Army of the Mongol Tatars. Tactics and strategy of the Mongol army during the reign of Genghis Khan

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I. Introduction………………………………………………………………..….... 3 pages.

II. Mongol-Tatar army: …………………………………………..…..4-8 pp.

1. Discipline

2. Composition of the army

3. Armament

4. Battle tactics

III. Russian army: ………………..……………………………………...8-12 pp.

1. Discipline

2. Composition of the army

3. Armament

4. Battle tactics

IV. Conclusion……………………………………………………………...13 -14 pp.

V. Literature…………………………………………………………….………………….….15 pp.

Appendix ………………………………………………………………………………..16-19 pages.

Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………….….20-23 pp.

Introduction

It is still interesting why the Mongol tribes, who did not have cities and led a nomadic lifestyle, were able to capture such a huge and powerful state as Rus' in the 13th century?

And this interest is also enhanced by the fact that the Russian army defeated the crusaders from Europe in the middle of the 13th century.

Therefore, the purpose of the work is to compare the Mongol and Russian troops in the 12th - 13th centuries.

To achieve this goal, you need to solve the following tasks:

1. study the literature on the research topic;

2. describe the Mongol-Tatar and Russian troops;

3. create a comparison table based on characteristics

Mongol-Tatar and Russian troops.

Hypothesis:

If we assume that the Russian army lost to the Mongol-Tatar army

in anything, then the answer to the question becomes obvious: “Why did the Mongol tribes defeat the Russians?”

Object of study:

Armies of the Mongols and Russians.

Subject of study:

The state of the armies of the Mongols and Russians.

Research: analysis, comparison, generalization.

They are determined by the goals and objectives of the work.

The practical significance of the work lies in the fact that the conclusions drawn from the generalization compiled comparison table, can be used in history lessons.

The structure of the work consists of an introduction, two chapters, a conclusion, and a list of references.

Mongol-Tatar army

“An unheard-of army has come, the godless Moabites, and their name is Tatars, but no one knows who they are and where they came from, and what their language is, and what tribe they are, and what their faith is...” 1

1. Discipline

The Mongol conquests that amazed the world were based on the principles of iron discipline and military order introduced by Genghis Khan. The Mongol tribes were welded by their leader into a horde, a single “people-army”. The entire social organization of the steppe inhabitants was built on a set of laws. For the flight of one warrior out of a dozen from the battlefield, the entire ten were executed, for the flight of a dozen a hundred were executed, and since dozens consisted, as a rule, of close relatives, it is clear that a moment of cowardice could result in the death of a father or brother and happened extremely rarely. The slightest failure to comply with the orders of military leaders was also punishable by death. The laws established by Genghis Khan also affected civil life. 2

2. Composition of the army

The Mongol army consisted mainly of cavalry and some infantry. Mongols are riders who grew up riding horses from an early age. Wonderfully disciplined and persistent warriors in battle. The endurance of the Mongol and his horse is amazing. During the campaign, their troops could move for months without food supplies. For the horse - pasture; he doesn’t know oats or stables. Vanguard with a force of two or three hundred, preceding the army at a distance of two marches, and the same side detachments performed the tasks of not only guarding the enemy’s march and reconnaissance, but also economic reconnaissance - they let them know where the best food and watering places were. In addition, special detachments were deployed whose task was to protect feeding areas from nomads not taking part in the war.

Each mounted warrior led from one to four clockwork horses, so he could change horses during a campaign, which significantly increased the length of the transitions and reduced the need for halts and days. The speed of movement of the Mongol troops was amazing.

Setting out on a campaign found the Mongol army in a state of impeccable readiness: nothing was missed, every little thing was in order and in its place; the metal parts of weapons and harness are thoroughly cleaned, the storage containers are filled, and an emergency supply of food is included. All this was subject to strict inspection by superiors; omissions were severely punished. 3

The leading role in the army was occupied by the guard (keshik) of Genghis Khan, consisting of ten thousand soldiers. They were called “bagatur” - heroes. They were the main striking force of the Mongol army, so particularly distinguished warriors were recruited into the guard. In special cases, an ordinary guardsman had the right to command any detachment of other troops. On the battlefield, the guard was in the center, near Genghis Khan. The rest of the army was divided into tens of thousands (“darkness” or “tumens”), thousands, hundreds and tens of fighters. Each unit was headed by an experienced and skilled military leader. The army of Genghis Khan professed the principle of appointing military leaders in accordance with personal merit. 4

____________________

1 “Chronicle of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russian soil”

2 Internet resources: http://www. /war/book1/kto

3 Internet resources: Erenzhen Khara-Davan “Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy”

4 Internet resources: Denisov ordered Tatar-Mongol invasion? M.: Flinta, 2008

The Mongolian army included a Chinese division servicing heavy combat vehicles, including flamethrowers. The latter threw various flammable substances into the besieged cities: burning oil, the so-called “Greek fire” and others.

During sieges, the Mongols also resorted to the art of mines in its primitive form. They knew how to produce floods, made tunnels, underground passages and the like.

The Mongols overcame water obstacles with great skill; property was piled on reed rafts tied to the tails of horses; people used wineskins for crossing. This ability to adapt gave Mongol warriors a reputation as some kind of supernatural, diabolical creatures. 1

3. Armament

“The armament of the Mongols is excellent: bows and arrows, shields and swords; they are the best archers of all nations,” Marco Polo wrote in his “Book.” 2

The weapon of an ordinary warrior consisted of a short compound bow made of flexible wood plates attached to a central whip for shooting from a horse, and a second bow of the same design, only longer than the first, for shooting while standing. The firing range from such a bow reached one hundred and eighty meters.3

____________________

1 Internet resources: Erenzhen Khara-Davan “Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy”

2 Marco Polo. “A book about the diversity of the world”

3 Internet resources: Did Denisov order the Tatar-Mongol invasion? M.: Flinta, 2008

Arrows were mainly divided into light ones for long-range shooting and heavy ones with a wide tip for close combat. Some were intended for piercing armor, others - for hitting enemy horses... In addition to these arrows, there were also signal arrows with holes in the tip, which emitted a loud whistle in flight. Such arrows were also used to indicate the direction of fire. Each warrior had two quivers of thirty arrows. 1

The warriors were also armed with swords and light sabers. The latter are strongly curved, sharply sharpened on one side. The crosshairs on Horde sabers have upward curved and flattened ends. Under the crosshairs, a clip with a tongue covering part of the blade was often welded - characteristic feature the work of Horde gunsmiths.

The warrior's head was protected by a conical steel helmet with leather pads covering the neck. The warrior’s body was protected by a leather camisole, and in later times chain mail was worn over the camisole or metal strips were attached. Riders with swords and sabers had a shield made of leather or willow, and horsemen with bows did without a shield. 2

The infantry was armed various forms polearms: maces, six-fingers, coins, pecks and flails. The warriors were protected by plate armor and helmets. 3

____________________

1 Historical magazine “Rodina”. - M.: 1997. – page 75 of 129.

2 Internet resources: Did Denisov order the Tatar-Mongol invasion? M.: Flinta, 2008

3 Internet resources: http://ru. wikipedia. org/wiki/Army_of_the_Mongol_Empire

“They don’t know how to fight with knives and don’t carry them naked. Shields are not used, and very few use spears. And when they use them, they strike from the side. And at the end of the spear they tie a cord and hold it in their hand. And yet, some have hooks on the tip of their spears...” - reports the Medieval author Vincent of Beauvais.

The Mongols wore Chinese silk underwear, which was not pierced by the arrow, but was pulled into the wound along with the tip, delaying its penetration. The Mongol army had surgeons from China.

4. Battle tactics

The war was usually conducted by the Mongols according to the following system:

1. A kurultai was convened, at which the issue of the upcoming war and its plan was discussed. There they decided everything that was necessary to form an army, and also determined the place and time for the collection of troops.

2. Spies were sent to the enemy country and “tongues” were obtained.

The time of Chinggis Khan's accession to the imperial throne was when he finally established the foundations of the organization of his army. This organization was the result of the extensive combat experience of the previous decades, which passed, as we have seen, in almost continuous wars, during which the military genius and organizational abilities of the great Mongol conqueror managed to unfold in full splendor. Although the military art of the Mongols continued to develop during the subsequent reign of Genghis Khan, as well as under his successors, especially in the field of applying technology borrowed from cultural enemies to military affairs, and their development could, of course, influence the details of the military organization, still in its main features, the structure of the Mongolian armed forces and the methods of combat developed by Genghis Khan and his associates retained their character traits, which we will focus on, extending our review to this entire period.

First of all, the Mongolian Autocrat was concerned with the structure of his guard. On this subject we borrow the following data from B.Ya. Vladimirtsov:

“Genghis Khan wanted to have not only reliable personal security, protection of his nomadic headquarters and a selected corps of troops, but also an institution that, under his personal leadership and constant supervision, would be a school from which his faithful companions, personally known to him, could graduate, whom he could appoint to different positions and to whom he could give different instructions in accordance with the individual characteristics of each."

“All guards (keshikten) must be of aristocratic origin. Now, when Heaven commanded me to rule all nations, for my security guards, keshik, archers and others,” Genghis Khan commanded, “let them recruit ten thousand people from those thousands and hundreds. These people who will be with me must be recruited from the children of officials and free people, and select dexterous, stately and strong... whoever among the thousanders, centurions, and tens, and free people resists, he, as a guilty person, is subject to punishment." This aristocratic guard enjoys various privileges and special honor. “The bodyguard of my security guard (keshikten), - Chinggis commands, - is higher than the external (i.e., linear, army) thousand officers; their household are higher than the external centurions and tens. If the external thousand officer, considering himself equal to the keshikten of the security guard, argues and fights with him, he will be punished." All guards are under the personal supervision of the Mongol emperor, he himself sorts out all their affairs. “Those in charge of the security guards, without receiving verbal permission from me, should not arbitrarily punish their subordinates. In the event of a crime, one of them must certainly report to me, and then whoever should be cut off will be chopped off; whoever should be beaten will be beat" .

The guard also included a particularly selected unit - the “thousand brave” (Bagadurov). In battles, this detachment was used at decisive moments, and in quiet times it formed the personal security guard of the khan.

By recruiting the steppe aristocracy to serve in the guard and in command posts in the army, Genghis Khan gave it a strong organization, replacing the previous chaotic situation when its representatives were undisciplined leaders of disorganized and often random militias. From now on, military service and the duties of commanders were regulated on the basis of strict military legislation. The strictest discipline was established in the troops.

The entire Mongol army, according to an old custom dating back centuries, was organized according to the decimal system, i.e. divided into thousands, hundreds and tens; experienced and personally known to the supreme leader were placed at the head of large units.

We have not received information about what kind of power the Mongol leaders had. General M.I. Ivanin believes that this power was limited. For example, orkhons (highest military commanders) could be promoted to ranks no higher than a thousand-man in the troops of their tribe. The Mongol army had an institution similar to our general staff; Its ranks were called "yurtaji", and the main commander corresponded to the modern quartermaster general. Their main duty was reconnaissance of the enemy in peacetime and war time. In addition, the yurtaji had to: distribute summer and winter migrations, perform the duties of column leaders during marching movements of troops, assign camp sites, select places for the yurts of the khan, senior commanders and troops. In settled lands, they had to locate camps away from sown fields so as not to poison the grain.

To maintain order in the rear of the army, there was a special guard with functions similar to those performed by the current field gendarmes.

The troops had special ranks for economic affairs - "cherbi".

Each tribe was assigned a space in which it had to roam. In each such tribe, the tents were united into tens, hundreds, and in numerous tribes even thousands under the control of special military-territorial commanders. In the case of recruiting troops, orders were made one at a time, two at a time, etc. from ten. The latter was obliged to supply the recruited soldiers with the required food and needs for the campaign. During mobilization, military-territorial commanders became combat commanders, leaving deputies in place.

Clans and tribes, depending on their numbers, fielded tens, hundreds and thousands of cavalry. Small clans and tribes that could not staff an entire combat unit were united several at a time into one clan or one tribal group; otherwise, they split into smaller groups. The next military units in order - tens of thousands, darkness or tumens (tyumens) - could only in rare cases be composed of people of the same tribe; They were usually made up of different tribal groups, each fielding several thousand, so that the total was darkness. Sometimes the method of mixing tribes in combat units was used deliberately, with the aim of paralyzing tribal separatism. Since Genghis Khan waged almost constant war, and a successful war that brought glory and significant booty to his troops, then, naturally, between the tribes that served in the same hundreds or thousands, who were exposed to a common danger, divided general works and glory, a brotherhood in arms was born, which little by little weakened tribal antagonisms. Thanks to this policy, many large tribes that were under Genghis Khan disappeared into the general mass, losing even their names.

Thus, under his reign, the Mongol tribes that were often at odds with each other before Genghis Khan, in an environment of continuous military successes over external enemies, merged into one nation, imbued with national self-awareness and people's pride.

At the head of the military units were placed commanders from the clan and tribe that staffed the given unit, but they were chosen from among the battle-tested people who fit the second of the two types into which Genghis Khan divided all of humanity.

With this order of recruitment of the Mongol army, the clan system was preserved intact, and usually the tribal composition of the population, which created in the units of the troops, in addition to the external, mechanical connection, a strong internal, organic connection: the military leaders were from among their own aristocracy, whose representatives people were accustomed to seeing among yourself at the head and in civil life; warriors of the same unit were not a random gathering of people who were strangers to each other, but a group of individuals related to each other by kinship, acquaintance, common language, etc.

Any leader of a ten or other unit who turned out to be unsuitable for his position was obliged to be immediately eliminated by the senior superior over him; regarding senior command personnel, this was usually done by Genghis Khan himself, who in this case was helped by his deep knowledge of people and a clear understanding of the requirements that a high military commander must satisfy.

One is positively amazed how in that infantile, from our point of view, era, when in a warrior, regardless of his rank, almost exclusively individual fighting qualities were valued: courage, prowess, bravery, endurance, physical strength - qualities that, in addition to birthrights, are usually the suitability of one or another warrior for the role of leader was fully determined (for example, among European feudal chivalry); how in that era the thought underlying the following “saying” of Genghis Khan could have been expressed:

“There is no hero like Yesuge-bai, there is no person skilled in affairs like him. However, since he does not know the fatigue and hardship of the campaign, does not feel either thirst or hunger, he and other people from the nukers and warriors who will be with him, he considers everyone similar to himself in enduring difficulties, but they do not represent the strength and firmness of suffering. For this reason, it is not appropriate for him to command an army. It is appropriate to command someone who himself feels thirst and hunger, and commensurates the position of others with this situation, and goes on the road with calculation, and will not allow the army to experience hunger and thirst and the four-legged (horses) to grow thin. This meaning is indicated by: the path and work for the weakest of you."

Not bound by historical traditions, guided only by his mind, common sense and experience, Genghis Khan himself believed in the historical tradition. There is no doubt that in creating an armed force he generally adhered to ancient customs, but the organization of that permanent cavalry army, which victoriously passed along and across almost the entire continent of the Old World, was the work of his hands, his creative energy. The military articles of the Big Yasa were the foundation on which the device was based; the indisputable and inexorable authority of its supreme leader gave this foundation unshakable strength and stability. For this reason, none of the famous cavalry of antiquity or the Middle Ages (Parthian, Persian, knightly) can compare with the cavalry of Genghis Khan either in its fighting qualities or in its achievements. The period of the Middle Ages, which preceded the invention of gunpowder, can generally be called the century of the heyday of cavalry and its dominance on the battlefields. In Europe, such a “queen of the battlefield” at that time was the heavy knightly cavalry, but with the arrival of the Mongols, it was forced on the fields of Liegnitz in 1241 to cede its primacy to the cavalry of this Asian nomadic people, which should rightly be recognized for its era as the first in world. She was the powerful instrument with which the Mongol conqueror dictated his human will to the world.

Here are a few sayings from Bilik, which contain all the instructions given by Genghis Khan to military commanders:

"Art. 3. The beks (chiefs) of darkness, thousands and hundreds, who come to listen to our thoughts at the beginning and end of the year and return back, can command an army; The state of those who sit in their yurt and do not hear thoughts is like a stone falling into deep water, or like an arrow fired into a reed place: they disappear. It is not appropriate for such people to command.

(This article shows, firstly, that the army of Genghis Khan carried out constant “military-scientific” training of command personnel, and secondly, that he attached great importance to this training.)

Art. 4. Everyone who can manage his house faithfully can also manage his possessions; Anyone who can arrange ten people according to the condition, decently give him a thousand and darkness, and he can arrange it well.

(By opening prospects for promotion to junior commanders, the article was supposed to serve as an encouragement to show diligence in service.)

Art. 6. Any bek who cannot arrange his ten, we make him guilty with his wife and children and choose someone from his own ten as bek. We do the same with the centurion, thousander and temnik bek.

Art. 9. Any horse that runs well in a fat body, if it also runs in a half-body and lean, can be called good.

Art. 10. The senior beks who will be in command, and all warriors must, just as when engaged in hunting, distinguish their names, signify their name and glory when engaged in war; We must always earnestly pray to God and with a humble heart ask for the decoration of our name on eight sides, so that the ancient Lord, staying in one place, would hold the four sides with strength.

(Ambition and religion are encouraged as inspiration for military exploits).

Art. 11. Among the people one should be like a calf, small and silent, and during war - like a hungry falcon that comes to hunt: one should get down to business with a cry.

(This article emphasizes the intensity of energy that is used for the war, and the bold offensive spirit with which, in the opinion of the legislator, its conduct should be imbued.)

Art. 15. In times of troubles one must act as Dargai-Ukha did. He was traveling in a time of troubles from the Khatakin tribe, with him were two nukers (companions, retinue). From a distance we saw two horsemen. The nukers said: “We are three people, and there are two of them; let’s hit them.” He said: “As we saw them, they also saw us: we should not attack.” Having struck the horse with a whip, he galloped away. Later it turned out to be accurate and true that one of those two was Timuk-Ukha from the Tatar tribe; He placed about five hundred of his men in ambush, and showed himself, so that when those three horsemen attacked him, he would take flight, lure them there and, with the help of his nukers, capture them. Since he (Dargai) understood that meaning, he fled and united with twenty other nukers whom he had in the vicinity, and saw everything. What we are looking for is that prudence is necessary in business.

(In waging war, a commander and a warrior in general must combine courage and determination with caution.)

Art. 18. Just as our merchants, who bring brocade clothes and good things in the hope of profit, become experienced in those goods and materials, the army beks should also teach boys how to shoot arrows and ride horses, train them in these matters and do them so as bold and courageous as experienced merchants in the arts they master.

(Emphasising the importance of experience in military affairs, the legislator specifies that training should begin at a young age. From this article it is also clear that in peacetime, combatant commanders had the responsibility of “pre-conscription training” for young people.)

Art. 20. Beck, greedy for wine and vodka, cannot keep the affairs of thousands, hundreds and tens in order, cannot complete them. A simple warrior who is greedy for drinking wine, this person is exposed to a very big collision, i.e. great misfortune befalls him...

(Drinking reduces the energy level of a superior, and can lead a soldier to anti-disciplinary behavior.)

Art. 24. Numbers (i.e. those in charge of numbers 10, 100, 1000, etc. - command staff): thousanders and centurions, each must keep his army in order and in readiness, so that at any time, when a decree comes and order, they mounted their horses without waiting, even at night.

(Requirement for troops under the responsibility of commanders to be in constant “mobilization” or combat readiness.)"

In addition to these articles by Bilik, the following articles from Yasa itself can serve:

"Art. 6. The rules for subdividing troops into tens, hundreds, thousands and darkness must be preserved. This order allows you to assemble an army in a short time and form command units.

(The meaning of this article is probably that with the dissolution of the army to their homes, parts of the troops are not disbanded, but continue to exist in a “potential” state until a new war.)

Art. 7. By the time the campaign begins, each warrior receives a weapon from the hands of the commander to whom he is subordinate. He is obliged to keep it in good repair and present it to his superior for inspection before the battle.

(Probably, we are talking here about heavy and safety weapons, since the rest of the weapons the Mongol warrior, like our Cossack, had his own. In peacetime, heavy weapons were stored in organized government arsenals.)

Art. 22. He placed emirs (beks) over the troops and established thousands of emirs, bending emirs and ten emirs.

Art. 24. He forbade the emirs (military leaders) to contact anyone other than the sovereign, and if anyone turned to anyone other than the sovereign, he would put him to death; whoever changes his fast without permission is put to death."

According to Mirkhovend:

"Art. 27. He ordered soldiers to be punished for negligence, hunters who missed animals in a raid to be punished with canes, and sometimes the death penalty.

Art. 18. All governors are obliged to personally inspect the army and weapons before setting out on a campaign, present to them everything with which the warrior makes campaigns, and inspect everything down to the needle and thread. If a warrior does not have any necessary thing, the boss must punish him. A warrior must make weapons (light!) and uniforms at his own expense.

(As you can see, this arrangement has many similarities with the order of service of the Cossacks, who probably borrowed their order from the Golden Horde.)"

The following articles by Yasa on Lam are also interesting:

"Art. 8. It is forbidden, on pain of death, to begin plundering the enemy until permission from the high command follows, but after such permission, the soldier should be placed in the same conditions and he should be allowed to take as much as he can carry, subject to payment to the collector of the share due to the emperor.

Art. 15. Every man, with rare exceptions, is obliged to serve in the army.

Art. 17. Anyone who does not personally participate in the war is obliged to work for the benefit of the state for some time without remuneration.

(This article establishes “labor service” for all who do not perform personal military service in time of war, i.e. it proclaims a principle that received practical and legal implementation in Europe only during the Great War.)

Art. 22. Officials and commanders who violate their duty of service or fail to appear at the request of the khan are subject to death."

In addition to the above articles by Bilik and Yasa, there were probably many others that have not reached us, which established various duties of military personnel. But the above are enough to agree with the opinion of Plano Carpini, who attributes to Chingisov’s military legislation the strictest discipline of the Mongol army, which was expressed, among other things, in the fact that there were no cases of Mongol soldiers leaving the battlefield while the standard (badge) of the commander was raised. Genghis Khan owed success in many of his affairs to the iron discipline that forced people to defend the cause entrusted to them, sometimes to the last man. “The order and discipline I introduced,” he said, “I owe to the fact that my power, like the young moon, is growing from day to day and that I have earned the blessing of Heaven, the respect and obedience of the earth.”

Thus, in the Mongol army of the 13th century we see the implementation of the principles of an armed people and the territorial organization of troops, which in Europe received universal recognition no earlier than the 19th century. And it must be said that, perhaps, never have these two principles been so successfully applied to the actual situation as in the nomadic Power of Genghis Khan, which lived a patriarchal, tribal way of life. Subsequently, with the conquest of peoples of a different culture, these principles could not be universally applied, so in the last years of the reign of Genghis Khan, and equally and especially under his successors, we see in the Mongol army auxiliary contingents organized on other principles, for example, by forced collection or delivery by local authority a certain number physically fit recruits from conquered peoples - of course, without observing the territorial or tribal principle. But the core of the army, composed of nomads, continued to preserve the basic principles of its structure, thanks to this being an excellent weapon of war in the hands of Genghis Khan himself and that galaxy of talented commanders whom he managed to create during his lifetime and pass on to his successors on the Mongol throne.

Given the parallelism existing thanks to the territorial system in the organization of the army and the people, the latter, according to the old Mongol custom, was divided into three parts corresponding to the largest organizational units of the army, namely: 1 - the center (kel), at the head of which was placed under Genghis Khan Kaya; 2 - left wing, or left hand (eastern side, zyungar) under the command of Mukhali; 3 - right wing, or right hand(western side, barun gar), the command of which was entrusted to Boorch. Appointing him to this responsible position, Genghis Khan said: “I spare you punishment for nine crimes, be a temnik and rule this western country up to the Golden Mountains. Be a temnik of the left hand,” he said at the same time to Mukhali, “and rule the eastern side up to the mountains.” Karauny ". Here the word "temnik" should not be understood in the literal sense as equivalent to the expression "chief of darkness", i.e. the commander of a ten-thousandth corps of troops, since there could be several such corps in each wing; rather, temnik here means something like rank, just as in modern armies a division general can command not only a division, but also a corps and even an army.

In peacetime, these temniks were, as it were, military governors-general over the entire civilian population of the territories of the left, right wing and center, being endowed with administrative functions, just like centurions and thousanders. During the war, they acted at the head of their units, leaving deputies in place until the end of the war.

In the Mongol army, darkness was apparently the highest standing unit. Although the chronicles also mention the unit “tug”, corresponding to one hundred thousand and can be equated to a private army in modern terminology, in practice the private armies of the Mongols were made up of a different number of tumens, and, therefore, were not units of a permanent nature. The senior leaders, who were entrusted with command of such large units during the war, according to Lam, were called “Orkhons”, in our opinion - voivodes. There were eleven of them under Genghis Khan.

If we now draw a parallel between the organizations of the Mongolian and modern armies, then the Mongolian hundreds can be approximately equated to our squadrons (Cossack hundreds), thousands - to ten squadron regiments (such regiments existed in Russia back in the reign of Nicholas I), darkness - to cavalry corps, and such units as the center and wings will correspond to cavalry armies (for example, cavalry masses in the North American Civil War, Budyonny's cavalry army of 1920, etc.). This parallel lacks the echelon (division) of our modern organization. B.Ya. Vladimirtsov applies this name to tribal units numbering two, three or five thousand, into which darkness made up of different tribes could be subdivided, but if such a division existed, it probably had only administrative-territorial significance, since, in military terms, the Mongol army apparently strictly adhered to the decimal system.

However, having established such a purely external comparison between the Mongol army and the cavalry masses, organized, if not according to the completely modern, then according to the norms of the not very distant past, it should immediately be noted that from some, and, moreover, far from complete organizational similarities between these two objects of comparison It does not at all follow that the methods of their combat operations must coincide. The cavalry, for example, from the time of Napoleon, in its formations for battle, could not help but take into account the already very effective influence of fire in battle at that time, especially artillery, in comparison with which the effect of throwing weapons of the era of Genghis Khan was negligible. We must also not lose sight of the fact that the European cavalry of the said era constituted only part of the armed force of each state, and, moreover, a secondary part, while the entire combat strength of the Mongol army lay entirely in its cavalry, which performed the duties of all branches of the military. With such a difference in conditions, we see in the Mongolian order compact masses in deep formations, which were supposed to increase the force of the blow (shock) to the possible limits with the aim, for example, of breaking through the enemy’s center, knocking down one of his wings, etc.

This duty of “ramming” fell on the heavy Mongol cavalry, which was probably the reason why some writers compared the Mongol battle formation with the Macedonian phalanx of Alexander. According to General M.I. Ivanin, there is no basis for drawing such a parallel; and in fact, the similarity between these two battle formations - although both are based on deep formations of troops - can only be noticed during the last act of the battle, when a blow is actually made to the enemy battle position. The fact is that the phalanx, consisting of heavily armed infantry with sarissas (pikes) up to three fathoms long, was extremely heavy, clumsy and, therefore, incapable of maneuvering on the battlefield. Under this condition, it had to be aimed in advance at a selected point on the enemy front. Covering the flanks of the enemy, who, moreover, always outnumbered Alexander’s army many times over, was out of the question; on the contrary, securing his own flanks in battle was the constant concern of the Macedonian commander. This task lay mainly with the light infantry, which, in addition, was obliged to cover the phalanx from the front from the enemy's throwing weapons and war chariots. Thus, during the combat offensive of the phalanx, light infantry performed tasks of a predominantly passive nature.

In contrast, the masses of heavy cavalry of the Mongols had a high degree of maneuverability, and their light cavalry played a very active and not at all secondary role in battle. The former not only carried out a crushing blow to one or another section of the enemy front, but could also push him to the flank, and also be thrown to his rear. Thanks to this ability to maneuver, there was no need to identify the point for the main attack in advance: it could be determined during the course of the battle, depending on the prevailing situation. The light cavalry not only reconnaissance and cover, but mainly performs the task of actively preparing the impending decisive strike. This is the famous "Mongolian lava". It acted in the manner of our Cossack lava, which is, in all likelihood, a pale copy of it, but not in one wave, like the Cossacks, but in several parallel (up to five) open waves, and the riders of the first rank who had used up their supply of arrows, as well as those who had dropped out In formation, warriors were replaced from the rear ranks. With extraordinary mobility, maneuvering in front of the enemy’s front, they jumped into his flanks, and, when the opportunity presented itself, into his rear, these agile horsemen, armed with throwing weapons, sitting on their horses, trained like dogs, now breaking apart, now gathering into more or less dense groups , sent clouds of well-aimed arrows and darts into the enemy’s ranks, threatened him with an attack in one place or another, and themselves, usually not accepting his close attack, turned into feigned flight, luring him and leading him into ambushes.

With such actions they frustrated and exhausted the enemy physically and mentally to such an extent that he sometimes surrendered the rear even before the Mongol heavy cavalry entered the picture. If the enemy turned out to be persistent, then the actions of the light cavalry, in any case, made it possible to determine his location. weak spots or the most advantageous areas for delivering the main attack, where heavy cavalry masses, built, like the cavalry of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, in several lines, were quickly and secretly, with skillful use of the terrain, brought up in deep closed formations. Thanks to their high maneuverability, these masses had an advantage even over the valiant knightly cavalry of Europe, famous for its powerful striking force and the art of single combat, but extremely clumsy.

Thus, to summarize, we can say that the light Mongol cavalry had the responsibilities of guarding and reconnaissance during the campaign and battle, starting the battle, camouflaging the intended combat maneuver and preparing the main snowman, as well as pursuing the defeated enemy; the heavy cavalry was a “maneuverable reserve” with which a decisive blow was dealt to the enemy.

As a feature of Mongolian tactics, it can also be noted that the cavalry on the battlefield usually maneuvered “silently,” i.e. not by command, but by conventional signs, given by the badge (flag) of the boss. In night battles they were replaced by colored lanterns (Drums were used to give signals only when camped.) Mongol warriors rushed to the attack with a wild, piercing cry.

These were the general outline The tactical techniques of the Mongol army, as far as one can judge from the information that has reached us, is far from complete. Genghis Khan left instructions to his descendants on how to wage war, besiege and take cities, deal with conquered peoples, etc. Unfortunately, these rules, which were extremely respected by his descendants, have not reached us and we can only guess about them from the surviving descriptions of his campaigns and according to the instructions and rules that have come down to us of another great conqueror - Tamerlane, who, being a descendant of Genghis Khan on the female line and a Mongol from the Berulas tribe (born in Kosh), lived in an era separated from the death of Genghis Khan by just for a little over a hundred years (1336-1405), had an army of elements close to those that made up the army of Genghis Khan and was obviously strongly influenced by the latter’s instructions for waging war. General M.I. Ivanin even believes that Tamerlane’s decrees and rules were nothing more than a renewal of Genghis Khan’s decrees and rules, only with some changes and improvements.

In view of the importance of the military organization and military art of Tamerlane, for a better understanding of the state of military affairs under Genghis Khan, in the Appendix to this chapter we briefly present some data from the relevant decrees and instructions of the former that have reached us. In accordance with the tactical techniques of the Mongol army, the armament of its two main “arms” was determined - light and heavy cavalry, otherwise called archers and swordsmen. As the name itself shows, the main weapon of the first was the bow and arrow; They themselves and their horses had no or only the lightest safety weapons. Most archers had two bows and two quivers, of the latter one was expendable and the other was spare. The spare quiver was designed to protect the arrows from moisture. The arrows were extremely sharp. The Mongols were masters at making and sharpening them. Accustomed to archery from the age of three, the Mongol was an excellent marksman. Even many Mongolian women learned archery, not to mention that each one knew how to ride a horse, just like the men. Some of the archers were armed with darts. Probably, all light cavalry riders were also assigned sabers as hand-to-hand combat weapons, perhaps of a lighter type than the swordsmen's sabers.

In the heavy cavalry, men wore chain mail or leather armor; their headdress consisted of a light leather helmet with a strong backplate to protect the neck from saber strikes. In Batu's army they already wore iron helmets. The horses of the heavy cavalry had protective weapons made of thick patent leather. The main offensive weapons of the swordsmen were curved sabers, which they wielded perfectly, and pikes; in addition, each had a battle ax or an iron club, which was hung from the belt or from the saddle. IN hand-to-hand combat, as well as during skirmishes in small parties, the Mongols tried to throw or drag enemies off their horses; For this purpose, hooks attached to lances and darts were used, as well as lassos made of horsehair, which were thrown at the enemy from some distance, just as nomads still catch semi-wild horses from their herds. Captured by the noose of the lasso, the enemy rider was pulled off his horse and dragged along the ground; the same technique was used against a foot enemy.

Some of the horsemen, among the items of equipment they were required to wear, had lines or straps for harnessing horses to heavy throwing devices captured from the enemy, such as catapults, etc.

Of the items of equipment, each warrior was required to have with him: a file for sharpening arrows, an awl, needles, threads, a clay vessel for cooking food (although, if necessary, meat was eaten raw) and a leather bag ("bortoho") with a capacity of about two liters for a supply of kumys, milk or water. Two small saddle bags (“daling”) contained an emergency supply of food products and a spare change of linen. The emergency supply consisted of Mongolian canned food - dried meat and dried milk, which are still used to this day.

If these supplies were not enough, then the Mongol warrior cut the vein of his horse and drank a stream of blood, then bandaged the wound with sinew thread. Half a kilogram of blood is enough to saturate, and for a horse, especially a running one, this loss is not noticeable and is replenished in the body in a short time. Bread - dough wrapped in the shape of pancakes - was baked under the arm at camel, which replaced the convoy in the Mongol troops. It must be borne in mind that the normal temperature of a camel under its arm is very high in winter; then there were factory horses, as well as horses that had fallen into disrepair, which could be killed for meat; horse meat is considered a delicacy.

A Mongol, if necessary, can sleep while remaining astride a horse, which at this time can both march and graze. The Mongols served as clothing in winter fur hat with headphones, on hikes - a helmet or an iron helmet and a “dokha” (this name also passed into the Russian language) - a fur coat made of doubled fur, with the wool facing out, which is where the legend came from that the Mongols of the era of the conquest of Europe “dressed in animal clothes” skins." The dokha was sewn to such a length as to cover the legs below the knee, and was belted with a belt decorated with silver. On his feet are boots with felt stockings. The Russians turned these felt stockings into felt boots, but the Mongolian method is more convenient, since it is also suitable in damp conditions, while felt boots alone get wet. The Mongols dressed in this way easily endured the winter cold, and if they sometimes interrupted their operations during the winter, it was not because of the cold, but because of the lack of pasture. But in countries with high summer temperatures (for example, in Southern China), they happened to interrupt military operations due to the heat.

Equipped as described above, the Mongol army was the toughest (and at the same time the most disciplined) in the world and as such could truly conquer the world. We see a Mongol cavalryman on a campaign, carrying with him everything he needs; he could rightfully say: omnia mea mecum porto (I carry everything that is mine with me).

Marco Polo, who lived for many years in Mongolia and China under Kublai Khan, gives the following assessment of the Mongol army: “The armament of the Mongols is excellent: bows and arrows, shields and swords; they are the best archers of all nations.” Riders who grew up riding horses from an early age. They are amazingly disciplined and persistent warriors in battle, and in contrast to the discipline created by fear, which in some eras dominated European standing armies, for them it is based on a religious understanding of the subordination of power and on tribal life. The endurance of the Mongol and his horse is amazing. During the campaign, their troops could move for months without transporting food supplies and fodder. For the horse - pasture; he doesn’t know oats or stables. An advance detachment of two to three hundred strength, preceding the army at a distance of two marches, and the same side detachments performed the tasks of not only guarding the enemy’s march and reconnaissance, but also economic reconnaissance - they let them know where the best food and watering places were.

Nomadic pastoralists are generally distinguished by their deep knowledge of nature: where and at what time the herbs reach greater richness and greater nutritional value, where the best water pools are, at which stages it is necessary to stock up on provisions and for how long, etc.

The collection of this practical information was the responsibility of special intelligence, and without it it was considered unthinkable to begin an operation. In addition, special detachments were deployed whose task was to protect feeding areas from nomads not taking part in the war.

The troops, unless strategic considerations prevented this, lingered in places where there was plenty of food and water, and forced a forced march through areas where these conditions were not available. Each mounted warrior led from one to four clockwork horses, so he could change horses during a campaign, which significantly increased the length of the transitions and reduced the need for halts and days. Under this condition, marching movements lasting 10-13 days without days off were considered normal, and the speed of movement of the Mongol troops was amazing. During the Hungarian campaign of 1241, Subutai once walked 435 miles with his army in less than three days.

The role of artillery in the Mongol army was played by the then extremely imperfect throwing weapons. Before the Chinese campaign (1211-1215), the number of such vehicles in the army was insignificant and they were of the most primitive design, which, by the way, put it in a rather helpless position in relation to the fortified cities encountered during the offensive. The experience of the mentioned campaign brought major improvements to this matter, and in the Central Asian campaign we already see in the Mongolian army an auxiliary Jin division serving a variety of heavy combat vehicles, which were used mainly during sieges, including flamethrowers. The latter threw various flammable substances into the besieged cities, such as burning oil, the so-called “Greek fire”, etc. There are some hints that during the Central Asian campaign the Mongols used gunpowder. The latter, as is known, was invented in China much earlier than its appearance in Europe, but it was used by the Chinese mainly for pyrotechnic purposes. The Mongols could have borrowed gunpowder from the Chinese and also brought it to Europe, but if this was the case, then it apparently did not have to play a special role as a weapon of war, since in fact firearms neither the Chinese nor the Mongols had it. As a source of energy, gunpowder was used mainly in rockets, which were used during sieges. The cannon was undoubtedly an independent European invention. As for gunpowder itself, the assumption expressed by G. Lam that it might not have been “invented” in Europe, but brought there by the Mongols, does not seem incredible.”

During sieges, the Mongols used not only the artillery of that time, but also resorted to fortification and the art of mines in its primitive form. They knew how to produce floods, made tunnels, underground passages, etc.

The size of the Mongol army, of course, fluctuated different periods the reign of Genghis Khan and cannot be accurately assessed. Persian and Chinese writers, belonging to nations conquered by the Mongols, had an understandable tendency to greatly (two, three, four times) exaggerate the Mongol forces. The same remark applies to Russian chroniclers. The fantastic figures and characteristics of these sources are easily refuted by the simple consideration that the small population of even united Mongolia could in no case field more than two hundred thousand warriors. According to the calculations of a competent English researcher, quoted by G. Lam, the army of Genghis Khan set out on the Central Asian campaign (against Khorezmshah) in the following composition: guard - 1000, center - 101 thousand, right wing - 47 thousand, left wing - 52 thousand, auxiliary contingents - 29 thousand, total 230 thousand people.

This is the maximum size of the Mongol army achieved during the reign of Genghis Khan. By the time of his death, there were only about 130 thousand in the army. This number can be considered the maximum tension of the entire Mongol people, which under Genghis Khan numbered no more than one million souls, as determined by many of the researchers, and this cannot be considered implausible if now all the Mongols in Asia are about 5 million souls. Notes

The Secret Story.

This “thousand brave” was subsequently commanded by Tsagan-noyon from the Tanguts, brought by the khan as a fifteen-year-old orphan and raised by Khansha Borte as an adopted son. Under Ogedei Khan, he commanded all the troops in China and was the governor general there; The princes also obeyed him. Cm. Altan tobchi.

Lama,

By M.I. Ivanin.

The Mongols prepare kymyz from cow's milk by oxidizing aryan, from mare's milk - kumis, and lactic acid and lactic-alcohol fermentation occur in them; from them, by boiling-distillation through a curved tube, “arka” is obtained - an intoxicating drink containing about 15% milk alcohol. And now every Mongol, three or four times a week, in the summer, “smokes arka,” which he drinks with his neighbors. Selling it is considered a sin. This invention dates back to the time of Genghis Khan. After boiling for a long time, sour milk thickens; water is filtered from this curd and dried, cut into cubes. This powdered milk serves as food for the Mongols in winter to this day. The meat is cut into thin slices and dried in the shade; after drying, store. Meat and milk prepared in this way for future use never spoil.

Kalmyk troops had to eat this way during the conquest of the Caucasus in 1806.

However, if necessary, it was possible to conduct military operations in winter, since the Mongolian horse has the valuable property of finding food for itself in winter, raking snow with its hoof. Thus, the herds still graze among the Mongols all winter.

Also, “oh two horses,” the Kalmyks voluntarily went on a campaign in 1806 during the conquest of the Caucasus, as well as during the Patriotic War. Two regiments of them took part in the capture of Paris. This method allows the daily march of the cavalry to be increased to 150 versts. By making such marches, the Kalmyk khans in the 18th century, at the request of the Russian tsars, destroyed hundreds of thousands of Kuban Tatars, creating the historical “Victory Mound” on the bodies of their killed enemies. Ayuka Khan pacified the Nekrasovo-Bulavinsky rebellion in the same way, suddenly appearing near Novocherkassk with a 25,000-strong cavalry corps. In the southeast of Russia, the Kalmyks were thus the faithful guardians of Russian statehood, this legacy of Genghis Khan. In addition to the mentioned campaigns, the Kalmyk khans took voluntary part in campaigns on the shores of the Black, Azov and Caspian Seas, as well as in Khiva and Persia. There were up to 28 large trips alone.

By Lamu, With. 237, with English miles converted to versts.

By Lamu, With. 224-227.

By Lamu, With. 218-219. By guard is meant, obviously, only “a thousand brave men.” The rest of the guard is part of large units.

The invincible army of the Mongols

In the 13th century, the peoples and countries of the Eurasian continent experienced a stunning onslaught of the victorious Mongol army, sweeping away everything in its path. The armies of the Mongols' opponents were led by honored and experienced commanders; they fought on their own land, protecting their families and peoples from a cruel enemy. The Mongols fought far from their homeland, in unfamiliar terrain and unusual climatic conditions, often being outnumbered by their opponents. However, they attacked and won, confident in their invincibility...

Throughout the victorious path, the Mongol warriors were opposed by troops from different countries and peoples, among whom were warlike nomadic tribes and peoples who had extensive combat experience and well-armed armies. However, the indestructible Mongol whirlwind scattered them across the northern and western outskirts of the Great Steppe, forced them to submit and stand under the banners of Genghis Khan and his descendants.

The armies of the largest states of the Middle and Far East, which had multiple numerical superiority and the most advanced weapons for their time, the states of Western Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, could not resist either. Japan was saved from the Mongolian sword by the Kamikaze typhoon - the “divine wind” that scattered Mongolian ships on the approaches to the Japanese islands.

The Mongol hordes stopped only at the borders of the Holy Roman Empire - either due to fatigue and increased resistance, or due to the intensification of the internal struggle for the throne of the Great Khan. Or maybe they mistook the Adriatic Sea for the limit that Genghis Khan bequeathed to them to reach...

Very soon the glory of the victorious Mongol weapons began to outstrip the boundaries of the lands they had reached, remaining long in the memory of many generations. different nations Eurasia.

Fire and strike tactics

Initially, the Mongol conquerors were considered people from hell, an instrument of God's providence to punish irrational humanity. The first judgments of Europeans about Mongol warriors, based on rumors, were not complete and reliable. According to the description of contemporary M. Paris, the Mongols “dress in bull skins, are armed with iron plates, are short, portly, hefty, strong, invincible, with<…>backs and chests covered with armor.” The Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II claimed that the Mongols knew no other clothing than ox, donkey and horse skins, and that they had no other weapons than crude, poorly made iron plates (Carruthers, 1914). However, at the same time, he noted that the Mongols are “combat-ready shooters” and could become even more dangerous after rearming with “European weapons.”

More accurate information about weapons and the art of war Mongol warriors contained in the works of D. Del Plano Carpini and G. Rubruk, who were envoys of the Pope and the French king to the court of the Mongol khans in the middle of the 13th century. The attention of Europeans was drawn to weapons and protective armor, as well as military organization and tactics of warfare. There is also some information about the military affairs of the Mongols in the book of the Venetian merchant M. Polo, who served as an official at the court of the Yuan Emperor.

Most complete event military history The time of the formation of the Mongol Empire is covered in the Mongolian “Secret Legend” and the Chinese chronicle of the Yuan dynasty “Yuan shi”. In addition, there are Arabic, Persian and Old Russian written sources.

According to the outstanding orientalist Yu. N. Roerich, the Mongol warriors were well-armed horsemen with a varied set of weapons of distance, close combat and means of defense, and the Mongol equestrian tactics were characterized by a combination of fire and strike. He believed that much of the military art of the Mongol cavalry was so advanced and effective that it continued to be used by generals until the beginning of the 20th century. (Khudyakov, 1985).

Judging by archaeological finds, the main weapon of the Mongols in the XIII-XIV centuries. there were bows and arrows

IN last decades archaeologists and weapons specialists began to actively study finds from Mongolian monuments in Mongolia and Transbaikalia, as well as images of warriors in medieval Persian, Chinese and Japanese miniatures. At the same time, researchers encountered some contradiction: in descriptions and miniatures, Mongol warriors were depicted as well-armed and equipped with armor, while during excavations of archaeological sites it was possible to discover mainly only the remains of bows and arrowheads. Other types of weapons were very rare.

Weapon history specialists Ancient Rus', who found Mongol arrows at the devastated settlements, believed that the Mongol army consisted of lightly armed horse archers, who were strong with the “massive use of bows and arrows” (Kirpichnikov, 1971). According to another opinion, the Mongol army consisted of armored warriors who wore practically “impenetrable” armor made of iron plates or multi-layer glued leather (Gorelik, 1983).

Arrows are raining down...

In the steppes of Eurasia, and primarily on the “indigenous lands” of the Mongols in Mongolia and Transbaikalia, many weapons were found that were used by the soldiers of the invincible army of Genghis Khan and his commanders. Judging by these finds, the main weapon of the Mongols in the XIII-XIV centuries. there really were bows and arrows.

Mongolian arrows had a high flight speed, although they were used for shooting at relatively short distances. In combination with rapid-fire bows, they made it possible to conduct massive shooting in order to prevent the enemy from approaching and engaging in hand-to-hand combat. For such shooting, so many arrows were required that there were not enough iron tips, so the Mongols in the Baikal region and Transbaikalia also used bone tips.

The Mongols learned the ability to shoot accurately from any position while riding on horseback. early childhood- from the age of two

According to Plano Carpini, Mongol horsemen always started the battle from arrow range: they "wound and kill horses with arrows, and when men and horses are weakened, then they engage in battle." As Marco Polo observed, the Mongols “shoot back and forth even when driven. They shoot accurately, hitting both enemy horses and people. Often the enemy is defeated because his horses are killed.”

He described it most vividly Mongol tactics Hungarian monk Julian: when “in a clash in war, their arrows, as they say, do not fly, but seem to rain down.” Therefore, as contemporaries believed, it was very dangerous to start a battle with the Mongols, because even in small skirmishes with them there were as many killed and wounded as other peoples in large battles. This is a consequence of their dexterity in archery, since their arrows pierce almost all types protective equipment and shells. In battles, in case of failure, they retreat in an orderly manner; however, it is very dangerous to pursue them, since they turn back and know how to shoot while fleeing and injure soldiers and horses.

Mongol warriors could hit a target at a distance in addition to arrows and darts - throwing spears. In close combat, they attacked the enemy with spears and palms - tips with a single-edged blade attached to a long shaft. The latter weapon was common among soldiers who served on the northern periphery of the Mongol Empire, in the Baikal region and Transbaikalia.

In hand-to-hand combat, Mongol horsemen fought with swords, broadswords, sabers, battle axes, maces and daggers with one or two blades.

On the other hand, details of defensive weapons are very rare in Mongolian monuments. This may be due to the fact that many shells were made of multi-layered hard leather. However, in Mongol times, metal armor appeared in armored warriors' arsenal.

In medieval miniatures, Mongol warriors are depicted in armor of lamellar (from narrow vertical plates) and laminar (from wide transverse stripes) structures, helmets and with shields. Probably, in the process of conquering agricultural countries, the Mongols mastered other types of defensive weapons.

Heavily armed warriors also protected their war horses. Plano Carpini gave a description of such protective clothing, which included a metal forehead and leather parts that served to cover the neck, chest, sides and croup of the horse.

As the empire expanded, the Mongol authorities began to organize large-scale production of weapons and equipment in state workshops, which was carried out by craftsmen from the conquered peoples. The Chinggisid armies widely used weapons traditional to the entire nomadic world and the countries of the Near and Middle East.

“Having participated in a hundred battles, I was always ahead”

In the Mongol army during the reign of Genghis Khan and his successors, there were two main types of troops: heavily armed and light cavalry. Their ratio in the army, as well as weapons, changed during many years of continuous wars.

The heavily armed cavalry included the most elite units of the Mongol army, including detachments of the Khan's guard, formed from Mongol tribes that had proven their loyalty to Genghis Khan. However, the majority of the army was still lightly armed horsemen; the great role of the latter is evidenced by the very nature of the military art of the Mongols, based on the tactics of massive shelling of the enemy. These warriors could also attack the enemy with lava in close combat, and pursue during retreat and flight (Nemerov, 1987).

As the Mongol state expanded, auxiliary infantry detachments and siege units were formed from subject tribes and peoples accustomed to the conditions of foot combat and fortress warfare, armed with pack and heavy siege weapons.

Achievements of sedentary peoples (primarily the Chinese) in the region military equipment The Mongols used them for siege and storming of fortresses for other purposes, and for the first time used stone-throwing machines for field combat. The Chinese, Jurchens, and natives of Muslim countries of the Middle East were widely recruited into the Mongolian army as “artillerymen.”

For the first time in history, the Mongols used stone-throwing machines for field combat.

A quartermaster service was also created in the Mongol army, special units, ensuring the passage of troops and the construction of roads. Particular attention was paid to reconnaissance and disinformation of the enemy.

The structure of the Mongol army was traditional for the nomads of Central Asia. According to the “Asian decimal system” of dividing troops and people, the army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tumens (ten-thousand-strong units), as well as into wings and a center. Each combat-ready man was assigned to a specific detachment and was obliged to report to the gathering place at the first notice in full equipment, with a supply of food for several days.

At the head of the entire army was the Khan, who was the head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces of the Mongol Empire. However, many important matters, including plans for future wars, were discussed and outlined at the kurultai - a meeting of military leaders chaired by the khan. In the event of the death of the latter, a new khan was elected and proclaimed at the kurultai from members of the ruling “Golden Family” of the Borjigins, descendants of Genghis Khan.

The thoughtful selection of command personnel played an important role in the military successes of the Mongols. Although the highest positions in the empire were occupied by the sons of Genghis Khan, the most capable and experienced commanders were appointed commanders of the troops. Some of them in the past fought on the side of Genghis Khan's opponents, but then went over to the side of the founder of the empire, believing in his invincibility. Among the military leaders there were representatives of different tribes, not only Mongols, and they came not only from the nobility, but also from ordinary nomads.

Genghis Khan himself often stated: “I treat my warriors as brothers. Having participated in a hundred battles, I was always ahead.” However, in the memory of his contemporaries, the most severe punishments to which he and his commanders subjected their soldiers to maintain harsh military discipline were preserved much more. The soldiers of each unit were bound by mutual responsibility, answering with their lives for the cowardice and flight from the battlefield of their colleagues. These measures were not new to the nomadic world, but during the time of Genghis Khan they were observed with particular rigor.

They killed everyone without any mercy

Before starting military operations against a particular country, Mongol military leaders tried to learn as much as possible about it in order to identify the weaknesses and internal contradictions of the state and use them to their advantage. This information was collected by diplomats, traders or spies. Such focused preparation contributed to the eventual success of the military campaign.

Military operations, as a rule, began in several directions at once - in a “round-up”, which did not allow the enemy to come to his senses and organize a unified defense. The Mongolian cavalry armies penetrated far into the interior of the country, destroying everything in their path, disrupting communications, routes for the approach of troops and the supply of equipment. The enemy suffered heavy losses even before the army entered the decisive battle.

Most of the Mongol army was lightly armed cavalry, indispensable for massive shelling of the enemy

Genghis Khan convinced his commanders that during the offensive they could not stop to seize booty, arguing that after victory “the booty will not leave us.” Thanks to its high mobility, the vanguard of the Mongol army had a great advantage over the enemies. Following the vanguard, the main forces moved, destroying and suppressing all resistance, leaving only “smoke and ashes” in the rear of the Mongol army. Neither mountains nor rivers could hold them back - they learned to easily cross water obstacles, using waterskins inflated with air to cross.

The basis of the offensive strategy of the Mongols was the destruction of enemy personnel. Before the start of a big battle, they gathered their troops into a powerful single fist to attack with as many forces as possible. The main tactical technique was to attack the enemy in loose formation and massacre him in order to inflict as much damage as possible without large losses of his soldiers. Moreover, the Mongol commanders tried to throw detachments formed from subject tribes first into the attack.

The Mongols sought to decide the outcome of the battle precisely at the shelling stage. It did not escape the observers that they were reluctant to engage in close combat, since in this case losses among the Mongol warriors were inevitable. If the enemy stood firm, they tried to provoke him into an attack by feigning flight. If the enemy retreated, the Mongols intensified their attack and sought to destroy as many enemy soldiers as possible. The horse battle was completed by a ramming attack by armored cavalry, which swept away everything in its path. The enemy was pursued until complete defeat and destruction.

The Mongols waged wars with great ferocity. Those who resisted most steadfastly were especially brutally exterminated. They killed everyone, indiscriminately, old and small, beautiful and ugly, poor and rich, resisting and submissive, without any mercy. These measures were aimed at instilling fear in the population of the conquered country and suppressing their will to resist.

The offensive strategy of the Mongols was based on the complete destruction of enemy personnel.

Many contemporaries who experienced the military power of the Mongols, and after them some historians of our time, see precisely this unparalleled cruelty as the main reason for the military successes of the Mongol troops. However, such measures were not the invention of Genghis Khan and his commanders - acts of mass terror were characteristic of the conduct of wars by many nomadic peoples. Only the scale of these wars was different, so the atrocities committed by Genghis Khan and his successors remained in the history and memory of many peoples.

It can be concluded that the basis for the military successes of the Mongolian troops were the high combat effectiveness and professionalism of the soldiers, the enormous combat experience and talent of the commanders, the iron will and confidence in victory of Genghis Khan himself and his successors, the strict centralization of the military organization and a fairly high level of weapons for that time. and equipping the army. Without mastering any new types of weapons or tactical techniques of mounted combat, the Mongols were able to perfect the traditional military art of the nomads and use it with maximum efficiency.

War strategy in initial period The creation of the Mongol Empire was also common for all nomadic states. As his primary task - quite traditional for the foreign policy of any nomadic state in Central Asia - Genghis Khan proclaimed the unification under his rule of “all peoples living behind felt walls,” that is, nomads. However, then Genghis Khan began to put forward more and more new tasks, striving to conquer the whole world within the limits known to him.

And this goal was largely achieved. The Mongol Empire was able to subjugate all the nomadic tribes of the steppe belt of Eurasia and conquer many sedentary agricultural states far beyond the borders of the nomadic world, which no nomadic people could do. However, the human and organizational resources of the empire were not unlimited. The Mongol Empire could exist only as long as its troops continued to fight and win victories on all fronts. But as more and more lands were captured, the offensive impulse of the Mongol troops gradually began to fizzle out. Having encountered stubborn resistance in Eastern and Central Europe, the Middle East and Japan, the Mongol khans were forced to abandon their ambitious plans for world domination.

The Genghisids, who ruled individual uluses of a once united empire, eventually became involved in internecine wars and tore it apart into separate pieces, and then completely lost their military and political power. The idea of ​​world domination of Genghis Khan remained an unfulfilled dream.

Literature

1. Plano Carpini D. History of the Mongols; Rubruk G. Travel to Eastern countries; Book of Marco Polo. M., 1997.

2. Khara-Davan E. Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy. Elista, 1991.

3. Khudyakov Yu. S. Yu. N. Roerich on the art of war and the conquests of the Mongols // Roerich readings of 1984. Novosibirsk, 1985.

4. Khudyakov Yu. S. Armament of Central Asian nomads in the era of the early and developed Middle Ages. Novosibirsk, 1991.

The nomadic horsemen of Mongolia, through successive conquests beginning in the twelfth century and continuing over several generations, created the world's largest land empire. During these conquests, the Mongols fought most of the world powers of medieval Asia and Europe and were victorious in most cases. Their empire was built entirely on military victories achieved by an army unlike any other in the world. Most opponents considered them invincible. Their advance on Europe was stopped only by the death of the ruling dynasty. Potential contenders for the throne went home with their troops and never returned.

Mongol army

The Mongols were nomadic shepherds and hunters who spent their lives riding on steppe horses. From early childhood they learned to ride in the saddle and use weapons, especially compound bows. Every healthy man under 60 years of age was required to take part in hunting and war. The armies of the united Mongol tribes consisted of the entire adult male population.

They fought under a strict code of discipline. All production was collective. Leaving a comrade in battle was punishable by death. This discipline, along with skillful leadership, well-organized intelligence gathering and organization, transformed the Mongol troops from a mass of horsemen into a real army.

The Mongol army was organized according to the decimal system, with units of ten, one hundred, one thousand and ten thousand men. The number of men in the units probably rarely approached the actual numbers due to casualties and attrition. A unit of ten thousand men was a major fighting unit, like a modern division, capable of supporting a fight on its own. Individual soldiers were identified primarily with the thousand-man unit of which they were part, the equivalent of a modern regiment. The true Mongol tribes fielded their own Thousands. The vanquished, such as the Tatars and Merkits, were divided and distributed among other units so that they could not pose an organized threat to the ruling dynasty.

Genghis Khan created a personal guard unit of ten thousand people. This unit was recruited throughout the tribe, and it was a high honor to be included in it. At the beginning of its existence, it was a form of holding noble hostages. Then it turned into household members and a source ruling class growing empire.

At first, Mongol soldiers received no pay other than spoils of war. Promotions were based on merit. When the rate of conquest slowed, it was introduced new system payment. Later, officers were given the opportunity to transfer their posts by inheritance.

Each soldier went on a campaign with approximately five horses, which allowed for their rapid replacement and rapid advancement. Until the advent of mechanized armies in the twentieth century, no army had moved as fast as the Mongol army.

The Mongols fought primarily as light cavalry archers (without armor), using compound bows. It was a compact weapon with impressive range and penetration. They hired Chinese and Middle Easterners as siege engineers. Infantry, garrison troops and heavy cavalry (in armor) with spears came from the armies of conquered peoples.

Mongol tactics

The Mongol armies relied on small arms, the ability to move quickly, and a reputation for ruthlessness that preceded them. All of their opponents moved much slower and more deliberately. The Mongols sought to divide the enemy forces and crush their units with massive archery. They sought to encircle the enemy and achieve local superiority in numbers. They injured the horses, and the horses threw off their riders, making them more vulnerable.

The Mongol light cavalry could not withstand the rapid advance of the heavy cavalry, so they feigned flight, drawing the knights into grueling charges that left them vulnerable. The fleeing Mongols quickly turned back and turned into pursuers. They excelled in ambushes and surprise attacks. Mongol commanders made extensive use of scouts and synchronized troop movements to catch the enemy at a disadvantage.

The Mongols also made extensive use of intimidation tactics. If the population of one city was killed after being taken, it became very likely that the next city would surrender without a fight. This is proven by the fact that when the Mongol armies approached, the cities surrendered one after another.

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