on March 8, 1940, a few days before the end of the Soviet-Finnish War, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee developed a memorandum that described the future military actions of the British-French allies against the USSR. Combat operations were planned on a wide scale: in the north in the Pechenga-Petsamo region, in the Murmansk direction, in the Arkhangelsk region, in Far East and in the southern direction - in the area of Baku, Grozny and Batumi. In these plans, the USSR was considered as a strategic ally of Hitler, supplying him with strategic raw materials - oil. According to the French General Weygand, the strike should have been carried out in June-July 1940. But by the end of April 1940, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain admitted that the Soviet Union adheres to strict neutrality and there is no reason for an attack. In addition, already in June 1940, German tanks entered Paris, and it was then that the joint French-British plans were captured by Hitler's troops.

However, all these plans remained only on paper and for more than a hundred days of the Soviet-Finnish war, no significant assistance was provided by the Western powers. Actually, Finland was put in a hopeless situation during the war by its closest neighbors - Sweden and Norway. On the one hand, the Swedes and Norwegians verbally expressed all their support for the Finns, allowing their volunteers to participate in hostilities on the side of the Finnish troops, but on the other hand, these countries blocked a decision that could actually change the course of the war. The Swedish and Norwegian governments refused the request of the Western powers to provide their territory for the transit of military personnel and military cargo, and otherwise the Western expeditionary force would not have been able to arrive at the theater of operations.

By the way, Finland’s military expenditures in the pre-war period were calculated precisely on the basis of possible Western military assistance. Fortifications on the Mannerheim Line in the period 1932 - 1939 were not at all the main item of Finnish military spending. The vast majority of them were completed by 1932, and in the subsequent period the gigantic (in relative terms it amounted to 25 percent of the entire Finnish budget) Finnish military budget was directed, for example, to such things as the massive construction of military bases, warehouses and airfields. Thus, Finnish military airfields could accommodate ten times more aircraft than were in service with the Finnish Air Force at that time. It is obvious that the entire Finnish military infrastructure was being prepared for foreign expeditionary forces. Typically, the massive filling of Finnish warehouses with British and French military equipment began after the end of the Winter War, and all this mass of goods, almost in full, subsequently fell into the hands of Nazi Germany.

The actual military operations of the Soviet troops began only after the Soviet leadership received guarantees from Great Britain of non-interference in the future Soviet-Finnish conflict. Thus, the fate of Finland in the Winter War was predetermined by precisely this position of the Western allies. The United States has taken a similar two-faced position. Despite the fact that the American Ambassador to the USSR Steinhardt literally went into hysterics, demanding that sanctions be imposed against the Soviet Union, expel Soviet citizens from US territory and close the Panama Canal to the passage of our ships, US President Franklin Roosevelt limited himself to only introducing a “moral embargo.”

The English historian E. Hughes generally described the support of France and Great Britain for Finland at a time when these countries were already at war with Germany as “the product of a madhouse.” One gets the impression that Western countries were even ready to enter into an alliance with Hitler only so that the Wehrmacht would lead the West’s crusade against the USSR. French Prime Minister Daladier, speaking in parliament after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, said that the results of the Winter War were a disgrace for France, and a “great victory” for Russia.

The events and military conflicts of the late 1930s in which the Soviet Union participated became episodes of history in which the USSR for the first time began to act as a subject of international politics. Before this, our country was viewed as a “terrible child”, an unviable freak, a temporary misunderstanding. Nor should we overestimate the economic potential of Soviet Russia. In 1931, Stalin, at a conference of industrial workers, said that the USSR was 50-100 years behind developed countries and that this distance must be covered by our country in ten years: “Either we do this, or we will be crushed.” The Soviet Union failed to completely eliminate the technological gap by 1941, but it was no longer possible to crush us. As the USSR industrialized, it gradually began to show its teeth to the Western community, beginning to defend its own interests, including through armed means. Throughout the late 1930s, the USSR carried out restoration of territorial losses resulting from the collapse Russian Empire. The Soviet government methodically pushed state borders further and further beyond the West. Many acquisitions were made almost bloodlessly, mainly by diplomatic methods, but moving the border from Leningrad cost our army many thousands of soldiers' lives. However, such a transfer was largely predetermined by the fact that during the Great Patriotic War, the German army got stuck in the Russian open spaces and in the end Nazi Germany was defeated.

After almost half a century of constant wars, as a result of the Second World War, relations between our countries normalized. The Finnish people and their government realized that it was better for their country to act as a mediator between the worlds of capitalism and socialism, and not to be a bargaining chip in the geopolitical games of world leaders. And even more so, Finnish society has ceased to feel forward detachment the Western world, designed to contain the “communist hell”. This position has led to Finland becoming one of the most prosperous and rapidly developing European countries.

We will briefly talk about this war, already because Finland was the country with which the Nazi leadership then connected its plans for further advancement to the east. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Germany, according to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, maintained neutrality. It all started with the fact that the Soviet leadership, taking into account the situation in Europe after the Nazis came to power in Germany, decided to increase the security of its northwestern borders. The border with Finland then passed only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, that is, within range of a long-range artillery gun.

The Finnish government pursued an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union (Ryti was then prime minister). The country's president in 1931-1937, P. Svinhufvud, stated: “Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.”

In the summer of 1939, the Chief of the General Staff visited Finland ground forces Germany Colonel General Halder. He showed particular interest in the Leningrad and Murmansk strategic directions. In Hitler's plans, the territory of Finland was given an important place in the future war. With the help of German specialists, airfields were built in the southern regions of Finland in 1939, designed to receive a number of aircraft that was many times greater than what the Finnish air force had at its disposal. In the border areas and mainly on the Karelian Isthmus, with the participation of German, English, French and Belgian specialists and financial assistance from Great Britain, France, Sweden, Germany and the USA, a powerful long-term fortification system, the “Mannerheim Line”, was built. It was powerful system of three strips of fortifications up to 90 km deep. The width of the fortifications stretched from the Gulf of Finland to the western shore of Lake Ladoga. From total number 350 defensive structures were reinforced concrete, 2400 were made of wood and earth, well camouflaged. The sections of wire fences consisted of an average of thirty (!) rows of barbed wire. In the supposed areas of the breakthrough, giant “wolf pits” were dug with a depth of 7-10 meters and a diameter of 10-15 meters. 200 minutes were set for each kilometer.

Marshal Mannerheim was responsible for creating a system of defensive structures along the Soviet border in southern Finland, hence the unofficial name - “Mannerheim Line”. Carl Gustav Mannerheim (1867-1951) - Finnish statesman and military leader, President of Finland in 1944-1946. During Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, he served in the Russian army. During the Finnish Civil War (January - May 1918) he led the white movement against the Finnish Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks, Mannerheim became commander-in-chief and regent of Finland (December 1918 – July 1919). He was defeated in the presidential elections in 1919 and resigned. In 1931-1939. headed the State Defense Council. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commanded the actions of the Finnish army. In 1941, Finland entered the war on the side of Nazi Germany. Having become president, Mannerheim concluded a peace treaty with the USSR (1944) and opposed Nazi Germany.

The clearly defensive nature of the powerful fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” near the border with the Soviet Union indicated that the Finnish leadership then seriously believed that its powerful southern neighbor would certainly attack small Finland with a population of three million. In fact, this is what happened, but this might not have happened if the Finnish leadership had shown more statesmanship. The outstanding statesman of Finland, Urho-Kaleva Kekkonen, who was elected president of this country for four terms (1956-1981), subsequently wrote: “The shadow of Hitler in the late 30s spread over us, and Finnish society as a whole cannot renounce the fact that it treated it quite favorably.”

The situation that had developed by 1939 required that the Soviet northwestern border be moved away from Leningrad. The time to solve this problem was chosen by the Soviet leadership quite well: the Western powers were busy with the outbreak of war, and the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany. The Soviet government initially hoped to resolve the issue of the border with Finland peacefully, without leading to a military conflict. In October–November 1939, negotiations were held between the USSR and Finland on issues of mutual security. The Soviet leadership explained to the Finns that the need to move the border was not caused by the possibility of Finnish aggression, but by the fear that their territory could be used in that situation by other powers to attack the USSR. The Soviet Union invited Finland to enter into a bilateral defense alliance. The Finnish government, hoping for help promised by Germany, rejected the Soviet offer. German representatives even guaranteed Finland that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany would subsequently help Finland compensate for possible territorial losses. England, France and even America also promised their support to the Finns. The Soviet Union did not claim to include the entire territory of Finland into the USSR. The claims of the Soviet leadership mainly extended to the lands of the former Vyborg province of Russia. It must be said that these claims had serious historical justification. Even in the Livonian War, Ivan the Terrible sought to break through to the Baltic shores. Tsar Ivan the Terrible, not without reason, considered Livonia an ancient Russian fiefdom, illegally seized by the crusaders. Lasted for 25 years (1558-1583) Livonian War, but Tsar Ivan the Terrible was unable to achieve Russia’s access to the Baltic. The work begun by Tsar Ivan the Terrible was continued and, as a result of the Northern War (1700-1721), was brilliantly completed by Tsar Peter I. Russia gained access to Baltic Sea from Riga to Vyborg. Peter I personally took part in the battle for the fortified city of Vyborg. A well-organized siege of the fortress, which included a blockade from the sea and a five-day artillery bombardment, forced the six thousand-strong Swedish garrison of Vyborg to capitulate on June 13, 1710. The capture of Vyborg allowed the Russians to control the entire Karelian Isthmus. As a result, according to Tsar Peter I, “a strong cushion was built for St. Petersburg.” Petersburg was now reliably protected from Swedish attacks from the north. The capture of Vyborg created the conditions for subsequent offensive actions by Russian troops in Finland.

In the fall of 1712, Peter decided to independently, without allies, take control of Finland, which was then one of the provinces of Sweden. This is the task Peter set for Admiral Apraksin, who was to lead the operation: “To go not for ruin, but to take possession, although we don’t need it (Finland) at all, to hold it, for two main reasons: first, there would be something to give up in peace, which the Swedes are clearly starting to talk about; another thing is that this province is the womb of Sweden, as you yourself know: not only meat and so on, but also firewood, and if God allows it to reach Abov in the summer, then the Swedish neck will bend more softly.” The operation to capture Finland was successfully carried out by Russian troops in 1713-1714. The final beautiful chord of the victorious Finnish campaign was the famous naval battle off Cape Gangut in July 1714. For the first time in its history, the young Russian fleet won a battle with one of the strongest fleets in the world, which was then the Swedish fleet. The Russian fleet in this major battle was commanded by Peter I under the name of Rear Admiral Peter Mikhailov. For this victory, the king received the rank of vice admiral. Peter equated the Battle of Gangut in importance to the Battle of Poltava.

According to the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, the Vyborg province became part of Russia. In 1809, by agreement between the Emperor of France Napoleon and the Emperor of Russia Alexander I, the territory of Finland was annexed to Russia. It was a kind of “friendly gift” from Napoleon to Alexander. Readers with at least some knowledge of 19th-century European history will likely be aware of this event. Thus, the Grand Duchy of Finland arose within the Russian Empire. In 1811, Emperor Alexander I annexed the Russian Vyborg province to the Grand Duchy of Finland. This made it easier to manage this territory. This state of affairs did not cause any problems for more than a hundred years. But in 1917, the government of V.I. Lenin granted Finland state independence and since then the Russian Vyborg province remained part of the neighboring state - the Republic of Finland. This is the background to the question.

The Soviet leadership tried to resolve the issue peacefully. On October 14, 1939, the Soviet side proposed to the Finnish side to transfer to the Soviet Union part of the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and also to lease the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula. All this area was 2761 sq. km. in exchange, Finland was offered a part of the territory of Eastern Karelia measuring 5528 sq. km. however, such an exchange would be unequal: the lands of the Karelian Isthmus were economically developed and strategically important - there were powerful fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line”, providing cover for the border. The lands offered to the Finns in return were poorly developed and had neither economic nor military value. The Finnish government refused such an exchange. Hoping for help from the Western powers, Finland hoped to work with them to seize Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula from the Soviet Union by military means. But these plans were not destined to come true. Stalin decided to start a war with Finland.

The military action plan was developed under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikova.

The General Staff's plan took into account the real difficulties of the upcoming breakthrough of the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and provided for the necessary forces and means for this. But Stalin criticized the plan and ordered it to be remade. The fact is that K.E. Voroshilov convinced Stalin that the Red Army would deal with the Finns in 2-3 weeks, and victory would be won with little blood, as they say, throw in our hats. The General Staff's plan was rejected. The development of a new, “correct” plan was entrusted to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. The plan, designed for an easy victory, which did not even provide for the concentration of even minimal reserves, was developed and approved by Stalin. The belief in the ease of the upcoming victory was so great that they did not even consider it necessary to inform the Chief of the General Staff B.M. about the start of the war with Finland. Shaposhnikov, who was on vacation at that time.

They do not always, but often find, or rather create, some reason to start a war. It is known, for example, that before the attack on Poland, the German fascists staged an attack by the Poles on a German border radio station, dressing German soldiers in the uniform of Polish soldiers, and so on. The reason for war with Finland, invented by Soviet artillerymen, was somewhat less imaginative. On November 26, 1939, they shelled Finnish territory for 20 minutes from the border village of Mainila and announced that they had come under artillery fire from the Finnish side. This was followed by an exchange of notes between the governments of the USSR and Finland. In the Soviet note, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov pointed out the great danger of provocation committed by the Finnish side and even reported on the victims it allegedly led to. The Finnish side was asked to withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus 20-25 kilometers and thereby prevent the possibility of repeated provocations.

In a response note received on November 29, the Finnish government invited the Soviet side to come to the site and, based on the location of the shell craters, make sure that it was the territory of Finland that was fired upon. The note further stated that the Finnish side agreed to the withdrawal of troops from the border, but only from both sides. This ended the diplomatic preparations, and on November 30, 1939, at 8 a.m., units of the Red Army went on the offensive. An “unfamous” war began, which the USSR did not want to not only talk about, but even mention. The war with Finland of 1939-1940 was a severe test of the Soviet armed forces. It showed the Red Army’s almost complete unpreparedness for waging a big war in general and a war in the harsh climatic conditions of the North in particular. It is not our task to full story about this war. We will limit ourselves to only describing the most important events war and its lessons. This is necessary because 1 year and 3 months after the end of the Finnish war, the Soviet armed forces were to experience a powerful blow from the German Wehrmacht.

The balance of forces on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war is shown in the table:

The USSR sent four armies into battle against Finland. These troops were located along the entire length of its border. In the main direction, on the Karelian Isthmus, the 7th Army was advancing, consisting of nine rifle divisions, one tank corps, three tank brigades and with a large amount of artillery and aviation attached. The number of personnel of the 7th Army was at least 200 thousand people. The 7th Army was still supported by the Baltic Fleet. Instead of competently disposing of this strong group in operational and tactical terms, the Soviet command did not find anything more reasonable than to strike head-on at the most powerful defensive structures in the world at that time, which made up the “Mannerheim Line.” During the twelve days of the offensive, drowning in snow, freezing in 40-degree frost, suffering huge losses, the troops of the 7th Army were only able to overcome the supply line and stopped in front of the first of the three main fortification lines of the Mannerheim Line. The army was drained of blood and could not advance further. But the Soviet command planned to victoriously end the war with Finland within 12 days.

After being replenished with personnel and equipment, the 7th Army continued the fighting, which was fierce and looked like a slow gnawing of fortified Finnish positions, with heavy losses in people and equipment. The 7th Army was first commanded by Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev, and from December 9 - Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov. (After the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army on May 7, 1940, the rank of “commander of the 2nd rank” began to correspond to the rank of “lieutenant general”). At the beginning of the war with the Finns, there was no question of creating fronts. Despite powerful artillery and air strikes, the Finnish fortifications held out. On January 7, 1940, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northwestern Front, which was headed by Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Tymoshenko. On the Karelian Isthmus, the 13th Army (corps commander V.D. Grendal) was added to the 7th Army. The number of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus exceeded 400 thousand people. The Mannerheim Line was defended by the Finnish Karelian Army led by General H.V. Esterman (135 thousand people).

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Finnish defense system was studied superficially by the Soviet command. The troops had little idea of the peculiarities of fighting in conditions of deep snow, in forests, on severe frost. Before the start of the battles, senior commanders had little understanding of how tank units would operate in deep snow, how soldiers without skis would attack waist-deep in snow, how to organize the interaction of infantry, artillery and tanks, how to fight against reinforced concrete pillboxes with walls up to 2 meters and so on. Only with the formation of the North-Western Front, as they say, did they come to their senses: reconnaissance of the fortification system began, daily training began in methods of storming defensive structures; uniforms unsuitable for winter frosts were replaced: instead of boots, soldiers and officers were given felt boots, instead of overcoats - short fur coats, and so on. There were many attempts to take at least one enemy line of defense on the move, many people died during the assaults, many were blown up by Finnish anti-personnel mines. The soldiers were afraid of mines and did not go on the attack; the “fear of mines” that arose quickly turned into “fear of forests.” By the way, at the beginning of the war with the Finns there were no mine detectors in the Soviet troops; the production of mine detectors began when the war was nearing the end.

The first breach in the Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus was made by February 14. Its length along the front was 4 km and in depth - 8-10 km. The Finnish command, in order to avoid the Red Army from entering the rear of the defending troops, took them to the second line of defense. Soviet troops failed to break through it immediately. The front here has temporarily stabilized. On February 26, Finnish troops tried to launch a counteroffensive, but suffered significant losses and stopped attacks. On February 28, Soviet troops resumed their offensive and broke through a significant part of the second line of Finnish defense. Several Soviet divisions crossed the ice of the Vyborg Bay and on March 5 surrounded Vyborg, the second most important political, economic and military center of Finland. Until March 13, there were battles for Vyborg, and on March 12, in Moscow, representatives of the USSR and Finland signed a peace treaty. The difficult and shameful war for the USSR is over.

The strategic goals of this war were, of course, not only to capture the Karelian Isthmus. In addition to the two armies operating in the main direction, that is, on the Karelian Isthmus (7th and 13th), four more armies took part in the war: 14th (divisional commander Frolov), 9th (corps commander M.P. Dukhanov, then V.I. Chuikov), 8th (divisional commander Khabarov, then G.M. Stern) and 15th (2nd rank commander M.P. Kovalev). These armies operated on almost the entire eastern border of Finland and in its north on a front from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea, stretching over a thousand kilometers. According to the plan of the high command, these armies were supposed to pull back part of the Finnish forces from the Karelian Isthmus region. If successful, Soviet troops on the southern section of this front line could break through north of Lake Ladoga and go to the rear of the Finnish troops defending the Mannerheim Line. Soviet troops in the central sector (Ukhta area), also if successful, could reach the Gulf of Bothnia area and cut the territory of Finland in half.

However, in both sectors, Soviet troops were defeated. How was it possible, in harsh winter conditions, in dense coniferous forests covered with deep snow, without a developed network of roads, without reconnaissance of the terrain of the upcoming military operations, to attack and defeat Finnish troops, adapted to life and combat activity in these conditions, moving quickly on skis, well equipped and armed with automatic weapons? It does not require marshal wisdom or greater combat experience to understand that it is impossible to defeat such an enemy under these conditions, and you can lose your people.

In the relatively short-lived Soviet-Finnish war, many tragedies occurred with Soviet troops and there were almost no victories. During the battles north of Ladoga in December-February 1939-1940. Mobile Finnish units, small in number, using the element of surprise, defeated several Soviet divisions, some of which disappeared forever in the snow-covered coniferous forests. Overloaded with heavy equipment, Soviet divisions stretched along the main roads, having open flanks, deprived of the ability to maneuver, and became victims of small units of the Finnish army, losing 50-70% of their personnel, and sometimes even more, if you count prisoners. Here's a concrete example. The 18th Division (56th Corps of the 15th Army) was surrounded by Finns along the road from Uoma to Lemetti in the 1st half of February 1940. It was transferred from the Ukrainian steppes. There was no training for soldiers to operate in winter conditions in Finland. Units of this division were blocked in 13 garrisons, completely cut off from each other. Their supply was carried out by air, but it was organized unsatisfactorily. The soldiers suffered from cold and malnutrition. By the second half of February, the surrounded garrisons were partially destroyed, the rest suffered heavy losses. The surviving soldiers were exhausted and demoralized. On the night of February 28-29, 1940, the remnants of the 18th Division, with the permission of Headquarters, began to leave the encirclement. To break through the front line, they had to abandon equipment and seriously wounded people. With heavy losses, the fighters escaped from the encirclement. The soldiers carried out the seriously wounded division commander Kondrashev in their arms. The banner of the 18th division went to the Finns. As required by law, this division, which had lost its banner, was disbanded. The division commander, already in the hospital, was arrested and soon executed by court verdict; the commander of the 56th Corps, Cherepanov, shot himself on March 8. The losses of the 18th division amounted to 14 thousand people, that is, more than 90%. The total losses of the 15th Army amounted to about 50 thousand people, which is almost 43% of the initial strength of 117 thousand people. Similar examples A lot can be cited from that “unfamous” war.

Under the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty, the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the area north of Lake Ladoga, the territory in the Kuolajärvi region, as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula went to the Soviet Union. In addition, the USSR acquired a 30-year lease on the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. The distance from Leningrad to the new state border is now about 150 kilometers. But territorial acquisitions did not improve the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR. The loss of territories pushed the Finnish leadership into an alliance with Nazi Germany. As soon as Germany attacked the USSR, the Finns in 1941 pushed back Soviet troops to pre-war lines and captured part of Soviet Karelia.

before and after the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.

The Soviet-Finnish war became a bitter, difficult, but to some extent useful lesson for the Soviet armed forces. At the cost of great blood, the troops gained some experience in modern warfare, especially the skills of breaking through fortified areas, as well as conducting combat operations in winter conditions. The highest state and military leadership became convinced in practice that the combat training of the Red Army was very weak. Therefore, specific measures began to be taken to improve discipline in the troops and to supply the army with modern weapons and military equipment. After the Soviet-Finnish war, there was a slight decline in the pace of repressions against the command staff of the army and navy. Perhaps, analyzing the results of this war, Stalin saw the disastrous consequences of the repressions he unleashed against the army and navy.

One of the first useful organizational events immediately after the Soviet-Finnish war was the dismissal from the post of People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of a famous political figure, Stalin's closest ally, “the people's favorite” Klim Voroshilov. Stalin became convinced of Voroshilov's complete incompetence in military affairs. He was transferred to the prestigious position of deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, that is, the government. The position was invented specifically for Voroshilov, so he could well consider this a promotion. Stalin appointed S.K. to the post of People's Commissar of Defense. Timoshenko, who was the commander of the Northwestern Front in the war with the Finns. In this war, Tymoshenko did not show any special leadership talents; rather, on the contrary, he showed weakness as a leader. However, for the bloodiest operation for the Soviet troops to break through the Mannerheim Line, which was carried out illiterately in operational and tactical terms and cost incredibly large casualties, Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. We do not think that such a high assessment of Tymoshenko’s activities during the Soviet-Finnish war found understanding among Soviet military personnel, especially among the participants in this war.

Official data on the losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, subsequently published in the press, are as follows:

total losses amounted to 333,084 people, of which:
killed and died from wounds – 65384
missing - 19,690 (of which over 5.5 thousand were captured)
wounded, shell-shocked – 186584
frostbitten – 9614
sick – 51892

The losses of Soviet troops during the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line amounted to 190 thousand people killed, wounded, and prisoners, which is 60% of all losses in the war with the Finns. And for such shameful and tragic results, Stalin gave the front commander the Golden Star of a Hero...

The Finns lost about 70 thousand people, of which about 23 thousand were killed.

Now briefly about the situation around the Soviet-Finnish war. During the war, England and France provided assistance to Finland with weapons and materials, and also repeatedly offered to its neighbors - Norway and Sweden - to allow Anglo-French troops to pass through their territory to help Finland. However, Norway and Sweden firmly took a position of neutrality, fearing being drawn into a global conflict. Then England and France promised to send an expeditionary force of 150 thousand people to Finland by sea. Some people from the Finnish leadership proposed continuing the war with the USSR and waiting for the arrival of the expeditionary force in Finland. But the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, soberly assessing the situation, decided to end the war, which led his country to relatively large casualties and weakened the economy. Finland was forced to conclude the Moscow Peace Treaty on March 12, 1940.

Relations between the USSR and England and France deteriorated sharply because of these countries' help to Finland and not only because of this. During the Soviet-Finnish War, England and France planned to bomb the oil fields of Soviet Transcaucasia. Several squadrons of the British and French Air Forces from airfields in Syria and Iraq were to bomb oil fields in Baku and Grozny, as well as oil piers in Batumi. They only managed to take aerial photographs of targets in Baku, after which they headed to the Batumi area to photograph oil piers, but were met by fire from Soviet anti-aircraft gunners. This happened at the end of March - beginning of April 1940. In the context of the expected invasion of France by German troops, plans for the bombing of the Soviet Union by Anglo-French aircraft were revised and ultimately were not implemented.

One of the unpleasant results of the Soviet-Finnish war was the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations, which lowered the authority of the Soviet country in the eyes of the world community.